05000339/LER-1980-008-03, /03L-0:on 800521,during Mode 3 Operation,Redundant Channel Protection Was Lost.Caused by Personnel Not Placing Tave Protection Loop Failed Channel in Trip Mode within Required Time.Failed Channel Placed in Trip Mode

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/03L-0:on 800521,during Mode 3 Operation,Redundant Channel Protection Was Lost.Caused by Personnel Not Placing Tave Protection Loop Failed Channel in Trip Mode within Required Time.Failed Channel Placed in Trip Mode
ML19323H688
Person / Time
Site: North Anna 
Issue date: 06/10/1980
From: Cartwright W
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML19323H686 List:
References
LER-80-008-03L, LER-80-8-3L, NUDOCS 8006160056
Download: ML19323H688 (2)


LER-1980-008, /03L-0:on 800521,during Mode 3 Operation,Redundant Channel Protection Was Lost.Caused by Personnel Not Placing Tave Protection Loop Failed Channel in Trip Mode within Required Time.Failed Channel Placed in Trip Mode
Event date:
Report date:
3391980008R03 - NRC Website

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Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station, Unit #2

Attachment:

Page 1 of 1 Docket No. 50-339 Report No. LER 80-008/03L-6

Description of Event

On May 21, 1980, during mode 3 operation, the failed channel in the Tave Protection loop was not placed in the trip mode within I hour as per T.S. 3.3.2.1.

Due to an oversight, the operations personnel believed the failed channel was a control channel rather than a protection channel.

This item is reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.c.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence Since the failed channel was not placed in the trip mode within the required time frame, the redundancy in the channel protection was lost.

However, since the reactor was in mode 3, che event did not have an effect on the health or safety of the public.

Cause of Event

The event occurred because of an oversight by operations personnel.

The Shift Supervisor believed the failure was in a control channel rather than in a protection channel.

Immediate Corrective Action

When discovered, the failed channel was immediately placed in the trip mode and a maintenance request was submitted for the repair of the defective channel.

In addition LER 80-007/03L-0 was submitted describing this failure.

Scheduled Corrective Action When completed, a copy of this event report will be placed in the required reading log for all operations personnel.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence No further actions required.