ML20080P014
| ML20080P014 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zimmer |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1983 |
| From: | Devine T GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, MIAMI VALLEY POWER PROJECT |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20080P018 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8310060245 | |
| Download: ML20080P014 (81) | |
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h UNITED STATES OF AMERICA *; a
? NUCLEAR REGUIATORY COMMISSION
,o '; F 3 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BODD .- 3,
', In the Matter of ) 00CMETEi!
) 'JS!2 :
THE CINCINNATI GAS AND ELECTRIC ) COMPANY, e_t_. al_. Docket No. 50-358 g gq (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power ) Station) ) W,. , , ;:
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y G!.w: MVPP'S PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF SEPTEMBER 15, 1983 ORDER Pursuant to 10 CFR S2.771, intervenor Miami Valley Power Project ("MVPP") petitions the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (" ASLB" or " Board") to reconsider its Septephe- 15, 1983 order. The Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company, et. al. (William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) ASLBP No. 76-317-01 OL, 17 NRC (September 15, 1983) (" September 15 Order"), denying MVPP's Motion to Reopen the Record for admission of eight proposed contentions; as well as ancillary motions requesting receipt of additional evidence, , and Board review of significant unpublished or pending Nuclear l Regulatory Commission ("NRC") investigations pertaining to the William H. Zimmer nuclear power station ("Zimmer") . MVPP requests that this Board reconsider its decision in the entirety, as well as with respect to specific portions of its proposed contentions based on new information or events that meet the Board's expressed requirements for timely filing. MVPP also requests that this Board reconsider its decision not to reopen the record for more limited purposes including discovery and receipt of evidence to further 1/ develop the evidentiary record before accepting contentions." N As a protective measure MVPP also is submitting a motion to the l Appeal
- Board to extend'the time to' appeal the September 15 order
[ until after this Board has ruled on today's petition for l reconsideration. 8310060245 831003 PDR ADOCK 05000358 g PDR I . _ _ _ _ _ _-._ _..,_ _ _ .__ _ _ __ _.. _ _ _,
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** 'f It is proper for thic LicCnsing B3ard to raconsid2r ita '
Order dated September 15, 1983,. As the Commission has held, " (t) he { ability to reconsider is inherent in the ability to decide in the first instance." Florida Power and Light Company (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2), CLI-80-41, 12 NRC 650, 652 (1980). In addition to significant nonfactual developments, petition for reconsideration can be founded on errors of fact or' law, as , recognized by the Commission in its review of MVPP's Petition for Reconsideration of Commission Order of July 30, 1982. Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),
.CLI-83-4, 17 NRC , slip op. at 1 (February 22, 1983) (" February 22 Order") . A petition for reconsideration may also be based upon an abuse of discretion, as noted in the NRC Staff Answer in Support of Miami Valley Power Project's Petition for Reconsidera-tion of the Commission's Order of July 30, 1982 (September 22, 1982) at pages 10-12.
In meeting that standard, a petition may properly consist of "an elaboration upon, or refinement of, arguments previously . advanced." Tennessee Valley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plants,
. Units lA, 2A, 1B, & 2B), ALAB-418, 6 NRC 1,2 (1977). Accord, Central Electric Cocperative, Inc. (Virgil C. Summer Nuclear F Station, Unit 1), CLI-81-26, 14 NRC 787, 790 (1911).
MVPP's instant Peitition for Reconsideration meets all of i these procedural standards, and must be considered by the Licensing Board on its merits. l This petition is supported by extensive information which arose after the Commission held that there was an inadequate basis to i l reopen the record. Among the most compelling recent developments are the significant factual developments of the last week. These develop-l l ments require reopening the record due to their inherent impact on
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_3- '/ any licensing decision, as well as their relevance to specific 1 reopening criteria analysed by this Board. The petition is also j based on instances of legal error and abuse nf discretion with respect to this Board's evaluation of the criteria for reopening the record and accepting new contentions. I. SIGNIFICANT FACTUAL DEVELOPMENTS , [l' The last week has seen significant new developments concerning the status of the Zimmer plant, the role of the NRC stiff at Zimmer, and the nature of reopened licensing hearings. Certain of these events in isolation would require this Board to reopen the record. All are highly relevant to any decision on MVPP's initiative. Taken in combination, the new developments summarized below represent a fundamentally different record than was before this Board when it ruled on September 15, 1983. A. Bechtel Announcement of Revised Cost-Schedule Estimates. On Friday, September 30, when the Bechtel Power Corporation reported to Applicants on the estimated cost and time necessary to complete the plant, Bechtel told Applicants that Zimmer cannot be completed for another two to three years and will have a total price-tag of $2.8 to $3.5 billion. (See " Cincinnati GEE Says l Plant Cost Could Double," The Wall Street Journal, p. 3 (October l 3, 1983), attached and incorporated as Exhibit 1) . In light of the' current $1. 7 billion cost estimate, in terms of expenditures Applicants will have to rebuild the plant. The immediate significance of the announcement is that all previous assumptions about QA and design issues are no longer relevant ! for licensing. In effect, unless the record is reopened Zimmer will be 9 I
_ _ . . . _ . _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _ - . _ . '1 built again without ang oversight by the Atomic Safety and Licensing 1, Board. It is unfortunate that the QA breakdown escaped this Board's ) t i scrutiny the first time Zimmer was built, but the parties had not i presented a basis for alarm. This time, however, the QA breakdown is known by all parties and by the Board. Licensing proceedings are mandatory under these circumstances. Under these conditions, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, very clearly requires public hearings. Section 189 of the Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. 5, 2239 (a) (1) states in pertinent part: In any proceeding under this chapter, .for the granting, suspending, revoking, or amending or any license or construction permit, or application to transfer control, and in any proceeding for the issuance or modification of rules and regulations dealing with the activities of liceumees, and in any proceeding for the payment of compen-sation, an award or royalties under sections 2183, 2187, 2236 (c) or 2238 of this title, the Commission shall grant a hearing upon the request of any person whose interest may be affected by the proceeding, and shall admit any such person as a party to such proceeding. The Commission shall hold a hearing after thirty days' notice and publica-tion once in the Federal Register, on each application under section 2133 or 2134(b) of this title for a construction permit for a facility, and on -any application under section 2134 (c) of this title for a construction permit for a testing facility. The importance of hearings is not diminished by earlier pro-ceedings addressing the initial round of construction at Zimmer. Since the plant is going to be largely rebuilt, hearings are necessary to resolve the ultimate question of whether the plant can and will be operated so as not to endanger the public health and safety. 42 U.S.C. SS 2133(d), 2232 (a) ; 10 C.F.R. S 50.57 (a) (3) (i) .
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Even if the repairs contemplated by Bechtel to finish the plant were nothing more' than patchwork on the old design, the j i; massive scope and unreliable CG&E QA program raise serious safety concerns and warrant a full review by this Board, as contemplated by' MVPP contentions 4 and 7. Especially given the , track record of CG&E, any systematic rebuilding cries out for licensing proceedings to protect the public health and safety rights of MVPP as well as all other citizens of Ohio and Northern Kentucky. It is clear that making modifications to safety-related equipment without adequate quality assurance constitutes a serious safety issue, with enormous potential safety consequences to the public. See. e.g., "Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2 Allegations Regarding Safety Related Modifications, Quality Assurance Procedures and Use of Polar Crane," NRC Office of Investi-gations (September 1, 19 83) . Similarly, Chairman Palladino acknowledged, at an October 26, 1982 Public Staff briefing of the Commission on the status of Zimmer acknowledged that repairs under the Quality Confirmation Program at Zimmer could actually create more serious problens than the original l QA deficiencies. The recent calloway case strongly affirms that pervasive quality assurance program weaknesses both raise the ultimate issue for licens-ing, even if all specific construction errors are corrected. The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board states:
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l In examining claims of quality assuranca deficiencies, one must look to the implication of those deficiencies in terms ! of safe plant operation. l l
r _a_.____ __m. . . ._.__ _ _ - _ . _ N 6-Obviously, this inquiry necessitates careful consideration 5 of whether all ascertained construction errors have been f cure d. Even if this is established to be the case, however, I there may remain a question whether there has been a breakdown in quality assurance procedures of sufficient dimensions to raise legitimate doubt as to the overall integrity of the facility and its safety-related structures and components. A demonstration of a per~vasive f ailure to carry out the quality assurance program might well stand in the way of the , requisite safety finding. , [ Union Electric Company (Callaway Plant, Unit 1) ALAB-740, 17 NRC
, , slip op. at 2-3 (September 14, 19 83) (emphasis added) .
For all of these reasons it is clear that both the letter and the spirit of the hearing requirement of the Atomic Energy Act re-quire a full public hearing on the quality assurance impact of the Bechtel announcement. - A legitimate public hearing on these crucial safety questions is not only required, but offers significant benefit for the public interest. That is why it has long been a general rule that " issues
' should be dealt with in the hearings and not left over for later (and possibly informal) resolution by the staff." Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Indian Point; Unit No. 2), CLI-74-23,
! 7 AEC 947, 951-52 (1974), quoted Public Service Company of Indiana, Inc. (Marble Hill Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-461, 7 NRC 313, 318 (1978). l The unique and fundamental legal importance of hearings has been clearly recognized by the Commission. For example, in the very first reported NRC decision, the Commission stated:
- We wish to underscore the fundamental importance of meaningful public participation in our adjudicatory process. Such participation, performed in the public j interest, is a vital ingredient in the open and full con-l sideration of licensing issues and in establishing public confidence in the sound discharge of the important duties l which have been entrusted to us. It cannot be disputed
'- that only if our rules provide for, and we are perceived
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. h, by all to allow ' full exploration of the safety and envir-i l
onmental aspects of each reactor for which a construction l permit or operating license is sought,' will the objective of such meaningful participation be achieved. Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2) , CLI-75-1, 1 NRC 1, 2 (1975). As the Commission itself has noted: When the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 authorized the develop-ment of a civilian nuclear power industry, it was understood from the first that the public might well be apprehensive about a technology associated in the ninds of most with the destructive power of atomic weapons. One of the major reasons for providing for public hearings on nuclear power plants was to provide a means for educating the public about nuclear energy and the measures taken to assure its safety. The 1965 report to the AEC by its Regulatory Review panel, for example, characterized the most significant functions of public hearings as including a demonstration that ' the AEC has been diligent in protecting the public interest' and that the , applicant's proposal had received a ' thorough and competent review. ' Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1) , CLI-80-39, 12 NRC 607, 613 (1980) (separate views of Commissioner Hendrie), quoted ir! Metropolitan Edison' Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1) , CLI-82-6, 15 NRC 407, 409 (1982). Hearings go far beyond a mere educational function, however, as this Licensing Board has repeatedly observed: We believe that a full public airing of this matter will not only contribute to public confidence, but will also strengthen the QA program. Subjecting the program to the scrutiny of the Commission's adjudicatory process can only contribute, not detract, to reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be protected. Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-82-54, 16 NRC 210, 215 (1982), quoted in Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), Memorandum and Order, 17 NRC -
, , slip op. at 33 (September 15, 1983).
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8_ ', ,* 1 If CG&E were right in its assertion that intervenors are simply
" shrill" voices caring nothing about the safety of the plant, see exhibit 7, infra, then hearings would also effectively discredit the distractions and would increase public confidence in the safety of the Zimmer plant.
In addition to the salutary effects adjudication will have on plant QA, it will play an important role in insuring proper NRC staff action. In the words of former Commissioner Peter Bradford: We look to public hearings to serve two purposes. They should provide a strong and skeptical independent check on the NRC's internal reviews, and they provide the only avenue for citizens to resolve concerns about a new and serious hazard being introduced into their communities. Testimony of Peter Bradford before Senate Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, March 31, 1981. Commissioner Bradford's comments reflect one of the important practical values of public hearings, and underline -again the legal imperative of holding such hearings. Because of the importance of the QA issues that have never ! been aired in a adjudicatory hearing, .there has been a massive loss of public confidence in the safety of the Zimmer Plant, based on j the issues initially raised by whistleblowers and MVPP. This loss of confidence is reflected in numerous local and national investiga-tive reports and local editorials. Examples are incorporated and attached as Exhibits 2 through 5 Exhibit 2, " Weak Links? Nuclear-Plant Welders Of ten Aren' t Qualified for the Job, Critics Say," Wall Street Journal, (September 7, 1983), page 1; Exhibit 3, "The Truth About Zimmer," Cincinnati Magazine, September 1983, page l
- 82. Exhibit 4 ; Editorial: "The Zimmer Report," Cincinnati Post, i - -
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f (August 24, 1983); Exhibit 5 , Editorial: "Z IMMER: Torrey Pinns < study lays the blame for f ailures on CG&E's management," Cincinnati Enquirer, (August 25, 1983). While MVPP recognizes that loss of I public confidence is not a dispositive basis for hearings, it e clearly is a significant factor. These additional exhibits suggest that this Board may have underestimated the intensity of pdblic concern over Zimmer. The Bechtel announcement also is relevant and decisively .signifi-cant for specific arguments critical to evaluate MVPP's prcposed contentions. For ins tance, it TSans that the fif th criterion 'to evaluate new contentions under 10 CFR S2.714 (a), whether reopening the record will broaden the issues or delay the proceeding; now weighs compellingly in MVPP's favor. The Bechtel announcement indicates that CG&E's consultant has already broadened the issues as f ar as possible, and the projected construction delays will dwarf the time burdens necessary for reasonable 6djudication of MVPP's
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contentions. , Additionally, the Bechtel announcement cements the financial conflict of interest that disqualifies Applicants frcm continued control over quality assurance remedial action. Bechtel's announcement definitionally means that Zimmer faces a potentially fatal economic barrier to completion. As CG&E has recognized, the severity of the economic burden will directly depend on the nature of its quality verification program. The new information also exacerbates the conflict from legal arbitration between the partners over cost and schedule issues. In light of the nature of the issues in arbitration proceeding, CG_&E:could lose the financial support of its partners for completion of the project. (See "Utilitfes Disputes Over Zimmer Will Go To Arbitration," The k
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(.. j s - f. [ Cincinnati 2nquirer, p. D-2 (September 8, 1983) attached and incor-porated an Exhibit 6 ) . The combined effect of CG&E's new legal / g t vulnerability to economic consequences, and the staggering nature of thesconsequences, renders it inherently impossible for CG&E to maintain' objective jdagments on, the same quality assurance issues that constitute the economic threat. < B. MVPP Offer to Stipulate Time and Issue Limitations. 1 On Thursday, September 29, 1983, through counsel , MVPP communicated an offer to stipulate limitations on its proposed con-l tentions that would (1) specify a reasonable time limit for the m hearings; (2) minimize interference with other CG&E management ,' ' e x activitids:,1 and (3) establish a program,for MVPP to withdraw all
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a f actual,'al' legations from litigation on the QA contentions, dependant
- . . upon, stipulation of an adequate correct action program for each
~ > ( ., allegation without as'suming *' its validity. The mechanism to reduce r,
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the issues in dispute would depend ' pon; u negotiations between CG&E S an'd the whistleblowers who initially raised the issues to MVPP. l4 ; .D\ Tod3ys MVPP recorded the offer in a letter to Applicants. (See ( , l October 3, 1983 letter to Admiral Joseph Williams, Jr. from Thomas , s 1" , Devine, attached and incorporated as Exhibit 7) . s This offer inherently would eliminate relevant delays from ! reopened proceedings by prohibiting delays, and would shrink the scope of contested is, sues solely to those with constructive signifi-cande for the safe completion of Zimmer. Combined with the effect s of the Bechtel announcement, MVPP now makes a compelling showing on ? s l the fifth criterion to accept late contentions. C. Removal of Mr. Cummi'ngs. I \ On Wednesday, September 28,MVPP counsel learned that NRC Office
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7_. f g/ of Inspector and Auditor ("OIA") hea'd James Cummings had been removed from his position on a 3-2 vote of the Commission. Mr. Cummings had V supervised' the 1981 investigation of the NRC's role in failing to identify the Zimmer QA breakdown after allegations by whistleblower Thomas Applegate. Mr. Cummings was removed from office in the wake of NRC internal investigation by Administrative Law Judge Helen Hoyt into his handling of the sensitive assignment. "NRC Ousts Investi-gations Chief Who Guided Zimmer Probe," The Cincinnati Equirer,
- p. . A-1 (September 30, 1983). Mr. Cummings deleted certain key sections
'of the published report and then on March 22, 1982 denied the existence of the deleted materials in response to a November 23, 1981 Freedom of-Information Act ("FOIA") request presented on behalf of Mr. .
Applegate by the' Government Accountability Project (" GAP") , now MVPP's counsel as well. The NRC staff's persistent, intricate program j to deceive the public about the nature of the evidence on Zimmer led y to harsh -judicial condemnation. Applegate v. NRC, No. 82-1829 (D.D.C. O May 24', 1983). Again in response to an allegation from Mr. Applegate with GAP's representaticn, Administrative Law Judge Hoyt recently completed an l investigation into alleged deliberate actions by the NRC staff de-signed to prevent the public from learning the truth about Zimmer. GAP attorneys testified about instances of where Mr. Cummings engahed
'in such misconduct. --2/
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For a full discussion of NBC staff misomduct with respect to Zimer,
- see the August 20, October 11 and Mr 14,1982 MVPP sutznissions petiticning L the Comission to reconsider its July 30, 1982 Order dismissing contentions l
' proposed by MVPP.
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r r c k On September 15, 1983 GAP requested the report under the FOIA. No response has been received to date. On August 26, 1 1983 MVPP moved that this Board review and consider the Hoyt investigation prior to ruling on the proposed contentions. In its September 15 Order this Board denied the motion. (See L September 15 Order, at 25. ) : An analysis of Mr. Cumming's removal is necessary to fairly evaluate whether good cause exists for MVPPs tardiness. This Board has applied the standards in the Commission's recent Catawba decision, Duke Power Company, et al. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2) , CLI-83-19, 17 NRC (June 30, 1983) to evaluate whether good cause existed for MVPP's 1983 lateness in refiling contentions. The new Catawba standard must also be applied to MVPP's 1982 tardiness. In that light, MVPP's tardiness is fully excused. As recognized by this Board, Catawba stands for the proposition that intervenors are responsible to analyze the significance of all available information on the public record. (17 NRC at , slip op. pp. 11-12, quoted in July 15 Order, p. 25). Mr. Cumming's dismissal is consistent with MVPP counsels ' allegations that the NRC staff censored the public record to conceal the same basic issues upon which MVPP proposed its May 1982 contentions. House Interior and Insular Affairs Chairman Morris Udall already has recognized that NRC manipulation of the FOIA was a major f actor behind the delay in recognizing the necessity for stronger regulatory action in 1982. (MVPP's June 3 Motion to Reopen the Record, Exhibit ti , 13 ) . Catawba does not hold intervenors liable for information y. . beyond the public record, and this Board has ruled that Catawba is control ing. The Hoyt investigation apparently confirmed that the j . , - c-,. n- ,, --e e.-----m- , - , y-
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13 - 1 NRC staff distorted the public record itself, on the same issues for which MVPP was " late." In light of Catawba all of MVPP's 1982
" tardiness" must be assessed to the staff.
f Any other result would frustrate the suggestion in Catawba that undue delay by the staff can easily be dealt with in a balancing test. Most significant, any other decision would excuse j t the NRC staff and CG&E from all liability before this Board for withholding relevant information for years. Simultaneously, the public would be judged in default of its obligations for failing to be clairvoyant and taking six months to independently expose the coverup. This result would violate the ultimate test of Catawba:
"The proper test of a regulation is whether its normal and fair interpretation will deny persons of their statutory rights." Id. ,
citing American Trucking Association v. United States, 201 U.S. App. D.C. 327, 627 F.2d 1313, 1318-19 (D.C. Cir. 1980). MVPP feels vindicated that the Commissioners recognized the severity of Mr. Cummings' misconduct. Unfortunately, the intervenors have not been made whole. The Board still has penalized the publit , by refusing to allow hearings, because of the deception of high-3/ level NRC staff management. ~ _3/ The Hoyt inwkstigation also received evidence that Begion III manipulated the ptblic record in 1E Report 50-358/81-13, the other Novenber 1981 NRC dis-closure of QA violations. MVPP attorneys made this point in testinony to Judge Hoyt. Janes McCarten, a former NRC inv6stigator, recently reported that-he also testified to that effect and specifically applied his criticisms of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement to whether this Board should reopen licensing hearings. - Mr. McCarten led the 1981 investigaticn which created the other half of the public record on Zinmer for which MVPP is accotntable under Catawba. MVPP received Mr. McCarten's letter fran a ocnfidential source under ocmditions of anonymity. See June 29, 1983 letter to Helen F. Hoyt from Janes B. McCarten, attached and incorporated as EAibit 8,) . 0
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II. ERROR IN BALANCING THE F1VE CRITERIA OF 10 CFR S 2.714 (a) This Board stated that MVPP's contentions , i should and could have been advanced long ago. f Nothing new has been. presented which is outside i the contemplation of the original contentions. In this circumstance, MVPP must make a compelling showing on the other four criteria in order to be successful. Mississippi Power and Light Company, j et al. (Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2), J ALAB-704, 16 NRC 1725 (1982). [ A. Incomparable Factual Contexts. Initially, MVPP submits that Grand Gulf is inapposite on
. the facts. In that case the state of Louisiana was relatively inactive except for the ASLB forum (Grand Gulf, id. , at 1730).
By contrast, in 1982 MVPP conducted a parallel investigation and submitted contentions in six months. In 1983, during the 2.5 months between receipt of Applicant's response to the NRC's Demand for Information and the June 3 motion to reopen the record, MVPP pursued corrective action at Zimmer through conducting a parallel investigation to that of the staff; participated actively in the Commission's third party program; submitted a relevant petition undar 10 CFR S 2.206; studied and. assimilated two massive I evaluations of the record at Zimmer -- submitted successively by CG&E and the NRC staff; and prepared its motion. The relevant diligence of the parties is not comparable. Second, the extent of delay attributed to the intervenors in Grand Gulf is not comparable to this proceeding. In Grand Gulf Louisiana was dormant for four years. MVPP has been filing briefs on its contentions for all but nine months out of the less than two years since this Board's late 1980 estimate for timely filing. e
M Third, a calculation of tha ralsvant time frame to nasens *# f delay indicates that at most MVPP has taken 3.0 months of relevant time to study the record it had obtained and to prepare its motions. MVPP contends that this amount of " delay" is reasonable and, i I indeed, inherently necessary for proper preparation of submissions. At worst, the inexcusable delay has been marginal and does not justify imposition 'of the " compelling showing" burden on all 3 t other criterj a under section 2.714 (a). I Initially, the starting point for any-fair computation of time must begin when MCPP received the new info'rmation in previously unavailable documents, Cincinnati Gas and Electric et al. (William H. Zimmer' Nuclear Station), LBP-80-14, 11 NRC, 570,574 (1980), not when it conceived the subject matter for contentions. Since MVPP has paid the penalty for this burden, it should receive the resulting benefits. In the instant case the Commission dismissed even this Board's sua sponte contentions in large part due to insufficient evidentiary basis outside the public record. Indeed, Applicants not only argued that MVPP was required to provide sufficient evidentiary basis for its ' g motion but should be prohibited from submitting additional supporting evidence! (Applicant's Answer to Motion by Miami Valley Power Project for Leave to File New Contentions (June 2, 1983), at 43-7) . - The effect of the policy was that MVPP had to provide credible proof for its contentions, not merely conceive them. Nor was it enough to receive anonymous tips from NRC whistle-blowers, without evidence outside the public record. MVPP took j six months to (1) study the four-inch thick IE Report No. 50-358/81-13; (2) conduct a parallel investigation that proved the MT
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' oxtant of the NRC-staff's covarup in that report; and (3) prspara *7 new contentions. MVPP's investigation bore its first f ruits of
" secret" documentary evidence in early May. Two weeks later it filed the proposed contentions, on the same day that it received ft the bulk. of documentary evidence. MVPP then intensified its investigation, testified in forums before Congress and the
. Commission, responded to Applicant's pleadings, received a
; " course" in quality assurance from whistleblowers, applied the knowledge to some 3,000 pages of documentary evidence and indexed the data in an August 20, 1982 sdamission to the Commission.
The net result is that for the relevant factor, time between receipt of non-public evidence and filing of contentions, MVPP took two weeks. With respect to other measures, MVPP took six months to cover the NRC staff's tracks, and three months to assimilate and present the massive exhibits submitted for the record on August 20, 1982. By any fair standard, these were all reasonable time periods. By contrast, the NRC staff spent nine months preparing IE Report 50-358/81-13. CG&E took six months to respond ineffectively to MVPP's August 20 submission of evidence.-4/ During 1983, MVPP took 2.5 months to study approximately ) 550 pages of Aatailed reports from Applicants and the NRC staff's National Evaluation Team and to prepare its motion after the limitations of the NRC's remedial Zimmer Action Plan were exposed, in addition to the other contributions listed above. (Supra, at 14.) 13Ha time required by MVPP to "do its homework" compares
$/ MVPP, contends that it is unnecessary to defend the timelines of its 1980 motion since that motion is no longer before this Board. ,tve current proceeding is on a new motion based upon new
; evidence. Since this Board ha.e applied the 1982 schedule against MVPP, however, it is necessary to respond further.
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. _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ . . . . - - - _ (1 favorably to the evaluation in Wisconsin Public Serice Corporation, et al.. (Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant), .CBP-78-24, ,8 NRC 78, 81 n.2 . that petitioners to intervene " acted in a timely manner" by filing their petition 30 days after learning the true status of their procedural rights.
Finally, MVPP's good cause for tardiness must be evaluated in the light of the pace set in these proceedings by Applicants and NRC staff. Since these proceedings began in 1975, both have had access to all the information submitted by MVPP and in existence at that time. By comparison, MVPP's three month lag time over two years between receipt of evidence and sub-mission of contentions represents an accelerated schedule, compared to the seven year time lag by the same parties now complaining about MVPP's pace. A. Legal Error Even when not considered separately, licensing boards must evaluate all the principles for reopening the record when examin-ing the five criteria for late contentions. The factors inherently are intertvi-
- Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CBP-83-30, 17 NRC , , slip op.
- p. 16 (June 22, 1983).-5/ Despite recognizing the mandatory nature of the reopening factors, the Board failed to articulate any rationale for its summary conclusion that the standards for reopen-l l
ing the record'have not been met, other than to allude to the S/ The standards for reopening the hearing are (1) whether the motion is timely, (2) whether it addresses significant safety (or environ-mental) issues, and (3) whether a different result might be reached if the profferred material were considered. Pacific Gas and Electric Co., (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2) ALAB-598, 11 NRC 876,879 (1980). l
separate standards for the admission of contentions. Thus, .this Board failed to address the most important factor ; of all, whether the Zimmer plant can be safely operated, and thus f ignores the significant public health and safety issues that MVPP has raised, and persuasively supported with extensive new evidence produced by its own investigations.' . If the Licensing Board were to consider the ultimate ' issue of safety, MVPP submits that it would be compelled by logic and NRC precedent to reopen the record, and to admit MVPP's contentions. The Board places great reliance on Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, , Units 1 and 2), CLI-83-19, 17 NRC (June 30, 1983), to assert that MVPP's new evidence should not be considered. Catawba, however, places the competing factors in their proper perspective and supports the pre-eminent importance of. safety in determining whether to reopen the record and admit new contentions: 4 T 7here is: substantial public interest in efficient and e ditious administrative pro-ceedings . . . T 7his interest is undoubtedly ! subordinate to e public's interests in health, safety and the environment . . . Catawba, supra, slip op. at 11. This reiterates a well-established principle in NRC cases: that safety is a more important issue than timeliness. For example, the Appeal Board stated in Vermont Yankee Power Co. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Station), ALAB-124, 6 AEC 358, 365 n. 10 (1973), "[ I_7f the problem raised presents a sufficiently grave threat to public safety, a board should reopen the record to consider it even if it is not newly discovered and could have been raised in timely fashion." Similarly, the Board in Consumers Power Company (Big Rock l
Point), LBP-8 2-19 , 15 NRC 627,6.31 (1982), stated: Even though there has been no showing of, good I cause for late filing, we are hesitant to reject any contention supported by sufficient basis to demonstrate that the public health and safety or the environment would be endangered. In such a r case we would be obligated to exercise our authority to declare such an issue part of the proceeding, perhaps by analogy to the' 'sua sponte authority provided for in operating license cases f~ emphasis added_7 i-See also, e.g., Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island [ l Nuclear Station, Unit 2), ALAB-474, 7 NRC 746 (1978); Carolina Power and Light Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units J 1, 2, 3 and 4), LBP-78-2, 7 NRC 83 (1978). The Board also erred by basing its review on a search for new issues, rather than new information. While creative, this approach discards long-standing precedent. /[N_7ewly arising information has long been recognized as providing ' good cause' for acceptance of a late contention. Consumers Power Co.
-(Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2) , LBP-82-63,.16 NRC 571,577 (1982),
citing Indiana and Michigan Electric Co. (Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2) , CLI-72-75, 5 AEC 13,14 (1972), and Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Station), ! LBP-80-14, 11 NRC 570,574 (1980), appeal dismissed, ALAB-595, 11 NRC 860 (1980). The Board's " meat and bones" analogy is instructive. Last year, the Commission declined to accept MVPP's platter, because it was all bones. The meat is the meal.
- Within the past year, important new evidence, .of several different t.
types, has arisen, and MVPP has now provided the necessary quantum of evidence for reopening the record and admitting MVPP's conten-tions. , a o
b The Board's application of the " meat and bones" analogy would ] lead to strange consequences indeed. For example, .it would be e
~
impossible to reopen a record to consider the effects of recurring accidents or events, because each new event would merely lend more support to the relevant contention, . adding more and more '" meat on the bones", but never being considered significant enough to warrant a hearing, merely because it was "conteinplated by" the contention. In reality, the sign'ificance of recurring violations is that the Applicant's program is not working. As it continues to fail, the consequences multiply and the risk to public safety is maximized. The Commission-ordered Torrey Pines Report on its management review ("TP Report") offers strong evidence in support of this proposition. The TP Report discusses a myriad of significant QA program flaws that persist today. Even if the rest of Zimmer's problems were solved, licensing hearings would be invaluable in light of the ominous nature of those which remain. For example, in 1982 CG&E began trending quality deficiencies for the first time in its history. The TP Report reveals, however, that in 1983 CG&E dropped the program. Nonconformance Reports ("NR") and Corrective Action Reports (" CAR") have remained open l for years. As late as February 1983 cases were found where individual audit reports remained open for 2-3 years without CG&E interim inquiry. Even more disillusioning, QA remains vulnerable to being shunted aside while construction inspects itself. Torrey Pines described "recent examples" where construction control', led or attempted to perform QA audits and inspections for work such as hardware modifications after design changes. m_
^ ^ '- ^ ^ ~~ ~
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1 4 1 On the most basic issue, the QA program still has not produced '4 results . The "QA Group also still appears to have difficultics in obtaining corrective action responses and followups from 4. individuals." Decisively, Torrey Pines conceded that ((p_[ resent corrective action requests do not adequately pursue the identifica- . I tion of the cause of the problem, nor do they purge'the system of F, t the problem. The timeliness of response and followup to the point of effective preventive measures still appears to be inadequate. Specific examples of QA deficiencies that have continued during 1983 include the structural inability of the CG&E program to " ensure that an approved vendor is used." Similarly, Problems related to the use of HJK's Weld 1 Form, Welding Procedures, Radiographic Weld Identification, and Welding Inspection and Surveillance forms constitute a case in point. The TPT Team reviewed records which show that welding instruction and control problems appeared frequently from 1975 to 1983. A second case in point is the consistency of problems cited from 1973 to 1983 regarding overall control of the design document system. Welding
- procedures / documentation and design documents are essential parts of the work instructions provided to the crafts and the instructions provided to inspectors and QA personnel.
, Similarly, the Torrey Pines Report reveals that Applicants' tradition of material false statements to the NRC continued unabated at least through Feburary 1983, over three months after
- the strongest remedial action in history taken by the Commission-with respect to a plant under construction.
To illustrate, in its August 20 , 1982, Petition to Suspend Cons truction (" August 20 Petition"), MVPP alleged that piping was inspected to construction aids rather than to approved design drawings. (August 20 Petition, p. 11) In its February 28, 1983 i response to the Demand for Information ("CG&E Response) Applicants
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.I ridiculed " petitioners' . unfamiliarity with inspection requirements" and insisted, "[IJnspection and acc~eptance of final construction 9
are based on Sargent and Lundy approved des'igns." (CG&E Response, at 6) Unfortunately, Applicants' statement repres'ented a fairy tale. In August 1983, Torrey Pines' disclosed, In at least one circumstance, it appears that inspections were performed using
.t conditionally-approved design documents for more than four years. I' Other indications of design control problems were that . . .
inspectors inspected hardware to as-built from the design drawings
. . . (TP Report, p. 4-23)
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Similarly, .last summer MVPP charged that the premise of the b Quality Confirmation Program was a " piece-meal -- rather than comprehensive -- investigation." (August 20 Petition, at 94.) Again Applicant scoffed and responded, In general, .these allegations illustrate that petitioner's notion of the purpose 'of the QCP [ is distorted. The QCP is a comprehensive program F which the Company established in cooperation with the NRC to demonstrate its commitment to building i the Zimmer Station to meet all regulatory require-
. ments. (CG&E Response, pp. 284-85.)
Again, Applicants' 19 83 self-assessment was not based in reality. Torrey Pines reported, "As conceived at the present time, the QCP is not intended to be a comprehensive quality verification program for Zimmer. Its scope is limited to those items agreed upon with the NRC. " (TP Report, p. 53.) As a third illustration, MVPP charged, . inter alia, that CG&E's QA philosophy was to "do as little as possible." (Augus t 20 Petition, at 106. ) CG&E responded, "It is denied that CG&E's approach was 'to do as little as possible. '" (CG&E Response,
- at 311. ) The Torrey Pines conclusion suggests that Applicants had l
to know better: From all dae evidence available, it appears daat CG&E's major priority was to complete the Zimmer
- project at the least cost and as close to schedule as possible. In this environment, QA was viewed as l a r.equirement to be met at the minimum permissible level. (TP Report, p. 3-7)
A fi al illustration concerned MVPP's allegation that CG&E controlled Kaiser's QA program and, inter alia, specifically i overruled Kaiser on QA staffing levels. This is the same issue 3 for which MVPP alleges that two branches of the NRC staff -- OIA and, UIE -- deceived the public in 1981 in order to maintain
g credibility.for a " reform" that increased CG&E's control over - Zimmer. CGEE responded," Petitioner's claims in Allegation 253 1 5 of CG&E's direct control of Kaiser's performance under its Quality f Assurance. Program are not supported by the statements therein and are denied." (CG&E Response at 320) The Torrey Pines Report obliterated any residual thread of credibility for the CG&E-NRC f l' staff position. The Report puts CG&E's 1983 credibility gap in perspective, drawn from aJ#ritten record prepared in a moment of candor by a former CG&E QA manager: e. n i. . For example, in response to the CG&E QA manager's 1981 request for dumentation which refutes HJK's claim that CG&E repeatedly denied HJK's requests for additional resources, one CG&E QA Director, who had worked on the project from the beginning, wrote
'This correspondence speaks for itself. I can add little information that is not already discussed in,the letters. It is not a nice nistory, but very true.'
In sum, this Board's dismissal of approximately 4000 pages of new evidence and hundreds of allegations as no more than 1983 meat on 1982 bones is analogous to Applicant's protected response that each additional MVVP discovery and disclosurc was "nothing new. " CG&E's "nothing new" attitute has prevented it from solving the problems at Zimmer. MVPP urges this Board not to sidestep these serious contentions in a similar manner and with predictable results. In similar fashion, this Board has defined-out the possibility that MVPP's 19 83 contentions could contain anything new. This Board decided that the 1982 contentions " contemplate" almost any instance of QA failures, so that no QA failure, no' matter how
- dramatic, could constitute new information that would warrant reopening the record. .
~~
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This approach is in error. It is improper to disallow new evidence that serves to particularize the scope of MVPP's contentions. In fact, it is normal for contentions to start out more broad and general, and to be refined and narrowed by discovery:
/ C 7'ontentions . . . place some reasonable limits En 31scovery. Boards have recognized that those 1 discovery limits can, without prejudice to the t hearing process, be more broad and general than the revised contentions that can be developed after discovery and which will ultimately structure the hearing.
Duke Power Company (Catawba Nuclear Station, . Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-16, 15 NRC 566 (1982). If the Board believes that MVPP's contentions are too broad, it can allow discovery to narrow them as requested by MVPP in.its June 3, 1983 motion, rather than disparaging MVPP's spontaneous efforts to particularize the scope of the contentions by dismissing the new facts as somehow irrelevant because they are "within the ' contemplation" of the 1982 submission.of MVPP's contentions. Even if literally accurate, MVPP should not be penalized either because the scope of the QA breakdown is comprehensive, l l or because of its early ability to recognize the scope. Both factors strongly favor reopened hearings. The former indicates that Applicants' program is permeated with illegality. The latter illustrates that MVPP was perceptive. In fact, however, there are numerous key distinctions. For example, last year MVVP did not mention welding in the language for its eight proposed contentions. Last May 18, MVPP did not even understand the concept of welding procedures, let alone
" contemplate" the issue. This year those subjects play a major role:in*MVPP's contentions. Last year, MVPP contended that the 4
h quality of Zimmer was indeterminate. This year MVPP charges that the condition is quality condemnable. l The Board's sea'rch for new contentions rather than new information leads it to the related error of failing to distinguish the various sets of new information from each other. Thare have been many new factual developments in this case in recent months, p some of which individually could support a reopening of the record. As noted before, newly arising information can provide good cause for reopening the record. But for this principle to adequately function, distinct new factual developments and dis-coveries must be analyzed separately, If one newly arisen set of facts do not support a reopening of the record, that does not diminish the ability of the next newly arisen set of facts, if significant enough, to provide good cause to reopen the record. This premise is necessary if the licensing process is to retain any capacity-to respond dynamically to new developments and issue decisions relevant to the final condition of the plant. The Commission's recent Catawba decision confirmed the preeminent 1 i status of public safety. (Supra, at 18) And those paramount interests are served by allowing serious safety issues to be heard, regardless of how or when they arise. Apart fron newly arising information, good cause for late contentions can also be founded upon changes in Commission policy:
/lanningT_7he p recent regulatory (including evacuation)
~
developments in emergency and radiological monitoring . . . constitute " good cause" for . . . untimely' filing. It is true, of course, that emargency planning and radiological monitoring could have been raised as issues back in 1975, when the proceeding commenced. Both Dr. Fankhauser
- and the City of Cincinnati did so. But, at the time, the relief which could be granted was far less than what it is today.
. . , .- . ~ . , _ . , .
f Cincinnati Gas and Electric (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Station), LBP-80-14, 11 NRC 570,573 (1980). Within the past year, regulatory developments have changed the face of the Zimmer proceeding, from a relatively neglected power plant with serious problems to a focus of intense Commission t I effort to save the plant, with new requirements, new investigations, and a program that has led to a prediction by Bechtel,'the joint project manager, that finishing the plant may cost as much as has been spent to date. These changed circumstances will dramatically alter the Zimmer plant, for better or for worso. The evolving regulatory approach at Zimmer increases the importance of public participa-tion by the community affected by the change, and justifies relaxed timeliness criteria to promote constructive response. These examples show clearly that the concept of " good cause" for late filing is a flexible concept, which is based on circumstances in each individual case. This flexibility and accommodation to realistic circumstances l j' .is also reflected in the fact that even a f ailure to demonstrate good cause for delay will not be held against an intervenor if l delay in the proceedin'g is not : attributable to the intervenor's actions. South Caroline Electric and Gas Co. (Summer Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-78-24, 8 NRC 78 (1978). Because of this reasonable rule, it is clear that even if MVPP's motion to reopen the record and admit new contentions were extremely tardy at this point, which it very clearly is not, l reopeni,ng the record would still be appropriate. No reasonable hearing sdhedule could interfere with Bechtel's projected start-up date. (Supra, at 3). l l
- .71 III. SUCCESSFUL ATTAINMENT OF GRAND GULF STANDARDS Even if this Board's interpretation of Grand Gulf represented the correct legal standard, a full assessment of the current record in light of new developments indicates that MVPP has met the test imposed. Under this test, . MVPP must make a compelling showing under two new criteria -- contribution to the record and [
delay.' As seen above, the Bechtel announcement and MVPP's letter to Admiral Williams provide a compelling showing on the latter criterion. MVPP's margin on this issue is even more compelling after factoring in the significance of its contentions. In Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Unit 1) LBP 30, 17 NRC' , slip op. p. 16 (June 22, 1983) the Board - explained- that "even where a contention is measured solely under Section 2. 714. (a) (i) , the extent to which the petitioner's participation will broaden the issues or delay a proceeding is properly balanced against the significance of the issue." In short, j MVPP's margin here is especially compelling. This is due to the significant nature of MVPP's contentions, added to its strong factual improvement since September 15 on issues directly applicable to delay. This leaves only MVPP's contribution to the record as a
. barrier to reopening hearings. This is ironic, in light of the general consensus that MVPP identified the Zimmer QA deficiencies i when all other channels had failed (July 12 Reply Brief,at 59).
In light of this, although recognizing MVPP's ability to gather a large amounts of relevant documents, this Board declined to find l ! a comp,elling showing due to MVPP's tardiness and failure to I
-. . - - - - - y
F digest the documents presented for the record. (September 15 j; Order, p. 34 ) MVPP respectifully suggests that weighing the l volume versus the quality of index largely circumvents the decisive factors for this criterion -- whether the information contains a significant, triable issue. (Shoreh am, supra, slip op. at 16) Evaluated from this premise, the information presented by MVPP since last July is much more significant than for its 1982 motion when this Board judged the criterion strongly in MVPP's favor. Similarly, this Board recognized that MVPP presented litigable matters (September 15 Order, at 38) but failed to apply the finding to the criterion. Second, MVPP's contribution should be judged by the unique nature of the issues it has raised. MVPP has challenged the assumptions of status quo policy. To illustrate, MVPP challenged the claims that Zimmer's problems are largely paperwork; that CG&E was unaware of its contractor Kaiser's improper QA program; and that the Quality Confirmation Program is a comprehensive plan. l In each case, MVPP was right about issues which formed the premises for the NRC 9 += ff and Commission policy. For both the above contributions, MVPP served as an agent to raise the Lopics and evidence where the status quo proved
" inadequate to probe ' soft' and sensitive subjects and witnesses" l
(September 22, 1982 NRC Staff Answer, at 8, and cases cited therein) In this respect, .MVPP's particular strength should maximize the value of public hearings. Third, MVPP can make a unique contribution to hearings through ,its ability to maximize the contributions of whistle-I i 1
~
I blowers to the f act-finding process. MVPP's counsel GAP is a
. i :
non-profit non-partisan organization with a special expertise i l in assisting whistleblowers, mostly from outside the nuclear industry.. Zimmer whistleblowers frequently are honest employees who have been frustrated in their attempts to challenge safety _ defects through communications with Applicants and the NRC staff. - The results demonstrate that through -their association with GAP < these individuals have maximized their effectiveness. MVPP's ability to channel the expertise of whistleblowers represents a significant contribution to the record and independently warrants a compelling showing. Fourth, the above contributions are particularly necessary in light of the recurring, erratic nature of the policies and record created from alternative forums. To illustrate, the significance of the Torrey Pines Report was decreased by its failure to provide any specific citations. The quality of the findings was inconsistent. Although Torrey Pines made a significant contribution to recognizing the scope and causes of the QA breakdown, it. offered only ineffectual recommendations and badly censored the record on two of the most significant issues at Zimmer -- retaliation against whistleblowers and welding. MVPP exposed the evidentiary weak-nesses as a result of its own independent investigation. (See September 27, 1983 letter to NRC Commissioners from Thomas Devine, attached and incorporated as Exhibit 9) . MVPP's strong contribution to the record on welding and whisteblower retaliation mandates a compelling showing and hearings with respect to those issues, due 'to their high safety signifi ance. The importance of welding is self-apparent.
- l
.- 'c
'i The Appeal Board's recent decision in Callaway specifically ,
recognizes the effect that a serious problem of retaliation against whistleblowers can have on inhibiting disclosure of ! safety violations. (Callaway, supra, slip op. at 43-4) MVPP has presented significant evidence that whistleblowers face just such a threat at Zimmer. As an NRC inspector recently was quoted, !
"The simple truth is that if the quality-control people aren't willing to give up their jobs to report this sort of thing, then we don't find out about them. " (Exhibit 2) The anonymous inspector's comment illustrated both the pervasive nature of the retaliatory environ-ment at Zimmer, and the helplessness of the staff to respond effectively. Torrey Pines was more " ineffective." It failed to even report the evidence it received of retaliation. MVPP through counsel can make a unique contribution to litigating the potential safety impact recognized by Callaway as one of significant safety import. MVPP's strength on this issue is particularly necessary, in light of the unsettled, contradictory nature of therecord on whistleblower retaliation.
The staff's record on welding and its oversight of the Zimmer Action Plan cry for public oversight. For example, to date the staff has only asked for background files on the case studies in the Torrey Pines Report, which could institutionalize reduced public accountability under the FOIA. Similarly, the staff issued contradictory findings on its oversight of welding issues covered by the Torrey Pines Report. On September 1, 1983 Mr. Keppler informed Torrey Pines that the level of discussion was insufficient to support the conclusions, and tha't the Torrey Pines findings in the case are inconsistent ________ ~
O with those of the staff. By contrast,.a September 6-8, 1983
),
Region III inspection found no items of concern. In contrast with the findings of GAP's investigation and the implications of Mr. Keppler's letter, .the Region III team rosily concluded, "All of the documentation reviewed appeared to be appropriate and supportive of TPT conclusions and recommendations." (Compare ; i: September 1, 1983 letter to W.J. Neylan from James Keppler, I IE Report No. 50-35 8/83-16 (OSC) (September 16, 1983)) Clearly, in light of the stakes for the upcoming corrective action, there is a compelling necessity to obtain the full value systematically of MVPP's contribution through discovery and public cross-examination. .I Fifth, this Board erred to penalize MVPP for tardiness under this criterion. Since this Board is relying upon Grand Gulf to weigh the criteria, inexcusable tardiness can only be counted against MVPP once. Any other result would improperly make it impossible to admit late contentions, once an intervenor failed to establish good cause. That is the case because Grand Gulf requires a compelling showing on all the other criteria if good cause is not satisfied. Sixth, this Board erred to claim that MVPP has not conscien-tiously indexed the evidence presented for the record. The August 20 Petition tc Suspend Construction applied the evidence to 254 specific cliegations; the October 18, 19 82 Supplement applied the evidence to 58 distinct issues; the July 12, 1983 Reply Brief to ! 50 allegations; and the August 26, 19 83 Motion applied the results. of an investigative trip to 32 new issues ~ before the evidence was even presented. While a large number of affidavits were presented without l 9
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.l further explanation on July 12, the relevant issues had already bee,n digested in the other briefs listed above. The affidavits _;
served as the basis for specific allegations but had not been attached ~as exhibits before July 12. Seventh, MVPP's contribution to the record will improve if hearings are resumed, since it will no longer be necessary to participate in multiple, informal substitute forums, ih addition to proceedings before this Board. MVPP seeks to resolve its remaining safety concerns as expeditiously and systematically as possible. Toward that end, it will concentrate exclusively on making a significant, manageable contribution to the record before this Board, if given the opportunity.
-In case the Board has remaining doubts about MVPP's l
contribution, MVPP again requests the more limited step of j reopening the record for discovery without admitting contentions. This initiative could be used to refine the contentions and test MVPP's ability to manage the record. In short, MVPP is willing i
- to cut the meat into bite-size pieces for this Board if necessary.
'. IV. IMPROPER INTERPRETATION OF COMMISSION'S POLICY ON PENDING INVESTIGATIONS
! MVPP further requests that this Licensing Board reconsider its denial .of -the August 26, 1983 motion pursuant to the Commission's August 10, 19 83 Statement of Poliq/, 48 Fed. Reg. 36358 (August 10, 1983), for zmview of pending investigations -- (1) Administrative ! Law Judge Hoyt's investigation, and (2) the ongoing OI investiga-tion of Zimmer performed primarily by Mr. John sinclair. In the , September 15 order, this Board ruled that the Statement of Policy does ndt apply to proposed contentions.
- This Licensing Board need not consider whether the Commission's
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.. policy tpplies to the Hoyt invastigation, sinca it is no longar a f '
6/ pending.
~
As a result, the Eoyt investigation falls into the j) . same category as the Torrey Pines Report: both are completed L reports to be admitted as new information or additional evidence i 1'
- for purposes of reopening the record and filing late contentions.
The OI investigation is still pending and, therefore, subject to the Statement of Policy. In pertinent part, the , Policy provides that parties to an adjudicatory proceeding are under a general duty to inform boards "of matters that are material to the issues in controversy," such as pending NRC staff i investigations. The NRC regulations define " contested proceeding" as: (1) a proceeding in which there is a controvery between the staff of the Commission and the applicant for a license concerning the issuance of the license or any of the terms or conditions thereof or (2) a proceeding in which a petition for leave to intervene in opposition to an application for a license has been granted or is pending before the Commission [ emphasis added_/. NRC Rules and Regulations, 10 CFR 1, Pt. 2, Sec. 2. 4 (n) The regulatory definition reveals the error of the limitation , proposed by this board, Just as with the ex parte rule, a pending attempt to intervene triggers applications of the policy. Even if the restrictive interpretation of the Policy's scope , were correct, this Board should evaluate the evidence from the OI investigation. There is no . attempt to state that the Policy bars a licensing board from taking the initiative to obtain such data. Combined, the two efforts which this Board has declined to review represent the Commission's fullest development of the Zimmer record to date. 5/ Indeed, the Hoyt investigation had been completed when this Board ruled on, September 15, 1983. There fore , it was improper to deny review based on an interpretation of the Commission's policy for pending investigations. i i I
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. V. .SUA SPONTE INITIATIVES 1 This Board declined to raise MVPP's contentions as its own due to expressed concerns that "anything has transpired" that I would change the Commission's mind and permit the action.
(September 15 Order, at 39) MVPP petitions this Board to reconsider. Significant developments on the public record render _ that explanation unpersuasive.
- First, even on February 23, 1983, there was not a genuine dispute of fact over significant safety issues. CG&E didn't submit its Response to the Demand for Information until February 28, 1983. The Commissioners agree that hearings are permissible, and indeed are required, once that threshhold is reached. (See June 3, 198 3, Motion, p. 38)
Second, the facts about the staff's role at Zimmer have been confirmed by the judiciary only since May 24, .1983; and publicly , recognized by the Commissioners as severe since last week. Third, MVPP has informed this Board of when it obtained the supporting evidence for its evidence. This again contrasts with i the record before the Commissioners on February 23, and responds to a concern wayressed last July 30. Fourth, in light of the prolonged nature of the corrective action program, sustained intensive personal oversight by the Commissioners would be unrealistic and counterproductive for other plants. The Commission's July 30, 19 82, Order dismissing this Board's .contenionc was premised upon such a commitment. Fif th, the Commission's decision last July 30 does not imply 1 it would disapprove lesser sua sponte initiatives such as reopening the record for discovery, or even merely for ongoing monitoring
k 4
, of any approved construction completion quality verification programs without accepting contentions. Through this action, MVPP's contribution could be tested and/or its contentions I refined. At a minimum this Board could reopen the record to maintain ongoing supervision of Zimmer's completion, as 1
necessary. p In light of the drastically different circumstances from last year, Board failure to take sua sponte action due solely to concerns of Commission dismissal.would significantly exacer-bate the effects of last year's restriction on necessary sua sponte actions. In light of the new factual context, MVPP contends that hearings are required by the Atomic Energy Act. (Supra, at 19) If this Board's only remaining concern is MVPP's ability to manage its record, this Board should assign MVPP to those contentions for which the intervenors have unquestionable expertise and adopt the remainder as Board contentions. Which-ever method is selected, the public health and safety requires this Board to resume its participation and assert its leadership in solving Zimmer's persistent quality assurance breakdown. Respectfully submitted, l DxL John Clewett Thomas Devine Of Counsel Legal Director Dated: October 3, 1983 8 l I f .
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... CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE v; ,
5 I HEREBY. CERTIFY that copies of the foregoing " Miami Valley
, Power Project's ' Petition for Reconsideration of SeptembeiY-15',E
.19 832 Order" have been served upon the following by mailing' first-class, postage prepaid, this 3rd day of October, 1983. :
sqdr~e4 P5:01
~
Judge John H. Frye, III , Troy B. Conner,
- Chairman, Atomic Safety 'and Licenstag Connor and Wetterhahn Board '
1' 1747 Pennsylvania Ave. NW ~ U.S. Nuclear Regulatory. Commission i ;4 a Washington,.DC 20555 3 Washington, DC'2000.6; " N ' John D. Woliver, Esqu' ire" , Charles A. Barth, Esquire Clermont County Communi7.y Council !. Counsel for the NRC Staff Box 181. [ Office of the Executive, Legal Batavia, OH 45103 4 Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission ~ Brian Cassidy, Esquire Washington, DC 20555 Regional Counsel Federal Emergency Management j Dr. Frank F.-Hooper Agency -- Region I Sierra Nevada Aquatic Research John W.'--McCormack POCH Laboratory Boston, MA 02109 l Route 1, Box 198 .' % Mammoth Lakes, CA 93546 George"2.,Pattison,< Esquire -
- 1 Prosecuting Attorney of.
Dr. Stanley M. Livingston Clermont County, Ohio Administrative Judge 462 Main Street _ 5 1005 Calle Largo Batavia; OH 45103 Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501 ( i,
,< Docketing and Service. Branch i
Nucle,ar Regulatory Commissioners (4) Office of the Secretasy .; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss. ion Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 205h5( Chairman, Atomic Safety and David K. Martin, Esquire Licensing Appeal' Board Panel Assistant Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Acting Director, Division of Washington, DC 20555 Environmental Law 239 St. Clair Street Robert F. Warnick Frankfort, KY 40601 Director, Enfo ma" ant and Investigation _
-e William J. Moran, Esquire NRC Region III Vice President and General Counsel 799. Roosevelt Road ' '
- The Cincinnati Gas and Electric Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 Company
(- P.O. Box 960
. Deborah Faber Webb, Esquire. Cincinnati, OH 45201,
-7967 Alexandria Pike L Alexandria, KY 41001 l Andrew B. Dennison, Esquire .,
Attorney at Law / 200 Main Street -
- Batavia, OH 45103 Thomas Devine l Counsel for Intervenor MVPP Paul Ryder Governor's,, Of fice i
State House , Columbus, Ohio 4 3215 s. 4
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" CincinnatiG&E CarMakerstoLih4th .
Despite,WarningsTha
- SaysPlantCost- +
. t.
m i wss CouldDouble . .,_By C,u,ius _ w. w_ saves s_.y a__ DETROIT-U.S. auto makers are going
. n a
s a!! out in their four28tuarter products a d k ' . a
\ Partners in Zimmer Facility g5 ,g8 ",'u""a",e'",dld f,*"
[1 m 3 n L 4Au ' w ^ 2xpress ' Shock: Report SuEgest Need to Rebuild ad rar g,,n,,(,,,,,, ,, ,,,omat, ,,,we
=ts* d * *dustry ** **r p*'
- mo unmaus. the manufact=n hope to e
r i t . '- stpe out ungering shortages of some models n I ,
' By on dealers' kxs. and they are betting that h l
} J ,. _
marrner we,Dansoes to wm simesDar2t eJ~ recent sales Irnprovements ut!! streng2en. a
\ "\
g The industry's pian to assemble 1.9El.290 s CINCINNATI-Oncinnatl Gas & Electric t Co. saw the troubled Z1mrner nuclear power cars in the October-through-December pe-N , plant could cost twice its previous asumate. riod-compared with 1.::6.517 utts a year 7
<* C -
The muuty's partners expressed shock at the earDer-represents the largest fourth <luar-new esumate, wluch suggests that much ter output since the it million um.s of
.\ 9 g construcuon must%e redone, ggag. ,tl 3
. The esumate. based on a report by Bach- The schedule,if maintamed, wul assure a g tel Power Corp., a untt of cknety beM Bech- comunutuon of the industry's robust proht ,
- tet Group Inc placed me cost of the plant neevery to me quarter compared utth a ,
- at compteuon at 12.8 biluon to 33.5 bilua, year earber. o depending on whether the plant could be Sn- The cluef aim W the industry's current e Ished in two or three yeart A previous esu- plan is to enminate a shortage that company g i = * * ,
s mate put ce cost of completing Zimmer at ometals and dealers say has unuted sales ,
, ' gl.7 talDon. Be:htel Power has been hired by gams arough most of the summer. Analysts e oneinnatt Gas to manage me construccon estimate that new<ar inventones at the end
' p"clect- of September were 1.155,000 umts, or a Sk s
- Dayton Pown & IJght Co. and Amencan day supply. That's higher than stocks have g Electric Power CE, partners ta the project, been all summer but sult below the today c said they have begun newatnf the impact t me highu esumate wut hm on meir ce mightn't even be 75% complete. the point at g pames. melueng me futm coats of bomw- w!uch the Pubbe Ut1 Dues Cbmmtssaan of t g *- Ing many. As Rported. Se two suDues 0100 allows a uunty to charge the cost of s i
have sought a readjustment of construccon ed fuds for castrucuan to electnc- f lt Costs wM Oncinnau Gas, ce pmpet man- rate payers. Consumer groups in Ohio have I agn eM oww W e% of the proget been argutng that very point during rate-in- t "m um shocked to get cost asumates crease hearings, with Rmited success. I i of that magnitude" said Stephen Koziar, Cincinnatt Gas yesterday said its 94 es- t general w.nwt of Dayton Power, owner of uma:e of plant compleuen hasn't changed.
- ggg,
* . "It was somewhat larger than we ex- Borrowing Funds pected. and me is a restrained statement," Ometals at Dayton Power and American g said A. Jameph Dowd, general counsel for Electne Power said they are concerned eat Amencan Elei tric Power, whose Columbus 2e new cost esumates will lacrease their ,
6 Southern Otuo Electric Co. unK owns the costs of borrowing money. They have fi-remaintng 2B% panced their share of Zimmer construction 1, Supporting Docurnestts wtta borrowed funds. l Although Dayton Power's and Arnencan Onetnanti G a ednt give reasons for the Electne Power's debt raungs haven't
. . sharp tacreaar 4 the constructmntost eso.
' n ate. However, tt ynrnised its partners that changed because W her. Moody's In-vestors Service Inc. recency lowered its rat-
_- _.- N would gtve thern supportmg documents within 30 days. f%einnau Gas said an exact tags on sema! secuNues of Oncinnan Gas t esumate depends on how soon the Nuclear because of N hr troubWs. De debt-raung concern said tast month that although Regulatory Commusion anows safe'y-r, Oncanau Gas's debt protecuan wasr't in lated construcuen at the plant to resume. The Zimmer plant, at Moscow, f'tlo, was jeopardy. futm Zinner Snancmg te
' quirements could result in a eternortung fi-supposedly f*% cornplete last November,
#~ -
when the NRC ordered safetyrelated con. sancial postm. strucuan halted because of faulty welds, Neither Dayton Power acr American T Electric Power knew the impact the new es-
% doctored safety records and other prob
- - ttmate might have on artutration proceed-lems.
E* tags wim Clacionau Gas over Z1rnmer costs. Onemnau Gas also said N wmW submn s
' a " course of acuan" to the regtalators outlin. The private artuttation proceedings are an
#. 2 ' %
kng construchon-manatwet ehengas sad attempt to adjust the costs Dayton Power 1 the c nstructxxi work that raams to be and Amencan Electric Power are assessed done. That plan would need NRC approval by Oncinnatt Gas.
,; before work could begin.
\ -
. ne amount of anoney viceded to comp!,te Andros Analyzers $3 M&n Job
- the remaining 3% of the project-equal to BERKELEY, Cahf.-Andros Analyzers the amount already sperit to but!d F% of Inc. said it signed a contract for more than
- N strongly suggests that sigmficant 33 miu on to supply parts for exhaust gas
* ~. amounts of construcuan at the plant need to analyzers to a maker of automouve test
,:,i g:,., be reworked. Thus, the plant isn't p% com- equipment that it edn't identify. Andros
- r
**-r- , % / . '. . g 'e ~ . 3 piete.
makes infrared gas analyzers for medical
- n M,,, -
The esumate also suggests thtt the plant and industrial-instrumem makers. 7--
, - w:.434Am e y
n . 99g,qJLw--p ' j ( .%%%, % . , . . f t J . _
, 39 t f. =
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f fl y== - * =e T EXilIBIT 2 l ., -1 q q ml H Sorne earty Indratums of the protwers came la Imt. when the Senate Lataw Cane-
.d w d* d * * - J* *
- g mattre epened an investigatase has wha N ancres was a unw memtershiperittaJ C 1933 Dem Aars & co pay,1=. 4r Aghs Rewned s srheme kvcivat East Coast and naacsas morass of me smermanonal arooni d w soner-makers, tras shorteiders, stark-l t
- _* _ _ _ Eaer = Ei= =
WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 7.1983 W.ars oaa. Manne 7,,grgen W ag,eHeand
. . i-narps >=es, or enhas presuem. vinos-40 C E N TS -
'; % Defetta i
, ---At the Washngton Puh3r Power Sgyly wre enufkd for anothn. NRC hwsuga-
"'"r *"" "7 "'8*** *"8 **
- gewsttgsuna into a an.as portka of the
+ 1 Mr. Wetver had been similarly disturbed i ' System's nactor Ps I la southeastern lors also charge that some quaancanon ermmittee's hanngs has failed In sutstant>
gg{gg -. a few weeks eartier at Z1mmer. Thea. ce an- Washington, for example. NRC lasperters. records had been wholly rewritten and that ste the charges. l oaer rouume mapecu.ca at the Kaiser eaa..t. prodded by pwnis from c t>m waa=1 mar e'*= ma8 #5 = m g ,,,m ,,wg simenos ,roi-i. w suned in me afnaa. f me
===a *r-a= -* -~ ~ i =msp-im. com. uo,
.i. a mon ,a..ontrant, meas i u -*= = ad -ha a r- ,o,N,,e,,n,,,-
ts, tor,uampe %,,a, Im,,n,,s a,ests ,,,,
. Nuclear-Plant Welders. .
a='r e*s o=f the etreaminence of a crtucai, =a on- a*w=*r ~ =Zime-u , tw *rapa n - u= pr= O[ ten Aren t w^iialified foot high rasanos stueu arved ne nac.. undetected. the wids couw have jeopar# .
; Caawd am m l ,.,wu, on,,,,,,,
,, meia,n, ,ing
, , , ,a,gso,,0,,,,,,,,
e "Other funny things were turning up, inedt. a,. e. safe w .eas.huidow
. u.a.f ae.renw. e, or e mr to ,em h.d lavratigators vertned Mr. Wea a.oe.ee
. A.d t. ,,ed , ,,,,,, ,,,c, ,o, ,e,e,,, a,n
, Sutrommittee en Oversight and Investiga.
FortheJoba CriticsSay : '= " ar *a= -ca. ** =ad ea= a = a= a' = bad a'= -d- ia- d ar -*
- a' aa'a"er's **=- report. Jaurarymre.
-i-*ps -nyla emurg owne cases,
>= ar union
. halls siid.
sam la affidartts that hundreds of doca- fupy tavestigatlag-charges ef laterior weM- "This plant is as raample of what haF
, ments supporttag the quanfications of weld. Ing at the $an Onofre aucirar plant to Cag. peas when quaDty assurance breaks &wn much as $2.810. according la tesamesy.
- Y' bid Td kults '
'"'"'* * ** '" "" ^"d 'ad r*a'ad** "a ' """' t
"*d?""'th'r*""'"o-Ing and that cGet documema appeand t la Mrktgan.'And the scente latzw Cimrne't.
{ "he t
"*"*'~r'"""'
NRC's former project managw' "at Z1,,-At the same time
===[ & aitoa
= ,prn wgaa efflcta dr j
I
' ee Mre ROuthly FaWid h'"o'NRC
" '*2' d 3' 'a=*
- accard-Investigators, the ' sam'e testI.was "' th"d t'=r '='2raung ihe i rarr. . - ,gg 4 i Ing t
""d b quMtfy snwal wWm.
apparently etdaspread sale of unica craf [ nwbnsh% b unstuhnni wwn e
, Hespanoing to $e NRC's fladtags Katser i Mp N h "conD&M W equauty W at me
,,,,,,,,,8,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,
g , ,, 4
; *.l gggY Ugj0n CSTd5 80ld , The voluminous testimony about falstfled lt were weldtag and even everseeing welders saft'y related and strurturalsteel welds at W " knew a mur ateut uhu k we mer i . i tests stand las for unquaufted seiders ard i' at dozens of moustital sites, t:iclueng se,. the plant." It also cues Se cone;usters gg brW I'* be WsaW me '"""' m D0u)s.ks at Faolity m N* .
i defecove w
,,,,,,d, ,,ek,ts la,,sare,,ty s,yst,em,,s hi,pe,d nc,,,,,,,,,,,,, ,i ,. eral auc,kar,staats, a,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,2;,.
drawn by Torn,y
,1,w ,,,d,,1,d Pines Technokay o, ancer.nau la a re- ""*d 6'h2nd a apaa' sta' cas; me cca. c' i
.# construcuan indennstely of the st.7 bimos.
'. l,mer wm tennred by the frRc nep. Morns t suiting nrm said any management short. [med a wiee arr'arnbwr s'a prows 'km'
' By J. Rawarr Baans?
- Mepide plant. which is omd by Qt (JdaN. an Artama Democrat, th& qed last l comings at Se plaat "have been er can be uty. , %
awa.c ,o == aw,, , cinnati Cas & Electric Op., an Americas !l year. A federal grand jury is sahllo be sult corrwted' by the uuhry. Ceametjg Teaches Qarged
'. 3pt
*I A Drue our a year age.Otuch Weavw. a Electric Power On substeary and Dayton >
tmsugaung cruntnal charTes conmruing l A Kaiser synkesman adds: "We henr4 Aanther witness was Ralph Powes. wtw quantycontrol inspector for H.J. Kaiser En. Peuw & Ught & fwged druments at Zham, and IUtC ofn. ! Zimm b one of N nuut W coe- now rusa has own wWtug shop b $4a104, gineers, walked la unexpectedly on a group It is unclear prectsrly what retadonship . cials now say 79% of the structuralsteeg strurted nuclear-pnwer plants la the coun- Pa., but to 1972 was welding akag4de eUwr
- of welders taking quall!!canos tests at Be eatsts bMures shoddy weWing ca a radia- I weids alone there don't meet code reqstre try. Other people la the nuclear poww is.
' botiermakers em the storage systeva lot .
, ZLmmer nuclear plant near Oncinnatt. Hon shkki, for instam, and the cheating e rneots. dustryjust shake their brads k wonderment spent radioactive fact at Three Mlle talang What Mr. Weaver saw alarmed Ptm. Ac. Bat Inay pnnde R la W test Imo@. whm ai the quauty W mm plant."
craftsmen are suppreed te meet detailed
- Masty Qacial Welds .{ UnN I scar Harrtsburg. Pa. There. the cording to as affidavit submitted by hire to The NRC says its laspw'lons, whirk le welds were sa poor that warners em la-the Nuclear Regulat Commission, one government and Industry standarda before h mu M Me @ 8' h k fYD8 i
. clude sample x rays of crurtal welds and te structed to use bh'w torches to make the welder who was unde g certificados for Bey am hand. But conum is growing om I wkws of wWes en nra e runwsts, am the most dithruft safety-related work at the Im2 dw incidean of faulty wWs and the f so are surfam of w wMs Ino "a ce and chan" the reactor cooling syncra.Crarks M Gene pas . it aWt eye. r. Pmrs estined.
plant was ta.htng the wrong test-a much quantym programa designed to dektt en I ts. *Wr 3A is bum la me Imi almpler one that Mr, Weaver joked later, mem* ptprs couhl threates the coobag systera and. NRC offletals, though, play down the sig-
" basically could be done by a charnp after a to the event of as acektent. couM trnpede a *
" smrance of me wMs bwam W Wwage Otlier Zirismers g' safe shutdown. Faulty welds la ether areas- hat nurtal 4 W plats sakry.
few weeks of tralutng." Other welders were the N and force-Moreover, interviews with dosens of ' of e of committ!ag a variety of lafracuens, accord- l such as the rearter radiation shleid prot > med More disturning. thougit, is Mr. Powers *s t welders, welding engineers, aurleariluality- lems alleged at Zimmer and WPPSS 2. could anegarlos before the $rnate committee that Ing to Mr. Weaver's affidarts and many cul- PbvMdy, mough, wime NRC hispectors l control laspectors and NRC inspect.srs sug- l, weaken the first Bne of defense for workers i amm Baa kW af W kHumakw wWen era. gest that, la varytag degrees, there are la. espress strong doubts about thett stitttty to agalast radiattom leakage. I espa b Naat bougM untos cank Mr. Weaver's affidavit says the test so- deed other rimmerit la fact, thnugh Zhe- detect cheattag. "Hoprf; ally, it ducss't hage pervtsor told him that Kaiser's construcuan la a irtler last Mar:;h to Onctanau C4 E. k prws rangmg ap to W Im a mer may be a particularly bad case. Mr. Zimmer's majority owner, the NRC outuned [a ppen, as m. urb neartry lural ta Titusville. Pa. Mr. Poens Kvision had approved the departure trora l Weaver and others say welding improprte. snme welding problems that it said at had
. oneas rwit wouW knperWappear says. but P dues
. regulauons "for people who can't pass 2e g said a fariner local offrtal aDeged to have l tics-rang *ng frma stand ans during tesung -
four4. Among the anegations: that quality. anM Ge mmhnships *1ad a motto: 'If test otherwise " Thne on-stte Katser inapec- go the sale of make memberships lor SGs. sus. tors had never before inspected telding assuraare rereris had luea " altered and , you w got the liread, we'w got tM but-a yearJots-are a fact of life in the nuclear. supplemented" without supervislam and that leff ~
. tests, and two NRC inspectors standlag . e9nstrucuan Industry. '
acarby were abilvtous to the cheattag. Als , welders qua?8ed for aan type e( wekang j
, , affidavit says.
9
a
, _ s .
ue ger. .e ,ms c.,r t ,r.s,. t . 1
- M:r aa eg= a:'=::=
Weak Links? Cn. tics Say Many Nuclear-Plant Welders
~ "- W O ""~" 5 * ~*
Gere was as wrongdoing at the time " Mr. fletslager says. Aren't Qualified and Test Results Are Often Falsified _ Key to Hiring , s _ Union brats aba reap benents when they Unios memtwrship. of course, dorsm's ter of weeks." M*. Diaway adds: *Bestles. land cetracts In targe mkanonstmrtan , ,, g,, g I guarantee a welder a murkar piam M. the proof is la the performance? PhoteFidentificatlose Plaa pts. By plackg metr nmters in study. NRC regulanons still reqdre ceruhcanos at Despite the Senase hearings, the NRC Et paymg Ma, Sry can cumt e ** Weavef was latended as retaMon Itc hts the construcuna site la practice, though. It says k has beca handicapped in Ks efterts se After the hrst Sraate latzw Cornadttee contact wuh the NRC. The tempany acws
. elrtuany ensures M Mferrals. and wit. h*aring last year. Chairman Orrte flatch, a numa frorn ww ues paid by each Innow up en the committee's investiganon. L;tah Republican, asked the NHC to lastuute " "h"' 'IP'C"UY ' that to the settlernret. hMk a and Mr.
nesses testined that care equipped with a Cructal witams at nrst reftased to permM Weaver acknowledged that seither was se antes card, a welder had a high likelihood of a photeklenufrathe rfagram Io coantm ' N'"I snitung any RatitDty er wrWMddng. On Ik their names to be handed ever to the NRC the kirsury of me test booth wewer. Tk ticularty wk rs. It puts y a la the post-
'getung wort, trpending en the amount of because they feared job rewisrim latttal oth r hand. the company concedes that the t test supervtston. At TMI. Mr. Powers test > NRC stall ts conskbrtug reromrnrndtag the """ *I *N *
- INI ordinaruy take . says a for'mn",, questions about Se accuracy et Mr.
laterviews wuh one committee talormant change. MeanwMe, the agency has begun a Sed, supervtston was spotty at best, and ylch>d attle spectfle and some contradic- nw local mat suppM Ge N M Weawr's resume were unfounded: ewn te modest system of spot cherting. So far, the cheanng was common. "Some of these guys tory taformauon NRC tevestigators say. w tns. lore os settlemes was reache4 la tact. managed to get through Oe tests without And the agency lound nothtag alarming in MRC's Mr. Tayter says. the agency has In-fewmatam from three of its nye regional of. "I' '8 Florida Power & 12ths Os. tiad hired hka as. , knowing how to boca a torth up." be us nytew d the percentage of odders who reunnd in th ea% h M On a quahtycontal laspector at Rs SL 1 sele . passed tests at three plants. Oces thtee three estimate that their lasTec- ,,gg,,, pg,,g, t tors witness se to us wektret underrotng Wie embers behmed w Isral $ss et me Mr. Ptmers also test 18ed that union forc- "As far as I'm concerard. we've cloord Victist ' ines had hirn to take il testa for the lawsugattos." says WlDiam Ward, a di- tests in an average year. Last year, welders n d Asartance af W a 4 tonk an estimated 35.000 to 3,000 tegs at au- pra es et the Numbing and MpeMHng AnoGn employee vasel as baW tut
'ether kasd fueled plants. His son. Vision erector in the NBC's Ornee et laut clear plants. Indatry, genaDy =hral one d me nading andM A M h a m ugt.ttons. kW trainet pigenntag hans e me matka 8'ho hership added.
frora ahad bouentLC., Charlestos. helocal ownunk unloa meer One NRC lespector worrtes that the' pantrasurance analyW. nys mat ther he typecticas lacreased agency depends too much es ut1Dtles and Practicany as were enjoytag steady vert. was suspMed of reportmg problems at Zim- l { enly e are 2e nquiret appunuca largey because of Ge prennanon of gov-4murs. Union efacials e there , deny the On the other hand. the NRCs Mr. Taylor ,6 i f en # ponce memwiwa. "Thne's mer to the NRC he was snevel frern his 5A * { , charge
- says Ms branch has rewrtten Rs prwedures es real safeguard against dishonesty" he names research faculues and the kral's seea-year prettles to the documret fertrW
- says. "If the uttaty is less tun honest with . large geographk terruary. Nevertheless. room. skre he says his duurs amounted to }
; Omnndttee investigators aim turned up to
, me ease of as nyear*t Wem virgtman mgprovide anhaugh fw Mereard especuos d weld ,
de numkr WM us,it can actuaDy art as up. It can send us the enke has was able to suggdy Is times as a ciert's. On May 25. 3912, two wwks befom ain win preinity arrious to no more aan *"' " "" "' J" 'k 'k 8 % many d mem wh by h M tesuhed kfwe a House serorn-REND eky Ann Farky wh says k **'t* 2 2% of the total. "We've told our inspectors og mornadii. w,wers wk journey trera I minee abnw uie , ant. w imiwd a M bougM unkm menuals froen me, saan "noe awking kbs at aucf*ar-plam ces site la site in search of wora. Supplytne only evaluados that praised Ms performaan and i is plek things up in the test boothy Mr.Tay- -
, SmW CamMas al as W. Powms se. - lor says. "The heartags locused our atten- strurnos sites have a powerftJ mnuve for 'j t au that aamber woukt have meant a kus 4 l nptained that me transfer would "bree&n e g Even thourth he had no more than l'alace s - wmal mnnon dunan m wat durs to C# l he butM and " improve his undee status at the time. Mr. Farley became the um on W possikuty d fraudukM khat- cheatlag: money. A pipectter welder at a l local, forernan of a crew of bancemakersInstantag auclear plaat commands a presalunt wage , s*.andhg W dayuday accvkles of edier
{I e at % Ns Vogue se kstad be ud saks W nu memke as much as $26 as hour. la a year's urne. Harassment Oarged -
*[ weeks fler his testimony. Mr. Jones ships apparently aren't a proNem only at na ammats b 3Mhnot WM me . Quality < outed taspectors complaim that
. I w'I asn't reany surprised to be named construction sites. A former quality-assue - was laid off. tast sneath, he filed for stue !
"When a guy can go frera miaking 84 an i
they aften tack the autonomy to lastst em Lary bankruptry. A Kaiser spokesman ece-loreman because I was the only one who had are
,gcy,,ugher for %eckel,,g,
,, ,,,,,ggpq C,orp,grecalm
,,, g hour le 53 an hour, he,s gotag strwter scpervision of widing tests et cor* tends that Mr. Jones's transfer wasal e de
""Y kind of bnok (alon membmMpl at get th M mry way be can.,to chest to- muon et had wMs. Some say Scy even Beckers suppflets for the Palo Verde se m DW hated rdkttni me company's
"' '
- asserts a , were harassed kr dahg metr jote.
I is suel young. Mr. Fartcy says he still has only clear plant. The welder, who wportedly hadn't been certined in to years d= spite a 8 NCWnpany
- D, After Mr. Weaver reported welding prel> dectslos to place him "where se ereded the abat W hers, emeM for cerWkados emy Irw that he has seen stand tas take tests Ine tems to Ge NRC. lor esamste. Katset raised M the Ome "
namths, was welding Danges onto large pipe wemrs en mon saa M jobs, meloding da abow hs hudhg of espense ac- wq u tk whole problems of Cornpasty*a Rep (y secuans used in the reartor's main cauling Burkar plants. counts and tPe accurary of his resume- Daws in nortearttant construrtks, am NRC Richard Conway. Georgts Power's senior Then, at suspended Wra with pay. But a sul> mspector says: "The simple truth is that W kne. "We arver would have caught this guy Helphig Fricads vtce president for engineering and construe- sequent savesugatko by the NRC and the the quanfytomtrol people arn't wunnt h if Bechtel hadal had such strtet standards Fedwal Buwas of lawstigaum fund % lion, acknowledges that Mr. Fartry was on this job" she iays. A larmer quahty<catrui inspector at hired as a journeyman upon a union hall s WPPSS. now te a simuar postuon at a Mid- majw W* wun W. Weam's infoe gtve op their jobs a wport Oh W % g era we &ml Dad out abat M,, At the plant sites themselves, wekitng
.m ...- /. los. But Mr. Omway considers and quaury<entret inspectors say, supervt- westere nuclear plant, recans two frirads mann w has inckgramd. accueng h W. g Mr. Earley's length of apprenureship trrele- saae of quallneauon tests cRen is laz. Test who were persuadnl b maad h for etkr Weaver and NHC staffers. And after Mr.
vant became. Mr. Conway says the youth supervtmars. employed by ,the contractor, weMets durDr testi No moury chngM Weaver fUed a compialet chargtag harass-apparently passed a welding test. hands? sk says be an trerdrw. "'They mest out the IJbor Department. Kaher somenmes leave the test booths unattended "The term el apprenticeship hasn't got, for hours at a Ome and permit unlem fors' took the testa because the other welders armJ to a arckment wuh Wm nat, anmg anytMag to do with skin? says Mr. Osway, men to vouch for the lesting of aston weld- touMal pass them abetwho hesus= they othrr thhlga. IMnted his request te be tald were off with fun rekration. vacatics and arver Ebo is also the chairman of the Edisse Elec- ers. "A kg of supervtsors don't care." a ,,g.au friends ud kcane M paid so tric lasutute's constructice comnuttee. welding engineer says. "Others just look the * ~ are pay and a Nday expense artaunt
*some guys can lears how to weld la a mat- amounung to miere than 8:9.ese.
other way? , e O e
n g.g y e y w y f! t W_
;3
" a The Truth about ds, ( q.t;. 4'd: :h Zimmer. -
.- . s . .rg ; r c~;.;,.
j
., ummuis:sumumsenssimums EXHIBIT 3
,.%30 sop (6$tiseets24 tis"EWemmLwctw ;s
~ '
i . O c septemoer 1983 si.so - 1,
) 5
=
'~
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m l g { _ i The Truth about Zimmer182 , , f Nobody asked us if we wanted a nuclear ; j ,1.- f t, I power plant twenty miles upstream. We don't get to choose whether to pay for ;
)gN-.
E i l,
;' it. Zimmer is a mess, a textbook V :S** ".:,..
g , exarnple of how not to build a nuclear ' ' . l t power plant. The government still p. .2 i [ refuses to reopen licensing hearings, b "4 t% -Jg' - g y which would let us question those ., y ., responsible, so we're being asked to -
< c trust many of the same people who got I us into this potentially dangerous mess
- m the first place. Meet the bureaucrats, g:p .
, ~]
} ? i the business leaders and the whistle. 82 g
- blowers who are all part of a system l _
.j gone awry.
T. m.
1 Con:en:s
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Volume 16 Number 12 September 1983 I Features Columns A Souquet for Mr. Benchl32 Sports /18 As Big Number $ hangs up his uniform, Can UC football recover from the loss it's high time we thank Johnny Bench of Mike Gottfried? Athletic director for the gift of his wonderful sustamed -? Mike McGee says the Bearcats
- new
[/ } performance as a Cincinnati Red. Bob coach, Watson Brown, will " set this McKay recaps his career as an All. Star ,I community on its ear." catcher, and Roger Kahn, author of A f. . , g Season in the Sun, tells us of the man & lichind the catcher's mask. Some of Bench,s buddies and fans share personal j p,,,,,,, f 34 stones, and for the s'atisticians, we have Tom Brush is a nice guy-and a lousy the record years. i b h Wid Ws of
,, Chicago or Boston, he would be caten Doing Business in the 'Msl55 -
alive. View from the Topl55 32 Four top-level executives give their versions of good management and People /28 l what they see as their responsibilities Focusing on some of the biggest to employees. contributors in the massive United The Seginning at the End/65 Appeal campaign here-those who give "You're fired!" need not mean time as well as money.
"You're finished!" That's where outplacement firms come in. Also, tips on how to fire an employee Restaurants /94 without bitterness or lawsuits. Two familiar German restaurants have To MS or Not to MS7173 been given new life-the' Black Forest Does a graduate degree in business and Zimmer's.
administration give you a boost up the e ladder of success? It depends. I l Soccer Handbook: A Guide for Nothing but the Facts /128 l Sewildered Parentsl75 -, Grandes Dames of the Arts: Patricia Betcha don't know anything about the ' J: Corbett, Maria Longworth Nichols l _.m game. Most parents don't. Back when W. Storer, Mary Hopkins Emery and Anna you were on the field it was simpler: you ""*"' l had your pickup games, kickball or 75 sandlot baseball, then your tiigh school WlisCellany football and basketball. Who knew from soccer? Here's a complete guide to the Backstairs /6 basics, a who's who of players, how to Lettersl8 watch and how to learn to play. The Truth about Zinsaier182 j Observer /11 Nobody r,sked us if we wanted a nuclear power plant twenty miles upstream. % e g, 3,, ,. s/16 don't get to choose whether to pay for .. Dining Out198 it. Zimmer is a mess, a textbook " example of how not to build a nuclear J Calendar /102 power plant. The government still Catalog Showcase /122 refuses to reopen licensing hearings, 7 __ - - - which would let us question those responsible, so we're be,mg asked to - m __ Classifieds/124 trust many of the same people who got I us into this potentially dangerous mess s. -1 on the cover l g-pM i - -mN i Photo by Tony Walsh m the first plage. Meet the bureaucrats, the business leaders and the whistle- 82 Photography blowers who are all part of a system All photography, unless otherwise g)ne awry. credited, is by Tony Walsh. Gncinnad SEPTEMBER 1983 3 t.-r.-- --
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A i Born to Lose ? The Truth about Zimme~r By Dale Keiger l 3
- r. David Fankhauseris a geneticist l at Clermont College, near Batavia.
He's also an organic farmer, a goatherd and, to his neighbors, 1, something of a character. He has kept his long hair and granny
' glasses, has been said to walk into town barefoot for groceries and describes his life as "an experiment in self-sufficiency." He moved his family to a farm ten miles from Moscow, Ohio, to escape some unhealthy aspects of modern life. Then Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company began building the i
s William H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station a few minutes away. Fankhauser didn't want any kind of nuclear facility that close. In his laboratory he uses radiation to induce l mutations in specimens, and he believes government l I standards for nuclear plant radiation emissions are in-adequate. But as his feelings became better known to his neighbors, he heard good reasons to stop Zimmer, specifically. People kept bringing him evidence of shoddy construction, telling of bad suppression pool l work and cable insulation problems. He decided to i speak out. i Few people listened to him, oir to others opposing Cindtvuts SEPTEMBER 1983 83
~ - - - - - -
Zimmer fails on every point. CGAE may be am a make h safe, given enough time the
'i* '" new plant.
**n*ging CGAE, the conuruedon nepartner'respon-
*" We trusted the federal and money, but to can the facility safe now
- is ludicrous.
partners in the plant are Dayton Power & government to SADClion a of coarse,is*= point ^dvoc=> s sareir Light and Columt,us A Southern Ohio of nuclear power insist the danger from g Bectric), tried to ensure that its critics Safe' effective niiciearsplitting atoms has been greatly esag-would not be taken seriously. On one occa- Power program. We gerated and they have some good points.
- sion, a CG&E spokesman suggested the trusted CG&E to uphold But estunates of the toD from a hypotheti-y' opposition must be using ouija boards as their source of information. do not The message its responsibility to build a caiwom sanan acci to conservative Ci,rcinn=1 was: Safe and economical plRDt study informally known as the trust these people. Arcyou going to believe a,po,t, there would be 9.000 initial i
this organic goatherd", this aging hippie, or as possible. We trusted the lo9,om initialinjuries ud lem fatalities,
" the company that for 150 years has always Nuclear Regulatory cancer deaths. Damage would total $34.5 binion. Of the plants with ee highest
- c pmvided switch?
power when you flicked the Commission (NRC) to potential casushics, n-er ranks firth in There was just one problem: the organic eBSure its safety by ini tial injuries, among reactors under con-goatherd was right, ,,,ctio,, n,,, ,,um,,, ,,,,, t3, ,om Zimmer is a mess. Already a textbook Supervising constructionpossible at accident under the worst possible example of how not to build a nuclear Zimmer. All three conditions, and the odds of that are ex.
- plant, the Clermont County operation real- Mgly dim. Nudear advocmes point m ly is an example of much more: a system betrayed us.
..J sone awry. What happened at Zirnmer was these low probabilities and say the risks are acceptable. Bat where do we draw the line?
~ not an accident or an unfortunate set of ble, so we are left with only this: we are How many deaths are acceptab
- coincidences. Zimmer was born to lose, told to trust many of 'he same people who of the estimates? The population and 'it's important to understand why, betrayed us before to now make everything Moscow, Ohio? A few plant technicians because the system that produced Zunmer f they say. and security guards? And was Three Mile a.
y . produced our other nudear plants, We promise. as well. Trust us. ' right. This time Islandwill be dif erent,
" acceptable" because it didn't kiu There have been improvements in this Work remams stopped at Zimmer while anyone? Zimmer may never hurt anyb sj
;jt system, but you must wonder if they are the government tries to figure out how bad more than it already has, but the point
- , enough. things are and what to do. Every month of we don't know that because we don't kno
- We trusted the federal government to delay costs an estimated $15 million, but how wcH it was buDt. Neither does CGRE.
t sanction a safe, efrective nudear power it's necessary because things are so fouled Neither doesthe government. Andanti ( f program. We trusted CG&E to upholdup. its The quality of the plant is "indeter. fmd out, we have to trust them to protect 1i responsibility to build as safe and minate," says the government, but Zunmerus. economical a plant as possible. We trusted can't be called safe. To be safe, CG&E f the Nuclear Regulatory Commission must be able to prove the plant was built oday by it'seasy to forgetthat Zunmer j (NRC) to ensure our safety by supervising qualified personnel who followed an ap-seemedlike agoodideain1968 when { construction at Zimmer. All three betrayed proved design and used approved buUding i it was announced in CG&E's annua
- us. The NRC had clear warnings of some- materials and procedures. CG&E can't do report. Its estimated cost was thing dreadfully wrong at Moscow years that. To know Zimmer is safe, we must its year of comple*i n,1975. (The next ago. At first, the commission faded to know that each step of construction was in- year,1%9, the company a a recognize the seriousness of the problem; spected and documented according to plant would be named afte then it covered up to avoid embarrassment. federal law. that the operators know what Zimmer, CG&E president and an e
' The government still refuses to reopen could go v rong and what' to do about it for forty-nine years. CG&E directors Banting hearings, which would, in effect, and that we canbe evacuated,if omey- predicted the plant would be "a fitting let us question under oath those responsi- testimonial to his leadership.") The
-y ca-awy hesiey and icity was estimated to in-The Zimmer Cost Mounts .. ..
dema:ul for electr crease 7 percent per year. Coal prices were
.. @~ ' rising and environmentalists succeedmg in
'I Jc imposing stricter, more expensive cican air
- gg:. requirements on coal-burmns utilities.
I 5240 million M : Nuclear seemed a clean, cheap alternative, pv c alluring with its glamorous, high-tech im-
$3QQ m((((On es utiNties ded ct, to their earmngs N new equipment expenditures, but did not O .. require them to refund the savings to rate
$$$Qggjog payers. The bigger the new equipment pur-i i gj;vyfg ***
-~ $e**iil17"p*[*rer'edand*"u'"a
$1billignj was the biggest equipment purchase
- f. ..
* ..m p f?'y : around. Zimmer had a lot going for it.
4 .......
- e m M J $1,$ billjon Looking back, we now see what planners py);ps._ e w m .i , . .J w ev . /~ M.?? % N 3" y) , Y ,% w$ G e T ea"s MIlio n
.! .+.- .w...
body anticipated the
' K5UK @'E %M4, .M7b h am n e s w e Fra O S) 85N W'. m n.c u . v.- w 2 (*
94 Cmennati SEPTEMaER 1983
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Arab oil embargo or that we would begin 9
* *- conserving energy because cf it. Nobody Knew the Midwest was enjoying its last QF WK Mn n AAU U boisterous years before a severe recession '
forced industry to cut power consumption.
As a result, demand didn't increase by 7 percent a year; the figure was closer to gg .
% ~~~' .-' *- -
Zimmer announced by CG&E. [ 3 percent. CG&E also didn't know the ,
~'
government would order several extremely g1 - . 3 4 *
- expensive modifications in nuclear plants
- that were not part of the original estimated Initial site clearing and construction. Liz Scheurer, of the Ohio Office of Historical Preservation, pressured by CG&E management over historical preservation regulations.
cost. .
~
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Another factor made Zimmer attractive in 1968: low apparent risk. Utility company
' CG&E takes vendor QA (quality assurance) control from Henry J. Kaiser Company, shareholders do not bear the risk of new construction - that's passed to customers the main construction contractor. .
through rate increases. He Public Utilities - t Commission of Ohio (PUCO) had always
%dC ~
I granted such ir. creases and CG&E assumed Kaiser repeatedly requests more QA naffing; CG&E refuses.
, that would continue. Congress provided gg , - , , , ,
' - another important safeguard called the 'd Price-Anderson Act. No one expected a Original target year for completion. .
. major accident at a nuclear plant, but everyone knew that if somehow one did gg t -
C
' ~
Vic Griffin, Kaiser's QA engineer, publicly airs his concerns. NRC investigates; no happen it could be awesome. But not to "
' worry - just in case, the Price-Anderson substantive action taken.'
l Act limited a utility's liability to $560 ppg ,
~ / ,
Besides, what was going to happen? NRC's Terry Harpster begins working at Zimmer as inspector. He te!!s CGAE, NRC
.. ' administrators in Chicago and NRC officials at NRC headquarters about his concerns nese things were safe, right? The federal
- over serious problems at Zimmer. No substantive action taken.
. government had done research and written all these strict regulations, so what could happen? All you had to do was follow the MO ' -
. Dave Jones, a Kaiser employee, starts working at Zimmer. Romas Applegate, a I rules. Didn't you?
private detective working for CG&E at Zimmer, calls the NRC with his a!Iegations; the
) If that were true, we might have avoided first IE investigation of his charges takes place, with no substantive action taken.
; much trouble. But at the inception of the E
I nuclear program, the government made a mistake. We had incinerated'more than a gg c Sherrill Nolder invesugation on twhalf of Kaiser. In March, the NRC Region III staff [ hundred thousand Japanese civilians at
. recommends a shutdown; immediate Action I.etter written instead. OIA report cen-l Hiroshima and Nagasaki by splitting atoms and were anxious to show peaceful applica, sored. City signs deal with CG&E in October, pulling out of licensing hearings. In November, NRC fines CG&E 1200,000.
, ; tions for this horrible power, to be the ! atomic good guys. When the government decided we should have nuclear power, the M2 Dave Jones demoted after he talks to government. Harpster report leaked. In June, Atomic Energy Commission was created State Senator Cooper Snyder applies political pressure on state boiler inspector. In and given contradictory functions: to both November, the NRC orders construction halted at Zimmer. regulate and promote nuclear power. His contradiction caused problems immediate-ly. He government saw the successful U.S. James Asselstine, "We are paying a price provisions for reactor licensing almo't Navy nuclear program and thought if the for not following a more deliberate ap- word.for word from the Federal Commun-j Navy could operate safe nuclear reactors, proach in those early years." so could America's utilities. All they had to ictions Act of 1934, which meant we were ne government relied on sound utility to license nuclear plants in much the same do was take the Navy's reactors and build management. If it wasn't going to own and way we licensed radio stations. The govern-them bigger. His tumed out to be wrong. operate the nation's nuclear plants itself, it ment let more than sixty utilities embark on When the AEC's experts counseled caution had to. It couldn't afford the personnel re. nuclear programs that had never been ade-l to allow adequr.ie research and testing, the quired to run the civilian program the way quately tested, without making sure those i AEC stopped being a regulator and started Admiral Hyman Rickover had run the utilities could handle the incredibly com-promoting instead. Nothing would impede Navy's. His meant writing comprehensive plex technological problems involved, and l our march into the nuclear age. We didn't standards and regulations and trusting with minimal assurances the utilities would i have time for warmngs and testing. In utilities to follow them. But the govern- obcy the rules. "De whole enterprise was several cases, the AEC hid ominous reports ment didn't write those kinds of rules. It handled on the basis that utilities would from the public. couldn't, because it didn't know enough, master the technology and perform well,"
"We plunged into nuclear with little in some cases, and chose to hide ominous says NRC Commissioner Victor Gilinsky.
doubt and little hesitation " says Con- research in others. The Atomic Energy Act "It turned out in quite a few cases that l gressman Morris Udall, chairman of the of August 30, 1954, contained thirty <>ne faith was misplaced." CG&E was one of ' congressional subcommittee charged with references to health and safety, but no those cases. oversight of the NRC. "nere was no definitions. Congress seemed to assume if The utility didn't waste time making its devious or evil purpose ~ we were just too the word " safety" appeared often enough, first mistake. It was a nuclear novice, but optimistic." Adds NRC Commissioner that would make it reality. He Act copied instead of seeking experienced help,it hired Gnonnau SEPTEMBER 1983 P'S
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/k , J. . i 1 ; Nb David Fankhauser, a geneticist Vic Griffin, Quality Assurance James Keppler, Nuclear at Clermont College: In his engineer for Kaiser: He Regulatory Commission (NRC) laboratory, he uses radiation sounded thefirst alarm in Region III top stiministrator:
to induce mutations in 1976, questioning the "There was no deal cut." specimens, and he believes installation of uninspected g.
- government standardsfor components Nobody was earnest. Those at Kaiser knew trouble was brewing. On October i4,1974, Kaiser QA nuclear piant radiation listening.
M*"*8" CG&E %ce . William Friedrich President wrote to Earl Borgmann: emissions are inade7uate. probably spent a lot more effort trying to "Every effort is being made to comply with another firm with limited experience, the get around them than just doing them." the drawings and specifications, codes and Henry J. Kaiser Company, as main con- She remembers calls from Robert Wiwi, standards, with a minimum number of struction contractor. Kaiser had worked currently vice president for electric opera- people, but it is becoming virtually im-
. for Armco and built some big things, in- tions, and William Dickhoner, president. possible to continue working in all areas i
cluding the Hoover Dam, but its only CG&E seemed to regard regulations as with the present staff." In a January 15, l nuclear experience was on two experimen- penalties, and itself as a victim of politi- 1975, reply to another Kaiser request for tal reactors built for the government. It had cians in thrall to anti-progress, anti- more inspectors, Borgmann made a veiled never built a commercial plant. The situa- technology radicals. The company was also threat and unwittingly foretold the future: tion was aptly described by a local jour- cheap, and as a result, ruined the quality ". . . there are trying times ahead of us and nalist as a dance of virgins. auurance (QA) program meant to protect if Kaiser expects to remain a significant fac-In the early 1970s. federal regulators us from unsafe construction. An effective tor on this project, it will have to adapt to didn't monitor Zimmer construction close- QA program requires two things: a suffi- the situation now facing us, which is one of ly, assuming enlightened self-interest would cient staff of independent inspectors fully austerity and hard work. It is dange ous prevail. Why would CG&E build a bad supported by management and thorough for us to tamper with a constructor's plant? What they hadn't anticipated was documentation for every step of construc- responsibility by trying to assess and decide how badly CG&E uriderestimated its task, tion, the importance of which cannot be the proper level of his manpower." and the utility's attitude toward rules. This overemphasized. Paperwork was virtua!!y Dangerous or not, CG&E routinely did it. attitude didn't take long to surface. Liz all the government relied on for regulation. The utility took control of the Approved Scheurer worked for the Ohio Office of Federal " inspection" in those days Vendors List. The AVL derived from a Historical Preservation in the early 1970s, amounted to a paperwork review. If the simple premise - you can't build a nuclear supervising compliance with federal regula- licensee's inspections were not performed plant with just anything. You have to use tions on historical and archaeological properly and documentation not accurate proper materials. Recognizing this as one preservation. CG&E had to work with and complete, the government literally place where utilities might cut corners, the Scheurer to acquire the permission to build would not know what was happening at the government requires them to buy safety-related materials from approved vendors, on the Zimmer site. She and her boss, Bert site. If construction continued under an in-Drennan, recall that it was common to en. adequate QA program, mistakes and safety but lets them make the evaluations. Ap-counter resistance to the regulations and violations could be buried under overlying proving a vendor often means stationing an they got some from CG&E. "They were construction and remain hidden until they inspector in the vendor's plant to monitor assembly of components. You can't inspect not eager to have any kind of complica- caused an accident. tion," Scheurer says, which is understand- CG&E has tried to blame Kaiser for the a component after dehvery: disassembling able, but, "they were trying . . . to get QA breakdown, but internal memos and it to check parts breaks the seals and voids around the las I was contacted by higher- letters prove CG&E ran the show from the the warranty. CG&E would not let Kaiser do in-plant inspections. however; they were ups [in CG&E] and more or less told I beginning. The utility denied Kaiser re-should find a way that they wouldn't have quests for additional QA staffing in 1974 too expensive. Instead, the utility company to comply with all the regulations. They and 1975, when construction began in simply read its vendors' QA manuals. If Sg One nnati SEPTEMBER 1983
t l . _ _ _ _ . - . m .
* these checked out all right, CG&E took Kaiser went along. written for the same steel on May 5,1977, 3 that to mean everything would be fme on Dings got worse. Someone decided it .it was listed as safety-reloted and pre- g any purchased components. Kaiser knew would be okay to buy materials as non- sumably used that way. Was Frank Adams ,
vendors shouldn't be trusted that far, but safety-related (from non-approved vendors) & Co. an approved vender for nudear. CG&E wouldn't listen. De new pro- then illegally upgrade them to safety- grade neel? Hardly- Frank Adams & Co. cedures violated Kaiser policies and the related after delivery. One example involved is a scrap dealer. Was this just a clerical g codes of the American Society of Mechani- 10,688 pounds of steel beams shipped Feb- mistake? Possibly. But an internal Kaiser cal Engineers (ASME) that form the basis ruary 24,1975, from Frank Adams & Co. investigation conducted in July 1981 for regulating nuclear construction (even On the Kaiser requisition it is listed as non- estimated that 80 percent to 90 per_ cent of the Rusnans use the ASME code), but safety-related, but when a stores issue was structural materials were handled this way.
?
n Zimdier' shew r.5 pkq. .q..ww & +hss
. Joe Witums Jr..," Admiral" Wilhams 1. ---
p-'~;=*~h.: M' enM*4arp.3,4:p m % -u9. S M64% g.fiq 1,W chaff, but you've got.to listen. Tm to everyone at CG&E, admits he flunked ? 7 not saying the intervenors did not bring 3 retirement. Rat partly cxplains how hel' . . * .'"up some valid points.* 1f I find allE ceded up as the utility's new via presi 1 3, (the defects in this plant, and fmd all; dent for nudear operations and the man *.<
- x ithe defects in the paper, then ergo Ir
. responsible for Mmmer sincelast April. s .
Fahould have satisfied any reasonable l . x After.setiring as an adnural in Hyman Intervenors." w Ac - ?4, O M-l.
, Rickover's nuclear Navy, WNmt tried , g; , f'. J Hose intervenors represent a touchy .c
- 'taking it easy. Dat didn't work - he, - -f - 1 3 subject forWilhams. He wonders about ;
;, ; sot restless. He tried his own consulting . , '.; p " __?' '
fM Qthe motives of some of them, and strug- -
. business. nat didn't work either-his . pp 4 gles to' express his reservations without '.
, -wife objected to his frequent travel.~ L JS yi+
f +4Q f soundmg like a Red-baiter. Some critis, t
% o .- he says. " prey opon the fears of John'? ,
r nere was nothing left to do but so y *
.4 ' back out and get a regular job. *O $ ..Q.' Pub 5c. ney take advantage of the "
t- - ei Not that his current position is encre- flack of knowledge of the untrained per-C ~
^'
; ly " regular." Wilhams walked in on i # ^ 3 son about nudear power. Dey mak,e .
. one of the nanon's worst utility prob-i exaggerated aHegations. They prey on a 4,
H . lems, and it's his job to make Zimmer^ Adm. Joseph Wilhams, Jr., vice .. g {j pera's natural fear of things he can ' .'
' finichable and operable, assummg the.; . president for nudear e>4= at 7.,y. not sea or touch. I just don't think that ';
- P Nudear RegulatoryCommissiongivesits .- CG&E: "Iknow we're somiafu:d -M'pple who ' & ' h enremist '
i '.'1 permission. He professes to be pleased ' "#'f"'."#$ff.%.;.3 % measures ~ ~ ' " " are responsible.' ;&? -ir% W '.
~
- i. " with what he's found. - There's no questionin my mind that :
I $'""I'm impressed with the people," he.d operated the same way, bait be says he3 the Soviet Union would like for the ; pseys. 'Tm somewhat punled why the . . doesn'tiritend to try to run Zimmer as a ; nuclear industry not to be developed in : f ' morale is as high as it is.Dese guys are f boot camp. "I wasn't a martmet in the ' this country. They understand how vital -
' Navy. I don't find numefuDy leading . that power is going to be to the growth
~
r _ on a roll out here." . r. in the five months he has hud 1.is new ' ; people in civilian life any different from ' of our economy. Now, how do you say ~
, ' post, Williams has begun to bring in (leadirts them]in militarylife." - ~ i something like that without it looking l
.- . reinforcements from the mihtary. He ? His first job has been to scrutinize "'like ArtmiralWiUlams seesa Redbehind l p Navy nuclear program has been an un-what has already been built and the - every goddamn rock? I'm not good at
, i qualified success, and the atomic in , . - paperwork, to see what has to be fixed. artienlarms this in a sophisticated way."
f .dustry has long depended on Navy ~ "'"I've got a bunch we're going to find Just as he's unabashedly patriotic, . trained personne.l. Williams quickly- ;we've got a sound plant. I know we're ---Wmtam< is unabashedly pro-nudear. N He thinks the civilian program has been - [ hired three assie". *= 1 residents, aD <h gonna find problems, but nothing we -Navy me
- . He has no trouble explammt why the we<<=ry is better operator trainmg. I's . ATM1 [Three Mile Island] as a success.
,.-mihtary's program was able to ac- .wants better crisis simulation. Now, $Was anybody hurt? ne answer is ad.
9mphsh what the civilian program has ? CG&E crews have to leave the site for f Did anybody reasve a significant dose E not, starting with the man who ran it : trainmg in a simulator that. creates cof radiarian? ne answer is no. Should
- Rickover. 'i ' : h' reaLstic, hypothetical crises that the[ it ever have FOM to the pohit it
~"He was the goddamndest~ dictater' . crew must then safely resolve. Dat - did? Hellno. But from the <t=adpaint -
".you ever saw,".Wilhams recaDs of the: i imulator s doesn't match "Iimmer's con-; gof being a danger to the pubHc,it really man be served under. "[The Navy] had trol room, however, and Wmiams . wasn'ti . . , .
4 3.% t ' a highly competent man who was the . would like to see a better one iriershi ~ ' *1 just like to keep busy at somethmg
, ' sole authority on how nacia:ar plants . on site. He wants to increase engmeer-c.,I think is important. And that's egousu-
. would be built and operated." Rickover : ing support for the plant: "Peopic say,Ncal, you know? But Ilike to do some-g set trammg standards, nand-picked his' MMyGod 200peopleinengineeringata : thing that ready contributes. It's going iofficers, supervised even the tiniest single plant?' Absohnely!" '4 Wi ' to3 be a tough couple of years. I don't i design and construction deta!!s and '- - He'd also like to change some'at , wantpeopleinOhiotosupportZimmer, made sure the military reactors were ' titudes. He acknowledges that in the I just don't want them to oppose it for -
7 built conservatively. De result was a past people at "Ammer were too slow to reasons that are not valid. -
' fleet of ships with safe, dependable, - pay attention to critics. "My people are "Come out here in a couple, three cost-effective reactors. Williams thinks- going to listen," he insists. "They're . ' months. You'll see some changes." -
the civilian program could have also good at sifting the wheat from the ~ Dale Keiger Gnonnats SEPTEMBER 1983 57
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William Dickhoner, president, Earl Borgmann, vice president Thomas Devine, of the Government Accountability Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.: of general engineering at Puying the pricefor the early CG&E: An exchange of Project (GAP): Tipped off by years? Every month of delay memos, a veiled threat and a a private detective, he gathered costs an estimated $15 million. forecast of "trying times enough evidence to help 3 ahead." convince the government to reopen the investigation into Even if the Kaiser in"estigator was wrong half the time (and the report has never been constantl y pressured not to hold up con-Emmer. refuted), that means nearly half the safety- struction. As Zimmer took longer to build related construction fails to meet federal and the price increased, this pressure inten-codes. If structural material fails, it could sified. At times, things got rough. Dousing reasons. Welding is the glue holding a cause an accident. Furthermore, the Kaiser inspectors with buckets of water was one nuclear plant together. At Zimmer, there report states: ". . . as a cost.saving policy, means of getting the point across. Accord- were many different welding procedures, CG&E directed that structural materials be ing to Dave Jones, there were others. Jones all of which had to be done properly by an purchased Non-Essential (non-safety- was a burly Kaiser employee made special adequately trained welder. nus, welder related] and later upgraded to Essential assistant to the site QA manager in Novem- certification was critical and so are weld Isafety-related] for construction pur- ber 1980. Kaiser thought enough of him to records. If a welder's work begins to poses." In other words, CG&E ordered the give him considerable responsibility, but disintegrate, for example, repair crews upgrading, when he tried to do his job he ran into op- need to find and check his other welds. If a Dere was one tragicomic episode in all position. When he persisted, he says, other section of pipe proves defective, in;pectors i this vendors business. CG&E was forcing workers, " team players" who regarded must know where else it was used so it can Kaiser to use vendors that only the utility him as a troublemaker, started dropping by be replaced. If a change was made in had approved, violating regulations cover- his office and asking him how he felt. design, technicians need to know so the ing Kaiser as construction contractor. "You know, Dave," they'd say, "a guy like final blueprints match the actual plant. Someone had a bright idea for getting you has to start thinking about his health." Documentation is the road map that allows around the problem: put CG&E on the Jones says he understood the message, but monitoring and correction of problems. Kaiser AVL. Dus, decisions made by didn't care. He'd grown up tough and What's more, without proper documenta-CG&E regarding vendors would be accept- didn't like being leaned on. By 1982, he'd tion, the NRC was blinded. During most of able. To everyone's embarrassment, when made enough people mad to be demoted. Zimmer's construction, the NRC did not Kaiser checked out CG&E, the utility failed CG&E publicly branded him a disgruntled, inspect hardware, only the paperwork. Its to qualify for Kaiser's list. Iow-level clerk, ignoring the fact that this entire inspection effort depended on the Vendor and material problems were only " low. level clerk" had been on Kaiser accuracy of that paperwork. Because the part cf CG&E's demolishing of the QA orgamzation charts just one step below the paper was bad, those early inspections program. For QA inspectors to do their site QA manager. weren't worth much. The other key element of a good QA The scope of the problem is staggering. Job, they must be independent and backed by management, because they're not program is the documentation required by At the Cincinnati Environmental Advisory popular on construction sites. Nobody the government showing where all parts Council hearings in September 1982, the likes being graded and no boss likes to hear were bought, who installed them and what NRC's Dorwin Hunter estimated the num-that part of his job must be reported and procedures were followed. The builder ber of missing documents at four million. hahed for rework. Because of this, federal must record every welder, every weld, every ne NRC since has backed away from that law requires that utilities and construction piece of pipe and valve, and document number, but the true figure is clearly very departments grant total independence to every design change and nonconformance high. The NRC must track dowTt 2,400 QA inspectors and prevent harassment and to standards found by inspectors. Why so welders now scattered around the world, to intimidation. At Zimmer, inspectors were much fuss? There are many important check their qualifications. A Kaiser in-N Gncinnati SEPTEMBER 1983
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vestigation stated that 42,000 purchase the blame for that. In the early days of snaking the rounds, spoke to a young law-orders must be reviewed to check for bad their opposition, they were naive. They yer named Romas Devine,of the Govern-3 ment Accountability Project (GAP). GAP materials. The government probably will thought all they had to do was lay their in-never fmd a lot of the paper. formation before the public, which would decided to represent Applegate, and In some cases, that's exactly what utility be attentive and demand action. Instead, a Devine began interviewing Zimmer workers officials wanted. One important document conservative constituency took one look at in Cincinnati. Ly December of 1980, he in nuclear plant construction is the Non- this col!cction of mmplainers, who remind- had enough evidence to contact the N conformance Report, or NR. NRs must be ed them of the anti. war movement of the which agreed to reopen the investigation, written whenever an inspector fmds '60s, and dism,ssed them as malcontents, but not just because of Devine. A former something that does not meet construction CG&E didn't have to refute any charges, Zimmer QA inspector working at another standards. Copies of all NRs are forwarded because no one looked past surface impres- nuclear plant coincidentally had s to the NRC. Internal documents and testi- sions to hear them in the first place. The telling the NRC of serious violations he mony by various CG&E and Kaiser person- anti-Zimmer people didn't tmderstand knew about. The NRC finally suspec nel show that throughout construction packaging and it cost them years of effort. that its investigatcrs and inspectors had Not only did the public fail to listen - so been missing something. i CGAE strove to reduce the number of NRs, not by seeing to it that work was donc did the government. It aussed its first The NRC dispatched IE to Zimmer right the first time, but by circumventing chance in 1976, when a Kaiser QA engineer again, but it did something els the system. At meetings, CG&E employees named Vic Griffm went public with his government agency decided to inv discussed how problems could be dealt concerns about installation of unmspected itself, calling on people from its Office of l with without writing the required NR, in- components. It missed its second chance in Inspector and Auditor (OIA) and telling venting substitute forms which did not im- 1980 with Thomas Applegate, a private them to find out if something had been pose strict correction standards or have to detective working for CG&E at Zimmer, wrong with IE's earlier work. OIA in be turned into the NRC. NRs were altered who'd called the NRC after being fired gators interviewed NRC personnel from with correction fluid or voided without due when he reponed to CG&E evidence of December of 1980 to February of 1981, and cause. In later years, when Zunmer was faulty welds and falsified field documenta- exammed documentation from the first under intense scrutiny, CG&E wrote new tion. Each time, the NRC crdered investi- Applegate investigation. What they found was embarrassing. In an October 1981 procedures designed to identify habitual gator Gerald Phillip :.nd its Office of In-NR writers among inspectors and have spection and Enforcement (IE) to conduct memo to NRC Chairman Nunzio Palladino,
" heart-to-heart talks" with them. an inquiry. In Griffin's case, nothing ever OIA Director James J. Cummmgs described The government admits "whistleblow- camc orthe IE probe. As fot Applegate,IE it this way: " Fundamentals basic to all ers" deserve most of the credit for reveal- reported one minor paperwork violation. investigations were simply not observed . . .
The investigative file contained no results irg the truth about Zimmer, but they had Cases closed. little effect at first. Nobody listened. The Except Applegate refused to just go of interviews at all nor was there any de. anti-Zimmer activists must share part of away. He went to Washington and, while tailed record of copies of documentation Oncinnats SEPTEMBER 1983 39
~ ~~
.. . . .=. . ..
l IUUn Zimmer [ reviewed [ emphasis Cummmgs's]." IE ap- Zimmer back in 1978, if not earlier. He parently hadn't interviewed witnesses or public was going to scream if it Icarned , review how much the NRC had known, and for ' aore,ed weldingclearly documentation. Funher-T, RAVEL investigators hadn't bothered to go into the plant and look at the welds how long. Hezds might roll. What to do? The answer was to cover up, censor the Applegate had noted as having problems, report, do a little " word engineering," in despite his having listed the welds by their the NRC's euphemistic lexicon. De OIA CONNECTION ' identification codes. IE had simply in- report was rewritten repeatedly from April dicated no problems were found. If some- 7 to Atigust 7 at the direction of OIA
. PERSONALIZED TRAVEL by PROFESSIONALS body had gone into the plant, he would Director Cummmgs. De idea was simple: .
who have been where yoitre going'9 have discovered that weld #RH-42 didn't leave the attachments - the inches-thick ) exist anymore (it had been improperly cut stack of supporting evidence - untouched, j BUSINESS out) and weld #CY606 was covered by con- but dilute the summary so that, while it , TMm crete, s a body could teli if it had been wouldn't lie, it would cloud the truth. done properly or not. Also, the IE report Cummings knew that few people would SPECIALIST had mentioned, in its one finding of infrac- bother to look at the attachments. Who ' tic'n, that "a CG&E official" had im- had time, or sufficient interest? Most
, WE GUARANTEE properly ordered the closing out of an NR would just read the transmittal memo and 1
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IN WRITING on defective piping; what OIA found was the summary, and nobody would get ex-
. LOWEST that this wasn't any ordinary " official," cited because by now that summary didn't but QA Manager William Schwied. His say much of anything.
AlRLINE RATES was direct implication of a top CG&E orfi- well, two people did get excited -
- ONE CALL RESERVATION SERVICE cial subvening the QA program, and IE Gamble and Sinclair. When they read the NNING 3 had not pursued the lead. final report and checked the attachments, e PROM CN RMAT ONS
< l" e DETAILED TRAVEL trlNERARIES
- e CONVENTION MEETING PLANNING E-e SALES INCENTfVE PROGRAMS been a hard-nosed preoperations start-up NRC. But the Harpster report had been e CUSTOMl2ED SILUNG inspector for the NRC's Region III, which pulied from the document altogether.
e PASSPORT AND VISA SERVICES has jurisdiction over Zimmer. He was sent Sinclair and Gamble wanted to know why,
; to Zimmer in October 1977 and didn't like and they went to their boss, Arthur f =0 CHAAGE FOR ouA services what he found. He thought CG&E didn't Schnebelen. Schnebelen, in turn, took Att uAsen carerr cAAos appreciate the amount of resources needed them to Confront Cummmgs.
y Acctmo wt otuvts to youn to operate a nuclear plant, that the plant Cummmgs defended his decision, saying [
"" was understaffed and that too many un- that the Harpster material was inconsistent h"s"s trained personnel were involved. He said with the thrust of the OIA investigation
' utzt Evtut=Gs. he'd found an employee entrusted with and therefore should not be included.
sAr, on sun supervising the start.up operation who had Gamble and Sinclair replied that it was an j A only three months' experience. Funher- investigator's job to report what he'd UO M/ s[O l10[O more, the QA inspectors weren't able to do found, whether it fit the original mission or g ggg their jobs correctly. Harpster finally con- not. Schnebelen tried to get the Harpster cluded that Zimmer was out of control. He document out in a different way, arguing to be there told OIA investigators John Sinclair and that since information always seemed to 874-8006
- David
- pmb- Gamble i*mau thatwhh he had x
tried to resolve leak anyway, why hide it? Just mail it CG&s. -d- a -- -v . - in. "we d-t working up to Earl Borgmann, with no know what to do with this, but we thought success. Ren, Harpster said, he went up you should see it anyway." Cummings
?
the NRC Region III management chain to didn't like that idea, and countered with a James Keppler, the top administrator, and shrewd bureaucratic move. Create a third reported his findings (Keppler recalls this file, he said, just for Harpster. Gamble and taking place in 1978 or 1979). Harpster said Sinclair knew this would bury the report, l , he managed to set up a meeting at NRC because no one would ever know to ask for j headquarters to discuss CG&E problems in the "Harpster file," and they objected July of 1978 only after " screaming." By again. Cummings finally decided to hold the time he'd left Zimmer in March 1979, the document and include it in a later OIA to join the team investigating the accident report, this one covering an OIA investiga-at Dree Mile Island, he'd heard nothing tion into possible enminal actions at Zim-MI 467 CIRCLE FREEWAY CINCINNATI, OHIO 45246 about any action on his complaints. mer. Because the cr:minal investigation has ne information Sinclair and Gamble never been concluded, the OIA criminal in-wrote in their report, which was filed April vestigation report has never come out. He 7,1981, was explosive. The NRC was Harpster interview did make it out, how-belatedly recognizing how much it had ever: it was leaked to GAP in July of 1982. mis-d f r ye rs. Now, here was this OIA After GAP's Tom Devine went public with ) > Near Showcase Cinema. Off Crescentvme Rd repon upg that Cs investigpm h, an Oh of Gnnal Counsel attomey
- aroestrato oeno taavat Actav ermoss, had been mept and that top people m the named Rick Parrish contacted Sinclair and ,
l NRC had been told how bad things were at Gamble and told them Harpster, now high-N Oncinnati SEPTEMBER 1983
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er up in the NP.C. was writing a statement Kaiser personnel at Zimmer July 21-31, refuting the trport's accuracy. Gamble and 1981, and filed a twelve-page report listing 7 ,
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- Sinclair saad to warn Harpster that if he did numerous violatiens and implicating '-
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that, they'd sign affidavits swearing to its CG&E in the breakdown. Kaiser thought U ' ' ) accuracy. Furth'ermore, they'd publish enough of her to send her back to Zimmer 1 their notes. Harpster apparently rahud within months to conduct another in- b" 8
- they meant busisfess and backed off. vestigation, but her first report was kept y under wraps. Kaiser did not report the L..
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findings to the NRC. When copies later , This was not the only example of
" word engineering." By July of mysteriously arrivert at NRC headquarters 1981, NRC investigators were clos- in a plain brown envelope, Nolder was
[ ing in on CG&E, accumulating evidence fired. She is suing Kaiser. F that the utility was behind the breakdown More than just cover-ups prolonged the t i of quality assurance at Zimmer. On July 9, abuses at Zimmer, ne NRC was excruci- !
~ -
John Sinclair and another investigator, atingly slow to face that Zimmer was not g
- Albert Puglia, interviewed CG&E's simply a series of isolated incidents, but a B William Schwiers, who was about to retire widespread breakdown. By March of 1981, after several years as QA manager for Zim- the NRC was tracking more than 600 F
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mer. He began the interview criticizing allegations found by its second IE in-
'C Kaiser, stating the contractor had not given vestigation, including illegal voiding of its QA persor.nel sufficient independence NRs, harassment and intimidation of L-from the construction department. Asked quality assurance personnel, cosmetic i
- about Kaiser requests for additional QA in- rework that merely hid problems, pressure
!' spectors, Schwiers replied that he believed on inspectors from Kaiser management
- all such requests had been honored. Then and reassignment of those too insistent on !
the investigators played their trump card. proper work, bad welding procedures, a ney told him they had asked for docu- boukmaking operation run out of a plant ' ( JERRY DEVITT & ASSOCIATES mentation from Kaiser that would prove security office and several serious construc- t
' CG&E's role in denying those staffing re- tion flaws, including some in the suppres. r REALTORS quests, and that Kaiser had agreed to turn sion poc! that protects against a meltdown. -
it over. Faced with this, Schwiers admitted At a Region til meeting held at the end of
- . CAREW TOWER he'd had "some authority" in denying re. March of 1981, the staff laid it on the line t CINCINNATl, OHIO 45202 quests for more inspectors, that "on - Zimmer should be padlocked. Con- 513/241-7688 paper" it looked like he was :n control. He struction had to stop until investigators
- couldn't remember who had attended could learn what exactly was happening.
.! management meetings at which those re- But Region til boss Keppler wouldn't do quests were discussed, but noted that he it. The investigation would continue, he 2
reported directly to Earl Borgmann. As the said, but so would construction. Keppler ' interview progressed, Schwiers became met with CG&E's Borgmann on March 31. ' more agitated. He gave a few answers that NRC sources insist Keppler and Borgmann he could not explain, then stated that he worked out a deal, something Keppler I
?
l was under " tremendous pressure" at Zim. strenuously denies. "Here was no deal mer. Finally, he refused to answer any cut," he says. Whatever happened at the L more questions with more than "yes" or meeting, on April 8,1981. Keppler issued l an "Immediate Action Letter," which was t ,
"no." b
'*. This interview was important as evidence the first real step taken against CG&E. De
{y of CG&E's culpability in wrecking the letter ordered the utility to take several cor-Zimmer QA program. But, again, the sum- rective actions regarding quality assurance, I mary of the investigation was diluted so but it fell far short of a stop order. Keppler j that the Schwiers interview was only men. maintains this was adequare, that a shut- i , tioned, not discussed, with no clue to its down was not called for because the in- [ g significance. If anybody bothered to read vestigation had revealed only " program- L 5 all the cttac!vnents, they found it last in the matic," not hardware, problems. At a fa , pile, beh'nd fifty-one others. Region 111 staff meeting a few weeks later, ne NRC wasn't the only organization a top official from NRC headquarters, Vic I I C trying to hide what it knew about Zimmer. Stello, also argued that the staff was only The Kaiser report noting the widespread digging up paperwork problems. What was upgrading of non-safety-related material to the big deal, where were the hardware h j a hF safety-related was written by Sherrill problems? Keppler's and Ste!!o's logic is '. Nolder, Kaiser supplier quality engineer. curious for two reasons. nrst, as has been She had been sent to look into that specific explained, a breakdown in paperwork is no 'r problem, as wed as to determine the ade- trifle, given the importance of documenta- E quacy of document control, assess vendor tien. Second, both Keppler and Ste!!o ;. evaluation and judge compliance with pro- knew that investigators hadn't found hard-curement regulations. Nolder interviewed ware problems yet because they hadn't had i Oncinnat SEPTEMBER 1983 91
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ .'- :. c M ( "-;;: W y s -Ts Zimmer t
Q;m; r ,, @~ ~ 13;-M g+t: PWi ammamaa - n.g . time to look. The full investigation even- He now insists that not only was Milan s W. .+.d . tually resulted in the November 1981 im- mistaken in refusing to certify Zimmer, but
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6,.h ; rea position of $200,000 in fines on CGAE for that Milan reahzed his mistake at the June l' f.f iN=~S: E i' 4' V - '@f- QA problems. He NRC still tried to 2 meeting. "It was a stunning revelation to I' 2h.,, $ - downplay the extent of hardware prob- the inspector," Snyder says. Other par-
$)E 3
- . .h Q %y. "h, lems, but as of January 1982, it was still ticipants in the meeting refute Snyder's new
[g-;<ab'r .. #M .q ,1 tracking those 600 allegations. A!!egations tale. are not proven deficiencies, but the NRC's G H p?j ne other state official whose distnct in-M d Edf- 4 -Q, long insistence that there seemed only to be cludes Zimmer, Sue Fischer, state represen-
- c. 3,d , ",p.d paperwork problems is one more example tative from Clermont County, hasn't been M.G. e ..h of its lack of candor. There was more con- much help either. She's new in office and g% 6 -:
<W N cern with reputation than regulation, and knows little about the plant, but that didn't because of this, construction would con- stop her from publicly aDying herself with y,, MAM tinue for another year before the NRC pro-Zimmer groups at a recent "Zimmer Y(w;",a;l @M Q. .j ~
finaHy ordered a halt. Area Energy Forum." When questioned _p TMES, wq a The public had one last " guardian dur- by a reporter at the gathering. Fischer saw
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@W ing these years - elected officials. But they no problem with publicly declanng a posi-Wu weren't much help. One, State Senator tion on an issue she knows little about.
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.55 [E 2 Cooper Snyder, tried to apply political " Send me some m terial on it," she urged dir+C: i.-F W pre".sure to the Ohio chief boiler inspector the reporter.
FM S ,, "l when the inspector refused to certify Zim- Cincinnati City Council finds itself in a M -==- ' N* mer. Snyder, a Republican from Blan- bind of its own making. The city was an of-3.N2 3E35 chester (his district encompasses Clermont ficial intervenor in the Zimmer licensing B if h County and Zimmer), can list among his hearings, based on concerns for monitoring legislative triumphs a successful 1980 effort radiation released into the atmosphere and 1E
@Mg"dk yky TME* pKh 21%y to prevent cockfighting from being made a Ohio River in the event of an accident.
A m. ~ felony. He defended it as good family fun, CG&E and the NRC staff opposed the a%+ng#'g stating on the statehouse floor: "I do not city's request for monitors, and the city
* $2 '
know of young people in chicken families was pessimistic about its chances, facing
- ' -'e MMAM Lr, on drugs." that kind of opposition. Despite its strong
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T [3 9 Under Ohio law, Zimmer could not position, CG&E struck a deal with the city.
%g E-F.5' P operate unless the chief boiler inspector signed October 21,1981, in which CG&E Donald Milan certified it as an approved would provide water and air moritoring
. 7 pp 44
_ .ygf q pressure vessel. When the news broke in data (air only if there's an " emergency ac-
, :W W the May 28,1982, edition of the Enquirer tion" st the plant) in return for the city 7f that Milan would not approve Zimmer, withdrawing as intervenors and agreeing to
[9
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m- Snyder called him and invited him to his stay out of the licensing process from that i ' ";'s.
- 4 'M9 office. When Milan arrived, Snyder greeted point on. Why would CG&E make such an
"""M P !; N. him with, "Weu, Don, that's the end of arrangement when the city seemed sure to
@ ;'~- Q ~ %~y$ g.q' Zimmer." Milan disagreed, the two chat- lose at the licensing hearings? Only CG&E officials know that answer, and they re-mes mana. ,? ted amiably and Milan left.
M" [.'h' "" l *"amE gd He was on the road a few days later fused to be interviewed for this story. But C't c M*4 when he caUed his office and learned that a it's interesting to note that only thirty-five h Yh s
< i meeting was scheduled for June 2 invoMng days later the NRC levied the $200,000 fine y$ E agd
=+
Earl Borgmann and Richard Jagger, assist- on CG&E, and that Councilman Guy ant director of inspections for the National Guckenberger acknowledges that had the
@, .i 4.y gn s. Board of Boiler & Pressure Vessel Inspec- fine come first the city would not have
)%-o JK+sa ss.GiL 6 37[h( W
_8E.: tors. Milan decided he'd better show up at signed the agreement. Was CG&E tipped that meeting, and returned to Columbus. off about the impending fine and anxious
'SYg Xfd Wsc-5 "M When Snyder walked into the conference, to back the city into a legal corner?
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gagg, Q Mr., Milan knew what was going on. State Possibly - there are people within the boiler inspectors are under considerable NRC who keep anti-Zimmer people in-
- -f@
b f#@h political pressure not to hold up expensive fermed of NRC activities. CG&E could projects like Zimmer. Milan knew Snyder easily have. its own source of inside l
- gjgg 1M% - was there to pressure him into changing his information.
.: mind about certifying the plant, and he The city has legal grounds for demand-
,m
-] didn't like it. He told the senator, ','l don't ing reformation of the agreement, or like dog couars on dogs, much less on repudiating it, 'out council is waiting to see j "y w*e myself." The meeting ended with Milan what happens next. Guckenberger has been
~MI " ,,.,; A y standing firm. Borgmann later wrote a let- the most vocal with his concerns, and he's han..dh D_ M*?:a
?.7 ter to him stating that CG&E would fuDy not particularly happy with his coUcagues; comply with the inspector's wishes, and it he feels they're not sufficiently versed on M[-M ; S,h[d has, seeking certification. Snyder has the details. "We cannot leave it to someone resorted to denigrating Milan by inventing else to make sure the plant is completed h'hfM mm [',;; a new version of the Columbus meetmg. safely, he says.
- e Oncinnate SEPTEM8ER 19a3 1
Zimmer BUSINESS MEETING? mmmmmmmmmmmmimumme Have Yourself a And so, here we are today. HeMam. tag for Zimmer probably reads about 31.85 bi!! ion by now, of price o tt Km. d of Day which we've paid an estimated 5184.3 ~
- million and wiH surely pay much more before we're through. Construction re-In hdntitOD U mains halted while management and hard-ware audits are concluded, and we must The perfect setting for that mix of business and pleasure.
still trust the same organizations that got us here. CG&E is conducting its " Quality Overlooking the gcif course, the Lexington Maniott
. Confirmation Program " and this time Resort Griffin Gate offers your meeting planner the promises to acknowledge aD problems and ultimate in flexibility, and your attendees an almost endless list of amenities not available elsewhere.
h g e and au$lts, and , this time they won't miss anything. CG&E shareholders are nervously watching their Nestled in the heart of Bluegrass country, the Lexington investment (the utility is currently con- Marriott Resort features a Rees Jones designed 18 hole sidered a bad place to put your money), golf course, lighted tennis courts, pools, saunas and whue the company has a tough new vice health club facilities, plus 317 spac!ous guest rooms, ('j'd*"*'[,""**' y, , ed "'iro n$e unique restaurants and lounges, and ample free parking. nuclear Navy who may be what CG&E
,, needed from the stan. He NRC senses Recreation... Relaxation... Meeting / Banquet Facilities.
,J that the public is getting fed up, but once
' again all we have to go on are promises. Call us direct at (606)2315100 or toll free, (800)
, The NRC still won't reopen licensing hear. 228 9290, for details and brochures that'll help you ings. As Commissioner Victor Gilinsky make your next function a GREAT one!
. candidly notes, "Here is tremendous l '
hostDity he c toward public hearings as a vehicle foi regulatory action." Gilinsky I l
)
; favors those new hearings. He has pictures ,.e,k( % '
V of only two plants on his office wall, Zim- ,, ,, I mer and Hree htile Island. But his vote -sy 3 l [ probably won't be enough. The NRC doesn't want us involved. It prefers to tell i f us what's good for us, and it doesn't want I to admit the extent to which it helped create this fiasco. We are due an account-ing. We are owed licensing hearings. We will probably get ne:ther. ( _ Perhaps the most frightening thought is fg//g/f gfff'g/fhfgf/ l that while Zimmer was out of control, the . l plant was 97 percent completed. But for a W ff few tenacious people who refused to shut up, Zimmer would be a fait accompli.
. Nobody asked us if we wanted a nuclear 180o Newtown Pike. I.ezington, Kentucky 40511-999o power plant twenty miles upstream. We don't get to choose whether to pay for it.
Nobody knows what it will cost to finish it. It may never run at anything near accept- g _,, g able efficiency; the nation's other reactors generally have poor operatmg records. And l even if it does run we!! for the fuu thirty-odd years of its projected life, we're still faced with decommissioning: the site will "M be " entombed" and guarded for 104 years while the radioactivity lessens, and then the fg reactor will be dismantled, assummg some- g., ; _. . h one has figured out what to do with all that g/ " .1 : ,p-+ ? . nati,3 radioactive waste. Nobody knows what g; C ' ,C M h that will cost, because nobody has ever M4 d 'NN done it. Nobody even knows how to do it (-p
- but somebody will think of something, M e says the nuclear industry. Trust us. Sound f.9N7 ,,,
famHiar? O - - - - - -- cinonnati SEPTEMBER 19s3 93
1 ,L jI k N _. . ._ ........_..__.=~. . . _ . _. . .. T zmm d 3 4. A 14 THE CINCINNATI ENOUIRER Thursday.' August 25,1983 e p
, 1 b c THE ENQUIRER
- l gr , WILLI AM 1. KEATING Phsdent and Publishw GEORGE R. BLAKE FA** Vre Presdent ,
TilOM AS S. GEPH ARDT Amuci,sie rsdor e FREDL FOSTER VicePresident. Advenming
" "-m" LARRY G. LINDQUIST Vice Presdent. Chulaten FR ANCIS M. PRICE Via Presdent.Producten ZIMMER i Torrey Pines studylays the blame for failures on CG&E's management TORREY PINES Technology pre . workable system of on-site Inspec-pared an alm % 400-page critical tions and specifications checks.
- evaluation of Zimmer Nuclear Power .
Plant and found a great deal wrong Torrty Pines, while allowing that withCG&rs management. neither CG&E nor general contractor Henry J. Kaiser had experience Torrey Pines found that COLE building nuclear plants, also levels its executives put cost considerations most damning indictment - that ahead of quality assurance, that the profits / costs meant more than qual-general contractor had no prior or Ity assunnce. concurrent expertence in bu11 ding nuclear power stations, that CG&E CG&E's management has no ex. President William H. Dickhoner did cuse for Zimmer's problems. Torrey not have an accurate picture of the Pines charges that project manage-project's problems and inadequacies. ment should have been aware of Zimmer's problems and shortcom-But the conclusions contained in ings. So, too, should the company's the Torrey Pines report corroborate highest management. many of the charges leveled by CG&E's critics over the years.That,in Consider that the Zimmer plant turn,only serves to reinforce another be gan as a multimillion-dollar of the report's findings - that the expansion that soon exceeded a bil-general public now assumes the lion. Consider, too, that nuclear cor pany is guilty until proved inno- power is a relatively new technology cent that tends to make the pub!!c nerv-ous. Is it likely that upper manage. l If that was once an unfair burden ment would remain aloof in such a l for the firm, now it is a stigma of high-stakes game? Is it res.sonable CG&E's own making. Thera just is no now to pleadignorance? Other way to put it. CG&E manage-i ment knew, and should have recog. CG&E behaved in this affair very nized from the outset, that a con. much like a government agency. As i struction project of this type would more and more problems were dis-require extraordinary attention to covered, they were discounted or the records and quality control The blame placed elsewhere. company had to expect that it would As costs conunued to mount, they be called into account by anti-nu. elear interests, the federal govern. Were passed on to consumers through
- work-in. progress rate hikes. For all
' ment and eventually,the public, its problems, CG&E did not endure ID* "I* #DU#*** #8'" N "Ih"I But CG&E proceeded with what,in Zimmer w uld have brought down on hindsight, can be regarded as a kind any other private industry. of institutional arrogance. When the
. first signs of trouble surfaced CG&E Torrey Pines recommended a embarrassed itself by its inability to wholesale replacement of construc-answer accusations with hard evi- tion and operations management dence. The deeper the investigations groups. That's a reasonable first step.
went, the greater CG&E's troubles- But the responsibility for Zimmer . Now Torrey Pines has iound that does not stop at that level Questions records for the plant were confused, need to be asked all the way to upper incomplete, difficult to retrieve and management. That is surely the only possiblyinvalid. , way popular confidence in the 5 company will be restored. It may be Management also failed during the only way the plant will be com-the early years to ensure that con- pleted without more costly delsys and struction was co-ordinated with a overruns.
.- ot}r W . . . _ . . . . . . . . . _ _ . . . .- ._.
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EXHIBIT 5 {
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Editort.1 Page Editoe POST uaanne o nes= r e00 Broadway. Cmcwmen. ONo. 4s2c2 (513)3s2 2000 we.=y. August 24, l9s2 I I editorials The Zimmer report af ter the accident at Three The report of Torrey Pines Mile Island in Pennsylvania Technology, the San Diego. did the federal agency, charged based engineering itrm hired with the licensing of nuclear fcur tuonths ago to analyze safety procedures at the belea. power slyely plants, become aggres-coneerned about guered William H. Zimmer Nu. Zimmer's shortcomings. In clear Power Station at Moscow, November 1981, the NRC fined O., offered no start!!ng revela. CO&E 3200,000 for quality assur-tions but its recommendations - ance breakdowns;the following to Cincinnat10as & Electric Co. November it suspended all management and the Nuclear safety related work and called Regulatory Commission which appeared in Cincinnati for the lndependent study. newspapers this week-should While the report presents a be studied by every member of bleak picture, it is not a hope-this community. less one.The remedies would go far to rebuild public confidence That is because no issue has in Zimmer and, finally, get it been more centralto life here- operating safely. The Torrey nor more divisive-than the ' Pines study recommends the construction of Zimmer. Its hiring of an engineering firm multitude of problems since to take over the daily manage-the mid-1970s has been the ment at the station, suggests subjectof exhaustivepublicde* the election of a new board bate and study. I4t it be said member with expertise in the that it was not always easy to nuclear industry, and urges the
' separate the safety-concerned establishment of a new com-critics from those who opposed mittee of the borrd to monitor all nuclear-generated power on Zimmerindependently,with its philosophical or political, or own staff of advisers. The less solid, grounds. But CO&E board, concludes the recom-management, says the Torrey mendation, should include *'a i
Pines report, did not even at- respected leader from the Cin-tempt to make such distinc- cinnati co'mmunity." tions, reacting negatively to all These recommendations will criticism. I not be cheap to implement-The study levels most of the the study alone is estimated to blame for construction prob- cost $500,000, and CO&E and its lems and delays at the plant on Zimmer co-owners, the utility CO&E management painting a companies of Dayton and
- picture of a project virtually Columbus, already have $1.7 out of control. The bottom line billion invested in the plant.
for the company, it says, was Saf ety, however, knows no not quality and safety assur- price. Most costly ultimately anee but cost and completion would be to allow the long schedule. Even today, the re- shadow of doubt that Zimmer port adds, construction records has cast to continue to darken are neither complete nor easily this community. CO&E's own retrievable. . report to the NRC, due shortly, The Nuclear Regulatory will also make compulsory Commission also comes in for. reading for all who now live in its share of lumps. Not until thatshadow.
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- EXHIBIT 7
[ GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT ~ institute for Policy Studies (202)234 9382 1901 Que Street. N.W., Washington. D.C. 20009 l October 3, 1983 l Admiral Joseph Williams, Jr. Senior Vice President ! Cincinnati Gas and Electric j. 139 East 4th Street Cincinnati, Ohio 45201
Dear Joe:
this As promised in our September 29 telephone conversation, (MVPP) Jetter provides a record of the Miami Valley Power Project's hearings offer for expedited Atomic Safety In and LicensingCincinnati exchange, Board (ASLB) Gas and on the Zimmer nuclear station. Electric (CG&E) woald drop its opposition to reopening the record for litigation of MVPP's eight proposed contentions. The proposal is tailored to address the specific concerns you raised at our September 22, 1983 meeting. You discussed the undesirabl< side effects even from expedited hearings, which you said would detract from time that you and your top managers spend on the job i and could drag on for years. You pointed to the Comancho Peak l hearing as a three-year " expedited" proceeding. I am confident that the following proposal can achieve both MVPP's goal for effective public participation resolving the Quality ol Assurance (QA) deficiencies at Zimmer, and your concerns as l ll expressed above:
- 1. MVPP and CG&E will stipulate a specific time limitThis for time completion of hearings on the eight proposed contentions. limit w
- so that any relevant ASLB orders could be incorporated into your upcoming construction completion program.
- 2. MVPP will negotiate with CG&E to determine mutually acceptable l corrective action for all allegations contained in the first sevenThe a proposed contentions. The would not imply that the original allegations were correct.
October 10 meetings that you are holding at my suggestion with whistleblowers could be the first step toward defining a common ground MVPP will withdraw all such allegations fromMVPP its contentions prior to would reserve the commencement of disecvery for the hearings. right to reintroduce any such issues if Ebe agreed corrective action were not implemented.
- 4. .
,. I l
t Admiral Joseph Williams, Jr. October 3, 1983,
- 3. MVPP will agree to stipulate discovery and testimony schedules so that productivity conflicts are nonexistent or minimal.
To illustrate, MVPP will conduct depositions on nights and weekends, if practical arrangements can be agreed to record the transcripts. If schedule conflicts cannot be resolved for specific CG&E witnesses, MVPP will agree to substitution of other utility representatives authorized to speak on the same topics where feasible. For example, Mr. Borgmann is quite f amiliar with the QA issues and may now have time . to. testify. This proposal inherently puts a cap on excessive time delays, minimizes interference with your program, and guarantees that the relevant QA issues even for discoveryMVPP are shrunk to include will consider anyonly those modifi-for which a solution is in dispute. cations af ter you have an opportunity to review the plan with counsel. On a separate matter, I have been informed of your recent speech attacking the intervenors as " shrill" and not interested in getting the plant on line. Joe, I am disappointed that you are still resorting to the old tactic of attacking the motives of the public Your predecessors said critics who have exposed Zimmer's problems. we were shrill, too, but we were right. In light of your accusations, you should welcome reopened licensing hearings. If our charges are empty _ hysteria,' hearings will help assure the plant's completion by discrediting the intervenors and regaining public confidence. To illustrate your beliefs, you have criticized MVPP's challenge to Mr. Dickhover's continued leadership. We wish Mr. Dickhoner the best. . MVPP simply does not feel secure with public safety at the ' mercy . of Mr. Dickhoner's policies. In this respect, our concerns are consistent with those expressed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) . Commissioners on September 27. Surely you would not dismiss the Commissioners as " shrill." There should be no ' confusion about MVPP's goal at Zimmeris-- full enforcement of the Atomic Energy Act; no more, no less. If it fine. If ! possible to achieve that goal and still complete the plant,If MVPP's goal not,.so be it. l constructively. My proposal for whistleblowers to meet and hopefully l work withof evidence you on correcting MVPP's the quality assurance breakdown wasI hope tha good faith. efforts seriously. We dc. l Sincerely, l l Thomas Devine Legal-Director TD/ea .
- .* j
{ EXHIBIT 8 '
' 37042 Avon I Lake Villa, Il 60046 j June 29, 1983 [
t Helen F. Hoyt Administrative Law Judge U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mailstop E-W 439 Washington, D.C. 20555
Dear Judge Hoyt:
On June 7,1983 I was interviewed at your request concerning your in'/estigation of irregularities in the l NRC's Office of Inspector and Auditor 1981 investigation of another NRC investigation at the William H. Zimmer nuclear power station in Moscow, Ohio. During the course of this interview, which was transcribed. by a court reporter. I provided information relative to the 1981 OI A investigation. But I also used this forum to inform the NRC about mismanagement of other OI A investigations, partic-ularly the OIE investigation conducted at Zimmer in 1981. In and DOJ criticisms o'f the'NRC light of recent congressionaland due to the forthcoming ASLB decision investigative program, whether to hold licensing hearings, I feel that the information I provided to you should be reported Al s o immediately to the Commissioners
, as we discussed earlier I and the ASLB panel on Zimmer.
would like a copy of my transcript for my own records. As you well know, I feel strongly that the testimony I gave would have a major impact on the decision to hold licensing hearings and perhaps trigger a wider investigation into Region III and OIA's handling of the Zimmer investigation from a safety standpoint, and also why the NRC did not vigorously pursue allegations of criminalThis misconduct by utility second issue and significant is very contractor for personnel at Zimmer. the Commissioners in light of recent 00J criticisms of NRC's performance in this area. Thank you for your immediate attention to this serious matter. Sincerely, f) James B. McCarten cc: Commissioners Zimmer ASLB panel Julian Greenspun, 00J Cong. Udall, House Interior Comm.y
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** . l Miami Valley Power Project
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3516 Vine St. .
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f Cincinnati, Ohio 45220 EXHIBIT 9 i Ns ! (513) 221-6877 i l September 27, 1983 l l Honorable Nunzio Palladino, Chairman - Honorable Victor Gilinsky Honorable James Asselstine i Honorable Thomas Roberts Honorable Frederick Bernthal United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20535
Dear Commissioners:
On behalf of the Miami Valley Power Project ("MVPP"), the Government Accountability Project (" GAP") of the Institute for Policy Studies ("IPS") presents these comments on the August 1983 Torrey Pines Technology ("TP") Independent Review of Zimmer Proj ect Management ("Torrey Pines Report") . MVPP recognizes that the report is a significant addition to the public record on Zimmer. However MVPP is concerned that the Torrey Pines Report is seriously comp,romised by two fundamental flaws: 1) manipulation of the record; and 2) suspect policy judgments. MVPP requests that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission immediately take the following actions: (1) Obtain and publicly disclose all information received and/or generated by Torrey Pines during its management review. l (2) Thoroughly question Torrey Pines representatives on the l nature and basis for the underlying assumptions and values used by Torrey Pines in selecting and evaluating options for manage-( ment structures to complete the Zimmer nuclear power station, I as well as the criteria for assigning weight to the different variables used in the evaluation. (3) Direct Region III Administrator James Keppler to require establishment of a Zimmer Public Oversight Committee ("ZPOC") as a condition to per=it resu=ption of construction at Zimmer. The ZPOC should have: 1 1 (a) full access to information; (b) the authority to subpoena witnesses to testify under oath at " legislative.-style" oversight l hearings; (c) the responsibility and authority to establish a whistleblowing channel to which Zimmer employees l
i .: . 2 ': i 6 could make legally protected, confidential disclosures of NRC or program violations for ZPOC investigation ., and report in cooperation with the NRC staff; and (d) predominantly public membership, representative of the community and the citizen organizations
, which have-actively monitored resolution of the l Zimmer quality assurance breakdown to date. . -
Membership should be consistent with the guidelines proposed in an August 26, 1983 letter to Mr. Keppler from Sister Alice Gerdeman, Steering Committee t f l Chair of p e Coalition for Affordable Safe' Energy ~ (Attachment 1). (" CASE"1 ! (4) Grant the relief in MVPP's pending May 26, 1983 petition
. under 10 CFR 2.206 by removing the Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company ("CG&E") from management control of l the quality assurance program at Zimmer.
I
*he' basis for this relief is summarized in the examples of generic and specific deficiencies presented below, which are l illustrative rather than comprehensive of the analytical weaknesses in the Torrey Pines Report. ,
I. Manipulation of the R6 cord i The Torrey Pines Report suffers from a generic flaw that undercuts the credibility of its findings: the authors did not provide any specific citations. Although Torrey Pines reviewed over 3200 documents and interviewed approximately 100 people (Torrey Pines Report, at 1-1), there are.no verifiable references to this wealth of information. As a result there is little ornosignificancetotheTorreyPinesconc1usions. They suffer from a basic flaw for any auditing analysis: the findings are - unverifiable from the information presented. 1/ CASE is a coalition of 49 Ohio and Northern Kentucky organizations united by their concern for the safety and financial implications of the Zimmer quality assurance breakdown. CASE member organizations include religious orders and churches, environmental groups, neighborhood associations, consumer groups, and unions representing the firefighters, hospital workers, teachers, mine workers, steel workers and railroad workers, among others. f b t . . _ . . . . _ . . . . _.
r 3 .
)
This default on a precondition'for credibility is particularly j unfortunate. At a May 1983 public meeting in Cincinnati, former Zimmer Senior Quality Assurance Analyst David Jones questioned Torrey Pines on this issue and was reassured that adequate .f references would be provided. In reality, there were none. (111 September 26, 1983 Affidavit of David Jones, enclosed as Attachment 2, at f). , This omission would be significant even if Torrey Pines had reported the facts fully, accurately and objectively. j
" Independent" or third party reviews are an increasingly sig-nificant component of the Commission's design and quality assur- 3 ance ("QA") regulatory program. The effectiveness of the third party program at Zimmer is uniquely significant, in view of the unprecedented scope of the QA breakdown and the absence of licensing hearings.
If the Commission accepts a third party report without published references for such a critical assignment as the Zimmer management review, the program will represent a deterioration of the public record. Currently, NRC's own Office of Investigations and Office of Inspection and Enforcement provide specific ref-erences for their findings in published reports. . The loss of accountability extends further. Torrey Pines apparently is retaining possession of most of the investigative file and internal records generated during its $500,000, 60 person-months project. In meetings with public representatives, CG&E l officials have maintained that they did not receive the Torrey Pines supporting documentation and research files. Mr. Keppler has only requested supporting documentation for the case studies. i (September 1, 1983 letter from James G. Keppler to Torrey Pines Technology). The evidence obtained by Torrey Pines will be wasted if it merely gathers dust in the TP office files. That result would waste the primary value of the project. The significanc'e of the effort is the information that wa's generated, not the analysis , in the report. The former would constitute a significant con-tributton to the public record on Zimmer. The latter is largely neutralized due to the bias and internal contradictions discussed below with raspect to current developments. Even more significant', NRC failure to obtain the records gathered and generated by,Torrey Pines could structurally decrease p(ublic "FOIA"). accountability Currently ifunder the the Freedom public of Information is dissatisfied withAct the published record, the FOIA is available to request supporting documentation and other relevant agency records. If the NRC defaults on obtaining the TP Zimmer file, a defense could be presented that the information does not constitute " agency records" and therefore is beyond reach. The history of Zimmer has been 0
- w T
.. 4 .;
l one of corporate and NRC suppression of the truth about the QA program. The tradition was broken only after public whistleblowing disclosures exposed the QA breakdown, and resulted in. community outrage. No " reform" for Zimmer will be credible, if it insti-tutionalizes lack of public access to the facts about the plant's i I condition. A. General Evaluation of CG&E Management Program The Torrey Pines review of the CG&E program suffers ! from a "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde" schizophrenia. The analysis of I root causes and the history of the QA breakdown is reasonable and incisive. Torrey Pines made its conclusions about current events, however, in spite of the record it presented.
- 1. Current state of the QA program.
The most significant inconsistencies involve the most fundamental conclusion in the report: Since the November 12, 1982 Show Cause Order suspending construction, there has been a significant improvement in the management attitude toward quality and the trend can be expected to continue. (TP Report, at 8-26). This rosey assessment is directly undercut'by other Torrey Pines findings on specific deficiencies in the basic elements of a minimal quality program. For example, in 1982 CG&E began trending quality deficiencies for the first time in its history. The.TP Report reveals, however, that in 1983 CG&E dropped the program. (Id., at 4-34). Nonconformance Reports ("NR") and Corrective Action Reports (" CAR") have remained open for years. As late as February 1983 cases were found where individual audit reports remained open for 2-3 years without CG&E interim inquiry. (Id.). Even more disillusioning, QA remains vulnerable to being shunted aside while construction inspects itself. Torrey Pines described "recent examples" where construction controlled or attempted to perform QA audits and inspections for work such as hardware modifications after design changes. (Id., at 4-40). On the most basic issue, the QA program still has not produced results. The "QA Group also still appears to have difficulties in obtaining corrective action responses and followups from individuals." (Idz, at 4-34). Decisively, Torrey Pines conceded that " p resent corrective action requests do not adequately pursue the entification of the cause of the problem, nor do they purge the system of the problem. The timeliness of response and followup to the point of effective preventive measures still appears to be inadequate." (Id., at 3-18). Specific examples of QA deficiencies that have continued during 1983 include the structural inability of the CG&E program to " ensure that an approved vendor is used." (Id. , at 4-47) . Similarly, 1
, 5 ~
t Problems related to the use of HJK's Weld.1 Form, Welding Procedures, Radiographic Weld Identification, and >" Welding Inspection and Surveillance forms constitue a , case in point. The TPT Team reviewed records which show that welding $nstruction and control problems appeared frequently from 1975 to 1983 A second case in point is the consistency of problems cited from 1973 to 1983 regard-ing overall control of the design document system. Weld-ing procedures /doccmentation and design documents are ; essential parts of the work instructions provided to the ; crafts and the instructions provided to inspectors and QA personnel. - (Id ,at 4-11,12). In short, the effects of the new management QA attitude perceived by Torrey Pines are not reassuring. Even since ongoing safety-related construction was halted, the QA program doesn't work.
- 2. Mr. Dickhoner The gap between conclusions and facts also extends to Torrey Pines' analysis of CG&E President William Dickhoner's record. MVPP does not seek to issue personal criticisms devoid of constructive value. But Torrey Pines made Mr. Dickhoner's record an issue by endorsing final and active responsibility for him on all issues relevant to Zimmer, including quality assurance and whistleblewers. As a result, Mr. Dickhoner would have an unprecedented impact on the project. Torrey Pines judged Mr.
Dickhoner capable of the challenge. (Id. , at 10-2) . TP drew this conclusion without explaining the abundant evidence in the public record and the TP report that his leader-ship would perpetuate the QA deficiencies, because his policies were the cause of the breakdown. To illustrate, Torrey Pines blames pG&E vice presidents for administering improper QA prac-tices. But evidence not mentioned by Torrey Pines makes it clear that Mr. Dickhoner approved. Inadequate staffing was the most obvious effect of CG&E's QA philosophy. Last August MVPP s dis-closed an October 30, 1974 letter from Mr. Dickhoner that flatly rejected the Kaiser QA Manager's urgent plea for perscanal that had been sought as " absolutely necessary" to meet the require-ments of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. Mr. Dickhoner acted dtspite being warned that otherwise it would be " virtually impossible" to cover all the legal QA requirements. (August 20 3 1982 MVPP Petition to Suspend Construction, Attachments 83 and 84). I
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Mr. Dickhoner's'crebibility did not improve over the years. In 1981 he responded to the Applegate whistleblowin which sparked the crumbling of the Zimmer coverup. gMr. disclosure Dick-honer's defense to interested citizens was that he cared more for the community than did Mr. Applegate, and that Mr. Applegate's co asel GAP was part of the closest thing to a " Communist front group" in America today. In November 1981 the NRC substantially confirmed Mr. Applegate's charges. Now Mr. Dickhoner's defense shifted. It was just a paperwork problem for which he was publicly quoted as denying even a single bad weld. He issued this public re-assurance despite prior NRC notice to CG4E to the contrary. (May 18 17-18)., 1982 MVPP Motion for Leave to File New Contentions, at Mr. Dickhoner's loyalty to his QA philosophy persisted
, ', during 1982. It was illustrated with respect to vendor quality
's assurance. Next to welding, vendor QA may be the most significant, pervasive failure at Zimmer in terms of impact on public safety.
4 iTorrey Pines succinctly explained the causa of the problem:
, "CG&E policy over the years basically has been to rely on the 7 inte at 4grity 47). of CG&E the vendor refusedtovendor provide a quality surveys and product."
inspections(TP dueReport, to cost and schedule pressures. (Id. at 4 46-47). Unfortunately, in June 1982 Mr. Dickhoner publicly rejected vendor inspections as " traipsing all over the country on jur_kets that weren't required." (August 20 Petition to Suspend Construction, Attach-ment 61). Even last November after construction was suspended, Mr. Dickhonar insisted that Zimmer was as well-built as any nuclear plant in the country under construction or in operation. Again the facts are embarrassing. The preoperational test program was 46.8% complete in November 1982 when Mr. Dickhoner boldly declared his confidence in the completed work. By April 1983 the test completion rate for essential systems "had returned to zero. The net result of the four year exhaustive effort was that the preoperational test program had shown that the essential syste=s were not ready for start-up." (TP Report, at 7-3). There could be no more basic indicator of the total failure of installed systems at Zimmer. Torrey' Pines may be correct that Mr. Dickhoner has adopted some new perspective that. qualifies him for ultimate control of Zimmer QA. Torrey Pines interviewed Mr. Dickhoner, and undoubtedly conducted intensive research on the issue. In light of the above record, however, TP should reveal the evidence for its currently unsupported endorsement. 3 CG&E and the NPC
. Torrey Pines provides contradictory assessments of CG&E's relationship to the NRC. On the one hand TP credited 0
1
t i 7 i CG&E with'being " generally responsive" to NRC guidance. (Id&, 3-13). - On the other hand, TP recognized that CG&E had ignored Atomic Energy Commission ("AEC") warnings since 1971 of QA staffing ; deficiencies. CG&E's lack of responsiveness to NRC warnings 3 since 1975 of inadequate management control led to repetitive violations. Torrey Pines disclosed for example, that between 1975 and 1980 the NRC identified 16,CG&E violations of NRC requirements for control of welding material. (Ids, 3-4,14). L
- 4. CG&E oversight of Catalytic. Inc. .
Torrey Pines turned to CG&E's. oversight of Catalytic, Incorporated's ("CI") 1982 Quality Confirmation Program ("QCP") repairs to demonstrate the utility's new capacity for effective oversight. Torrey Pines concluded, "In general, CI was found to perform well...." TP reported that CG&E was "quite satisfied" with Catalytic's work. (Id., at 6-37). This cheerful, undocumented generality does not square with the facts in the report or the public record. After a few months work last summer, serious deficiencies in Catalytic's performance led to stop work orders. By September the NRC had identified five significant deficiencies in CG&E's oversight of Catalytic. Since September CG&E has been attempting to investigate what happened and develop corrective action. It is not done. (liz, p. 4-44). If Catalytic is the model for an effective CG&E program, TP should reveal the evidence that supports CG&E's performance. The public record is that after a year's effort CG&E has been ! unable to ccrrect the residual effects from three months of Catalytic work. 5 Quality Confirmation Program Torrey Pines' inconsistencies with respect to the Quality Confirmation Program have a distorted significance, because TP recommended exempting any work covered by the QCP from the Quality Verification Program ("QVP") that supposedly will provide the ultimate assesrment of Zimmer's quality. If
.the QCP results are not reliable, this recommendation would create a giant loophole in the Quality Verification Program.
Predictably, Torrey Pines reported high confidence in the current CG&E management. (Id., at 5-7). Again, however, the specific information in the report contradicts the vote of confidence. For example, Torrey Pines disclosed that in May 1983 CG&E had failed to meet QCP procedure commitments made to the NRC in 1981. QCP Task VIII still does not have written procedures, over two years into the program. Two other tasks did not have procedures ready until late May 1983. (Id. , at 5-8). Even into 1983, CG&E did not formally transmit QCP procedures to contractors with QCP responsibilities. (Id ._, at 5-8,9) .
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M 8 A The QCP management response to audits is a repetition of Zimmer QA traditions. All of the illustrative incidents re-ported by Torrey Pines have occurred since the Show Cause Order,
- i or the period covered by the organizational reforms TP now claims will lead to successful completion of the plant. As a result, the record is especially depressing. As of August 1983, 11 of 19 findings were still open for a February 1982 QCP audit. TP reported, "This status has not changed since November 8, 1982.
There is no evidence in the audit package that indicates attention , has been given to the concerns identified.'! (Id t, at 5-10,11) . The QCP's 1983 response to an October 1282 audit reveals the scope of the ongoing QA failure. The 19o3 QCP team described its actions to correct specific, identified examples. But the QCP responses skipped the most elementary principles of audits -
- 1) identification of the root cause of the problem; 2) search for similar deficiencies; and 3) identification of actions taken i to prevent recurrence. (Idx, at 5-10,11).
- 6. Overzeneralities Finally, when Torrey Pines conclusions wire not refuted by the public or its own record, on occasion the reason was that the conclusions were too vague and incomplete to be meaningful. For example, TP's assessment of an effort since April 1981 to develop minimally adequate operating procedures is that the results " generally appear to contain the necessary level of detail to help" CG&E run the project. There is not any assessment whether CG&E would be running the project to the proper standards. (liz, at 6-30).
B. Case Studies The NRC staff already has requested the Torrey Pines files relevant to the case studies in the report. This data j should be prc ptly released to the public to use in evaluating the upcoming CG&E proposals for quality verification. l MV)P is particularly disappointed with Torrey Pines' super-i ficial, inaccurate case studies on welding and attitudes toward whistleblowerr. These issues are uniquely significant to MVPP because of its own'1983 investigation and published results on welding, as well as its recommendations to whistleblowers to cooperate with the Torrey Pines study. MVPP would not make that recommendation again. The-published results diverged so far from the record presented that MVPP has serious reservations whether the findings in these two case studies were presented in good faith. e
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- 1. Welding procedures and eualifications In addition to criticisms already identified by Region III, two conclusions in this area are highly irresponsible and premature. Initially, Torrey Pines indicates that "CG&E J
upper management was aware of and responded appropriately in providing sworn statements to the NRC refuting the allegation of withholding of information on requalification of welders at a July 1982 meeting." (Id., at 8-23). In light of TP's qualifier that it "did not investigate the veracity of the statements ; made concerning the data provided to the NRC" (emphasis added) t (Id., at 8-22), it should not have endorsed CG&E's response. i Indeed, MVPP has presented evidence to law enforcement and NRC investigators that in fact CG&E upper management pressured employees to sign identical affidavits that would refute the allegations, despite protests that the statements were inaccurate. Torrey Pines also noted with approval that a Welding Procedure Task Force is making " good progress to correct past deficiencies and prevent recurrences...." (,Id., at 8-24). This reassurance flies in the face of the earlier Torrey Pines observation that problems.with welding procedures have persisted frequently into 1983 Additionally, the audit which led to the. task force, Audit #67, has been open fcr nearly two years. The " good progress" evaluation is inconsistent with TP's general condemnation of the audit program because some responses had been overdue "by as much as two years." (Idz, at 4-27). The lack of TP credibility for welding is overwhelming when the findings are compared to evidence already on the public record but ignored by Torrey Pines. To illustrate, a July 6, 1983 affidavit from Sherrill Noldeg submitted with an MVPP licensing brief, illustrated the " good progress." In July 1982 Zimmer auditors on-site attempted to close out the findings with a four-inch thick stack of duplicative records that did not even address issues raised in Audit #67. The team leader, J. Gilhooly, commented, "This is a complete whitewash." (July 12, 1983 MVPP Reply Brief, Attachment 12, at 8, Exhibit 12). l In January 1983 Kaiser management made more " progress" when it attempted to close out the audit by rewriting the findings. On February 18, 1983 still more " progress" was achieved when Ms. Nolder was dismis~ sed after warning the Kaiser president of the severity of the violations (Id., at 7-8). MVPP unsuccessfully attempted to present to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("ASLB" or " Board") evidence of 6:111 more attempts at " progress" - through transferring unresolve ra issues to a new audit and therefore preventing the originators from enforcing their findings. The new evidence indicates that in addition to numerous welding procedure deficiencies, it may be impossible to even identify when the procedures were used improperly. They were so vague that excessive tolerances were built into the essential variables, and basic data was not
10 i always recorded on the Q-1 forms. (MVPP s August 26, 1983 Motiop to Present New Evidence, at 4-5,' enclosed as Attachment 3).u In short, Torrey Pines' analysis of welding procedure deficiencies at Zimmer represents a major retreat from the l analysis which existed prior to the TP Report.
- 2. Attitudes toward whistleblevers Torrey Pines listed 21 instances where employees ;
disclosed QA deficiencies, in order to identify.the CG&E manage- i ment response.o 10 of 20 cases where Torrey Pines drew a con-
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clusion, it found that CG&E's response was ~ inappropriate wholly or in part. In 3 of 21 cases TP determined that retaliation had occurred but in each instance it was resolved. On their face, these findings represent a significant deficiency. MVPP contends that it is flatly unacceptable to only take appropriate corrective action in responding to the concerns of whistleblowers in 50% of the cases. Since MVPP had recommended to many of these witnesses that they cooperate with Torrey Pines, a survey of five witnesses was undertaken to test whether TP had reported the record adequately. Resulting affidavits are enclosed as Attachments 2, and as Attachments 4-7 Torrey Pines flunked the test, both in terms of accuracy and objectivity. Illustrations of this charge are provided below. (a) Narrowine the issue to exclude organizational freedom. Mr. David Jones pointed out that Torrey Pines missed the issue by limiting it to "whistleblowing" personnel actions and disputes. In overview, the analysis of whistleblowing missed the real problem - the lack of organizational freedom required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion I for all quality personnel. The real issue was whether Quhlity Assurance (QA) personnel had the freedom to identify and verify corrective action of violations, not merely whether individuals were wronged. In other words, the real issue is whether the program was compromised by lack of organizational freedom. This was the root cause of the QA breakdown, as I told Torrey Pines. But Torrey Pines' report skipped the root cause and quibbled about the individual personnel actions. In the process, Torrey Pines shrunk the scope of the issue drastically. Whistleblowers constitute only a 2/ The NRC Office of Investigations has expressed its desire to review this evidence.
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small portion of'the personnel who were charged with responsibilities to perform Quality Assurance duties and were prevented from doing 'so by management at q Zimmer. (Attachment 2.; at 1-2). f (b) Failure to list significant substantive issues challenged by whistleblowers. According to the witnesses, the summary table on pages 8-4/5 of the TP Report failed to mention significant , issues they had raised. The omissions include the following - i i l (1) cancellation of Equipment Trouble Reports ("ETR") to provide quality verification of repairs and modifications of General Electric ("GE") components undertaken in response
.to Field Design Instructions / Field Deviation Disposition Requests
("FDI-FDRR"). (Attachment 2, at 3).
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i (2) lack of quality control inspections and surveillance for weld repairs conducted as a result of the Qu.ality Confirmation Program. (Attachment 4, at 1; Attachment 5). (3) lack of prior welding experience or training for some supervisors for Quality Confirmation Program ~ welding repairs. (Attachment 5). , (4) serious organizational weaknesses in the Quality Confirmation Program (Attachment 6, at 1). (5) widespread use of In-Process Inspection Deficiency Reports ("IIDR") as an inferior substitute for Nonconformance Reports ( & ) i (6) assignment.of minimally qualified QA/QC ersonnel to handle advanced duties, without' adequate supervision. Id.) (7) structural steel purchased on the basis of
' design sketches instead of approved Design Document Changes
("DDC") because the DDC program was too far behind to be utilized for the', purchases. ( & , at 2). (8) substitution of unqualified replacements jokingly referred to as " hamburger flippers", for experienced management and inspection personnel. (Id.) (9) unreliable statistics in the dual inspection program by CG&E inspectors, who on occasion literally slept on the job and signed off on items without looking at them; or who wrote up irrelevant Nonconformance Reports to make it appear that problems had been identifie4 while ignoring serious safety violations. Specific examples occurred with respect to hangers and the primary containment. -(Id.). e I
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1 s~ l .. 12 ,. I (10) widespread lack of material traceability, referenced with specific examples. (Attachment 7, at 1). (11) intentional falsification of documents f and markings (Idz) / (c) Inaccurate disclosure of substantive concerns raised by whistleblowers. Torrey Pines concluded that the " allegation . of bad welds" by two anonymous whistleblowers, Messrs "Q" and j "R" "seem Sic ;; The problem is] that they did not make such an allegation. inaccurate." (TorreyF P As Mr. R explained, In other respects the report is inaccurate. For example, Torrey Pines stated that I alleged " poor quality welds." That is incorrect. I said the welding program was poor, not the welds themselves. I told Torrey Pines that individuals were trained and certified to do original welds but were assigned to engage in weld repairs, which is a distinct and more difficult procedure. I also explained that the procedures actually used were too vague and therefore allowed an excessive amount of individual discretion, par-ticularly since the personnel had not been trained to use those procedures. Finally, I said that as a result, in practice the welders " repaired" the welds by grinding them out entirely, doing new welds and making them look nice with a few extra passes. (Attachment 4, at 1-2; Attachment 5). This factual dispute illustrates why the Commission should obtain the supporting data for the report. MVPP counsel has worked previously with Messrs Q and R. They have been careful to limit their allegations to suspect practices in the welding program, rather than an evaluation of the hardware. Further, Mr. Richard Reiter witnessed the interview and agreed with their recollection. (Attachment 7). Review of the supporting file could help reveal whether the inaccuracies were a result of mistaken recollections by witnesses, good faith errors in Torrey Pines' notes, or whether the report contains deliberate material false statements. (d) Manipulation of the record The validity of the Torrey Pines statistical compilation is compromised by eight " ringers" out of 21 case studies in the sample. These eight cases involved employees whom CG&E labeled as whistleblowers. Torrey Pines did not claim to interview any of the CG&E-nominated whistleblowers. TP merely discussed the cases with the CG&E QA Manager, because the "whistleblowers" "were not available for interview." Predictably, Torrey Pines concluded that CG&E had responded appropriately to 1
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y s. 13 c I the allegations in every case. (Torrey Pines Report at 8-4,5). [u\ Quite simply, this biased manipulation of the sample repre-sents an indefensible methodology. In these eight case studies, Torrey Pines acted as CG&E's mouthpiece, rather than as an ob- j jective reviewing organization. - (e) Acceptance of management denials at face value Even when TP interviewed the whistleblowers, the bias was evident in its evaluation of retaliation allegations. Based on the evidence in the record, Torrey Pines was satisfied to " resolve" the reprisal charges merely by obtaining a management denial. For instance, Torrey Pines was satisfied with the ex- ! planation that "[m]istreatment or reprisal of D. Jones was denied by all former HJK supervisors. HJK claime'd payroll error caused temporary pay cut, later corrected." (Id., at 8-4). It is unfortunate that TP did not check back with Mr. Jones, as their representatives had promised. He could have provided the following description of how his pay cut was corrected. "It wasn't." i (Attachment 2, at 4). In another instance TP rejected an allegation by Messrs Q and R that another employee suffered retaliation: " Info shows Griffis not mistreated." TP identified Griffis as a Catalytic employee. (Torrey Pines Report, at 8-4). In this case there is serious question how TP even obtained a denial to accept at face value. As Mr. R. explained, I wonder how Torrey Pines came to that conclusion.
~The authors did not claim to have interviewed him.
I also do not understand how Torrey Pines could have made this conclusion based on a document review, since they spelled -the victim's name wrong -- it was "Griffiths," not "Griffis"; and had him working for the wrong company -- he worked for4,CG&E,)not (Attachment at 3 Catalytic. (f) Failure to consider significant events Although TP gave CG&E a clean bill of health on retaliation, the report contains no discussion of the most significant publicity event during 1982 with respect to QA organizational freedom -- the May 1982 dousing of three QA employees with " dirty water". The dousing led to the temporary shutdown of the plant. CG&E hired a private detective to investigate the incident. The results of the investigation and any corrective action have never been publicly disclosed. Without evaluating the adequacy and results of CG&E's " private eye" response, Torrey Pines' exoneration of the utility is premature.
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(g) Incomplete disclosures of reprisal allegations In some instances TP went beyond accepting management's position on rcyrisals at face value. Torrey Pines ; did not even report what happened to the whistleblower, his j allegations of retaliation against others, or his rebuttal of - the management position. This censorship of the whistleblower interviews permitted Torrey Pines to maintain superficial. credibility as it accepted incredible CG&E positions. To illustrate, Torrey , Pines failed to disclose the following significant evidence
. that witnesses claim to GAP that they have provided ,-- ;.
(1) addition of interior layers of authority [' on the organizational chart to neutralize persistent critics (Attachment 2, at 2); . (2) an announced policy by Kaiser corporate official Dave Howard that "he managed by intimidation" ( L ,
'at 3);
i (3) harassment and discriminatory salary treat-ment of a QA employee who tried to incorporate a procedure to control FDI/FDDR repair work on sensitive GE equipment in the Nuclear Steam Supply System (Id.); r (4) " layoffs" in July 1982 of QA per'sonnel -- including Mr. Jones, despite TP's failure to recognize his job loss -- who had been identified as " habitual NR writers" by the NR Action Plan. Torrey Pines' conclusion that the NR Action Plan was an attempt to improve the Nonconformance System merely e parrots the utility party line. As with so many other examples, the conclusion was reached on the basis of discussions with C W 's QA Manager. Although MVPP counsel originally presented the issue last August and-met with TP twice, they never raised the topic. In spite of this bias, if TP had accurately reported Mr. Jones' interview it would not have been credible to mimic the CG&E position here. (Idz, at 5); i (5) Supporting analysis by Mr. Richard Reiter L concerning retaliation against Mr. Jones (Attachment 7); w
. (6) a practice by supervisors of brdering l unqualified Level I personnel to sign off on work or else be "sent down the road".' (Attachment 6, at 1-2);
(7) orders to inspectors not to challenge struc-tural steel that had been purchased to design sketches (Id.); (8) restriction of inspectors to limited work areas, with a prohibition to inspect or report deficiencies in other locations, even during a general surveillance (Idz); < (9) the absence of a formal program to engage in constructive dissent (Id.);
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35 (10) layoffs of experienced inspectors in November 1982, using the NRC suspension of const:ruction as the l excuse despite ongoing QA work and simultaneous rehiring of inexperienced personnel.(lis, at 3). j (h) Inaccurate description of reprisal allegations Torrey Pines reported that Mr. Weaver alleged reprisal only regarding reassignment of duties...." (Torrey i Pines Report, at 8-5). That is inaccurate. In fact, he informed TP of a management effort to fire him on pretextual charges. After Mr. Weaver defended himself fiercely, management " furloughed" f-r him -- maintaining his salary but preventing him from returning to the site to do his job. (Attachment 6, at 2-3). Similarly, Mr. Jones reports that TP was wrong to state that there was a " casual attitude" at Zimmer toward 10 CFR 50 55(e) reports. Mr. Jones provided an eyewitness account to Torrey Pines of a determined philosophy to avoid 50 55(e) reports, enforced by such techniques as shouting, orders not to write memoranda, and transfers. (Attachment 2, at 3-4). The above analysis could be expanded, but the point should be clear. The accuracy of the record presented by Torrey_ Pines for recent events is suspect. As Mr. Jones stated, "Many of us told Torrey Pines the truth. Unfortunately, Torrey Pines only shared the part they wanted to. The public record on Zimmer remains biased and distorted." (Attachment 2, at 5). The credi-bility gap will remain and compromise the rest of the Zimmer Action Plan, until the-information gathered by Torrey Pines'is made public. II. Suspect Policy Judgment Torrey Pines essentially recommended retaining the leaders and organizations of the' status quo to manage Zimmer -- the Board gf Directors Litigation Committee (newly titled as the Zimmer' Oversight Committee ("20C")3/, Mr. Dickhoner and Mr. Williams. The proposal has only cosmetic distinctions from CG&E's own recommendation. (Torrey Pines Report, at 9-62). In light of the continuing QA violations since the SCO, this organization per je is not credible. The current retreat on trending analysis, continued ineffectiveness of the audit program; 3/ The provision for a public member on an advisory staff to the 200 has the potential to be significant, but the proposal is too sketchy to be meaningful: Torrey Pines did not specify whether the public advisor would have the same access to in-formation as the ZOC members. (id._, at 40-5,6). 9
__ ___. __ r .. 16 , , persistent attempts and, in some cases, performance of QA L functions by construction; continued systematic failure of correct-ive action to follow through in a timely manner on its findings, identify root causes, " purge the system of the problem", and I prevent recurrences; sustained inability to " ensure that an approved vendor is used, ' frequent 1983 problems with welding; [i and continued inability to control the design document system all argue against retaining the status quo response. (Suora, at 4-5). , More specifically, the TP proposal is unacceptable due to i four serious analytical flaws -- 1) adopting and maintaining the ll historical biases that led to the QA breakdown; 2) restricting the public to a token role; 3) relying upon naive trust in individuals as a substitute for structural accountability; and 4) Institntionalizisg legal'nonaccountability. . A. Adopting the priorities that caused the QA breakdown Although Torrey Pines identified schedule / cost priorities over QA as a major cause of the QA breakdown, it explicitly adopted those priorities as its o,M "at this point in the Zimmer construction...." (Id., at 10-2).W As a result, Torrey Pines recommended legitimizing the flawed assumptions that brought Zimmer to where it is today -- shut down. As a result, Torrey Pines' priorities promise to perpetuate the mistakes of the past. It is fitting that TP revealed its bias in the context of a
-recommendation to retain the overall leadership of Mr. Dickhoner, who established those priorities.
B. Restricting the public to a token role. Torrey Pines' planned role for.the public at Zimmer is to be represented by an adviser to the 20C. This recommenda-
-tion represents tokenism. Anything less would be nonexistent.
bd Torrey Pines explained that a break from tradition would not be practical. " I n the case of Zimmer, the advanced state of construction precludes consideration of some of the more esoteric organizational philosophies." (Id., at 9-20) This is the same excuse relied on by Mr. Keppler in early 1981 not to suspend construction. As a result, the situation deteriorated for another 1 5 years. What both Mr. Keppler and Torrey Pines have overlooked, however, is that Zimmer is an esoteric plant. CG&E experimented by attempting to build a nuclear power plant essentially without the " conventional" compliance with the law through a quality assurance program. Conventional solutions are not appropriate for Zimmer. 9
1 17 Torrey Pines' recommendation is consistent with its stated criteria and the biases revealed by its analysis, Public credi-bility is a "want" criteria for Torrey Pines, not a "must". (Id., 9-18/19). If anything, Torrey Pines revealed its active opposition to the Atomic Energy Act provisions for public participation when it argued against the alternative for a new company on grounds that the organizational change could lead to reopened licensing hearings. (Id., at 9-50). If adopted the Torrey Pines recommendation for public { hearings will eliminate all confusion about the token nature of i the public's ability to control or even participate meaningfully on matters crucial to its own safety with respect to nuclear power. Zimmeris often conceded as the nost poorly constructed nuclear plant in the country, and widely agreed as a case of unprecedented NRC neglect that was reversed due to the persistence of the public and whistleblowers from the nuclear industry labor force. Yet both the Commission and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board have refus&d to reopen public licensing hearings. If in the absence of licensing hearings NRC offers only token public par-ticipation in correcting the abuses at Zimmer, the message will be clear: public safety is not a public concern. , C. Relying on naive trust in individuals as a substitute for structural accountability One of the asrumptions in the organization endorsed by TP is that " organizational characteristics of this alternative can be presumed to be adequate on the basis that the new executive e and the ZPOC would insist on QA awareness and support; organi-zational balance; and correction of policies planning /schedulingproblems."(Id.,at9-61$. procedures,and The assumption is utterly naive. It means the premise for confidence in Zimmer is trust in three entities -- the Board of Directors, Mr. Dickhoner and Mr. Williams. Either alone or in combination, these entities do not merit the extraordinary blind trust that Torrey Pines would require. The Board has passively watched for ten years as Mr. Dickhoner and his aides caused the problem. Obviously, there is no basis for confidence there. Mr. Wiiliams.is relatively inexperienced in commercial nuclear power. Even if he proves to be an extraordinary leader, however, that is no substitute for active public oversight. Certainly his leadership will be welcome, if effective. Zimmer does not need a Messiah, however. It needs a system that guarantees public accountability. D. Institutionalizing legal nonaccountability Torrey Pines views the upcoming Quality Verification Program as a project that " affords CG&E the opportunity to make its QA 4
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I and QC objectives evident." (Id., at 9-14). This is precisely the opposite premise from what is appropriate. After CG&E ]; defied, and at best violated, legal minimums for ten years, the management report was an opportunity to institutionalize { public oversight and to maximize the safety of the surrounding { community. Torrey Pines should have recommended every step that would help achieve these goals. Instead, TP opted to "give CG&E another chance."
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Torrey Pines did not even re. commend remering CG&E from control of the QA program. TP's analysis of this alternative was entirely favorable. The only significant objection was that j third party QA would not solve Construction, Engineering and t Operational deficiencies. That is hardly startling and is no reason to avoid an effective QA corrective action program that would maximize public confidence. Again, however, TP opted for nonaccountability to the public, and non11 ability for i previous abuses. Almost without analysis, TP chose not to recommend the best QA solution on the excuse that it would not be a panacea. In November 1981 Mr. Keppler succeeded in placating the public for a few months with harsh rhetoric, while permitting CG&E to tighten its grip on Zimmer. He was able to maintain l short-term credibility for his program, because the NRC published l reports severely distorted the available evidence -- much of I which had already been obtained. It only worked for'a few months. , The Torrey Pines Report is analogous to the NRC's November 1981 initiative -- strong rhetoric, a public record of suspect accuracy,'and still further retrenchment of CG&E control over Zimmer. That approach will not work again. The Commission should exercise leadership to institutionalize an open record and public accountability, while removing CG&E from control of the project. Avoiding the issues again may doom the plant from
. ever being completed.
. Respectfully submitted, W
Thomas Devine Counsel for Miami Valley Power Project i i l 8 i
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, . . .'N. , . 4(..O. ,.......a-James Keppler N ' ' ' .. , l ", . ;; '
' ~ Regional Administrator, Region III
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Agency , 799 Roosevelt Road :
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Glen Ellyn, IL 60137
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Dear Mr. Keppler:
< Af'ter preliminary review o,f the Torrey Pines management audit recomendations' 'for the Ziruner Nuclear Power Station, the Coalition for Af fordabl. , eSafe Energy :(CASE) has several'scrious concerns: ;
. 1) We. challenge the report's co6clusion tha't Zinher can be completed. This 'codelusion Seems premature based on the fact that Zimmer was 97% completed under po,or, "out of control" management. A total and completely independent hardware / con
struction audit, not by Bechtel or CG&E, must be' implemented with.as much detail and thoroughness as should have gone into the original construction. i e .
' 2) We affirm the formation of a Zimmer Power Project Oversight Committee. However. ~
.: having this committee consist of members of the present CG&E Board of Directors , .
E;j- will;do little to ensure that dollars will not continue to overrride safety at the plant. The CG&E Board is responsible for the current indeterminate safety conditions at the plant. We urge that the suggested board have 'a minority mer.bership of CG&E representatives and other representatives from DP&L~,.C&SOE, and an equal number of concerned citizens from this comunity.as voting' members,
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- 3) We want to stress again the purpose of bur organization. As rate-payer's affected physically and financially by the Zimmer Station, we expect that our health.and
- safety will be the prime concern of the NRC in its decision making process..This is especially important to us now that our assertions that'our safety has 'noi. '
been a pajor consideration of CG&E hav,e been corroborated by the.Torrey Pines report. Ve also reassert that we are not willing to pay for the costly, mistakes made at Zimmer through poor utility management. Those responsible'for the management breakdown at Zimmer must be made to assume in some way financial liability for ' these mistakes and violations.
- 4) In your latest letter to us you indicated that a public hearing would be held after CG&E makes its recommendations to you. We feel strongly that CG&E needs to hear our concerns in detail before they make their-recommendations to the NRC.
If there is no possibility of the public hearings influencing the recommendations, " the process of public comment becomes an idle and meaningless mockery.. 4 0 I .. . . . . . . . .
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y:?.M For 97X.of Zimmer, the NRC has somehow' allowed CG&E to poorly ma . 1
'. Good management for the last 3%. of the construction.cannot undo the damage done'.- j in the 97% already built'. To assu.re public safety, a ' thorough hardda're..hud'iE[is?.h. .:"-;%.,0 essentiali regardless of the cost. - '
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The.NRC based on a should superficial notandbecheap., permitted auditto ofallow hardware the problems. utility to: simply complete becausef constrdction.4,*f , .7; , - ;,l...
~ . the NRC'did not begin to do its assigned job until after Three MileYIsland.,t;j' 4
and numerous .- Zimmer .wbistleblevers created immense public pressure.H..,g,n.n-f.f... N.~. ..- .f'
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,.,. Sincerely.
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5 ST'. Alice Cerdeman .. ." ! .* CASE Ste,ering Committee Chair - . g 3..A.,. 5. 0.*N.1.t sc' . .
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