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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER PAGE 0l5l0l0l0l2l9l5 1 l0Fl 0 l 4 ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT TITLE Missed Radiation area surveys because of inadequate Technical Specification review; no impact EVENT DATE LER NUMBER REPORT DATE OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEO.
REV.
MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER (S) 710N UNIT 2 0 l 6 l 0 l 0 l 0 l 3 l 0 l4 nla ola 9 l7 917 olilo olo ols ois 917 I I I I I I I THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (CHECK ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING) 5 20.402(b) 20.405(e) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)
POWER 20.405(a)(1)(1) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 73.71(c) 0l0l0 LEVEL 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(v11)
OTHER (Specify in 20.405(a)(1)(iii) x 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
Abstract below 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 36 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LICEN5EE CONTACT FOR THIS LER NAME TEtEPHONF NUMBfR N.M. BRENNAN REG. ASSURANCE X2380 81817 71alel-12inlel4 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT
^
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPRDS TO NPRDS I
I I I I I I I
I II I i I I
I I I I I I I
I I I I I I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION YES. (If ves. comolete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
M NO DATE l
l l
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e.
approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines).
At 0350 hours0.00405 days <br />0.0972 hours <br />5.787037e-4 weeks <br />1.33175e-4 months <br /> on April 4,1997. Area radiation monitor ORE-0006 " Primary Sample Room Area Monitor" failed. The Unit Supervisor (US) reviewed the Technical Specifications (TS). Zton Operational Determination Manual (20DM) Process Radiation (PR) section. and Zion Radiation Protection (ZRP) ZRP 5820-12 "Out of Service Surveillance for Radiation Monitors." On April 6, 1997 the same US who was on j
shift on Apr11 4, reviewed the TS and this time noticed TS 3.14-1 table reference to OR0006. The consequences of the event are two missed area surveys to meet the TS requirements for a failed radiation detector. The causes of this event are I)a cognitive error by the US in his review of the TS; 2)no confirming review required or performed by either the Shift Engineer (SE) or Nuclear Station Operator (NS0): 3)less than adequate questioning attitude by any subsequent reviewers. A contributing factor in this event was an error in the ZRP 5820 12. Corrective Actions: 1)US, SE and NSO have been counseled. 2)ZRP 5820-12 has been corrected. 3)The US has presented this event at a Licensed Sh1ft Supervisor meeting to ensure awareness and emphasize lessons learned. 4)The US w111 modify procedures to require a confirming review be performed by the NSO. 5)0perating Training Department will determine the type of training required as a result of this LER and the resultant procedure changes and incorporate lessons learned into the liCPnsed Operator Training. (NUREG code A) 9705080273 970505 PDR ADOCK 05000295 S
PDR ZLER\\97010.ler(1)
l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION t
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMtlER LER NUMBER PAGE l
YEAR SEO.
REV.
t ZloN NUCLEAR POWER STATION
[
0l5l0l0l0l2l9l5 9l7 0l1l0 0l0 0l2 0l4
~
0F i
TEXT-Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]
i A.
PLANT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT i
i Unit 1 MODE 5-CSD Rx Power 0 RCS [AB] Temperature / Pressure 89f/ atmos Unit 2 MODE 5-CSD Rx Power 0 RCS [AB] Temperature / Pressure 82f/37psig l
B.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
- - i At 0350 hours0.00405 days <br />0.0972 hours <br />5.787037e-4 weeks <br />1.33175e-4 months <br /> on April 4.1997, Area radiation monitor ORE-0006 [IL]" Primary Sample Room Area Monitor" i
failed. Monitor ORE-0006 is a common area radiation monitor listed in Technical Specifications (TS)
{
table 3.14-1 as OR-0006 [IL] and is controlled from Unit 1 Radiation Monitor Display System (RMDS)
[
[IL] control panel. Unit 1 Unit Supervisor (US) contracted Radiation Protection (RP) to determine the problem with the monitor. RP reported that local area covered by ORE-0006 (primary sample room) was
<1mr/hr and could not repair the monitor immediately. The US had the Unit 1 Nuclear Station Operator (NS0) remove the monitor from scan on the Unit 1 RMDS panel.
l The NSO questioned the US if there were any surveillance to be conducted, but did not review any i
procedures himself. The ORE-0006 monitor is on RMDS panel 2 which contains only TS Radiation l
monitors.
At approximately 0430 hours0.00498 days <br />0.119 hours <br />7.109788e-4 weeks <br />1.63615e-4 months <br /> the US completed his review of Technical Specifications (TS), but he failed l
to adequately review Table 3.14-1. He then reviewed the wrong section of the Zion Operational l
Determination Manual (20DM). ie: Process Radiation (PR) section instead of the Area Radiation (AR) j section. Next he reviewed ZRP 5820-12 "Out of Service Surveillance for Radiation Monitors," step 3 l
" Monitors not requiring Routine Surveillance." ZRP 5820-12 step 3 incorrectly listed ORE-0006 as not requiring a routine surveillance. The Unit Supervisor (US) called the RP department, and they also l
referred to ZRP 5820-12 step 3 and confirmed his incorrect findings. The US filled out a PT-14E j
" Degraded Equipment Status" (DEL), a log used to track the inoperable non-TS equipment. There is no i
clear understanding of why the US looked at PR instead of AR in the ZODM.
I At 0530 hours0.00613 days <br />0.147 hours <br />8.763227e-4 weeks <br />2.01665e-4 months <br /> on April 4,1997, the Primary NSO. US. Shift Engineer (SE), and the RP Supervisor were
- - l notified to sign the DEL paperwork. The SE questioned whether provisional monitoring was required, l
and the US stated. "None that I could find. RP confirms this." The SE stated that the radiation monitor was an old Westinghouse monitor (which are usually TS related), but he failed to follow-up.
)
1 l
Although this DEL was documented in everyone's turnover, no other licensed individual challenged the DEL. Periodic Test (PT) PT-0 Appendix N Unit 1 " Unit 1 Radiation Monitor Check Sheet for all Modes of
- - Operation" was performed daily with DEL recorded for the inoperable ORE-0006.
i l
i i
i ZLER\\97010.ler(2)
l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE YEAR SEO.
REV.
ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION 0l5l0l0l0l2l9l5 9l7 0l1l0 0l0 0l3 0l4
~
~
0F TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX)
B.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT (Continued)
On April 6, 1997, at 0450 hours0.00521 days <br />0.125 hours <br />7.440476e-4 weeks <br />1.71225e-4 months <br /> area radiation monitor ORT-ARIO [lL]" Auxiliary Building Area Monitor Elevation 542" went into instrument fail. The same US who was on shift on April 4.1997, reviewed the TS and this time noticed TS 3.14-1 table reference to OR0006. He then again ru earched the 200M.
This time he referenced the index and realized OR0006 is in the ZODM section AR under ORE-0006.
Realizing and confirming his error. he informed the Shift Engineer and RP. Initially the RP Supervisor again indicated that OR0006 is a non TS monitor with no surveillance, but later at 0505 hours0.00584 days <br />0.14 hours <br />8.349868e-4 weeks <br />1.921525e-4 months <br /> found documentation (an " attachment" to the ZRP 5820-12) that confirmed daily area surveys is required. A technician was dispatched to perform the survey immediately.
At 0552 hours0.00639 days <br />0.153 hours <br />9.126984e-4 weeks <br />2.10036e-4 months <br /> on April 6.1997. RP reported that the area survey was complete and satisfactory. The consequences of the event are two missed area surveys to meet the TS requirements for a failed Primary Sample Room radiation detector.
C.
CAUSE OF EVENT
The causes of this event are 1) a cognitive error by the Unit Supervisor (US) in his review of the Technical Specifications: 2)no confirming review required or performed by either the Shift Engineer (SE) or Nuclear Station Operator (NS0): 3)less than adequate questioning attitude by any subsequent reviewers of the NSO/US/SE turnover sheets. PT 0 Appendix N. or Degraded Equipment Log. A contributing factor in this event was an error in the RP procedure.
D.
SAFETY ANALYSIS
The in-operability of ORE-0006 " Primary Sample Room Area Monitor" did not create any unmeasured release of radioactive materials to the environment. Technical Specifications requires the Sample l
Room to have a surveillance conducted every 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> during the time that the monitor is out of service. The purpose of the primary sample room area radiation monitor (OR-0006) is to provide early warning of a high radiation level which may require evacuation of personnel from the affected area l
during normal and accident conditions.
l The impact on personnel safety for not performing the actions required as a result of the radiation monitor's inoperability was insignificant. All personnel working in the area monitored by OR-0006 are required to wear digital alarming personnel dosimetry which have a dose rate and dose accumulation alarm capability. In addition, personnel are required to utilize portable survey meters (ion chambers) whenever obtaining or handling primary coolant samples within the primary sample room. In the event of an unexpected increase in dose rates. both devices would immediately alert the individual (s) to the changing conditions During this time, however.1RIA-PR49 " Vent Stack "SPING" Monitor" was out of service (see PT-14 #
97000233 and W/R # 970035759) and the Radiation Protection (RP) department were taking " grab samples" every shift (8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />). as directed by ZRP 5820-12 "Out of Service Surveillance for Radiation Monitors."
As a result of this sampling process no un-monitored releases were made. The pathway to the environment from the Sample Room for Noble gas is through the ventilation system to the Vent Stack.
l ZLER\\97010.ler(3)
1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION l
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE YEAR SEO.
REV.
ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION 0lSl0l0l0l2l9l5 9l7 0l1l0 0l0 0l4 0l4
~
0F TEXT Energy Industry Identification System (E!IS) codes are identified in the text as [XX]
E.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
1.
Nuclear Station Operator. Unit Supervisor and Shift Engineer have been counseled, 2.
ZRP 5820-12 "Out of Service Surveillance for Radiation Monitors" step 3 " Monitors not requiring Routine Surveillance" has been corrected.
3.
The Unit Supervisor has presented this event at a Licensed Shift Supervisor meeting to ensure awareness and emphasize lessons learned.
4.
The Unit Supervisor will modify the following procedures to require a confirming review be performed.
l PT-14 " Inoperable Equipment Surveillance Tests."
PT-14E " Degraded Equipment Status."
5.
Operating Training Department will determine the type of training required as a result of this LER and the resultant procedure changes and incorporate lessons learned into the Licensed Operator Training.
i F.
PREVIOUS EVENTS SEARCH AND ANALYSIS l
l A review of Zion's Nuclear Tracking System database has revealed a previous occurrence in which Licensed Shift Supervisors performed an inadequate review, refer to LER 95-006.96-007 and 96-009.
Zion Station has identified that problems exist in the area of TS surveillance complia' and are taking steps to eliminate this problem.
G.
COMPONENT FA1LUPE DATA None l
1 ZLER\\97010.ler(4) i
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| 05000295/LER-1997-001-01, Forwards LER 97-001-01,which Clarifies Info on Root Cause,Safety Analysis & Event Description.Corrective Actions Updated to Show Status of Items | Forwards LER 97-001-01,which Clarifies Info on Root Cause,Safety Analysis & Event Description.Corrective Actions Updated to Show Status of Items | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000295/LER-1997-001, Forwards LER 97-001-00 Which Involved Discovery of Lack of Sump Cover Plate Holes Contrary to Plant Structural Drawing Details,Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) | Forwards LER 97-001-00 Which Involved Discovery of Lack of Sump Cover Plate Holes Contrary to Plant Structural Drawing Details,Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000295/LER-1997-001-14, :on 970110,recirculation Sump Cover Plate Holes Were Not Installed at Original Construction.Caused by Construction Error.Holes Installed IAW Emergency Exempt Change Prepared Prior to Ramp Down |
- on 970110,recirculation Sump Cover Plate Holes Were Not Installed at Original Construction.Caused by Construction Error.Holes Installed IAW Emergency Exempt Change Prepared Prior to Ramp Down
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(e)(2) | | 05000295/LER-1997-001-03, :on 970110,recirculation Sump Covers Were Not Installed at Original Construction.Cause Is Unknown & Impact on Plant Operation Is Unknown.Sump Cover Was Removed,Holes Were Drilled & Cover Replaced Prior to Expiration of LCO |
- on 970110,recirculation Sump Covers Were Not Installed at Original Construction.Cause Is Unknown & Impact on Plant Operation Is Unknown.Sump Cover Was Removed,Holes Were Drilled & Cover Replaced Prior to Expiration of LCO
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-001-11, :on 970902,Unit 2 Instrument Bus Perturbation Occurred.Caused by Insufficient Policy/Guidelines. Development of Policy for Proper Use of Protective Gear, Equipment & Tools |
- on 970902,Unit 2 Instrument Bus Perturbation Occurred.Caused by Insufficient Policy/Guidelines. Development of Policy for Proper Use of Protective Gear, Equipment & Tools
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-001, Forwards LER 97-001-00 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) Which Requires Written Rept Using NRC Form 366, License Event Rept, within 90 Days of Discovery of Event.Attachment a Contains Commitments Associated W/Ltr | Forwards LER 97-001-00 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) Which Requires Written Rept Using NRC Form 366, License Event Rept, within 90 Days of Discovery of Event.Attachment a Contains Commitments Associated W/Ltr | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000295/LER-1997-002, Forwards LER 97-002-00.Commitments Made by Util Listed | Forwards LER 97-002-00.Commitments Made by Util Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-002-01, :on 970117,containment Isolation Valves Were Not Tested Prior to Leaving Cold Shutdown.Caused by Mgt Deficiencies in TS Implementation Process.Containment Isolation Valves Will Be Verified Tested Prior to Mode 4 |
- on 970117,containment Isolation Valves Were Not Tested Prior to Leaving Cold Shutdown.Caused by Mgt Deficiencies in TS Implementation Process.Containment Isolation Valves Will Be Verified Tested Prior to Mode 4
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-002-09, :on 971012,inadvertent Isolation of Svc Water Cooling to 2B DG During Sys Alignment,Occurred.Caused by Shift Mgt Not Ensuring All Operability Requirements Met. Valve 2MOV-SW0023 Opened to Restore Flow to 2B EDG |
- on 971012,inadvertent Isolation of Svc Water Cooling to 2B DG During Sys Alignment,Occurred.Caused by Shift Mgt Not Ensuring All Operability Requirements Met. Valve 2MOV-SW0023 Opened to Restore Flow to 2B EDG
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-002, Forwards LER 97-002-00,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B),which Requires 30 Day Written Rept.Commitments Associated W/Correspondence,Encl | Forwards LER 97-002-00,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B),which Requires 30 Day Written Rept.Commitments Associated W/Correspondence,Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | | 05000295/LER-1997-003, :on 970117,determined That EDG Tests Completed in Previous Refueling Outages Failed to Meet TS Requirement. Caused by Programmatic Deficiencies.Corrected Deficient Procedures & Completed Tests on Operating Unit |
- on 970117,determined That EDG Tests Completed in Previous Refueling Outages Failed to Meet TS Requirement. Caused by Programmatic Deficiencies.Corrected Deficient Procedures & Completed Tests on Operating Unit
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-003, Forwards LER 97-003-00 Re Unit 2 RHR Sys Declared Inoperable,Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) | Forwards LER 97-003-00 Re Unit 2 RHR Sys Declared Inoperable,Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000304/LER-1997-003-10, :on 971014,unit 2 RHR Sys Declared Inoperable. Caused by Oil Leak from Oil Bulb.Leak Coming from Oil Bulb on Ob CC Pump Stopped by Removing Bulb & Inspected |
- on 971014,unit 2 RHR Sys Declared Inoperable. Caused by Oil Leak from Oil Bulb.Leak Coming from Oil Bulb on Ob CC Pump Stopped by Removing Bulb & Inspected
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000304/LER-1997-004-08, :on 971015,small Bore Containment Penetration Line Inadequately Supported Since Plant Construction Was Noted.Cause Cannot Be determined.Non-destructive Exams Performed to Determine Condition & Integrity of Pipe |
- on 971015,small Bore Containment Penetration Line Inadequately Supported Since Plant Construction Was Noted.Cause Cannot Be determined.Non-destructive Exams Performed to Determine Condition & Integrity of Pipe
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000304/LER-1997-004, Forwards LER 97-004-00,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Commitments Associated W/Correspondence,Encl | Forwards LER 97-004-00,per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).Commitments Associated W/Correspondence,Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000295/LER-1997-004, Forwards LER 97-004-00 Re Failure to Start Pump in Required Time & Led to Declaring 1C Containment Spray Pump Inoperable | Forwards LER 97-004-00 Re Failure to Start Pump in Required Time & Led to Declaring 1C Containment Spray Pump Inoperable | | | 05000295/LER-1997-004-04, :on 970221,identified Failure to Start Pump in Required Time & Led to Declaring 1C Containment Spray Inoperable.Caused by Clogged Fuel Filter & Defective components.1C Containment Spray Pump Fuel Drained & Flushed |
- on 970221,identified Failure to Start Pump in Required Time & Led to Declaring 1C Containment Spray Inoperable.Caused by Clogged Fuel Filter & Defective components.1C Containment Spray Pump Fuel Drained & Flushed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-004-01, :on 970221,reactor Was Shutdown,Per LCO 3.6.1 Due to One Inoperable Containment Spray pump.1C CS Pump Day Tank Was Drained,Flushed,Refilled w/biocide-added Fuel from Different Source |
- on 970221,reactor Was Shutdown,Per LCO 3.6.1 Due to One Inoperable Containment Spray pump.1C CS Pump Day Tank Was Drained,Flushed,Refilled w/biocide-added Fuel from Different Source
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | | 05000295/LER-1997-005, Forwards LER 97-005-00 IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).Actions Listed | Forwards LER 97-005-00 IAW 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).Actions Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-005, Forwards LER 97-005-00 Which Documents Event That Occurred at Zion Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.Commitment Made within Ltr,Encl | Forwards LER 97-005-00 Which Documents Event That Occurred at Zion Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.Commitment Made within Ltr,Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-005-07, :on 971021,failed to Test 2A SI Pump Suction Valve in Prescribed Periodicity.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure That TS IST Requirements for Each Component Are Met.Ist Group Will Include Second Check in Review |
- on 971021,failed to Test 2A SI Pump Suction Valve in Prescribed Periodicity.Caused by Inadequate Program to Ensure That TS IST Requirements for Each Component Are Met.Ist Group Will Include Second Check in Review
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000295/LER-1997-005-03, :on 970221,supplement to Unapproved Mode Change W/Ts Required Equipment Inoperable Were Noted.Caused by Inadequate Planning & Briefing.Both Units Have Been Placed in Cold Shutdown W/Rcs at Atmospheric Pressure |
- on 970221,supplement to Unapproved Mode Change W/Ts Required Equipment Inoperable Were Noted.Caused by Inadequate Planning & Briefing.Both Units Have Been Placed in Cold Shutdown W/Rcs at Atmospheric Pressure
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000304/LER-1997-006-07, :on 971028,informed of Potential to Exceed 10CFR50.46 ECCS Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Fuel Clad Gap re-opening & 17% Maximum Cladding Oxidation Limit.Performed Conservative Corrosion Calculations |
- on 971028,informed of Potential to Exceed 10CFR50.46 ECCS Acceptance Criteria.Caused by Fuel Clad Gap re-opening & 17% Maximum Cladding Oxidation Limit.Performed Conservative Corrosion Calculations
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000304/LER-1997-006, Forwards LER 97-006-00 Per 10CFR50.73(a)92)(ii)(B) Which Requires 30 Day Written Rept When Any Event or Condition Occurs That Resulted in Condition of Nuclear Power Plant. Regulatory Commitments Encl | Forwards LER 97-006-00 Per 10CFR50.73(a)92)(ii)(B) Which Requires 30 Day Written Rept When Any Event or Condition Occurs That Resulted in Condition of Nuclear Power Plant. Regulatory Commitments Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000295/LER-1997-006, :on 970222,Zion Station Exceeded Limiting Condition for Operation Due to Inadequate Procedure Controls.Standing Order to Require Review of TS During OOS Procedure Implementation,Was Issued |
- on 970222,Zion Station Exceeded Limiting Condition for Operation Due to Inadequate Procedure Controls.Standing Order to Require Review of TS During OOS Procedure Implementation,Was Issued
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-007-06, :on 971030,failure to Maintain Required Number of Svc Water Pumps Operable Was Identified.Caused by Failure of Mgt Personnel to Adhere to Requirements for Reviewers to Use Applicable Drawings.Procedure Rev to Provide Guidanc |
- on 971030,failure to Maintain Required Number of Svc Water Pumps Operable Was Identified.Caused by Failure of Mgt Personnel to Adhere to Requirements for Reviewers to Use Applicable Drawings.Procedure Rev to Provide Guidance
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-007-02, :on 970311,operator Opened Local Sys Auxiliary Transformer Panel.Cause of Sys Auxiliary Transformer Trip Could Not Be Conclusively Determined.Unit 2 Sys Auxiliary Transformer Tested for Damage |
- on 970311,operator Opened Local Sys Auxiliary Transformer Panel.Cause of Sys Auxiliary Transformer Trip Could Not Be Conclusively Determined.Unit 2 Sys Auxiliary Transformer Tested for Damage
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(7)(ii) | | 05000295/LER-1997-007, Forwards LER 97-007-00 Re Automatic Actuation of Esf. Submitted Table Identifies Actions Committed to by Util | Forwards LER 97-007-00 Re Automatic Actuation of Esf. Submitted Table Identifies Actions Committed to by Util | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000304/LER-1997-007, Forwards LER 97-007-00 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) Which Requires Written Rept for Any Event or Condition That Could Prevent Fulfillment of Safety Function of Structures or Sys Needed to Remove Residual Heat.W/Commitments Attach | Forwards LER 97-007-00 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) Which Requires Written Rept for Any Event or Condition That Could Prevent Fulfillment of Safety Function of Structures or Sys Needed to Remove Residual Heat.W/Commitments Attached | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | | 05000295/LER-1997-008, :on 970321,air Filters Containing Al Were Inadvertently Installed in Containment Due to Faulty Parts Selection Process.Hepa Filters Containing Al Will Be Removed or Replaced w/non-Al Containing Filters |
- on 970321,air Filters Containing Al Were Inadvertently Installed in Containment Due to Faulty Parts Selection Process.Hepa Filters Containing Al Will Be Removed or Replaced w/non-Al Containing Filters
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-008-07, :on 971122,safety Related Snubber Not in Snubber Program & Subsequently Was Not Inspected Per Ts. Cause Unknown.Procedure TSS 15.6.48 Revised to Incorporate Unit 2 Snubber |
- on 971122,safety Related Snubber Not in Snubber Program & Subsequently Was Not Inspected Per Ts. Cause Unknown.Procedure TSS 15.6.48 Revised to Incorporate Unit 2 Snubber
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-008, Forwards LER 97-008-00 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B),which Requires 30 Day Written Rept.Attachment a Provides Commitments Associated W/Correspondence | Forwards LER 97-008-00 Per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B),which Requires 30 Day Written Rept.Attachment a Provides Commitments Associated W/Correspondence | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000295/LER-1997-009-01, :on 970114,1FCV-CS0002 Was Inoperable Between 970115 & 0208.Caused by Failure to Verify That Acceptance Criteria for Return to Service Was Met.Disciplined Unit Supervisor & Will Cover Event in Licensed Operator Training |
- on 970114,1FCV-CS0002 Was Inoperable Between 970115 & 0208.Caused by Failure to Verify That Acceptance Criteria for Return to Service Was Met.Disciplined Unit Supervisor & Will Cover Event in Licensed Operator Training
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-009, Forwards LER 97-009-00 IAW 10CFR50.73(A)(2)(i)(B) Which Requires Listed Corrective Actions | Forwards LER 97-009-00 IAW 10CFR50.73(A)(2)(i)(B) Which Requires Listed Corrective Actions | | | 05000304/LER-1997-009-08, :on 971202,test Relay SIX1-AX Did Not Unlatch as Required During Restoration of PT 10-3.Caused by Failure to Follow Procedures.Rewired Test Relay SIX1-AX |
- on 971202,test Relay SIX1-AX Did Not Unlatch as Required During Restoration of PT 10-3.Caused by Failure to Follow Procedures.Rewired Test Relay SIX1-AX
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000304/LER-1997-009, Forwards LER 97-009-00,re Event Which Occurred at Zion Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.Commitments Made within Ltr Also Encl | Forwards LER 97-009-00,re Event Which Occurred at Zion Nuclear Power Station,Unit 2.Commitments Made within Ltr Also Encl | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000295/LER-1997-010, :on 960316,reactor Trip Due to Equipment Failure Occurred.Caused by New But Defective Pneumatic Vol Booster on Valve.Pneumatic Vol Booster for 1C Main FW Regulating Valve Replaced |
- on 960316,reactor Trip Due to Equipment Failure Occurred.Caused by New But Defective Pneumatic Vol Booster on Valve.Pneumatic Vol Booster for 1C Main FW Regulating Valve Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000295/LER-1997-010-01, :on 970404,radiation Area Surveys Were Missed. Caused by Inadequate TS Review.Nso,Unit Supervisor & Shift Engineer,Counseled |
- on 970404,radiation Area Surveys Were Missed. Caused by Inadequate TS Review.Nso,Unit Supervisor & Shift Engineer,Counseled
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000295/LER-1997-012-02, :on 970423,determined That Test Criteria for H Recombiner Was Inappropriate.Caused by Low Std for for Documentation of Changes to Vendor Recommendations. Will Review Results of 1995 TS Compliance Self Assessment |
- on 970423,determined That Test Criteria for H Recombiner Was Inappropriate.Caused by Low Std for for Documentation of Changes to Vendor Recommendations. Will Review Results of 1995 TS Compliance Self Assessment
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-012, Forwards LER 97-012-00,which Documents 970423 Event That Occurred at Zion Generating Station.Commitments Made by Util,Listed | Forwards LER 97-012-00,which Documents 970423 Event That Occurred at Zion Generating Station.Commitments Made by Util,Listed | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000295/LER-1997-013-02, :on 970412,VT-3 Insp Requirements of Relief Request CR-13 for Reactor Head Bolting Were Not Performed. Caused by Failure to Revise ISI Database After SER Received from Nrc.Procedure Revised |
- on 970412,VT-3 Insp Requirements of Relief Request CR-13 for Reactor Head Bolting Were Not Performed. Caused by Failure to Revise ISI Database After SER Received from Nrc.Procedure Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-014-02, :on 970502,TS Surveillances on Radiation Monitors Were Missed Because Technical Interpretation That Kept 1(2)RT-PR15 Operable Was Inoperable.Revised Station Procedures |
- on 970502,TS Surveillances on Radiation Monitors Were Missed Because Technical Interpretation That Kept 1(2)RT-PR15 Operable Was Inoperable.Revised Station Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-015-01, :on 970724,Unit 1 EDGs & Unit 2 RHR Sys Was Declared Inoperable Which Resulted in Inadvertent ESF While Performing TS Related Surveillance.Caused by Unclear Expectations.Declared EDG Operable on 970729 |
- on 970724,Unit 1 EDGs & Unit 2 RHR Sys Was Declared Inoperable Which Resulted in Inadvertent ESF While Performing TS Related Surveillance.Caused by Unclear Expectations.Declared EDG Operable on 970729
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000295/LER-1997-015-02, :on 970724,Unit 1 EDGs & Unit 2 RHR Sys Were Declared Inoperable & Inadvertent Esg Actuation Was Noted While Performing TS Related Surveillances.Cause Is Under Investigation.Restored ESF Equipment |
- on 970724,Unit 1 EDGs & Unit 2 RHR Sys Were Declared Inoperable & Inadvertent Esg Actuation Was Noted While Performing TS Related Surveillances.Cause Is Under Investigation.Restored ESF Equipment
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000295/LER-1997-016-01, Forwards LER 97-016-01,which Clarifies Info on Event Description,Root Causes & Safety Analysis.Cas Have Been Updated.Attachment a Provides Commitments Associated W/ Correspondence | Forwards LER 97-016-01,which Clarifies Info on Event Description,Root Causes & Safety Analysis.Cas Have Been Updated.Attachment a Provides Commitments Associated W/ Correspondence | | | 05000295/LER-1997-016, Forwards LER 97-016-00 Re Failure to Recognize That 125 Vdc Buses Were Inoperable During Inter Unit cross-tie.Event Investigation Is Ongoing & Corrective Actions Will Be Provided in Supplemental LER | Forwards LER 97-016-00 Re Failure to Recognize That 125 Vdc Buses Were Inoperable During Inter Unit cross-tie.Event Investigation Is Ongoing & Corrective Actions Will Be Provided in Supplemental LER | | | 05000295/LER-1997-016-02, :on 970905,failed to Recognize That 125 Vdc Buses Were Inoperable During Inter Unit cross-tie.Cause Indeterminate.Corrective Actions Will Provided in Supplemental Response to LER |
- on 970905,failed to Recognize That 125 Vdc Buses Were Inoperable During Inter Unit cross-tie.Cause Indeterminate.Corrective Actions Will Provided in Supplemental Response to LER
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-017-02, :on 970806,TS Surveillance on Containment Isolation Valve Operability Was Missed After Maint.Cause Undetermined.Revised & Performed PT-306 for Affected Valves Prior to Units 1 & 2 Reaching Mode 4 |
- on 970806,TS Surveillance on Containment Isolation Valve Operability Was Missed After Maint.Cause Undetermined.Revised & Performed PT-306 for Affected Valves Prior to Units 1 & 2 Reaching Mode 4
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000295/LER-1997-017, Forwards LER 97-017-00,informing That TS Surveillance Containment Isolation Valve Operability Was Missed After Maint.Commitments Made within Ltr,Encl | Forwards LER 97-017-00,informing That TS Surveillance Containment Isolation Valve Operability Was Missed After Maint.Commitments Made within Ltr,Encl | | | 05000295/LER-1997-017-01, :on 970806,TS Surveillance on Containment Isolation Valve Operability After Maint Was Missed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure Writer Who Failed to Identify Remaining Procedures by 1993 UFSAR Rev Has Been Counseled |
- on 970806,TS Surveillance on Containment Isolation Valve Operability After Maint Was Missed.Caused by Personnel Error.Procedure Writer Who Failed to Identify Remaining Procedures by 1993 UFSAR Rev Has Been Counseled
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