05000219/FIN-2011002-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Establish Proper Baseline Data for Service Water Pumps in Accordance with ASME Code |
Description | The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10CFR 50.55a, Codes and Standards, because Exelon did not properly establish baseline reference values for the service water pumps as required by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code for Inservice Testing (lST). Exelon procedure 641.1.001, Service Water Pump Operability and In-Service Test, required the operators to take differential pressure baseline data at three flow rates, while the ASME requirement in subsection ISTB (lST of pumps in light-water reactor power plants) paragraph 4.1, Preservice Testing, requires that this data be taken at a minimum of five points. Exelon\'s corrective actions included revising procedure 641.1.001 to be in accordance with the ASME code, rebaselining #1 and #2 service water pumps, and performing an extent of condition review to ensure that all pumps are baselined in accordance with the ASME Code. Exelon entered this issue into the CAP as lR 1175089. This finding is more than minor because it is similar to IMC 0612 Appendix E minor example 2.cin that the same issue affected both service water pumps and both have experienced degrading performance into the action range. Additionally, the finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected it could have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 lnitial Screening and Characterization of Findings, to determine that the NCV screened as very low safety significance (Green). This finding is applicable to the lnitiating Events cornerstone as a transient initiator, but screens as Green because the finding does not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources, where complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures are available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. [H.2.(c)] |
Site: | Oyster Creek |
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Report | IR 05000219/2011002 Section 1R22 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Kulp R Nimitz J Tomlinson R Bellamy J Ambrosini T Hedigan E Keighley |
CCA | H.7, Documentation |
INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Oyster Creek - IR 05000219/2011002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Oyster Creek) @ 2011Q1
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