ML20235A896
ML20235A896 | |
Person / Time | |
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Site: | Calvert Cliffs, Mcguire, Sequoyah, McGuire, 05000000 |
Issue date: | 09/21/1987 |
From: | Hood D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
To: | Miraglia F, Murley T, Sniezek J NRC |
References | |
NUDOCS 8709230457 | |
Download: ML20235A896 (19) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:,' t > Docket Nos.: 50-369 J27 and 50-370 m ' ii MEMORANDUM FOR: T. Murley* J. Partlow R. Capra J. Sniezek* F. Congel W. Butler F. Miraglia* H. Miller V. Nerses R. Starostecki* S. Black
- J. Stolz S. Varga* B. Boger* E. Adensam D. Crutchfield* G. Lainas* H. Berkow L. Shao* F. Schroeder K. Jabbour C. Rossi* G. Holahan A. Thadani J. Richardson W. Lanning W. Troskoski THRU: Kahtan N. Jabbour, Acting Director Project Directorate II-3 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II i
FROM: Darl S. Hood, Project Manager Project Directorate 11-3 Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF MEETING WITH WESTINGHOUSE REGARDING CLASS IE SWITCHGEAR MODELS D5-416, DSL-416, DS-420, DS-206 AND DSL-206 TIME & DATE: September 23, 1987 9:00 am - 4:30 pm LOCATION: Air Rights Building Conference Room AR 2242 PURPOSE: To discuss the technical basis for Westinghouse's recommended actions, criteria and conclusions in Enclosure 1 and related breaker failures due to inadequate welds of the pole shaft assembly at Calvert Cliffs 1 (Enclosure 2) and Sequoyah 2. PARTICIPANTS: ~ 1/ NRC WESTINGHOUSE J. Richardson P. Morris J. Stone W. Bamford, et al. D. Hood, et al. B7092 g y gj$ ,7 Darl S. Hood, Project Manager PDR ppt Project Director 11-3 P Division of Reactor Projects I/II cc: See next page
Enclosures:
(1) Westinghouse letter of September 11, 1986 (2) Calvert Cliffs 1 memo of September 18, 1986 1/ The neeting is open for interested members of the public to attend as observers iiursuant to "Open Meeting and Statement of NRC Staff Policy," 43 Federal Register 28058, 6/28/78. pM V[ PDII-3/DRPI/II PDII-6/DRPI/II DHood/ rad KJabbour 09/jp/87 09/g/87
a-MEETING NOTICE DISTRIBUTION 4350ket_Ellih2' NRC Participants ;
'NRC POR J. Richardson ;
L PDR J. Stone I NSIC PRC System D. Hood ) S. McNeil PD#II-3 Rdg E. McKenna M. Duncan i W. Troskoski (MNBB 6113) ! B.-Kolostyak G. Holahan T. Murley ; F. Miraglia l G. Lainas ! S. Varga EJordan l - GPA/PA VWilson WLanning JPartlow ACRS (10) OGC-Bethesda Receptionist (Building where mtg is being held) I bec: Licensee / Applicant & Service List i I n a t - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[ 'Pr. H. B.. Tucker-l i Duke Power Company McGuire Nuclear Station cc: Mr. A.V. Carr,'Esq. Dr. John M. Barry Duke Power Company. Department of Environmental Health P. O. Box 33189 Mecklenburg County
-.'422 South Church Street 1200 Blythe Boulevard Charlotte, North Carolina .28242 Charlotte, North Carolina 28203. ' County Manager of Mecklenburg County Mr. Dayne H. Brown, Chief 720 East Fourth Street Radiation Protection Branch -
Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 Division of Facility Services Department of Human Resources Mr. Robert Gill 701 Barbour Drive Raleigh, North Carolina . 27603-2008 Duke Power Company Nuclear Production Department P. O. Box 33189 .. Charlotte, North Carolina 23242 J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq. Bishop. Libennan, Cook, Purcell and Reynolds 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20036 Senior Resident Inspector c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Route 4 Box 529 Hunterville, North Carolina 28078 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 L. L. Williams Area Manager, Mid-South Area ESSD Projects Westinghouse Electric Corporation MNC West Tower - Bay 239 , P. O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 i I i l
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y *. F' ENCLOSURE 1 j ; > i l . l
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Thefol$owinginforsationandrecommendationsareprovidedforyouruse.if you havo Westinghouse Models DS-416, DSL-416, DS-420, DS-206 and DSL-206 switchgear installed in your plant in IE service. BACKGROUND i On July 2,1987, it was reported that a DS-416 reactor trip breaker did not i open on' demand at McGuire Unit 2 during rod drop testing following a refueling outage. This malfunction was determined when plant psrsonnel observed smoke in the vicinity of the reactor trip switchgear. Since the breaker had not opened pn demand the shunt coil current was not interr ted resultin in a damaged. coil. The breaker could not be tripped manuall , but did tr p when '
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the mangal charging handle was manipulated. During subsequent cycling on the j
! test bench, 'the breaker jaemed again. An inspection was conducted at the site l
jointly.by Westinghouse, Duke Power and the NRC, during which the breaker was
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cycled for 37-38 times. 'It rated successfully each time. Visual inspectuon noted wear (nearl 3000 cycles of o aration) and separation of the weld wh' ch attached the center pola lever to tie pole shaft. The NRC issued ~ Information Notice 87-35 on July 30, 1987 reporting this event. l INVEST 1hATIONRESULTS The bre6ker was subsequently shipped to Westinghouse where a detailed investigation following the guidelines jointly developed by Duke Power, tb ; NRC and Westinghouse. The breaker malfunctioned after some 130 operations. l , l . . i I , i I h 6
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I Septembe'r 11, 1987 Page 2 Af ter observing the condition it was found that the jamming could be repeated i 1 by manually forcing the close cam and main drive link into a uniqueThe brej constrained position. own through about thirty subsequent operations. The scen'ario at McGuire can be explained as follows: The roller attached to j The the main drive link normally rests on the outer close cam laminations. l broken weld permitted lateral movement of the main drive link which moved the In the jammed position, the roller had ! roller close to its tolerance limits. The force exerted by 'be breaker j slipped off the outer laminate of the cam. d i closing ' action induced a twisting motion which caused the roller .a we' ge I between the close cam lamination and the side frame. Although it was i established that the stacking of part tolerances played a part in the jamming l of the breaker, it was also concluded that the breaker would not jam unless a broken w' eld was present to permit the twisting action that allowed the roller to wedge. . __ . _ . . . ....._ _ . . . Subsequeht evaluation of the broken weld revealed that the weld had about 25% f j fusion. The mechanism producing the weld separation was low cycle fatigue with the' fatigue striations indicating separation after about 2,500 cycles A conservatively i (consist'ent with Duke's estimate of operating cycles). calculat'ed load on the weld was determined to be 10,000 psi. The designed weld str'pngth is 35,000 psi giving a " safety factor" of 3.5. POTENTIAk. SAFETY IMPACT Westinghouse considers this malfunction of the DS-416 Reactor Trip Breaker to D5-416 breakers have operated through many thousands be a random occurrence. 4 of cycle's without any malfunction similar to that reported at McGuire. l Despite ,'the quality of the weld in the McGuire breaker, it performed for It
about 3,000 cycles confirming that the weld as designed is conservative.
was also', evident that while it is necessary to have a weld separation to initiate' the occurrence it also requires other part tolerances to be near maximum.; For thes'e reasons, Westinghouse does not recommeltd_tha_t any icnediata actinne be taken'. This, however, does not preclude recommended actions in line with
! .hornl_ surveillance ahir mafHtenance practices.
RECOMMEdE0 ACTIONS l Primary Attention has been focused on Westinghouse Because the weld separation performedwith a random contributing
'" factors from tolerance build-up.
inspectipn of the pole' shaf ts (welds) during manufacture and because one . I I i 6 yt---
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Septembe'r 11, 1987 j l "
- Page 3 l ',l - ' 3 ! , e
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l instance of the roller rubbing the side frame surfaced durina the . 1styesligaff5n~ Westinghouse reconnends_the_followingac.tinan for 1E_
- s plications of DS-416 switchgear:
A.'ShortTermInspection(NextSurveillance) IWeld Inspection (On Three Pole Lever Welds)
! This inspection may be performed with the breaker disconnected and ' racked out fully on the cell rails, or on a bench, as is suitable to ,the user. Minimum tools are - small mirror, fillet gauge (1/8" and . ; 3/16"), flash light, screwdriver, socket wrench and long handled pliers.
Proc'edure
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- 1. Trip 'the breaker if energized and closed.- Rack it out on '
l cell rails fully extended, or transfer to bench.
- 2. Remove front panel.
- 3. ' Disconnect motor leads, and the link for the auxiliary i- switches.
! 4. Remove the to) cover towards the front of the breaker.
making sure t3at wires -in the harness are not damaged. I
, 5. Inspect the weld (s) visually to the criteria giver, below. . 6. Reinstall all items removed or disconnected.
Criteria and Actions
- 1. Wald Separation l'
Action: If separated welds are found, remove from service i as main or Dypass Dreaker. 1 . j 2. Cracked Weld _ For checking the presence of weld cracking, exclude the ends which may show evidence of cold start.
- l Acti6n: If cracks are found, use only as bypass breaker _
i until weld condition can be corrected. 4 $ f 4
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- 3. Size and Length of Weld .
Exclusive of the ends of the weld, which may show e'vidence of cold start, the weld should have at least 3/16' fillet for. 90' continuously.around the pole shaft. .If the fillet is under 3/16", then the weld must be at least 1/8" fillet ( for 120' continuously around the pole shaft. Either size weld.provides a " safety factor" in excess of 1.5. Actidn: If dimensions are not met, use only as bypass breaker until weld condition can be corrected. j s B. Long Term Ingpection (Next Refueling) 1
- 1. Examine Welds for Separation, Cracks or Size
~ * ' Inspect Nmainder bf pole shaft welds ~with"the exception of stop levers which do not perform a safety function. Replace pole . f i shaft if necessary. j i 'I
- 2. AlignmentofBreakerMechanism .
l Refer to Fi ure.1. This tolerance check should be performed on thebenchw$ththeclosingspringsdisconnectedfromthe f cam-shaft (common shaft going through the close cas). - i l l Procedure -
'1. Remove front panel of the breaker.
- 2. Disepnnecttheclosingspringsfromthecamshaft. The l other end may be lef t undisturbed.,
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- 3. De-energize control powers to the breakers, if wired to power supplies. Breakers should be open with springs i discharged.
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- 4. Restrain the UVTA with a wire loop so that the breaker is not in.a trip-free mode.
- 5. Simulate manual charge of the closing springs to the charged position, to turn the close cam to the " Ready to Close" posit, ion.
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l Septembe'r 11, 1987 ;
. Page 5 l ;
!- 6. With' pressure applied to roller as indicated in Figure 1 ! slowly turn the closing cam manually by the a ring charging . l' handle. (Note: To release the can to turn press both manual trip and close buttons simultaneously. Continue to turn the cam until the breaker contacts reach the closed
. position.
At this time, the maximum lateral play of the roller is in effect. j!
- 7. Through the front of the breaker, sight the close cam, the roller and the side frames. Using a flashlight, check to see that -
- a. roller is making contact with the two outer laminates of the close cam. It is not required to be centrally
'placed. - - -- - -- --
- b. there is visible gap between the side frame and the roller side at each end of the mechanism. .
If either of the two checks are not satisfactory, contact Westinghouse. s .
- 8. Reinitall all couponents removed.
[ fOtherSwitch6earModels I . Other switchgea,r models which utilize the identical pole shaft and mechanism a uld also be inspected. 1. DSL-f16and05-420
' Insppetion schedule should be identical to that outlined abovp for DS-416.
- 2. D5-2Q6andDSL-206 l
I Since the stresses on these welds are considerably less than thosp on the D5-416 application. (resulting in a much larger
" safety factor"), it is reconsnended that all the above inspections be accomplished at the utilities' convenience in a time frame not to exceed the next refueling outage.
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. POSE 7/8 .-/
Septembe'r 11, 1987 - i
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s CONCLUSIONS Westingh'ouse believes'that the above actions are prudent and when accomplished on a one-time basis wi.11 provide assurance that a similar circumstance will not be ~ repeated. - 1 i
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Sincerely, l r
. f . i H. C. Walls, Manager i
- Nid-America Region ProjectsDepartment Attac 'nt - Figure 1 HT/3277 cc: G. J. P11m1 T. A. Rieck F. G. Lentine J. A. Johnson W-E. J. Fuerst D. L. Farrar J. A. Usam W J. Marianyi WOG Rep.
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2: , 5 MECHANISM SIDE FRAME , . t 1 MAIN DRIVE LINK i l
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FRONT VIEW POWER OPERATED (STORED ENERGY) MECHANISM h 6$ w
.- ENCLOSURE 2-C<M C4yp. ,
Septenber 18, 1986
'Io: J. P. M: Nicker nun D. A. Wright i
i
Subject:
EgNFP 480 Volt Breaker No. 52-1108 - NCR 3894 i i During routine maintenance of the subject breaker, it was discovered that the veldment connecting the center pole levar aru to the pole shaft was broken. Se pole shaft with the broken weldment and a pole shaft removed from another breaker were sent to the Materials Engineerig and Aralysis Unit (MELAU) for evaluation. on' Arm A visual examination No. 3 shown in FigureofNo. the1.failed breaker indicatas that the failure occurrei At highar magnification, shcwn in Figure No. 2, it is observed that the fillet veld separated frten the levar arin at all but a small area at the start of the wald. he fillet weld remained attached to the pole shaft eide along its entire langth. Examination of the separated surface reveals that approximately 70 percent of the wald had not fused to the lever arm. Dese unfused areas have a flat, smooth and relatively featureless surface. %e zwnaining 30 percent represents the areas that fractured during operation of the breakar. Hawecepie examination of the fractured in a wald.armas reveals a rough woody texture characteristic of an overload fracture All fractured areas have a similar appearance and there is no evidence
~ et beach marks iniicative of a fatigue fracture. herefore, we assume that the fracture of the fused areas was the result of overload. Since the cyclic operatig lands of this breaker are assumed to be consistant the failure most probably occurred during the first cycle (s of operation. Se failed lever arm was connectai to the anti-rotational lever arm)beside it, therefore, the load was transferred to this levar arm after the failure and the breakar continued to operate.
A measurement of the fillet legs indicates that the lag on the pole shaft side was 0.30 inch and the lag on the lever arm side was 0.10 indh. his mismat& of leg sizes oftechnique welding 3 to 1 and lack of fusion on the lever arm side indicates an improper in annufacture. that thsee arms waru waland to the pela shaft in production using ons Metal ArcWe s Walding (G9H) process. electrode in the joint, Ithe appears that the walder did not pu. ply position the electrode was positioned more toward the pole shaft resulting 3). in lag mismat& and indk of fusion cm the lever arm side (see Figure No. A i 4e.e nactive eXmednation (NEE)' was performed on all pole shaft to lever arm walds for both pole shaft assemblies sent to ME&AU. Se NIE consisted of visual enamnination and wet fluoresount angnetic particle examination. masults of these emanninations are shown .in MtE Deport No. 85-1445 included as Attachment No.1, and are mannarised as follows: 1. Visual commination indicates that in general the starts of the walds are not fused properly to the levar arm side. -
- 2. .
Visual exista. examination also indicates that in ganarmi a fillet leg mimatch ~-
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'. 3. -. Magnetic particle examination indicates that with the exception of the start, the welds appear to be fused to the lever arm side.
he condition - of the unfailed welds were probably adequate for intended service, however, flaws present including the falla$ weld indicates that there es inadegante control of welding durirxJ pmtaction. - To further investigate the problem of welder techniqJe a section was rem: nod frun the center of all unfailed welds. he sections were ground to a 240 grit finish of fusion. and the walds were macreetched with amnenium persulfate to reveal the deptri Depth of fusion measurements were made for all sections and the results recorded in Table No.1. A photograph representative of welds examined is ahan in Figure No. 4. These results reveal that the depth of fusion on the pole shaft was significantly greater than the depth of fusion en the lever arm. It is im note that the depth of fusion does not detarmine the adegaacy of the ]portant oint. to If ocuplete fusion is present the joint is adegaata. he results indicate that the welder's technique was poor, but in most cases there was adequate fusion outside of the start of the wald. We conclude fzun the analysis that the failure was caused by lack of fusion of - f the wald as a result of improper welding technigae. Inspection of the welds on both assemblies sent to ME&AU indicates a potential exists that scre failures may have occurred or will occur an the pole shaft assemblies now in servios. HE;&AU reocan- ) i mands that prwisions be made to nordii /Myely examine and/or repair all breakers j that are now operating with similar pole shaft assemblies. We believe the nest ' cfficient fix would be to fillet weld the backside of the joint. 7br anore details on unld repair cxantact R. E. Cantrell on 787-5505. o (
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