05000334/LER-1981-001-01, /01T-0:on 810106, Supports H-162,H-164 & H-166 Reported Not Modified Per IE Bulletin 79-14.Caused by Loss of Pertinent Drawings.Work on Supports Completed

/01T-0:on 810106, Supports H-162,H-164 & H-166 Reported Not Modified Per IE Bulletin 79-14.Caused by Loss of Pertinent Drawings.Work on Supports Completed

ML20002E202
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	01/20/1981
From:	Lacey W, Lacy W DUQUESNE LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20002E165	List: 05000334/LER-1981-001, Forwards LER 81-001/01T-0
References
IEB-79-14, LER-81-001-01T, LER-81-1-1T, NUDOCS 8101260634
Download: ML20002E202 (3)

LER-1981-001, /01T-0:on 810106, Supports H-162,H-164 & H-166 Reported Not Modified Per IE Bulletin 79-14.Caused by Loss of Pertinent Drawings.Work on Supports Completed

Event date:
Report date:
3341981001R01 - NRC Website

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBAGLE CONSEQUENCES h I o I 'l l On 1/6/81. the Duquesne f.icht Conn.inv Ennineering Department reported that 32" f

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b Attachment To Ltit 81-001/01T Beaver Valley power Station Duquesne I.lght Company Docket No. 50-334 On January 6, 1981, the Duquesne Light Company Engineering Department reported that 32" SilP-1,2,3-601-Q2 supports11-162,11-164 and !!-166 had not been modified as reported to the NRC in the August 14, 1980 IE Bu11ctin 79-14 Ictter.

The design safety function of hangers !!-l'$2,11-164 and 11-166 is to protect other equipment if one pipe should break and result in a large pipe whip. TheThe shim deficiency was in the number of shim stacks that limit pipe movement.

stacks help distribute the pipe break loads uniformly over the honeycomb collapse collar. This collapse collar dissipates energy due to pipe breaks, thus minimizing the loads imposed upon the valve house wall. This wall acts as the last safety-rcisted support for all three main steam lines.

It was determined in the IE Bulletin 79-14 of fort that the shim stack installed was not according to the design drawings and would not adequately distribute the load properly. Because of this, there was an increased possibility that the design loads of the valve house wall would be exceeded if one of the main steam lines ruptured. This wall failure would cascade into the two remaining steam lines which are supported of f this wall.

The problem with this nonconformance being missed appears to be in the transmittal of records between the concerned departments. A drawing package transmitted to the contractor was illegible and so it was sent back to the construction department. New drawings were made, excluding the ones of the supports in question, and were then re-transmitted. When the new drawings were compared to the transmittal list, they matched and were accepted.

All design change packages for modifications of Beaver Valley power Station are reviewed during turnover activitics to assure that as-built conditions are in This accordance with required engineering as part of the turnover program.

check is made concurrently by the Construction Department, Start-up Group, and the Station Engineering Group. In addition, a review is made to assure that all applicable Technical Specifications can be met utilizing the as-modified station equipment. A final safety review is performed to assure that the "as built" configuration does not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined by 10 CFR 50.59.

As allowed by the turnover program, the Station Engineering Group conducted a 25., review on three design change packages (those associated with pipe supports, as-built corrections, and seismic reanalyses) because of their peculiar nature and magnitude. The above described discrepancy was discovered by the Construction Department during a final follow-up check.

Upon receiving the discrepancy report from the Mechanical Engineering Department, the Station Superintendent ordered the plant startup to discontinue until the discrepancy was corrected and the Quality Assurance Manager assured him that no other discrepancies had occurred..

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Duquesne 1,lght Company Docket No. 50-334 The Quality Assurance !!anager requested a final review of the three design change packages of concern and conducted an investigation of the problem to determine if the program contained weaknesses allowing this to occur. During this review, one other discrepancy was discovered on hanger ll-4A on the river water system which was determined not to be a significant safety concern; however, the discrepancy was corrected immediately.

On January 9,1981, the Quality Assurance !!anager assured the Superintendent that all reviews were complete and that there was a high degree of assurance that no other discrepancies existed. On that basis, the Superintendent released the station to continue startup activitics. The Quality Assurance !!anager has subsequently issued a report of his investigation with recommended action to prevent this type of oversight from recurring. Corrections are being made in an expeditious manner.

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