05000315/LER-2016-002, Regarding Rod Position Indication Inoperable Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications

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Regarding Rod Position Indication Inoperable Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications
ML16256A785
Person / Time
Site: Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 09/09/2016
From: Lies Q
Indiana Michigan Power Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
AEP-NRC-2016-74 LER 2016-002-00
Download: ML16256A785 (6)


LER-2016-002, Regarding Rod Position Indication Inoperable Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications
Event date:
Report date:
LER closed by
IR 05000315/2017001 (1 May 2017)
3152016002R00 - NRC Website

text

INOIANA MICHIGAN POWER A unit of American Electric Power September 9, 2016 Docket No.: 50-315 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 315/2016-002-00 Indiana Michigan Power Cook Nuclear Plant One Cook Place Bridgman, Ml 49106 lndianaMichiganPower.com AEP-NRC-2016-74 10 CFR 50.73 Rod Position Indication Inoperable Longer Than Allowed by Technical Specifications In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report (LER) System, Indiana Michigan Power Company, the licensee for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1, is submitting as an enclosure to this letter the following report:

LER 315/2016-002-00: Rod Position Indication Inoperable Longer Than Allowed by Technical Specifications There are no commitments contained in this submittal.

Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. Michael K. Scarpello, Regulatory Affairs Manager; at (269) 466-2649.

Sincerely, 2~15.i a. sCues Site Vice President MPH/mll

Enclosure:

LER 315/2016-002-00: Rod Position Indication Inoperable Longer Than Allowed by Technical Specifications

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 c:

R. J. Ancona - MPSC A W. Dietrich - NRG Washington, DC MDEQ - RMD/RPS NRG Resident Inspector C. D. Pederson - NRG Region Ill A J. Williamson - AEP Ft. Wayne AEP-NRC-2016-74

Enclosure to AEP-NRC-2016-74 LER 315/2016-002-00:

Rod Position Indication Inoperable Longer Than Allowed by Technical Specifications

NRC FORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 1013112018 (11-2015)

, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not reouired to resoond to, the information collection.

2. DOCKET 05000315 YEAR 2016
3. LER NUMBER SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 002 REV NO.

00 1-RPIS-K14-SC (K14 CONTROL ROD POSITION ROD BOTTOM BISTABLE AND SIGNAL CONDITIONER)

ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

NUCLEAR SAFETY There was no actual or potential nuclear safety hazard resulting from the inoperable K14 NARPI module. All control rods bottom lights were still functional and all control rods remained trippable.

INDUSTRIAL SAFETY There was no actual or potential industrial safety hazard resulting from the inoperable K14 NARPI module.

RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY There was no actual or potential radiological safety hazard resulting from the inoperable K14 NARPI module.

PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT (PRA)

PRA models the plant response to accident scenarios that have the potential to end in either core damage or a large early release of radiation to the environment. Control rod position indicators like K14 NARPI are not used to mitigate these scenarios; therefore its inoperability did not increase the potential consequences of modeled accident scenarios. The rod bottom lights were still functional, meaning that the control room was still able to confirm reactor trip with K14 NARPI inoperable. Additionally, since the inoperability did not result in a plant trip, it did not increase the likelihood of occurrence of a modeled accident scenario.

For these reasons, it is determined that the inoperability of K14 NARPI was not significant from a risk perspective.

CAUSE

Component failure of the Unit 1 Rod K14 NARPI signal conditioner. The component failure was not the result of human performance errors during the TC set adjustment.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The Unit 1 Rod K14 NARPI signal conditioner was replaced on July 15, 2016. The Control Bank 'D' surveillance was completed successfully following signal conditioner replacement.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

A review of Licensee Event Reports for the past three years found no similar events