05000456/FIN-2013002-05
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Finding | |
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Title | NonSafety-Related Turbine Building Waste Disposal System to Safety-Related Essential Service Water Pump Room Sump Design Interaction |
Description | On January 21, 2013, the licensee documented in IR 1465027, 1WF040A Not Seating Properly, that SX sump pump discharge check valves 1WF040A and/or 1WF040B might be leaking by based on data that indicated that when the TB sump pump(s) operated, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 A train SX pump room sump pump(s) would start shortly after. This condition suggested that the TB sump pump(s) were filling the Unit 1 and Unit 2 A train SX sump to a level that caused the SX sump pump(s) to start. The licensees prompt operability evaluation was documented in IR 1473152, Single Point Vulnerability for SX Pump Room Flooding, and concluded that the SX pumps were operable since the SX pump room sump pumps can pump water out of the SX pump room sumps and, therefore, prevent water from accumulating in the SX pump room. However, the inspectors noted that previous IRs indicated degraded performance of both A train SX pump room sump pumps (IR 1426946, 1WF06PB Does Not Develop Adequate Discharge Pressure, and IR 1464644, 1WF06PA and B Degraded Insufficient Urgency to Correct. ) On February 13, 2013, the licensee updated their operability review to credit isolating the TB from the SX pump rooms by closing nonsafety-related isolation valves 1WF055 and 2WF055 until the final operability evaluation was complete. On February 14, 2013, the licensee documented that alarm response procedure BwAR OPL02J-2-A6, TB Floor Drain Sump Level High High, was being revised to provide operator direction to align the SX pump room sump to the Radioactive Waste system in the event of TB flooding. Additionally, credit was given to the nonsafety-related SX pump room sump high level alarm to alert operators to an off-normal level condition. The licensee credited the SX pump room sump pumps to be able to pump against the head pressure from the flood water in the TB, though reference was not given to their degraded condition. Issue Report 1473152 referenced UFSAR 10.4.5, Circulating Water System, and identified that the worst case flood in the TB could theoretically reach 396 feet. The lowest elevation of the SX sump pumps was 322 feet. The IR stated that the discharge of the SX room sump pumps was given as 100 gpm at 106 feet which would prevent inflow from the TB. The IR also stated that the NRC Standard Review Plan (SRP) requirement to prevent flooding of a safety-related area was maintained. On March 18, 2013, WO 1497423 was performed and identified that the disc for 1WF040B (SX sump discharge check valve) was stuck in the mid-position. NRC SRP 3.6.1, Plant Design for Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment, BTP SPLB 3-1 B.3.b, stated, In analyzing the effects of postulated piping failures, the following assumptions should be made with regard to the operability of systems and components: (1) Offsite power should be assumed to be unavailable if a trip of the turbine-generator system or reactor protection system is a direct consequence of the postulated piping failure; (2) A single active component failure should be assumed in systems used to mitigate consequences of the postulated piping failure and to shut down the reactor, except as noted in Item B.3.b.(3) below. The single active component failure is assumed to occur in addition to the postulated piping failure and any direct consequences of the piping failure, such as unit trip and loss of off-site power (LOOP). Additionally, SRP 9.3.3, Equipment and Floor Drainage System, required that the equipment and floor drainage system be capable of preventing a backflow of water that might result from maximum flood levels to areas of the plant containing safety-related equipment. SRP 10.4.5, Circulating Water System, required compliance with General Design Criteria 4, Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases, based on meeting the following: 1) Means should be provided to prevent or detect and control flooding of safety-related areas so that the intended safety function of a system or component will not be precluded due to leakage from the Circulating Water system; and 2) Malfunction or a failure of a component or piping of the Circulating Water system including an expansion joint should not have unacceptable adverse effects on the functional performance capabilities of safety-related systems or components. Based on the above, the inspectors questioned whether the failure of the 1WF040B check valve would result in water from a postulated TB flood to backflow into the common Unit 1 and Unit 2 A train SX pump room sumps resulting in the loss of the 1A and 2A SX Pumps. The inspectors were unable to determine during the inspection whether the licensees justification was acceptable and therefore this issue will be considered an URI pending further NRC review. |
Site: | Braidwood ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000456/2013002 Section 1R06 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
Type: | URI: |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.06 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Garmoe E Duncan J Benjamin M Holmberg M Perry R Jickling R Ng T Daunm Learnm Perry N Feliz Adorno R Edwards R Ng T Daun T Go V Meghani A Dahbur A Dunlop A Garmoe A Sallman E Duncan J Benjamin J Neurauter J Robbins |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Braidwood - IR 05000456/2013002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Braidwood) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Braidwood)
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