05000237/FIN-2011004-04
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Preventive Maintenance Procedure For Valve 2-2301-29 |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed for the failure to have a procedure adequate to ensure quality during the preventive maintenance (PM) performed on the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) 2-2301-29, Return to Condenser Valve, in March 2011. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as IR 1250901, HPCI Return To Condenser Leak From Valve Body. The licensees corrective actions included determining the acceptable internal and external inspection scope and revising procedure DMP 0040-06, Copes-Vulcan Valve and Reverse Acting (Air to Open) Operator Maintenance, as appropriate. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to identify long term degradation during a preventive maintenance activity in March 2011 resulted in the HPCI system becoming inoperable in August 2011. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a, for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors answered Question 2, (Does the finding represent a loss of system safety function?) Yes and went to Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A. A Region III Senior Reactor Analyst performed an SDP phase 3 evaluation using the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model for Dresden. The high pressure coolant injection system was modeled as unavailable for an exposure period of 6 days. The delta CDF estimate was 7.9E-8/yr, which represents a finding of very low safety significance (Green). The dominant core damage sequence was a loss of main feedwater followed by the failure or unavailability of high and low pressure injection sources. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding. |
| Site: | Dresden  |
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| Report | IR 05000237/2011004 Section 1R19 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Draper L Jones J Corujo-Sandin R Orlikowski D Melendez-Colon C Phillips M Ring |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Dresden - IR 05000237/2011004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Dresden) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Dresden)
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