ML19242B518
| ML19242B518 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 01/16/1979 |
| From: | Dircks W, Minogue R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS), NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19242B477 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 SECY-79-038, SECY-79-38, NUDOCS 7908080650 | |
| Download: ML19242B518 (76) | |
Text
.....__ _ _ _
-p UNITED STATES Janeary 16. 1979 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION CONSENT CALEND AR ITEN.
Far:
Tne Commissioners From:
Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Standards Development William J. Dircks, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards xy' Lee V. Gossick, Executive Director for Operations j j/
Thru:
Subject:
PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF CATEGORY II AND III MATERIAL Purcose:
To obtain the Commission's approval of cevised proposed mend-ments to 10 CFR Parts 70, 73, and 150 for publication in final form.
Category:
This paper covers a major issue requiring Commission action.
Discussic:.-
Backaround On May 24, 1978, the Ccmmission issued for public comment propon-amendments to 10 CFR Parts 70, 73, and 150 to require physical r tection measures to detect thef t of special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance.
These amendments were primarily to show U.S. endorsement of physical protection pro-cedures recommended by the IAEA ir INFCIRC/225.
The amendments were to apply to the possession and use of such material at fixes sites and to transportation between sites, including import and export shipments.
Interested persons were given thirty days to s '
comment on the proposed amendments.
Enclosure "A" consists of revised preposed amendments to 10 CFR
)
Parts 70, 73, and 150 and a statement of consideration which
^
includes discussion of some of the more ionificant issues raiso-
[
s by commenters and discussions of change.
le.
A summary of th.
commento and staff responses thereto are. ;iuded as Enclosure There are four proposed substantive changes and several other a
changes of a less substantive character, such as rewording or addition of definitions.
Changes The proposed subst.ntive changes are as follows:
Contact:
R.
J. Jones, SD J43-5907
@l C. K. Nulsen, NMSS r
bn -LU 427-4043 79 08 080 b
e
.e The Commissioners 2
1.
The proposed amendments have been revised to exempt plutonium-beryllium (PuBe) sealed sources from material requiring physical protection.
Commenters stated that the cost of providing the required physical protection for PuBe sealed sources would be prohibitive from the point of view of the limited budgets available at universities, where most of the sources are now located.
Imposition of the proposed requirements, it was said, would result in the curtailment of the use of such sources at some sites with a significant impact on the sucational and research programs at such insti-tutions.
The staff agreed that the threat to the common defense and securj was sufficiently low that specific physi-cal security measures should not be required for PuBe sources.
The basis far this is the small quantities of plutonium found "uBe sources (generally from 16 to 161 crams) and the ft
.h t potential adversaries wishing to obtain a 2 kg quar. L.
of plutonium would have to commit separate acts of theft at a large number of widely separater sites without being detected.
There is an upper limit et 500 grams of plutonium to which this exemption can be ipplied because greater than a 500 gram accumulation of plutonium in this form invalidates the basis for this exemption.
IAEA guide-lines allows for such exceptions in the case of research type facilities.
2 The proposed amendments have been changed to reflect that plutonium with isotopic concentration exceeding 80 percent in plutonium-238 would be exempted from the physical protec-tion requirements.
This change corrects an oversight in the initially proposea amendments in which it was intended that such material would be exempted to be consistent with the definitions of Category II and III material in the IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1.
3.
Package and vehicle search requirements at facilities at which special nuclear material of moderate strategic signif-icance is used or stored have been changed.
As revised, random searches are required regarding items leaving con-trolled access areas, but not of those entering as previously required.
The primary objec'ive of entry searches is to detect materials which could be useful in sabotage.
Since protection against sabotage was not within the scope of the proposed amendments, an entry search requirement would not be necessary.
4.
Several commenters stated that more time would be needed than the sixty days proposed for submission of physical security plans.
The staff agrees that more time may be required, and has changed the submission date to be 120 days followin s o,_ G G, Jhe d
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a The Commissioners 3
effective date of the final amendment.
The amendments will become effective 120 days after publication in the Federal Register.
The 120 days from the date of publication of the final rule in the Federal Register will provide sufficient time for:
a.
the public and licensees to review and respond to supporting guidance to be published concurrently with
.he amendment, b.
the NRC to consider the public comments on the guidance, and c.
preparation and issuance of the guidance in final form.
Following publication ; the final guidance on or before the effective date of the imendments, licensees will have 120 days to submit their physical security plans.
This will provide those licensees who have limited managerial and financial resources sufficient time to prepare their security plans.
In a December 19, 1978 letter to Chairman Hendrie, Thomas Pickering, Assistant Secretary of State, Oceans and International Environ-mental and Scientific Affairs, expressed concern about the amount of time for full implementation following publication of this rule.
A separate paper has been submitted to the Commission prcposing a response 'o Mr. Pickering's letten The proposad response does not charle the implementation schedule recom-mended in this paper.
Other comments which resulted in changes for clarity or defini-tion are discussed in Enclosure "B" Other Comments There was one area of comment for which no specific changes were made to the proposed amendments but which is of significance.
These comments dealt generally with the technical justification of the proposed amendments.
Many of the commenters questioned the technical justification for the proposed amendments for the following reasons:
a lack of detailed informatica regarding the threat, the additional costs of implementation which were perceived to be incommensurate with only marginal improvements in physical protection, and the adverse impacts on the licensees' cngoing educational and research pro-grams.
Particular attention was focused by some commenters an the physical protection requirements for low enriched uranium.
The technical justification for the adoption of the proposed amend-ments has both a domestic and international component,.which are 520 0 v '.'
The Commissioners 4
closely interrelated.
Current NRC physical protection regula-tions apply primarily to strategic special nuclear material (uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 to 20% or greater, U-233, and plutonium) in quantities of five formula kilograms or greater.
There are no specific physical protection requirements for quanti-ties in lesser amounts.
Yet, a 4.9 formula kilogram quantity of SSNM is almost as important a quantity as 5.0 formula kilograms.
Multiple thefts of such materials in less than formula quantities could result in the accumulation of more than a formula quantity.
The proposed detection requirements are considered to provide sufficient protection with minimum added cost so as not to adversely affect educational and research programs.
Since the requirements are of a detection nature rather than prevention, characterizations of the adversary in the regulations was deemed not to be necessary.
In regard to low enriched uranium (LEU) (enrichments less than 20%), clandestine enrichment to higher levels m'.y go beyond the capability c' subnational terrorists, but it does not go beyond the capabili of other governments.
Unless properly safeguarded, LEU could be 3colen on behalf of foreign governments and enriched to explosive usable levels after it is smuggled out of the U.S.
With respect to the difference between LEU and natural uranium, the separative work necessary to reach reactor grade material, i.e. 3% U-235, is about 50% of that required to reach 93% U-235 enrichment.
(
Reference:
" Nuclear Thef t:
Risks and Safeguards,"
Willrich and Taylor, pg. 129.)
The Nuclear Non-Prcliferation Act of 1978 specifies that NRC shall promulgate regulations which assure that physical security measures are provided to special nuclear material-. exported from the United States, without specifying whether the materials are LEU or HEU.
Pursuant to this legislation, the Commission has promulgated 10 CFR Part 110.43 which provides among other things that:
"(b) Commission determinations e1 the adequacy of physical security programs in recipient countries for Category II and III quantities of material will be based on available relevant information and written assurances from the recip-ient country or group of countries that physical security measures providing as a minimum protection comparable to that set'forth in INFCIRC/225 will be maintained."
Physical protection measures similar to those proposed, which are based on the recommendations of the IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1, have alreacy been adopted by several countries.
Another area of comment dealt with employee screening.
Some of the licensees interpreted the screening requirement to call for a full field background investigation of all personnel entering the controlled access areas where the material is used or stored.
520-103 r 4
u
s The Commissioners 5
The wording of the rule has been revised to more clearly indicate that the requirement is merely one requiring a screening based on knowledge of persons permitted access rather than a formal security investigation.
The guidance to be issued with the rule explains more fully the intent of this requirement.
Sabotaae at Non power Reactors The proposed amendments, that are the subject of this paper, are limited to consideration of theft of SNM and do not include sabo-tage protection.
The NRR staff is currently examining the neces-sity to require additional physical protection measures at non-power reactors that have the potential "or exceeding Part 100 release limits as a result of sabotage.
If this proves to be necessary, NRR plans to propose a new separate section of Part 73 to deal with this issue.
Preliminary investigation indicates that these added requirements, if necessary, would be applica-ble to a very small number of non power reactors.
For that rea-son, the staff recommends that Commission approval of the proposed new Section 73.47 not be delayed pending resolution of this issue.
Guidance A regulatory guide entitled " Standard Format and Content for the Licensee Physical Security Plan for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate or Low Strategic Significance" (Enclo-sure "C") will be published for public comment at the time the rule is published.
The guidance included in this document pro-vides for a much lower level of physical security than that required for formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material.
The emphasis of this guide is on a detection and response system rather than a prevention system.
Value/Imoact The Value Impact Assessment has bee:. revised tc better reflect the impacts of the revised proposed amendments.
In addition, a new set of lower cost estimates has been provided to take into account the options available to licensees as dascribed in the guidance document which is now available in draft form.
The revised Value Impact Assessment now shows that there will be only about 61 licensees for SNM of low strategic significance, as opposed to approximately 500 licensees as reported previously, due to the exemption from physical protection requirements of PuSe sealed sources.
The number of licensees for SNM of moderate strategic significance is 37.
Total incremental industry costs for physical protection require-ments imposed by the proposed amendments, based upon the lower cost estimates provided in the revised value impact assessment, are summarized in the table below:
520 101
e*
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Caoital Costs Annual Costs Fixed Sites 5
125.154
$ 202.904 Moderate Only 69,708 184,076 Low Onl) 55,446 18,828 Transportation 5
12,574 5
1,430 Moderate Only 7,566 926 tow Only 5,008 504 AVERAGE COST / FACILITY Fixed Sites 5
1,277 2.070 Moderate 1,884 4,975 Low 910 309 Transportation 629 72 Moderate 630 77 Low 626 63 In addition to the costs stated above, some licensees will be required to pay a licensing fee to have their security plans reviewed.
Those licensees required to pay a licensing fee are identified in Table XII of Annex 2 of Enclosure D along with the estimated amount they must pay.
The total fee impact is approxi-mately $190,000 which would be collected initially--approximately
$125,000 for Category II and $65,000 for Category III.
Fees listed that are $2,000 and greater, however, are subject to manpower cost review, (e.g., when review of the plan is complete, the oxnanditures for professional manpower and support services will be determined and the resultant fee assessed, but in no event will the fee exceed that shown in the schedule,) and because of the possibility of refunds, the net effect of the fee impact may be less than $190,000.
Colleges and Universities required to file plans for research reactors and special nuclear material licenses under the rule would not be subject to fees.
NRC Resources The amendments proposed in this paper would impact NRC resources as follcws:
1.
Amendments to existing physical security plans for 50 non-power reactor licensees would need to be reviewed.
This would require an estimated 3.5 man years of effort in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
This effort would be completed by the end of FY 1980.
New plans and plan mainte-nance during the period FY 1981 through 1984 is estimated to require 3.5 man years of effort in NRR.
2.
Fuel cycle physical security plans for 8 Category II facil-ities, 7 Category III facilities, and 20 transportation secu-rity plans would need to be reviewed.
This would require an estimated 6.3 man years of effort in the Office of Nuclear 520 102
The Commissioners 7
Material Safety and Safeguards.
This effort would be completed by the end of FY 1980.
The 35 plans referred to are comple-tely new plans whereas the nonpower reactor plans, referred to in 1. above would be modifications of current plans already reviewed and approved by NRR pursuant to S 73.40.
New fuel cycle plans and plan maintenance during the period FY 1981 through FY 1984 is estimated to require a total of 3.2 man years of effort in NMSS.
3.
Inspection of these physical security requirements will be included in the currently programmed efforts for the mate-rial control and accounting inspectors and health physics inspectors to minimize the impact on IE resources.
For those fixed sites not currently covered by anj inspection program, one additional man year and $25,000 in travel funds would be requi red.
This would provide inspections of C3tegory II facilities once every 2 years and Category III facilities once every 3 years.
Three additional man years and $75,000 in travel funds would be required to inspect 20 percent of Category II shipments and 10 percent of Category III ship-ments.
One additional man year would be required to administer the program.
Recommendation:
That the Commission:
1.
Accrove the amendments set forth in Enclosure "A" for publi-cation in final form in the Federal Register.
2.
Note that upon publication of the amendments, the proposed guidance set forth in Enclosure "C" (Standard Format and Content Guide) would be published for a public comment period of 60 days.
Another 60 days will be needed to incorporate the comments into a revised gaide.
At this time (i.e., 120 days after publication in the Federal Register) the amend-ment would become effective.
The licensees would be given a period of 120 days after the amendments become effective (240 days after publication in the Federal Register) to sub-mit their plans.
Plans would have to be implemented and followed by the licensee within 30 days after approval by the Commission or 120 days after submittal of plans (360 days after publication in the Federal Register), whichever is later.
3.
Note that the appropriate Congressional Committees will be notified of this Commission action.
4.
Note that a summary of the comments on the proposed amend-ments and the responses thereto are attached as Enclosure "B" 52C 103
The Commissioners 8
5.
Note that a Report Justification Analysis contained in Enclo-sure "D" will be submitted to the Comotroller General for such review as may be appropriate under the Federal Reports Act.
6.
Note that a value/ impact assessment has been prepared as Enclosure "D" and will be placed in the Public Document Room.
7.
Note that neither an Environmental Impact Statement nor a Negative Declaration is required in accordance with 10 CFR 51.5(d)(3) because the proposed amendments are not signif-icant from the standpoint of environmental impact.
8.
Note a public announcement such as Enclosure "E" will be issued when the amendments are filed with the Office of the Federal Register.
Coordination:
The Offices of International Programs, Nuclear Reactor Regulation, State Programs, and Inspection and Enforcement concur in the recommendation of this paper.
The Office of the Executive Legal Director and OGC have no legal objection.
The Office of Public Affairs prepared the draft Public Announce-ment, Enclosure "E" Scheduling:
For affirmation at an early policy session.
4-s Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Standards Development A
William J. Dircks, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Enclosures:
See next page
[j
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The Commissioners 9
Enclosures:
"A" - Federal Register Notice "B" - Summary of Comments "C" - Standard Format and Content for the Licensee Physical Security Plan for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate or Low Strategic Significance "D" - Value/ Impact "E" - Public Announcement Commissioners' ccmments or consent should be provided directly to the Office of the Secretary by close of business Tuesday, January 30, 1979 Commission Staff Office comments, if any, should be submitted to the Commissioners NLT January 24, 1979, with an information copy to the Of# ice of the Secretary.
If the paper is of such a nature that it requires additional time for analytical review and comment, the Commissioners and the Secretariat should be apprised of when comments may be expected.
This paper is tentatively scheduled for consideration et an Open/ Closed Meeting during the Week of February 5, 1979.
Please refer to the appropriate Weekly Commission Schedule, when nublished, for a specific date and time.
DISTRIBUTION:
Commissioners Commission Staff Offices Exec. Dir. for Opers.
Regional Offices ACRS AS&LBP AS& LAP Secretariat k
bad LU
ENCLOSURE A FEDERAL REGISTER NOTICE NY0 l Oii
i ENCLOSURE A Title 10 - Energy CHAPTER I - NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PART 70 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL PART 73 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION PLANTS AND MATERIALS PART 150 - EXEMPTIONS AND CONTINUED REGULATORY AUTHORITY IN AGREEMENT STATES UNDER SECTION 274 Safeguard Requirements for Special Nuclear Material of Modcrate and Low Strategic Significance AGENCY:
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION:
Final rule.
SUMMARY
The Nuclear Regulatory Commiss.on is amending its regula-tions for physical protection of plants and materials, including nonpower reactors, to require physical protection measures to detect theft of special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance.
ihe amendments are being made in the interest of common defense and security.
The measures are designed to provide a level of protection equivalent to that recommended in Information Circular /225/Rev. 1 (INFCIRC/225) published by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The amendments specify protection
<?
} ') 0 10;7 S I'E 290 1
Enclosure "A"
requirements for special nuclear material at fixed sites, including nonpower reactors, and for special nuclear material in transit.
Physical protection requirements for independent spent fuel storage installations and nuclear power reactors are presently covered under 10 CFR S 73.40, g 73.50, and s 73.55 and therefore are not included in these amendments.
Concurrent with the publication of the amendments, the NRC is publishing a regulatory guide entitled, " Standard Format and Content for the Licensee Physical Security Plan for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate or Low Strategic Significance."
This document has been prepared as an aid to uniformity and completeness in the preparation and review of the physical security plan for special nuclear macerial of mode ate and low strategic significance.
In addition, a value/ impact assessment of these amendments has been prepared and placed in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C.
EFFECTIVE DATE:
(Insert date 120 days after publication in FR).
NOTE:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has submitted this rule to the Comptroller General for review of its reporting require-ment under the Federal Reports Act, as amended, 44 U.S.C. 3512.
The date on which the reporting requirement of the rule becomes effective, unless advised to the contrary, includes a 45-day period which that statute allows for Comptroller General review (44 U.S.C. 3512(c)(2)).
L, $y, p t '
2 Enclosure "A" C, 9 [i jfi[i
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Mr. R. J. Jones, Chief, Safeguards Standards Branch, Office of Standards Development, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555 (301) 443-5907 or Mr.
C. K. Nulsen, Requirements Analysis Branch, Division of Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555 (301) 427-4043.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
On May 24, 1978 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published in the FEDERAL REGISTER (43 FR 22216) proposed amendments to 10 CFR Parts 70, 73, and 150 of its regulations.
Interested persons were invited to submit written comments and sug-gestions on the proposed amendments within thirty days after publi-cation in the FEDERAL REGISTER.
Based on the public comments and other considerations, the Commission has adopted the proposed amend-ments, with modifications as set forth below.
Significant differences from the proposed rule published for comment on May 24, 1978 are:
(1) Plutonium-Beryllium (Pu8e) sealed sources would be exempted from the physical protection requirements; (2) Plutonium with isotopic concentration exceeding 80 percent in plutonium-238 would be exempted from the physical protection requirements; (3) package and vehicle Search requirements at facili-ties where special nuclear material of moderate strategic signifi-cance is used or stored have been changed; (%) The period of time allotted for submittal of a licensee plan to implement these requirements has been changed frcm 60 days to 120 days after the 5,5 $
109
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.h U L /' Enclosure "A"
effective date of the amendment.
In addition, editorial and clarifying changes were made and some definitions added to clarify the intent of the regulations.
The following discussion pertains to items (1) through (4) above.
(1) PuBe sealed scurces - Commenters stated that the cost of providing the required physical protection for PuBe sealed sources would be prohibitive from the point of view of the limited budgets available at universities where most of the sources are now located.
Imposition of the proposed requirements, it was said, would result in the curtailment of the use of PuBe sources at some sites with a significant impact on the educational and research programs at those institutions.
In view of the sery small quantities of plutonium found in PuBe sealed sources (generally, from 16 to 161 grams) and the fact that potential adversaries wishing to obtain a 5 kg formula quantity of plutonium would have to commit separate acts of thef t at a large number of widely separated sites without being detected, the Commission has decided that the threat to the common defense and security of this country was sufficiently low that physical security measures should not be required for PuBe sealed sources.
There is an upper limit of 500 grams of plutonium to which this exemption can be applied because greater than a 500 gram accumulation of plutonium in this form invali-dates the basis for this exemption.
IAEA guidelines allows for such exceptions in the case of research type facilities.
(2) More than 80 percent Pu-238 - The proposed rule has been amended to reflect that plutonica with isotopic concentration exceed-ing 80 percent in plutonium-238 would De exempted from the physical 4
Enclostre "A" c_1 r 907
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protection requirements.
This change corrects an oversight in the initially proposed amendments in which it was intended that such material would be exempted to be consistent with the definitions of Category II and III material in the IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1.
(3)
Search requirements - Package and vehicle search require-ments at facilities at which special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance is used or stored have been changed.
As revised, random searches are only required regarding items leaving controlled access areas, and not of those entering.
The primary objective of entry searches is to detect materials which could be useful in sabotage.
Since protection against sabotage is not within the scope of the proposed amendments, an entry search requirement is not necessary.
(4)
Submission and Implementation of Plans - Several commenters stated that more time would be needed than the sixty days allowed for submission of physical security plans, or amendments to them, following the date the proposed amendments become effective.
The Commission agrees that more time may be required, especially in the case of licensees who have limited managerial and financial resources, and has changed the submission date to be 120 days fol-lowing the effective date of the amendment.
In addition, the licensee is now required to implement the approved security plan within 240 days following the effective date of the amendment or within 30 days after the plan is approved, whichever is later.
Concurrentwit[thepublicationoftheamendments,theNRCis publishing a guide entitled " Standard Format and Content for the 5
g { E g o)ure "A" 520 1it
Licensee Physical Security Plan for the Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate or Low Strategic Significance."
The guide is being published for a sixty-day comment period and will be reissued with comments taken into consideration.
The amendments to 10 CFR Parts 70, 73 and 150 would become effective at this time (120 Jays after publication).
Licensees would therefore have 240 days after publicatinn of the amendments to submit their plans.
The plan would have to be implemented 30 days after approval by the Commission or 360 days after (date of publication in the FEDERAL REGISTER).
Another area of comment dealt with employee screening.
Some of the licensees interpreted the screening requirement to call for a full field background insestigation of all personnel entering the controlled access areas where the material is used or stored.
The wording of the rule has been revised to more clearly indicate that the requireinent is merely one requiring a screening based on knowledge of persons permitteo access ratner than a formal securi'.y investigation.
The guidance package being issued with the rule explains more fully the intent of this requirement.
There was one other area of comment for which no specific changes were made to the amendments but which is of significance.
These comments dealt generally with the technical justification for the proposed amer.cments.
Many of the commenters questioned the technical justification for the proposed amendments on t he basis of the lack of detailed WI75 Enclosurg;"d U A?;
6 J
i 1 /-
information regarding the threat; the additional costs of implementa-tion they perceived to be incommensurate with only c:tryinal improve-rnents in physical protection; and the impacts on the licensees' ongoing educational anc research programs.
Particular attention was focused b_v some commenters cn the physical protection requirements for low enriched uranium.
The technical justification for the U.S. adoption of the proposed amendments is contingent on both domestic and international factors, which are closely ir.terrelated.
Current NRC physical protection regulations apply primarily to strategic special nuclear material (uranium enriched in the isotope U-235 to 20% or greate, U-233, and plutonium) in quantities of five formula kilograms or greater.
There are no specific physical protection requirements for quantities in lesser amounts.
Yet, it can be properly argued that a 4.9 formula kilogram quantity of SNM is about as important a quantity as 5.0 formula kilograms. ' Multiple thefts of such materials in close to formula quantities could result in the accumulation of more than a formula quantity.
The proposed detection requirements are considered to provide sufficient protection with minimum added ccst so as not to affect educational and research programs.
Since the requirements are of a detection nature rather than prevention, characterization of the adversary in the regulations was deemed not to be necessary.
In regard to low enriched uranium (LEU) (enrichments less than 20%), clandestine enrichment to higher levels may go beyond the 520
!13
, Enclosure "A" 7
51a cy ~/ o 0
capability of subnational terrorists, but it does not go beyond the capability of other governments.
Unless properly safeguarded, low enriched uranium could be stolen on behalf of foreign govern.nents and enriched to explosive useable levels af ter it is smuggled out of the U.S.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 specifies that NRC shall promulgate regulations which assure that physical security measures are provided to special nuclear materials exported from the United States without specifying whether the materials are low enriched uranium or high enriched uranium.
Pursuant to this legis-lation, the Commission has promulgated 10 CFR Part 110.43 which provides among other things that:
"(b) Commission determinations on the adequacy of physical security programs in recipient countries for Category II and III quantities of material will be based on available relevant information and written assurances from the recipient country or group of countries that physical security measures providing as a minimum protection comparable to that set forth in INFCIRC/
225 will be maintained."
While the proposed amendments would provide a needed extension of domestic physical protection to special nuclear materials for which the level of physical protection required was not previously specified, the full value of such protection could not be realized until similar protection is afforded all such material among the nations utilizing such materials.
Physical protection measures similar to those proposed, which are based on the reccmmendations of 8
Enclosure "A" m.v
. ) \\,0 C. I f I
the IAEA Information Circular INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1, have already been adopted by several countries.
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and sections 552 and 553 of title 5 of the United States Code, the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 70, 73, and 150 are published as a document subject to codification.
1.
Paragraph 70.22(g) of 10 CFR Part 70 is revised to read as follows:
670.22 Contents of Applications x
x x
x x
(g)
Each application for a license that would authorize the transport or delivery to a carrier for transport of special nuclear material in an amount specified in S 73.1(b)(2) of this chapter shall include (1) a description of the plan for physical protection of special nuclear material in transit in accordance with s 73.30 through 73.36, 73.47(a) and (e), 73.47(g) for 10 ko or more of soecial nuclear material of low strateoic sianificance,* and 73.70(g) of this chapter including, as accrooriate, a plan for the selection, qualification and training cf armed escorts, or the specification and design of a specially designed truck or trailer [as-sppropriate], and (2) a licensee safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats, thefts, and Comparative text to published effective regulations.
Deletions are lined through and additions are underscored.
9 E
1 sure "A" SPNr
industrial sabotage relating to the special nuclear material in transit.
Each applicaticn for such a license shall include the first four cate-gories of information contained in the applicant's safeguards con-tingency plan.
(The first four categories of information, as set forth in Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73, are Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, and Responsibility Matrix.
The fi f tn category of information, Procedures, does not have to be submitted for approval.)
2.
Paragraph 70.22(h) of 10 CFR Part 70 is revised to read as follows:
x x
(h)
Each application for a license to possess or use at any site or contiguous sites subject to control by the licensee uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the uranium-235 isotope), uranium-233, or plutonium alone or in any combination in a quantity of 5,000 grams or more computed by the formula, grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium), other than a license for possession or use of such material in the operation of a nuclear reactor licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter, shall include a physical security plan, consisting of two parts.
Part I shall address vital equipment, vital areas, and isolation zones, and shall demonstrate how the applicant plans to meet the requirements of
[Part-73-] sg 73.40, 73.50, 73.60, 73.70, and 73.71 of this chapter in the conduct of the activity to be licensed.
Part II shall 'ist tests, inspections, and other means to demonstrate compliance with such requirements.
10 Enclosure "A" 52 0 / l [
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(,)
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3.
Section 70.22 is amended to add a new paragraph (k) to read as follows:
x x
x x
x (k)[fj)]* Each application for a license to possess or use at any site or contiguous sites subject to control by the licensee special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance or 10 kg or more of special nuclear material of low strategic significance as defined under paragraphs 73.2[f:)] (x) and [(ss)] (v) of this chapter, other than a license for possession or use of such material in the operation of a nuclear power reactor licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter, shall include a physical security plan which shall demonstrate how the applicant plans to meet the requirements of paragraphs E73-47(c) snd-fd)3* 73.47(d), (e), (f) and (g), as aooro-priate, of Part 73 of this chapter.
4.
Paragraph 73.l(b) of 10 CFR Part 73 is revised to read as follows:
' j 9 73.1 Puroose and Scoce x
x x
x x
w (b)
Scope (1) This part prescribes requirements for (i) the physical pro-teu
, of production and utilization facilities licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter; (ii) the physical protection of plants in which activities licensed pursuant to Part 70 of this chapter are conducted, and (iii) the physical protection of special nuclear A
Comparative text to the regulations published for public comment.
3 Deletions are lined through and additions are underscored.
11 Enclosure "A" G
117 W 300
material by any person who, pursuant to the regulations in Part 70 of this chapter, possesses or uses at any site or contiguous sites subject to the control by the license, formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material or special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance or special nucle 7r material of low strategic significance.
(2) This part prescribes requirements for the physical pro-tection of special nuclear material in transportation by any person who is licensed pursuant to the regulations in Part 70 and Part 110 of this chapter who imports, exports, transports, delivers to a carrier for transport in a single shipment, or takes delivery of a single shipment free on board (f.o.b) where it is delivered to a carrier, formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material or special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance or special nuclear material of low strategic significance.
5.
Section 73.2 of 10 CFR Part 73 is amended by revising para-graph (b) and adding new paragraphs (fz)-fss)-and-fbb)] (x), (y), (z),
(aal and (bb) to read as follows:
g 73.2 Definitions x
x x
x x
(b)
" Authorized individual" means any individual, including an employae, a student, a consultant, or an agent of a licensee who has designated in writing by a licensee to have responsibility for surveillance of or control over special nuclear material or to have 6
12 Encidsure "A" 110 5,nLU iiu
unescorted access to areas where special nuclear material is used or stored.
n x
n (x) [( )] "special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance" means:
(1) less than a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material, but more than 1000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) or more than 500 grams of uranium-233 or plutonium or in a combined quantity of more than 1000 grams when computed by the equation, grams = (g','ams contained U-235) + 2 (grams U-233 + grams plutonium), or (2) 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 percent in the U-235 isotope).
(y) [(as)]
"special nuclear material af low strategic signifi-cance" means:
(1) less than an amount of strategic special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance, as defined in g 73.2(x)(1) [73-ef ){ 3],
but more than 15 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope) or 15 grams of uranium-233 or 15 grams of plutonium or the combination of 15 grams when computed by the equation, grams = grams contained U-235 + grams plutonium +
grams U-233, or 5U 102 13 Enclosure "A"
%_ u lu71 iiG ai/
(2) less than 10,000 grams but more than 1000 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20 percent in the U-235 isotope), or (3) 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 contained in uranium enriched above natural but less than 10 percent in the U-235 isotope.
(z) " Controlled access area" means any temporarily or permanently established area which is clearly demarcated. access to which is con-trolled and which affords isolation of the material or oersons within it.
(aa) "Stratec.c =pecial nuclear material" means uranium-235 (con-tained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotooe),
uranium-233, or olutonium.
(bb) " Formula cuantity" means strategic special nuclear material in any combination in a quantity of 5,000 grams or more comouted by the formula, grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233 + grams clutonium).
6.
A new s 73.47 is added to 10 CFR Part 73 to read as follows:
s 73.47 LICENSEE FIXED SITE AND IN-TRANSIT REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF MODERATE AND LOW STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE.
(a) General Performance Objectives (1)
Each licensee who possesses, uses or transports [ strategic]
soecial nuclear material of moderate or low strategic significance shall establish and maintain a physical protection system that will achieve the following objectives:
R I
~ r, -
.U, 14 Enclosure "A" e
s b0 j
(i) Minimize the possibilities for unauthorized removal of special nuclear material consistent with the potential consequences of such actions; and (ii) Facilitate the location and recovery of missing special nuclear material.
(2) To achieve these objectives, the physical protection system shall:
(i) Detect and assess unauthorized access [and-msterisis intredaction-inte-] or [ensetherized] activities within the
[ vicinity-ef] controlled access area containing special nuclear material; (ii) Detect and assess unauthorized removal of special nuclear material; (iii) Assure proper placement and transfer of custody of special nuclear material; and (iv) Respond to indications of an unauthorized removal of special nuclear material and then notify the [cemmanicate-te] appro-priate response forces of its removal in order to facilitate its recove ry.
(b)(1) A licensee is exempt frem the requirements of this section to the extent that he possesses, uses, or transports (i) special nuclear material which is not readily separable from other radioactive material and which has a total external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding or (ii) sealed Etcrosure " A" 15
- -) }
b%
.i 52U ii
plutonium-beryllium neutron sources totaling 500 arams or less con-tained clutonium at any one site or conticuous sites or (iii) cluto-nium with an isotocic concentration exceeding 80 percent in plutonium-238.
(2) A licensee who has cuantities of special nuclear material equivalent to special nuclear material of moderate strategic signif-icance distributed over several buildinas may, for each building which contains a cuar. city of special nuclear material less than or eaual to a level of special nuclear material of low strategic sianif-icance, proter.t the material in that building under the lower classi-fication ohysical security reauirements.
(c)
Each licensee who possesses, uses, [er] transports or who celivers to a carrier for transport special nuclear matorial of moderate strategic significance o' 10 kg or more of special nuclear material of low strategic significince shall:
(1) submit by [date [66-days] _.20 days from effective date of amendment] a security plan or an amended security plan describing how the licensee will comply with all the requirements of Sections 73.47 [fc3--(d)--(e)--and-(f)] (d), (e), (f), and (a), as accro-oriate, including schedules of implementation; and (2) Within 240 days after the effective date of these amend-ments or 30 days after the plan (s) submitted oursuant to cara-graoh (c)(1) of this section is aoproved, whichever is later, imolement the aporoved secur ty olan.
i h2b
- ~
16 Enclosure "A" r rn Ib
[)
(d)
FIXED SITE REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF MODERATE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE - Each licensee who possesses, stores, or uses quantities and types of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance at fixed sites, except those who are licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to Part 50, shall:
(1)
[ stere-or-] use the [sech] material only within a controlled access area which is illuminated [safficient] sufficiently to allow detection and surveillance of unauthorized penetration or activities, (2) store [sach] the material only within a controlled access area such as a [vscit-] vault-type room or approved [6SA] security cabinet or their eouivalent which is i'luminated sufficiently to allow detection and surveillance of unauthorized oenetration or activities, (3)
[continceasiy-moniter] monitor with an instrusion alarm or other [ devices] device or procedures the controlled access [sres]
areas to detect unauthorized penetration or activities, (4) [cendcet preempleyment-screening-to-determine-the-trust-worthiness-of-empieyees-hsving-secess-te-the-materisi-] conduct screenino orior to granting an individual unescorted access to the controlled access area where the material is used or stored, in order to obtain information on whicn to base a decision to Dermit such
- access, (5) deve and maintain a controlled badging and lock system to identify and limit access to the controlled access [sres] areas to authorized individuals,
,n,
%-- 3 O[j b2IJ IdJ 17 Enclosure "A"
(6) limit access to the controlled access [ ares] greas to authorized or escorted individuals who require such access in order to perform their duties, (7) assure that all visitors to the controlled access [sres] areas are under the constant escort of an individual who has been authorized
[anescorted] access to the area, (8) establish a security organization or modify the current secu-rity organizat. ion to coasist [ consisting] of at least one watchman per shift able to assess and respond to any unauthorized penetrations or activities in the controlled access [eres] areas, (9) provide a communication capability between the security organization and appropriate response force, (10) search on a random basis vehicles and packages [ entering er] leaving the controlled access [ ares] areas, and (11) establish and maintain [centingency pisns] response procedures for dealing with threats of thefts or thefts of such
[materisi] materials.
(e)
IN-TRANSIT REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF MODERATE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE -
(1)
Each licerdee who transports, exports or delivers to a carrier for transport spec.!'l nuclear material of moderate strategic significance shal'-
(i) provide advance notification to the receiver of any planned shipments specifying the made of transport, estimated time of arrival, i L lt eor ggy 18 Enclosure "A" 5W507
}E location of the nuclear material transfer point, name of carrier and P
[fiight ncmber--if sppiicabie] transport identification,
=
(ii) receive confirmation from the receiver prior to the com-
_]
?
mencement of the planned shipment that the receiver will be ready to y
accept the shipa:ent at the planned time and location and acknowledges the specified mode of transport, c-(iii) transport the material in a tamper-indicating [iecked-er]
sealed container, [snd]
(iv) check the integrity of the containers [;-iecks] and seals prior to shipment, and (v) arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the material in accordance with the requirements of 6 73.47(e)(3) of this part unless the receiver is a licensee and has agreed in writing to arrange for the in-transit ohysical protection.
(2)
Each licensee who receives special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance shall:
(i) check the integrity of the containers [--iecks;] and seals upon receipt of the st"oment, [ana, (ii) notify
.e shipper of receipt of the material as required in b
Section 70.54 of Part 70 of this chapter, and b_'_
(iii) arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the e
material in accordance with the r muirements of 5 73.47(e)(3) of this y
part unless the sn1 w er is a licensea and has acreed in writing tu F-arrange for the in-traisit chysical protection.
j
\\L' 3,: \\,
J r W 508 E
19 Enclosure "A" E-c
(3)
Each licensee, either shioper or remeiver, who arranges for the physical protection of special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance while in transit or who takes delivery of such material free on board (f.o.b.) the point at which it is delivered to a carrier for transport shall:
(i) arrange for a telephone or radio communications capability, for notification of any delays in the scheduled shipment, between the carrier and the shipper or receiver, (ii) minimize the time that the material is in transit by reducing the number and duration of nuclear material transfers and by routing the material in the most safe and direct manner, (iii)
[ conduct preempieyment-screening--ef-sif-sitensee-emrreyees involved-in-the-transportatien of-the-materiai-to-determine he-trest-worthiness-ef-the-individeaf-entrusted with-transportatier-deties-]
conduct screening of all licensee emoloyees involved in the transoor-tation of the material in order to obtain information on whi-' to base a decision to cermit them control over the material, (iv) establish and maintain [ contingency pisns] response oracedures for dealing with threats of thefts or thefts of such
- material, (v) make arrangements to be notified immediately of the arrival of the shipment at its destinatior, or of any such shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated time of arrival at its destination, and e
, n}&
L, q p
h(
20 Enclosure "A" r or
- / a.
i '"
3LU
(vi) conduct immediately a trace investigation of any shipment that is lost or unaccounted for afcer the estimated time and report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as specified in 6 73.71 and to the shipper or receiver as appropriate.
The licensee who made the physical protection arrangements shall also immediately notify the Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appendix A of the action being taken to trace the shipment.
(4)
Each licensee who exports special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance shall comply with the requirements specified in f 73.47(c) [and]. (e)(1) and (e)(3). [cp-to-the-first p oi nt-whe re-th e-s hi pme nt-i s-e f fi e sde d-e a ts i d e-the-U ni t e d-S ta te s - ]
(5)
Each licensee who imports special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance shall, (i) comply with the requirements specified in G 73.47(c) [cnd]2 (e)(2) and (e)(3) [frem-the-first point-wnere-the-shipment-ispicked cp inside-the-United-States], and (ii) notify the exporter who delivered the material to a carrier for transport of the arrival of such material.
(f)
FIXED SITE REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF LOW STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE - Each licensee who possesses or uses special nuclear material of low strategic significance at fixed sites, except those who are licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor pursuant to Part 50, shall:
(1) store or use the material only within a controlled access area, z v(1t o
t; 10 ss 21 Enclosure "A" E90 127
(2)
[centinceas4y-moniter] monitor with an intrusion alarm or other [ devices] device or procedures the controlled access [ ares] areas to detect unauthorized penetrations vi activities, (3) assure that a [gestd-] watchman or offsite response force will respond to all unauthorized penetrations or activities, and (4) establish and maintain [ contingency pisns] resoonse orocedures for dealing with threats of thefts or thefts of such material.
(g)
IN-TRANSIT REQUIREMENTS FOR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF LOW STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE -
(1)
Each licensee who transports or who delivers to a carrier for transport special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall:
(i) provide advance notification to the receiver of any planned shipments specifying the mode of transport, estimated time of arrival, location of the nuclear material transfer point, name of carrier and
[ffight nember--if-sppiicabic] transoort identification, (ii) receive confirmation from the receiver prior to commencement of the planned shipment that the receiver will be ready
- .o accept the shipment at the planned time and location and acknowledges the specified mode of transport, (iii) transport the material in a [4ecked cr] tamoer indicating sealed
[centsiners] container, [sna]
(iv) check the integrity of the containers [--iecks] and seals prior to shipment, and (v) Arrange for the in-transit physical orotection of the material in accordance with the recuirements of i 73.47(g)(3) of this cart, b[ b
)bb 22 Enclosure "A" SC3F
unless the receiver is a licensee and has agreed in writing to arrange for the in-transit physical protection.
(2)
Each licensee who receives quantities and types of special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall:
(i) check the integrity of the containers [--Tocks] and seals upon receipt of the shipment, [ar.d]
(ii) notify the shipper of receipt of the material as required in s 70.5A of Part 70 of this chapter, and (iii) arrange for the in-transit physical protection of the material in acccrdance with the requirements of 9 73.47(g)(3) of this part, unless the shipper is a licensee and has agreed in writing to arrange for the in-transit physical protection.
(3)
Each licensee, either shipper or receiver, who arranges for the physical protection of special nuclear oaterial of low stragegic significance while in transit or who takes delivery of such material free on board (f.o.b.) the point at which it is delivered to a carrier for transport shall:
(i) establish and maintain [ contingency pisns] response croce-dures for dealing with threats of thefts or thefts of such material, (ii) make arrangements to be notified immediately of the arrival of the shipment at its destination, or of any such shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated time of arrival at its destination, and g
23 Enclosure "A" 52C 129
(iii) conduct immediately a trace investigation of any shipment that is lost or unaccounted for after the estimated arrival time and report to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as specified in s 73.71 and to the shipper or receiver as appropriate.
The licensee who made the physical protection arrangements shall also immediately notify the Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appendix A of the action being taken to trace the shipment.
(4)
Each licensee who exports special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall comply with the appropriate requirements specified in s 73.47(c) [and]1 (g)(1) and (g)(3). [ap-to-the-first point where-the-shipment-is-offlesded-eatside-the-United-States-]
(5)
Each licensee who imports special nuclear material of low strategic significance shall:
(i) comply with the requirements specified in S 73.47(c) [anc]2 (g)(2) and (g)(3) [frem-the-first point where-the-shipment-is picked up-inside-the-United-States], and (ii) notify the person who delivered the material to a carrier for transport of the arrival of such material.
7.
Section 73.71(a) of 10 CFR Part 73 is revised to read as follows:
6 73.71 Raports cf unaccounted for shipments, suspected thef t, unlawful diversion, or industrial sabotage (a)
Each licers9e who conducts a trace investigation of a lost or unaccounted for shipment pursuant to s 73.36(f), g 73.47(e)(3)(vi),
or s 73.47(g)(3)(iii) shall immediately report to the appropriate NRC Enei os bre "?'" h' 6'I I 5 24 c.jr
., t.
..s
Regional Office listed in Appendix A the details and results of his trace investigation and shall file within a period of fif teen (15) days a written report to the appropriate NRC Regional Of fice setting forth the details and results of the trace investigation.
A copy of such written report shall be sent to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555.
x x
x x
8.
Section 73.72 of 10 CFR Part 73 is revised to read as follows:
s 73.72 Requirement for advance notice of shipment of special nuclear material Each licensee who plans to import, export, transport, deliver to a carrier for transport in a single shipment, or take delivery at the point where it is delivered to a carrier, [qesntities-of]* formula cuantities of strategic special nuclear material [as specified 5-73-1(b)(2)] or special nuclear material of moderate strategic sionifi-cance shall notify the Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory Commission Insoection and Enforcement Regional Office listed in Appen-dix A by U.S. Mail, postmarked at least 7 days in advance of the shipping date.
The following information shall be furnished in the advance notice:
shipper, receiver, carrier (s), estimated date and time of departure and arrival, transfer point (s), and mode (s) of shipment.
The Director of the appropriate Nuclear Regulatory xComparative text to published effective regulations.
Deletions are lined through and additions are underscored.
25
~ gg--
E6 closure "A" C 7 f.
I s 'l JcU 1J
Commission Inspection and Enforcement Regional Office shall also be notified by telephone 7 days in advance of the shipping date that an advance shipping notice has been sent by mail, and of any changes to the shipment itinerary prior to the shipment date.
Road shipments or transfers with one-way transit times of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or less in duration between installations of a licensee are exempt from the requirements of this section.
9.
10 CFR Part 150 is amended to add a new Section 150.14 to read as follows:
s 150.14 Commission Regulatory Authority for Physical Protection Persons in Agreement States possessing, using or transporting special nuclear material of lcw strategic significance in quantities greater than 15 grams of plutonium or uranium-233 or uranium-235 (enriched to 20% or more in the U-235 isotope) or any combination greater than 15 grams when computed by the equation grams = grams uranium-235 + grams plutonium + grams uranium-233 shall meet the physical protection requirements of s 73.47 of 10 CFR Part 73.
EFFECTIVE DATE:
(120 days after publication in FR)
(Sec. 53, 161i, Pub. Law 83-703, 63 Stat 948, Pub. Law 93-377, 88 Stat 475; Sec. 201, Pub. Law 93-438, 88 Stat 1242-1243, Pub. Law 94-79, 89 Stat 413 (42 U.S.C 2073, 2201, 5841).)
Dated at Washington, D.C. this day of
, 1978.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of L:ie Commission i
I:
26 Enclosure "A"
EllCLOSUPc au SU:"AA. Y OF CCPME:;TS q
)
j o
i a
5
-c _, u '"
p-
ENCLOSURE "B" PUBLIC COMMENT
SUMMARY
AND STAFF RESPONSES 1.0 Introduction Comments were received from thirty eight persons and organizations.
These comments were categorized and analyzed for response by category.
The following discussions provide a summary of the ccaments in each category and the staff response.
Many of the cccments were of a general nature and were categorized under the heading of Generic Issues while the remainder have been categorized according to the applicable portion of the proposed amendments.
After each Comment Summary is listed in coded form those commenters who had similar questions or comments.
Aopendix A lists the commenters, tneir identificaticn ccde, and the date their comments were received.
Also, the ccnmenters indi-vidual letters have been coded and cross-referenced and will be made available in the Public Document Rccm.
2.0 Generic Issues 2.1 Threat and Technical Justification 2.1.1 Ccmment Summary:
Commenters raised a number of arguments relating to the reasonableness of the threat and technical justifica-tion statements made cy the staff in the Supolementary Informatico.
These views have been summarized as follcws:
520
!34 1
Enclosure "B" h
a.
Commenters viewed the threat as not being convincing, especially with regard to the possible theft of lcw enriched uranium In this case, they thought it would be more likely for an ad/ersary to seek to obtain natural uranium, which would remain unprotected.
(VPI, TAM, PSU, AIF, UMI, EXN, CPL, CMC, WEC, GEV, NFS, BWC, MIT, NUS) b.
Commenters questioned the necessity of adopting the IAEA recommendations since the INFCIRC/225 document was purely acvisory in nature and was not part of the currently prcposed US/IAEA Agreement for Application of Safeguards.
(AIF, UMI, EXN, CMC, WEC, GEV, SUN) c.
A commenter also stated that the proposed requirements were not necessary since existing requirements for reporting missing or stolen special nuclear material are adequate for detecting thefts berare an adversary could accumulate a sufficient quantity to fabri-cate a clandestine fission explosive.
(BWC)
2.1.2. Resconse
a.
In regard to low enriched uranium (LEU) (enrich-ments less than 20%), clandestine enrichment to higher lesels may go beyond the capability of subnational terrorists, but it dce: not go beyond the capability of other governments.
Unless prcperly safe-guarced. LEU could be stolen on cehalf of foreign governments anc enricned to explosive useable levels after it is smuggled out of the U.S.
With respect to tne difference between LEU and natural uranium, the secaration work necessary to reach reactor grade material, '
e.,
3% U-235, is about SC% of that required to reach 93% U-235 enricrment.
[
Reference:
'"4uclear Thef t:
Risks and Safeguards," Wiliricn and Taylor, pg. 129.]
520 135 2
Enclosure "B"
-4 n
._._L
( >
b.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 implies that there should be dcmestic safeguards for this material.
The Act specifies that NkC shall promulgate regulations which assure that pnysical secu-rity measures are provided to special nuclear materials exported frca the United States, without specifying whether the materials are LEU or HEU.
The basis for such regulations is the strategic importance of those materials in the interest of national security.
It cannot be assumed that these materials which now require protection when exported are less vulnerable to theft when used domestically.
If the Congress deemed it necessary in the interests of ccmmon defense and security to protect such materials abroad, then domestic protection is equally necessary.
c.
The proposed amendments require a theft detection and deterrence capability which should complement the reporting requirements presently in effect.
The existing reporting requirements as stated in 10 CFR Part 73.71(b) recuire that licensees, " report to NRC any incicent in which an attempt has been made, or is believed to have been made, to commit a thef t or unlawful diversica of special nuclear material,"
The proposed amencments provide a basis for early detection of such incidents in addition to a theft deterrent capatility.
Furtnermore, while the proposed amencments affect special nuclear material in quantities as small as 15 g, inventory control requirements in 10 CFR Part 70.51(e) acply only to the possession of material in excess of one formula kilogrsm, and inventories are recuired to be taken no more frequently than every two months (six months for uranium, twu months g)-
7jC
- D J
Enclosure "3" 3
.f
'30 O\\u Sc0
for plutonium).
Thus, no redur.dancy exists between tne pecocsed amenc-ments and 10 CFR Part 73.71.
2.2 Value/Imcact of Procosed Amendments 2.2.1 Comment Summary:
Commenters stated that the costs of imple-mentation of the proposed amendments were excessive ccmpared to the relatively small increases in protection which would be effected by them.
Some ccmmenters said that they as licensees woJid have to close their doors to students and researchers if the proposed amendments were to be approved since their university budgets could not be extended to meet the high costs of implementation.
Specifically, or.e of the commenters stated that the requirements effectively ruled out the use of some forms of transportation by being over restrictive.
(VPI, NBS, VIL, UMO, UVA, BYU, PSU, TAM, AIF, UAZ, NFS, UKA, CIA, HAR)
2.2.2 Resoonse
A Value/ Impact Analysis has been prepared and placed in the Public Document Room.
This analysis contemplates imcacts :n educational and nuclear research institutions wnica are less severe then those suggested by ccamenters.
Examinaticn of the detailed ::mments revealed that much of the concern regarding tne cost cf imolementation was based upon misinterpretation and lack of informatien regarding the intent of the pr: cosec rules snd the way in unich tney are to be implemented.
This confusion arises from two scurces.
First, the proposed amendments were written in a someohat generai manner of language in orcer to ailcw the licensees as much flexibility as cossible while still meeting the level of 3-:tection intancec.
T,is J ;1 0
, s a
Enclosure "2" jnp t <
}-
was done to allow each licensee to utilize best the rescurces at his disposal to keep dcwn capital and ocerating costs.
Secondly, the proposed requirements were written in general terms with the intention that their meaning woulo be made clear by the guidance document whicn is to accompany the proposed amendments.
Thus, much misinterpretation should be corrected with the cublication of the final version of the proposed a;endments.
In addition, several changes have been made in the proposed rule which will clarify the intent of the rule.
With regard to the portion of the amendments addressing material in transit, it was not intended that these amendments would imcose such constraints that exclusive means of transport would be required.
The guidance document will make this clear and demonstrate how the physical protection requirements can be satisfied without resorting to exclusive-use vehicles.
2.3 Acolication to Ncn-Pcwer Reactor 5ites 2.3.1 Comment Summary:
A ccmmenter expressed concern regarding the acplication of the procosed amendments to non power reacter sites, stating that:
tne SNM is in the form of bulky fuel elements wnich make them very difficult to divert; accurata item-by-item accountaoii-ity is maintained at all times; and current approved security plans recuired of all reactors provide more than acequate protection.
(NES)
2.3.2 Rescense
Many of the non pcwer reactors presently are oper-sting under physical security plans tney have filed cursuant to 10 CFR Part 73.20 and under interim guicance issuec by NRC in 1972 Tc a Cf 3
5 Enclosure "3"
,n E '? f.'
i30 Ju u
large extent, these reactor sites a; ready have in place much of the pnysical protection whicn would be required under the prcposed amenc-ments.
The additional protection that would be necessary to bring the level of protection up to that recommended oy IAEA, which has been determined by the staff to be reasonable and proper for the categories of material being protected, would be only minimal in cost.
3.0 Soecific Issues 3.1 Statement of Considerations 3.1.1 Plutonium in Sealed Sources 3.1.1.1 Comment Summarv:
Commenters suggest that plutonium in sealed sources of the Pu-Be type would not be of suostantial assistance in manufacturir.g a nuclear weapon and thus snould be exempt from the proposed amendments.
(UVA, BYU, UCS, PSU, SUN, TAM) 3.1.1. 2 Resconse:
The staff agrees that plutonium contained ir.
sealed sources of tne Pu-Be type are fcund in sufficiently small cuantities at given sites and that such sites are sufficiently separated that it would be impractical for sn adversary to accumulate encugh plutonium thrsugh incivicual thef ts to nanuf ac-ture a nuclear weacon.
Prucent management practice snoulc ce sufficient to assure that such material is not stolen and thac possible thefts would be detected in a timely enough manner to prevent the accumulation of formula quantities o# ciutonitm.
There is, hcwever, an up;er limit of ECO g of clutonium.c vnicn this exemotion can te acplied.
(Oresently, rc cne ice see is o
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6 Enclosure
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known to be authorized to hold more than 500 grams of this form of material.) The staff believes that greater than 500 gram accumu-lations of plutonium in this form would invalicate the assumptions upon wnicn the exemption has been based.
3.1.2 Standard for Determinino Self-Protectica Radiation Level 3.1.2.1 Comment Summary:
Ccmmenters questioned the level of radiation fixed in the proposed amendments for determining which material is self prc,2cting and thus exempt frca requirements for physical protection.
One commenter suggested that the dose rate be determined in prcportion to the amount of material avail-able.
Another ccmmenter suggested lower dose rates in ths absence of technical justification for the rate given ir. the proposed amendments.
(UMO, UKA, UVA, UAZ) 3.1.2.-
cconse:
The stancard for determining the level of radiation at which special nuclear material will be ccnsidered sel# protecting differs from the level reccmmended by IAEA to a slight extent.
The standarc of 100 rems / hour at three feet di f fers from the I AEA value of 100 rads / hour at or.e meter in orcer to remain consistent with a similar NRC standard, wnicn nas been in effect for ser time.
In adcition, the NRC provides for complete exemption rather than icwering the category of protection required as in tne IAEA reccmnendations.
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Encicsure "E
The dose rate levels to qualify for the exempticn in the prcposed amendments and otner.';RC regulations are independent of the amcunt of material cecause the self protection is provided by virtue of the external radiation of the material ar.c by the fact that the material is not readily separable from other radioactive materials.
3.1.3 Plutonium with Isotcoic Concentration Exceeding 80% in Pu-233 3.1.3.1 Ccmment Summary:
A ccmmenter noted that plutonium with an isctopic ccncentration exceeding 80% in Pu-238 is exempt under the IAEA recommendations but not under the proposed amendments.
(MRC) 3.1. 3. 2 Resoonse:
This cmission was an oversight.
This matcrial is now exempted under the final rule.
3.1.4 Acolicability to Power Reactor Sites Prior to Coeratina License Issuance 3.1.4.1 Comment Summar'.
A cc,Tmenter was unclear ss to unether the proposed amendments aculd recuire chysical protection f:r fresh fuel stored at a power reactor site prior to the issuance of a license for coerating a power reactor under Part 50.
(CMC) 3.1.4.2 Res:ense:
The proocsed amencments wcula apply i., this case due to licensing under Part 70 prior to issuance of an cperating licerse under Part 50.
3.2 6 70.22(j)
P5ysical Security Plan 3.2.1 Material Control anc Accounting Exemotion Limit 3.2.1.1 Ccmment Summary:
Some ccem. enters stated that material not exceeding :ne ef fective (11cgram sncula be e.<emotec from cre
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Enclosure "3" r"r i.'*
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proposed amendments on the basis that such material was currently exempted frcm material centrol and accounting requirements.
(GEV, AIF) 3.2.1.2 Rescong :
Material not exceeding one effective Ki vgram is not exempted from material control and accounting requirements.
All special nuclear material is subject to material control and cccounting requirements.
Quantities exceeding one effective kilo-gram are subject to certain additional material control and accounting requirements not apolied to quantities less than one ef fective kilogram.
3.2.2 Facilities Protected under Part 73.50 3.2.2.1 Comment Summary:
Some commenters suggested that no physical protection planc nced be submitted for facilities presently covered under Part 73.50, and that such a statement snculd be included in the proccsed amendments to assure that redundant plans would not have to be submitted.
(GEV, AIF) 3.2.2.2 Resoonse:
The coverage of s73.47 and s73.50 are m.utually exclusive.
Section 73.47 covers facilities having material of mcderate and Icw strategic significance.
These materials, by cefinition, have an upper quantity limit wnich is the icwer quantity limit for the formula quantity of strategic special nuclear material coverec by 573.50.
No statement is neecec in the regulation other than the scoce of coverage state-ments 9ade in the first paragraphs of the res::ecti se sections.
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Enclosure "3"
- 3. 3 4 73.1 Purocse and Sccce 3.3.1 Exemotions of Material Held in Labcratory and Cther Facilities 3.3.1.1 Comment Su=ary:
Some ccamenters suggested that analytical, research, quality control, metallurgical and electronic laboratories which possess or use not greater than 350 grams of HEU, Pu, U-233, or any combination thereof, should be exempted from physical protec-tion requirements under the proposed amendments.
The basis for this was stated to be a similar exemption for such material as provided currently under 10 CFR 73.6(c).
(BYU, MIT, GEV, AIF) 3.3,1.2 Resoonse:
The current requirements for physical protec-tion of nuclear materials at fixed sites apply to f acilities possess-ing formula quantities or greater of SSNM.
The exemption appearing in Part 73.6(c) relieves such facilities frcm applying specific requirements of s 73.60 to analytical, research, quality control, metallurgical or electronic laboratories provided that tne total inventcry is less than 350 grams of 'J-235, U-233, or plutonit.n, or any ccabination thereof.
The provisions of s 73.60 deal primarily with the use or stcrage of ShM in Materiai access breas (MAAs) to '.snich additional access anc egress controis are apolied.
These same laboratories are not, however, exempt from tne general facility protection requirements delineatea in s 73.50.
Contrary to tne claims of certain ccmmenters, tne crotection at
'.w to such laboratcries (i.e.. those coeratea sithin existing facilities sith total plant inventories exceeding 5 formula M icgrams) exceecs the lesel tc ce proviced tnrougn imolemeMation of the arc:cse e
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requirements for materials of moderate and lcw str,tagic signif-icance at locaticns not presently covered by 10 CFR Part '3.
3.3.2 Stel in a Reactor Core and Irraaieted Fuel Elements 3.3.2.1 Cciment St.mmary:
Commenters suggested that a specific exemption be provided for SNM residing in a reactor core.
Inis would be consistent with the exemption currently provided in Part 73.50 for such materic.l.
(GEV, AIF) 3.3.2.2 Resoonse:
StM residi.g in a reactor core is considered 1
a self protecting (and thus exempt from requirements of Part 73.47) if it has an external radiation dose rate in excess of 100 rem / hour at a distance of three feet frcm any accessible surface, without intervening shielding.
The same standard applies for material not in a reactor core, but which has been irradiated.
3.4 5 73.2 Definitions 3.4.1 Physical Protection System 3.4.1.1 Comment Sumnary:
The proposea ru'es were descriced by one commenter as requiring a onysical crotection system which is not specifically defined other than tnrough 5ection 73.50 and 73.60.
It was suggested that further information nould be equired cy the licensees before they could begin to meet the CDjectives and requirements cf the proposed amendments.
(VPI, AIF, SUN, UCS, CMC)
- 3. 4.1. 2 Resconse:
Guidance material is nca being precarec ard will ce made avai iole to licensees at the time tne 'inal rule
'(U is mace effective.
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3.2.2 Cefinitions of Terns 3.4.2.1 Comment Surmary:
Several term: were found by ccmmenters to be confusing, without definitions, or otherwise in need of clarification.
These included the folicwing:
" controlled access area", "authcrized individual", " enriched above natural", " pre-employment screening", "GSA approved security cabinet", " physical protection system", " missing SNM", " trustworthiness", "in the most safe and direct manner", " appropriate response force", " con-tingency plans", "vaul t" and "vaul t-type room. "
(VP I, U'!A, LMI,
SWC, PNL, GEV, NFS, AIF, RIA, SUN, NUS) 3.4.2.2 Resoonse:
Four additional terms have been addeu to Part 73.2 as cefinitions:
" Controlled access ares", " author-ized individual," " Strategic Special Nuclear Material" and " formula quantity." Other terms will be clarified in the guidance being prepared to accctDany the proposec regulations or have teen defined in other parts of the regulations.
The amencments ':ve been changed to clarify the meaning of terms or the questicnable terms have not been used.
3.5 73.47 Licensee Fixed Site and In-Transit Recuirements 'cr Ohvsica'.
crotection of 5NM of Mcderate and Low 5 ratecic 5icnificance 3.5.1 General Performance Cbiectives 3.5.1.1 Ccement Summarv:
Scme cc menters cbjected to the imocsi-tion of general performance objectives in accition to sceci'ic recuirements ccatained in otner secticr.s cf tr.e procosec amerdments.
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It was suggestea that conformance witn the specific cesign require-ments must be considered as fulfilling any general performance objectives.
The genera! 'erformance cbjectives in the past, it was clairred, b:"a M-
.ed to imoose additional cumulative require-ments not contemplated by the Ccmmission when the rule was pub-lished.
Response
The sections of the rule follcWing the general performance cbjectives (Secticns 73.47(d), (e), (f) and (g)) are not specific design cbjectives.
Rather, they prescribe functional recuirements for the physical protection of the SNM which may be satisfied by a choice in each case on the part of the licensee of a number of different ccmoinations of devices and procedures.
Guidance is to be provided to help the licensee make these choices.
The general performance objectives are necessary in order to pro-vide overall guidance to the NRC staf f and the licensee as to what the ceneral cojectives of the Commission were at tne time the rule became effective.
These objectives then are used to assist the staff's jucgments regarding accaptance criteria in the review of licensee security plans.
3.5.2 Time for Security Plan Submission 3.5.2.1 Ccement Summary:
Scme ccmmenters suggested tnat a icnger period shoula be allcwed following tre effective data of the amer.d-ments ::efore physical security plsns are to oe su mitted.
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3.5.2.2 Resoonse:
The prcpcsed amendments have been change; to allcw plans to be submitted 220 days from publication in the Fede al Register or 120 days rather tnan 60 days from the ef fective date of the rule.
The 120 days frcm the date of publication of tne final rule in tho Federal Recister and its effective date will provide suf ficient time for:
a.
the public and the licensee to review and respond to supporting guidance oublished concurrently with the amendment, b.
the NRC to consider the public ccements, and c.
preparation and issuance of the guidance in final form.
Following puclication of the final guidance, licensees will be allcwed another 120 days to sucmit their physical security plans.
This will provide those licensees who have limited managerial and financial resources sufficient time to precare their security clans.
o 3.5.3 Delay Until Action is Taken on Ncn-Pcwer Reactors 3.5.3.1 Ccmment Summarv:
A commenter suggested trat tre require-ment for suomission of physical security plans be ceiayed until action is taken on the issue of a separate ule for non ;caer n
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U la Enclosure "3" 520 147
reactors in order to avoid costly duplication of effort in tne preparation of such plans.
(SUN) 3.5.3.2 Resocnse:
Plans submitted under tne proposed amendments would provide a base for plans that might be required under a separate non power reactor regulation.
These would not be duoli-cation but rather revision of the plan to cover any additional requirements called for specifically for non power reactors.
3.5.4 Cost of Backoround Investigations Excessive 3.5.4.1 Comment Summary:
Ccmmenters expressed c6ncern cver the excessive costs they might incur if they were required to conduct background investigaticas of students, researchers, and employees invob ' d with material of acderate strategic significance.
( ',' P I,
TAM, UCS, SUN, UMO, MIT, RIA, TRN) 3.5.4.2 Resoonse:
Background investigations were never con-templated as the minimum acceptability criterion for satisfaction of the requirement for pre employment screening.
The proposed amencments have been changed to ostter reflect this intent wnica is also addressed in the guidance.
3.5.5 Use and Storace Recuirenents for Control'ed Access Areas 3.5.5.1 Cccment Summary:
Ccmmenters exnibited a degree of confu-sicn over specific.aquirements for use and storage of SNM in controlled access areas.
(UCS, UCC, NES) 3.5.5.2 Resconse:
Puolished guidance.sili take into consiceration all the ccmments received, including tnose ceali g with cefiniticrs and accettability criteria #cr controiled access areas ic. tne use and stcrage of SNM.
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3.5.6 Physical Security Recairements for Less Stratecically $icnificant Material at Same Site 3.5.6.1 Comment Summary:
Low strategically significant and exempt materials may be used or pcssessed on tne same site.
Under tne proposed rule it would seem that the less strategically significant materials would have to be protected at the same level as the more strategically significant material.
It is strongly urged that the rule permit varying levels of security ccmmensurate with the strategic significance of the material involved.
(MIT, TAM) 3.5.6.2 Resconse:
The physical protection of different categories of SNM at differi.it levels ccmmensurate with their strategic signif-icance is recognized by the IAEA in publication INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1 (Section 4.3.1).
The regulation has been revised to allow for this type of different levels of protection.
3.5.7 Continuous Monitorina of Controlled Access Areas
- 3. ;,7.1 Comment Sumnary:
The requirement to continucusly Tenitor the controlled access area is unnecessary.
The controlled access areas should be monitored on a continuous casis only when unoccuoied.
(WEC, AIF, GEV, HAR, UC5, EWC) 3.5.7.2 Rescanse:
The term " continuously monitor" nas been deleted from the croposed amencments.
Tne revised worcing for Section 73.47(d)(3) wnicn usec to cantain this term raw recuires only that the licensee acnitor sucn areas.
urtner guidance is C
proviced in the guidance material ceing cretared to acccmcan; the crocosed amencments.
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3.5.8 Searches of Packaces and Venicles Enterir.g and Lea'/ing the Controlled Access Area 3.5.8.1 Ccmment Summary:
Commenters stated tnat the prcposec amendments vould require the searching of packages carried by cperations and research personnel into and cut of the controlled access arca (reactor room) on a frequent basis.
Hcwever, only the Director and Assistant Director were said tc have access to the vault, implying a great deal of unnecessary effort.
':UCS, RIA) 3.5.8.2 Resoonse:
The search requiremen. for packages ce vehicles entering a controlled access area has been deleted frca the proposed ame ndmer.t s.
Packages need be searched cn a random basis only when leaving a controlled access area.
3.5.9 Resconsibilities of Carrier for Physical Protection 3.5.9.1 Comment Summary:
Commenters questioned whether the i
numerous requirements for protection of SNM anile in trans t ard for tracing any lost or stolen shipment were the responsibility of the ccmmon carrier such as a trucking firm cr the licensee.
It was noted that the licensee has no control over routing ci shicments, carrie employees, etc.
(CPL, UCS, TRN) 3.5.9.2 Resconse:
3 resent'y, carriers wnc are not licensees have no respoisibility to Drovice pr.ysical protection for 3Decial nuclear material uncer tne proposed amendments.
However, the proposed amencments clearly state tne resocnsibilities of licarsees in their respectise roles as snipcer cr receiver to provide for tne physicai protection of 5.NM in transit.
Altncugn the licensee
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may not have physical or administrative control over the ShM or the personnel engaged in transporti'g it.while it is in transit, the licensee has the responsibility of contracting with tne carrier to assure he will provide for the performance of the required notification and other procedures during transit.
The physical security plan subr.itted by the snipper or receiver licensee mus; indicate the means by which those procedures are to be carried cut and should contain assurances that they will be performed as necessary,
- 3. 5.10 Shiomnts f rc:n Non-Licensees 3.5.10.1 Ccmment Summary:
If tne recei/e. licensee cannot rely upon the non-licensee snipper's verification of container anc seal integrity he will be required to send an empicyee to tne shipper's facility prior to each ship. ant, thus incurring unnecessary expenses and possible delays.
(TRN) 3.5.10.2 Resconse:
Under the proposed amencments the licenses who accepts delivery of special nuclear material of accerate cr icw strategic significance free on board (f.o.a.) tre coint at which it is delivered to a carrier for transcort must arrange for the pnysical protactica cf sucn material in accorcance witr the requirements of Section 73.47(e)(3).
These requirements do not include the cnecking #cr integrity of tne seals and conta ners i
used for the snigment.
Section 73.27(e)(1) assigns :nis res:cnsi-cility to the shipper or receiver c.ily if re is a licensee.
- n the case wnen tne s' f c;er is :ne Ceoartmen; cf Energy, current r
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practices for the transportation of $NM of moderate and low strategic significance require that the cargo containers cr com-partments be locked and sealed.
It snould not be difficult to arrange for cunfirmation of the integrity of locks and seals prior to the material being turned over to a carrier.
Such arrangements would be provided for in the receiver licensee's chysical security plan.
3.5.11 Exclusive-Use Modes of Transportation Not Recuired 3.5.11.1 Comment Summary:
A ccamenter suggested that the communi-cations capability requirement would in Tect mandate use of an exclusive-use vehicle for road transportation and coula effectively rule cut use of some otn'r modes of transportation entirely.
(TRN) 3.5.11.2 Resconse:
The requirement #cr maintaining a communica-tions capability between the carrier and shipper or receiver was not intended to eliminate the possibility of use of any form of transportation or require.se of exclusive vehicles.
The purpose of the communications requirement was to allow the carrier ;o notify the shipper or receiver of any celays in the scneduled shipment, ratner than to maintain continuous open communications.
The proposed amendments have been modified to make this point clear 3.5.12 Contincency Plans 3.5.12.1 Comment Summars Scme commenters statec that tnera were no minimum requirements given Tor contingency plans and tnat they woulc require adcitional tim to prepare contingency plans
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beyond the 60 days allcwed for the physical security plan.
( T R.N,
UCS, t1IT, C?L) 3.5.12.2 Resconse:
Tne term " contingency plans" has been del 3ted from the nroposed amendments to avoid con sion with the type of plans described in Appendix C to Part 73, which do not apply for facilities covered under the proposad mendments.
Response proce-durcs for iealing with threats of +.iefts or thefts of special nuclear materials will be equired to be included in the licensee's physical security plan instead, and detTils regarding the inclusica of these procedures will be much less ccmrlex than the contingency plan procedures described in Aependix C.
The tine for preperation of physical security plans nas been extended to 120 days following
.le effective date of the proposed amendments.
3.5.13 Licensee ?.?soonsibilities Durinc Shioment 3.5.13.1 Comment Summary:
A ccmmenter suggested that comollance with Sections 73.47(e)(4) and (5) and 73.47(g)(a) and (5, culd regt. ire the expcrt or import licensee to have an emoloyee at esca airport or pier used for export or import snicments.
It was suggestau instead tnat the excort or imcort licensee sncula ce alic'.sec to utilize carrier employees or otrars to cerform the integrity caeck of locks and seals prior to shipment.
(TRN) 3.5.13.2 Resoonse:
The integrity checks of loc <s and seals crior to shipment, and other. measures required to ce taken oy the e.garte-licensee prior to c mmitting the shipment to the carrier, can be pcrformed oy tne licensee.
Acditional crecks of locks anc sea's S MC 30 Enclosure "3" L ~
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while the shipment is in progress may be considered prudent by the carrier but are not required under the prcocsed 3.Tardments.
Generally, however, phytical security responsioilities of the licensee may ce delegated to third perties (e.g., carriers, private security forces) through contractual cbligations, provided that such obligations assure that all appropriate NRC regulations are satisfied.
3.6 Exemotions and Lontinued Regulatory Authority in Agreement States Under Section 274 3.6.1 Cy:erage of Nuclear Waste Burial Grounds in Agreer.ent States
- 3. 6.1.1 Comment Summary:
A ccmmenter inquired as ta the extent to which the new Section 150.14 is to apply to State licensed nuclear waste burial grounds.
(NFS)
- 3. 6.1. 2 Response:
Part 150 would be amer.ded by the addition of a new Section 150.l' whicn extencs to Acreement State licensees coverage of the prcposed amendments to special nuclear -'.aterial et moderate and low strategic significance belcw tha present 350 g limit for U-235 end 200 g limits for U-233 and plutonium.
- Thus, all SNM cf moderate and lcw strategic significance would be coverec under the prcposec ame aments unless scecifically exempted.
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Enclosure "3"
APPENDIX A CATEGORY II AND III MATERIALS RULE LIST OF CCMMENTERS ID DATE NO.
COMMENTER CODE RECEIVED 1
Monsanto Research Corporation NRC 6/06/78 2
Texas A&M University, Nuclear Eng'g. Dept.
TAN 6/16/78 3
State University of New York at Buffalo, Nuclear Science and Technology Facility SUN 6/19/78 4
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University VPI 6/19/78 5
Rhode Island Atomic Energy Commission, Nuclear Science Center RIA 6/22/78 6
National Bureau of Standards (Reactor Radiation)
NBS 6/22/78 7
University of California, Santa Barbara UCS 6/22/78 8
University of Michigan, Phoenix Memorial Laboratory UMI 6/22/78 9
Conner, Moore & Corber, Law Offices CMC 6/23/78 10 Exxon Nuclear Company, Inc.
EXN 6/23/78 11 (Comments for wrong rule) 12 Union Carbide Corporation UCC 6/27/78 13 Pennsylvania State University PSU 6/27/78 14 Massachussetts Institute of Technology, Nuclear Reactor Laboratory MIT 6/27/78 15 National Bureau of Standards (Health Physics)
NES 6/27/73 16 Battelle, Pacific Northwest Laboratories PNL 6/27/78 17 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign UIL 6/27/78 18 Oregon State University, Radiation Center ORS 6/27/78 19 University of Missouri, Research Reactor Facility LMO 6/27/78 20 Transnuclear, Inc.
TRN 6/27/78 21 General Electric, Nuclear Energy Business Group GEN 7/10/73 22 Babcock and Wilcox, Power Generation Group EWC 7/10/78 23 University of Kansas, Dept. of Chen & Petrol. Eng'g UKA 7/10/78 24 Harvard University, University Health Services HAR 7/10/78 25 University of Virginia, School of Eng'g & Appl'd Science UVA 7/10/73 26 Westingnouse Electric Corp., Water Reactor Div.
WEC 7/10/78 27 NUSAC, Inc.
NUS 7/10/73 28 Penn State University PSU 7/17/73 29 University of Arizona UAZ 7/17/73 30 General Electric, Nuclear Energy Eng'g Group, Vallecitcs Nuclear Center GEV 7/21/73 31 Transnuclear, Inc.
TRN 7/21/73 32 Brigham Young L'niversity By v
,u 22 Enclosure "3" 520 i55
CATEGORY II AND III RULE List of Commenters - Continued 33 Nuclear Fuel Services NFS 7/27/78 34 Carolina Power and Light Company CPL 8/1/78 U1 University of Arizona UAZ 6/13/78 U2 Department of Energy, Office of Safeguards & Security DOE 7/14/78 U3 Pennsylvania State University PSU 7/31/78 U4 Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.
AIF 7/27/78 Q -3f 9-520
!b6 23 Encicsure "3"
ENCLOSURE C Standard Format and Content for the Licensee Physical Security Plan For the Protection of Special Nuclear Material of Moderate of Low Strategic Significance
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