|
---|
Category:REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT (SEE ALSO AO LER)
MONTHYEARML20062D5401990-11-0505 November 1990 Ro:On 901029,coupling Assembly Connecting Control Rod to Drive Mechanism Misaligned ML20248C6081989-08-0303 August 1989 Ro:On 890726,apparent Release of Fission Products from Fuel Element Occurred.Caused by Spent Fuel Element 6368.Fuel Element Removed from Core & Placed in Spent Fuel Storage ML20244A8531989-04-0606 April 1989 Ro:On 890330,anomaly Discovered at Top End of Rod Worth Curve.Caused by Missing Aluminum Spacer.All Spare Rod Mark F Drive Assemblies Being Checked to Ensure Presence of Aluminum Spacers ML20236T2221987-11-0606 November 1987 Ro:On 871030,deputy physicist-in-charge (DPIC) Bypassed Cylinder Down Limit Microswitch & Failed to Check Action of Interlock Sys When Checking Operation of Maintained Control Transient Rod.Maint Overhaul on Sys Ordered & DPIC Rebuked ML20206G1111987-04-0707 April 1987 Ro:On 870320,operator Incorrectly Lowered Pulse Rod Receiver to Reduce Core Excess Reactivity.Caused by Human Error.Matl Re Problem Will Be Introduced Into Requalification Training Course ML20207P8131987-01-0909 January 1987 Ro:On 870105,safety Rod Did Not Drop After Termination of Customer Irradiation & Reactor Scram.Mesh Screen Protecting Rod Barrel from Debris Discovered to Be Too Tight & Binding Rod.Control Rods Recalibr on 870108 ML20206A8641986-06-0505 June 1986 Ro:On 860527,after Reactor Startup Following 10-day Programmed Shutdown,Readings of Certain Thermionics Data Showed Slightly Higher Secondary Pressure than Desired. Fused Light Circuit Not Operating.Right Fuse Installed ML20137W5811986-02-13013 February 1986 Ro:On 860125,air Pump Which Circulates Air Through Particulate Filter in Continuous Air Monitor Found Not Functioning.Caused by Partially Inserted Power Cord Plug. Plug Inserted Properly & Pump Returned to Operation ML20140C4421986-01-21021 January 1986 Ro:On 851229,cell Top Monitor Exhibited Apparent Loss of Sensitivity During Startup.Electronic Count Rate/Power Supply Package (Eberline RM-14) Replaced ML20136F2511985-11-14014 November 1985 Ro:On 851030-1107,Channel K-3 Scram Level Set 9% Higher than Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Erroneous Entry in Log Book.Scram Setpoint for Channel Corrected ML20062B3051978-09-15015 September 1978 Ro:On 780831,while at Full Power,Control Rod Continued to Withdraw Even When Operator Not Depressing Up Control. Caused by Faulty Switch.Switch Replaced 1990-11-05
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20210Q9201999-08-12012 August 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 36 & 45 to Licenses R-38 & R-67,respectively ML20206F4241999-04-27027 April 1999 Rev 2 to General Atomics Triga Reactor Facility Decommissioning Plan ML20195E6561998-12-31031 December 1998 Triga Mark I Reactor Annual Rept for CY98, Dtd Apr 1999 ML20203C4631998-10-16016 October 1998 Issue a to QAPD-9009-2, Triga Reactor Facility Decommissioning QA Program Document ML20154B4851998-10-0101 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 44 to License R-67 ML20216G0671997-12-31031 December 1997 Triga Mark I Reactor Annual Rept CY97 ML20212G4201997-10-29029 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 35 to License R-38 ML20211P3461997-10-0909 October 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 34 to License R-38 ML20140D5091997-04-18018 April 1997 Rev 0 to General Atomics Triga Reactor Facility Decommissioning Plan ML20137U1541996-12-31031 December 1996 Triga Mark I Reactor Annual Rept for CY96 ML20134E6351996-06-10010 June 1996 Partially Deleted Commission Paper Re Financial Assurance for General Atomics Facilities ML20062D5401990-11-0505 November 1990 Ro:On 901029,coupling Assembly Connecting Control Rod to Drive Mechanism Misaligned ML20248C6081989-08-0303 August 1989 Ro:On 890726,apparent Release of Fission Products from Fuel Element Occurred.Caused by Spent Fuel Element 6368.Fuel Element Removed from Core & Placed in Spent Fuel Storage ML20244A8531989-04-0606 April 1989 Ro:On 890330,anomaly Discovered at Top End of Rod Worth Curve.Caused by Missing Aluminum Spacer.All Spare Rod Mark F Drive Assemblies Being Checked to Ensure Presence of Aluminum Spacers ML20235Q3751989-02-16016 February 1989 Triga Mark I Annual Rept for 1988 ML20235Q0941989-02-16016 February 1989 Triga Mark F Annual Rept for 1988 ML20055H0191988-12-31031 December 1988 Safety Evaluation Under 10CFR50.59 Microprocessor-Based Instrumentation & Control Sys for General Atomics Triga Mark I Reactor ML20206J2831988-11-18018 November 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 40 to License R-67 ML20147A7681988-02-23023 February 1988 Annual Operating Rept for 1987 ML20149N1131988-02-22022 February 1988 Annual Operating Rept for 1987 ML20236T2221987-11-0606 November 1987 Ro:On 871030,deputy physicist-in-charge (DPIC) Bypassed Cylinder Down Limit Microswitch & Failed to Check Action of Interlock Sys When Checking Operation of Maintained Control Transient Rod.Maint Overhaul on Sys Ordered & DPIC Rebuked ML20237G6961987-08-31031 August 1987 Safety Evaluation Report on HIGH-URANIUM Content, LOW-ENRICHED URANIUM-ZIRCONIUM Hydride Fuels for Triga Reactors.Docket No. 50-163.(GA Technologies,Incorporated) ML20235E9981987-07-0606 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 38 to License R-67 ML20209C4681987-04-10010 April 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 27 to License R-38 ML20206G1111987-04-0707 April 1987 Ro:On 870320,operator Incorrectly Lowered Pulse Rod Receiver to Reduce Core Excess Reactivity.Caused by Human Error.Matl Re Problem Will Be Introduced Into Requalification Training Course ML20205A1931987-03-19019 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 37 to License R-67 ML20212C3341987-02-25025 February 1987 Annual Operating Rept for 1986 ML20207P8131987-01-0909 January 1987 Ro:On 870105,safety Rod Did Not Drop After Termination of Customer Irradiation & Reactor Scram.Mesh Screen Protecting Rod Barrel from Debris Discovered to Be Too Tight & Binding Rod.Control Rods Recalibr on 870108 ML20205Q2101986-09-15015 September 1986 Speech Entitled, Current Status of U Zirconium-Hydride Low Enriched U Fuel Design & Development, Presented at Seventh European Triga Users Conference on 820915-17 in Istanbul, Turkey ML20203F9581986-07-31031 July 1986 Revised Decommissioning Plan ML20206A8641986-06-0505 June 1986 Ro:On 860527,after Reactor Startup Following 10-day Programmed Shutdown,Readings of Certain Thermionics Data Showed Slightly Higher Secondary Pressure than Desired. Fused Light Circuit Not Operating.Right Fuse Installed ML20154B3351986-02-27027 February 1986 Annual Operating Rept for 1985,discussing Operating Experience,Changes in Design,Performance Characteristics & Procedures,Fuel,Control Rod,Pulsing Sys & Reactor Safety Surveillances & Continuous Air Monitor ML20154B4651986-02-27027 February 1986 Annual Operating Rept for 1985 ML20212C2901986-02-25025 February 1986 Annual Operating Rept for 1986 ML20140C3331986-02-20020 February 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 36 to License R-67 ML20137X7081986-02-20020 February 1986 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 35 to License R-67 ML20137W5811986-02-13013 February 1986 Ro:On 860125,air Pump Which Circulates Air Through Particulate Filter in Continuous Air Monitor Found Not Functioning.Caused by Partially Inserted Power Cord Plug. Plug Inserted Properly & Pump Returned to Operation ML20140C4421986-01-21021 January 1986 Ro:On 851229,cell Top Monitor Exhibited Apparent Loss of Sensitivity During Startup.Electronic Count Rate/Power Supply Package (Eberline RM-14) Replaced ML20136F2511985-11-14014 November 1985 Ro:On 851030-1107,Channel K-3 Scram Level Set 9% Higher than Tech Spec Limit.Caused by Erroneous Entry in Log Book.Scram Setpoint for Channel Corrected ML20133K3261985-10-17017 October 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 35 to License R-67 ML20205Q2191985-10-14014 October 1985 Speech Entitled, Final Results of Qualification Testing of Triga Fuel in Oak Ridge Research Reactor Including Post- Irradiation Exam, Presented at 851014-16 Meeting in Petten,The Netherlands ML20128L8261985-06-13013 June 1985 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 34 to License R-67 ML20054L9301982-02-25025 February 1982 Annual Financial Rept 1981 ML20062B3051978-09-15015 September 1978 Ro:On 780831,while at Full Power,Control Rod Continued to Withdraw Even When Operator Not Depressing Up Control. Caused by Faulty Switch.Switch Replaced 1999-08-12
[Table view] |
Text
r s
@ In Reply G A Technologies Inc.
Refer To: 67/9012 PO. BOX 85608 SAN DIEGo. CAUFORNI A 92138 5 June 1986 (619) 455-3000 Mr. Harold R. Denton Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Docket No. 50-163: Reactor Facility License R Possible Reportable Occurrence.
Dear Mr. Denton:
On Wednesday, May 28, 1986, the NRC office of Region V was notified by telephone of a possible reportable occurrence concerning the TRIGA Mark F Reactor (R-67). Upon a careful rereading of the pertinent section of the Technical Specifications, i.e., Section 10.2.6(g), it may be that this is not a reportable occurrence. However, upon further investigation of the event, another aspect of the related thermionics operation may be report-able. Both aspects are reported herein.
At 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br /> on May 27,1986, about 3-1/2 hours after completing a reac-tor startup following a 10-day programmed shutdown, the on duty senior re-actor operator (SRO) was taking hourly readings of certain thermionics data when he discovered a slightly higher secondary pressure than desired in the in-core number 4 thermionic device. The latter is a non-fueled thermionic test and an alarm is not required by the Technical Specifica-tion. Taking all the correct steps in the notification procedure, he con-tacted, among others, the thermionic test engineer for guidance. At this juncture he found that the fused light alarm circuit at the reactor con-sole was not operating and that the associated reactor room audible alarm could not function. The SRO then instituted control of personnel entry into the reactor room. This extra control was continued on the following shift and lasted until the fuse in the light alarm circuit was replaced with a slightly larger fuse by an electronic technician (about 1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> on May 28). These facts were reported to Region V on May 28.
The confusion as to whether this is a reportable occurrence arises from the interpretation of the intent of 10.2.6(g). Section 10.2.6(g) re-quires a pressure sensing device capable of indicating a leak in the purgeable secondary contaiment be operable. We believe that the routine prompt notification of the reactor console operator by the computer print-er (at the same console) with or without the console alarm light and aud-ible alarm within the reactor room is sufficient under 10.2.6(g) because the reactor operator has complete control of entry to the reactor room 8606180381 860603 DR ADOCK 0500 1 3 gg 10955 JOHN JAY HoPKINS DR , SAN DIEGO CAUFoRNIA 92121
t 1 H. R. Denton 67/9012 '
and, for anyone in the reactor room, he can order immediate personnel evacuation from the reactor room. While we-normally provide an audible
~ alarm in. the reactor. room, it appears that the intent of 10.2.6(g) is met without such a' reactor room alarm.
A further review of the events surrounding the failure of-the light alarm
- on the reactor console revealed the following additional information.
The repeater printer located at the reactor console which immediately identifies all thermionic alarms was not functioning when the inspection was conducted at 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br /> on May 27, 1986. It had, in fact, not been activated, as it is normally,' when full power was reached at the end of-the reactor startup, i.e., at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> on May 27, 1986. The regular hourly data taken at the main thermionic computer assured that no alarms of any sort had in fact occurred since 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> until the slightly high pressure in device number 4. (It may be .noted that this pressure reached
- the alarm point only a couple of minutes prior to 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br />.) Failure to activate the repeater printer was traced to the thermionic staff. whose job it is to activate this printer ' arter completion of all thermionics diagnosis and reactor. startups. In this instance, the thermionic engi-neer instructed the SRO on how to put it on line. Thus from about 1900 hours0.022 days <br />0.528 hours <br />0.00314 weeks <br />7.2295e-4 months <br /> on, the repeater printer performed its function as usual.
The . normal function of ,the repeater printer. is to alert the reactor op-erators to the several thermionic operating parameters that may. be out--
side desired limits. Except for the secondary containment pressure
[10.2.6(g)(1)] none of the other alarms is related to actions required under 'the Technical Specifications. -The alarm- on the computer printer for the secondary. containment pr' essure has been used as the means to meet the intent of 10.2.6(g)(1).
1he following actions have been- taken in' response to and as a' result of
~
our investigations of the event occurring on May 27:
- 1. A slightly larger fuse (0.5a instead of'0.25a)' was inserted in the console light alarm circuitry on May 28, 1986. Subsequently, on June 3,1986, the DC Sonalert circuit which was part of the console light '
alarm circuitry has been replaced by an AC Sonalert, a change intended to improve reliability. The fuses are now 2 amps.
- 2. The thermionic staff has been reminded of the important function that the repeater printer on the reactor console plays in meeting a lic-ense required specification (10.2.6(g)(1)). To this end a specific item is being added to their thermionic startup and thermionic diag-nostic checklist to require specifically that the repeater printer be activated and functioning.
s-. . ,
j.
l-l H. R. Denton 67/9012
- 3. A purchase order has been placed to provid; additional instrur:enta-tion.for the thermionic equipment that will provide indication of excessive secondary pressure directly to the reactor console rather than through the thermionic computer. When this modification is installed, the operation as regards the licensed required alarm
, [10.2.6(g)(1)] will parallel that presently used for the license required scrams [10.2.6(f)(1)].
.If you have questions concerning the above, you may call me at (619) 455-2823 or Dr. W. L. Whittemore at (619) 455-3277.
Very truly yours,
~
Keith E. Asmussen Manager, Licensing &
, Nuclear Compliance KEA:he cc: Mr. John B. Martin, NRC. Region V.
5 1
' N y.
l s:
0 i...,, . .. _, ., .