05000395/LER-1988-001, :on 880204,three Perimeter Cameras Lost Due to Circuit Breaker Trip.Caused by Electricians Crimping Electrical Lead While Replacing Distribution Panel Cover. Security Procedures Implemented

:on 880204,three Perimeter Cameras Lost Due to Circuit Breaker Trip.Caused by Electricians Crimping Electrical Lead While Replacing Distribution Panel Cover. Security Procedures Implemented

ML20196G267
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	03/01/1988
From:	Higgins W, Nauman D SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-88-001, LER-88-1, NUDOCS 8803070227
Download: ML20196G267 (6)

LER-1988-001, on 880204,three Perimeter Cameras Lost Due to Circuit Breaker Trip.Caused by Electricians Crimping Electrical Lead While Replacing Distribution Panel Cover. Security Procedures Implemented

Event date:
Report date:
3951988001R00 - NRC Website

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At approximately 0830 hours0.00961 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00137 weeks <br />3.15815e-4 months <br />, February 4, 1988, two plant electricians crimped an electrical lead while replacing an electrical distribution panel cover. The circuit shorted to ground and tripped a circuit.reaker which resulted in a loss of three perimeter cameras. Simultaneously, the current to ground situation caused the associated inverter to temporarily overload creating a momentary, but significant reduction in voltage that resulted in six electric door strikes failing in the unlocked (energized) position. At approximately 0840 hours0.00972 days <br />0.233 hours <br />0.00139 weeks <br />3.1962e-4 months <br />, security procedures were implemented to compensate for the loss of the cameras and total loss of the security computer system.

At approximately 0907 hours0.0105 days <br />0.252 hours <br />0.0015 weeks <br />3.451135e-4 months <br />, eleven additional security force personnel reported for duty from the training augmentation to compensate for the loss of alarm capability and locking mechanisms at the vital areas affected by the outage. Operational tests were conducted on all vital doors and perimeter intrusion detection segments affected. All tests were satisfactorily completed at 1243 hours0.0144 days <br />0.345 hours <br />0.00206 weeks <br />4.729615e-4 months <br />, February 4, 1988. Compensatory posts at each vital area remained in effect until each door was operationally tested.

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Date and time of event (start and end time):

February 4, 1988. Event started at 0832 hours0.00963 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00138 weeks <br />3.16576e-4 months <br /> and ended at 1243 hours0.0144 days <br />0.345 hours <br />0.00206 weeks <br />4.729615e-4 months <br />.

2.

l.ocation of actual or threatened event: Vital areas.

3.

Plant Operatina Phase: Mode 1, 100% Power.

4.

Safety systems affected or threatened. None.

5.

Type of security force onsite:

Proprietary supervision and contract security force personnel.

6.

Number and type of personnel involved; Two plant electricians, one quality control inspector, and approximately 30 security personnel.

7.

Method of discovery

Sensor annunciation in the Central and Secondary Alarm Station (CAS and SAS) which indicated that Inverter XIT5910 was operating in other than the automatic mode. Subsequent to the initial annunciation, multiple perimeter intrusion and class A supervision annunciations were received and three video inputs from perimeter cameras were lost in the CAS and SAS as the result of an electrical power interruption at Inverter XIT5910. Verbal reports from both operations and security personnel responding to the event indicated that several doors secured by electrical door strikes had failed in the unlocked (energized) position in contravention to the design basis for loss of electrical power to portal access controller (PAC) units.

8.

Procedural errors involved. if applicable:

Not applicable.

9.

Immediate actions taken or planned:

a.

Security procedures were implemented to compensate for the loss of three CCTV cameras and total loss of the security computer system. All actions were initiated at approximately 0840 hours0.00972 days <br />0.233 hours <br />0.00139 weeks <br />3.1962e-4 months <br />, b.

Upon receiving reports that two vital doors had failed with their electrical strikes in the unlocked (energized) position, a recall of security personnel from the training augmentation was directed at approximately 0842 hours0.00975 days <br />0.234 hours <br />0.00139 weeks <br />3.20381e-4 months <br /> to provide adequate manpower to compensate for the "potential" loss of both alarm capability and locking mechanisms at 18 vital doors receiving electrical power from APN5910.

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At approximately 0904 hours0.0105 days <br />0.251 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.43972e-4 months <br />, a security instrument mechanic was directed to cycle each breaker in APN5910. The action was required to reset and reinitialize the affected PAC units and was completed at approximately 0906 hours0.0105 days <br />0.252 hours <br />0.0015 weeks <br />3.44733e-4 months <br />. As a results of the action, the PAC microprocessor and ancillary control boards were reset and reinitialized causing the affected electric door strikes to return to the locked (deenergized) position.

d.

At approximately 0907 hours0.0105 days <br />0.252 hours <br />0.0015 weeks <br />3.451135e-4 months <br />, 11 additional security force personnel reported for duty from the training augmentation and were dispatched to observe the affected portals and provide access control. At approximately 0915 hours0.0106 days <br />0.254 hours <br />0.00151 weeks <br />3.481575e-4 months <br />, all compensatory posts were manned and all vital area portals were verified to be properly secured.

e.

Based upon inspection by security personnel conducting compensatory patrols, the locking mechanisms on six vital doors failed in the unlocked (energized) position. Operations and fire protection personnel were posted by the Shift Supervisor at these doors for the purpose of performing continuous fire watch and remained at the affected doors until approximately 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br /> after all doors had been secured.

Security personnel were dispatched to compensate vital doors which were discovered by the security compensatory patrols to be in an unlocked (energized) position.

f.

Operational tests were conducted on all vital doors and perimeter intrusion detection segments connected to APN5910. All tests were satisfactorily completed at 1243 hours0.0144 days <br />0.345 hours <br />0.00206 weeks <br />4.729615e-4 months <br />.

Compensatory posts at each vital area remained in effect until each door was operationally tested.

10. Corrective actions taken in response to the event:

a.

The damaged electrical circuit in APN5910 was immediately temporarily repaired and final repair was completed February 18, 1988.

b.

The design of the microprocessor and cardreader interconnect boards is being developed and a modification will be processed which will preclude the randon actuation of the electric door strikes during a momentary, but signi'icant reduction in electrical power at a PAC unit.

Pending receipt of components required for implementation of the modification and allowing four weeks for installation and testing, the scheduled target date for completion of the modification is July 15, 1988.

11. Local. state or federal law enforcement agencies contacted:

None.

12. Description of media interest and press release:

None.

13.

Indication of previous similar events:

None.

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14. Knowledceable contact:

W. R. Higgins, Supervisor, Regulatory Compliance

15. Description of failed or malfunctioned eauipment: Microprocessor boards (Part 200140) and cardreader interconnect boards (Part 200569) which are subcomponents of the Portal Access Control (PAC) manufactured by TENERA (Previous TERA Corporation T-146 EIIS [IA]), L. P. (Berkeley, CA).

The PAC unit and its ancillary control boards are used in the security computer system to control access of personnel to various areas of the plant using cardreaders and electrically controlled door strikes.

Failure of the equipment was due to the momentary reduction of the five VDC power supply below the industry design specification necessary to maintain proper transistor-to-transistor (TTL) logic for integrated circuitry resulting in the spurious, but random actuation of several electric door strikes.

16. Apparent cause of each component or system failure:

a.

At approximately 0832 hours0.00963 days <br />0.231 hours <br />0.00138 weeks <br />3.16576e-4 months <br />, two plant electricians crimped an electrical circuit (PSZ1142) while replacing the panel cover on APN5910 after completing a routine inspection of the panel at the request of Quality Control. The circuit shorted to ground and tripped breaker 24 which resulted in the immediate loss of perimeter cameras 11, 12, and 13.

Simultaneously, the current to ground situation caused Inverter XIT5910 to temporarily overload creating a me;.entary, but significant reduction in voltage to various components connected to the distribution panel.

b.

As a result of the electrical short, nine perimeter alarm annunciations occurred at the tagments receiving power from APN5910. Additionally, 34 portal access controller (PAC) uni +s reported a Class A supervision alert signifying that communications between the PAC units and the host computer had been disrupted.

c.

As a result of the shorted electrical circuit, the five VDC logic circuitry malfunctioned causing the processor board to hecf.:e disabled and prevented reinitialization of the PAC units when power was completely restored.

d.

In six cases, electric door strikes controlled by the PAC units failed in the unlocked (energized) position. The PAC units are designed to fail in the locked (deenergized) position whenever a total loss of power occurs. Based upon benct tests Lnducted by Security Maintenance to simulate the voltage drop experienced during the event, it was demonstrated that when voltage is reduced below 60 volts AC or three volts DC at a PAC unit that transistor-to transistor (TTL) logic is disrupted and may result in the electric door strike actuating and remaining actuated (unlocked). This phenomena is random and can occur only 4

when a momenta j, but significant reduction in voltage occurs at a PAC unit.

The door strike fails in the locked (deenergized) position each time a total loss of power occurs at a PAC unit.

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17. Status of the eauipment prior to the event: Operating.

18. Secondar_y functions affected (for multiple-function components):

None.

19. Effect on plant safety: None.

20. ynusual conditions that ma_y have contributed to the failure: None.

21. Previous occurrence: None.

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10CFR73.71 gth,cgna ti.ct,$c a ca, company gngNa s n

Nuclear Operations coun;b4ag29218 SCE&G March 2, 1988 Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 4

Subject: Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Docket No. 50/395 Operating License No. NPF-12 LER 88-001 Gentlemen:

Attached is Licensee Event Report No.88-001 for the Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station. This report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR73.71(c).

Should there be any questions, please call us at your convenience.

Very truly yours, am-D. A. Nauman RJB/ DAN: led Attachment I

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J.G.Connelly, Jr./0. W. Dixon, Jr./T. C. Nichols, Jr.

E. C. Roberts C. S. Bradham W. A. Williams, Jr.

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J. N. Grace General Managers C. A. Price G. G. Soult J. R. Proper W. R. Higgins T. L. Matlosz R. M. Campbell, Jr.

i K. E. Nodland J. C. Snelson G. O. Percival J. J. Hayes, Jr.

R. L. Prevatte J. B. Knotts, Jr.

INPO Records Center i

ANI Library Ng t.

Marsh & McLennan NSRC I

RTS NPCF File