05000247/FIN-2008002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure of 21 Swp Due to Inadequate Maintenance Procedure |
| Description | A self-revealing, non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for failure to provide an adequate procedure for installing cable termination lugs on the 21 service water pump motor cables. As a result, Entergy maintenance personnel installed undersized terminal lugs for the 21 service water pump motor jumper cables on January 26, 2000, which resulted in a high resistance connection that degraded over time and eventually caused the cables to fail while the pump was in service on January 27, 2008. Entergy entered this issue into the corrective action program, replaced the jumper cables with insulated bus bars, tested the motor for damage, and changed Engineering Standard ENN-EE-S-008-IP, IPEC [Indian Point Energy Center] Electrical Cable Installation Standard, to ensure the use of correctly sized terminal lugs in the future. Entergy also plans to perform an extent-of-condition review that includes thermography and visual inspections of other safety related motor cable terminations. The inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone; and, it affected the objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, Entergy failed to provide adequate procedural steps to ensure that the 21 service water pump was installed with appropriate electrical connectors. The inspectors evaluated the significance of this finding using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At- Power Situations, and determined that it was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency; it did not represent a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time; and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events |
| Site: | Indian Point  |
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| Report | IR 05000247/2008002 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2008 (2008Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Koonce A Patel C Hott P Cataldo R Mckinley S Barr S Smith |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000247/2008002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2008Q1
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