05000286/FIN-2008002-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inappropriate Exiting of TS 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green finding, of very low safety significance, because Entergy inappropriately exited Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown. Specifically, on February 25, 2008, Entergy inappropriately determined that the 32 and 33 pressurizer backup heater groups could satisfy the remote shutdown safety function for the 31 pressurizer backup heater group and exited Technical Specification 3.3.4. The inspectors determined that this action was contrary to the Unit 3 Technical Specification Bases, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination. Following discussion between the inspectors and Entergy management, operators re-entered Technical Specification 3.3.4 until the repairs of the 31 pressurizer backup heater group were completed. Entergy entered this issue into their corrective action program, and submitted a Licensee Event Report to the NRC. This finding did not involve a violation of regulatory requirements because Entergy did not exceed the 30-day allowed outage time for the 31 pressurizer backup heater group. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Configuration Control and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, Entergy inappropriately restored operability of the pressurizer heater remote shutdown function. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, using Phase 1 guidance contained in IMC 0609, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, because although it did represent a loss of operability of the component, it did not represent a loss of safety function, and the component was not lost for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance because Entergy did not make safety significant or risk-significant decisions using a systematic process when faced with uncertainty and unexpected plant conditions to ensure that safety was maintained. (H.1(a) |
| Site: | Indian Point  |
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| Report | IR 05000286/2008002 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2008 (2008Q1) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Koonce E Cobey P Cataldo S Barr |
| CCA | , |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000286/2008002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2008Q1
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