ML22138A338

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Appendix Volume, Part 2 (5th Cir.)(Case No. 21-60743)
ML22138A338
Person / Time
Site: Consolidated Interim Storage Facility
Issue date: 05/16/2022
From: Andrew Averbach
NRC/OGC
To:
US Federal Judiciary, Court of Appeals, 5th Circuit
References
00516320935, 21-60743, DOCKET NO. 72-1050
Download: ML22138A338 (180)


Text

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 16 000076

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 WCS Consolidated Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility Environmental Report Docket Number 72-1050 Revision 2 C.I. 31.29 000077

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 WCS CONSOLIDATED INTERIM SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITY DOCKET NO. 72-1050 ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT C.I. 31.29 000078

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 INTERIM STORAGE PARTNERS LLC CHAPTER 1 ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT Retrievable Storage Installation (MRS) license. This is ER consistent with the guidance provided in two regulatory documents:

  • Regulatory Guide 3.50, Standard Format and Content for A Specific License Application for an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation or Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility (NRC, 2014c)
  • NUREG-1748, Environmental Review Guidance for Licensing Actions Associated with NMSS Programs (NRC, 2003)

ISP anticipates that the NRC would issue the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) and License by September 2020. Phase 1 construction would begin after issuance of the license and after ISP successfully enters into a contract for storage with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) or holders of the title to SNF at commercial nuclear power facilities (SNF Title Holder(s)).

Construction is estimated to take approximately one year to complete. Both construction and preoperational testing are expected to be complete by April 2022. ISP anticipates continued storage for approximately 60 years or until a final geologic repository is licensed and operating in accordance with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982, as amended.

History and Background Since 1997, ISP joint venture member Waste Control Specialists has been licensed and authorized to treat, store, and dispose of certain types of radioactive materials at its facilities located in Andrews County, Texas. Waste Control Specialists is authorized to dispose of Class A, B, and C LLRW at the Texas Compact Waste Disposal Facility and the Federal Waste Disposal Facility (TCEQ, 2015a). Waste Control Specialists is also authorized to dispose of 11e.(2) byproduct materials at its Byproduct Material Disposal Facility (TCEQ, 2015b). These activities are regulated by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) under regulations determined to be compatible with NRC requirements, pursuant to Section 274 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

ISP joint venture member Orano CIS, through its parent company, Orano USA, and affiliate company TN Americas LLC has been in the dry fuel storage and transportation business for over 50 years, supporting several site specific licenses to store SNF and GTCC waste, currently stores SNF under several general licenses and holds several transportation licenses, including casks licensed to ship SNF and GTCC waste.

C.I. 31.29 Page 1-2 Revision 2 000079

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 17 000080

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 6 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 November 16, 2018 Mr. Jeffrey D. Isakson Chief Executive Officer/President Interim Storage Partners LLC P.O. Box 1129 Andrews, TX 79714

SUBJECT:

INTERIM STORAGE PARTNERS LICENSE APPLICATION TO CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE THE WASTE CONTROL SPECIALISTS CONSOLIDATED INTERIM STORAGE FACILITY, ANDREWS COUNTY, TEXAS, DOCKET NO.

72-1050 - FIRST REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, PART 1

Dear Mr. Isakson,

By letter dated July 19, 2018, (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18206A595), Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP), a joint venture of Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) and Orano CIS LLC (a subsidiary of Orano USA),

requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) resume all safety and environmental review activities associated with the proposed WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (WCS CISF) license application. ISP requested authorization to store up to 5,000 metric tons of uranium for a period of 40 years in the WCS CISF.

The NRC staff is conducting a detailed technical review of your application and has determined that additional information is necessary to complete its review. The information needed by the NRC staff is discussed in the enclosed request for additional information (RAI). As discussed in our August 21, 2018, letter notifying you of our decision to resume the WCS CISF technical review, the NRC staff expects to issue its first round RAIs in two parts (ADAMS Accession No. ML18225A281). The enclosed RAIs address selected portions of the NRC staff review performed to date, and additional RAIs will be issued in the future as the NRC staff continues its review.

We request that you provide responses within 60 days from the date of this letter. If you are unable to meet these deadlines, please notify NRC staff in writing, within two weeks of receipt of this letter, of your new submittal date and the reasons for the delay.

Upon removal of Enclosure 2, this document is uncontrolled.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION C.I. 38 000081

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 7 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION J. Isakson 2 Please reference Docket No. 72-1050 and CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002 in future correspondence related to the technical review for this licensing action. If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-0262.

Sincerely,

/RA/

John -Chau Nguyen, Senior Project Manager Spent Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Docket No. 72-1050 CAC/EPID No. 001028/07201050/L-2017-NEW-0002

Enclosures:

1. 1st Round RAIs - Part 1 (Non-Proprietary)
2. 1st Round RAIs - Part 1 (Proprietary)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION C.I. 38 000082

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 8 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION J. Isakson 3 INTERIM STORAGE PARTNERS LICENSE APPLICATION TO CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE THE WASTE CONTROL SPECIALIST CONSOLIDATED INTERIM STORAGE FACILITY, ANDREWS COUNTY, TEXAS, DOCKET NO. 72-1050 - FIRST REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, PART 1, DOCUMENT DATE: November 16, 2018 DISTRIBUTION:

MLayton, NMSS YDiaz-Sanabria, NMSS TTate, NMSS SKirkwood, OGC DBrown, NMSS PSilva, NMSS G:\SFST\Nguyen\Casework\WCS\Technical Review\Restart Technical Review\RAI Part1\ISP First RAI Part 1 non proprietary.docx ADAMS Pkg Accession No.: ML18320A183 LTR: ML18320A184 ENCL 2: ML18320A185 OFC: NMSS/SFM NMSS/SFM NMSS/SFM NMSS/SFM NSIR/DPR NMSS/DUWP NAME: JNguyen WWheatley JGwo DDunn MNorris BWatson DATE: 9/18/2018 10/02/2018 9/25/2018 9/25/2018 9/20/2018 11/8/18 OFC NRO/DLSE NRO/DLSE NRO/DLSE NRO/DLSE NMSS/SFM NMSS/DUWP NAME TSeshagiri DHeeszel ZXi JThompson CBajwa RFedors DATE 9/24/2018 9/24/2018 9/25/18 9/24/2018 11/13/18 11/8/18 OFC NRO/DLSE NRO/DLSE NMSS/SFM NSIR/DPR NMSS/SFM NAME MRahimi (J. JAnderson JMcKirgan JStirewalt MDudek Wise for)

DATE 10/1/2018 9/20/2018 11/16/2018 9/24/2018 10/4/2018 (11/7/18)

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION C.I. 38 000083

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 9 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 First Request for Additional Information, Part 1 (non-proprietary)

Docket No. 72-1050 WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility in Andrews County, Texas By letter dated July 19, 2018, (NRC Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18206A595), Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP), a joint venture of Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) and Orano CIS LLC (a subsidiary of Orano USA),

requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) resume all safety and environmental review activities associated with the proposed WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (WCS CISF) license application. ISP requested authorization to store up to 5,000 metric tons of uranium for a license term of 40 years in the WCS CISF application.

This request for additional information (RAI) identifies additional information needed by the NRC staff to complete its safety review of the WCS CISF license application. The requested information is sorted by the specific part of the license application, or the specific chapter or section number in the safety analysis report, or their respective supporting analyses. The NRC staff used the guidance in NUREG-1567, Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities.

Safety Analysis Report (SAR), Chapter 2, Site Characteristics RAI 2.2-1 Provide an evaluation and aircraft crash probability impact analysis of airway V68, which passes nearby the proposed WCS CISF, in accordance with guidance and acceptance criteria provided in NUREG-1567, Section 2.4.2.

During the NRC staffs review of the information presented in WCS CISF SAR Section 2.2, Nearby Industrial, Transportation and Military Facilities, the NRC staff identified an airway V68 passing nearby the proposed WCS CISF, which is not addressed by ISP. The closest airport identified is the Lea County Airport, which is 18 miles from the WCS CISF. Provide an analysis and evaluation of airway V68 and incorporate the changes, as appropriate in the application.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.94.

RAI 2.2-2 Provide the locations of nearby industrial, transportation, military, and nuclear installations. Describe potential hazards to the proposed WCS CISF from activities or materials at those facilities in accordance with the guidance and acceptance criteria provided in NUREG-1567, Section 2.4.2.

During the NRC staffs review, the NRC staff determined that ISP identified nearby facilities, but did not provide potential impact evaluations of these facilities on the proposed WCS CISF. Specifically, ISP identified a railroad, but did not provide details on products/materials transported by rail; the distance of the rail line from the proposed facility; or the potential impacts (if any) on the proposed facility. ISP identified Texas State Highway 176, but not the shortest distance between the highway and the proposed facility. ISP stated oil industry pipelines are located near the facility in WCS CISF SAR Section 12.2.2, but did not provide details as to what materials are transported in the pipelines; the distance of the pipelines from the proposed facility; or the impacts of the pipelines on the C.I. 38 Enclosure 1 000084

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 10 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 proposed facility. Different materials can be transported through these pipelines and these different materials can pose different potential hazards to the site.

Also, in accordance with SRP Section 15.5.2.10, ISP should analyze whether the effects of hazards near the site have been addressed as part of the WCS CISF design basis. When evaluating which external hazards should be considered in the design bases for the WCS CISF, ISP should use a screening criteria of 10-6 annual probability of exceeding the applicable dose criteria, not 1.0E-5, as stated in SAR Section 12.2.2. This criteria was established by the Commission for ISFSIs in the Private Fuel Storage proceeding (CLI-01-22) and further elucidated in CLI-05-19.

If the required impact evaluations are performed in some other section of the SAR, the NRC staff requests that these evaluations be cross referenced in SAR Section 2.2, pointing to where the evaluations are performed and conclusions are addressed for clarity. Provide a revised WCF CISF SAR Section 2.2, with details, additional analyses, and conclusions, as appropriate, by cross referencing the impact evaluations that are presented in Chapter 12, Accidents Analysis, of the WCS CISF SAR.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.94.

RAI 2.4-1 Provide technical justification for the rating curve of the large playa next to the WCS CISF storage area. This may include the outflow area cross section, the equation and parameters used to calculate the curve, and the details of the calculations under all surface water flow scenarios.

In the WCS request for supplemental information response dated December 16, 2016, WCS provided a flood calculation package of the CISF drainage area built on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers HEC-HMS model. ISP provided a rating curve of discharge from the large playa depression in the calculation package.

ISP also provided outflow rates from the playa for a few surface water flow scenarios in Attachment B to SAR Chapter 2, Site Characteristics. However, the information provided in the attachment did not include the cross-section of the playa outflow area or the equation and parameters to calculate the outflow rates all the way to the top of the cross-section. The NRC staff requires the additional information to verify the rating curve used for the 2016 floodplain study.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.90(f) and 72.92(c).

RAI 2.4-2 Provide additional information on the erodibility and long-term erosion of the diversion berms, under normal and extreme precipitation events, through all phases of the proposed WCS CISF facility. Estimate the seepage through and underneath the berms and the impact of seepage to the berms stability through all phases of the proposed facility.

In WCS CISF SAR Section 2.4.2.2, ISP stated that flood events are modeled without including the collection ditch and diversion berms to provide the greatest possible area contributing runoff to the playa that serves as a water detention pond and potentially to increase the water level of the playa. ISP stated that the 2 C.I. 38 000085

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 11 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 ditch and berm are to be constructed to minimize, not prevent, run-on of storm water by diverting it around the operational storage area. ISP stated that compromise of the collection ditch and diversion berms upstream of the CISF facility may result in increased flow across the storage area during some precipitation events. ISP further stated that this increase of flow would be short term and temporary in nature. However, because of the build-up of water and sediment behind the berm can potentially create a flood water wave higher than those modeled without the berm in the event that the berm is breached. The NRC staff requires additional information to evaluate the likelihood that events and processes (e.g., overtopping, breach of berm structure, and short- and long-term erosion) may negatively impact the integrity of the system, structure and component in the storage area. Additionally, the NRC staff requires the estimates of seepage through and underneath the berms and the impact of the seepage to the berms stability through all phases of the proposed CISF facility to evaluate potential impact of subsurface water to the foundation of the storage pads.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.90(f).

RAI 2.4-3 Provide clarification as to what is the exact design of WCS CISF rail side track, in particular the section east of the storage area.

In its 2016 floodplain analysis, ISP considered four drainage areas in the watershed encompassing the WCS CISF (i.e., P DA 1, P DA 2, P DA 3, and P DA 4, see SAR Figure 2-35). ISP stated that drainage area P DA 3 contains 42.8 acres and drains the southeast portion of the CISF site bounded by the existing WCS railroad and the CISF rail side track and that surface water runoff from P DA 3 discharges into the large playa located east of the facility (SAR Chapter 2 attachment B).

In reviewing the SAR, the NRC determined that the eastern portion of the CISF rail side track are not consistently identified in the site plan depicted in SAR Figures 2-1, 2-3, 2-4 and 2-15 versus that depicted in SAR Figure 2-35 and SAR Chapter 2, Attachment B, Figures 1.1.2-2 and 2.2.1-1. The drainage area P DA 3 depicted in the former group of figures appears to be larger than that depicted in the latter. Difference in the area of drainage P DA 3 may cause different flood water level on the south eastern corner of the storage area. If drainage area P DA 3 is correctly depicted in SAR Figure 2-35, the NRC staff requests that ISP correct the side rail track design in SAR Figures 2-1, 2-3, 2-4 and 2-15. If drainage area P DA 3 is correctly depicted in SAR Figure 2-1, the NRC request that ISP provide a floodplain analysis using the site plan in Figure 2-1.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.90(a) and (f).

RAI 2.6-1 Clarify the origin of the circular features as identified in the red circles on Figure 2-3 below. Specifically, provide the dimensions of the features and determine whether they might represent surface deformation at the site due to subsurface dissolution resulting from past or ongoing natural processes or human activities 3 C.I. 38 000086

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 12 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 in the site area, as mentioned in WCS CISF SAR Section 2.6.1. Also, discuss the potential for similar features to develop at the site in the future.

WCS CISF SAR Section 2.6.1 states, near-surface regional structural controls may be locally modified by differential subsidence related to groundwater dissolution of Permian salt deposits. However, the SAR does not specify where these locally modified areas of differential subsidence are located relative to the proposed site. The NRC staff noted the history of oil and gas exploration and extraction activities in the site area and the presence of some features in SAR Figure 2-3 that are circular in shape (i.e., similar to sinkholes or swales), some of which are shallow depressions 2 to 7 feet in depth.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.103(f)(1) and 10 CFR 72.103(f)(2)(ii).

RAI 2.6-2 Describe the origin and extent of the red-bed ridge mentioned in Attachment F, including: the relationship of the ridge to structures such as the inferred anticline and Mescalero Ridge escarpment described in Attachment F, or other local and regional geologic structures, including folds, faults of lineaments. Provide a figure showing the location of the red bed ridge relative to the WCS site. Provide an estimate of the depth to the crest and flanks of the red bed ridge and the estimated slope gradient from the crest to the flanks of the red-bed ridge at the WCS site, including a geotechnical stability analysis, if appropriate.

4 C.I. 38 000087

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 13 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 WCS CISF SAR Section 2.6.1 does not discuss the red-bed ridge, its origin or extent at the site, or its potential association with local and regional geologic structures or features. Attachment F to SAR Chapter 2 also notes that the red-bed ridge is parallel to regional escarpments, including the Mescalero Ridge in New Mexico. Attachment F concludes that the red-bed ridge is not the result of halite dissolution, but a structural high exists in the southwestern part of the site area and is likely the eastern limb of a north-northwest trending anticline; the anticline appears to coincide with the red-bed ridge. Previous site investigation reports from April 2000 (ML041910475) and February 2004 (ML041910489) describe the red-bed ridge as a paleotopographic divide between the Ogallala Aquifer and the Cenozoic basin fill aquifer or as a subsurface structure associated with a regional lineament that developed along the preferred jointing direction (300-310°). The NRC staff noted that based on boring logs from the monitoring wells, the slope gradient of the top of red-beds beneath the site may be as high as 5 percent, while the February 2004 report notes that the slope gradient may vary between 0.6 and 6.2 percent.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.103(f)(1).

RAI 2.6-3 Provide justification for why soil boring to depths greater than 45 feet are not needed.

WCS CISF SAR Section 2.6.4 states that the WCS CISF subsurface conditions were explored with eighteen soil borings. Among the eighteen borings, four borings encountered auger refusal conditions at depths ranging from 37 to 45 feet below ground surface (bgs), and fourteen borings were terminated at 25 feet bgs. General industrial guidance for geotechnical investigations, such as US Army Corps of Engineering1 and FHWA2 manual/standard, recommends the boring depth, for example, (1) be at least to a depth where the increased stress due to the estimated footing load is less than 10% of the existing effective overburden stress, (2) be 1.5 times the minimum dimension of footing below the base of the footing, or (3) penetrate a minimum of 3 meters into the bedrock, if bedrock is encountered before other required depths.

References:

1. US Army Corps of Engineers Geotechnical Investigations (EM 1110-1-1804, 1 January 2001).
2. FHWA GEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING CIRCULAR NO. 5 Evaluation of Soil and Rock Properties (April 2002)

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.103(f)(1) and 10 CFR 72.103(f)(2)(iv).

RAI 2.6-4 Provide the following information with respect to the laboratory investigations:

a. Justify how the soil strength and deformation properties of the cohesive soils were determined and how the settlement potential of the clay stratum can be 5 C.I. 38 000088

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 14 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 adequately evaluated given the absence of consolidated undrained triaxial tests and consolidated tests.

b. Provide results from the California Bearing Ratio (CBR) testing.
c. A description of the laboratory tests (including the test results) that were completed after the submittal of the Geotechnical Exploration Report (Attachment E to the SAR).

WCS CISF SAR Section 2.6.4 states the following tests were performed for this application: Atterberg Limits; Natural Moisture Content; Particle Size Analysis; Resistivity of Soil; Consolidated Undrained Triaxial Test; Standard Proctor Moisture-Density Tests; California Bearing Ratio; and Consolidation. However, Subsection 2.2 Laboratory test program of the Geotechnical Exploration Report (Attachment E to SAR) states that consolidated undrained triaxial tests and consolidation tests were not conducted because undisturbed Shelby tube samples could not be obtained due to the caliche. These tests are important for determining the shear strength parameters and consolidation characteristics of soil. Moreover, in the same subsection ISP indicated that one CBR test was performed. The staff reviewed ISPs soil data summary enclosed in Attachment E, Appendix B to the SAR, and the CBR testing results were not reported.

Additionally, Subsection 2.2, Laboratory test program, of the Geotechnical Exploration Report (Attachment E to SAR) states, At the time this report was prepared, some of the laboratory testing was still on-going. In order for the NRC staff to perform a complete evaluation of the laboratory investigations, ISP should provide a complete description of the laboratory tests, including the test results.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.103(f)(1) and 10 CFR 72.103(f)(2)(iv).

RAI 2.6-5 Provide the basis for using 20% of the dynamic modulus for the static elastic modulus as these values are considerably higher for similar soils.

Appendix D of the Geotechnical Exploration Report (Attachment E to SAR) provides the calculated static elastic moduli used for the design and analysis for a depth of 100 ft bgs. These calculated static elastic moduli are based on derived dynamic moduli from seismic wave values determined by the refraction micro-tremor (ReMi) method. Specifically, ISP used 20% of the dynamic modulus as the static elastic modulus for design and analysis. However, these elastic moduli exceed the typical range of values for similar soils reported by various engineering literatures.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.103(f)(1) and 10 CFR 72.103(f)(2)(iv).

RAI 2.6-6 Provide the following information regarding the slope stability evaluation:

a. Water resources in the site vicinity along with a description of its location; such as dams, natural or manmade ponds and how the stability of their embankments might affect the site.

6 C.I. 38 000089

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 15 Date Filed: 05/16/2022

b. When referring to the natural or manmade slopes, define the words close enough relative to the WCS CISF facilities and justify why the failure of these slopes would not adversely affect WCS CIFS facilities for phase 1 or for the total area of the proposed site, whichever applies.

WCS CISF SAR Section 2.6.5 provides general information regarding the slope stability of the site. Also, SAR Section 2.7 provides additional information linked to the slope stability of the site. SAR Section 2.7 states: There are no slopes, natural or manmade, close enough to the proposed WCS CISF facilities that their failure would adversely affect these facilities.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.103(f)(1) and 10 CFR 72.103(f)(2)(iv).

Safety Analysis Report (SAR), Chapter 15, Materials Evaluation" RAI 15-1. Clarify the following statements in WCS CISF SAR Appendix A, B, C and D, Section 3.4.6, Material Selection.

1. Provide an applicable reference for the following statement:

The DSC and cask materials are resistant to corrosion and are not susceptible to other galvanic reactions. Studies under severe marine environments have demonstrated that the shell materials used in the DSC shells are expected to demonstrate minimal corrosion during an 80-year exposure.

2. Clarify the range of environmental conditions expected for the Dry Shielded Canister (DSC) internals referenced in the following statement:

The DSC internals are enveloped in a dry, helium-inerted environment and are designed for all postulated environmental conditions.

3. Clarify the design life of the Horizontal Storage Module (HSM) in the following statement:

The HSM is a reinforced concrete component with an internal DSC support structure that is fabricated to ACI and AISC Code requirements. Both have durability well beyond a design life of 80 years.

The NRC staff note that the following information is included in the UFSARs referenced in the WCS CISF application:

  • Rancho Seco UFSAR Section 1.2, General Description of the Installation, indicates the system design life is 50 years.
  • The Advanced NUHOMS UFSAR (CoC 72-1029) does not specifically identify a design life.
  • The Standardized NUHOMS UFSAR indicates a service life of 50 years for the DSCs, TCs, and HSMs.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c).

RAI 15-2. Provide the following for the MP-187 system:

7 C.I. 38 000090

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 16 Date Filed: 05/16/2022

1. Drawings or a table that indicates the safety classification of the MP187 system structures, systems, and components (SSCs).

None of the drawings for the MP-187 system includes a safety classification for the components of the DSCs or the MP-187. Drawings for the MP-187, FO-,

FC-, and FF- DSCs are in the Rancho Seco SAR part 2 pages 813-830 (Docket No. 72-11). No Model 80 HSM or GTCC canister is included. The Model 80 HSM is in Appendix E.2 of the 72-1004 UFSAR. No HSM drawings are included in either the Rancho Seco or MP-187 UFSARs.

2. The complete set of drawings for the greater-than-Class C (GTCC) canister currently stored at Rancho Seco.

The internal structure and contents of the Rancho Seco GTCC canister are not included in the drawings in the WCS CISF SAR Appendix H. In addition, provide the applicable codes and standards for the design and construction of the Rancho Seco GTCC canisters including code alternatives.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and (c)(4).

RAI 15-3. Clarify whether the 24PT1 canisters from San Onofre included in the WCS CISF SAR include the GTCC canister. If the GTCC canister from San Onofre is included in the SAR, provide drawings for this GTCC canister.

The NRC staff note that there are currently 17 24PT1 canisters loaded with spent fuel at San Onofre. One of the canisters is loaded with GTCC from San Onofre

1. The GTCC is not in the approved contents of the 24PT1 DSC in the 72-1029 CoC (i.e., not included in technical specifications for the 72-1029 system (NRC ADAMS ML15054A513)).

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c).

RAI 15-4. Provide the complete set of drawings for the GTCC canisters currently stored at Maine-Yankee, Yankee-Rowe, Connecticut-Yankee, and Zion.

The drawings in WCS CISF SAR Appendix H are only of the multi-purpose cask (MPC), not the basket or the contents. In addition, provide the applicable codes and standards for the design and construction of these GTCC canisters.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and (c)(4).

RAI 15-5. Clarify the quality category of the MP197HB cask used for transportation and transfer operations for the 61BT and 61BTH DSCs.

WCS CISF SAR Appendix C.4.2.3 (61BT DSC) states that the MP197HB is an Important to Safety (ITS) Quality Category C component, whereas Appendix D.4.2.3 (61BTH DSC) states that the MP197HB is an ITS Quality Category A component.

8 C.I. 38 000091

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 17 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and (c)(4).

RAI 15-6. Identify the code exceptions for the 72-1029 system components designed and fabricated in accordance with the ASME code in WCS CISF SAR Appendix B, Section B.3.4.6. Material Selection. These are listed in 72-1029 UFSAR (R-6)

Table 3.1-14.

This information should be included and specifically referenced in the application.

See the reference to code exceptions in WCS CISF SAR Appendix A, Section A.3.4.6, Material Selection, as an example.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and (c)(4).

RAI 15-7. Specify the Quality Category of the coatings for the NAC-MPC vertical concrete cask and transfer cask identified in WCS CISF SAR Appendix E Sections E.7.1.10 and E.7.2.10.

The NRC staff note that the NAC-MPC UFSAR Section 3.8 and 3.A.8 do not specify whether the coatings are ITS. In contrast, the NRC staff note that the NAC-UMS UFSAR (72-1015) Section 3.8 has a statement indicating that the coatings are Not Important to Safety (NITS). Similarly, the NAC-MAGNASTOR UFSAR Section 8.6.2 has a statement indicating that the coatings are NITS.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and (c)(4).

RAI 15-8. Provide additional information to justify the classification of the 130-ton Crane and the WCS Lift Beam as NITS Components based on the NUHOMS system transfers being limited to heights of less than 80 inches.

Rancho Seco FSAR Appendix B, Standardized SAR References, Section 8.2.5.1 states:

The height of 80 inches is chosen as this envelopes the maximum vertical height of the transfer cask when secured to the transport skid/trailer assembly.

The transfer operation (shown in WCS CISF SAR Figure A.5-1) of the loaded MP187 from an incoming railcar to the NUHOMS Transfer Trailer that takes place in the canister handling building (shown in WCS CISF SAR Figure 1-7) appears to involve a lift of the NUHOMS system that is greater than 80 inches because the underside of the MP187 transfer cask (in the horizontal position as shown in Figure A.5-1) will be lifted above the trunnion attachment points on the MP187 Transfer Trailer. As described, the dimensions of the MP187 Transfer Trailer and the MP187 Cask, and the description of the WCS canister handling building and the transfer operation do not support a lift height of no more than 80 inches.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c),

72.24(d)(1) and (2), and 72.24(h).

9 C.I. 38 000092

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 18 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI 15-9. Provide information to show that the design criteria for the GTCC storage systems are the same as or bounding with respect to the WCS CISF site specific conditions.

The WCS CISF SAR Appendices A through G provide a comparison of the principal design criteria of the spent fuel storage systems to the conditions of the WCS CISF storage site. No such comparison was provided for the GTCC storage systems in the WCS CISF SAR.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c),

72.24(d)(1) and (2).

RAI 15-10. Provide the following information for ASTM A572 Grade 50 steel: (1) modulus of elasticity, (2) coefficient of thermal expansion, and (3) density.

This material is identified in WCS CISF SAR Section 15.3.2, Canister Transfer System, and Section 15.3.3, Vertical Cask Transporter. These property specifications are not provided in WCS CISF SAR Sections 15.3.2 and 15.3.3.

This information is necessary to assure compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and (c)(4).

RAI 15-12. Clarify whether the NUHOMS MP187 Multi-Purpose Cask will potentially be used to contain a failed NUHOMS Dry Shielded Canister (DSC) such as a FO-, FC-, or FF- DSC currently in use at Rancho Seco or the 24PT1 DSCs that are in use at the San Onofre ISFSI.

Procedures for placement of a DSC into the metal cask for storage at an onsite facility are described in Section 7.1.6 of the NUHOMS MP187 Multi-Purpose Cask Safety Analysis Report (ADAMS Accession No. ML063520505).

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(e) and (h).

RAI 15-13. Clarify the incorporation of approved aging management programs for the 61BT and 61BTH DSCs that are part of CoC No. 1004. CoC No. 1004 was renewed in December 2017.

The CoC holder has developed NRC approved aging management programs (AMP) for the 72-1004 SSCs including the DSCs. WCS CISF SAR Section 1.1 page 1-3 states: As these systems approach 20 years of service time, their applications for License Renewal, including Aging Management Program (AMP) requirements, will be submitted to the NRC for review and approval. However, the WCS CISF application does not include AMP for this system.

This information is needed to determine compliance necessary to assure compliance with 10 CFR 72.42(a)(2) and 72.240(c)(3).

10 C.I. 38 000093

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 19 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Consolidated Emergency Response Plan (CERP)

RAI EP-1: Clarify the approval authority for the proposed CERP.

The regulation in 10 CFR 72.44(f), states, in part: A licensee shall follow and maintain in effect an emergency plan that is approved by the Commission.

However, the transmittal letter dated March 16, 2017, states:

A Draft WCS Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is included as part of this revised application. WCS is required to seek agreement state approval for changes to the ERP, and therefore, only a draft version is provided until such time that NRC approves the content of the ERP and agreement state approval may be sought.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.44(f).

RAI EP-2: Identify any part of the CERP that does not apply to the 10 CFR 72.32(a) requirements for the CISF.

Section 3.1, Classification System, of RG 3.67 states in part:

The licensee should clearly identify any part of the emergency plan does not apply to activities licensed by the NRC.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.44(f).

RAI EP-3: Provide the location where emergency response personnel will observe indications for fire and smoke alarms and for radiation monitoring instrumentation.

Section 2.2, Detection of Accidents, of the proposed CERP states, in part:

Detection of accidents is dependent on personnel observation, by fire and smoke alarms, and radiation monitoring instrumentation.

The proposed CERP should state the specific location where personnel can observe indications of alarms and radiation monitoring instrumentation for the detection of an accident and to ensure accurate and timely emergency classification.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 72.32(a)(4).

RAI EP-4: Clarify the statements in Section 3.1, Classifications of Accidents, of the proposed CERP, which refer to classification of accidents at the proposed CISF for both an Alert and Site Area Emergency declarations.

The provisions of 10 CFR 72.32(a)(3), Classification of accidents, only require an Alert classification for accidents at an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI), while 10 CFR 72.32(b)(3) requires a classification for accidents at a monitored retrievable storage facility as either an alert or site area emergency.

11 C.I. 38 000094

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 20 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Section 3.1, of the proposed CERP states, in part:

Emergencies are classified as an Alert or Site Area Emergency.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(3).

RAI EP-5: Clarify the statements in Table A, Emergency Classification, of the proposed CERP, which refer to a response to an Alert classification at the proposed CISF.

The provisions of 10 CFR 72.32(a)(8) states, in part:

The licensee shall also commit to notify the NRC operations center immediately after notifications of the appropriate offsite response organizations and not later than one hour after the licensee declares an emergency.

Table A of the proposed CERP for response to a Site Area Emergency classification states, in part:

...Notify state and local agencies.

Notify the NRC Operations Center immediately after off-site notifications are made and no later than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after declaring a Site Area Emergency.

However, there is no statement regarding notification of the State and local agencies, as well as the NRC Operations Center for an Alert classification.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(8).

RAI EP-6: Clarify the individual (designated emergency response organization (ERO) position) on site at all times (24-hour per day, 7 days per week) with the authority and responsibility to accurately and timely perform emergency classification, and notify offsite agencies and the NRC.

Section 4.4, Incident Commander (IC), of the proposed CERP states, in part:

The IC or alternate is on the facility premises or on call 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day (i.e.,

available to respond to an emergency by reaching the facility within less than one hour if after working hours). In the absence or unavailability of the primary IC, an alternate IC is designated as the primary IC under a delegation of authority memorandum.

Section 4.4.1, Delegation and Assignment, of the proposed CERP states, in part:

These personnel may not always be present at the facility when an event occurs. One of the ICs listed in Attachment F, Emergency Information List of EP-1.1, Consolidated Emergency Response, is always on-call. If the on-call IC is not at the facility, then he / she is available to those individuals present at the facility through communication device or other means.

12 C.I. 38 000095

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 21 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Section 5.1.3, Initial Response and Notification, of the proposed CERP states, in part:

WCS Security Officers are trained to assume the duties of initial response and notification during these times. Upon detecting a perceived emergency, Security personnel on duty will immediately inform the IC.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(7).

RAI EP-7: Clarify the NRCs responsibilities for detecting, measuring and supervising cleanup for a release of Agreement State licensed radioactive materials at the proposed CISF.

Section 4.11, Coordination with Participating Government Agencies, of the proposed CERP states, in part:

The DSHS [Department of State Health Services], TCEQ [Texas Commission on Environmental Quality] and NRC have responsibilities for detecting, measuring, and supervising cleanup of radioactive materials that are released into the environment.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(7) and (8).

RAI EP-8: Clarify what State (Texas and/or New Mexico) and local response organizations that are notified at the declaration of an Alert classification. Additionally, what is the timing of these notifications?

Section 4.10, Activation of the ERP [Emergency Response Plan], of the proposed CERP states, in part:

  • Activation for any reason is reported to the TCEQ Region 7
  • If an emergency is declared notify the DSHS emergency numberwithin one hour of contacting off-site response agencies This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(8).

RAI EP-9: Clarify how the source term is determined for a release from the proposed CISF.

Section 5.2, Accident Assessment, of the proposed CERP states, in part:

The WCS inventory program can provide a real time radiological source term. This inventory tracking program can provide immediate real time information on the radionuclides that are stored in the specific areas impacted by the incident/accident.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(6).

RAI EP-10: Clarify if there are agreements in place or a memorandum of understanding with the New Mexico State Police.

13 C.I. 38 000096

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 22 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Section 5.3.1, Mitigation of Fires, of the proposed CERP states, in part:

In the event of a catastrophic fire, the Andrews and Lea County Sheriffs Departments, Texas Department of Public Safety and/or the New Mexico State Police are responsible for directing traffic along Highway 176 and evacuating any of the general public surrounding the facility that may be affected by windblown or gaseous wastes.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(8).

RAI EP-11: Clarify if there are agreements in place or a memorandum of understanding with the State of New Mexico for notification of the transportation of a contaminated person for treatment at a medical facility in New Mexico.

Section 5.3.5, Mitigation of Injuries, of the proposed CERP states, in part:

The primary treatment facility for radiological contaminated individuals will be the Carlsbad Medical Center in Carlsbad, New Mexico.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(8).

RAI EP-12: Clarify what recommended protective actions will be provided to off-site response organizations for the design-basis accidents at the CISF related to the ISFSI.

Section 5.4.5, Off-site Protective Actions, of the proposed CERP states, in part:

After declaration of a Site Emergency, the IC has the authority to recommend off-site protective actions. The IC or designee will make off-site notifications to local authorities.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(9).

RAI EP-13: Revise the threshold limits in Section 5.5, Exposure Control, and Table B, Protective Action Guidance, of the proposed CERP to ensure consistency with the latest version of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protective Action Guide (PAG) Manual for early phase PAGs.

Section 5.5, Exposure Control, of the proposed CERP states, in part:

The PAG threshold of concern for WSC is based on the EPA limits of less than one Rem Committed Effective Dose Equivalent (CEDE), five Rem thyroid, or 50 Rem skin dose at the site boundary.

Reference - Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, Office of Radiation Programs, USEPA, 1992 These limits are not consistent with those provided in either Table 2-1, PAGs for the Early Phase of a Nuclear Incident, of the Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents (EPA-400-R-92-001, May 1992) or in Table 1-1, Summary Table for PAGs, Guidelines, and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents, of the PAG Manual: Protective Action Guides and Planning Guidance for Radiological Incidents (EPA-400/R-17/001, January 2017).

14 C.I. 38 000097

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 23 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(9).

RAI EP-14: Provide a basis for the size of the emergency planning zone (EPZ) with respect to the CISF, and clarify the definitions for chief elected officials in Section 5.9, Emergency Planning Zone, of the proposed CERP.

Section 5.9 of the proposed CERP states, in part:

Based on the potential consequences of postulated emergencies, the EPZ for the WCS Facility has been defined as 6km [kilometer] (3.7 mile) radius circle centered on the Site.

Section 5.9 further states:

The size of the EPZ is sufficiently large that:

  • Detailed planning within the EPZ provides both an adequate basis for responding to all reasonably credible accidents and a substantial base for the expansion of response efforts in the event that this proves necessary by WCS, State of Texas, local agencies and other organizations responsible for off-site emergency response.
  • Projected maximum doses resulting from credible accidents, under unfavorable meteorological conditions, within the site will not require protective actions to be taken outside the EPZ.

Chief elected officials responsible for various portions of the WCS EPZ will provide the public information on operational emergencies at the WCS Facility and, based on inputs from the site and regulatory agencies, may recommend public protective actions, such as sheltering or evacuation.

The NRC staff needs additional information related to agreements or a memorandum of understanding with the State of New Mexico due to the proposed size of the EPZ includes several miles of the State of New Mexico, as well as an NRC-licensed fuel facility. The NRC staff also needs further clarification on the definition of Chief elected officials, as referenced in Section 5.9.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(1) and 10 CFR 72.32(a)(9).

RAI EP-15: Provide a description, by position or title, of the person responsible for developing, maintaining and updating the CERP.

Section 7.0, Maintaining Emergency Preparedness Capability, of the proposed CERP does not include the identification of the personnel responsible for developing, maintaining, and updating the plan, as required in 10 CFR 72.32(a)(7).

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(7).

15 C.I. 38 000098

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 24 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI EP-16: Clarify that the change process for the proposed CERP under the QA [Quality Assurance] Program will be evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 72.44(f), and that maintenance and updating of the CERP will be consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 72.32(a)(14).

Section 7.1, Written Emergency Plan Procedures, of the proposed CERP states, in part:

Changes to ERP-100, Emergency Response Plan, and EP-1.1, Consolidated Emergency Response, are composed in accordance with QA-5.1, Standard Operating Procedures and Work Instructions.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.44(f) and the requirements of 10 CFR 72.32(a)(14).

RAI EP-17: Clarify how the training of the staff at the Lea Regional Medical Center and Carlsbad Medical Center by the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is verified and documented.

Section 7.2.3, Off-Site Response Teams, of the proposed CERP states, in part:

Currently, the staff at the Lea Regional Medical Center in Hobbs, New Mexico and Carlsbad Medical Center in Carlsbad, New Mexico train with WIPP.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(10).

RAI EP-18: Clarify or revise the frequency and scope of the emergency planning drills and exercises, as provided in Section 7.3 of the CERP.

Section 7.3, Drills and Exercises, of the proposed CERP states, in part:

Emergency drills and exercises are conducted systematically.

[]

Consistent with the requirements in 10 CFR 72.32 (a) and (b), documented quarterly communications checks with off-site response organizations will include the check and update of all necessary telephone numbers.

This information is not consistent with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12), Exercises, which states, in part:

[p]rovisions for conducting semiannual communications checks with offsite response organizations and biennial onsite exercises to test response to simulated emergencies. Radiological/Health Physics, Medical, and Fire drills shall be conducted annually.

Section 7.3 of the proposed CERP does not contain provision identified for radiological/health physics, medical, and fire drills to be conducted annually, or a requirement to conduct a biennial exercise. Additionally, communication checks are required semiannually, rather than quarterly as identified in Section 7.3.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(12).

16 C.I. 38 000099

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 25 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI EP-19: Justify why the most recent version of the NRC endorsed methodology for the development of emergency action levels (EALs) was not used in the development of the EALs for the WCS CERP specific to the CISF.

The guidance used by the industry for the development of EALs is the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) document, NEI 99-01 Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non Passive Reactors, Revision 6, dated November 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12326A805). Specifically, Section 1.3, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), provides guidance on the development of EALs for an ISFSI.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(3).

RAI EP-20: Justify the Alert criteria and the dose thresholds used for the radiological plume incident in Appendix C, Facility Emergency Action levels, of the proposed CERP.

Appendix C contains the following Alert criteria for a radiological plume incident:

>100 mrem CEDE but <500 mrem CEDE from an accidental release of radioactive material to the general public.


or------

>1 rem CEDE in a Facility from an accidental release of radioactive material to Facility workers.

Additionally, Appendix C contains the following Site Area Emergency criteria for a radiological plume incident:

>500 mrem CEDE but <1 rem CEDE from an accidental release of radioactive material to the general public.


or------

>1 rem CEDE, calculated at a facility boundary, from an accidental release of radioactive material to Facility workers.

These criterion are not consistent with the analysis for dry cask storage of spent fuel in NUREG-1140, A Regulatory Analysis on Emergency Preparedness for Fuel Cycle and Other Radioactive Material Licensees, dated January 1988, (ADAMS Accession No. ML062020791). Additionally, the Alert criteria is more representative of the typical thresholds for a Site Area Emergency classification. Please provide justification for the use of these radiation levels as thresholds for an Alert classification, or revise accordingly.

In addition, the use of a CEDE dose threshold is inconsistent with NRC-endorsed EAL guidance. Please provide a justification for using the CEDE dose, or revise accordingly consistent with the latest NRC-endorsed EAL guidance.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.32(a)(3).

17 C.I. 38 000100

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 26 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 18 000101

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 27 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 INTER IM STOR AGE

.PART NERS January 7, 2019 E-53364 Director, Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Subject:

Partial Response to RAI Part 1, Physical Security, including Revision 3 of the Physical Security Plan, Guard Training and Qualification Plan, Docket 72-1050 .

Reference:

1. * - L~tter from John-Chau Nguyen (NRC) to Elicia Sanchez (ISP),

lnterir:n Storage Partners' License Application to Com,truc;;t and Operate the Waste Control Specialists Consolidated Interim Storage

. *---Eacilit¥,-Andr.ews-County, Texas~ck et-bJo.J2 -1050 - Fits+/-- -

. -* *_-_:*~-=~-~-:--.~_-:-:.~~ *-* - *_ **: *- .: Req~u~srror:.A:aai1fo*11ai-intofrnat1or-il'art f(PhysrcaFS.eoi:irtW;:*cratea *- : :*****:-~:-=*:* :::

_____________ --------------------** _ .... ________

  • Novembe r 6, 2018_(E-51587}_____________ __________ ---------------------------------- _________
  • ___
  • _____ _
    • ---_*** .. _. ---- ---* ____ -______ --- _---- 2*~- . :-*cefler from J. -scoff Kirl<"(WCS1 to Mark"Lcf friba-fcf{ f\f~ense* - - ... _. *':~---: -

Application to Construct and Operate a Consolidated Interim Storage

- Facilit~rfor'Spenrr,.Juclear FuelTn~Ancfrews;County, Texat*-bo cket72-1050, dated April 28, 2016 Interim Storage Partners (ISP) hereby files this partial response to the Request for Additional Information (RAI) Part 1, Physical Security documented in the attachments to the NRC letter dated Novembe r 6, 2018 (Reference 1) to support continued NRC review of the April 28, 2016 WCS License application requesting authorization to construct and operate a Consolidated Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel in Andrews County, Texas (Reference 2).

Contained in this submittaJ are responses to seventeen (17) of the twenty-eight (28)

RAls attached to Reference 1 . * * *

  • 300 I Safeguards Information ;JH5SZ/p When separated from Safeguards Information enclosure(s), this document is d~controlled provided the_ transmittal document d9es not otherwise warrant protection from the unauthorized disclosure. fo1t-15S C.I. 40 P.O. Box 1129
  • interimstora gepartners.c om 000102

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 28 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Safeguards Information Document Contrpl Desk E-53364

. Page 2 of 4 ISP and its team have determined that in order to provide complete and high quality responses to ttie balance of the RAls, we will need additional time to conclude the required responses. We would also like to schedule a meeting with NRC staff to discuss the remaining RIAs. Following that meeting, ISP will provide a schedule for completing *our responses to the RAls.

  • This submittal contains the following enclosures:
  • Enclosure 1 provides responses to the RAls items (SGI).
  • Enclosure 2 is Revision 3 of the Physical Security Plan (SGI)

. . ' \ '

  • Enclosure 3 contains Revision 3 of the Training and Qualification Plan (SGI)
  • Enclosure 4 cc:>nt~ins revised MOUs and changed SAR pages (Public)

Physical Secur:ity Plan and Guard Training and Qualification Plan changes are tracked and indicated by revision bars in Revision 3 of these documents.

No changes we,~e req1;.1ired to the Safeguards Co,ntingency Plan, therefore the current \

  • revision for this,:document remains Revision 2. All of the documents included in the attachment arEln,arkecf as Safeguards Information and must be withheld Linauthorizeu**df~*c1dsu~e* parsw.r,t to 10* CFR ?3::~2::-~:-:*** -----** --* * - * **:*-.* -~ ::*--;--:~

from ISP requests that ~ c9py of all correspondence regardjrig this matter be direclly mailed to Mr. Jack Boshoven, Chief Engineer CISF Licensing :Eind Engineering; at 713q*

Minstrel Way, $.uite 300, Coh,imbia, MD 21045.

Should you hay~ any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Jack


B esh~~ Ae:-a Hft:<f r.9tG- 6956, ~t-jae kl,esh even@ oranO ;group

. -* -*- - *... ::....:.. * .::....: .*.*..* .:.:.: . .* ' . ' *. ---* '**'*- .. ***-----* .* - . . . . --~.. ....:.-~.:.. ..* :c..:.....:./....*. , : : .. ::. ..*

~= - . -:.. ;* -

          • ---*-**-**** ~--*--* ---*

Safeguards Information When separated from Safeguards Information enclosure(s), this docume nt is decontrolled provided the transmittal document does not otherwise warrant protection from the unauthorized disclosure. C.I. 40 000103

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 29 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Safeguards Information Document Control Desk E-53364 Page 3 of 4 I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Sincerely,

~~~y Elicia B. Sanchez, .

Chief Financial Officer

  • Interim Storage Partners LLC I certify the above names person appeared before me and execut~d this document on this ~day of .le.!,~ a:>.(~~Dl- ol ~

LANA TULL . ~Public

'i Notary PubUc, State ot Texas i Mv CommlssiOn Expires December 01, 2019 cc: John (Chau) Nguyen (NRC SFM) - Letter Only Jeff Isakson, ISP/TN Americas - Letter Only Jack Boshoven, ISP/TN Americas -Letter Only Safeguards Information When separated from Safeguards Information enclosure(s), this document is decontrolled provided the-transmittal document does not otherwise warrant protection from the unauthorized disclosure. C.I. 40 000104

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 30 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 19 000105

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 31 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 March 6, 2019 Mr. Jeffrey D. Isakson Chief Executive Officer/President Interim Storage Partners LLC P.O. Box 1129 Andrews, TX 79714

SUBJECT:

INTERIM STORAGE PARTNERS LLCs LICENSE APPLICATION TO CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE THE WASTE CONTROL SPECIALISTS CONSOLIDATED INTERIM STORAGE FACILITY, ANDREWS COUNTY, TEXAS, DOCKET NO. 72-1050 - FIRST REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, PART 2

Dear Mr. Isakson:

By letter dated July 19, 2018 (NRC Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18206A595), Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP), a joint venture of Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) and Orano CIS LLC (a subsidiary of Orano USA),

requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) resume all safety and environmental review activities associated with the proposed WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (WCS CISF) license application. ISP requested authorization to store up to 5,000 metric tons of uranium for a period of 40 years in the WCS CISF.

The NRC staff is conducting a detailed technical review of your application and has determined that additional information is necessary to complete its review. The information needed by the NRC staff is discussed in the enclosed request for additional information (RAI). Consistent with our August 21, 2018, letter notifying you of our decision to resume the WCS CISF technical review, the NRC staff expects to issue its first round RAIs in several parts (ADAMS Accession No. ML18225A281).

We request that you provide responses within 60 days from the date of this letter. If you are unable to meet this deadline, please notify NRC staff in writing, within two weeks of receipt of this letter, of your new submittal date and the reasons for the delay.

Upon removal of Enclosure 2, this document is uncontrolled.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION C.I. 46 000106

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 32 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION J. Isakson 2 Please reference Docket No. 72-1050 and CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002 in future correspondence related to the technical review for this licensing action. If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-0262.

Sincerely,

/RA/

John-Chau Nguyen, Senior Project Manager Spent Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Docket No. 72-1050 CAC No. 001028 EPID L-2017-NEW-0002

Enclosures:

1. 1st Round safety RAIs - Part 2 (Non-Proprietary)
2. 1st Round safety RAIs - Part 2 (Proprietary)

OFFICIAL USE ONLY - PROPRIETARY INFORMATION C.I. 46 000107

ML19065A018 LTR: ML19065A019 ENCL: ML19065A020 OFFICE: NMSS/DSFM NMSS/DSFM NMSS/DSFM NMSS/DSFM NMSS/DSFM NRR/DSS NAME: JNguyen WWheatley DDunn ELove DTang SJones DATE: 01/07/19 01/09/19 01/19/19 01/18/19 01/15/19 01/16/19 OFFICE NMSS/DSFM NMSS/DSFM NMSS/DSFM NMSS/DSFM NMSS/DSFM NRR/DLP NAME JSolis JChang DBarto GBjorkman JMarcano RTurtil DATE 01/18 /19 01/10/19 01/16/19 01/18/19 01/16/19 01/18/19 OFFICE NMSS/DSFM NRR/DLP NRR/DSS NMSS/DSFM NMSS/DSFM NMSS/DSFM NAME MRahimi ABowers SAnderson CBajwa TTate CAraguas DATE 02/01/19 2/06/19 2/01/19 01/25/19 01/22/19 02/01/19 OFFICE NMSS/DSFM NAME IBerrios for JMcKirgan DATE 3/6/19 Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 34 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 First Request for Additional Information, Part 2 (non-proprietary)

Docket No. 72-1050 WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility in Andrews County, Texas By letter dated July 19, 2018 (NRC Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18206A595), Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP), a joint venture of Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) and Orano CIS LLC (a subsidiary of Orano USA),

requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) resume all safety and environmental review activities associated with the proposed WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (WCS CISF) license application. ISP requested authorization to store up to 5,000 metric tons of uranium for a license term of 40 years in the WCS CISF application.

This request for additional information (RAI) identifies additional information needed by the NRC staff to complete its safety review of the WCS CISF license application. The requested information is sorted by the specific part of the license application, technical specifications, proposed license conditions, the specific chapter or section number in the safety analysis report (SAR), or their respective supporting analyses. The NRC staff used the guidance in NUREG-1567, Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities.

License Application, Attachment A, Proposed License Conditions RAI PLC-1: Provide a description of onsite and offsite insurance coverage, as described in the License Application, Attachment A, Proposed License Conditions, proposed license condition No. 19, which states:

The Licensee shall obtain onsite and offsite insurance coverage in the amounts committed to by ISP in the ISP license application.

The NRC staff could not find a description of onsite and offsite insurance coverage in the license application RAI PLC-2: Clarify the terms, to the extent practicable, and, by this test, contained in Proposed License Condition 22 which states, Prior to removing the shipping cask closure lid, the gas inside the shipping cask shall be sampled to verify that the canister confinement boundary is intact to the extent reasonably practicable by this test.

As written, the license condition is vague and does not identify a specific procedure, test, or acceptance criteria.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(b), (c),

(d), (e) and (l) and 72.120(a).

C.I. 46 Enclosure 1 000109

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 35 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 License Application, Appendix A, Proposed Technical Specifications RAI TS-1: Specify the total design basis heat load for each of the storage cask designs to be used at the WCS CISF. Ensure the design basis values are included in the appropriate section of the Technical Specifications.

WCS CISF SAR Section 8.1.1, Criteria, states, Thermal assessments documented in this Chapter and associated Appendices verify that the WCS CISF characteristics and environmental conditions are bounded by the cask thermal analyses. However, the total design basis heat load for each type of canister received at the site is not provided in the Technical Specifications or anywhere else in the application. The NRC staff needs to evaluate whether thermal analyses of the storage cask systems proposed for use at the WCS CISF are bounding.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.44(c).

RAI TS-2: Clarify why the Technical Specifications are not consistent among the different storage systems to be used at WCS CISF. Ensure the Technical Specifications include any appropriate additional requirements for all storage systems.

Sections 3.2 through 3.4 of WCS CISF Technical Specifications provide Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs) and Surveillance Requirements (SRs) for all NAC storage systems, but equivalent LCOs and SRs are not provided for TN Americas dry storage systems. The applicant should ensure the Technical Specifications include appropriate additional requirements for the TN Americas storage systems or provide adequate justification why this information is not needed. The NRC staff needs this information to determine that adequate protection is provided during storage to preclude any important to safety materials from exceeding safety limits.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122 and 72.44(c).

RAI TS-3: Ensure the Technical Specifications (TS) include the appropriate information regarding the minimum center-to-center spacing between two canisters for vertical systems such as NAC-MPC, NAC-UMS, and MAGNASTOR.

The minimum center-to-center spacing between two canisters for vertical systems is not provided in the Proposed Technical Specifications. Section 4.3, Storage Area Design Features, of the proposed TS state that the Vertical Concrete Casks for NAC-MPC, NAC-UMS, and MAGNASTOR Systems shall meet the minimum center-to-center spacing requirements presented in the WCS CISF SAR. The minimum spacing values should be included in the TS because these values are used to perform the thermal evaluations for normal, off-normal, and accident-level conditions of storage.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.44(c).

2 C.I. 46 000110

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 36 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI TS-4: Ensure that appropriate details of the Horizontal Storage Module (HSM) Thermal Monitoring Program that is used to monitor the thermal performance of each HSM is included in the Technical Specifications (TS).

Section 5.1.3, HSM Thermal Monitoring Program, of the Proposed Technical Specifications states that the intent of the program is to prevent conditions that could lead to exceeding the concrete and fuel clad temperature criteria. Section 5.1.3 also states that each user must implement either TS 5.1.3(a) OR 5.1.3(b).

As the cask user, the applicant is required to implement one of the above TSs; however, it is not clear which TS would be implemented to monitor the thermal performance of each HSM at the site. The applicant should provide details of the program, per either TS 5.1.3(a) or TS 5.1.3(b). For example, if TS 5.1.3(a) is implemented, the user shall develop and implement procedures to perform visual inspection of HSM inlets and outlets on a daily basis. The NRC staff needs this information to make sure adequate protection is implemented to avoid conditions that could lead to safety-related components exceeding applicable safety limits.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.44.

RAI TS-5: Ensure that the Proposed Technical Specifications include adequate administrative controls such as limiting the amount of flammable material (including diesel fuel) to the equivalent of 50 gallons of diesel fuel.

Table 3-1 in Appendices A-D of the application for the Rancho Seco/MP187/NUHOMS Systems list the WCS CISF design criteria as 300 gallons of diesel fuel. Table 3-1 in Appendices E-G of the application for the NAC systems list the WCS CISF design criteria as 50 gallons of diesel fuel.

WCS CISF SAR Section 3.3.6 states: The CTS and the VCT are quantity limited (< 50 gallons) and are described in Section 12.2.1. The transfer vehicle for the NUHOMS System is also quantity limited (< 60 gallons) and will not be in the Cask Handling Building (CHB) during handling of the vertical systems. As the NUHOMS System is evaluated for fire with 300 gallons of diesel fuel, the quantity of fuel in the transfer vehicle is bounded for NUHOMS Systems operations. On the other hand, Section SAR 7.5.3.8, On-Site Accidents states, During operations, the amount of flammable liquids that are in the CHB will be administratively controlled to ensure the amount of flammable liquids is maintained below the fire load limits for the respective systems (e.g., 300 gallons of diesel fuel for NUHOMS Systems). In combination with fuel limitations and a fire suppression system, the fire hazard for the building is adequately mitigated (see WCS CISF SAR Section 3.3.6).

The information provided in WCS CISF SAR Table 3-1 of Appendices A-G, and WCS CISF SAR Section 3.3.6, and Section 7.5.3.8 appears to be inconsistent with regards to the WCS CISF design criteria for fire/explosions protection; therefore, administrative controls should be included in the Proposed Technical Specifications to limit the amount of combustible material to the equivalent of 50 gallons of diesel fuel to make sure WCS CISF is bounded. Also, inconsistencies in the application should be fixed or clarified. The NRC staff needs this information to determine that adequate protection is provided to preclude any important to safety material from exceeding safety limits.

3 C.I. 46 000111

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 37 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.44, 72.122(b), and 72.122(c).

RAI TS-6: Clarify which version of ACI-349 is called out in Operating Procedures -

Administrative and Management Control Section 5.1.3.b.iv of the Proposed Technical Specifications.

Based on the context of the information provided in the Proposed Technical Specifications, Administrative Controls Section 5.1.3.b.iv, it appears that the information referenced is an outdated version of ACI-349 (1985 version with the 1990 Revisions). The ACI-349 standard has been revised in 2006 and again in 2013. Note that starting in the 2006 revision, the thermal considerations were moved to Appendix E.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(4).

RAI TS-7: Ensure that Proposed Technical Specifications Section 5.1.3.b.v clearly explains what measurements or other evidence will be used to determine that, off-normal or accident temperature limits for fuel cladding have been exceeded, and what procedures or tests will be used to verify that the canister confinement is maintained.

The Proposed Technical Specifications, Operating Procedures - Administrative and Management Control Section 5.1.3.b.v, include these statements but there is no specific procedure or SAR section referenced.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(b) and (l), 72.120(a) and 72.122(h)(1).

RAI TS-8: Ensure the application provides the appropriate inspection requirements and acceptance criteria in Proposed Technical Specifications Section 5.2.2, Cask Drop, Inspection Requirement, which states, The NUHOMS CANISTER will be inspected for damage after any STC with CANISTER side drop of 15 inches or greater.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(4) and 72.120(a).

Safety Analysis Report (SAR), Chapter 3, Principal Design Criteria RAI 3-1: Clarify the application of ASME NOG-1, "Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Multiple Girder)," to the design of the canister transfer system (CTS).

The design criteria specified for the canister transfer system is inconsistent.

WCS CISF SAR Section 3.2.3.5 states the 1989 edition of ASME NOG-1 [Ref. 3-26] was used for the static design load combinations, while WCS CISF SAR Section 3.2.8.3 indicates that the important-to-safety canister transfer system 4

C.I. 46 000112

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 38 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 load combinations were in accordance with the 2010 edition of ASME NOG-1

[Ref. 3-34].

This information is needed to determine compliance with the 10 CFR 72.24(c)(4).

RAI 3-2: Provide the quality assurance classification and justification for the MP187 and the MP197HB transportation/transfer casks that will be used at the WCS CISF.

WCS CISF SAR Appendices A.3.1.4 and B.3.1.4 identify the MP187 as being qualified for transfer operations and SAR Appendices C.3.1.4 and D.3.1.4 identify the MP197HB as being qualified for transfer operations. WCS CISF SAR Table 7-1: WCS CISF Structures and QA Classification identify the transfer casks as important to safety, but the quality assurance classification of these Structures, Systems, and Components are not included in WCS CISF SAR Table 3-5, Quality Assurance Classification of Structures, Systems, and Components as Utilized at the WCS CISF.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c) and (d).

RAI 3-3: Provide the safety classification and quality assurance classification of the NAC Transfer casks for the transfer of Transportable Storage Canisters (TSCs) for the NAC-MAGNASTOR, NAC-UMS and the NAC-MPC systems.

The WCS CISF SAR Appendices E-G identify NAC Transfer casks for the transfer of TSCs for the NAC-MAGNASTOR, NAC-UMS and the NAC-MPC systems. The safety classification of SSCs for these systems is referenced to the respective UFSARs for these systems in WCS CISF Appendices E-G Section 3.1.2.1, however the transfer cask is not classified as either important to safety or not important to safety in the WCS CISF SAR and the quality assurance classification of these SSCs is not included in WCS CISF SAR Table 3-5, Quality Assurance Classification of Structures, Systems, and Components as Utilized at the WCS CISF.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c) and (d).

RAI 3-4: Clarify the information provided in WCS CISF SAR Section 3.3.7.1, Spent Fuel or High-Level Radioactive Waste Handling and Storage, which states:

A recovery method for the unlikely loss of confinement event is independent of any bare fuel handling facilities.

Provide specific information on the recovery method(s) that will be used for the systems incorporated by reference.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.120(a).

RAI 3-5: Provide the basis to classify the Cask Handling Building (CHB) as an important to safety (ITS) Category C structure in WCS CISF SAR Section 3.4.1, Cask Handling Building Quality Classification.

5 C.I. 46 000113

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 39 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 NUREG/CR-6407, Classification of Transportation Packaging and Dry Spent Fuel Storage System Components Accordance to Importance to Safety, defines ITS Category C as structures, systems and components (SSCs) whose failure or malfunction would not significantly reduce the effectiveness of storage system components and would not be likely to create a situation adversely affecting public health and safety. Category B items are defined as SSCs whose failure or malfunction could indirectly result in a condition adversely affecting public health and safety. Furthermore, the failure of a Category B item, in conjunction with the failure of an additional item, could result in an unsafe condition.

Based on the above definitions, justify the classification of the CHB as an ITS Category C SSC when collapse of the CHB structural members, failure of other structural members such as the overhead cranes, or dropping of other heavy objects under wind and seismic events, could create conditions leading to damage of canisters during transfer operations within the CHB.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122(b)(2)(ii).

RAI 3-6: Revise the discussion in WCS CISF SAR Section 3.2.3.5 to clarify whether the same soil property data presented in WCS CISF SAR Table 7-38 are also being used for WCS CISF SAR Section 7.6.4, Soil Structure Interaction of NUHOMS NITS Storage Pad.

The present SAR discussion covers only the soil property data used for the NAC system storage pad. The SAR Section 3.2.3.5 discussion on the soil properties data should be revised to also cover the NUHOMS NITS Storage Pad.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3),

72.24(d)(1) and (2) and 72.122(b).

RAI 3-7: Clarify the basis or scope supporting classification of the Canister Transfer System (CTS) and Vertical Cask Transporter (VCT) as important to safety (ITS)

Category B systems in WCS CISF SAR Table 3-5, Quality Assurance Classification of Structures, Systems, and Components as Utilized at the WCS CISF.

NUREG/CR-6407, Classification of Transportation Packaging and Dry Spent Fuel Storage System Components Accordance to Importance to Safety, defines ITS Category B as structures, systems and components (SSCs) whose failure or malfunction could indirectly result in a condition adversely affecting public health and safety. Thus, the failure of a Category B item, in conjunction with the failure of an additional item, could result in an unsafe condition. NUREG/CR-6407 defines ITS Category A as SSCs whose failure or malfunction could directly result in a condition adversely affecting public health and safety. Thus, the failure of a single item could cause loss of primary containment leading to release of radioactive material, loss of shielding, or unsafe geometry compromising criticality control.

The CTS and VCT handling systems each contain components, such as certain structural members and special lifting devices, whose failure could cause 6

C.I. 46 000114

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 40 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 canisters loaded with fuel to drop under conditions (i.e., drop heights and overpack configurations) that have not been evaluated to show that primary containment and a safe geometry would be maintained. Therefore, to clarify the classification and scope, either provide an evaluation showing a single component failure within the CTS or VCT handling systems would not directly result in a condition adversely affecting public health and safety to justify classification of the overall systems as ITS Category B or designate portions of the CTS and VCT handling systems as ITS Category A.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122(a).

SAR Chapter 4, Facility Design RAI 4-1: Provide additional information to support the differences between the required tests and maintenance activities described in WCS CISF SAR Section 4.5.1, Transportation Cask Repair and Maintenance Activities, and specific repair and maintenance activities provided in the SARs for each of the systems incorporated by reference. Alternatively, revise WCS CISF SAR Section 4.5.1 and state all maintenance activities for the transportation casks will follow requirements outlined in Chapter 8 of the SARs for the systems incorporated by reference.

The NRC staff notes the following potential inconsistencies between WCS CISF SAR Section 4.5.1 and SARs of the transportation systems incorporated by reference:

  • The NAC STC and NAC-UMST both have quick-disconnect fittings (e.g.,

vent, drain, inner lid interseal test and interlid ports) for which there are required inspections for proper function during each cask loading and unloading operation. See Table 8.2-1 of each SAR. (Section 8.2.4 of the NAC STC and the NAC-UMST SAR). These connectors shall be replaced, as required, and at a minimum of every 2 years. Neither the required inspections nor the periodic replacement are described in the WCS CISF SAR.

  • MP197HB has a structural test in its SAR Section A.8.2.1 and dimensional testing of the trunnions. Neither are described in the WCS CISF SAR.
  • Some transportation systems such as the MP187 and the MP197HB require periodic fastener replacement with frequencies that are based on either time or number of uses. The periodic replacement of these fasteners is not described in the WCS CISF SAR.

Clarify whether this is something other than visual testing (VT) and/or beyond the requirements identified in the Chapter 8 of the transportation SARs for the systems incorporated by reference. The NRC staff notes that the NAC-UMS requires periodic penetrant testing (PT) of trunnions (see NAC-UMST SAR Section 8.2.1).

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.120(a).

7 C.I. 46 000115

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 41 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI 4-2: Describe, or provide a reference to, the testing procedure and the acceptance criteria for Impact Limiter weight tests to detect the absorption of moisture for the NAC-STC and the TN MP197HB. WCS CISF SAR Section 4.5.1 states:

In addition, the impact limiters are inspected to verify that a significant amount of water has not been absorbed and that degradation of the energy absorbing material has not occurred. These inspections are performed by weighing the impact limiter and visual examination of the impact limiters and welds.

Weight testing of impact limiters appears to be used only in the NAC-UMST (NAC-UMST SAR Section 8.2.3) and the MP187 (ADAMS Accession No. ML063520505), which include acceptance criteria. The acceptance tests and maintenance chapters of the SARs for the NAC-STC and the MP197HB do not include testing procedures and acceptance criteria for evaluating the possibility of moisture absorption of the impact limiters. However, the MP197HB does require leak testing of the impact limiters to identify evidence of cracking in the welds (MP197HB SAR Section A.8.2.3.2).

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.120(a).

RAI 4-3: Describe the administrative controls that will be used to ensure the lift height of the NUHOMS transportation cask is maintained at or below 80 inches with respect to the following areas identified in Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612:

  • Definition of safe load paths (How will the operator determine load height?)
  • Procedures (What level of oversight will be provided and what actions will be taken if load exceeds height limit?)
  • Operator training (How will the crane operator and any supervisors be qualified?)
  • Crane inspection, testing, and maintenance (How will proper performance of crane controls be verified?)

The NRC staff found that the specified administrative controls do not provide sufficient information to fully demonstrate conformance with the guidance contained in Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants: Resolution of Generic Technical Activity A-36, because the administrative controls used to maintain that load height were not specified other than by specifying the load height limit in the applicable procedure descriptions in the FSAR. WCS CISF SAR Section 4.7.2 states that the two 130-ton overhead bridge cranes would be provided for transferring loaded NUHOMS fuel canisters within transportation casks from a rail car to the transfer trailer. This section of the WCS CISF SAR also states that the cranes would be administratively controlled to maintain the NUHOMS cask at or below the analyzed 80-inch drop height, and that, as indicated in Section 7.5.3.1 of the WCS CISF SAR, lifts performed by the overhead bridge crane would be governed by the guidance of NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants: Resolution of Generic Technical Activity A-36, to minimize the potential for release of radioactive material from a spent fuel cask.

8 C.I. 46 000116

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 42 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(h).

RAI 4-4: Describe the important-to-safety movement of a NAC fuel canister in its transportation cask from a railcar to the canister transfer system (CTS) and provide drawings of the major structures, systems, and components intended for this function.

The described movement of the NAC canisters from the railcar to the CTS using the vertical cask transporter (VCT) appears inconsistent with provided drawings of the cask handling building (CHB) and VCT. WCS CISF SAR Section 4.7.4, NAC Cask Transfer System, describes that the VCT is used to unload the NAC transportation casks from the railcar in the following manner:

After the transportation cask has been received, including removal of the impact limiters, the VCT is driven over, essentially straddling the railcar, and is positioned to engage the transportation cask upper trunnions. The VCT then raises and moves towards the rear of the cask to raise and lift the transportation cask from the railcar. The VCT then lowers the transportation cask to 3-6 off the ground. The railcar is removed from the unloading area and the VCT moves the cask to the CTS. The VCT is shown in Figure 4-4.

WCS CISF SAR Section 7.5.2, Vertical Cask Transporter (VCT), describes that the VCT lift removing the transportation cask for vertical storage cask systems from the railcar within the CHB is considered important to safety. However, WCS CISF SAR Figure 4-4 [Proprietary] depicts a mobile, hydraulic gantry hoist with less than a 5-foot hoist range, which is insufficient to upright a transportation cask that is over 15-feet in height from a horizontal position. Furthermore, Figure 1-7, Cask Handling Building Plan, and Figure 1-8, Cask Handling Building Section View, depict train rails traversing the entire CHB with the rails approximately at the finish grade of the CHB floor, which appears to preclude positioning the U-shaped VCT frame depicted in Figure 4-4 such that it can move over the railcar towards the rear of the cask.

This information is needed to determine compliance with the 10 CFR 72.24(d).

RAI 4-5: Revise WCS CISF SAR Section 4.4.1, Equipment Decontamination to: 1) define the term weeping, and 2) address decontamination of the interior of transportation packages and transfer casks.

WCS CISF SAR Section 4.4.1 states the only radioactive wastes are solid wastes generated from residual quantities of radioactive contamination that may be encountered on the surfaces of the transportation casks due to weeping. It is not clear what the applicant means by the term weeping. Additionally, WCS CISF SAR Section 4.4.1 discusses decontamination of the exterior of incoming transportation packages, but does not discuss decontamination of the interior surfaces of transportation packages or transfer casks after removing spent fuel canisters. These decontamination activities could be a significant contributor to solid decontamination waste, and should be discussed in this section.

9 C.I. 46 000117

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 43 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.126.

RAI 4-6: Revise WCS CISF SAR Section 4.5, Transportation Casks and Associated Components, discussion regarding the transportation casks design for protecting the canisters from the effects of environmental conditions, natural phenomena, and accidents.

The spent fuel transportation casks, which are designed in accordance with the 10 CFR Part 71 requirements, do not specifically address the effects of environmental conditions, natural phenomena, and accidents associated with 10 CFR 72.122(b) provisions. As such, the basis for citing the transportation cask evaluation results to address broadly the canister storage operation at WCS ICSF is unclear.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and 72.24(d)(1) and (2).

SAR Chapter 5, Operational Systems & Procedures RAI 5-1: Describe how the air-powered chain hoist used as part of the Canister Transfer System (CTS) satisfies the single-failure-proof criteria of NUREG-0612. The response should specify the degree of conformance with ASME NUM-1, Rules for Construction of Cranes, Monorails, and Hoists (with Bridge or Trolley or Hoist of the Underhung Type), criteria for Type IA or IB hoists, and, if compared to the Type IB criteria, justify the lack of redundant torque transfer mechanisms between the braking device and the chain considering the effects of fatigue and wear over the course of the facilitys operations.

WCS CISF SAR Section 5.2.1.3.2, Safety Features, states:

The CTS fully meets the single-failure-proof criteria of NUREG-0612

[5-4], providing a combination of fail-safe features and redundant design factors, as well as structures designed to the criteria of ASME NOG-1 for compliance with NUREG-0554 for single-failure-proof critical load handling. Additionally, failure modes and effect analyses (FMEA) have been performed to further demonstrate the design adequacy.

As described in WCS CISF SAR Section 7.5.1, Canister Transfer System, the CTS includes an air-powered chain hoist for transfer of NAC fuel canisters from the transportation to the storage casks. The chain hoist is described as having a single disc brake of 200% design capacity and inherent air-motor braking acting through the gear train, but the NUREG-0612 criteria specify redundant holding brakes acting via redundant gear trains. Therefore, the described design does not appear to fully satisfy the single-failure-proof criteria of NUREG-0612.

This information is needed in order to confirm compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(4).

10 C.I. 46 000118

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 44 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 SAR Chapter 7, Installation Design and Structural Evaluation RAI 7-1: Specify how the cask handling building (CHB) overhead crane design combines seismic loadings with normal loadings (e.g., CMAA #70, Specifications for Top Running Bridge & Gantry Type Multiple Girder Electric Overhead Travelling Cranes, with discussion of how seismic loading is incorporated or an appropriate alternative standard such as the design criteria for a Type II crane as defined in ASME NOG-1), and justify the not-important-to-safety (NITS) classification of the crane structure exclusive of the seismic clips and runway beams.

The design measures necessary to ensure the crane structure itself can withstand design seismic loading must be specified to verify the crane structure would not fall and damage important-to-safety (ITS) equipment per 10 CFR 72.122(b). WCS CISF SAR Section 7.5.3.1 states the following regarding seismic design of the overhead bridge cranes:

The overhead bridge cranes are classified as [NITS] and are designed in accordance with ANSI B30.2, Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Single or Multiple Girder, Top Running Trolley Hoist). The overhead bridge cranes rails are attached to the CHB structure in a manner that provides adequate assurance that the rails will remain attached to the CHB structure during the above-described seismic event. Seismic clips are provided on the overhead crane bridge trucks and trolley to limit uplift during a seismic event, thereby eliminating the potential for the bridge or trolley to fall onto loaded casks inside the CHB.

Also, WCS CISF SAR Section 3.4.1 states:

The 130-ton overhead crane and associated NUHOMS MP197HB and MP187 Casks Lift Beam Assembly are NITS because the NUHOMS cask and canister are not lifted above the Technical Specifications [3-1] height limits. The building structure (structural steel and column foundations) is classified as ITS, Category C to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 72.122(b)(2)(ii) [3-23] and to prevent massive building collapse onto cask systems and related ITS SSCs. The overhead crane bridge trucks and trolley seismic clips are ITS.

WCS CISF SAR Section 7.5.3.7, Structural Analysis and Design, describes how the loadings on the crane runway beams were established, but not the loadings on the crane structure itself.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122(b)(2)(ii).

11 C.I. 46 000119

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 45 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI 7-2: Describe the inspection and maintenance programs associated with the Canister Transfer System (CTS), including the air-powered chain hoist and the hydraulic jacking tower components.

WCS CISF SAR Section 7.5.1.13, Maintenance, addresses maintenance and inspection of CTS components. However, the guidance in NUREG-0612, Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants, specifies inspection, testing, and maintenance to a specific consensus standard for overhead cranes, and the specified actions do not fully correspond with those included in the applicable consensus standards for hydraulic gantries and chain hoists in the ASME B30 series, Safety Standard for Cableways, Cranes, Derricks, Hoists, Hooks, Jacks, and Slings.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(n).

RAI 7-3: Make appropriate adjustments to the SASSI model to account for concrete cracking to ensure consistency with the GTSTRUDL model. Report these findings in WCS CISF SAR Section 7.6.1.5 and/or other appropriate sections of the WCS CISF SAR.

In the GTSTRUDL model used to evaluate all of the load combinations, the concrete pad flexural stiffness is reduced by 50% to account for concrete cracking. However, in the SASSI soil structure interaction (SSI) model the concrete pad is considered to be uncracked and the flexural stiffness is not reduced (ENERCON CALC NO. NAC004-CALC-04, Rev. 1, "Soil Structure Interaction Analysis of ISFSI Concrete Pad at Andrews, TX," Page 34). In the load combinations, safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) occurs with Dealload (D) and Liveload (L). If the concrete pad is cracked under D and L, then it must be cracked under SSE. The GTSTRUDL and SASSI models must be consistent in their assumptions regarding concrete cracking. In the SSI analysis it is conservative to consider the concrete cracked. Had the concrete been considered cracked, it is estimated that the acceleration at the center of gravity of the cask would be higher by approximately 10%. (

Reference:

G. Bjorkman, "Influence of ISFSI Design Parameters on the Seismic Response of Dry Storage Casks," PATRAM 2010, London.)

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24 (d)(2).

RAI 7-4: Ensure the soil springs in the GTSTRUDL model reflect the behavior of the storage pad under applied loads. Make any changes to WCS CISF SAR Section 7.6.1.5 and/or other appropriate sections of the WCS CISF SAR.

In WCS CISF SAR Section 7.6.1.5, subheading "Nonlinear Soil Springs" it states:

Nonlinear (compression only) springs are included at each storage pad node using the GTSTRUDL function.... The GTSTRUDL command uses the user input soil stiffness... combined with the tributary area from each node's connecting element(s) to compute a spring stiffness in force per unit length.

12 C.I. 46 000120

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 46 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 The resulting soil springs are uncoupled and are commonly referred to as a "Winkler" foundation (M. Hetenyi, "Beams on Elastic Foundation," University of Michigan Press, 1946; and J. Bowles, "Foundation Analysis and Design,"

McGraw-Hill, Fourth Edition, 1988). Because of the way the soil spring stiffness is calculated, a uniformly distributed load applied to the storage pad will produce a uniform downward displacement everywhere. By contrast, if the storage pad were placed on an elastic half-space and a uniform load were applied, the displacement would not be uniform but concave downward, which is in agreement with measured test results (Bowles, 1988). One way to account for this using a Winkler foundation is to double the stiffness of the soil springs at and near the edges of the pad (Bowles, 1988).

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24 (d)(2).

RAI 7-5: In WCS CISF SAR Sections 7.6.1.4 and 7.6.5.3, clarify whether differential settlement was included with dead load in certain load combinations.

ACI 349 requires that differential settlement be included with dead load in certain load combinations. Specify in which of the load combinations listed on pages 7-48 and 7-91 of the WCS CISF SAR was differential settlement included with dead load.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3).

RAI 7-6: Provide a full description of the cask model and how it is connected to the pad to supplement the discussion in SAR Section 7.6.1.5.

With respect to the GTSTRUDL model discussed on page 7-49 of the WCS CISF SAR, it states that "Rigid members are used to locate the cask center of gravity in the model." Additional information is needed to describe the cask model and how it is connected to the pad.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3).

RAI 7-7: In WCS CISF SAR Sections 7.6.4.2 and 7.6.5.1, explain whether the concrete pad is assumed to be cracked or uncracked in the structural and SSI analyses.

Based on the value of Young's modulus used in the structural analysis and the SSI analysis, it appears that the concrete pad is considered to be uncracked. If this is correct, please explain the basis for this assumption.

This information is needed to determine compliance with and 72.24 (c) (d).

RAI 7-8: With respect to WCS CISF SAR Section 7.6.5.4, provide the proprietary settlement calculations for the NUHOMS storage pad for staff review.

Without reviewing the storage pad settlement calculations, the staff is unable to make a safety finding.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(d)(2).

13 C.I. 46 000121

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 47 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI 7-9: Provide the basis for the assumption in WCS CISF SAR Section 7.5.3.2 that an administrative control will be adequate to prevent failures of structural members and potential collapse of overhead cranes onto canisters during receipt, transfer, storage, and retrieval operations for the spent nuclear fuel and GTCC waste within the CHB.

The NRC staff needs additional information to determine the effectiveness of the administrative control to prevent failures leading to a reduction of storage cask system effectiveness. The evaluation of the effectiveness of this administrative control should consider factors such as time available to take mitigative actions because of an inclement weather watch/warning or other notification; estimated time to complete activities to place systems in a safe configuration; estimates of the tornado strike probabilities and maximum wind speeds for the site; and the capability of SNF transportation, transfer, and storage cask systems to withstand tornado missile impacts.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122(b)(2)(i) and (ii).

RAI 7-10: Pertaining to the seismic loads information in WCS CISF SAR Section 7.5.3.2, Design Analysis: (1) Provide the basis to use IBC/ASCE 7 default response spectra for the seismic loads of the CHB rather than the site-specific response spectra developed from the Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Evaluation described in WCS CISF SAR Chapter 2; and (2) Provide a comparison of the IBC/ASCE 7 default spectrum with the site-specific uniform hazard spectrum at 2% probability of exceedance in 50 years. Define the soil classification used for the soil amplification factor coefficients in order to reach the conclusion that the site could be classified as Seismic Design Category C.

The NRC staff needs additional justification on the applicability of the International Building Code (IBC) as the seismic design criteria for the CHB.

Standards such as the ASCE 4 establish criteria for nuclear facilities and provide facilities such as the CHB with design methods that result in a lower probability of unacceptable seismic performance than conventional facilities.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122(b)(2)(i) and (ii).

RAI 7-11: Provide the basis for the use of the IBC load combinations and ACI 318 in WCS CISF SAR, Section 7.5.3.2.1, Reinforced Concrete Load Combinations for the design of reinforced concrete members of the CHB, which is an ITS structure.

NUREG-1567 Section 5.4.4, Other SSCs Important to Safety, references ANSI 57.9 standards. The standards referenced on load combinations and design limits are in line with those for nuclear facilities such as ACI 349. Further justification is needed on the applicability of the IBC and ACI 318 for the design of reinforced concrete members of the CHB.

This is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122(b)(2)(i) and (ii).

14 C.I. 46 000122

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 48 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI 7-12: Provide a report for the design of the CHB that, at a minimum, includes the following: (1) the dimensions of all sections that have a structural role including locations, sizes, configuration, and spacing, (2) structural materials with defining standards or specifications, (3) location and specifications for assembly, and (4) fabrication codes and standards.

WCS CISF SAR Section 7.5.3.7, Structural Analysis and Design, states that the CHB will be designed using static analysis methods for the determination of forces and moments on structural steel members from service loading conditions and dynamic methods for loading conditions involving seismic loads. The application, however, provides no additional information that would allow the staff to review the design of the CHB consistent with the guidance in Section 5.5.4 of NUREG-1567.

The report provided should include descriptions of the design method used, computer models used, and information on the application of the structural analysis methods used to determine the capacity of the CHB for service and natural phenomena loads. In addition, clarify if the modal response spectrum analysis will be the dynamic method used for the evaluation of seismic loads of the CHB.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122(b)(2)(ii).

RAI 7-13: Revise WCS CISF SAR Section 7, Installation Design and Structural Evaluation, to add Concrete Casks (e.g., CC1 through CC4) to the item 2 description for the NAC MAGNASTOR storage cask system on WCS CISF SAR page 7-1. Alternately, provide an appropriate SAR note for generic use of the terminology, Vertical Concrete Cask (VCC), to also cover the MAGNASTOR overpacks, CC1 through CC4.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and 72.24(d)(1) and (2).

RAI 7-14: Revise the WCS CISF SAR page 7-3 statement, No new analyses are required for the NAC storage system, to recognize that a seismic reconciliation soil-structure interaction analysis is performed in SAR Section 7.6.3, Soil Structure Interaction of the VCC Storage Pad, to demonstrate seismic stability of the VCCs using the site-specific design basis earthquake motions.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3),

72.24(d)(1) and (2) and 72.122(b).

RAI 7-15: Provide the basis for the use of the International Building Code (IBC) as stated in WCS CISF SAR Section 7.5.3.2, Design Analysis to determine the design earthquake loads for the Cask Handling Building, which is an important to safety structure.

NUREG-1567, Section 5.4.4, Other SSCs Important to Safety, references ANSI 57.9 standards. The standards on earthquake loading follow references that are in line with those for nuclear facilities. The use of codes and standards such as the IBC appear in NUREG-1567, Section 5.4.5, Other SSCs, which invokes 15 C.I. 46 000123

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 49 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 commercial building codes for the design of Non-ITS SSCs, including load combinations.

The NRC staff needs additional justification on the applicability of the IBC as the seismic design criteria for the CHB. Standards such as ASCE 4 establish criteria for nuclear facilities. This code also provides analysis methods for facilities such as the CHB with design methods that result in a lower probability of unacceptable seismic performance than conventional facilities.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122(b)(2)(i) and (ii).

SAR Chapter 8, Thermal Evaluation RAI 8-1: Provide bounding site specific ambient temperatures which account for seasonal variations.

Seasonal variations must be accounted for as ambient temperatures may persist for periods of time sufficient for the cask systems to reach steady state conditions, which may differ from the use of an annual average, as analyzed in the respective FSARs.

The applicant has not clearly defined an ambient temperature which considers seasonal variations. According to the monthly averaged values provided, Table 1-2 of the license application seems to provide a value that bounds seasonal variations. The applicant needs to clearly state how a bounding site-specific ambient temperature which considers seasonal variations is obtained.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122 and 72.128.

RAI 8-2: Provide thermal evaluation, analysis, and results to demonstrate that all cask systems meet the WCS CISF site specific environmental conditions.

WCS CISF SAR Appendices A.8, B.8, C.8, and D.8 of the application provide a normal ambient temperature design criteria for the NUHOMS-MP187, Standardized Advanced NUHOMS, Standardized NUHOMS-61BT, and Standardized NUHOMS-61BTH Type 1 cask systems, respectively.

Appendices E.8, F.8, and G.8 of the application state that for the NAC-MPC, NAC-UMS, and MAGNASTOR, the maximum average yearly temperatures allowed are 75°F, 76°F, and 76°F, respectively. A definition of normal ambient temperature for the site is not clear in the application but according to the monthly averaged values provided (mean monthly temperature of 81.5°F

[considering seasonal variations] on SAR Table 2-2, Summary of Maximum and Minimum Temperatures for Andrews, TX, Period of Record: 1962 to 2010), SAR Table 1-2 would provide a value that seems to bound seasonal variations and the value seems to bound storage systems described in Appendices A-D of the application; however, Table 1-2 is not bounded by the systems described in Appendices E.8, F.8, and G.8. Therefore, a thermal evaluation is needed for these systems based on the normal ambient temperature presented in Table 1-2.

16 C.I. 46 000124

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 50 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 The NRC staff needs this information to verify that no thermal limits are exceeded for any of the cask systems stored at WCS CISF.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122 and 72.128.

SAR Chapter 9, Radiation Protection RAI 9-1: Ensure that the shielding analysis in the WCS CISF SAR Section 9.4, Estimated On-Site Collective Dose Assessment, includes the appropriate information specifying the neutron and gamma cross section libraries used to determine off site dose rates.

Both NAC Analysis 30039-5001, Rev. 0, and Areva Calculation WCS01-0503, Rev. 0, specify which version of MCNP is used for each part of the dose rate analysis, but do not specify which neutron and gamma cross section libraries are used. The WCS CISF SAR should include this information.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.104 and 72.106, and 10 CFR 20.1201 and 20.1301.

RAI 9-2: Ensure that the WCS CISF SAR includes the appropriate written policy that states managements commitment to maintain exposures to workers and the public As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) levels and addresses both facility design and operations. Consistent with 10 CFR 20.1101, the policy should include the following provisions as set forth in NUREG-1567, section 11.4.1.1.:

  • No practice involving radiation exposure will be undertaken unless evaluation of the practice demonstrates that its use will produce a net benefit to society.
  • All exposures will be kept ALARA, with technological, economic, and social factors considered.
  • Individual dose limits will be established that are appropriate for practices involving radiation exposure, and exposures to individuals will not exceed these limits.
  • Supervisors will integrate appropriate radiation protection controls into all work activities.
  • Workers will be appropriately instructed in the objectives and implementation of the ALARA program, with this information included in training modules.
  • There will be strict compliance with all regulatory requirements and license conditions regarding procedures, radiation exposures, and releases of radioactive materials.
  • A comprehensive program will be maintained, and periodically evaluated, to ensure that both individual and collective doses meet ALARA objectives and do not exceed acceptable levels.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 20.1101.

17 C.I. 46 000125

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 51 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI 9-3: Ensure that WCS CISF SAR Section 9.6.2.4, Environmental Monitoring, includes appropriate details on the facility Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP).

WCS CISF SAR Section 9.6.2.4 provides minimal details about the REMP for the WCS facility. The NRC staff needs to evaluate details, including: 1) number of samples; 2) sample locations; 3) collection frequency; 4) sample analysis to be performed; and 5) sample analysis frequency. The SAR should also include a map of suitable scale that identifies the sampling locations to show distance and direction of monitoring stations, with release points and relevant boundaries (e.g.,

controlled area boundary, site boundary) also indicated on the map. Additionally, the WCS CISF SAR description of the REMP should include the approach for determining background levels and the contribution of the facilitys incremental releases to background levels. The WCS CISF SAR should include the results of the background level determination.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.104.

RAI 9-4: Ensure the WCS CISF SAR Section 9.6.2.4 includes information clearly stating how neutron doses will be determined at the Owner Controlled Area (OCA) boundary dosimeter locations.

WCS CISF SAR Section 9.6.2.4 states that the Landauer Inlight Environmental X9 (beta/photon) dosimeter will be used for the perimeter environmental monitoring program. As neutrons will represent some fraction of OCA boundary dose, and the referenced dosimeter does not detect neutrons, it is not clear how the neutron component of the dose will be determined.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.104.

RAI 9-5: Ensure that WCS CISF SAR Section 9.5.2 includes appropriate information on radiation detection equipment and instrumentation to be used at the WCS CISF.

WCS CISF SAR Section 9.5.2 provides information on the radiation protection facilities at WCS, but only limited information on the radiation detection equipment and instrumentation to be used. The SAR should include information regarding the operational sensitivity and range, and frequency and methods of calibration for all of the equipment and instrumentation identified in the SAR.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 20.1501(c).

RAI 9-6: Ensure that WCS CISF SAR Section 9 includes appropriate information about the facility health physics program.

Table 10A-2 of Draft NUREG-2215, Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems and Facilities, contains a list of program elements expected to be included as part of a facility health physics program. Many of these elements are included in various sections of the SAR. However, several elements are missing, including:

18 C.I. 46 000126

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 52 Date Filed: 05/16/2022

  • Requirements for initial and refresher radiation protection training, contents (topics), and health physics-related qualification of workers;
  • Provisions to inform female workers of fetal protection requirements, to monitor fetal dose, and to provide alternatives to minimize fetal dose;
  • Requirements and procedures for calibration, maintenance, and care of radiation detection, monitoring, and dosimetry instruments and records; and
  • Preparing of reports and records for health physics program contents and audits, surveys, calibrations, and personnel monitoring results.

The description of the health physics program in the SAR should be revised to include these elements or justification should be provided for the alternative proposed.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 20.1208, 20.1501(b), 20.1501(c) and (d), 20.2103, and 10 CFR Part 20 Subparts L and M.

RAI 9-7: Ensure that WCS CISF SAR Section 9.1.2 clearly provides what is meant by, remote inspection of storage overpack vents for blockage.

This statement appears on WCS CISF SAR Page 9-5 as part of a discussion of measures to minimize dose to WCS personnel by avoiding the need to perform daily walkdowns near the storage casks. It is not clear how remote vent inspection would be accomplished, and such inspections are not discussed further in the SAR. The SAR should be revised to clarify remote inspections, this verbiage should be removed from Section 9.1.2, or justification should be provided for the proposed alternative approach.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 20.1101(b).

RAI 9-8: Address an apparent typographical error in WCS CISF SAR Section 9.3.2.1, Controlled Area.

The third paragraph of WCS CISF SAR Section 9.3.2.1 starts with the sentence:

ISP will establish access controls to ensure that unauthorized access inside the OCA and the PA. This sentence is incomplete and should be clarified.

RAI 9-9: Ensure that all the collective dose estimates from transportation and storage cask operations in the WCS CISF SAR Appendices are provided so that all operating procedure steps that could expose personnel are included.

It is not clear that all operating procedure steps that could expose personnel to radiation are captured in the collective dose estimates in WCS CISF SAR Sections A.9, B.9, C.9, D.9, E.9, F.9, and G.9. For example, inspection of Table B.9-2 indicates that step 11 for installing the cask shear key plug assembly, and steps 13 and 14 for sampling and leak testing the transportation package, are not reflected in the dose estimate. Similarly, Table B.9-3 does not include steps for removing the AHSM door, ensuring vents are clear of debris, and lubrication of support rails. All of these steps involve personnel close to a loaded transportation package or storage overpack, and should be reflected in the collective dose assessment. The applicant should ensure that all of the collective 19 C.I. 46 000127

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 53 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 dose assessments from the cited Appendixes accurately reflect the operating procedures for the various cask systems.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 20.1101(b).

RAI 9-10: Ensure that the collective dose estimates from transportation and storage cask operations in the WCS CISF SAR Appendices are provided so that all the cited distances and dose rates are appropriate for the specific operating step, and that the total dose calculations are correct.

It is not clear that all cited distances and dose rates for each operating step, and total dose calculations, are correct for the collective dose assessments in WCS CISF SAR Sections A.9, B.9, C.9, D.9, E.9, F.9, and G.9 of the WCS CISF SAR.

For example, inspection of Table G.9-1 indicates the following inconsistencies:

  • For the process step Perform radiation and contamination survey of MAGNATRAN Cask, the table indicates a worker distance of greater than two meters. It is not clear how personnel would be able to decontaminate the transportation package from that distance.
  • For process steps Inspect top impact limiter security seal and verify it is intact and correct ID, and Remove Personnel Barrier and complete surveys, it appears that the dose calculations are incorrect. For the first step, one person working for 15 minutes in a dose field of 20 millirem per hour should be five millirem total, instead of the table reading of one. For the second step, two people working for 30 minutes in a 20 millirem per hour dose field should equate to 20 millirem total, instead of the table reading of 32.
  • For the process step [Using VCT, move empty MAGNASTOR VCC to transfer position in CTF and set down adjacent to MAGNATRAN cask. Set up appropriate work platforms/man lifts for access to top of VCC and MAGNATRAN], the table indicates a distance of greater than two meters, and an associated dose rate of zero millirem per hour. Personnel will need to be closer than two meters to the MAGNATRAN package to set up work platforms around it, and other activities in the table list non-zero values for estimated dose for similar distances.
  • The process steps [Remove vent port cover and connect pressure test system to vent port to check for excessive pressure. If pressure is high, take sample and check. If clean vent to HEPA filter], and [Remove 48 MAGNATRAN lid bolts, install alignment pins and lid lifting hoist rings/slings and remove inner lid and store. Remove alignment pins], both cite worker distances of half a meter. However, the table cites different dose fields for the same distance (50 millirem per hour for the first step, and 30 millirem per hour for the second).

These inconsistencies, and any others in the collective dose estimates of WCS CISF SAR Sections A.9, B.9, C.9, D.9, E.9, F.9, and G.9 of the WCS CISF SAR, should be revised or justified.

20 C.I. 46 000128

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 54 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 20.1101(b).

SAR Chapter 11 Confinement Evaluation RAI 11-1: Provide information on corrective actions that would be taken if leak testing does not meet acceptance criteria for the post transportation leakage testing performed at the WCS CISF.

In response to RSI P-9-1, Description of actions that will be taken if a leakage rate test does not meet the acceptance criterion in a post transport package evaluation, the applicant stated: Although the procedure does not specify what actions will be taken should testing fail to satisfy an acceptance criterion, the Quality Assurance program implementing procedure on Test Control dictates that test failure will be managed through the corrective program. This will be defined within operational test procedures prior to implementation.

To enable the NRC staff to assess the corrective actions taken at the WCS CISF, the applicant should describe in detail the corrective actions taken for each type of cask system to ensure that the confinement safety is maintained..

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(e) and (l).

RAI 11-2: Provide (a) a limit for the release of radioactive gas (volume) for the gas sampling performed for each of the canister types to be received at the WCS CISF and (b) guidance to prevent/minimize risks caused by the release of radioactive gas during gas sampling, taking into account ALARA concerns.

In its response to RSI 9.4, the applicant stated that the likelihood of releasing radioactive gases during post-transport sampling is small because canisters are seal welded and tested to assure compliance with the leaktight standard of ANSI N14.5 or equivalent. The exceptions to this are FO-, FC- and FF-DSCs that were leak-tested to a leakage rate of 10-5 ref-cm3/sec.

Even though the likelihood of the release of radioactive gases is small, the applicant should provide the limit on the volume of radioactive gas to be released for each of the canister types received at the WCS CISF and guidance to prevent/minimize risk caused by the releasing radioactive gases during gas sampling, taking into account ALARA concerns.

This information is needed to determine compliance with10 CFR 72.24(e).

RAI 11-3: Explain the gas sampling process in sufficient detail to demonstrate that gas sampling would be appropriately performed during post-transportation verification of canisters received at the WCS CISF.

The applicant proposed License Condition No. 22, which would provide that Prior to removing the shipping cask closure lid, the gas inside the shipping cask 21 C.I. 46 000129

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 55 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 shall be sampled to verify that the canister confinement boundary is intact to the extent reasonably practicable by this test.

However, a description of the gas sampling process is not provided in the application (e.g., QP-10.02) and the applicant did not describe:

(a) Whether gas sampling would be performed for each canister or just a certain number of the bounding canisters from each site of origin. The applicant should clarify whether the canister selection basis for post-transportation verification described in Section 5.2 of QP-10.02 is applicable to gas sampling; (b) What rationale is used for not performing sampling for all canisters received at the WCS CISF; (c) The acceptance criteria (e.g., gas volume/concentration) for gas sampling performed on the canisters received at the WCS CISF.

This information is needed to determine compliance with10 CFR 72.24(e) and 72.44(c)(1)(i).

RAI 11-4: Provide a deadline by which to return a canister to the place of origin, or other facility licensed to perform fuel loading procedures, in License Application, Appendix A, Proposed Technical Specifications., if the canister does not pass the gas sampling testing and the post-transportation leakage testing acceptance criterion and therefore cannot be stored at the WCS CISF. If a deadline is not specified, the application should discuss how storage of such canisters is considered and accounted for in the sites safety analyses (e.g. normal and accident doses due to confinement and shielding, thermal time limits) and operating procedures.

The applicant needs to provide the information for each type of canister or each type of cask system used at the WCS CISF.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(g) and 72.44(c)(1).

SAR Chapter 12, Accident Analysis RAI 12-1: Provide a conclusion for the fire and explosion analysis in WCS CISF SAR Appendix A.12.2.5.

State whether the analysis in the Rancho Seco SAR Section 8.2.5, Fire is the same or bounding for the WCS site.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122 (c).

RAI 12-2: Provide accident analysis for the GTCC systems that address drop accidents, floods, lightning, tornado and wind missiles, and tip over for the NAC GTCC systems.

22 C.I. 46 000130

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 56 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 WCS CISF SAR Appendix H.8 addresses earthquakes and fire/explosion, but none of the other accidents listed are analyzed for the GTCC systems.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122(b).

RAI 12-3: Provide a technical basis for the offsite explosion analysis and explain why the 1,660 feet criteria is applicable for the operations at the quarry.

The analysis in WCS CISF SAR Section 12.2.2, Offsite Accident Analysis, appears to utilize the analysis for a truck transport on a highway using the guidance from Regulatory Guide 1.91. Provide additional information to support that the material limit of 50,000 lbs used in the accident analysis is applicable to the quarry operation located northwest of the facility. In addition, provide information to support the assessment for potential future quarry operations in the area.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122(b), (c) and (e).

RAI 12-4: Provide the following information for the gasoline, diesel, and propane tanks located on the Waste Control Specialists commercial waste disposal facility identified in WCS CISF SAR Section 12.2.2:

1. The distance between the proposed WCS CISF and the propane tanks and provide an analysis to support the conclusion that an accident involving these storage tanks would not impact the proposed WCS CISF. WCS CISF SAR Section 12.2.2 states that there are a number of gasoline, diesel and propane tanks located on the Waste Control Specialists commercial waste disposal facility. The location of each gasoline and diesel tank is provided and all gasoline and diesel tanks are greater than 1,660 feet from the proposed ISFSI and none of the locations have quantities that would create overpressures in excess of 1 psi at the CISF. The location of the propane storage tanks with respect to the CISF are not provided.
2. Indicate whether the analysis of the offsite accidents of the propane, gasoline and diesel storage tanks includes an assessment of the combined explosion overpressures of multiple storage tanks that are collocated at the Waste Control Specialists commercial waste disposal facility. WCS CISF SAR Section 12.2.2 states that there are a number of gasoline, diesel and propane tanks located on the Waste Control Specialists commercial waste disposal facility. The location of each gasoline and diesel tank is provided and all gasoline and diesel tanks are greater than 1660 feet from the proposed ISFSI and none of the locations have quantities that would create overpressures in excess of 1 psi at the CISF. However, it is not clear from the SAR whether the analysis considers the overpressure from a single tank explosion or the possible combined explosions of collocated tanks such as the 5,000 gallon gasoline tank and the 8,000 gallon diesel tank located 4,732 feet from the proposed CISF.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.122(b), (c) and (e).

23 C.I. 46 000131

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 57 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 SAR Chapter 13, Conduct of Operations RAI 13-1: SAR Section 13.2 provides a general high-level description of the program covering preoperational testing prior to the on-site receipt of SNF and the types of tests that will be performed and that the system for preparing, reviewing, approving, and implementing testing procedures and instructions for WCS CISF operations will be in accordance with written procedures. However, additional information is needed.

Provide specific test information, including type of test, expected response, acceptable margins of difference, method of validation, and corrective actions for unexpected or unacceptable results, or provide the Pre-operational Test Plan for operations, transfer operations, and overpack loading and retrieval. Refer to SRP Section 10.4.2.1 for guidance on the information needed.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(p)

RAI 13-2: Provide an operating startup plan that identifies those specific operations involving the initial handling of radioactive material to be placed into storage.

WCS CISF SAR does not appear to include an operating startup plan. NUREG-1567 provides guidance on the elements that should be included in an operating startup plan. The operating startup plan should identify those specific operations involving the initial handling of radioactive material to be placed into storage.

Although procedures to be used for normal operations or during steady-state conditions would not necessarily be included in the operating startup plan, the evaluation of the effectiveness of those procedures should be elements of the operating startup plan. For As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) considerations, as many of the operating startup actions as feasible should be performed during preoperational testing (i.e., before sources of exposure are present).

The operating startup plan should include the following elements:

  • tests and confirmation of procedures and exposure times involving actual radioactive sources (e.g., radiation monitoring, in-pool operations);
  • direct radiation monitoring of casks and shielding for radiation dose rates, streaming, and surface hot-spots;
  • verification of effectiveness of heat removal features; and
  • Documentation of results of tests and evaluations.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(p).

RAI 13-3: Provide TRN-1.1.

WCS CISF SAR Section 13.3 provides general descriptions of training and qualification of personnel. ISP stated WCS CISF personnel shall be trained and qualified in accordance with existing WCS Training Program and that ISP will expand ISP joint venture member Waste Control Specialists existing Training 24 C.I. 46 000132

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 58 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Plan, TRN-1.1, to encompass training for the WCS CISF. In accordance with 10 CFR 72.192, the training program must be submitted to the Commission for approval with the license application.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.28(c) and 10 CFR Part 72, Subpart I.

SAR Appendix A, NUHOMS-MP187 Cask System, RAI A-1: Provide the confinement calculations (e.g., Excel Spreadsheet), documented in WCS CISF SAR Section A.11, in order for the NRC staff to verify that the radionuclide inventory in WCS CISF SAR Table A.11.1, SNF Assembly Activities, an analysis with 24 spent nuclear fuel assemblies per canister, and an analysis with 21 canisters, is bounding for all fuel and GTCC waste in FO-, FC-,

and FF- DSCs.

The applicant provided a new confinement evaluation documented in Section A.11 of the WCS CISF SAR to include all of the isotopes required to meet current standards. The radioactive inventory was determined using the same design basis fuel assemblies that were demonstrated to be bounding in the Rancho Seco ISFSI FSAR, except that updated methods were used to calculate the radionuclide inventories.

The bounding assembly burnup and initial enrichment combinations used for the original analysis remain bounding for the radionuclide inventories regardless of the updated methods used to generate the source term. Therefore, assuming that all 21 canisters containing fuel under the SNM-2510 license are loaded with 24 fuel assemblies, each with the maximum radionuclide inventory for each assembly, the results bound the 21 canisters that are actually loaded.

The applicant should provide the confinement calculations (e.g., Excel Spreadsheet) for purposes of the staffs verification on the applicants confinement evaluation.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.104(a) and 72.106(b).

RAI A-2: Clarify whether the computed air leakage rates shown in WCS CISF SAR Section A.11.3.3, Appendix A, represent the allowable air leakage rate (cm3/sec) or the reference leakage rate (ref-cm3/sec)?

The applicant used the method described in ANSI N14.5 and assumed a leakage hole length to be the size of the weld length (3/16 inches) to compute a hole diameter of 4.7611x10-4 cm for a leakage rate of 1.0 x 10-5 std-cm3/sec, as shown in SAR Section A.11.3.3. The computed air leakage rates, based on ANSI N14.5, are 4.4914 x 10-6, 7.5892 x 10-6, and 2.5413 x 10-5 cm3/sec, respectively, under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions.

The applicant should either revise the unit of the leakage rate from cm3/sec to ref-cm3/sec or convert the allowable leakage rate to the reference leakage rate for clarification. The applicant should use the reference air leakage rate 25 C.I. 46 000133

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 59 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 (medium: air; cavity pressure: 1 atm abs; ambient pressure: 0.01 atm abs; temperature 25°C) as the acceptance criterion for testing as recommended by ANSI N14.5.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 72.24(e).

RAI A-3: Provide a rationale for the statement in WCS CISF SAR Appendix A.7, Structural Evaluation, p. A.7-1, that the canister confinement boundaries are evaluated for Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) for the WCS CISF. On the basis of the rationale, also revise, as appropriate, the last paragraph of page A.7-3 on the need for performing a bounding evaluation in WCS CISF SAR Section A.7.7, Structural Evaluation of Canister Confinement Boundary under Normal conditions of Transport, to demonstrate that the canister confinement boundaries are not adversely impacted by transport to the WCS CISF.

The FO-, FC-, FF- Dry Shielded Canisters (DSCs) should all have been certified for transport as part of the Model NUHOMS MP-187 transportation package (Docket 71-9255) by meeting the 10 CFR Part 71.71 requirements for Normal Conditions of Transport. It is unclear why the canister confinement boundaries need to be re-evaluated for the so-called Normal Conditions of Transport for transport of spent nuclear fuel to the WCS CISF site. However, If the Normal Conditions of Transport are considered to address certain handling and transfer operations upon canister receipt at the site, specifics to these operations must be provided and justified in the SAR for their applicability.

(Note: This request applies similarly to the evaluations proposed in Appendix B, Section B.7.9, Structural Evaluation of 24PT1-DSC Confinement boundary under Normal Conditions of Transport, Section C.7.8, Structural Evaluation of 61BT DSC Confinement Boundary under Normal Conditions of Transport, and Section D.7.8, Structural Evaluation of 61BTH Type 1 DSC Confinement Boundary under Normal Conditions of Transport)

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3),

72.24(d)(1) and (2) and 72.122(b)(1).

RAI A-4: Provide evaluations, as appropriate, to substantiate statements in SAR Section A.7.1, Discussion. At the bottom of page A.7-2, the SAR states:

The evaluation of the MP187 cask as a transfer cask is based on Revision 13 of Drawing NUH-05-4001 (Cask Main Assembly) and Revision 8 of NUH-05-4003 (Cask On-Site Transfer Arrangement), as shown in Volume IV of

[A.7-4]. The current revision of NUH-05-4001 is Revision 15 as shown in Section 1.3.2 of [A.7-7]. There are no significant design differences in the cask main assembly configuration between these two revisions.

The broadbase statement of the above, [T]here are no significant differences in the cask main assembly configuration between these two revisions, lacks clarity for the details through the process of incorporation by reference (IBR). The details addressed in individual revisions, including the design criteria on loads and load combinations and resulting changes in structural performance margins, 26 C.I. 46 000134

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 60 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 should be properly summarized in the SAR for the NRC staff to evaluate the design differences as a basis for making a safety finding.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3),

72.24(d)(1) and (2) and 72.122(b)(1).

SAR Appendix B, Standardized Advanced NUHOMS System RAI B-1: Revise the following statement in WCS CISF SAR Section B.3.3.3, Seismic Design:

This system was designed for very high seismic regions, such as the west coast, and as such the design basis earthquake shown in Figures 2.2-1 and 2.2-2 of reference [B.3-1] for the AHSM easily envelops the enveloping acceleration response spectra at the concrete pad base and HSM center of gravity obtained by the WCS CISF soil-structure interaction (SSI) analysis at all frequencies as demonstrated in Sections B.7.5 and B.7.8. Due to the very low accelerations, the ties between the individual modules and the shear keys used to transfer vertical motions are not required at the WCS CISF.

The NRC staff notes that the AHSM arrays evaluated in WCS CISF SAR Section 7.6.4 are markedly different from those evaluated in the AHSM FSAR. For the previously approved AHSM, the analysis is performed for an assembly of three AHSM modules. For the analyzed assembly, the adjacent modules are tied to each other with module-to-module ties to prevent out-of-phase tipping and module-to-module separation. The analysis indicates that, for the high seismic region, the AHSM row assembly will need 10 feet of space around all sides to accommodate sliding and to facilitate retrievability of the 24PT1-DSC. For the AHSMs at the WCS CISF, where ties between the individual modules and shear keys are removed, the FSAR approved AHSMs (Docket No. 72-1029) are reconfigured. As such, the seismic stability description for the AHSM must be revised considering the site-specific analysis results presented in SAR Section 7.6.4, Soil Structural Interaction of the NUHOMS NIT Storage Pad.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3),

72.24(d)(1) and (2) and 72.122(b)(1)(i).

RAI B-2: Revise the following statement on WCS CISF SAR page B.7-3, Section B.7.1, Discussion and make conforming changes to WCS CISF SAR Section B.7.8 The cask stability evaluations in [B.7-4] use the hypothetical case of the cask as a storage component, and hence in the vertical configuration, as bounding the horizontal configuration in the transfer mode.

The MP-187 in the transfer mode remains horizontal in the transfer trailer. As such, the cask stability and missile penetration evaluation of Section B.7.8 evaluation is the only evaluation that needs to be performed for the MP-187 transfer operation. The word, alternate, of the section title, which also appears throughout, should be removed from Section B.7.8, Alternate Cask Stability and Missile Penetration Evaluation of the MP187 Cask On-Site Transfer Configuration.

27 C.I. 46 000135

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 61 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3),

72.24(d)(1) and (2) and 72.122(b)(1).

RAI B-3: Provide additional information for the WCS CISF SAR Section B.7.4, Structural Analysis of AHSM with a Canister, seismic reconciliation analysis of the AHSM configured for WCS CISF. As a further clarification, also revise the last paragraph on page B.7-7, which states: [T]he stress qualification for AHSM ties and concrete keys is provided in Table 3.3-21 of [B.7-1]

The IBR evaluation of the AHSM uses the component design basis stress analysis results in UFSAR, Revision 6. The 1.5 g horizontal and 1.0 g vertical peak ground accelerations used are significantly higher than those of SAR Section 7.6.4, Soil Structural Interaction of the NUHOMS NTS Storage Pad, which considers the design changes of removing the module-to-module ties and shear keys from the analyzed AHSM configuration. As such, the IBR stress results must clearly be delineated to address both the loading conditions and corresponding structural margins of safety for the AHSM storage system components.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3),

72.24(d)(1) and (2) and 72.122(b)(2)(i).

SAR Appendix C, Standardized NUHOMS-61BT System RAI C-1: Replace the acronym PWR to read BWR in WCS CISF SAR Section C.3.4.2, by noting that the NUHOMS-61BT1 storage system is designed for storing the BWR FAs.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and 72.24(d)(1) and (2).

RAI C-2: Confirm that the IBR citation, Section K.2.3.2, is accurately identified in WCS CISF SAR Section C.3.4.2, Structural, for presenting the principal design criteria for evaluating the DSC confinement structural performance. If it is not the correct citation, please provide appropriate IBR citation(s) to facilitate the staff review of the principal design criteria.

Section K.2.3.2 of the Standardized NUHOMS FSAR appears to address the confinement barrier leak testing only and there is no discussion regarding the confinement boundary structural design criteria.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and 72.24(d)(1) and (2).

RAI C-3: With respect to the WCS CISF SAR Section C.7.7.3.1, Incorporated By Reference (IBR) use of the two FSARs (Rancho Seco, Revision 4 and TN Document NUH-003, Revision 14) to evaluate the MP197HB drop accident, provide an IBR list of the SAR sections, subsections, and paragraphs for identifying the specific analysis attributes and results to facilitate the staff safety review. In addition to Section C.7.7.3.1, Loads, the list should also cover, as 28 C.I. 46 000136

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 62 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 appropriate, other subject areas, including Section C.7.7.3.2, Finite Element Analysis Models, Section C.7.7.3.3, Boundary Conditions, and Section C.7.7.3.4, Stress Analysis Methodology.

The proposed use of the two previously approved SARs covers multiple transfer cask models, including MP 187, OS187, OS197, OS197L, and OS197H. It is unclear how the DSC 61BT was evaluated against the previously approved transfer cask model(s). A detailed IBR list of information is needed to facilitate the staff review of the MP 197HB for transfer operation drop accidents.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3),

72.24(d)(1) and (2) and 72.122(b)(1).

RAI C-4: In WCS CISF SAR Figure C.7-21, Top End Drop Buckling, revise the erroneous abscissa labeling, Time, to read, Deceleration (g), as appropriate to recognize that the canister end drop buckling capability is tracked against the load, in lieu of time increment.

This information is necessary to assure compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and 72.24(d)(1) and (2).

SAR Appendix D, Standardized NUHOMS-61BTH Type 1 System RAI D-1: Provide the calculation package(s) from which the summary discussions can be assessed and reviewed by the staff for the evaluation discussed in WCS CISF SAR Section D.7.3, Seismic Reconciliation of the Canister HSM Model 102, MP197 Cask.

The WCS CISF SAR summary discussion lacks clarity in a number of areas essential for assessing the applicability of analysis assumptions and results. For example, WCS CISF SAR Section D.7.3.1.3 states: [T]he forces and moments for each HSM subcomponent (roof slab, walls, floor slab) are determined for the WCS CISF spectra obtained from the SSI analysis, and then compared to their respective capacities, calculated as described in Section 8.1.1.5.E of [D.7-2].

The comparison is shown in Table D.7-1. Its unclear whether the noted SSI analysis is related to the site-specific analysis of SAR Section 7.6.4, where no HSM concrete subcomponents are explicitly modeled for extracting shear forces and bending moments for developing the data reported in Table D.7-1.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3),

72.24(d)(1) and (2) and 72.122(b)(2)(i).

RAI D-2: Clarify the use of stress ratio, cited in WCS CISF SAR Section D.7.3.1.5.2, Evaluation of Heat Shield, for presenting the Heat Shield stud evaluation methodology and results. To facilitate NRC staff review, also provide calculation package(s) to substantiate the interaction ratio safety margins determination.

The NRC staff notes that the interaction ratio evaluation is generally required of the stud embedment strength qualification, when the studs are subject to concurrent axial, bending, and shear stresses. The use of stress in lieu of interaction ratios suggests that the combined effects of axial, bending, and shear 29 C.I. 46 000137

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 63 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 stresses may not have been considered for evaluating the structural adequacy of the studs. The stress ratio criterion alone is insufficient and is also deviated from that of Section 8.1.1.7 of the FSAR, Revision 14, of Docket No. 1004.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3),

72.24(d)(1) and (2) and 72.122(b)(2)(i).

SAR Appendix E, NAC-MPC RAI E-1: Revise the discussion in WCS CISF SAR Section E.3.1.1.3, Seismic Design, on the seismic response of the NAC-MPC to recognize that the storage pad peak earthquake motions are based on the WCS CISF SAR Section 7.6.3 SSI analysis. On the basis of the SSI analysis results, which show markedly higher accelerations at cask center of gravity than those seismic motions used in the quasi-static analysis to demonstrate cask seismic stability, revise the Section E.3.1.1.3 discussion on the seismic response of the NAC-MPC at the proposed WCS CISF site.

SAR Section E.3.1.1.3 notes that Section 11.2.2 of the NAC-MPC FSAR demonstrates cask seismic stability for the peak pad seismic motion of 0.25 g horizontal and 0.167 g vertical in a quasi-static analysis. These seismic motions are seen markedly lower than those calculated at the cask center of gravity in the site-specific SSI analysis in Section 7.6.3. Section 7.6.3 also notes that cask sliding is likely to occur. Thus, the cask seismic performance discussion should be based on the storage pad seismic motions evaluated in SAR Section 7.6.3 for the WCS CISF site. [Note: This request applies also to Section E.3.2.1.3 for the MPC-LACBWR storage system.]

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c),

72.24(d)(1) and (2), and 72.122(b)(2)(i).

RAI E-2: In WCS CISF SAR Section E.3.1.2, Safety Protection Systems, in addition to those of the NAC-STC FSAR, add to the discussion of the other ITS SSCs to be considered for the WCS CISF safety evaluation. For the other ITS SSCs, also discuss the design description, design criteria, materials used for construction, and structural performance analysis in order to facilitate the staff safety review.

[Note: This request applies also to WCS CISF SAR Section E.3.2.2 for the MPC-LACBWR storage system.]

The ITS SSCs listed in Tables 2.3-1 and 2.3-2 of the NAC-MPC FSAR are those associated primarily with the storage cask system, such as the transportable storage canister and basket, vertical concrete cask, and transfer cask. Safety classification for other ITS SSCs must also be evaluated for the WCS CISF discussed in Section E.4, Operating Systems, NAC-MPC, including the ancillary equipment, adapter plate vertical cask transporter, rigging and slings, and storage pad used for receipt, handling, storage, and retrievability of the canisters.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and 72.24(d)(1) and (2).

30 C.I. 46 000138

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 64 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI E-3: Provide design details for the lifting yoke used for moving the transfer cask in WCS CISF SAR Section E.4.1.3, Transfer Cask.

The lifting yoke as an ancillary component for transfer cask lifting is not part of the design approval review for the NAC-MPC SAR. As such, it must be evaluated for the WCS CISF site. [Note: This request applies also to Section E.4.2.3 for the MPC-LACBWR storage system.]

This information is necessary to assure compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and 72.24(d)(1) and (2).

RAI E-4: Provide safety classifications of the SSCs discussed in WCS CISF SAR Section E.4.1.4, Auxiliary Equipment, for the WCS CISF operation.

Section E.3.1.2, Safety Protection Systems, presents safety classifications for the NAC-MPC storage system focusing only on the cask system components for the general license approval. Auxiliary equipment needed for the site-specific operation is not addressed. As such, safety classification must also be identified for the Auxiliary Equipment used at the WCS CISF site. [Note: The request also applies to Section E.4.2.4 for MPC-LACBWR.]

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and 72.24(d)(1) and (2).

RAI E-5: Revise, as appropriate, the WCS CISF SAR Section E.4.1.4.2, Rigging and Slings, description by identifying the specific rigging attachments and corresponding load paths rating criteria for which the ANSI N14.6, special lifting device, standard applies. [Note: The request also applies to Section E.4.2.4.3 for MPC-LACBWR.]

The staff notes that ANSI N14.6 and NUREG-0612 are cited as the standards for the ITS rigging attachments; however, the rigging attachments cited in the section appear to be of commercial off the shelf items. If the rigging attachments are configured as special lifting devices, they need to be designed, fabricated, operated, tested, inspected, and maintained per the ANSI N14.6 standard accordingly.

This information is necessary to assure compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and 72.24(d)(1) and (2).

RAI E-6: Provide a rationale for the Section E.7.1, Yankee Rowe MPC and Connecticut Yankee MPC, lead paragraph statement:

Finally, bounding evaluations in Section E.7.1.11 are referenced to demonstrate that the confinement boundaries for the Yankee-MPC and CY-MPC canisters do not exceed ASME B&PV Subsection NB Article NB-3200 (Level A allowables) during normal conditions of transport to provide reasonable assurance that the confinement boundary is not adversely impacted by transport to the WCS CISF.

31 C.I. 46 000139

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 65 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 The canister structural performance has already been certified by the NRC for the NCT under Docket 71-9235 and there appears no need to reevaluate the canister confinement boundary further for transport; however, if deemed necessary, revise, as appropriate, the evaluation in WCS CISF SAR Section E.7.1.11, Structural Evaluation of Yankee-MPC and CY-MPC Canister Confinement Boundaries under Normal Conditions of Transport.

The NRC staff notes that WCS CISF SAR Section E.7.1.11 refers to the confinement boundary evaluation of the NAC-STC with canisters as contents.

The NAC-STC package has been certified for meeting the 10 CFR Part 71.71 requirements for Normal Conditions of Transport (Docket 71-7235). As such, its unclear why it is necessary to re-evaluate the canister confinement boundaries for transport of spent nuclear fuel to the WCS site. However, if the Normal Conditions of Transport are considered to address certain handling and transfer operations upon canister receipt at the site, specific descriptions must be provided in the SAR to justify their applicability. [Note: The request also applies to Section E.7.2 and Section E.7.2.11 for LACBWR-MPC.]

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and 72.24(d)(1) and (2).

RAI E-7: Provide for staff review NAC Calculation 30039-2010, Rev 0, Concrete Cask Tip-Over Evaluation WCS, including any computer based analyses input/output files, for the site-specific non-mechanistic tip-over analysis.

The calculation and input/output files are necessary for reviewing the summary discussion of the cask tip-over modeling approach, its implementation, and calculated cask decelerations of Section E.12.1.3, Concrete Cask Non-Mechanistic Tip-Over Analysis. [This request also applies to NAC Calculation 30039-2015, Rev 0, Tip-Over DLF Calculation for WCS, as applied to Section E-12.2.3 for LACBWR MPC].

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c),

72.24(d)(1) and (2), and 72.122(b)(1).

RAI E-8: In WCS CISF SAR Figure E.12-2, CISF Configuration - Finite Element Model Set-Up, (1) clarify the use of the annotations: BAS1E; CAN1E and VCC1E and (2) identify where the liner, as discussed in Section E.12.1.3.7, Boundary Conditions, is being modeled. [This request also applies to Figure E.12-8 and E.12.2.3.7 for LACBWR MPC.]

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c),

72.24(d)(1) and (2), and 72.122(b)(1).

RAI E-9: (a) Identify the locations in WCS CISF SAR Figure E.12-2 for which the peak basket accelerations are calculated for evaluating the dynamic load factor (DLF) effects reported in Table E.12-3, Peak Accelerations and DLF for Yankee Rowe MPC VCC Systems. (b) Provide a sample set of time-history response plots to indicate the time elapsed for which the peak basket accelerations are selected for determining the amplified basket accelerations associated with the short- and 32 C.I. 46 000140

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 66 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 long-pulses. [This request also applies to Figure E.12-8 and Table E.12-7 for LACBWR MPC.]

WCS CISF SAR Table E.12-3 lacks information on whether the short- and long-pulse effects reported are associated with the same basket location. If not calculated for the same basket location, discuss the basis for selecting responses at different basket locations for determining the amplified basket responses.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c),

72.24(d)(1) and (2), and 72.122(b)(1).

RAI E-10: For the short-pulse DLF of 0.75 listed in Table E.12-7, Peak Accelerations and DLF for MPC-LACBWR VCC System, explain why a triangular pulse, which is independent of the basket orientation, is not used for calculating the bounding DLF of 1.52 for the Connecticut Yankee MPC and Yankee Rowe VCC systems.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c),

72.24(d)(1) and (2), and 72.122(b)(1).

SAR Appendix F, NAC-UMS RAI F-1: Revise the NAC-UMS Seismic Ground Motion Design Criteria listed in WCS CISF SAR Table F.3.1,Summary of WCS CISF Principal Design Criteria, which states, [T]he maximum allowable ground acceleration for the NAC-UMS system is 0.26 g horizontal and 0.29 g vertical.

The staff notes that Section 11.2.8 of the NAC-UMS FSAR defines the design basis peak pad seismic motions at 0.26 g and 0.29 g for two orthogonal horizontal components and 2/3 of the horizontal resultant for the vertical.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c),

72.24(d)(1) and (2), and 72.122(b)(1).

RAI F-2: Revise the discussion in WCS CISF SAR Section F.3.1.1.3, Seismic Design, on the seismic stability of the NAC-UMS to recognize that the storage pad peak earthquake motions are based on the WCS CISF SAR Section 7.6.3 SSI analysis. On the basis of the SSI analysis results, which show markedly higher accelerations at cask center of gravity than those seismic motions used in the quasi-static analysis to demonstrate cask seismic stability, revise the last two sentences of Section F.3.1.1.3, which state:

The existing analysis bounds the WCS CISF site pad design limits for accelerations at the top pad surface. Therefore, no further evaluations are required.

SAR Section F.3.1.1.3 notes that Section 11.2.8 of the NAC-UMS FSAR demonstrates cask seismic stability for the peak pad seismic motions of 0.25 g and 0.29 g horizontal components and 2/3 of the horizontal resultant for the vertical in a quasi-static analysis. These seismic storage pad motions are less severe than the ones resulting from the SSI analysis in SAR Section 7.6.3 for the 33 C.I. 46 000141

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 67 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 WCS CISF site. Section 7.6.3 also notes that cask sliding is likely to occur.

Thus, the cask seismic performance discussion needs to be revised based on the storage pad seismic motions evaluated in SAR Section 7.6.3 for the WCS CISF site.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c),

72.24(d)(1) and (2), and 72.122(b)(1).

RAI F-3: Provide design details for the lifting yoke used for moving the transfer cask in WCS CISF SAR Section F.4.1.3, Transfer Cask.

The lifting yoke as an ancillary component for transfer cask lifting is not part of the design approval review for the NAC-UMS SAR. As such, it must be evaluated for the WCS CISF site.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and 72.24(d)(1) and (2).

RAI F-4: Provide safety classifications of the SSCs discussed in WCS CISF SAR Section F.4.1.4, Auxiliary Equipment, for the WCS CISF operation.

Section F.3.1.2, Safety Protection Systems, presents safety classifications for the NAC-UMS storage system focusing only on the cask system components for the general license approval. Auxiliary equipment needed for the site-specific operation is not addressed. As such, safety classification must also be identified for the Auxiliary Equipment used at the WCS CISF site.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and 72.24(d)(1) and (2).

RAI F-5: Provide a rationale for the WCS CISF SAR Section F.7.1, Maine Yankee, lead paragraph statement:

Finally, bounding evaluations in Section F.7.1.11 are referenced to demonstrate that the confinement boundaries for the NAC-UMS canisters do not exceed ASME B&PV Subsection NB Article NB-3200 (Level A allowables) during normal conditions of transport to provide reasonable assurance that the confinement boundary is not adversely impacted by transport to the WCS CISF.

The canister structural performance has already been certified by the NRC for NCT under Docket 71-9270 and there appears no need to reevaluate the canister confinement boundary further for transport; however, if deemed necessary, revise, as appropriate, the evaluation in Section F.7.1.11, Structural Evaluation of NAC-UMS Canister Confinement Boundaries under Normal Conditions of Transport.

The staff notes that Section F.7.1.11 refers to the confinement boundaries evaluation of the NAC-UMS Transport cask canisters as contents. The NAC-UMS package has been certified for meeting the 10 CFR Part 71.71 requirements for Normal Conditions of Transport (Docket 71-7290). As such, its 34 C.I. 46 000142

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 68 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 unclear why it is necessary to evaluate the canister confinement boundaries for transport of spent nuclear fuel to the WCS site. However, if the Normal Conditions of Transport need to be considered to address certain handling and transfer operations upon canister receipt at the site, specific descriptions must be provided in the SAR to justify their applicability. [Note: The request is similar to that discussed previously for the NAC-MPC cask system]

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and 72.24(d)(1) and (2).

RAI F-6: In WCS CISF SAR Figure F.12-2, CISF Configuration - Finite Element Model Set-Up, (1) clarify the use of the annotations: BAS1E; CAN1E and VCC1E and (2) identify where the liner, as discussed in Section F.12.1.3.7, Boundary Conditions, is being modeled. [Note: The request is similar to that discussed previously for the NAC-MPC cask system]

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c),

72.24(d)(1) and (2), and 72.122(b)(1).

RAI F-7: (a) Identify the locations in Figure F.12-2 for which the peak basket accelerations are calculated for evaluating the dynamic load factor (DLF) effects reported in Table F.12-3, Peak Accelerations and DLF for UMS VCC Systems. (b) Provide a sample set of time-history response plots to indicate the time elapsed for which the peak basket accelerations are selected for determining the amplified basket accelerations associated with the short- and long-pulses. [Note: The request is similar to that discussed previously for the NAC-MPC cask system]

WCS CISF SAR Table F.12-3 lacks information on whether the short- and long-pulse effects reported are associated with the same basket location. If not calculated for the same basket location, discuss the basis for selecting responses at different basket locations for determining the peak amplified basket responses.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c),

72.24(d)(1) and (2), and 72.122(b)(1).

RAI F-8: Verify that the wording, Reference 4, is correctly cited for the WCS CISF SAR page F.12-13 statement, The acceleration used in the basket and canister evaluations for the UMS system in Reference 4 was 40gs.

Reference 4 cannot be located in Section F.12.2, References.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c),

72.24(d)(1) and (2), and 72.122(b)(1).

SAR Appendix G, NAC-MAGNASTOR RAI G-1: Revise the discussion in WCS CISF SAR Section G.3.1.1.3, Seismic Design, on the seismic stability of the MAGNASTOR to recognize that the storage pad peak earthquake motions are based on the SSI analysis of SAR Section 7.6.3.

On the basis of the SSI analysis results, which show markedly higher 35 C.I. 46 000143

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 69 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 accelerations at cask center of gravity than those seismic motions used in the quasi-static analysis to demonstrate cask seismic stability, revise the last two sentences of Section G.3.1.1.3, which state:

The existing analysis bounds the WCS CISF site pad design limits for accelerations at the top pad surface. Therefore, no further evaluations are required.

SAR Section G.3.1.1.3 notes that Section 11.2.8 of the MAGNASTOR FSAR demonstrates that the cask is stable during a 0.37 g horizontal storage pad motion. The vertical acceleration for this evaluation is defined as 2/3 of the horizontal motion. These storage pad accelerations are less severe than the ones resulting from the SSI analysis in SAR Section 7.6.3 for the WCS CISF site.

Section 7.6.3 also notes that cask sliding is likely to occur. Thus, the cask seismic performance discussion needs to be revised based on the storage pad seismic motions evaluated in SAR Section 7.6.3 for the WCS CISF site.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c),

72.24(d)(1) and (2), and 72.122(b)(1).

RAI G-2: Provide safety classifications of the SSCs discussed in WCS CISF SAR Section G.4.1.7, Auxiliary Equipment, for the WCS CISF operation.

WCS CISF SAR Sections G.3.1.2, Safety Protection Systems, presents safety classifications for the MAGNASTOR storage system focusing only on the cask system components for general license approval. Auxiliary equipment needed for the site-specific operation is not addressed. As such, safety classification must also be identified for the Auxiliary Equipment used at the WCS CISF site.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and 72.24(d)(1) and (2).

RAI G-3: Provide a rationale for the WCS CISF SAR Section G.7.1, Undamaged and Damaged PWR Fuel, lead paragraph statement:

Finally, bounding evaluations in Section G.7.1.9 are referenced to demonstrate that the confinement boundaries for the NAC-UMS canisters do not exceed ASME B&PV Subsection NB Article NB-3200 (Level A allowables) during normal conditions of transport to provide reasonable assurance that the confinement boundary is not adversely impacted by transport to the WCS CISF.

The canister structural performance has already been certified by the NRC for NCT under Docket 71-9356 and there appears no need to reevaluate the canister confinement boundary further for transport; however, if deemed necessary, revise, as appropriate, the evaluation in Section G.7.1.9, Structural Evaluation of NAC-MAGNASTOR Canister Confinement Boundaries under Normal Conditions of Transport.

The NRC staff notes that Section G.7.1.9 refers to the confinement boundaries evaluation of the NAC MAGNATRAN Transport cask canisters as content. The 36 C.I. 46 000144

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 70 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 NAC-MAGNATRAN package has been certified for meeting the 10 CFR Part 71.71 requirements for Normal Conditions of Transport (Docket 71-9395). As such, its unclear why it is necessary to evaluate the canister confinement boundaries for transport of spent nuclear fuel to the WCS site. However, if the Normal Conditions of Transport need to be considered to address certain handling and transfer operations upon canister receipt at the site, specific descriptions must be provided in the SAR to justify their applicability.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and 72.24(d)(1) and (2).

RAI G-4: In WCS CISF SAR Figure G.12-2, CISF Configuration - Finite Element Model Set-Up, (1) clarify the use of the annotations: BAS1E; CAN1E and VCC1E and (2) identify where the liner, as discussed in Section F.12.1.3.7, Boundary Conditions, is being modeled. [Note: The request is similar to that discussed previously for the NAC-MPC cask system]

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c),

72.24(d)(1) and (2), and 72.122(b)(1).

RAI G-5: (a) Identify the locations in WCS CISF SAR Figure G.12-2 for which the peak basket accelerations are calculated for evaluating the dynamic load factor (DLF) effects reported in WCS CISF SAR Section G.12.1.3.10, Determination of Amplified Accelerations. (b) Provide a sample set of time-history response plots to indicate the time elapsed for which the peak basket accelerations are selected for determining the amplified basket accelerations associated with the short- and long-pulses. [Note: The request is similar to that discussed previously for the NAC-MPC cask system]

WCS CISF SAR Section G.12.1.3.10 lacks the information on whether the short-and long-pulse effects are associated with the same basket location. If not calculated for the same basket location, discuss the basis for selecting responses at different basket locations for determining the peak amplified basket responses.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c),

72.24(d)(1) and (2), and 72.122(b)(1).

RAI G-6: Verify that the wording, Reference 5, is correctly cited for the WCS CISF SAR page F.12-14 statement, The acceleration used in the basket and canister evaluations for the MAGNASTOR system in Reference 5 was 35gs.

Reference 5 cannot be located in Section G.12.2, References.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c),

72.24(d)(1) and (2), and 72.122(b)(1).

SAR Appendix H, Canisterized GTCC Waste, H.1., Introduction and General Description of Installation 37 C.I. 46 000145

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 71 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI H-1: Revise WCS CISF SAR Appendix H.1 to address whether the confinement boundary of the GTCC canister does not exceed ASME B&PV Subsection NB Article NB-3200 (Level A allowables) during normal conditions of transport to provide reasonable assurance that the confinement boundary is not adversely impacted by transport to the WCS CISF.

The applicant made a similar statement in WCS CISF SAR Sections A.3.4.4, E.7.1, F.7.1 and G.7.1 to confirm that the canisters, received at WCS CISF, do not exceed ASME B&PV Subsection NB Article NB-3200 (Level A allowables) during normal conditions of transport to provide reasonable assurance that the confinement boundary is not adversely impacted by transport to the WCS CISF.

The applicant should add a similar statement (underlined above) in the WCS CISF SAR Appendix H if the confinement boundary of the GTCC canister does not exceed ASME B&PV Subsection NB Article NB-3200 (Level A allowables) during normal conditions of transport to provide reasonable assurance that the confinement boundary is not adversely impacted by transport to the WCS CISF.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.120(a).

38 C.I. 46 000146

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 72 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 20 000147

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 73 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 INTERI M STORA GE PARTNE RS March 22, 2019 E-53893 Director, Division of Spent Fuel Management

-Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Subject:

  • Partial Response to RAI Part 1, Physical Security, Including Revision 3 of the Physical Security Plan, Guard Training and Qualification Plan, Docket 72-1050

Reference:

1. Letter from John-Chau Nguyen (NRC) to Elicia Sanchez (ISP),

Interim Storage Partners' License Application to Construct and Operate the Waste Control Specialists Consolidated Interim Storage Facility, Andrews County, Texas, Docket No. 72-1050- First Request for Additional Information Part 1, Physical Security, dated November 6, 2018 (E-51587) *

2. Letter from Elicia B. Sanchez (ISP) to Document Control Desk (NRC), Partial Response to RAI Part 1, Physical Security, including Revision 3 of the Physical Security Plan, Guard Training and Qualification Plan, Docket 72~1050, dated January 7, 2019 Interim Storage Partners (ISP) provided a partial response to the Request for Additional Information (RAI) Part 1, Physical Security documented in the attachments to the NRC letter dated November 6, 2018 (Reference 1) on January 7, 2019 (Reference 2).

The reference 2 submittal provided responses to seventeen (17) of the twenty-eight (28)

RAls attached to Reference 1. Enclosure 1 of this letter is the draft responses to the remaining eleven (11) RAls along with topics of discussion/clarification associated with

  • some of the RAls.

Safeguards Information SoD I When separated from Safeguards Information enclosure(s), this document is decontrolled provided the transmittal document does not otherwise warrant protection from the unauthorized disclosure.

P.O. Box 1129

  • interimstoragep artners.com C.I. 51.1

--* - - * - - - - - - , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -000148 ------

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 74 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Safeguards Information Document Control Desk E-53893 Page 2 of 2

  • The revisions to the various documents (PSP, TQP, etc.) discussed in the Draft RAf
  • responses have not been completed yet and therefore we are not providing updates to the PSP, TQP and SCP with this letter.

Enclosure 1 is marked as Safeguards Information and must be withheld from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 73.22.

ISP requests that a copy of all correspondence regarding this matter be directly mailed to Mr. Jack Boshoven, Chief Engineer CISF Licensing and Engineering, at 7135 Minstrel Way, Suite 300, Columbia, MD 21045.

Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Jack Boshoven by telephone at (410) 910-6955, or by email at jack.boshoven@orano.group.

Sincerely,

~-Ju-:6 Elicia 8. Sanchez, Chief Financial Officer Interim Storage Partners LLC cc: John (Chau) Nguyen (NRC SFM) - Letter Only Jeff Isakson, ISP/TN Americas - Letter Only Jack Boshoven, ISP/TN Americas - Letter Only

Enclosures:

1. Draft RAI Responses (SGI) and Topics for Discussion.

Safeguards Information When separated from Safeguards Information enclosure(s), this document is decontrolled provided the transmittal document does not otherwise warrant protection from the unauthorized disclosure.

C.I. 51.1

- - * " ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -000149 ----~

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 75 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 21 000150

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 76 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 April 23, 2019 Mr. Jeffrey D. Isakson Chief Executive Officer/President Interim Storage Partners LLC P.O. Box 1129 Andrews, TX 79714

SUBJECT:

INTERIM STORAGE PARTNERS LLCs LICENSE APPLICATION TO CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE THE WASTE CONTROL SPECIALISTS CONSOLIDATED INTERIM STORAGE FACILITY, ANDREWS COUNTY, TEXAS, DOCKET NO. 72-1050 - FIRST REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, PART 3

Dear Mr. Isakson:

By letter dated July 19, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18206A595), Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP), a joint venture of Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) and Orano CIS LLC (a subsidiary of Orano USA),

requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) resume all safety and environmental review activities associated with the proposed WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (WCS CISF) license application. ISP requested authorization to store up to 5,000 metric tons of uranium for a period of 40 years in the WCS CISF.

The NRC staff is conducting a detailed technical review of your application and has determined that additional information is necessary to complete its review. The information needed by the NRC staff is discussed in the enclosed request for additional information (RAI). Consistent with our August 21, 2018, letter notifying you of our decision to resume the WCS CISF technical review, the NRC staff expected to issue its first round RAIs in several parts (ADAMS Accession No. ML18225A281). This is the third and final part of the NRC staffs first round RAIs.

We request that you provide responses within 60 days from the date of this letter. If you are unable to meet this deadline, please notify NRC staff in writing, within two weeks of receipt of this letter, of your new submittal date and the reasons for the delay.

C.I. 57 000151

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 77 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 J. Isakson Please reference Docket No. 72-1050 and CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002 in future correspondence related to the technical review for this licensing action. If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-0262.

Sincerely,

/RA/

John-Chau Nguyen, Senior Project Manager Spent Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Docket No. 72-1050 CAC No. 001028 EPID L-2017-NEW-0002

Enclosure:

1. 1st Round Safety and Environmental RAIs - Part 3 C.I. 57 000152

ML19120A428 OFFICE: NMSS/DSFM NMSS/DSFM NMSS/DSFM NMSS/FCSE NMSS/FCSE NMSS/DSFM NAME: JNguyen WWheatley DDunn JPark CRoman JMcKirgan DATE: 04/23/19 04/29 /19 03/19/19 04/18/19 04/18 /19 04/23/19 Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 79 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 First Request for Additional Information, Part 3 Docket No. 72-1050 WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility in Andrews County, Texas By letter dated July 19, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18206A595), Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP), a joint venture of Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) and Orano CIS LLC (a subsidiary of Orano USA),

requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) resume all safety and environmental review activities associated with the proposed WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (WCS CISF) license application. ISP requested authorization to store up to 5,000 metric tons of uranium for a license term of 40 years in the WCS CISF application.

This request for additional information (RAI) identifies additional information needed by the NRC staff to complete its safety and environmental reviews of the WCS CISF license application. For the safety RAI, the requested information refers to the specific part of the license application concerning proposed license conditions. The NRC staff used the guidance in NUREG-1567, Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities.

For the environmental RAIs, the requested information is sorted by topic and environmental resource area. This information will aid the NRC staffs preparation of its Environmental Impact Statement that is being prepared to fulfill the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended (NEPA), and the NRCs NEPA implementing regulations in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 51, Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions.

License Application, Attachment A, Proposed License Conditions RAI PLC-3: Provide the following information on the incorporation of aging management programs (AMPs):

1. Clarify the meaning of applicable portions of License Renewals that will be incorporated by reference through license amendments described in proposed Condition
20. As appropriate, clarify the language of proposed Condition 20.

ISP has proposed License Condition #20 to incorporate AMPs through license amendments. The proposed License Condition #20 states:

The Licensee shall submit License Amendment(s) to this license to incorporate applicable portions of License Renewals listed below, within 120 days of the effective date of License Renewal Approval for each of the following:

Clarify the criteria for determining what portions of the License Renewals are applicable or whether updated time limited aging analyses (TLAAs) and any other supporting analyses included in the certificate of compliance (CoC) renewals will be included in the license amendments identified in proposed License Condition #20.

The NRC staff acknowledges that ISP has indicated in response to RAI 15-13 that the AMPs for the renewed 72-1004 system will be incorporated into the WCS CISF application.

C.I. 571 Enclosure 000154

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 80 Date Filed: 05/16/2022

2. Describe the content and timing of amendments to address aging management activities including AMPs and TLAAs for systems that either have entered, or will enter, the period of extended operation if the current CoC holder is not able to complete the CoC renewal or has chosen not to renew the CoC. As appropriate, clarify the language of proposed License Condition #20.

The proposed License Condition #20, as written, states that ISP will incorporate applicable portions of License Renewals listed below, within 120 days of the effective date of License Renewal Approval. The proposed license condition does not address the possibility that the current CoC holder either would choose to not renew the CoC or may not be able to renew the CoC and, therefore, applicable AMP and TLAA information would not be supplied by the CoC holder for incorporation by ISP. The applicant should describe how the licensing basis provides a process for ensuring that appropriate and timely AMP and TLAA information is proposed for incorporation into the ISP license if a CoC renewal application was not submitted and completed by the current CoC holder.

This information is needed to ensure that the NRC can make the findings required by 10 CFR 72.40(a) for issuance of a license.

Environmental Requests for Additional Information Proposed Action (PA)

RAI PA-1 Provide additional information on the railroad side track to be built as part of the proposed CISF. This information should include:

  • Clarification of the location (i.e., footprint) of the railroad side track. The location of the proposed railroad side track is not consistently depicted in figures in the Environmental Report (ER). For example, compare ER Figure 2.2-6 with ER Figure 4.5-1. Specifically, clarify whether the railroad side track would cross Stateline Road into New Mexico as depicted in ER Figure 4.5-1.
  • The status of any Federal, State, or local permits or approvals that would be needed to construct and operate the railroad side track, as applicable both in Texas and New Mexico (as depicted in ER Figure 4.5-1, the railroad side track appears to be partly located in both states).
  • A description of the materials, methods, and equipment that would be used to construct, operate, and maintain the railroad side track, including timing of the construction. If the side track would be decommissioned along with the CISF, include similar information for decommissioning.
  • Local natural resources (e.g., groundwater, geologic materials) and manpower needed to construct and operate the railroad side track; and whether or not construction and operation workers for the railroad side track are already included in the resource impacts analysis in the ER (transportation, socioeconomics, etc.).

2 C.I. 57 000155

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 81 Date Filed: 05/16/2022

  • The amount of land that would be disturbed by construction and operation of the railroad side track.
  • The volume of soil that would be excavated during construction and potentially stockpiled during operation of the railroad side track and available information on the disposition of the stockpiled soil.
  • An assessment of the environmental impacts that construction, operation, and decommissioning of the railroad side track would have on all resource areas (e.g., land use, transportation, geology and soils, water resources, air quality, ecological resources, historic and cultural resources, noise, visual and scenic, socioeconomics, public and occupational health, and waste management).
  • Mitigation measures that would be implemented to reduce the environmental impacts associated with construction, operation, and decommissioning of the railroad side track on all resource areas.
  • Any environmental measures, management plans, and/or monitoring that would be required during construction, operation, and decommissioning of the railroad side track to comply with any Federal, State, and local rules and regulations.

ER Section 2.2.2.5 states that an approximately 2,134 m [7,000 ft] railroad side track would be built adjacent to the existing railroad access loop for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) deliveries to the proposed CISF. The ER provides limited information on the construction, operation, and decommissioning activities associated with the railroad side track. Specifically, additional information on the railroad side track is needed to support the NRC staffs description of the proposed action and evaluation of environmental impacts in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which requires that the ER include a description of the proposed action and discuss the impacts of the proposed action.

RAI PA-2 Provide additional information on the new concrete batch plant to be constructed as part of the proposed CISF. This information should include:

  • The size (acreage) of the batch plant and a figure showing its outline and location with respect to the proposed CISF and current site facilities.
  • The design of the concrete batch plant (description of major components) and associated infrastructure (e.g., access roads, pipelines, utilities, and areas for parking, waste management, chemical storage, and maintenance).
  • Any state and local permits or approvals that would be needed to construct and operate the batch plant.
  • A description of construction, operation, and decommissioning activities for the concrete batch plant and an anticipated schedule for construction, operation, and decommissioning.

3 C.I. 57 000156

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 82 Date Filed: 05/16/2022

  • The amount and source of water needed to operate the batch plant.
  • Manpower needed to construct and operate the batch plant and whether or not construction and operation workers for the batch plant are already included in the resource impacts analysis in the ER (transportation, socioeconomics, etc.).
  • The amount of land that would be disturbed during construction and operation of the batch plant and associated infrastructure.
  • The volume of soil that would be excavated during construction and potentially stockpiled during operation of the batch plant, and available information on the disposition of the stockpiled soil.
  • An assessment of the environmental impacts that construction, operation, and decommissioning of the batch plant would have on all resource areas (e.g., land use, transportation, geology and soils, water resources, air quality, ecological resources, visual and scenic resources, historic and cultural resources, noise, socioeconomics, public and occupational health, and waste management).
  • Mitigation measures that would be implemented to reduce the environmental impacts associated with construction, operation, and decommissioning of the batch plant on all resource areas.
  • Any environmental measures, management plans, and monitoring that would be required during construction, operation, and decommissioning of the concrete batch plant to comply with state and local rules and regulations.

ER Section 2.2.2.6 states that a concrete batch plant may be constructed to facilitate storage module construction and future expansion of the site. The ER provides limited information on the construction, operation, and decommissioning activities associated with the batch plant.

Specifically, additional information on the batch plant is needed to support the NRC staffs description of the proposed action and evaluation of environmental impacts, including cumulative impacts, in the EIS.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which requires that the ER include a description of the proposed action and discuss the impacts of the proposed action.

RAI PA-3 Provide additional information concerning the site selection process.

ER Section 2.3 and Attachment 2-2 provide a discussion of the criteria and weighting factors that ISP used to identify potential locations to site the proposed CISF, as well as the scores for the four sites considered. Table 2.3-4 in the ER provides the overall scoring based on three criteria: siting, environmental considerations, and operational considerations. The discussion in ER Section 2.3.3 identifies certain criteria either as environmental considerations or as operational considerations; however, no siting criteria are identified. As a result, it is not clear how siting scores were determined in Table 2.3-4. Therefore, please clarify how the siting scores were calculated.

4 C.I. 57 000157

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 83 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Additionally, in ER Section 2.3.7, ISP provides its review of a potential site in Eddy County, New Mexico, One of the references used is a 2015 report from Cox McLain Environmental Consulting. The NRC staff was not able to locate this report within ISPs license application. Therefore, please provide a copy of the report or point the staff to its location within the application.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(3), which requires that the ER include a description of the proposed action and alternatives to the proposed action.

NEPA PROCESS (NP)

RAI NP-1 Provide a list of relevant meetings, hearings, and presentations that have been made to organizations in the local communities and other parts of Texas and New Mexico that have been held to explain ISPs storage interests related to the proposed CISF.

The ER should provide a description of ISPs outreach efforts made to inform communities and affected populations within the region of the proposed CISF. This information would assist the NRC staffs analysis regarding the potential for disproportionate impacts to communities.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires the ER to include sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS AND PERMITTING (RRP)

RAI RRP-1 Provide, in tabular format, a list of all Federal, State, Tribal, or local approvals, authorizations, certifications, consultations, and permits that would be necessary to construct and operate the proposed CISF and associated infrastructure. Include in the list the status of the approval, authorization, certification, consultation, or permit (e.g., yet to be submitted, submitted, under review, issued).

ER Section 1.3 provides a general discussion of applicable regulatory requirements, permits, and required consultations for construction and operation of the proposed CISF. Based on the NRC staffs review, it appears that some regulatory and permitting requirements are not discussed in the ER. For example, State permitting requirements may apply to construction and operation of the railroad side track that may extend into New Mexico (see ER Section 2.2.2.5 and ER Figure 4.5-1) and a new concrete batch plant (see ER Section 2.2.2.6). A complete discussion of applicable regulatory requirements is needed to support the NRC staffs description and evaluation of applicable statutory, regulatory, and permitting requirements in the NRCs EIS.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(d), which requires that the ER include a list of all Federal, State, regional, and local permits, licenses, approvals and other entitlements that the applicant must obtain, as well as a description of the status of compliance with these requirements.

5 C.I. 57 000158

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 84 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 LAND USE (LU)

RAI LU-1 Provide a figure showing land use classification as identified in the ER within 8 km [5 mi]

of the proposed CISF boundaries.

ER Section 3.1 states that land use classification in the vicinity of the proposed CISF is primarily rangeland, built-up land, and barren land. Provide specific information on the distribution of classes of land use within and surrounding the proposed CISF. NUREG-1748, Environmental Review Guidance for Licensing Actions Associated with NMSS Programs, recommends figures should be used to describe the area for land use (NRC, 2003). In addition, NUREG-1567, Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities, recommends that land use should be described within an 8-km [5-mi] radius of independent spent fuel storage facilities (ISFSIs)

(NRC, 2000). The requested information is needed to support the NRC staffs description of the affected environment and evaluation of environmental impacts in the EIS.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which requires that the ER include a description of the affected environment and discuss the impacts of the proposed action.

RAI LU-2 Provide information on the number and location of wells (including a figure) associated with oil and gas exploration and development within a 10-km [6-mi] radius of the proposed CISF. The figure should indicate the type of well (e.g., oil, gas, injection, salt water disposal, etc.) and its status (e.g., active, plugged, dry and abandoned, shut in, etc.). In addition, provide information on oil and gas leasing including a figure illustrating existing oil and gas leases within a 10-km [6-mi] radius of the proposed CISF.

ER Section 3.1 states that land uses within a few miles of the proposed CISF includes drilling for and production from oil and gas wells and that the Elliott Littman oil field is to the northwest, the Freund and Nelson oil fields are to the south, the Paddock South and Drinkard oil fields are to the southwest, and the Fullerton oil field is to the east. However, the ER does not provide specific information on the type, status, and location of the oil and gas wells in the area of the proposed CISF. Specifically, this information is needed to support the NRC staffs description of the affected environment and evaluation of environmental impacts.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b), which requires that the ER include a description of the affected environment, and 10 CFR 51.45(b)(1), which requires that the ER discuss the impacts of the proposed action.

RAI LU-3 Clarify the total site footprint (i.e., area) for the proposed CISF, including the area that would contain the new rail siding, and indicate whether the calculated total disturbed area and total disturbed soils take the rail siding into account.

ER Section 3.1 states that the proposed CISF would include 130 ha [320 ac] of land within the WCS property boundary. However, the description of the land area does not explicitly state whether the area includes land for the new rail siding. Therefore, clarification is needed on both 6 C.I. 57 000159

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 85 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 the total land and soil areas disturbed by the proposed action (including the new rail siding).

This information is needed to support the NRC staffs description of the proposed action and evaluation of environmental impacts in the EIS.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which requires that the ER include a description of the affected environment and discuss the impacts of the proposed action.

TRANSPORTATION (TR)

RAI TR-1 Provide an analysis of radiological impacts to workers from transportation.

The analyses of radiological impacts from transportation in ER Sections 4.2.6; 4.2.7; 4.2.8; and -1 do not appear to specifically describe radiological impacts or any dose calculations applicable to transportation workers such as vehicle crew members and escorts, cargo handlers and inspectors, rail yard workers, or to emergency response personnel. For example, the ER incident-free population dose estimate is described as applying to residents, and accident calculations do not provide details as to whether the exposed population includes transportation workers. Because workers would be exposed to radiation and risks from the proposed transportation shipments, an analysis of radiological impacts that addresses workers should be included as part of the transportation impact analysis. This is consistent with NRC guidance in NUREG-1748, which states that radiological impacts to both the public and workers should be evaluated (NRC, 2003).

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires analyses in ERs to be quantitative to the fullest extent practicable.

RAI TR-2 Provide additional information on RADTRAN code transportation dose and risk assessment input parameter selections.

A subset of RADTRAN code input parameters is tabulated or otherwise described in the ER (Sections 4.2.6; 4.2.7, 4.2.8, and Attachment 4-1). If any other RADTRAN input parameters that were used in any ER transportation radiological risk assessment calculations (addressing both incident-free transportation and accidents) were modified from code defaults, these parameters should be identified along with the technical bases and applicable source references for parameter values. Complete documentation of the calculation inputs is necessary for the NRC staff to evaluate the technical correctness and applicability of these calculations to the proposed action.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

7 C.I. 57 000160

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 86 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI TR-3 Provide the input and output files for transportation dose and risk calculations conducted with the RADTRAN and WebTRAGIS codes and provide links to the applicable ER analyses.

ER Sections 4.2.6, 4.2.7, 4.2.8, and Attachment 4-1 indicate that transportation doses and risks were calculated using the RADTRAN code for risk assessment and the WebTRAGIS code for routing. Code input and output files will allow the NRC staff to verify that the computer code runs support the calculation methods, assumptions, input parameters, and results that are described in the ER. Because the ER includes several different transportation dose/risk calculations, information should also be provided that links specific files to the applicable ER analysis results (e.g., 3 incident-free representative routes; 3 types of accident analyses; 12 short-distance heavy-haul truck or barge routes).

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

RAI TR-4 Provide post- processing dose and risk calculation spreadsheets used to assess radiological impacts from transportation.

ER Sections 4.2.6.1 and Attachment 4-1 indicate that transportation dose results were calculated using spreadsheets. These ER Sections indicated that these spreadsheets incorporated the results of RADTRAN code output (unit risk factors) and WebTRAGIS output (routing details) to calculate transportation doses. The requested information will allow the NRC staff to verify that the calculations are technically correct and consistent with the methods, assumptions, input parameters, and results described in the ER.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

RAI TR-5 Provide the transportation study that is referenced in ER Section 4.2.6 as Attachment 4.1.

ER Section 4.2.6 describes that the transportation analysis evaluated both incident-free transportation and accidents and references a study entitled Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel to and from the Waste Control Specialists Proposed Consolidated Interim Storage Facility in Attachment 4.1 for the analysis. ER Section 4.2.8 (Impacts from Transportation Accidents) also references Attachment 4.1 for more details on accident dose risks. The ER does not appear to have an attachment with that number or title. The ER does include an Attachment 4-1 that contains information supporting RADTRAN incident-free calculations and WebTRAGIS routing, but does not appear to describe accident analysis methods or calculations.

As a result, please provide further information on the methodology or calculations used to determine the impacts of transportation accidents. If this information is included in an analysis that was omitted from the Environmental Report, that may be used to satisfy this request. The requested information will allow the NRC staff to verify that the application contains complete and accurate references.

8 C.I. 57 000161

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 87 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

RAI TR-6 Clarify the source documents that were used for calculating transportation accident impacts.

ER Section 4.2.8.2 (Accident Involving a Release of Radioactive Materials) states that accidents involving release of radioactive materials were evaluated by the RADTRAN code but the section does not appear to state whether ISP conducted these code calculations, or if they were from another source. If the RADTRAN calculations were from a prior analysis, the applicable analysis documentation should be referenced. If the RADTRAN calculations were conducted specifically for the ER, that should be clarified and information supporting the code runs including methods, assumptions, inputs, and results should be provided. The requested information will allow the NRC staff to evaluate the technical correctness and applicability of these calculations to the proposed action.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

RAI TR-7 Provide the radionuclide inventory used in transportation accident release calculations.

ER Section 4.2.8.2 (Accident Involving the Release of Radioactive Material) states that the radionuclide inventory used for estimating transportation accident consequences is provided in -1. The inventory information is not provided in Attachment 4-1. The RADTRAN code uses package release fractions in these accident calculations; therefore, the calculated release and dose are a function of the radionuclide inventory. The requested information will allow the NRC staff to review the technical correctness of the transportation accident dose calculations.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

RAI TR-8 Review tabulated loss-of-shielding transportation accident risk analysis results and make necessary corrections.

ER Section 4.2.8.3 [Loss-of-Shielding (LOS) Accidents] refers to results in ER Table 4.2-9 and states that the highest calculated dose is 0.12 rem; however, the table shows a higher calculated dose of 0.26 rem for the Maine Yankee Route. Inconsistent statements in the ER should be corrected.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

9 C.I. 57 000162

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 88 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI TR-9 Provide a missing reference for a cited NRC study in the non-radiological transportation risk analysis and describe the applicability of the analysis to the ISP proposal.

ER Section 4.2.9 (Non-radiological Risks) refers to an NRC analysis of non-radiological transportation risks from shipping SNF to a repository without reference to the analysis.

Additionally, this entire section is based on analysis and discussion that is not specific to the ISP proposal with no discussion that links the referenced analyses to the impact analyses and conclusions. The incomplete reference information in the ER should be provided. Additionally, a description of the applicability of referenced analyses to the proposed project should be added so that the technical basis for adoption of results in the ER is clear and transparent with clear linkage of these analyses to any specific impact conclusions.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

RAI TR-10 Revise transportation sections to clarify attribution.

ER Sections 4.2.6, 4.2.7, 4.2.8, 4.2.9, and Attachment 4-1 are written in passive voice that lacks information about attribution (specifically, what parties conducted which analyses). These sections should be reviewed and revised to unambiguously attribute all ISP methods, analyses, assumptions, and conclusions to ISP and attribute other analyses to properly referenced sources.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

GEOLOGY and SOILS (GS)

RAI GS-1 Describe erosion and sediment controls, soil stabilization practices, or structural controls that would be implemented during operation.

ER Section 4.3 identifies increased soil erosion as the result of construction activities due to site clearing and grading. ISP should identify and describe the planned best management practices (BMPs) that it will use to mitigate erosional impacts throughout the life of the CISF site. The additional information about BMPs would be used to assess the potential environmental impacts due to operation of the proposed CISF.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (c), which requires that the ER include a discussion of the impacts to the environment and alternatives available for reducing or avoiding adverse environmental effects.

10 C.I. 57 000163

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 89 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI GS-2 Describe the land surface modification proposed, including the volume of material to be excavated and redistributed and how the natural topography and stratigraphy of the proposed CISF project area would be modified during site leveling.

ER Section 4.3 (Geology and Soils) states that cut-and-fill activities might be required for some portions of the site. Provide information about the land areas that would be leveled and the potential volumes of material that would be exhumed and or redistributed to level the site.

ER Section 4.1 (Land Use Impacts) stated [d]uring the construction phase of the CISF, conventional earthmoving and grading equipment would be used. The removal of very dense soil or caliche may require the use of heavy equipment with ripping tools. Soil removal work for foundations would be controlled to reduce over-excavation to minimize construction costs.

In addition, loose soil and/or damaged caliche would be removed prior to installation of foundations for seismically designed structures. Additional information about ISPs land surface modification, including details about how the natural topography and stratigraphy at the site would be modified by the proposed action, is needed to assess the potential environmental impacts due to construction and operation of the proposed CISF.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (c), which requires that the ER include a discussion of the impacts of the proposed action and the alternatives available for reducing or avoiding adverse environmental effects.

RAI GS-3 Correlate the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) soil types inferred on the proposed CISF site with the material property data that ISP collected from 18 onsite soil test borings.

A site-specific soil survey of the proposed CISF site has not been performed. Four soil types were previously inferred by USDA to occur on the proposed CISF site; it is unknown how the average material properties associated with these four soil types compare with the actual material properties of soils recently tested onsite. ISP should provide additional information to correlate between the inferred USDA soil types and the recent material property data obtained from onsite soil borings.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b), which requires that the ER include a description of the affected environment.

RAI GS-4 Using available data from oil and gas well logs and any other available sources such as geophysical surveys, provide information on the depth and thickness of oil- and gas-producing geologic formations within a 10 km [6 mi] radius of the proposed CISF.

ER Section 3.1 states that land uses within a few miles of the proposed CISF includes drilling for and production from oil and gas wells. Provide information on oil- and gas-producing formations, such as depth and thickness, in the vicinity of the proposed CISF.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b), (b)(1), and (c), which requires that the ER include a description of the affected environment, discuss the impacts of 11 C.I. 57 000164

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 90 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 the proposed action, and contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

RAI GS-5 Provide information on deep well injection of wastewater at or near the proposed CISF.

This information should include the number and location of injection wells within a 10-km [6-mi] radius of the proposed project area. For each identified injection well, provide information on the geologic formation that wastewaters are being injected into, the depth and thickness of the targeted geologic formation, and injected wastewater volumes and rates.

ER Section 3.1 states that land uses within a few miles of the proposed CISF includes drilling for and production from oil and gas wells, and identifies oil fields northwest, south, southwest, and east of the proposed CISF. The requested information would be used to more accurately describe these current activities in the affected environment.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (c), which requires that the ER include a description of the affected environment and contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

WATER RESOURCES (WR)

RAI WR-1 Obtain and provide a new U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) determination documenting the lack of jurisdictional wetlands at and adjacent to the proposed CISF.

The USACE letter concerning Waste Control Specialists Disposal Site-Non-Jurisdictional Determination Request (WCS Project No. SWF-2007-173) supplied in ISPs license application states that the determination was valid for 5 years. The determination, therefore, expired in 2012. Updated surface water information is needed for the NRC staff to assess the potential environmental impacts to surface and groundwater near the proposed CISF.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(d), which requires that the ER include a list all Federal permits, licenses, approvals, and other entitlements that the applicant must obtain and a description of the status of compliance with these requirements.

RAI WR-2 Describe in additional detail the potentially affected surface water environment at and near the proposed CISF, including:

  • Seasonality of water in internally drained salt basins and surface depressions, including surface areas, seasonal water depths, shoreline lengths and monthly, quarterly, or other seasonal information about how much water the depressions contain throughout the year.
  • Whether nearby industrial sites in New Mexico (i.e., Permian Basin Materials/Wallach Concrete Quarry, Sundance Services, LLC/Parabo Disposal Facility, Fish Pond), with artificial, standing surface water bodies, are harboring wetlands.

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Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 91 Date Filed: 05/16/2022

  • Local surface water quality (i.e., surface water chemistry).

The additional information requested is needed to describe the surface water characteristics at and around the proposed CISF, and to evaluate potential impacts on surface water resources.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which requires that the ER include a description of the affected environment and an assessment of environmental impacts.

RAI WR-3 Clarify whether Baker Spring water chemistry data analyzed to date have a chemical fingerprint associated with Gatuna Formation/Pecos Valley Alluvium groundwater, with Antlers Formation groundwater, or with meteoric surface water. Clarify the nature of two groundwater springs located near the proposed CISF:

  • Is Baker Spring a groundwater-sourced spring, or is its name a misnomer because it only contains rainwater runoff?
  • Identify the groundwater source (i.e., the formal hydrogeologic unit/geologic formation) of an unnamed groundwater spring located 4.8 km [3 mi] east of ISP (see ER page 3-21) and identify the location of this spring relative to the proposed CISF on a map.

Baker Spring is described variously in literature as either a seasonally intermittent surface water feature sourced by rainfall (e.g., ISPs description at ER page 3-18) or as a Gatuna Formation groundwater-sourced spring (e.g., page 17 of Lehman and Rainwater, 2000). Updated surface water characterization information about Baker Spring and the other local spring are needed to describe the affected environment and to assess the potential environmental impacts to surface water and groundwater near the CISF.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which requires that the ER include a description of the affected environment and an assessment of environmental impacts.

RAI WR-4 Clarify ER descriptions of site topography, water-balance parameters, surface water basins, and hydrogeologic characteristics at the proposed CISF by:

  • Clarifying whether the statement on ER, page 3-19, that the proposed CISF is located on a southwest-facing slope that transitions from the Southern High Plains to the Pecos Valley physiographic section refers to the topographic slope upon which permitted WCS Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) facilities were constructed, or the location and natural slopes of the proposed CISF site, or to both (ER description appears vestigial from LLRW application-type documents, and therefore, possibly inaccurate relative to the proposed CISF site location).
  • Clarifying whether or not the proposed CISF is located directly above a relatively flat-lying, local topographic high point above the Red Bed Ridge surface water/groundwater divide, whereas the existing WCS LLRW facility lies on a southwest-facing, lower elevation slope of the Red Bed Ridge, on the Rio Grande River 13 C.I. 57 000166

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 92 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Basin side of the surface water/groundwater divide. (ER description appears vestigial from LLRW application-type documents, and therefore, possibly inaccurate relative to the proposed CISF site location).

  • Clarifying whether or not the proposed CISF is located entirely within the Rio Grande River Basin), which is separate from the adjacent Colorado River Basin, and whether or not the northwestern corner of the proposed CISF site is located at the river basin boundary.
  • Providing a topographic map that illustrates the specific location of the surface water drainage divide between the Rio Grande and Colorado basins relative to the location of the proposed CISF at a scale that is commensurate with the scale of the ISP/WCS property.
  • Clarifying site water-balance parameters; the ER states that infiltration and evapotranspiration would mitigate a significant amount of the potential runoff volume from the CISF site; quantify what is meant by the word significant and the other parameters of the site water-balance equation (i.e., evapotranspiration, runoff, storage, and infiltration/recharge).
  • Clarifying planned usage of new or existing water-retention basins, if any, that would support CISF-construction, -operations, and -decommissioning activities.
  • Clarifying planned or expected storm-water management facilities or activities.
  • Clarifying whether or not local Gatuna Formation groundwater occurs within the Rio Grande River Basin (and not within the Colorado River Basin).
  • Clarifying whether or not local Ogallala Formation groundwater occurs within the Colorado River Basin (and not within the Rio Grande River Basin).

Clarified topographic information, site water-balance information, descriptions of any planned usage of new or existing manmade surface water bodies, and hydrostratigraphic information for the units present immediately beneath the proposed CISF site is needed to assess potential environmental impacts to surface water and near-surface groundwater at the proposed CISF.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which requires that the ER include a description of the affected environment and an assessment of environmental impacts.

RAI WR-5 Further, describe the groundwater environment underlying and near the proposed CISF by identifying:

  • The groundwater source (i.e., the formal hydrogeologic unit) that supplies the nearest downgradient potable water well at the Letter B Ranch and the location of this well on a map relative to the proposed CISF.
  • All windmill-pumped groundwater wells located on and within an 8-km [5-mi] radius of the ISP/WCS property that historically pumped near-surface groundwater. Illustrate the 14 C.I. 57 000167

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 93 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 locations of these wells relative to the proposed CISF on a map, and interpret site information to identify on the map whether each well was screened in the Ogallala, Antlers, or Gatuna Formations.

  • All active, industrial groundwater wells located on the ISP/WCS property that provide non-potable water for a firewater tank, processing activities, dust suppression, or any other industrial use; show all such ISP/WCS well locations on a map and provide well-perforation depths. Identify the aquifer formation(s) of the non-potable water pumped from these wells (give specific formation names, such as Trujillo or Santa Rosa Formations; Dockum Aquifer is not sufficiently specific). Provide, per hydrostratigraphic unit, the annualized volume of non-potable groundwater now in use for ongoing activities at WCS, estimate any anticipated future changes to the annualized volume of non-potable water that will be consumed for non-CISF activities, and estimate the additional annualized volume of non-potable water per aquifer that ISP would use exclusively in activities associated with construction and operation of the CISF during its various phases. Clearly identify which proposed CISF-related activities would require use of site industrial groundwater, and how CISF buildout phase would affect consumptive use.
  • The number of boreholes/wells/piezometers drilled and completed beneath the proposed CISF footprint into the upper unit of the Dockum Aquifer, which may provide information about the occurrence and lateral continuity of saturated sand that occurs as lenses within the Cooper Canyon Formation/Red Bed Ridge clay unit. Provide hydrogeologic information available to ISP that would clarify the location of saturated sands beneath the proposed CISF potentially occurring within the Cooper Canyon Formation.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which require that the ER include a description of the affected environment and an assessment of environmental impacts, including cumulative impacts, and (b)(5), any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.

RAI WR-6 Provide an ISP CISF site-specific hydrostratigraphic column to clarify the composition of the local hydrostratigraphic units underlying the proposed CISF site, which have a much simpler configuration than what is shown in the regional stratigraphic column of Safety Analysis Report (SAR) Figure 2-13.

The regional stratigraphic column illustrated in SAR Figure 2-13 is too complicated (it shows units that are not present at ISP-WCS) and does not clearly describe the local subsurface geologic situation at the CISF. More simplified and accurate visual information is needed to clearly describe and communicate the affected groundwater and vadose zone environments at the proposed CISF, and to facilitate assessments of the potential environmental impacts of CISF construction, operation, and decommissioning.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which require that the ER include a description of the affected environment and an assessment of environmental impacts.

15 C.I. 57 000168

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 94 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI WR-7 Provide isopach maps for the tops of hydrogeologic units beneath the proposed CISF site, including isopach maps for the tops of all formally named formations and for the tops of water-bearing sand lenses occurring within the Cooper Canyon Formation.

Additional information about the depths to the tops of the local hydrogeologic units at the CISF site is needed to compare with potentiometric surface maps of hydraulic head and to accurately describe the affected groundwater and vadose zone environments at the proposed CISF to support the assessment of the potential environmental impacts of CISF construction and operation.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which require that the ER include a description of the affected environment and an assessment of environmental impacts.

RAI WR-8 Provide geologic formation names instead of generic material labels on updates to SAR Figures 2-16 and 2-17 (i.e., geologic cross-sections). The affected groundwater environment must be clearly described.

The CISF is located at or near a surface water/groundwater basin divide, where three near-surface geologic units have discrete interfaces within relatively short distances (i.e.,

Ogallala Formation, Antlers Formation, and Gatuna Formation). For the adjacent LLRW site, Lehman and Rainwater (2000) clearly indicated what units lay beneath the proposed facility.

In contrast, SAR Figures 2-16 and 2-17 only provide generic material type labels on the geologic cross-sections for the proposed CISF, and are, therefore, not explicit about which formations underlie the proposed facility. The proposed CISF would be located above regionally extensive, formally named geologic units having characteristics that are well-described in the literature. Additional information is needed about which hydrogeologic formations underlie the CISF site to accurately describe the affected groundwater and vadose zone environments at the proposed CISF and support assessment of the potential environmental impacts of CISF construction, operation, and decommissioning.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which require that the ER include a description of the affected environment and an assessment of environmental impacts.

RAI WR-9 Quantify the annualized volume of potable groundwater now in use for ongoing activities at WCS, estimate any anticipated future changes to the annualized volume of potable groundwater consumed for non-CISF activities, and estimate the additional annualized volume of potable groundwater that ISP will use exclusively to construct and operate the CISF during its various lifecycle stages and development phases.

ER Section 4.4 states that during construction and operation of the proposed CISF, potable water will be supplied by the existing potable water system that serves the WCS facility.

Additional information is needed to support assessment of the environmental impacts that ISPs 16 C.I. 57 000169

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 95 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 CISF potable groundwater consumptive use will have on groundwater resources and cumulative impacts.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which require that the ER include descriptions of the proposed action, the affected environment, and the impacts of the proposed action, including cumulative impacts.

RAI WR-10 Provide groundwater unit information that corresponds with the water quality data provided in the application to support the ER. ISP should clearly identify the names of the individual hydrogeologic formations that are associated with the groundwater quality described in ER Sections 3.4.14.1 and 3.4.14.5.

ER Sections 3.4.14.1 and 3.4.14.5 use terminology [e.g., 55 m and 69 m (180 ft and 225 ft) zones] that is not defined in the ER. Additional information about which geochemical data are associated with the sampled groundwater formations (e.g., Gatuna, Antlers, Ogallala, Cooper Canyon, Santa Rosa, and or Trujillo) is needed to support assessment of the potential environmental impacts to groundwater quality at or near the proposed CISF. Please provide a map that spatially indicates where geochemical samples were acquired from wells/boreholes, relative to the footprint of the proposed CISF.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b), which requires that the ER include a description of the affected environment.

RAI WR-11 Identify the shallowest groundwater located beneath the proposed CISF footprint by name and depth below the CISF land surface, whether in the Antlers, Ogallala, Gatuna, or Cooper Canyon Formation. In future documentation associated with the proposed action, name the specific aquifers in the Dockum Group that are discussed, whether the Cooper Canyon, Trujillo, or Santa Rosa Formations. In response to this RAI, use of the lumped term Dockum Aquifer should be avoided because it applies to the entire thick sequence of the Dockum Group (to both aquifers and aquitards) and does not clearly denote the site-specific aquifer that is being referenced at the proposed CISF.

ISPs license application should also call out by name the near-surface groundwater formations (Antlers, Ogallala, or Gatuna) that are referred to in any related text or that are associated with any data provided.

In response to RSI 9.6, the applicant indicated, Thenearest aquifer is located at a depth of 245 to 305 m [800 to 1,000 ft] below ground surface. The response to RSI 9.6 does not indicate by name a hydrogeologic formation associated with this aquifer. The applicant should clarify if they are referring to a water-bearing sandy zone within the Cooper Canyon Formation or to another aquifer deeper in the Dockum Group. Also in response to RSI 9.6, the applicant indicated that (t)he WCS site is separated from that [unspecified nearest] aquifer by the Dockum Formation, consisting of low permeability clays (109 cm/s). The applicant should clarify whether it meant, separated from that aquifer by the Cooper Canyon Formation, given that the Dockum Group contains two aquifers at the ISP/WCS property located below the Cooper Canyon Formation, as well as additional water-bearing sandy zones within the otherwise clayey Cooper Canyon Formation.

17 C.I. 57 000170

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 96 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which require that the ER include a description of the affected environment and an assessment of environmental impacts.

ECOLOGY (ECO)

RAI ECO-1 Provide updated ecological studies for the proposed CISF and associated rail siding in Texas and New Mexico, if available, and provide an estimated timeframe when the updated ecological studies will be available. Provide written documentation in response to Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) license conditions.

Ecological studies at the WCS site were conducted during 1996, 1997, 2004, and 2006. Some of these surveys covered the entire proposed CISF area while others covered only a portion of the proposed CISF area; however, due to the age of these surveys and the natural changes of plants and animals over time, the presence or absence of State and Federal species of concern, including threatened and endangered species, should be confirmed. The NRC staff understands that it takes more than one growing and breeding season to conduct baseline ecological surveys.

The NRC staffs review of WCSs Radioactive Material License R04100, Amendment No. 31 (October 2017) suggests that updated written documentation from the U.S. Fish and Wild Service (USFWS) and the Texas Parks & Wildfire Department (TPWD) may be available as a result of License Condition #160, which states The Licensee must provide to the executive director every five (5) years written documentation from the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service regarding the presence of threatened or endangered species occurring near the site. In addition, License Condition #161 noted in WCSs Radioactive Material License Amendment No. 12 from 2012 stated, The Licensee must recognize Baker Spring as a perennial water body and conduct appropriate aquatic surveys to establish baseline conditions and to identify the supported species, including aquatic and benthic invertebrates. Specifically, the additional information requested regarding ecological studies conducted after 2006 and baseline ecological studies and surveys previously conducted for Baker Spring is needed to describe the most recently observed ecological characteristics at and around the proposed CISF, and to evaluate potential impacts on ecological resources, including sensitive species.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b)(1) and (2), which require that the ER discuss the impacts and adverse effects of the proposed action, and the Endangered Species Act.

AIR QUALITY (AQ)

RAI AQ-1 Supplement the existing description of applicable air permits to address the following:

  • Whether the TCEQ permit would be a new permit or a modification of the existing WCS site permit 18 C.I. 57 000171

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 97 Date Filed: 05/16/2022

  • Whether the New Mexico Environment Department air permitting requirements could apply to the proposed action (specifically, construction of the rail side track).

ER Section 1.3.2.3 states that ISP would obtain from the TCEQ any required air permits to support construction and operation of the proposed action. However, the ER is unclear whether this would be a new permit or a modification to the existing WCS site air permit. In addition, it is unclear whether some of the railroad side track construction occurs in New Mexico (see RAI PA-2); however, the ER does not provide information about air permitting associated with the New Mexico Environment Department. Specifically, this information is needed to support the NRC staffs description and evaluation of applicable statutory, regulatory, and permitting requirements in the NRCs EIS.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(d), which requires that the ER include a description of the status of compliance with applicable environmental quality standards and requirements, including limitations and requirements which have been imposed by Federal, State, regional, and local agencies having responsibility for environmental protection.

RAI AQ-2 Provide either summarized onsite meteorological data (e.g., yearly, seasonally, monthly) or provide the data in Attachment A of the SAR Chapter 2 in a spreadsheet rather than a PDF file.

Attachment A of the SAR Chapter 2 (a PDF file about 5,000 pages long) contains the hourly data from four onsite meteorological stations over a 6 year period from 2010 to 2015.

However, summary information for the onsite meteorological stations is limited to wind speed and direction averaged over a 5 year period (see ER Section 3.6.4). Onsite meteorological data supports the general description of the affected environment, and any inclusion of this data in the EIS would be in summary form. Specifically, additional information on the onsite meteorological data is needed to support NRCs description of the proposed action and the affected environment in the EIS.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b), which requires that the ER include a description of the affected environment.

RAI AQ-3 Supplement the regional characterization of the annual air emissions by:

  • Expanding the current emission estimates in ER Table 3.6-8 to include (i) particulate matter PM10 and non-radiological hazardous air pollutants emission estimates and (ii) emissions data from New Mexico where some of the proposed action activities might occur.
  • Addressing future estimated regional emissions over the 40-year timeframe of the proposed action (e.g., how the current emission estimates in ER Table 3.6-8 are expected to change over time).
  • If available, addressing both current and future air emissions from the existing WCS site activities.

19 C.I. 57 000172

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 98 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 ER Table 3.6-8 provides current annual emissions for some criteria pollutants for Andrews County and the State of Texas. However, this table does not include estimates for particulate matter PM10 or non-radiological hazardous air pollutants. Also, this table does not include emission estimates from New Mexico, where a portion of the proposed actions activities, the construction of the CISF railroad side track, might occur (see RAI PA-2). Finally, ER Table 3.6-8 only presents a snapshot of current conditions and does not address regional emissions over the 40-year lifetime of the proposed action. Specifically, the regional annual air emissions are needed, including key air emissions (e.g., particulate matter PM10), to support the NRC staffs characterization of the environment where the proposed actions activities occur over the lifetime of the proposed action. The ER does not provide the air emission generated by the existing WCS facilities, which are located in close proximity to the proposed CISF site.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b), which requires that the ER include a description of the affected environment.

RAI AQ-4 Characterize the potential air emissions based on the entire range of the proposed actions emission sources. Consideration should be given, but not limited, to the following:

  • Combustion emissions from mobile sources, including onsite, local, and national (i.e., SNF) transportation.
  • Combustion emissions from cross-country transport of precast concrete pieces to the proposed site if an onsite concrete batch plant is not used.
  • Emissions from the railroad side track construction, if not already included.

ER Section 1.3.2.3 indicates that mobile sources (e.g., train, heavy haul trucks, transporters, and private vehicles) were not included as part of the air quality impact analyses because these sources are not regulated by TCEQ.

ER Section 2.2.2.6 states that if an onsite concrete batch plant is not constructed, then precast concrete pieces will be transported cross country to the proposed WCS site. Potential emissions from this activity were not included in the ER analyses.

ER Section 3.2.3 states that a railroad side track will be constructed. It is unclear if emissions from this activity were included in the project emission estimates described in ER Section 4.2.1.

This information is needed to accurately characterize the entire range of emission sources and project emissions from the proposed action in the EIS.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b), which requires that the ER include a description of the proposed action and its potential impacts on the environment.

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Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 99 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI AQ-5 Characterize the peak year emission levels. Consideration should be given, but not limited, to the following:

  • Overlap of the various stages (i.e., construction, operation, and decommissioning) within the framework of the planned eight phases.
  • Distinctions in construction emission levels between Phase 1 and subsequent phases.
  • Individual pollutants other than just particulate matter (e.g., other criteria pollutants, volatile organic compounds, non-radiological hazardous air pollutants) because the peak year for particulate matter could be different than the peak year for other pollutants.
  • Complete range of emission sources and activities associated with the proposed action (see RAI AQ-4).
  • Provide estimated emission levels (e.g., tons per year) for the activities and sources associated with the proposed CISF accounting for the various topics raised in the previous bullet points specified in this RAI (i.e., individual stages, overlapping of stages and phases, pollutants other than particulate matter PM10, range of emission levels) or provide a basis for not providing any aspects of this information.

ER Section 1.3.2.3 identifies that both the construction and the operation activities generate air emissions. ER Section 4.5.3 states that the CISF could be built in eight phases and indicates that this phased approach means that construction and operation activities could overlap at times. ER Section 4.5.3 also indicates that the first phase would also include site infrastructure construction (e.g., facilities, the railroad side track, possibly a new concrete batch plant).

The air impact analysis in ER Section 4.6 (i) does not clearly identify the proposed actions highest annual or peak year emissions considering the possible overlap of stages (i.e., construction, operation, and decommissioning) or phases as well as the distinction in construction emission levels between Phase 1 and the subsequent phases, (ii) only considers particulate matter, (iii) does not consider combustion emissions from mobile sources, and (iv) only provides estimated annual emission levels for the concrete batch plant (note that these emission level estimates in ER Table 4.6.2 do not specify units). The EIS analyses need to consider the peak year emission levels since this relates to the largest potential impacts from the proposed action.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b)(1), which requires that the ER include a description of the proposed action and its potential impacts on the environment.

RAI AQ-6 Provide a greater level of detail for the site-specific air dispersion modeling. Examples of additional information to provide include, but are not limited to, the following:

  • Estimated emission levels for the various pollutants generated by the proposed CISF activities that were used as input for the air dispersion modeling.
  • Details about the emission inventory assumptions, inputs, and calculations (e.g., types and number of emission sources, horsepower, load factors, and emission factors).

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  • Baseline ambient air concentrations.
  • Air dispersion modeling results, which allow for comparison to the various National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) thresholds.
  • Basis for why the air dispersion modeling did not include (i) pollutants other than particulate matter PM10, and (ii) sources other than fugitive dust from construction.
  • Identify who conducted the air dispersion modeling and when it was conducted.

ER Sections 4.2.1 and 4.6 state that air dispersion modeling was conducted to assess impacts of the proposed CISF. However, information in the ER concerning the modeling input is limited and did not include the emission inventory used as input for the modeling. ER Section 4.6 stated that construction stage particulate matter PM10 emission were below the NAAQS.

However, the analyses in the ER did not (i) provide the actual modeling results, (ii) compare the results to PSD thresholds, (iii) provide baseline ambient pollutant concentrations for inclusion in the NAAQS assessment, or (iv) explain why the air dispersion modeling was limited to the particulate matter PM10 emissions from fugitive dust from the construction stage. The requested detailed information provides a basis for characterizing the quality of the air dispersion modeling results.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires that the ER include sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

RAI AQ-7 Revise the air quality impact analyses as appropriate to address the following:

  • The entire range of emission sources associated with the proposed action as described in RAI AQ-4.
  • The peak year emission levels as described in RAI AQ-5.
  • Pollutants other than particulate matter PM10 (e.g., other criteria pollutants, volatile organic compounds, non-radiological hazardous pollutants).

ER Section 1.3.2.3 identifies two primary types of air emissions associated with the proposed action: combustion emissions from construction equipment and fugitive dust from excavation activities and construction equipment. However, the air quality impact analyses in ER Section 4.6 is limited to fugitive dust. The EIS impact analyses need to consider the entire range of emission sources (see RAI AQ-4), the peak year emission levels (see RAI AQ-5), as well as the entire range of pollutants generated by the proposed CISF to accurately characterize the air quality impacts. If additional air dispersion modeling is conducted in response to this RAI, consideration should be given to the information requests in RAI AQ-6 associated with the existing air dispersion modeling.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which require that the ER include a description of the proposed action and discuss the impacts of the proposed action.

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Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 101 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI AQ-8 Provide a technical basis for the assumption of a 50-percent reduction in emissions from dust suppression, given that various factors influencing the level of dust suppression activities are yet to be determined (e.g., identifying the specific mitigation measures that would be implemented). If a different efficiency value is warranted, then specify the value, provide a basis, and revise the emission inventory and impact analyses accordingly.

ER Section 4.6 states that the air emission inventory used for assessing impacts assumes a 50-percent reduction in fugitive dust emissions for dust suppression activities. However, the ER does not identify the actual, specific mitigation measure that would be implemented or the basis for the using this 50 percent value. Other ER text identifies several factors that influence the level of dust suppression activities: water conservation (see ER Section 4.2.3), possible requirements from an air permit, which has not yet been obtained (see ER Section 1.3.2.3), and implementation of a Best Management Emission Control Plan, which has not yet been developed (see ER Section 1.3.2.3). Providing a basis for the effectiveness of the dust suppression mitigation allows for an accurate characterization of the air emissions and associated impacts.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires that the ER include sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

CLIMATE CHANGE (CC)

RAI CC-1 Address the following aspects of climate change and the proposed actions greenhouse gas emissions:

  • Describe any relevant regional, state, or local goals or laws that address climate change.
  • Characterize the proposed actions greenhouse gas emission levels from stationary, mobile (e.g., onsite, local, and national), and indirect sources.
  • Disclose whether any mitigation, project design, or adaptation measures will be implemented to address greenhouse gas emissions from the proposed action.
  • Describe any areas where the environmental impacts of climate change overlap with the environmental impacts of the proposed action (e.g., water usage and availability).

The discussion of greenhouse gas emissions is limited to text in ER Section 8.5, citing NUREG-2157, and states that the proposed actions emission would be small but would add to the overall atmospheric burden of emissions that could contribute to potential long term impacts (NRC, 2014). The EIS needs to address the projects greenhouse gas emissions and the potential overlap of environmental impacts from climate change and the storage of SNF at the WCS site.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) through (d), which require that the ER include: a description of the proposed action and the environment affected; a discussion of the impacts of the proposed action; sufficient data to aid the NRC in its 23 C.I. 57 000176

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 102 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 development of an independent analysis; and a description of the status of compliance with applicable environmental quality standards and requirements, including limitations and requirements which have been imposed by Federal, State, regional, and local agencies having responsibility for environmental protection.

NOISE (NOI)

RAI NOI-1 Provide current information on measured background or ambient noise levels at the proposed CISF.

ER Sections 3.7.1 and 4.7.3 provide information on background noise levels at the neighoring URENCO facility measured in September 2003. In ER Section 4.7.3, ISP assumes that the measured September 2003 background noise levels at URENCO would be similar to current background noise levels at the proposed ISP CISF. Current site-specific information on background noise levels is necessary to describe the affected environment and establish background/ambient (baseline) conditions of the site so that the NRC staff can evaluate the impacts of construction and operation of the proposed CISF.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which require that the ER include a description of the affected environment and a discussion of the impacts of the proposed action.

RAI NOI-2 Provide estimates of peak noise levels that would be generated during construction and operation of the proposed CISF, for example, estimates of peak noise levels generated by vehicular and rail traffic, construction and operational equipment, and ancillary activities such as operation of the concrete batch plant.

ER Section 4.7.1 concludes that, (p)redicted noise levels, background noise levels, calculated construction noise levels, and operational noise levels should typically be well below both HUD and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidelines. However, the ER should estimate peak noise levels that would be generated during construction and operation of the proposed CISF to support this conclusion. Estimates of peak noise levels generated during construction and operation are needed to support the NRC staffs evaluation of potential noise impacts to offsite and onsite receptors.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which requires that the ER include a description of the affected environment and a discussion of the impacts of the proposed action.

RAI NOI-3 Provide information on peak noise to workers during construction and operation of the proposed CISF. This information should include:

  • Estimated peak noise levels that workers would be exposed to.

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  • Mitigation measures that would be implemented to reduce noise levels to workers.

The ER should assess the environmental impacts of noise to workers during construction and operation of the proposed CISF. Specifically, estimates of peak noise levels that workers will experience during construction and operation of the proposed CISF are needed to support the NRC staffs evaluation of noise impacts to onsite receptors.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which requires that the ER include a description of the affected environment and a discussion of the impacts of the proposed action.

CULTURAL AND HISTORIC RESOURCES (CHR)

RAI CHR-1 Clarify whether additional historic and cultural resources identification work, surveys, and Federal, State, or Tribal agency coordination will be needed prior to construction and operation of the proposed CISF because of construction activities potentially extending into New Mexico. If so, provide a description of the identification work, surveys, and agency coordination that would need to be completed and an anticipated schedule.

In response to its review of ISPs archeological survey of the proposed CISF site, the New Mexico State Historic Preservation Officer (NM SHPO) stated, The SHPO concurs that no additional cultural resources identification efforts are needed for this undertaking with the condition that all new ground-disturbing and construction activities are confined to Texas.

If, however, any construction related ground disturbances such as staging areas, equipment or materials storage yards, or access roads are needed in New Mexico, then a cultural resource survey will be required to identify and evaluate historic properties in the area of potential effects. (see ER Appendix A, Attachment 3-3). Figures in the ER and SAR show that the railroad side track to be built as part of the proposed CISF would extend into New Mexico (e.g., ER Figures 3.3-1, 3.6-1, 4.5-1, 4.12-1, and 6.1-1 and SAR Figures 1-1, 1-2, and 2-1).

Therefore, the route of the railroad side track would result in new ground-disturbing and construction activities in New Mexico. Specifically, the requested information is needed to support the NRC staffs evaluation of applicable agency coordination and consultation requirements and complete the NRC staffs description of the affected environment and assessment of environmental impacts on cultural and historic resources in the EIS.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (d), which require that the ER include a description of the affected environment and a description of the status of compliance with applicable environmental quality standards and requirements, including limitations and requirements which have been imposed by Federal, State, regional, and local agencies having responsibility for environmental protection.

RAI CHR-2 Provide a copy (electronic or website link) of the draft report or final report, if prepared, for the archeological survey conducted in May 2015 to inventory and evaluate archeological resources within the footprint of the proposed CISF.

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Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 104 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 ER Section 3.8.2 states that, In May 2015, a pedestrian archeological survey was completed in order to inventory and evaluate archeological resources on private land within the footprint of the proposed spent nuclear fuel CISF at the existing Waste Control Specialists waste disposal facility in western Andrews County, Texas. Information in ER Appendix A and D, indicates that the draft report for this survey entitled, Intensive Archeological Survey of the Proposed Waste Control Specialists Spent Nuclear Fuel Consolidated Interim Storage Facility, Andrews County, Texas, was submitted for review to the Texas Historical Commission (THC) on July 2, 2015.

The requested information is needed to support the NRC staffs description of the affected environment and assessment of environmental impacts on cultural and historic resources in the EIS.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which requires that the ER include a description of the affected environment and a discussion of the impacts of the proposed action.

SOCIOECONOMICS (SOC)

RAI SOC-1 Provide tax revenue information on a county and state level over a 40-year period.

Appendix A of the ER provides estimated employee compensation and regional tax impacts of the proposed CISF between 2019 and 2028. The iMpact analysis for PLANning (IMPLAN) model was run for a period of 20 years; however, ISP is requesting a license for a term of 40 years. This additional information is needed to evaluate the potential socioeconomic impacts on the states and the counties within the region during the requested license period.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b)(1), which requires that the ER include a description of the impacts of the proposed action.

PUBLIC AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH (POH)

RAI POH-1 Provide a map or figure showing monitoring locations for background radiation levels.

ER Section 3.11.1.1 (Background Radiation Levels at the CISF) provides monitoring results in Table 3.11-1, but should also include a figure showing the monitoring locations. Monitoring results should include information about the locations where the monitoring occurred. The requested information would allow the NRC staff to evaluate the applicability of measurements to the proposed CISF location.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

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Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 105 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI POH-2 Provide a map or figure of monitoring locations for historical exposures to radioactive materials.

ER Section 3.11.1.3 (Historical Exposure to Radioactive Materials at WCS) provides a table of monitoring results but should also include a map figure showing the monitoring locations.

Monitoring results should include information about the locations where the monitoring occurred.

The requested information would allow the NRC staff to evaluate the applicability of measurements to the proposed CISF location.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

WASTE MANAGEMENT (WM)

RAI WM-1 Provide generated waste volume estimates by waste type and facility lifecycle phase.

ER Section 3.12 (Waste Management) describes the wastes expected to be generated by the proposed action, including liquid (nonradioactive wastewater; sanitary) and solid waste (low-level radioactive waste, nonhazardous solid waste, hazardous waste). These descriptions do not provide information by lifecycle stage (i.e., construction, operations, decommissioning) and the expected volume of each waste that would be generated is not quantified.

Volume estimates should be provided for any solid wastes that could be generated in larger than negligible quantities, for example:

  • Annual and cumulative volumes of nonhazardous solid waste that would be generated from the fabrication of 3,200 storage systems over 20 years (ER Section 3.12.1.3)
  • Annual and cumulative volume of nonhazardous solid waste that would be generated during decommissioning The requested information will allow the NRC staff to evaluate the magnitude of potential waste management impacts for each proposed facility lifecycle stage. This includes impacts of waste generation on available capacity and operational life of disposal facilities.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

RAI WM-2 Provide additional information about the local municipal landfill and the WCS LLRW disposal facility, including the available capacity, annual disposed volume of waste, and currently projected operational life of these facilities.

ER Sections 3.12.1.3 (Solid Wastes) and 3.12.1.3.1 (Solid Low-Level Radioactive Waste) describe that nonhazardous solid waste and Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) would be disposed at a municipal landfill and the adjacent WCS LLRW facility, respectively, but provides no description of characteristics of these facilities. The characteristics of affected disposal 27 C.I. 57 000180

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 106 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 facilities such as available capacity, annual disposed volume, and operational life will allow the NRC staff to evaluate the impacts of proposed waste generation on these facilities.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

RAI WM-3 Clarify which NRC Regulatory Guide applicable to release of waste materials for disposal the application relies on.

ER Section 3.12.1.3.2 (Non-Radioactive Solid Waste) references NRC Regulatory Guide 1.86 for limits applicable to releasing waste materials for disposal. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.86 has been retired, but similar limits are referenced in Regulatory Guide 8.30. The commitments to follow NRC guidance in the application should reflect the currently applicable guidance.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

RAI WM-4 ISP should clarify ER statements about whether hazardous waste would be generated by the proposed action.

ER Section 1.3.2.4 (Pollution Prevention and Waste Management) states that small quantities of hazardous wastes would be generated and are expected to be much less than 100 kg in a month. This information appears to conflict with the statement in ER Section 3.12.1.3 (Solid Wastes) that indicates mixed and hazardous waste is not expected to be generated at the CISF.

If hazardous waste is generated by the proposed action, ISP should clarify if the hazardous waste would be disposed at the adjacent WCS Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) facility.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

CUMULATIVE IMPACTS (CI)

RAI CI-1 Identify and describe past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions that may result in a potential for cumulative environmental impacts within an 80-km [50-mi] radius of the proposed CISF.

ER Section 2.6 provides a description of present actions within a 48-km [30-mi] radius of the proposed CISF that have a potential for cumulative environmental impacts. However, other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions within and outside an 80-km [50-mi]

radius of the proposed CISF have the potential for cumulative environmental impacts. For example, oil and gas development and production activities, livestock grazing, renewable energy projects (e.g., wind and solar farms), and a number of reasonably foreseeable future actions (e.g., the proposed Eddy Lea Energy Alliance/Holtec CISF, the Ochoa Potash Mine Project, and the DK Disposal E & P Landfill and Processing Facility) all have the potential for 28 C.I. 57 000181

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 107 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 cumulative environmental impacts. The requested information is needed to support the NRC staffs evaluation of cumulative impacts in the EIS.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires that the ER contain an analysis of cumulative impacts that may result from the proposed action.

RAI CI-2 Provide additional information to support the analysis of cumulative impacts of both nuclear and non-nuclear past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future activites for all resource areas.

The analysis of cumulative impacts presented in ER Section 2.6 is limited to brief statements regarding (i) air quality attributable to expansion of the WCS-Controlled Compact Waste Facility and Federal Waste Facility, operations at Permian Basin Materials, and manufacture of concrete at WCSs existing concrete batch plant; (ii) competition for and use of aggregate, crushed rock, and other mineral resources; and (iii) radiological doses attributable to the nearby URENCO USA uranium enrichment facility and WCSs low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities. To support the NRC staffs analysis of the potential cumulative impacts of the proposed action, address potential cumulative impacts relevant to all resource areas, including an evaluation with supporting information of the environmental impacts of nuclear acitivities (e.g., URENCO USA, WCSs low-level radioactive waste facilities, and the proposed Eddy Lea Energy Alliance/Holtec CISF) and non-nuclear activities (e.g., oil and gas exploration and development, potash mining, and livestock grazing) within an 80-km [50-mi] radius of the proposed CISF. The requested information is needed to support the NRC staffs evaluation of cumulative impacts in the EIS.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires that the ERs contain an analysis of cumulative impacts that may result from the proposed action.

ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES AND MONITORING (EMM)

RAI EMM-1 Provide additional information on the proposed pre-operational and operational Radiological Monitoring Program for the proposed CISF. The additional information should include:

  • Media or effluents to be sampled.
  • Number and location of sample collection points, including distal control sample collection points.
  • Radiological measuring devices or methods of analysis and the radiological constituents to be analyzed, including lower limits of detection.
  • Procedures/protocols for sample collection (e.g., sample size, sample collection frequency, and sampling duration), handling, preservation, and transport.
  • Discussion that justifies the choice of sample locations, analyses, frequencies, duration, sizes, and lower limits of detection.

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Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 108 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 ER Section 6.3 provides a limited discussion and few details about the pre-operational and operational Radiological Monitoring Program for the proposed CISF. Specifically, the additional information is needed to support the NRC staffs description of the applicants pre-operational and operational Radiological Monitoring Program and the NRC staffs environmental evaluation of the adequacy of radiological monitoring activities for the proposed CISF to demonstrate compliance with the requirements in 10 CFR 72.104 (Criteria for radionuclide material in effluents and direct radiation from an ISFSI or MRS).

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

COST-BENEFIT (CB)

RAI CB-1 Revise the quantitative cost and benefit estimates in ER Chapter 7 to include discounting and provide details and assumptions (e.g., a project schedule by year specifying when activities occur) or provide a basis for not doing so for any of the cost factors.

Discounting was not used for any of the estimated costs and benefits of the proposed action and no-action alternative presented in ER Chapter 7. ER Section 7.2.1 explains that discounting was not used because ISFSI operations include substantial labor, technological, and regulatory compliance expenditures, and it was assumed that these expenses remain relatively constant. The justification for not discounting appears to focus only on ISFSI operational costs associated with the eliminated storage costs presented in ER Section 7.2.1.

However, this only represents one of the three key cost factors presented in the analysis and the nature of the other two costs is somewhat different than the ISFSI operation cost. The cost for the development of the CISF and relocation of SNF described in ER Section 7.3 includes significant capital and infrastructure costs (see ER Table 7.4-2). The cost-benefit analysis for the repurposed land in ER Section 7.2.2 accounts for the future estimated value of the land at decommissioned nuclear-purposed land once the license is terminated (see ER Table 7.2-6).

The net benefit calculation in ER Section 7.4.1 uses the undiscounted values from all three of these key qualitative estimates. Discounting is appropriate when analyzing this proposed action because of the 40-year timeframe and the nature of some of the costs. Specifically, discounting the quantitative estimates is needed to support the description of the costs and benefits in the NRCs EIS. Discounting requires specifying the timing (i.e., the specific years) in which activities occur. Key high dollar activities include the construction, operation, and decommissioning of the CISF as well as the SNF transportation. The details and assumptions associated with the calculation (e.g., a project schedule by year specifying when activities occur) are needed to support NRCs staffs understanding of how the discounting calculations were performed and for evaluation of cost and benefits of the proposed action and no action alternative.

The requested information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires that the ER include consideration of the benefits and costs of the proposed action and its alternatives as well as contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

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Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 109 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI CB-2 Clarify and supplement the SNF transportation schedule and associated assumptions as appropriate in the ER to

  • Ensure the SNF transportation schedule and associated assumptions used for the cost benefit analysis are consistent with this information, as described in other parts of the ER or revise the analyses accordingly.
  • To the extent it is known, provide greater detail for the assumptions for the shipment of SNF to the proposed CISF in future potential expansions of the CISF beyond the currently proposed 5000 MTUs ER Section 7.2.1 describes that SNF transport occurs over a 31 year period. ER Section 4.2.7.1 states that the SNF would be transported over a 20 year period, assuming up to 200 canisters of SNF being transported to the CISF annually. The detailed assumptions for the SNF transport in ER Section 7.2.1 address the initial transportation at a greater level of detail than the potential future expansion (e.g., ER Table 7.2-3).

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and 10 CFR 51.45(c), which require that the ER include a description of the proposed action and sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

RAI CB-3 Provide additional information, supplement the calculation and associated assumptions for the total SNF storage costs presented in ER Table 7.2-2. This should include the following:

  • Provide the detailed calculation and associated assumptions for the total SNF storage cost for both potential future expansions (all eight phases) and no action currently presented in ER Table 7.2-2.
  • Supplement the current information in ER Table 7.2-2 to provide the cost estimates for implementing just phase 1 (i.e., the initial license request) and the detailed calculation and associated assumptions or provide a basis for not doing so.
  • Supplement ER Table 7.2.2 to also include cost estimates, which assume no additional reactors are shutdown (i.e., use an annual cost of storing SNF for an operating reactor) and revise the cost benefit analyses in ER Chapter 7 accordingly or provide a basis for not doing so.
  • Identify the reference for the statement in ER Section 7.2 that by 2053 there will be a total of 71 shutdown reactor sites in the United States according to NRC data (see AIN-1).

ER Table 7.2-2 contains the assumed total cost of storing SNF storage at the various generation sites over the 40 years (i.e., the proposed CISF 40-year license period) for both the full build out (i.e. all eight phases) (with a CISF) and no-action alternative (without a CISF). The difference between these two values is the avoided reimbursement cost. ER Section 7.2.1 provides a general description on how these values were calculated based on the transition of SNF from the current storage locations to the proposed ISP site. However, the ER does not 31 C.I. 57 000184

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 110 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 provide sufficient information for the NRC staff to determine exactly how the particular values in Table 7.2-2 (and the associated Figure 7.2-1) were calculated. ER Table 7.2-2 also does not provide the cost estimate information for just phase 1 (i.e., the initial license request).

ER Table 7.2-2 assumes an annual cost of storing SNF at each generation site based on this activity occurring at a shutdown reactor. NRC staff requests that this table be supplemented to also include estimates assuming an annual cost of storing SNF based on this activity occurring at an operating reactor (i.e., no additional reactors are shut down). Using an annual storage cost based on a value for an operating reactor could alter the estimated benefit as calculated in ER Table 7.2-2. NRC staff consider this an important component for characterizing the costs and benefits. As requested in this RAI for the current estimate in ER Table 7.2-2, provide the detailed calculation and associated assumptions for the calculation so NRC staff can follow exactly how theses cost estimates were generated. Specifically, this additional information is needed to support NRC staffs description of the total cost for the proposed action and the no-action alternative in the NRCs EIS.

The requested information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires that the ER include consideration of the benefits and costs of the proposed action and its alternatives as well as contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

RAI CB-4 Provide additional information, supplement the descriptions in ER Section 7.3 concerning the calculation, and associated assumptions for the costs of constructing, operating, and decommissioning the facility. This should include the following:

  • Supplement the current information to provide the cost estimates for implementing just phase 1 (i.e., the initial license request) or provide a basis for not doing so.
  • Clarify whether the staffing estimates in ER Table 7.3-10 represent the total number of employees supporting the ISP operations or only the additional new hires augmenting the existing WCS staff.

ER Section 7.3 explains that the costs for developing the proposed CISF, relocating the SNF to this facility, and operating the ISFSI incorporates the assumptions and cost estimates from a 2009 EPRI report (EPRI, 2009) and adjusts values, where appropriate, for the circumstances of the proposed CISF. However, the cost estimates in ER Section 7.3 appear to include future expansions (i.e. all eight phases) and do not include such estimates for just phase 1 (i.e., the initial license request). It is unclear whether the staffing estimates in Table 7.3-10 represent the total number of employees supporting the ISP operations or only the new employees augmenting the existing WCS staff. Specifically, this additional information is needed to support the NRC staffs description of the total cost for developing the proposed CISF, relocating the SNF to this facility, and operating this facility in the NRCs EIS.

The requested information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires that the ER include consideration of the benefits and costs of the proposed action and its alternatives as well as contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

32 C.I. 57 000185

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 111 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 REFERENCED INFORMATION RAI RI-1 Provide an electronic copy or active website link to the final version of WCSs Application for License to Authorize Near Surface Land Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste (dated 2007).

Citations in the ER indicate that relevant information and studies can be found in WCSs Application for License to Authorize Near Surface Land Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste (dated 2007). The requested information is needed to confirm information presented in the ER and to support NRCs evaluation of environmental impacts in the EIS.

This information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(c), which requires ERs to contain sufficient data to aid the NRC in its development of an independent analysis.

REFERENCES Anaya, R. and I. Jones. Groundwater Availability Model for the Edwards-Trinity (Plateau) and Pecos Valley Aquifers of Texas. Austin, Texas: Texas Water Development Board Report 373.

April 2009.

CEQ. Considering Cumulative Effects under the National Environmental Policy Act.

ADAMS Accession No. ML12243A349. Washington, DC: Council on Environmental Quality.

1997.

EPRI. Cost Estimate for an Away-From-Reactor Generic Interim Storage Facility (GISF) for Spent Nuclear Fuel. Report No. 1018722. Palo Alto, California: Electric Power Research Institute. 2009.

ISP. Interim Storage Partners LLC License Application. Docket No. 72-1050, Rev. 2.

ADAMS Accession No. ML18206A483. Andrews, Texas: Interim Storage Partners LLC.

2018a.

ISP. WCS Consolidated Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility Environmental Report.

Docket No. 72-1050, Rev. 2. ADAMS Accession Package No. ML18221A405.

Andrews, Texas: Interim Storage Partners LLC. 2018b.

ISP. WCS Consolidated Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility Safety Analysis Report.

Docket No. 72-1050, Rev. 2. ADAMS Accession Package No. ML18221A408.

Andrews, Texas: Interim Storage Partners LLC. 2018c.

Lehman, T.M. and K. Rainwater. Geology of the WCSFlying W Ranch, Andrews County, Texas. Texas Tech University Water Resources Center: Lubbock, Texas. 2000.

Meyer, J.E., M.R. Wise, and S. Kalaswad. Pecos Valley Aquifer, West Texas: Structure and Brackish Groundwater. Austin, Texas: Texas Water Development Board, Report 382, June 2012.

33 C.I. 57 000186

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 112 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 NRC. Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel:

Final Report, Volume 1. ADAMS Accession No. ML14196A105. Washington, DC:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. September 2014.

NRC. Guidance for Electronic Submissions to the NRC. ADAMS Accession No. ML13031A056. Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 2011.

NRC. NUREG-1748, Environmental Review Guidance for Licensing Actions Associated with NMSS Programs. ADAMS Accession No. ML032450279. Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. August 2003.

NRC. Regulatory Guide 8.30, Rev. 1, Health Physics Surveys in Uranium Recovery Facilities.

ADAMS Accession No. ML021260524. Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. May 2002.

NRC. NUREG-1567, Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities. ADAMS Accession No. ML003686776. Washington, DC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

March 2000.

TCEQ. Draft Environmental and Safety Analysis of a Proposed Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility in Andrews County, Texas. Austin, Texas: Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. 380 pp. August 2008.

34 C.I. 57 000187

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 113 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 22 000188

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 114 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 INTERIM STORAGE PARTNERS

  • June 26, 2019 E-54576 Director, Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

. U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

  • Attn: Doc_ument Control Desk One White Flint North

. 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Subject:

Partial Response to RAI Part 1, Physical Security, including Revision 3 of the Physical Security Plan, Guard Training and Qualification Plan, Docket 72-1050

Reference:

1. Letter from John-Chau Nguyen (NRC) to Elicia Sanchez (ISP),

Interim Storage Partners' License Application to Construct and Operate' the Waste Control Specialists Consolidated Interim Storage Facility, Andrews County, Texas, Docket No. 72-1050 - First Request for Additional Information Part 1, Physical Security, dated November 6, 2018 (E-51587)

2.
  • Letter from Elicia B. Sanchez {ISP) to Document Control Desk (NRC), Partial Response to RAI Part 1, Physical Security, including Revision 3 of the Physical Security Plan, Guard Training and Qualification Plan, Docket 72-1050, dated January 7, 2019
3. Letter from Elicia B. *Sanchez (ISP) to Document Control Desk .

(NRC), Partial Response to RAI Part 1, Physical Security, including Reyision 3 of the Physical Security Plan, Guard Training and Qualification Plan, Docket 72-1050, E-53893, dated March 22, 2019

4. Letter from Jack Boshoven (ISP) to Document Control Desk (NRC), .

Interim Storage Partners {ISP) First Request for Additional Information *RAI) Proposed Submittal Schedule, Docket 72-1050, E-54395, dated May 31, 2019 - ,

Sao 1 Safeguards Information

  • When separated from.Safeguards Information enclosure(s), this

/\fr-1552~,

document is decontrolled provided the transmittal document does not otherwise warrant protection from the unauthorized disclosure.

NJvf 55 2D P.O. Box 1129

  • interimstoragepartners.com.

C.I. 62 ;J11'5S 000189

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 115 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Safeguards Information Document Contr9I Desk E-54576 Page 2 of 3 Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP) hereby submits its draft RAI responses for Physical Security RAls RAl-9, -10, -11, -12, -13, -14, -16, -19, -22, -23, and -26 and a new 2019 WCS CISF Blast Analysis supporting these responses. ISP requests that a meeting be scheduled to discuss this submittal with NRC Staff in accordance with ISPs reference'4 letter.

In addition ISP also submits revised or supplemented draft responses to Physical Security RAls RAl-6 and -8 also to be discussed in the aforementioned requested meeting.

Interim Storage Partners provided a partial response to the Request for Additional Information (RAI) Part 1, Physical Security documented in the attachments to the NRC letter dated November 6, 2018 (Reference 1) on January 7, 2019 (R~ference 2): The reference 2 submittal provided responses to seventeen (17) of the twenty-eight (28)

RAls attached to Reference 1. On March 22, 2019 ISP (Reference 3) provided draft .

responses to the remaining eleven (11) RAls along with topics of discussion/clarification associated with some of the RAls. The revisions to the various documents (PSP, TQP, etc.) discussed in the Draft RAI responses were not completed at that time were not provided to the PSP, TQP and SCP with that submittal. NRC and ISP met on April 4, 2019 to discuss th~ draft responses and topics identified in our draft responses.

This submittal incorporates the items discussed during the April 4, 2019 meeting. Per our discussions during the meeting, ISP is including Revision 4(Draft) of the PSP, TQP and SCP. Also discussed in the April 4, 2019 meeting was the 2015 blast analysis and

.ISP is evaluating superseding or revising this analysis to address verbal comments and will submit the result to the NRC with the final responses to the Physical Security RAls.

Enclosures 1 through 5 are marked as Safeguards Information and must be withheld from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 73.22. Enclosure 6 contains a full size PDF copy of attachment 10.1 and 10.2 of the PSP and is not designated as SGI when separated from the PSP.

ISP requests that a copy of all correspondence regarding this matter be directly mailed to Mr. Jack Boshoveo, Chief Engineer CISF Licensing and Engineering, at 7135 Minstrel Way, Suite 300, Columbia, MD 21045. _,

Safeguards Information When separated from Safeguards Information enclosure(s), this document is decontrolled provided the transmittal document does not C.I. 62 otherwise warrant protection from the unauthorized dJsclosure.

000190

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 116 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Safeguards Information Document Control Desk E-54576 Page 3 of 3 Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Jack Boshoven by telephone at (410) 910-6955, *or by email at jack.boshoven@orano.group.

Sincerely,

(__

UL:-~~

Elicia B: Sanchez, -

Chief Financial Officer Interim Storage Partners LLC cc: John (Chau) Nguyen (NRC SFM) - Letter Only Jeff Isakson, ISPffN Americas - Letter Only Jack Boshoven, ISPffN Americas - Letter Only

Enclosures:

1. Draft RAI Responses dated June 26, 2019 (SGI)
2. Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Physical Security Plan, PSP-100, Revision 4 (Draft) (SGI) '-
3. Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Security Training and Qualification Plan, TQP-700, Revision 4 (Draft) (SGI)
4. Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safeguards Contingency Plan, PSP-300, Revision 4 (Draft) (SGI)
5. 2019 CISF Blast Analysis, Dated June 13, 2019 (Draft) (SGI)
6. DVD with full size print of PSP Attachments 10.1 and 10.2 (Not SGI)

Safeguards Information When separated from Safeguards Information enclosure(s), this document is decontrolled provided the transmittal document does not otherwise warrant protection from the unauthorized disclosure. C.I. 62 000191

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 117 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 23 000192

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 118 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 June 28, 2019 E-54423 Director, Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Subject:

Submittal of Responses to Transportation First RAIs, Part 3, Docket 72-1050 CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002

Reference:

1. Letter from John-Chau Nguyen (NRC) to Jeffery D. Isakson, Interim Storage Partners LLCs License Application To Construct And Operate The Waste Control Specialists Consolidated Interim Storage Facility, Andrews County, Texas, Docket No. 72-1050 -

First Request For Additional Information, Part 3, dated April 23, 2019 Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP) hereby submits responses to the Transportation RAIs from First Request for Additional Information, Part 3 issued April 23, 2019 (Reference 1) to support the continued review of the WCS CISF License Application.

Contained in this submittal are the responses, including revised Environmental Report (ER) pages and other supporting documents.

In responding to the Transportation RAIs, ISP reviewed the original calculation and decided to regenerate the basis transportation evaluation consistent with the TN Americas Quality Assurance Requirements for licensing activities. Although there are small changes to the output values, the conclusions remain the same as the original evaluation described in Section 4.2 of the ER. A copy of the revised transportation evaluation is included in Enclosure 4.

The following enclosures are being submitted:

P.O. Box 1129

  • interimstoragepartners.com C.I. 63.1 000193

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 119 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Document Control Desk E-54423 Page 2 of 3

  • Enclosure 2, herein, provides the responses to the Transportation RAls . Each RAI response has a section stating the impact of the response on the ER indicating which sections, tables, etc. , have been changed. (Public)
  • Enclosure 3 provides the ER changed pages associated with the RAI responses .

(Public)

  • Enclosure 4 is a copy of ISP Calculation WCS01 -0506, Revision O associated with the RAI responses (Proprietary) .
  • Enclosure 5 includes the RADTRAN and WebTRAGIS input/output files (asci text files) and dose and risk calculation spreadsheets (native Excel' format) from ISP calculation WCS01 -0506 Revision O (Proprietary).

Please note that Enclosure 5 deviates from the NRC guidance on electronic submittals as described above.

Should you have any questions regarding this submission, please contact Mr. Jack Boshoven, of my staff, by telephone at (410) 910-6955, or by email at jack.boshoven@orano.group.

Sincerely, Jeffery D. Isakson Chief Executive Officer/President Interim Storage Partners LLC cc: John-Chau Nguyen , Senior Project Manager, U.S. NRC Jack Boshoven , ISP LLC Elicia Sanchez, ISP LLC Renee Murdock, ISP LLC Enclosures :

1. Affidavits Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
a. Interim Storage Partners
2. RAI Responses (Public)
3. ER Changed Pages (Public)
4. Calculation WCS01-0506, Revision O (Proprietary)
5. Input/output files and Spreadsheets supporting Calculation WCS01-0506 (Proprietary)

C.I. 63.1 000194

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 120 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Document Control Desk E-54423 Page 3 of 3 Document Components:

001 PUBLIC ISP Transmittal Letter.pdf, 778,663 bytes 002 PUBLIC Encl 1 Affidavits.pdf, 896,315 bytes 003 PUBLIC Encl 2 RAI responses.pdf, 190,865 bytes 004 PUBLIC Encl 3 ER Changed Pages.pdf, 1,388,775 bytes 005 SUNSI Encl 4 Calculation WCS01-0506.pdf, 4,693,948 bytes, Proprietary 006 SUNSI Encl 5 Computer Files Associated with WCS01-0506 (disk), 13,247,079 bytes, Proprietary OSM#1 (Entire submittal except for the computer files):

001 PUBLIC ISP Transmittal Letter.pdf, 778,663 bytes 002 PUBLIC Encl 1 Affidavits.pdf, 896,315 bytes 003 PUBLIC Encl 2 RAI responses.pdf, 190,865 bytes 004 PUBLIC Encl 3 ER Changed Pages.pdf, 1,388,775 bytes 005 SUNSI Encl 4 Calculation WCS01-0506.pdf, 4,693,948 bytes, Proprietary OSM#2 (Enclosure 5):

006 SUNSI Encl 5 Computer Files Associated with WCS01-0506 (disk), 13,247,079 bytes, Proprietary OSM#3 (Public Information Only):

001 PUBLIC ISP Transmittal Letter.pdf, 778,663 bytes 002 PUBLIC Encl 1 Affidavits.pdf, 896,315 bytes 003 PUBLIC Encl 2 RAI responses.pdf, 190,865 bytes 004 PUBLIC Encl 3 ER Changed Pages.pdf, 1,388,775 bytes C.I. 63.1 000195

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 121 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 24 000196

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 122 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 June 28, 2019 E-54422 Director, Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Subject:

Submittal of Additional Partial Response to First RAI, Part 1, Docket 72-1050 CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002

Reference:

1. Letter from John-Chau Nguyen (NRC) to Jeffery D. Isakson, Interim Storage Partners License Application to Construct and Operate the Waste Control Specialists Consolidated Interim Storage Facility, Andrews County, Texas, Docket 72-1050 - First Request for Additional Information, Part 1, dated November 16, 2018 2 Letter from Jeffery D. Isakson (ISP) to Document Control Desk, Submittal of Partial Response to First RAI, Part 1, Docket 72-1050 CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002, E-54257, dated May 31, 2019 Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP) hereby submits responses to RAIs (RAI NP-2.4-2, NP-2.6-1, NP-2.6-2, NP-2.6-6, P-2.6-1, P-2.6-2 and P-2.6-4) from First Request for Additional Information, Part 1 issued November 16, 2018 (Reference 1) to support the continued review of the License Application. Contained in this submittal are the responses, including revised safety analysis report (SAR) pages and other supporting documents, which incorporate comments from our April 11, 2019 meeting with the NRC discussing our draft responses to those RAIs.

The following enclosures are being submitted:

  • Enclosure 1 includes affidavits pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390 from Interim Storage Partners, Waste Control Specialists, and NAC International.

P.O. Box 1129

  • interimstoragepartners.com C.I. 64.1 000197

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 123 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Document Control Desk E-54422 Page 2 of 3

  • Enclosure 2, herein, provides a proprietary version of the response to the RAls.

Each RAI response has a section stating the impact of the response on the SAR indicating which sections, tables, etc. , have been changed.

  • Enclosure 3 provides a public version of Enclosure 2 (RAI responses).
  • Enclosure 4 provides the proprietary version of the SAR changed pages associated with the RAI responses .
  • Enclosure 5 is a public version of Enclosure 4 (SAR changed pages) .

Should you have any questions regarding this submission, please contact Mr. Jack Boshoven, of my staff, by telephone at (410) 910-6955, or by email at jack.boshoven@orano.group .

Sincerely, Jeffery D. Isakson Chief Executive Officer/President Interim Storage Partners LLC cc: John-Chau Nguyen , Senior Project Manager, U.S. NRC

.Jack Boshoven , ISP LLC Elicia Sanchez, ISP LLC Renee Murdock, ISP LLC

Enclosures:

1. Affidavits Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
a. Interim Storage Partners
b. Waste Control Specialists
c. NAC International
2. RAI Responses (Proprietary Version)
3. RAI Responses (Public Version)
4. SAR Changed Pages (Proprietary and Security-Related Version)
5. SAR Changed Pages (Public Version)

C.I. 64.1 000198

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 124 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Document Control Desk E-54422 Page 3 of 3 Document Components:

001 PUBLIC ISP Transmittal Letter.pdf, 730,534 bytes 002 PUBLIC Encl 1 Affidavits.pdf, 929,433 bytes 003 SUNSI Encl 2 RAI responses proprietary version.pdf, 11,089,290 bytes, Proprietary 004 PUBLIC Encl 3 RAI responses public version.pdf, 11,627,547 bytes 005 SUNSI Encl 4 SAR Changed Pages.pd.pdf, 2,889,400 bytes, Proprietary 006 PUBLIC Encl 5 SAR Changed Pages.pdf, 2,697,138 bytes OSM#1 (Entire Submittal):

001 PUBLIC ISP Transmittal Letter.pdf, 730,534 bytes 002 PUBLIC Encl 1 Affidavits.pdf, 929,433 bytes 003 SUNSI Encl 2 RAI responses proprietary version.pdf, 11,089,290 bytes, Proprietary 004 PUBLIC Encl 3 RAI responses public version.pdf, 11,627,547 bytes 005 SUNSI Encl 4 SAR Changed Pages.pd.pdf, 2,889,400 bytes, Proprietary 006 PUBLIC Encl 5 SAR Changed Pages.pdf, 2,697,138 bytes OSM#2 (Public Information Only):

001 PUBLIC ISP Transmittal Letter.pdf, 730,534 bytes 002 PUBLIC Encl 1 Affidavits.pdf, 929,433 bytes 004 PUBLIC Encl 3 RAI responses public version.pdf, 11,627,547 bytes 006 PUBLIC Encl 5 SAR Changed Pages.pdf, 2,697,138 bytes C.I. 64.1 000199

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 125 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 25 000200

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 126 Date Filed: 05/16/2022

.INTE:RI.M

. . PARTNER$:.* STORAGE: . ** . .

July 31, 2019 E-54844 Director, Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk

  • One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Subject:

Submittal of Partial Response to First RAI, Part 1, Docket72-1050.

CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002

Reference:

1. Letter from John-Chau Nguyen (NRG) to Jeffery* D. Isakson, "Interim Storage Partners' License Application to Construct and Operate the Waste Control Specialists Consolidated Interim . .

Storage Facility, And~ews County, Texas, Docket 72-1050 - First.

Request for Additional Information, Part 1," dated November 16, 2018 2 Letter from Jeffery D. Isakson to Director, Division of Spent Fuel Management (NRG), "Submittal of Partial Response to First RAI, Part 1, Docket72-1050 CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002,"

dated May 31, 2019 Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP) hereby submits supplemental information in support of .our partial response to the First Request for Additional Information, Part :1. issued November 16, 2018 (Reference 1) provided in Reference 2 to support the continued review of the WCS CISF License Application .. Contained in this submittal are the .

supplemental documents . NRG staff

. indicated

. . . . fo have would be useful . .

in support of their review during the 20June19 audit at the WCS CISF Site.

!Jf-15520

Jlvl 5 s 2 i P.O. Box .1129
  • interimstoragepartne.rs.com C.I. 67.1 000201

f Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 127 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Document Control Desk E-54844 2 of2 The following enclosures are being submitted:

  • Enclosure 1, Report on Mapping of a Trench Through Pedogenic Calcrete (Caliche) across a Drainage and Possible Lineament, Waste Control Specialists Disposal Site, Andrews County, TX. April 2007.
  • Enclosure 2, Seismic and Resistivity Surveys Exhibit A and Exhibit B, 2001.
  • Enclosure 3, OAG Water Levels: Empirical and Modeled Relationships between Precipitation and Infiltration, 2011.
  • Enclosure 4, Report on Activities to Satisfy Byproduct RML Conditions 41A, 41C, and 43, July 2008.
  • Enclosure 5, Byproduct Material Facility Siting Investigation, 2001.
  • Enclosure 6, Photos of Cores from 2001 Byproduct Material Siting Investigation.

Should you have any questions regarding this submission, please contact me by telephone at (410) 910-6955, or by email at jack.boshoven@orano.group.

Sincerely, a k Boshoven I

M ief Engineer CISF, Licensing and Engineering Interim Storage Partners LLC l cc: John-Chau Nguyen, Senior Project Manager, U.S. NRG Jeff Isakson, ISP LLC Elicia Sanchez, ISP LLC En,closures:

1. Report on Mapping of a Trench Through Pedogenic Calcrete (Caliche) across a Drainage and Possible Lineament, Waste Control Specialists Disposal Site, Andrews County, TX. April 2007 (Public)
2. Seismic and Resistivity Surveys Exhibit A and Exhibit B, 2001 (Public)
3. OAG Water Levels: Empirical and Modeled Relationships between Precipitation and Infiltration, 2011 (Public)
4. Report on Activities to Satisfy Byproduct RML Conditions 41A, 41C, and 43, July 2008 (Public)
5. Byproduct Material Facility Siting Investigation, 2001 (Public)
6. Photos of Cores from 2001 Byproduct Material Siting Investigation (Public)

C.I. 67.1 000202

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 128 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 26 000203

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 129 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 August 20, 2019 E-54979 Director, Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Subject:

Supplemental Information for RAI Part 1 in Support of RAI NP-2.4-1 and NP-2.4-2, Docket 72-1050 CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002

Reference:

1. Letter from John-Chau Nguyen (NRC) to Jeffery D. Isakson, Interim Storage Partners License Application to Construct and Operate the Waste Control Specialists Consolidated Interim Storage Facility, Andrews County, Texas, Docket 72-1050 - First Request for Additional Information, Part 1, dated November 16, 2018 2 Letter from Jeffery D. Isakson to Document Control Desk (NRC),

Submittal of Partial Response to First RAI, Part 1, Docket 72-1050 CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002, dated May31, 2019 Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP) hereby submits supplemental information in support of our responses to RAI NP-2.4-1 from the First Request for Additional Information, Part 1 issued November 16, 2018 (Reference 1) to support the continued review of the WCS CISF License Application. Enclosure 1 to this letter is the revised Attachment B to SAR Chapter 2 referenced in our response to RAI NP-2.4-1. In addition, revised Attachment B to SAR Chapter 2 also supports the response to RAI NP-2.4-2 from Reference 1.

P.O. Box 1129

  • interimstoragepartners.com C.I. 68.1 000204

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 130 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Document Control Desk E-54979 Page 2 of 3 Should you have any questions regarding this submission, please contact Mr. Jack Boshoven, of my staff, by telephone at (410) 910-6955, or by email at jack.boshoven@orano.group.

Sincerely, Jeffery D. Isakson Chief Executive Officer/President Interim Storage Partners LLC cc: John-Chau Nguyen, Senior Project Manager, U.S. NRC Jack Boshoven, ISP LLC Elicia Sanchez, ISP LLC Renee Murdock, ISP LLC

Enclosure:

1. Updated Attachment B to SAR Chapter 2 C.I. 68.1 000205

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 131 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Document Control Desk E-54979 Page 3 of 3 Document Components:

001 PUBLIC ISP Transmittal Letter.pdf, 231,598 bytes 002 PUBLIC Encl 1 SAR App B Chapt 2 Part 1 of 5.pdf, 72,469,044 bytes 003 PUBLIC Encl 1 SAR App B Chapt 2 Part 2 of 5.pdf, 70,484,323 bytes 004 PUBLIC Encl 1 SAR App B Chapt 2 Part 3 of 5.pdf, 90,285,284 bytes 005 PUBLIC Encl 1 SAR App B Chapt 2 Part 4 of 5.pdf, 87,256,023 bytes 006 PUBLIC Encl 1 SAR App B Chapt 2 Part 5 of 5.pdf, 85,946,824 bytes OSM#1 (Entire Submittal):

001 PUBLIC ISP Transmittal Letter.pdf, 231,598 bytes 002 PUBLIC Encl 1 SAR App B Chapt 2 Part 1 of 5.pdf, 72,469,044 bytes 003 PUBLIC Encl 1 SAR App B Chapt 2 Part 2 of 5.pdf, 70,484,323 bytes 004 PUBLIC Encl 1 SAR App B Chapt 2 Part 3 of 5.pdf, 90,285,284 bytes 005 PUBLIC Encl 1 SAR App B Chapt 2 Part 4 of 5.pdf, 87,256,023 bytes 006 PUBLIC Encl 1 SAR App B Chapt 2 Part 5 of 5.pdf, 85,946,824 bytes C.I. 68.1 000206

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 132 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 27 000207

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 133 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Safeguards Information

,~*...

INTERIM STORAGE PARTNERS September 18, 2019 E-55056

  • Director, Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Subject:

Completed Response to RAI Part 1*, Physical Security, including Revision 5 of the Physical Security Plan, Training and Qualification Plan, and Safeguards Contingency Plan, Docket 72-1050 CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002

Reference:

1. Letter from John-Chau Nguyen (NRC) to Elicia Sanchez (ISP),

Interim Storage Partners' License Application to Construct and Operate the Waste Control Specialists Consolidated Interim Storage Facility, Andrews County, Texas, Docket No. 72-1050- First Request for Additional Information Part 1, Physical Security, dated November 6, 2018

2. Letter from Elicia 8. Sanchez (ISP) to Document Control Desk (NRC), Partial Response to RAI Part 1, Physical Security, including Revision 3 of.the Physical Security Plan, Guard Training and Qualification Plan, Docket 72-1050, E-53364, dated January 7, 2019
3. Letter from Elicia B. Sanchez (ISP) to Document Control Desk .

(NRC), Partial Response to RAI Part 1, Physical Security, including Revision 3 of the Physical Security Plan, Guard Training and Qualification Plan, Docket 72-1050, E-54576, dated June 26, 2019

4. Letter from Jack Boshoven (ISP) to Document Control Desk (NRC),

Interim Storage Partners (ISP) First Request for Additional Information (RAI) Proposed Submittal Schedule, Docket 72-1050 CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002, E-54395, dated May 31, 2019 Safeguards Information (' b}

~6 When separated from Safeguards Information enclosure(s), this document is decontrolled provided the transmittal document does not Nv--15 5-ZD otherwise warrant protection from the unauthorized disclosure.

NH S>SZ}p P.O. Box 1129

  • i~terimstoragepartners.com C.I. 71 fVHSS 000208

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 134 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Safeguards Information Document Control Desk E-55056 Page 2 of 3 Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP) hereby submits its RAI responses for Physical Security RAls RAl-9, -10, -11, -12, -13, -14, -16, -19, -22, -23, and -26 and the 2019 WCS CISF B,ast Analysis supporting these responses. In addition ISP also submits revised or supplemented responses to Physical Security RAls RAl-4, -5, -6, -8 and -27.

ISP provided a partial response to the Request for Additional Information (RAI) Part 1,

  • Physical Security documented in the attachments to the NRG letter dated November 6, 2018 (Reference 1) on January 7, 2019 (Reference 2). The reference 2 submittal -

provided responses to seventeen (17) of the twenty-eight (28) RAls attached to Reference 1. On June 26, 2019, ISP (Reference 3) provided draft responses to the remaining eleven (11) RAls, draft revised or supplemented responses to RAls RAl-6 and -8, along revision 4 of the Physical Security Plan.Training & Qualification Plan, Safeguards Contingency Plan and draft 2019 WCS CISF Blast Analysis.

This submittal incorporates the changes based on the discussions ISP has had with NRC staff regarding the previous draft submittals. This submittal is consistent with the

  • schedule identified in Table 3 of Reference [4].

The following enclosures are being submitted:

  • Enclosure 1 Contains the RAI Responses dated September 18, 2019 (SGI)
  • Enclosure 2 is a copy of the Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Physical Security Plan, PSP-100, Revision 5 (SGI) *
  • Enclosure 3 is a copy of the Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Security Training and Qualification Plan; TQP-700, Revision 5 (SGI)
  • Enclosure 5 is a copy of updated 2019 CISF Blast Analysis, Dated August 8, 2019 (SGI)
  • Enclosure 6 includes copies of the MOUs (Change Pages to the Consolidated Emergency Response Plan) that were revised as described in the RAI responses (Public):
  • Enclosure 7 is a full size print out of PSP Attachment 10.1 Drawing (SRI)

Enclosures 1 through 5 are marked as Safeguards Information and must be withheld from unauthorized disclosure pursuant to 1b CFR 73.22: Enclosure 1 contains a full size PDF copy of attachment 10.1 and is not designated as SGI when separated from the PSP; however it contains Security Related Information and should be appropriately controlled.

  • Safeguards Information When separated from Safeguards Information enclosure(s), this document is decontrolled provided the transmittal document does not otherwise warrant protection from the unauthorized disclosure.
  • C.I. 71 000209

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 135 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Safeguards Information Document Control Desk

  • E-55056 Page 3 of 3 ISP requests that a copy*of all correspondence regarding this matter be directly mailed to Ms. Elicia B. Sanchez, at 9998 Highway 176, Andrews, TX 79714.

Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Mr. Jack Boshoven by telephone at (410) 910-6955, or by email at jack.boshoven@orano.group.

Sincerely,

~~8~JL~

Elicia B. Sanchez, ~

Chief Financial Officer Interim Storage Partners LLC cc: John (Chau) Nguyen (NRC SFM) - Letter Only Jeff Isakson, ISP/TN Americas - Letter Only Jack Boshoven, ISP/TN Americas - Letter Only

Enclosures:

1. RAI Responses dated September 18, 2019 (SGI)
2. Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Physical Security Plan, PSP-100, Revision 5 (SGI)
3. Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Security Training and Qualification Plan, TQP-700, Revision 5 (SGI) . . .
4. Consolidated Interim Storage Facility Safeguards Contingency Plan, SCP-300, Revision 5 (SGI)
5. 2019 CISF Blast Analysis, Dated August 8, 2019 (SGI)
6. Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) (Public)
a. Andrews County Sheriff's Office
b. The Eunice New Mexico Police Department
7. Full size PSP Attachment 10_.1 Drawing (SRI)

Safeguards Information When separated from Safeguards Information enclosure(s), this document is decontrolled provided the transmittal document does not otherwise warrant protection from the unauthorized disclosure.

C.I. 71 000210

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 136 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 28 000211

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 137 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 September 20, 2019 E-55190 Director, Division of Spent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Subject:

Supplemental Information regarding ISP Letter E-55041 - Data located for Site 5 for Enclosure 1 report. Docket 72-1050 CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002 Reference 1 Letter from Jack Boshoven (ISP) to Document Control Desk (NRC),

Supplemental Information regarding References from the ISP Environmental Report (ER) Chapter 3, Description of the Affected Environment. Docket 72-1050 CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002, E-55041, dated September 4, 2019.

Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP) hereby submits the following supplemental information providing the Site 5 data that was missing from the Reference [1] submittal.

As stated in the Reference [1] submittal the raw data for plant cover for site 5was not included in the report nor was it included within the Waste Control Specialists 2007 LLRW license application. ISP joint venture member Waste Control Specialists had reached out to the author of the report but was told that due to the age of the report the data could not be located. The author of the report has now located the missing pages.

The data is included in Enclosure 1 of this letter.

P.O. Box 1129

  • interimstoragepartners.com C.I. 72.1 000212

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 138 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Document Control Desk E-55190 Page 2 of 3 The following Enclosures are being submitted as identified in Table 1:

  • Enclosure 1: Site 5 data for the "Ecological Assessment of the Low Level Waste Depository, Andrews County, TX;" Ecology Group (1997).

Should you have any questions regarding this submission, please contact me by telephone at (410) 910-6955, or by email at jack.boshoven@orano.group.

Sincerely, Jack Boshoven Chief Engineer CISF, Licensing and Engineering Interim Storage Partners LLC cc: John-Chau Nguyen, Senior Project Manager, U.S. NRC Jeff Isakson, ISP LLC Elicia Sanchez, ISP LLC Renee Murdock, ISP LLC

Enclosures:

1. Site 5 data for "Ecological Assessment of the Low Level Waste Depository, Andrews County, TX;" Ecology Group (1997).2.

C.I. 72.1 000213

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 139 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Document Control Desk E-55190 Page 3 of 3 Document Components:

001 PUBLIC ISP Transmittal Letter.pdf, 284,494 bytes 02 PUBLIC Encl 1 Site 5 Data for Ecological Assessment.pdf, 1,024,892 bytes OSM#1 (Entire Submittal):

001 PUBLIC ISP Transmittal Letter.pdf, 284,494 bytes 02 PUBLIC Encl 1 Site 5 Data for Ecological Assessment.pdf, 1,024,892 bytes C.I. 72.1 000214

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 140 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 29 000215

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 141 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 i - - - - - - - ------- ----- - .---------.

I ltt INTERIM STORAGE PARTNERS October 8, 2019 E-55033 Director, Division ofSpent Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U, S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Subject Submission of ISP Draft Responses for Several RAls and As.sociated Document Markups from First Request For Additional Information, Part 3, Docket 72-1050 CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002

Reference:

1. Letter from John-Chau Nguyen (NRC) to Jeffery 0. Isakson, "Interim Storage Partners LLC's Llc.ense Application to Construct and Operate the Waste Control Specialists Cons.olidated lriterim Storage Facility, Andrews County, Texas, Docket No. 72-1050 -

First Request For Additional Information, Part 3," dated April 23, 2019 .

2. Letter from Jack Boshoven to John-Chau Nguyen (NRC), "Interim Storage Partners (ISP) First Request for Additional Information (RAI) Proposed Submittal Schedule, Docket 72-1050 CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002," E-54395, dated May 31; 2019 Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP) hereby submits its draft responses to RAls from Reference [1] ih preparation for meetings to be scheduled with NRC staff for discussion.

The draft responses and associated application changed pages being submitted are the remaining portion of those identified in Table 4 of Reference [2] associated with the Environmental Report (ER); the rest were submitted earlier in accordance with the timeline in the table. Enclosure 2 (proprietary) contains the draft responses to the RAls and associated marked up pages for the ER. Enclosure 3 (public) is the non-proprietary version of Enclosure 2. *

  • Certain portions of this submittai include proprietary information, which may not be used for any purpose other than to support the NRC staff's review of the application. In
  • accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, ISP is providing an affidavit (Enclosure 1), specifically requesting that this proprietary information be withheld from public disclosure.

C.I. 73 P.O, Box 1129

  • interimstorc!gepartners.co(!I 000216

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 142 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Document Control Desk E-55033 Page 2 of 2

  • The following RAls are the subject of this submittal. Please note that the ER markups included in Enclosures 2 and 3 also may contain markups supporting other RAls addres.sed in an earlier submittal.
  • RAls SOC-1, Cl-1 Cl-2, CB-1, CB-2, CB-3, and CB-4, associated with Cost Benefit Analysis performed in support of the WCS CISF project a revised Should you have any questions regarding this submission, please contact me by telephone at (410) 910-6897, or by email at christopher.olsen@orano.group.

Sincerely, Jeffery Isakson Chief Executive Officer lnteri.m Storage Partners LLC cc: John-Chau Nguyen, Senior Project Manager, U.S. NRG

Enclosures:

1. Affidavits Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.390
a. Interim Storage Partners
2. Draft RAI Responses with .associated application changed pages (Proprietary)
3. Draft RAI Responses with associated application changed pages (Public)

C.I. 73 000217

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 143 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 30 000218

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 144 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 October 11, 2019 PUBLIC MEETING NOTICE Organization: Interim Storage Partners, LLC (ISP)

Date: Thursday, October 24, 2019 10:00 a.m. - 11:30 a.m.

Location: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Two White Flint North, Room 5D30 11545 Rockville Pike North Bethesda, MD 20852-2738

Purpose:

To discuss NRCs request for additional information, dated April 23, 2019, issued in connection with NRCs review of the license application for the proposed ISP Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (CISF) at Andrews County, TX.

Participants:

NRC/NMSS ISP Cinthya Roman Jeff Isakson Dan Doyle, et al. Elicia Sanchez, et al.

Meeting Category: This is a Category 1 Meeting. The public is invited to observe this meeting and will have one or more opportunities to communicate with the NRC after the business portion, but before the meeting is adjourned. The NRCs Policy Statement, Enhancing Public Participation on NRC Meetings, effective May 28, 2002, applies to this meeting. The policy statement may be found on the NRC website, www.nrc.gov, and contains information regarding visitors and security.

The NRC provides reasonable accommodation to individuals with disabilities where appropriate. If you need a reasonable accommodation to participate in this meeting or need a meeting notice, a transcript, or other information from this meeting in another format (e.g., Braille, large print, sign interpreters), please notify the meeting contact. Determinations on requests for reasonable accommodation will be made on a case-by-case basis.

Contacts: John-Chau Nguyen (301) 415-0262, John-Chau.Nguyen@nrc.gov or Chris Allen (301) 415-6877, William.Allen@nrc.gov Attendance either in person or on the phone by other than those listed above should be made known by Monday, October 21, 2019, by telephone or email to the above contacts.

Docket No. 72-1050

Enclosure:

Agenda C.I. 76 000219

ML19284B621 OFFICE NMSS/FCSE NMSS/DSFM NMSS/DSFM NAME JPark JP JNguyen for WA WWheatley WW DATE 10/11/2019 10/11/2019 10/11/2019 Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 146 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 AGENDA Public Meeting between Interim Storage Partners, LLC (ISP), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

October 24, 2019 10:00 a.m. - 11:30 p.m.

Room: Two White Flint North - 5D30

Purpose:

To discuss NRCs request for additional information, dated April 23, 2019, issued in connection with NRCs review of the license application for the proposed ISP Consolidated Interim Storage Facility at Andrews County, TX.

10:00 a.m. - 10:10 a.m. Introductions/Opening Remarks NRC/ISP 10:10 a.m. - 11:15 a.m. Discussion of Environmental NRC/ISP request for additional information (RAIs) (1) 11:15 a.m. - 11:30 p.m. Opportunity for Public Questions and NRC/Public Comments for NRC staff (1) 11:30 p.m. Adjourn (1) Start and end times are approximate to facilitate discussion between NRC and ISP.

Enclosure C.I. 76 000221

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 147 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 31 000222

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 148 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Environmental Impact Statement Scoping Process Summary Report The ISP CISF Environmental Impact Statement Public Scoping Period October 2019 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Rockville, Maryland C.I. 77 000223

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 149 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 A The ISP CISF Environmental Impact Statement Public Scoping Period A.1 Introduction In April 2016, Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) submitted a license application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), including a Safety Analysis Report (SAR) and Environmental Report (ER), requesting authorization to construct and operate a Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (CISF) for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) at WCSs existing hazardous and Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) storage and disposal site in Andrews County, Texas.

The function of the CISF would be to store SNF and reactor-related Greater Than Class C (GTCC) LLRW generated at commercial nuclear power reactors. The SNF and reactor-related GTCC LLRW would be transported from commercial reactor sites to the CISF by rail. Although the initial license request is to store 5,000 metric tons of uranium (MTU) at the CISF, WCS has stated its intent to submit future license amendment requests such that the facility could eventually store up to 40,000 MTU.

On April 18, 2017, WCS requested that the NRC suspend its licensing review. On June 8, 2018, Interim Storage Partners, LLC (ISP), a joint venture of WCS and Orano CIS LLC (a subsidiary of Orano USA), requested that NRC resume the licensing process (ISP, 2018a).

With this request, ISP submitted a revised license application, later updated on July 19, 2018, to the NRC, which included a revised SAR (ISP, 2018b) and ER (ISP, 2018c). The revised application requests authorization to construct and operate a CISF for SNF and reactor-related GTCC radioactive waste (collectively referred to as SNF) as well as a small amount of mixed oxide fuel at the WCS site. ISP prepared the revised license application in accordance with requirements in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 72, Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater than Class C Waste.

The NRC is preparing an environmental impact statement (EIS) in accordance with Section 51.20(b)(9) of 10 CFR Part 51, Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions, which implements the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). The NRC published a notice of intent (NOI) to prepare an EIS in the Federal Register (FR) and began its scoping process on November 14, 2016 (81 FR 79531).

As part of its scoping and environmental review processes, the NRC staff requested public comments, attended a site visit of the proposed facility, held information gathering meetings with local governments, and held public scoping meetings in Hobbs, New Mexico; Andrews, Texas; and Rockville, Maryland. Additional information can be found in Section A.4 of this report.

The scoping meetings were designed to elicit input from the public and government and private sector agencies and organizations on the scope of NRCs environmental review for the proposed action. The comments received have helped the NRC staff determine the significant issues to be analyzed in detail in the EIS. Details of these meetings (i.e., slides, handouts, and transcripts) are available on the NRC public web page for this project:

https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/cis/waste-control-specialist.html. Additionally, the comments received are addressed in later sections of this scoping summary report.

This scoping summary report summarizes comments and information the NRC gathered during the scoping process. Section A provides a concise summary of the NRCs scoping process for the EIS, an overview of the issues that were raised (Section A.7), and a summary of the NRCs determinations regarding the scope and content of the EIS (Section A.8). Section B contains summaries of comments received during the public scoping period and the NRCs responses.

A-1 C.I. 77 000224

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 150 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 These responses contain conclusions on the scope of the EIS, including identification of any significant issues. Section C contains an alphabetized table that identifies the individuals that provided comments, their affiliation if provided, and the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession number that can be used to locate the correspondence. Section D provides references cited throughout the report. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

A.2 Background In November 14, 2016, the NRC published a Federal Register Notice (FRN) announcing NRCs intent to prepare an EIS, conduct scoping, and request public comment (81 FR 79531). With this FRN, the NRC opened the public scoping comment period for the EIS, a period that closed on April 28, 2017 (82 FR 14039). Following ISPs request that NRC resume the licensing process, the NRC issued an FRN on September 4, 2018, announcing re-opening of the scoping period for an additional 45 days (83 FR 44922), which was later extended to close on November 19, 2019 (83 FR 53115). Thus, a total of 243 days was provided for the public to submit scoping comments to the NRC. Given that NRC staff guidance in NUREG-1748, Environmental Review Guidance for Licensing Actions Associated with NMSS Programs (NRC, 2003) recommends a minimum 45-day scoping comment period, the NRC determined that 243 days constituted ample time for comments to be prepared and submitted to the NRC.

A.3 Environmental Impact Statement The proposed action is the issuance to ISP, under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 72, of an NRC license authorizing the construction and operation of the CISF at the WCS site in Andrews County, Texas. The function of the CISF would be to store SNF and reactor-related GTCC LLRW generated at commercial nuclear power reactors. The SNF and reactor-related GTCC LLRW would be transported from commercial reactor sites to the CISF by rail. During operation, the proposed CISF would receive SNF from decommissioned reactor sites, as well as from operating reactors prior to decommissioning. The CISF would serve as an interim storage facility before a permanent geologic repository is available. Although the initial license request is to store 5,000 MTUs at the CISF, ISP has stated its intent to submit future license amendment requests such that the facility would eventually store up to 40,000 MTU. ISPs expansion of the proposed project (i.e., beyond an initial phase) is not part of the proposed action currently pending before the agency. However, the NRC staff will consider the expansion phases in its description of the affected environment and impact determinations in the EIS, where appropriate, when the environmental impacts of the potential future expansion were able to be determined so as to conduct a bounding analysis for the proposed CISF project.

The NRC staff is conducting this analysis as a matter of discretion, because ISP provided the analysis of the environmental impacts of the future anticipated expansion of the proposed facility as part of its license application (ISP, 2018a,b).

ISP envisions the CISF to be constructed in eight phases with each phase designed to store up to 5,000 MTU; therefore, ISP analyzed the environmental impacts in the license application for storage of 40,000 MTU. ISP, however, will be required to submit license amendment requests to increase its storage capacity beyond the initial 5,000 MTU phase. The NRC would conduct safety and environmental reviews for any subsequent license amendment request to increase the facilitys storage capacity. ISP is requesting a license for a period of 40 years. The license application relies on selected TN Americas and NAC International dry cask storage systems, which would prioritize SNF stored at shutdown and/or decommissioned reactor sites. Additional storage systems and SNF currently located at operating reactor sites would be addressed via A-2 C.I. 77 000225

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 151 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 potential future license amendments. Renewal of the license beyond 40 years would require ISP to submit a license renewal request, which would be subject to separate safety and environmental reviews [i.e., an Environmental Assessment (EA) or EIS]. Therefore, the current EIS will evaluate the initial licensing period of 40 years. By the end of the license term of the proposed CISF (40 years plus subsequent renewals, if approved), the NRC expects that the SNF would be shipped to a permanent geologic repository. This expectation of repository availability is consistent with NUREG-2157, (NRC, 2014), which concluded that a reasonable period of time for the development of a repository is approximately 25 to 35 years (availability by 2048), based on experience in licensing similarly complex facilities in the United States (U.S.)

and national and international experience with repositories already in progress.

A separate safety review, conducted in parallel with the environmental review, will address the safety of SNF receipt, transfer, and storage operations and related activities at the proposed CISF in Texas. While the proposed action does not include or require a specific license for transportation of radioactive material or approval of specific transportation routes, the EIS will include a discussion of the impacts of transportation for representative shipments to and from the proposed facility. Transportation of SNF to the proposed CISF would be primarily or entirely by rail.

A.4 Scoping Process On November 14, 2016, the NRC staff opened the scoping period and subsequently extended the scoping period until April 28, 2017. During this period, the NRC staff hosted four meetings to allow members of the public to provide oral scoping comments. These meetings were held in Hobbs, New Mexico on February 13, 2017; in Andrews, Texas on February 15, 2017; and at the NRC Headquarters in Rockville, Maryland (also via webinar) on February 23 and April 6, 2017.

The NRC staffs meeting slides, handouts, and project fact sheets were available in both English and Spanish at the scoping meetings, and these slides, handouts, and fact sheets, as well as the transcripts for each meeting, are available at NRCs public web page at https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/cis/wcs/public-meetings.html. On September 4, 2018, the NRC staff reopened the scoping period for the ISP license application until November 19, 2018. Comments received during this re-opened scoping period were considered by the NRC, along with all comments received during the previous period, in determining the scope of the EIS.

Written comments were accepted via the Federal rulemaking website (www.regulations.gov) using Docket ID NRC-2016-0231, through email to WCS_CISF_EIS@nrc.gov, fax, or regular U.S. mail. The scoping process provided an opportunity for members of the public to identify issues and highlight concerns related to the proposed CISF. The purpose of the scoping process (83 FR 44923) is to:

  • Ensure that important issues and concerns are identified early and are properly studied
  • Identify alternatives to be examined
  • Identify significant issues to be analyzed in depth
  • Eliminate unimportant issues from detailed consideration
  • Identify public concerns A-3 C.I. 77 000226

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 152 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 No-Action alternative and mitigation measures that will be implemented to avoid or minimize adverse impacts.

The NRC has a longstanding practice of conducting its regulatory responsibilities in an open and transparent manner to keep the public informed of the agencys regulatory, licensing, and oversight activities and to involve stakeholders in the regulatory process. In part, it does so by making information available to the public through the NRCs public Web site (www.nrc.gov) and its online public document system (the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS; accessible at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html ). The NRC made WCSs application and ISPs revised application available to the public in ADAMS (docket number 72-1050) and on a project-specific website https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage/cis/waste-control-specialist.html. The NRC also provided paper copies of WCSs application to public libraries in Andrews, Texas, in Hobbs, New Mexico, and in Eunice, New Mexico.

As regards the NRCs hearing process and standing in those proceedings, the NRC conducts hearings in accordance with the Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure established in 10 CFR Part 2 of NRCs regulations. The NRCs requirements for standing are provided in 10 CFR 2.309.

The staffs Safety Evaluation Report will address the requirements for storage of the spent nuclear fuel in the CISF. For additional comments and responses concerning safety and storage, see Section B.26 [Comments Concerning Safety].

Comments: (1-5-2) (1-7-7) (2-30-1) (3-9-5) (3-10-5) (3-26-2) (3-26-4) (3-33-2) (4-5-1) (5-2)

(6-4) (35-2) (38-2) (38-7) (40-1) (40-10) (62-2) (105-2) (112-4) (118-6) (118-18) (139-24) (146-6)

(149-7) (149-9) (160-2) (165-4) (165-31) (165-34) (169-4) (170-2) (178-2) (201-1) (220-3)

(220-5) (225-4) (235-1) (239-1) (249-1) (261-2) (272-2) (275-1) (392-1) (401-1) (434-6) (447-2)

(476-1) (511-19) (539-4) (551-2) (554-13) (556-3) (566-10) (605-1) (673-4) (695-3)

B.1.2 NEPA Process - Scoping Process The NRC staff received comments about the scoping process for the proposed ISP CISF.

One commenter stated that scoping for the proposed CISF should include consideration of unique and unprecedented modeling for severe accident scenarios and cost-benefit mitigation alternatives. One commenter welcomed the scrutiny of the NRC and encouraged NRC to visit the site whenever needed. Another commenter looked forward to the publication of responses to comments made at the scoping meetings. Another commenter expected comprehensive answers in the EIS to the issues raised during the scoping process. Finally, a commenter stated that scoping should include a discussion of the responsibilities of the two national nuclear agencies to ensure that interim storage of SNF is safe for the public now and in the future.

Response: The NRC staff strives to conduct its regulatory responsibilities, including the scoping process, in an open and transparent manner, consistent with the NRC Approach to Open Government (https://www.nrc.gov/public-involve/open.html). The NRC requirements for scoping are found at 10 CFR 51.26-51.29 and are further explained in NUREG-1748, Section 4.2.3 (NRC, 2003). The objectives of the scoping process include: (i) defining the scope of the proposed action that is to be the subject of the EIS, (ii) determining the scope of the EIS and identifying alternatives and significant issues to be analyzed in depth, and (iii) identifying and eliminating from detailed study issues that are peripheral or are not significant. To this end, the NRC strives to give equal time to all participants in the scoping B-2 C.I. 77 000227

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 153 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 B.1.6 NEPA Process - Inadequate Information and/or Analysis in the License Application The NRC staff received comments that expressed concern that the license application has missing, misleading, inaccurate, and inadequate information and analyses. Commenters stated that the ER contains inadequate and incomplete information and analyses with regard to issues, resource areas, and required programs and plans including: (i) transportation routes, (ii) social concerns, (iii) security and terrorism, (iv) contamination of food and water, (v) water resources, (vi) geology, (vii) quality assurance, (viii) accidents and cleanup plans, (ix) human exposure from both accidents and normal operations, (x) types of canisters and monitoring systems, (xi) decommissioning and financial assurance, (xii) location of electric lines and estimates of electric use, and (xiii) transfer of fuel from damaged canisters.

Response: In developing the EIS for the proposed CISF, the NRC staff will review and evaluate information and analyses provided in the applicants license application and supplemental documentation. In addition, the NRC staff will independently collect and review additional information related to the proposed CISF project and its environs. If the NRC staff determines that the information provided in the applicants license application is not sufficient (e.g., missing or inaccurate) or cannot be independently gathered to allow completion of the EIS, the staff will submit requests for additional information (RAIs) to the applicant to request the information. As needed, the NRC staff will request an updated and revised ER and SAR, and these revised documents will be made publicly available, as appropriate.

Comments: (3-31-2) (4-3-3) (4-4-1) (4-4-3) (4-4-4) (134-5) (134-8) (134-11) (134-16) (134-17)

(134-21) (134-23) (138-2) (139-2) (139-14) (165-1) (165-3) (165-5) (174-1) (408-24) (460-1)

(460-4) (491-10) (517-1) (517-15) (517-16) (518-10) (518-11) (518-12) (518-14) (523-13)

(527-7) (527-13) (539-8) (545-9) (570-5) (570-6) (598-4) (599-1) (599-2) (819-47)

B.2 Comments Concerning NEPA Process - Public Participation B.2.1 NEPA Process: Public Participation - Requests for More Public Meetings The NRC received many comments requesting additional public scoping meetings or suggesting locations for additional public scoping meetings. Many of the comments requested public meetings along transportation routes or near sites from which the SNF could be shipped.

Some commenters referenced the number and locations of meetings held by the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) or for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. Some of the comments also requested that the public comment period be extended. Some comments noted that additional public meetings were not held once the license application review was re-opened.

Response: In a January 30, 2017 FRN, the NRC staff announced the dates, times, and locations for two public comment meetings that the staff would host as part of its scoping process for the environmental review of the ISP license application (82 FR 8771). These meetings were held in Hobbs, New Mexico, on February 13, 2017, and in Andrews, Texas on February 15, 2017. The NRC staff also hosted two webcast-based public comment meetings held in Rockville, Maryland on February 23, 2017 and April 6, 2017. In preparation for these meetings, the NRC issued a press release and made information related to the license application review available to communities local to the proposed project, as well as on the NRCs website, such that the information was accessible nationwide.

B-5 C.I. 77 000228

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 154 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Comments: (1-12-2) (1-17-7) (2-13-8) (2-22-2) (2-22-6) (3-12-2) (3-17-1) (12-2) (28-2) (58-2)

(139-7) (149-2) (165-13) (165-15) (171-13) (195-1) (333-2) (345-2) (350-1) (408-10) (412-3)

(429-3) (469-5) (512-5) (517-4) (557-3) (564-8) (663-4) (784-2)

B.4.2 Proposed Action - De Facto Disposal The NRC staff received a large number of comments expressing concern that the proposed CISF would not be an interim storage facility but would instead become a de facto disposal site.

Commenters stated that the facility would become a de facto disposal site because there was no intention to move the SNF twice (i.e., once from the generation site and once to the final repository). Some commenters stated concern that licensing the proposed CISF would reduce the need for and likelihood of construction of a permanent repository, or that because there is currently no final permanent repository available, that this interim facility would be a de facto disposal site. Some commenters were concerned that once the proposed CISF is licensed, Congress would have little incentive to fund and build a permanent repository. Some commenters were concerned that the interim proposed CISF would not be built to the same standards as a permanent repository should the proposed CISF become a de facto disposal site. Commenters stated that the EIS should address the impacts of the proposed CISF becoming permanent by default. Commenters expressed concern about the maintenance of canisters and casks over the timeframe of the proposed project, stating that the timeframe would be indefinite.

Response: The proposed action is to construct and operate a CISF for SNF, providing an option for storage of the spent fuel before a permanent repository is available. The EIS will evaluate the impacts of the proposed action for the license term of the proposed facility, which is 40 years. If the license is approved, the licensee will have the option to apply for a license renewal under 10 CFR 72.42. However, the environmental analysis for the EIS assumes that fuel will be transported away from the CISF and that decommissioning of the CISF would occur at the end of the initial 40-year license period. In accordance with 10 CFR 51.23(b),

51.80(b)(1), and 51.97(a), with respect to analysis of potential environmental impacts of storage beyond the license term of the facility, the impact determinations in the Continued Storage GEIS, NUREG-2157 (NRC, 2014), shall be deemed incorporated into the EIS for the proposed CISF. As explained in the Continued Storage GEIS, consistent with current national policy, disposal in a permanent repository is feasible (see Appendix B of the GEIS). Therefore, evaluation of impacts of SNF disposal or indefinite storage at the proposed CISF are outside the scope of this EIS. Additional discussion regarding the scope of the EIS with respect to safety of canisters and casks and transportation can be found in Section B.26 [Safety] and Sections B.9 and B.10 [Transportation].

Comments: (1-9-3) (1-12-6) (1-13-3) (1-13-4) (1-16-1) (2-5-1) (2-5-3) (2-8-2) (2-8-10) (2-9-1)

(2-9-7) (2-10-5) (2-17-2) (2-20-2) (3-5-10) (3-13-7) (3-16-4) (3-24-1) (3-31-5) (4-9-3) (4-14-6)

(4-14-8) (21-3) (24-2) (28-12) (28-18) (30-3) (30-19) (38-5) (87-4) (98-9) (99-16) (100-2) (101-3)

(111-6) (121-4) (127-2) (127-6) (130-1) (132-2) (134-13) (140-1) (142-5) (146-3) (164-9) (165-8)

(165-22) (165-32) (169-3) (171-8) (175-3) (220-20) (277-2) (280-1) (318-4) (335-2) (339-12)

(395-3) (406-1) (408-20) (408-22) (421-3) (436-2) (439-2) (443-2) (444-1) (460-11) (461-1)

(463 1) (470-5) (476-5) (491-8) (502-2) (502-3) (511-3) (511-21) (517-14) (521-1) (522-9)

(523 3) (523-7) (525-3) (525-4) (530-5) (539-6) (545-4) (545-6) (554-11) (556-2) (559-19)

(560 7) (570-4) (576-15) (589-1) (598-2) (599-3) (620-13) (645-15) (650-2) (650-4) (663-3)

(815 7) (819-2) (819-6) (819-7) (819-15) (819-17)

B-13 C.I. 77 000229

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 155 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 B.5 Comments Concerning the Purpose and Need of the Proposed Action B.5.1 Purpose and Need for a CISF The NRC received comments about the purpose and need for the CISF. Some commenters stated that storage facilities like ISP are needed to provide storage for SNF currently stored at individual sites. Other commenters stated that the proposed CISF would cause thousands of unnecessary SNF waste shipments throughout the U.S. Commenters expressed differing opinions on whether the purpose and need would or would not address the need of long-term storage of SNF. Several commenters stated that construction of a CISF would not solve the issue of SNF disposal. Other commenters noted that there is no need for a CISF and that SNF can be stored safely at reactor sites for as many years as it would remain at a CISF.

Response: Absent findings in the NRCs safety review or NEPA analysis that the proposed facility does not meet regulatory requirements, the NRC has no role in the planning decisions of private entities. An EIS discusses the purpose and need for the proposed action to establish a range of reasonable alternatives, in addition to the proposed action, that can satisfy the underlying need.

Comments: (1-6-1) (1-7-2) (1-11-3) (1-18-7) (2-20-1) (2-28-2) (2-29-2) (3-27-1) (4-25-2) (5-1)

(27-1) (30-1) (32-1) (42-1) (63-3) (134-2) (140-9) (146-2) (180-2) (220-4) (400-5) (447-3) (460-3)

(461-2) (470-6) (512-1) (517-3) (559-2) (576-14) (645-8)

B.5.2 Purpose and Need - NRCs Continued Storage GEIS and the Proposed CISF The NRC staff received one comment stating that the ER's purpose and need statement regarding the safety of the proposed CISF compared to the continued storage of SNF at reactors or Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSIs) contradicts the NRCs Continued Storage GEIS.

Response: The NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 51, Appendix A, require an EIS to include a description of the purpose of, and a discussion of the need for, a proposed action. The NRC staff guidance in NUREG-1748 (NRC, 2003) regarding the preparation of the purpose and need analysis in the applicants ER and the NRC staffs EIS states that the applicant and the NRC staff treatment of this subject should explain why the proposed action is needed, going on to indicate that the discussions should describe the underlying need for the proposed action and should not be written merely as a justification of the proposed action, nor to alter the choice of alternatives. In short, an applicant should describe what will be accomplished as a result of the proposed action.

The applicants ER states that the proposed CISF would provide temporary storage of SNF for decommissioned shutdown sites in order to return the land to greenfield status; reducing costs related to surveillance, maintenance, emergency preparedness, and physical security at current ISFSIs; and alleviating the need for constructing new ISFSIs. Safe storage at the proposed CISF is only one component of the applicants stated purpose and need.

Furthermore, the EIS will compare the impacts of the proposed action with the No-Action alternative but will not provide a determination regarding which option is safer. All NRC licensed sites, both at-reactor ISFSIs and CISFs, are required to be in compliance with NRCs safety, security, and environmental regulations. Similarly, the Continued Storage GEIS, (NUREG-2157) did not perform any qualitative analysis of the safety benefits of at-reactor B-14 C.I. 77 000230

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 156 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 B.6.4 Assumptions - Legal Framework of the Proposed CISF The NRC staff received numerous comments regarding the legality of licensing an interim storage facility. Several commenters noted that under current Federal law (i.e., the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended), SNF is prohibited from transport and storage at an interim storage facility. One commenter stated that the government, rather than a private company, should administer all nuclear storage after the utilities relinquish control. Another commenter recommended that the NRC amend 10 CFR Part 72 to address any potential differences in personnel resources, equipment, and emergency preparedness.

Response: The NRC has previously licensed a consolidated (away-from-reactor) interim spent fuel storage installation, and NRC regulations allow for licensing private away-from-reactor interim spent fuel installations under 10 CFR Part 72. The NRC allows licensed private transportation of spent fuel. For more information on the NRCs regulation of spent fuel transportation, see https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-transp.html. Issues relating to title to spent fuel are primarily outside the scope of this EIS because who holds title will likely not influence the environmental impacts of the proposed action. The comment that the government rather than a private company should administer nuclear storage is a matter of policy and is outside the scope of this EIS.

Comments: (1-18-6) (2-5-2) (2-8-3) (2-31-2) (3-2-3) (3-2-6) (3-12-7) (3-13-6) (3-31-1) (6-1)

(28-21) (55-4) (134-12) (139-1) (139-3) (139-26) (160-1) (165-6) (165-30) (415-4) (425-1)

(434-3) (436-8) (444-3) (467-1) (502-17) (511-2) (523-6) (525-7) (528-11) (539-23) (540-2)

(545-25) (547-2) (549-2) (557-7) (557-9) (634-2) (803-4) (819-5) (819-14)

B.7 Comments Concerning Alternatives B.7.1 Alternatives - Other The NRC staff received several comments containing suggestions for alternatives to a consolidated interim storage facility for SNF (the proposed action) to be analyzed in the EIS.

The comments included the use of lasers, onsite vitrification, solar and lunar disposal, and reprocessing as suggested methods for disposal or treatment of SNF. One commenter suggested selling SNF to foreign governments. Another commenter suggested different rock types for safe storage.

Response: For the purpose of the NRC environmental review of the proposed action, only alternatives that are considered reasonable or feasible and that would meet the purpose and need will be analyzed in the EIS. While some suggested alternatives are innovative, only those alternatives that are currently available are considered reasonable or feasible. Additional comments related to alternatives that are out of scope are in Section B.30 [Out of Scope]. For information on the scope of the proposed action see Section B.4 [Proposed Action]. Additional comments on alternatives can be found in a separate response within this section of the report.

Comments: (2-14-5) (3-18-1) (4-2-1) (8-1) (13-2) (172-1) (185-2) (187-1) (250-2) (270-2)

(412-2) (412-20) (412-21) (449-1) (459-2) (480-2) (534-1) (625-1) (636-1) (689-1) (703-1)

(773-1) (813-1)

B-17 C.I. 77 000231

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 157 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 B.7.2 Alternatives - Proposed Site Location The NRC staff received comments about the use of alternative sites for the proposed project and for long term or permanent storage of the SNF. Commenters suggested storing SNF at existing licensed and operating ISFSIs, secured military bases, DOE-owned facilities, states other than Texas, or leaving the SNF where it was generated and is currently stored. Several commenters recommended consolidating fuel in areas close to the reactors to minimize transportation and risk. Some commenters suggested moving SNF away from natural hazards.

One commenter stated that CEQ guidance required the NRC to evaluate reasonable alternatives including those not proposed by the applicant and those outside the jurisdiction of the NRC. A few commenters suggested modifying and monitoring existing spent fuel pools for SNF storage. One commenter suggested burying the SNF where it is currently located.

Another commenter suggested extending the licensed life of current ISFSIs.

Response: The NRC will evaluate the potential environmental impacts of the construction, operation, and decommissioning of the proposed CISF. In the EIS, the No-Action alternative will evaluate the potential impacts of not constructing or operating the proposed CISF and leaving the SNF onsite at current locations as a baseline for comparison against the potential environmental impacts of constructing and operating a CISF. The scope of the EIS, with respect to safety and transportation, is discussed in Sections B.10 and B.26, [Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel - Safety/Accidents and Safety], respectively.

Comments: (1-22-7) (2-18-6) (3-7-1) (3-7-4) (3-13-8) (3-15-1) (3-15-2) (3-15-4) (4-4-6) (4-14-5)

(4-14-11) (4-23-2) (18-2) (28-23) (31-2) (41-2) (45-8) (54-2) (58-9) (63-4) (71-3) (73-2) (86-3)

(100-4) (101-7) (110-3) (115-2) (115-6) (122-3) (142-9) (163-1) (164-12) (165-24) (165-27)

(177-1) (192-3) (193-6) (196-1) (203-3) (208-1) (213-3) (217-3) (218-2) (242-1) (247-2) (250-1)

(260-1) (266-1) (274-1) (284-5) (286-1) (288-1) (297-1) (318-1) (327-3) (329-3) (338-3) (342-4)

(348-1) (365-2) (398-2) (412-8) (412-22) (413-2) (417-1) (418-1) (436-7) (442-1) (442-3) (454-3)

(460-9) (466-2) (495-2) (508-5) (511-7) (522-10) (522-11) (550-2) (552-1) (559-4) (562-2)

(563-5) (570-19) (571-17) (575-2) (575-4) (576-13) (579-2) (583-1) (586-2) (591-6) (600-1)

(648-2) (653-2) (660-2) (662-2) (664-2) (669-5) (691-1) (704-2) (706-2) (766-2) (771-1) (775-2)

(777-1) (779-4) (780-5) (784-1) (797-3) (803-2) (805-3) (815-5) (819-20)

B.7.3 Alternatives - Hardened Onsite Storage (HOSS)

Several comments were received recommending that the NRC consider HOSS or other similar additional protections at existing sites as an alternative to the proposed action. Some commenters requested that NRC conduct studies comparing the relative safety of HOSS to the proposed action.

Response: The NRCs safety and environmental review is limited to an evaluation of the proposed CISF as described in ISPs license application. The No-Action alternative evaluates the potential impacts of leaving the SNF at current storage locations as a baseline for comparison against the potential environmental impacts of constructing and operating a proposed CISF. HOSS and other onsite hardening concepts are not being analyzed in detail because they do not meet the purpose and need of the proposed action (construction and operation of a CISF). Furthermore, this licensing action for a new facility does not propose or impose safety requirements for the storage of spent fuel at existing sites; therefore, assessing the impacts of HOSS and other hardened storage concepts at other sites will not be analyzed in this site-specific licensing process.

B-18 C.I. 77 000232

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 158 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Comments: (3-15-3) (3-17-3) (3-19-7) (3-22-4) (3-28-2) (4-19-3) (58-5) (58-8) (118-5) (118-16)

(121-2) (135-3) (163-2) (207-2) (321-2) (425-2) (434-1) (439-4) (468-8) (476-4) (515-2) (517-19)

(519-8) (541-3) (570-1) (570-20) (573-4) (574-2) (632-2) (669-2) (779-3) (819-19) (819-32)

B.8 Comments Concerning Land Use B.8.1 Land Use - General Comments The NRC staff received comments that expressed concern about potential land use impacts from the proposed CISF, including economic effects and consequences from potential accidents or attacks that would affect the viability of the land for other uses. Commenters expressed concerns about irreversible commitments of land use and the potential conflicts with natural areas, tourism, energy and mineral mining, agriculture, and recreational activities in the area.

One commenter raised questions about subsurface mineral rights for the oil and gas industry within the boundary of the proposed CISF. The same commenter was also concerned about the implication of subsurface extraction on induced seismicity and groundwater movement.

Another commenter stated that the Texas-New Mexico state boundary may be inaccurate and implying that as a result, the proposed CISF may be located entirely in the State of New Mexico. One commenter stated that a 2007 publication by the IAEA recommended any away-from-reactor storage be sited away from mineral exploration, chemical manufacturing facilities, and airports.

Response: The EIS will include a description of land use within the proposed project boundary and the surrounding area. The impact assessment in the EIS will consider impacts of construction, operation, and decommissioning of the proposed CISF on land use in the area, as well as a discussion of appropriate mitigation measures. This assessment will discuss proposed land use agreements and land ownership and will address potential conflicts with other nearby land uses, such as prohibitive mineral usage agreements. However, because the NRC does not have authority over nonnuclear private business ventures, specific business interests of companies will not be included in the scope. The scope of the EIS with respect to industries in the area and tourism are discussed in this report in Sections B.18

[Socioeconomics]. Information on induced seismicity is discussed in Section B.14.3 [Geology and Soils - Induced Seismicity], and groundwater in Section B.12 - [Groundwater Concerns -

Aquifers].

Comments: (6-10) (14-5) (16-6) (45-6) (84-2) (94-3) (102-5) (109-2) (408-4) (462-8) (502-25)

(517-11) (542-1) (544-1)

B.8.2 Land Use - Concerning HLW at the WCS Site The NRC staff received comments on the use of land within the WCS site for storage of HLW.

Commenters noted that the agreement and acceptance of the WCS facility by the community was contingent on use of the facility for non-HLW. Commenters expressed disappointment that the proposed action would allow the land at the WCS site (i.e., a portion of which would be the proposed location of the CISF) to be used to store SNF.

Response: The EIS will include a description of land use within the proposed project boundary and the surrounding area. The impact assessment in the EIS will consider impacts of construction, operation, and decommissioning of the proposed CISF on land use in the area, as well as a discussion of appropriate mitigation measures. However, because the NRC does not have authority over private business ventures, specific business interests of companies will not B-19 C.I. 77 000233

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 159 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 32 000234

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 160 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 November 5, 2019 Mr. Jeffrey D. Isakson Chief Executive Officer/President Interim Storage Partners LLC P.O. Box 1129 Andrews, TX 79714

SUBJECT:

INTERIM STORAGE PARTNERS LLCs LICENSE APPLICATION TO CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE THE WASTE CONTROL SPECIALISTS CONSOLIDATED INTERIM STORAGE FACILITY, ANDREWS COUNTY, TEXAS, DOCKET NO. 72-1050 - FIRST REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, PART 4

Dear Mr. Isakson:

By letter dated July 19, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18206A595), as supplemented May 31 and July 31, 2019 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML19156A038 and ML19217A210), Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP), a joint venture of Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) and Orano CIS LLC (a subsidiary of Orano USA), requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) resume all safety and environmental review activities associated with the proposed WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (CISF) license application. ISP requested authorization to store up to 5,000 metric tons of uranium for a period of 40 years in the WCS CISF.

The NRC staff is conducting a detailed technical review of your application and has determined that additional information is necessary to complete its review. The information needed by the NRC staff is discussed in the enclosed requests for additional information (RAI). We request that you provide responses within 30 days from the date of this letter. If you are unable to meet this deadline, please notify NRC staff in writing, within two weeks of receipt of this letter, of your new submittal date and the reasons for the delay.

C.I. 78 000235

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 161 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 J. Isakson Please reference Docket No. 72-1050 and CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002 in future correspondence related to the technical review for this licensing action. If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-0262.

Sincerely,

/RA/

John-Chau Nguyen, Senior Project Manager Storage and Transportation Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Docket No. 72-1050 CAC No. 001028 EPID L-2017-NEW-0002

Enclosure:

1st Round Safety RAIs - Part 4 C.I. 78 000236

ML19309E913 OFFICE: NMSS/DFM NMSS/DFM NMSS/RESS NMSS/RESS NMSS/DFM WWheatley TWertz FMiller DDoyle NAME: JNguyen via e-mail via e-mail via e-mail via e-mail DATE: 10/25/19 11/1/19 10/28/19 10/29/19 11/4/19 Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 163 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 First Request for Additional Information, Part 4 Docket No. 72-1050 WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility in Andrews County, Texas By letter dated July 19, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18206A595), Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP), a joint venture of Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) and Orano CIS LLC (a subsidiary of Orano USA),

requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) resume all safety and environmental review activities associated with the proposed WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (CISF) license application. ISP requested authorization to store up to 5,000 metric tons of uranium for a license term of 40 years in the WCS CISF application.

The requests for additional information (RAI) identify additional information needed by the NRC staff to complete its safety review of the WCS CISF license application. The requested information refers to the specific part of the license application concerning funding. The NRC staff used the guidance in NUREG-1567, Standard Review Plan for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities.

License Application RAI LA-1 Provide an estimated cost of construction (including a breakdown of the various cost components, such as materials, labor, engineering and design, etc.) for the proposed facility and how construction of the proposed facility will be funded (i.e., proposed amounts of debt financing, equity investment, other sources of funding, etc.) which is specific to the proposed facility and its location.

The application lists what a similar facility would cost per an Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) study; however, the application does not provide information regarding what ISP estimates for the cost of construction. The licensee states, The Electric Power Research Institute estimated cost for construction of the CISF that will be used to store 5,000 MTU is approximately $170 million. Staff notes that the EPRI study is approximately 10 years old, and the application makes no allowance for possible cost variances, inflation or other possible cost increases; therefore, these statements do not provide adequate information to make a reasonable assurance determination with regard to the cost of construction activities.

With regard to funding construction activities, the application states that Orano and Waste Control Specialists will provide initial capitalization of ISP. It also states that [t]he funding for constructing the CISF is expected to be primarily through future contracts for storage of SNF with the DOE or other SNF Title Holder(s). The funding may include a combination of debt financing, equity investments, and net income. These statements do not provide adequate information for staff to make a reasonable assurance determination with regard to the funding of construction activities.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.22(e).

Enclosure C.I. 78 000238

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 164 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI LA-2 Provide the estimated operating costs for the proposed facility (including a breakdown of labor, materials, security, etc.) and how ISP intends to fund the operation of the proposed facility using future contracts with SNF title holders which is specific to the proposed facility.

While the application lists what a similar facility would cost per an EPRI study, the application does not provide enough information regarding what ISP estimates the operating costs for the proposed facility will be. The licensee states, The Electric Power Research Institute estimated the operating and labor cost needed to store 5,000 MTU of SNF at an interim consolidated storage facility for 40 years at $394,612,500. Staff notes that the EPRI study is approximately 10 years old, and the application neither makes allowance for possible variances in costs nor accounts for inflation. Therefore, ISP needs to provide the estimated operating costs for a facility at the proposed site.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.22(e).

RAI LA-3 Identify the funding mechanism to be used to provide decommissioning funding assurance.

While the application provides the projected total cost to decommission the facility (separate from the stored material), the application does not provide enough information for NRC staff to determine the type of method that the applicant intends to use for decommissioning funding assurance. The licensee states in the application, Alternatively, ISP may [emphasis added]

use a surety bond combined with a conformity external sinking fund as authorized by 10 CFR 72.30(e)(3). Payments from storage operations would be deposited into the external sinking fund as waste is received. A surety bond would be used to assure the difference in the decommissioning cost estimate and the value of the sinking fund until the sinking fund is fully funded. Therefore, ISP needs to provide more specificity about their plans to fund decommissioning of the proposed facility.

This information is necessary to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.30(b)(6) and 10 CFR 72.30(e)(3).

2 C.I. 78 000239

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 165 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 33 000240

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 166 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 November 21, 2019 E-55363 Director, Division of Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852

Subject:

Submission of ISP Responses for RAIs and Associated Document Markups from First Request For Additional Information, Part 3, Docket 72-1050 CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002

Reference:

1. Letter from John-Chau Nguyen (NRC) to Jeffery D. Isakson, Interim Storage Partners LLCs License Application To Construct And Operate The Waste Control Specialists Consolidated Interim Storage Facility, Andrews County, Texas, Docket No. 72-1050 -

First Request For Additional Information, Part 3, dated April 23, 2019

2. Letter from Jack Boshoven to John-Chau Nguyen (NRC), Interim Storage Partners (ISP) First Request for Additional Information (RAI) Proposed Submittal Schedule, Docket 72-1050 CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002, E-54395, dated May 31, 2019 Interim Storage Partners LLC hereby submits responses to RAIs from First Request for Additional Information; Part 3 issued April 23, 2019 (Reference [1]) to support the continued review of the Licensing Application. Contained in this submittal are the responses; including revised safety analysis report (SAR), Environmental Report (ER),

and other supporting documents, which incorporate comments from our October 24, 2019 meeting with the NRC discussing our draft responses to these RAIs. This submittal is consistent with the schedule identified in Table 4 of Reference [2].

The following enclosures are being submitted:

  • Enclosure 2 provides a proprietary version of the responses to the RAIs.

P.O. Box 1129

  • interimstoragepartners.com C.I. 79.1 000241

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 167 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Document Control Desk E-55363 Page 2 of 5

  • Enclosure 3 provides a public version of Enclosure 2 (RAI responses)
  • Enclosure 4 provides a description of additional changes that are not associated with the RAI
  • Enclosure 5 provides a proprietary version of the attachments to RAI responses (Attachments LU-2-1, WR-5-1, WR-5-2 and ECO-1-1)
  • Enclosure 6 provides the SAR changed pages associated with the RAI responses
  • Enclosure 7 provides a proprietary version of the ER changed pages associated with the RAI responses
  • Enclosure 8 provides a public version of Enclosure 5 (Attachments LU-2-1, WR-5-1, WR-5-2 and ECO-1-1)
  • Enclosure 9 provides a public version of Enclosure 7 (ER changed pages)
  • Enclosure 10 applicable sections of Waste Control Specialists' "Application for License to Authorize Near Surface Land Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Waste" (dated 2007)
  • Enclosure 11 CMEC Report referenced in RAI PA-3 Response (Proprietary)
  • Enclosure 12 Appendix E HEC-HMS Input for the Flood Plain Report
  • Enclosure 13 native files associated with RAI responses Please note that Enclosures 12 and 13 deviate from the NRC guidance on electronic submittals as described above.

Should you have any questions regarding this submission, please contact Mr. Jack Boshoven, of my staff, by telephone at (410) 910-6955, or by email at jack.boshoven@orano .group .

Sincerely, Jeffery D. Isakson Chief Executive Officer/President Interim Storage Partners LLC cc: John-Chau Nguyen , Senior Project Manager, U.S. NRC Jack Boshoven , ISP LLC Elicia Sanchez, ISP LLC C.I. 79.1 000242

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 168 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 34 000243

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 169 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAIs and Responses - Public Enclosure 3 to E-55363 Environmental Requests for Additional Information Proposed Action (PA)

RAI PA-1 Provide additional information on the railroad side track to be built as part of the proposed CISF. This information should include:

  • Clarification of the location (i.e., footprint) of the railroad side track. The location of the proposed railroad side track is not consistently depicted in figures in the Environmental Report (ER). For example, compare ER Figure 2.2-6 with ER Figure 4.5-1. Specifically, clarify whether the railroad side track would cross Stateline Road into New Mexico as depicted in ER Figure 4.5-1.
  • The status of any Federal, State, or local permits or approvals that would be needed to construct and operate the railroad side track, as applicable both in Texas and New Mexico (as depicted in ER Figure 4.5-1, the railroad side track appears to be partly located in both states).
  • A description of the materials, methods, and equipment that would be used to construct, operate, and maintain the railroad side track, including timing of the construction. If the side track would be decommissioned along with the CISF, include similar information for decommissioning.
  • Local natural resources (e.g., groundwater, geologic materials) and manpower needed to construct and operate the railroad side track; and whether or not construction and operation workers for the railroad side track are already included in the resource impacts analysis in the ER (transportation, socioeconomics, etc.).
  • The amount of land that would be disturbed by construction and operation of the railroad side track.
  • The volume of soil that would be excavated during construction and potentially stockpiled during operation of the railroad side track and available information on the disposition of the stockpiled soil.
  • An assessment of the environmental impacts that construction, operation, and decommissioning of the railroad side track would have on all resource areas (e.g., land use, transportation, geology and soils, water resources, air quality, ecological resources, historic and cultural resources, noise, visual and scenic, socioeconomics, public and occupational health, and waste management).
  • Mitigation measures that would be implemented to reduce the environmental impacts associated with construction, operation, and decommissioning of the railroad side track on all resource areas.
  • Any environmental measures, management plans, and/or monitoring that would be required during construction, operation, and decommissioning of the railroad side track to comply with any Federal, State, and local rules and regulations.

ER Section 2.2.2.5 states that an approximately 2,134 m [7,000 ft] railroad side track would be built adjacent to the existing railroad access loop for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) deliveries Page 1 of 114 C.I. 79.3 000244

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 170 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAIs and Responses - Public Enclosure 3 to E-55363 RAI WR-6 Provide an ISP CISF site-specific hydrostratigraphic column to clarify the composition of the local hydrostratigraphic units underlying the proposed CISF site, which have a much simpler configuration than what is shown in the regional stratigraphic column of Safety Analysis Report (SAR) Figure 2-13.

The regional stratigraphic column illustrated in SAR Figure 2-13 is too complicated (it shows units that are not present at ISP-WCS) and does not clearly describe the local subsurface geologic situation at the CISF. More simplified and accurate visual information is needed to clearly describe and communicate the affected groundwater and vadose zone environments at the proposed CISF, and to facilitate assessments of the potential environmental impacts of CISF construction, operation, and decommissioning.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which require that the ER include a description of the affected environment and an assessment of environmental impacts.

Response to RAI WR-6:

A CISF site-specific geologic column with the presence or absence of groundwater is included as Figure 2-37 in the SAR, which was updated as part of the response to RAI P-2.6-1. The geologic column is reproduced in Figure WR-6-1 below, which describes the subsurface at the site including the formation name, composition or lithology, USCS designation as appropriate, age, and material properties. The CISF geologic column shows the Ogallala Formation unconformably overlying the Cooper Canyon Formation of the Dockum Group. The geologic investigations conducted by Waste Control Specialists throughout the LLRW area did not differentiate between the Ogallala/Antlers/Gatuna sands and gravels which are in the same hydrostratigraphic position overlying the Cooper Canyon. In an earlier investigation, Lehman and Rainwater (2000) (WCS, 2007, Reference [1]), interpreted where these individual sand and gravel formations occurred, generally placing the Cretaceous Antlers over the crest of the red bed ridge, with the Ogallala Formation situated to the northeast and the Gatuna to the southwest. However, their interpretation was not based on sufficient boring data to distinguish the contacts between the Antlers and the Ogallala in the proposed CISF area, nor between the Antlers and the Gatuna on the south side of the ridge. The geologic column shows Ogallala overlying the Dockum, though it may also be considered as Antlers/Ogallala undifferentiated, as shown in the contour map (Figure WR-7-2) in response to RAI WR-7.

Page 45 of 114 C.I. 79.3 000245

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 171 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAIs and Responses - Public Enclosure 3 to E-55363 RAI WR-11 Identify the shallowest groundwater located beneath the proposed CISF footprint by name and depth below the CISF land surface, whether in the Antlers, Ogallala, Gatuna, or Cooper Canyon Formation. In future documentation associated with the proposed action, name the specific aquifers in the Dockum Group that are discussed, whether the Cooper Canyon, Trujillo, or Santa Rosa Formations. In response to this RAI, use of the lumped term Dockum Aquifer should be avoided because it applies to the entire thick sequence of the Dockum Group (to both aquifers and aquitards) and does not clearly denote the site-specific aquifer that is being referenced at the proposed CISF. ISPs license application should also call out by name the near-surface groundwater formations (Antlers, Ogallala, or Gatuna) that are referred to in any related text or that are associated with any data provided.

In response to RSI 9.6, the applicant indicated, Thenearest aquifer is located at a depth of 245 to 305 m [800 to 1,000 ft] below ground surface. The response to RSI 9.6 does not indicate by name a hydrogeologic formation associated with this aquifer. The applicant should clarify if they are referring to a water-bearing sandy zone within the Cooper Canyon Formation or to another aquifer deeper in the Dockum Group. Also in response to RSI 9.6, the applicant indicated that (t)he WCS site is separated from that [unspecified nearest]

aquifer by the Dockum Formation, consisting of low permeability clays (109 cm/s). The applicant should clarify whether it meant, separated from that aquifer by the Cooper Canyon Formation, given that the Dockum Group contains two aquifers at the ISP/WCS property located below the Cooper Canyon Formation, as well as additional water-bearing sandy zones within the otherwise clayey Cooper Canyon Formation.

This additional information is needed in accordance with 10 CFR 51.45(b) and (b)(1), which require that the ER include a description of the affected environment and an assessment of environmental impacts.

Response to RAI WR-11:

The shallowest groundwater beneath the proposed CISF footprint is a few inches to a few feet of saturation in the undifferentiated Antlers/Ogallala sediments starting at the northern fence line of the Protected Area boundary in the northeast corner. The sands and gravels containing the water at a 90- to 100-foot depth are part of the hydrostratigraphic unit termed the Antlers/Ogallala/Gatuna (OAG) by ISP joint venture member Waste Control Specialists. The OAG comprises laterally contiguous sands and gravels of the Tertiary Ogallala, Cretaceous Antlers and Cenozoic Gatuna Formations and at the Waste Control Specialists facility this unit is discontinuous and largely dry or unsaturated beneath the Waste Control Specialists facilities.

The shallowest water bearing zone at the neighboring Waste Control Specialists facility is located in a siltstone/sandstone lense at a depth of approximately 225 feet below ground surface. There are no borings into the sandstone/siltstone lenses of the Cooper Canyon Formation within the CISF footprint. There is no cross-formational flow between the hydrostratigraphic units.

Page 59 of 114 C.I. 79.3 000246

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 172 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Tab 35 000247

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 173 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 February 3, 2020 Mr. Jeffrey D. Isakson Chief Executive Officer/President Interim Storage Partners LLC P.O. Box 1129 Andrews, TX 79714

SUBJECT:

INTERIM STORAGE PARTNERS LLCs LICENSE APPLICATION TO CONSTRUCT AND OPERATE THE WASTE CONTROL SPECIALISTS CONSOLIDATED INTERIM STORAGE FACILITY, ANDREWS COUNTY, TEXAS, DOCKET NO. 72-1050 - REQUEST FOR CLARIFICATION OF RESPONSES RELATED TO MATERIALS REVIEW

Dear Mr. Isakson:

By letter dated July 19, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18206A595), as supplemented May 31, and July 31, 2019 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML19156A038, and ML19217A210), Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP), a joint venture of Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) and Orano CIS LLC (a subsidiary of Orano USA), requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) resume all safety and environmental review activities associated with the proposed WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (WCS CISF) license application. ISP requested authorization to store up to 5,000 metric tons of uranium for a period of 40 years in the WCS CISF.

By letter dated November 16, 2018, the staff issued requests for additional information (RAIs)

(First Request for Additional Information, Part 1; ADAMS Accession No. ML18320A184) in connection with its Materials Evaluation review for the WCS CISF. By letter dated May 31, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19156A038), ISP provided responses to the staffs request. The staff has reviewed your responses to staffs RAIs and determined that additional clarification and/or supplementation of your responses are needed to complete its review. The information needed by the staff is discussed in the enclosure. We request that you provide responses within 45 days from the date of this letter. If you are unable to meet these deadlines, please notify NRC staff in writing, within two weeks of receipt of this letter, of your new submittal date and the reasons for the delay.

C.I. 84 000248

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 174 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 J. Isakson Please reference Docket No. 72-1050 and CAC/EPID 001028/L-2017-NEW-0002 in future correspondence related to the technical review for this licensing action. If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-0262.

Sincerely,

/RA/

John-Chau Nguyen, Senior Project Manager Storage and Transportation Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Management Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Docket No. 72-1050 CAC No. 001028 EPID L-2017-NEW-0002

Enclosure:

Request for Clarification of ISPs Responses to 1st RAI, Part 1 C.I. 84 000249

ML20034E835 OFFICE: DFM DFM DFM DFM DFM WWheatley DDunn via MRahimi DDoyle NAME: JNguyen via email email via email via email DATE: 1/17/20 1/22/20 1/21/20 1/27/20 2/3/20 Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 176 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 Request for Clarification of ISPs Responses to First Request for Additional Information, Part 1 Docket No. 72-1050 WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility in Andrews County, Texas By letter dated July 19, 2018 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML18206A595), as supplemented May 31, and July 31, 2019 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML19156A038, and ML19217A210), Interim Storage Partners LLC (ISP), a joint venture of Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) and Orano CIS LLC (a subsidiary of Orano USA), requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) resume all safety and environmental review activities associated with the proposed WCS Consolidated Interim Storage Facility (WCS CISF) license application. Interim Storage Partners LLC requested authorization to store up to 5,000 metric tons of uranium for a license term of 40 years in the WCS CISF application.

By letter dated November 16, 2018, the staff issued requests for additional information (RAIs)

(First Request for Additional Information, Part 1; ADAMS Accession No. ML18320A184) in connection with its Materials Evaluation review for the WCS CISF. By letter dated May 31, 2019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML19156A038), ISP provided responses to the staffs request. The staff has reviewed your responses to staffs RAIs and determined that additional clarification and/or supplementation of your responses are needed to complete its review. The information required by staff is discussed below:

RAI NP-15-10-S Clarify bolting material listed on WCS SAR page 15-8.

SAR page 15-8 has a listing for ASTM A574 Grade 70, but the reference cited, Structural and Thermal Material Properties - MAGNASTOR/MAGNATRAN Cask System, NAC Calculation 71160-2101 Rev. 9, NAC International, Atlanta, Georgia (Reference 15-3), does not contain information for ASTM A574 material.

There are two issues that need clarification:

1. ASTM A574 is not in Reference 15-3 but yield strength and tensile strength values listed on SAR Page 15-8 are correct according to ASTM A574.
2. ASTM A574 has multiple grades including: 4137, 4142, 4145, 4340, 8740, 5137M, and 51B37M, but no Grade 70. The Grades of ASTM A574 refer to alloy designations (i.e.,

4340 Cr-Mo steel) rather than strength (e.g., A516 Grade 70). The yield strength and tensile strength of all grades of ASTM A574 is 135 ksi (minimum) and 170 ksi (minimum) respectively which is much stronger than a typical "Grade 70" steel which usually refers to an alloy with a tensile strength of 70 ksi.

This information is necessary to assure compliance with 10 CFR 72.24(c)(3) and (c)(4).

C.I. 84 Enclosure 000251

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 177 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 RAI NP-15-13-S Provide the following:

1. The location of the referenced tables in the RAI response: The response to RAI NP-15-13 refers to (1) SAR Table 15.3-1 comparing the FO, FC and FF DSCs to the DSC subcomponents evaluated in the 1004 renewal, (2) SAR Table 15.3-2 comparing the GTCC DSCs to the DSC subcomponents evaluated in the 1004 renewal, (3) SAR Table 15.3-3 comparing the 24PT1 DSC to the to the DSC subcomponents evaluated in the 1004 renewal and, (4) SAR Table 15.3-4 comparing the AHSM to the HSM subcomponents evaluated in the 1004 renewal. SAR tables corresponding to Tables RAI 15.13-1 through RAI 15.13-4 were not included with the SAR change pages provided with the RAI response.
2. The applicability of the CoC No. 1004 AMPs to the 24PT1 DSC and the AHSM in the response to RAI NP-15-13: In their RAI response, the applicant stated:

SAR Section B.13 has been added to Appendix B to require the AMPs in Appendix C, Section C.13, to be applied to the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS System (i.e., the 24PT1 DSC and the AHSM). SAR Tables 15.3-3 and 15.3-4 review the subcomponents of the 24PT1 DSCs and AHSM, compare them to corresponding DSC and HSM subcomponents evaluated in the Renewed CoC 1004, and conclude that no AMA is required or that the AMPs in CoC 1004 are applicable. Therefore, the AMPs in Appendix C (SAR Section C.13) are applicable to the SSCs of the MP187 system proposed for storage at the WCS CISF.

It appears that the underlined statement should refer to the Standardized Advanced NUHOMS System and the 24PT1 DSC. The preceding paragraph in the RAI 15-13 response addresses the FO, FC, and FF DSCs of the MP187 system.

3. The CoC No. 1004 renewal time limited aging analyses (TLAAs), if any, which will be used to manage aging effects in the period of extended operation: Table RAI 15.13-1 through RAI 15.13-4 include a column titled CoC No. 1004 Aging Management Activity.

The entries in this table only refer to aging management programs (AMPs). No TLAAs are listed in these tables. Several TLAAs in the CoC No. 1004 renewal that were incorporated into Rev. 17 of the CoC No. 1004 FSAR Section 12.2 would appear to be applicable including:

  • Fatigue Evaluation of the Dry Shielded Canisters
  • Horizontal Storage Module Concrete and Dry Shielded Canister Steel Support Structure Thermal Fatigue, Corrosion, and Temperature Effects Evaluation
  • Dry Shielded Canister Poison Plates Boron Depletion Evaluation
  • Evaluation of Neutron Fluence and Gamma Radiation on Storage System Structural Materials
  • Confinement Evaluation of 24P and 52B Non-Leaktight DSCs
  • Thermal Performance of Horizontal Storage Modules for the Period of Extended Operation 2 C.I. 84 000252

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 178 Date Filed: 05/16/2022

  • Evaluation of Additional Cladding Oxidation and Additional Hydride Formation Assuming Breach of Dry Shielded Canister Confinement Boundary
  • Evaluation of Cladding Gross Rupture during Period of Extended Operation
4. Revisions to any TLAAs approved in the CoC No. 1004 renewal and incorporated into CoC No. 1004 UFSAR Revision 17 that do not consider the proposed actions and loadings associated with the transportation of the existing DSCs currently in service at other specifically licensed and generally licensed ISFSIs: The movement of DSC to the proposed ISP/WCS CISF facility should consider additional parameters associated with the transfer and transportation operations as necessary. For example, it appears that the Fatigue Evaluation of the Dry Shielded Canisters included in Section 12.2 of the CoC No. 1004 UFSAR Revision 17 does not address loading cycles associated with the movement of DSC to the proposed ISP/WCS CISF facility including: (1) DSC loading during removal from the existing HSM, (2) DSC loading and temperature cycles during transportation package leak testing prior to transportation, (3) loads during transportation, (4) temperature during transportation, (5) DSC loading and temperature cycles during transportation package testing upon receipt at the ISP/WCS CISF facility, and (6) DSC loading during placement into the HSM at the ISP/WCS CISF facility.
5. Additional information on the assessment of ITS components in Tables RAI 15.13-1 through RAI 15.13-4 where the comparison component for the CoC No. 1004 system was NITS: Entries in the columns of Table RAI 15.13-1 (page 38 of 93 of the RAI response) for the Stop Plate (2nd row) and the Bottom Shield Plug (6th row) are considered ITS for the FO, FC and FF DSCs currently located at the Rancho Seco ISFSI but are NITS for the CoC No. 1004 system. The assessment of the ITS components should consider the ITS function, the range of possible aging mechanisms and the operating environment. The applicant should also review Tables 15.13-2 thru 15.13-4 for similar entries.
6. Additional information on the NITS components for the FO, FC, FF in Table RAI 15.13-1, the GTCC DSC in Table RAI 15.13-2, the 24PT1 Component of Table RAI 15.13-3 and the AHSM components in Table RAI 15-13-4: Specifically, provide additional information on the screening assessment and the determination on whether these components might be screened in under category 2 in accordance with the guidance in NUREG-1927 Revision 1 Section 2.4.2.
7. Revised material information for the GTCC DSC and the DSCs from the CoC No. 1004 in Table RAI 15.13-2: The information provided in this Table RAI 15.13-2 appears to contain many errors on the materials used for the DSC components. For example, the Outer Bottom Cover Plate in Table RAI 15.13-2 is listed as SA-240 Type 304 for the GTCC Material and A240 Type 304 for the CoC No. 1004 Material. These appear to be reversed. The DSCs approved for spent fuel storage under the CoC No. 1004 system used SA-240 Type 304. The GTCC canisters used A240 Type 304.
8. Aging management reviews for the FO, FC, FF, GTCC and 24PT1 DSCs and the AHSM: Tables RAI 15.13-1, through RAI 15.13-4 provide a crosswalk to justify the application of the approved CoC No. 1004 AMPs to the FO, FC, FF, GTCC and 24PT1 DSCs and the AHSM. While Tables RAI 15.13-1 through RAI 15.13-4 identify the safety classification of the subcomponent parts, the safety function(s) of the subcomponent parts are not identified. The CoC No. 1004 renewal (along with other CoC and specific license renewals) have included an aging management review with the safety functions 3 C.I. 84 000253

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 179 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 of the ITS SSCs identified. The staff has used the information in the aging management review to evaluate the adequacy of the proposed aging management activity. The information provided in previous renewals has been consistent with the guidance in NUREG-1927 Revision 1 Section 3.2. Without information on the safety functions of the ITS SSCs, the staff cannot determine whether the proposed aging management activities are sufficient to maintain the safety function of the ITS SSCs throughout the period of extended operation.

9. The use of surrogate inspections identified in SAR Sections C.13.3.1 and C.13.4.1: The revised SAR pages in Appendix C state the following:

Interim Storage Partners (ISP) may use inspections results from other general or specific licensee inspections if it can be demonstrated that the other licensee inspections are bounding. Parameters to be considered in making a bounding determination include: similar or more benign environmental conditions, similar storage system design components, similar stored fuel parameters, heat load, and operational history.

The staff notes that Sections C.13.3.4 and C.13.4.4 state the following:

A minimum of one DSC from each originating ISFSI, is selected for inspection. The DSC(s) selected for inspection is based on the following considerations/criteria which provide the basis for selection of a bounding DSC(s): (1) Time in service, (2) Initial heat load, (3) DSC Fabrication and Design Considerations and (4) HSM array configuration relative to climatological and geographical features.

Sections C.13.3.4 and C.13.4.4 do not address the potential use of surrogate inspections.

NUREG-1927, Revision 1, notes that the use of surrogate inspections may be acceptable only when substantial operating experience provides a basis for their use.

Table B-1 notes that an approach of using surrogates would need to be justified on a case-by-case basis by an applicant, considering canister examination results for the susceptibility rankings.

In addition, in the Response to December 21, 2016, Nuclear Energy Institute Submittal:

NEI 14-03, Format, Content and Implementation Guidance for Dry Cask Storage Operations-Based Aging Management, Revision 2 (ML18325A207) the NRC clarified the additional information necessary for the use of surrogates for AMP inspections:

The NRC has not approved the use of surrogates for AMPs to date. There is not yet substantial operating experience for canister examinations for the various susceptibility rankings to understand how the susceptibility assessments may be applied, and surrogates used, across the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation fleet. There is not yet a technical basis for the use of surrogate inspections for canisters until the Code Case is developed and operating experience exists for canister examination results for the various susceptibility rankings. For other structures, systems, and components (SSCs) within the scope of renewal, there are limited AMP inspection results and no industry guidance for determining which SSCs may be appropriate for the use of surrogate inspections. Both a 4 C.I. 84 000254

Case: 21-60743 Document: 00516320935 Page: 180 Date Filed: 05/16/2022 guidance document that considers the effects of environmental and operational parameters on aging effects and operational experience gained from conducting AMP inspections are necessary for identifying potential surrogates for SSCs other than storage canisters.

This information is needed to determine compliance with 10 CFR 72.42(a) and 72.120(a).

4 C.I. 84 000255