05000280/LER-1981-044-03, /03L-0:on 810705,amp Readings for Heat Tracing Panel 10,circuits 2A & 4A,& Panel 11,circuits 1A & 1B,were Below Tech Specs.Caused by Excessive Heating of Tape. Defective Heat Tracing Replaced & Tested

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/03L-0:on 810705,amp Readings for Heat Tracing Panel 10,circuits 2A & 4A,& Panel 11,circuits 1A & 1B,were Below Tech Specs.Caused by Excessive Heating of Tape. Defective Heat Tracing Replaced & Tested
ML20009H692
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 07/29/1981
From: Joshua Wilson
VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML20009H621 List:
References
LER-81-044-03L-02, LER-81-44-3L-2, NUDOCS 8108100365
Download: ML20009H692 (2)


LER-1981-044, /03L-0:on 810705,amp Readings for Heat Tracing Panel 10,circuits 2A & 4A,& Panel 11,circuits 1A & 1B,were Below Tech Specs.Caused by Excessive Heating of Tape. Defective Heat Tracing Replaced & Tested
Event date:
Report date:
2801981044R03 - NRC Website

text

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i7 771 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CONTRCL BLCCK; I l

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lWith the unit at 100% oower, separation of a one inch instrument air line elbow I

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caused a decrease in instrument air pressure. To prevent a loss of all instrument Ictai i

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ATTACHMENT 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO:

50-281 REPORT NO:

81-045/03L-0 EVENT DATE:

07-03-81 TITLE OF EVENT:

BORON INJECTION TANK RECIRCULATION VALVES SHUT 1.

DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

With the unit at 100% power, a one inch instrument air line elbow, located in the auxiliary building, separated from the piping causing the instrument air pressure to decrease. A loss of all instrument air was averted by isolating the instrument air to the auxiliary building. Within ten minutes, the break was located, isolated and the auxiliary building instrument air pressure restored.

The Boron injection Tank recirculation valves 2884 A, B & C closed and remained closed while the Instrument air supply to the auxillary building was isolated.

This event is c trary to T.S. 3.3.A.3 and is reportable in accordance with T.S. 6.6.2.b.(2).

2.

PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES AND STATUS OF REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

Recirculation between the BIT and the Boric Acid Storage Tank (BAST) ensures that the Bir is full of concentrated Boric Acid at all' times. During the period the valves were closed, less than 10 minutes, there was no change in the tempera-ture, boric acid concentration or liquid level of the BIT; therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3

CAUSE

This event was caused by the operator isolating the auxiliary building instrument air supply to avert a complete loss of air pressure and the attendant valve closures which would have tripped the reactor.

4.

IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The break in the air line was located and isolated.

5 SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The leak was repaired and the Auxiliary Building instrument air restored, reopening the BIT recirculation valves.

6.

ACTION TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

No additional corrective action is required.

7 GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.

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