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MONTHYEARML15328A4502015-11-19019 November 2015 License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-425-A, Rev. 3, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control - Risk Informed Technical Specification Task Force Initiative 5B Project stage: Request AEP-NRC-2016-17, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-425-A, Revision 3, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to License Control - Risk Informed Technical Specification Task Force (RITSTF) Initiative 5B2016-02-0404 February 2016 Supplement to License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-425-A, Revision 3, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to License Control - Risk Informed Technical Specification Task Force (RITSTF) Initiative 5B Project stage: Supplement ML16127A0792016-05-11011 May 2016 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control Project stage: RAI ML16154A1822016-06-0909 June 2016 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control Project stage: RAI AEP-NRC-2016-48, Unit 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-425, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies Program to Licensee-Control.2016-06-16016 June 2016 Unit 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-425, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies Program to Licensee-Control. Project stage: Response to RAI ML16211A0152016-08-0101 August 2016 Follow-Up Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control Project stage: RAI AEP-NRC-2016-69, Follow-up Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-425, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies Program to License Control-Risk Informed Technical Specification Task Force2016-09-0909 September 2016 Follow-up Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-425, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies Program to License Control-Risk Informed Technical Specification Task Force Project stage: Response to RAI 05000315/LER-2016-002, Regarding Rod Position Indication Inoperable Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications2016-09-0909 September 2016 Regarding Rod Position Indication Inoperable Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications Project stage: Request AEP-NRC-2016-88, Withdrawal of Emergency License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of Completion Time for Inoperable AC Source- Operating2016-10-13013 October 2016 Withdrawal of Emergency License Amendment Request for One-Time Extension of Completion Time for Inoperable AC Source- Operating Project stage: Withdrawal ML16308A1132016-11-16016 November 2016 Summary of October 27, 2016, Public Meeting with Indiana Michigan Power Company Regarding the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Project stage: Meeting ML17045A1502017-03-31031 March 2017 Issuance of Amendments Adopting of TSTF0425-A, Revision 3, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control - RITSTF Initiative 5B Project stage: Approval 2016-05-11
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Similar Documents at Cook |
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LER-2016-002, Regarding Rod Position Indication Inoperable Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications |
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INOIANA MICHIGAN POWER A unit of American Electric Power September 9, 2016 Docket No.: 50-315 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 315/2016-002-00 Indiana Michigan Power Cook Nuclear Plant One Cook Place Bridgman, Ml 49106 lndianaMichiganPower.com AEP-NRC-2016-74 10 CFR 50.73 Rod Position Indication Inoperable Longer Than Allowed by Technical Specifications In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report (LER) System, Indiana Michigan Power Company, the licensee for Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1, is submitting as an enclosure to this letter the following report:
LER 315/2016-002-00: Rod Position Indication Inoperable Longer Than Allowed by Technical Specifications There are no commitments contained in this submittal.
Should you have any questions, please contact Mr. Michael K. Scarpello, Regulatory Affairs Manager; at (269) 466-2649.
Sincerely, 2~15.i a. sCues Site Vice President MPH/mll
Enclosure:
LER 315/2016-002-00: Rod Position Indication Inoperable Longer Than Allowed by Technical Specifications
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 c:
R. J. Ancona - MPSC A W. Dietrich - NRG Washington, DC MDEQ - RMD/RPS NRG Resident Inspector C. D. Pederson - NRG Region Ill A J. Williamson - AEP Ft. Wayne AEP-NRC-2016-74
Enclosure to AEP-NRC-2016-74 LER 315/2016-002-00:
Rod Position Indication Inoperable Longer Than Allowed by Technical Specifications
NRC FORM366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 1013112018 (11-2015)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not reouired to resoond to, the information collection.
- 2. DOCKET 05000315 YEAR 2016
- 3. LER NUMBER SEQUENTIAL NUMBER 002 REV NO.
00 1-RPIS-K14-SC (K14 CONTROL ROD POSITION ROD BOTTOM BISTABLE AND SIGNAL CONDITIONER)
ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY CONSEQUENCES
NUCLEAR SAFETY There was no actual or potential nuclear safety hazard resulting from the inoperable K14 NARPI module. All control rods bottom lights were still functional and all control rods remained trippable.
INDUSTRIAL SAFETY There was no actual or potential industrial safety hazard resulting from the inoperable K14 NARPI module.
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY There was no actual or potential radiological safety hazard resulting from the inoperable K14 NARPI module.
PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT (PRA)
PRA models the plant response to accident scenarios that have the potential to end in either core damage or a large early release of radiation to the environment. Control rod position indicators like K14 NARPI are not used to mitigate these scenarios; therefore its inoperability did not increase the potential consequences of modeled accident scenarios. The rod bottom lights were still functional, meaning that the control room was still able to confirm reactor trip with K14 NARPI inoperable. Additionally, since the inoperability did not result in a plant trip, it did not increase the likelihood of occurrence of a modeled accident scenario.
For these reasons, it is determined that the inoperability of K14 NARPI was not significant from a risk perspective.
CAUSE
Component failure of the Unit 1 Rod K14 NARPI signal conditioner. The component failure was not the result of human performance errors during the TC set adjustment.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
The Unit 1 Rod K14 NARPI signal conditioner was replaced on July 15, 2016. The Control Bank 'D' surveillance was completed successfully following signal conditioner replacement.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
A review of Licensee Event Reports for the past three years found no similar events
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| 05000316/LER-2016-001, Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Due to Moisture Separator Heater Expansion Joint Failure | Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Due to Moisture Separator Heater Expansion Joint Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000316/LER-2016-002, Regarding Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable Due to a Manufacturing Design Issue | Regarding Emergency Diesel Generators Declared Inoperable Due to a Manufacturing Design Issue | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000315/LER-2016-002, Regarding Rod Position Indication Inoperable Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications | Regarding Rod Position Indication Inoperable Longer than Allowed by Technical Specifications | |
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