ML20235Q094
| ML20235Q094 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | General Atomics |
| Issue date: | 02/16/1989 |
| From: | Asmussen K GENERAL ATOMICS (FORMERLY GA TECHNOLOGIES, INC./GENER |
| To: | Chris Miller Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| 67-1350, NUDOCS 8903020493 | |
| Download: ML20235Q094 (10) | |
Text
.
b CENERAL ATOhNCS February 16, 1989 67-1350 Mr. Charles L. Miller, A: ting Director Standardization and Non-Power Reactor Project Directorate U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Camission Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Facility License R-67; Docket 50-163; Subnittel of TRIGA Mark F Annual Report (3 copies)
Dear Mr. Miller:
The following is an annual report for General Atomics' (GA's) TRIGA Mark F reactor (License R-67) prepared in the same format as that required for GA's Mark I (R-38).
While the Technical Specifications for Mark F require no annual report, the numbered sections below are the sections referred to in Section 9.6(e) of the Technical Specifications for GA's Mark I TRIGA reactor (License R-38, Docket 50-89).
PART I:
A brief narrative sunmary of (1) operating experience (including experiments performed), (2) changes in facility design, performance characteristics and operating procedures related to reactor safety occurring during the reporting period, and (3) results of surveillance tests and inspections.
1.
Operating Experience The Mark F reactor was in operation during 1988 mainly to provide steady-state irradiation for experiments related to thermionic device tests.
No pulsing operations were performed.
In addition to the extended irradiations of thermionic devices, occasional out-of-core irradiation of samples was also carried out.
During this year, experience associated with the Mark F FLIP fuel tramp uranium, reported first in 1978 and then in successive years, is unchanged. This situation causes no problem, but is, as before, under continuous scrutiny. Occasional indications of this e
effect were observed in 1988, but none created any personnel
.Q exposure problems.
m Sha The operating schedule during all of 1988 resulted in irradiation ffs runs lasting typically 4000 or more continuous hours, after which the reactor was shut down and one or nore of the thermionic 25 devices were renoved from the core and inspected using the i
l gg underwater neutron radiography (NR) rig and the same Mark F aq reactor as the NR neutron source.
The NR inspection cycle took I
8 typically 5-7 days, after which the long term irradiation was i
gg resumed; typically, the reactor power for thermionic irradiation co a tr 10955 JOHN JAY HOPKINS DRIVE, SAN DIEGO. CA 92121 1194 PO DOX 85608, SAN DIEGO, CA 92138-5608 (619) G5-3000
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' i was selected in the range 950 to 1500 kW according to the neutron flux level desired by the experimenter.
Occasional inspection periods were longer when additional reactor related activities were required.
A shut down was also necessitated by year-end holidays that lasted about one week.
In the course of the year, one license amendment was granted (License Amendment No. 40).
This amendment adds requirements to be in effect for a closer site boundary when thermionic devices are under test, and establishes requirements for allowable reactor building air leakage and verification thereof, and for the installation, availability, and surveillance of operability of a reactor roam activated charcoal filter system with forced air flow.
No reportable occurrences arose with this facility during 1988.
2.
Changes in Facility Design, Performance Characteristics, and Operating Procedures All of the essential mechanical design changes in the facility pursuant to the long term thermionic tests were incorporated in 1985 and discussed in that year's Annral Report.
None of the operations during 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988 involved any changes in reactor performance characteristics. All of the operation was steady-state; no pulsing operations were involved. The continuous operation (namely at 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> / week) is essentially unchanged.
Minor changes in the Operating Procedures were made in 1988 mainly to clarify the intent since nest were written when 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> / week operation was in effect.
The changes in facility design during 1988 were mainly in the reactor auxiliary instrumentation. Where appropriate, a 50.59 review was performed and all required approvals were obtained (see Part V).
(a) Alarm / scram annunciators for certain auxiliary systems were assembled on one panel to provide annunciation of several key parameters associated with thermionic operations.
This included new status lights for the thermionic alarm circuit and the uninterruptible power supply and new switching mechanisms for certain of the scram bypass operations for the thermionic cells.
(b) A newly constructed thermionic device was completed and installed in the Mark F reactor in 1988.
(c) Revised written procedures set forth the operating procedures to be followed for the control of the Mark F reactor tank water temperature.
A new section elaborates on the steps to i
l be taken by the reactor operator when deviation fram the desired 36*1'C is n1 avoidable.
)
l l 3.
Surveillance tests and inspections were performed as required by Sections 4.0, 5.0, and 6.0 of the Mark F Technical Specifications.
A sumary of results is presented below.
Fuel Surveillance The reactor fuel was neasured for bending and length changes and inspected visually.
The surveillance occurred on 6/17/88. Three elements (Nos. 6349, 6339, and 6336) failed the 1/16-inch bend test and were rmoved fram service.
Thirty-one fuel elements failed the 1/32-inch bend test but successfully passed the 1/16" bend test.
Two additional fuel elements (Nos. 5873 and 5072) passed the length and bend requirements but were difficult to remove from the grid plate. These two elements have been removed from service until they can be investigated further.
As mentioned in the annual reports of 1986 and 1987, approximately 26 fuel elements were o mtinued on an increased frequency of in-spection.
During 1988 eul of this group were inspected once. We were testing a hypothesis that slow, progressive bending of a fuel element is influenced by the direction of the local flux gradient.
Measurements on 26 elments for bending at the 1/32-inch level were made on 2/6/87, 6/8/87, 10/19/87, and 6/13/88.
While the about same number (16) passed the 1/32-inch bend test during each of these tests, each time this number included same fuel elements that previously would not pass the 1/32-inch bend test but had been further irradiated with an orientation that reversed the flux gradient.
Tentative evidence exists to show that (1) the flux gradient is responsible for a portion of the bending of a fuel element and (2) rotating 180* to a new exposure position can produce a certain anount of " unbending" in the same fuel element.
Control Rod System Surveillance Since the start-up of the thermionic test program in January 1985, no pulse assembly (rod, rod drive, piston, etc.) has been in the core.
Only five control rods with standard control rod drives have been in use in 1985, 1986, 1987, and 1988.
On 6/17/88 all five control rods were checked and found to be satisfactory.
Various ones of the drive assemblies were replaced and repaired during 1988 (See Part IV).
Reactor Safety Surveillance As specified in the Technical Specifications, channel tests of the reactor safety system channels, channel calibrations of the power level monitoring channels, and calibration of the temperature and channel checks of the fuel element temperature-measuring channels were performed.
The tests were perfomed at least as often as required, and the results were satisfactory.
1 I
. The reactor power calibration is required at least semiannually by the Technical Specifications.
It is typically performed nore often since the thermionic project involves neutron radiographic operations during which the thermionic devices are removed frcxn the core and then reinstalled, perhaps with fuel rearrangement. A power calibration is perforned after this operation is complete.
Power calibrations were performed in January, June, and September j
1988.
All four power channels required adjustments of five
{
percent or more in two of these three calibrations. For the third i
power calibration only two of the four channels required a l
sensitivity adjustment of five percent or greater. The number of changes in detector sensitivities is consistent with past experience when changes in core configurations are involved.
The area nonitor and survey systems wre under surveillance during this reporting period.
The frequency of calibration was as indicated below.
Continuous Air Monitor Alann setpoints were checked weekly when there was reactor operation.
The system was calibrated semiannually with two Sr-9/Y-90 sources in front of the cietector (9,520 and 110,000 CPM).
Eberline Area Monitors Operation was checked with a source every two weeks; calibration was performed semiannually with a naminal 4nci Cs-137 source.
Portable Survey Meters The Eberline RO2 and RO2A meters, the Ludlum pancake GM meters (Model 3), and the LFE SNOOPY (neutron) meters were calibrated semiannually in the General Atomics calibration facility.
PART II: A tabulation showing the energy generated by the reactor (in megawatt-hours).
The energy generated in 1988 by the Mark F reactor was 10,922.5 megawatt-hours.
The bar graph on the following page shows a monthly distribution of power generated.
PNG III:
The number of emergency shutdowns and inadvertent scrams, including the effect, if any, on the safe operation of the reactor, and the reasons for any corrective maintenance required, if any.
1.
6/22/88 While a technician was perfonning on-line repair of a water leak in the flow rate nonitor for the thermi-onic cell cooling system, he accidentally shorted
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1988
. contacts in the flow monitor.
This scramued the reactor. No safety issues were involved.
2.
6/22/88 During a routine start-up, the operator by error pushed the Rod No. 1 SCRAM button rather than the UP button.
3.
6/28/88 Wile ' perfonning the routine, on-line weekly scram check for the CAM (with the CAM scram in bypass), the technician accidentally shorted to ground one of the terminals.
This action circumvented the bypass and caused a reactor scram.
Improved procedures are now in effect for perfonning this weekly safety test. No safety issues were involved.
4.
9/15/88 Iost facility site power causing a reactor scram just after completing a planned reactor start-up.
5.
12/17/88 Wile testing an air pump, a technician accidentally plugged its AC power cord into the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) bus.
This nunentary power drain caused a drop in AC voltage output frm the UPS which scramned the reactor.
All access to the AC bus has subsequently been altered to require a special AC plug.
This action will minimize the likelihood of plugging unauthorized equipment into the UPS bus. No safety issues were involved.
These five scrams in 1988 represent a decrease fran the eleven reported for 1987.- Part of this improvanent is due to improvements made in 1986 and 1987 in the reactor control and safety system.
In addition to the above scrams, two events occurred that did not cause a scram because of protective circuitry installed to prevent certain accidental scrams.
1.
9/29/88 A high voltage trip occurred in the K2 power channel.
The 2-cut-of-3 requirement for reactor scram prevented a facility scram.
The K2 high voltage power supply was reset and the unit returned to service under increased surveillance.
This high voltage trip did not occur again in 1988. No safety issue involved because two functioning power channels were in use as required by the Technical Specifications.
2.
10/4/88 A site-wide momentary power glitch occurred without a reactor scram because of the protection provided by the uninterruptible power supply. The operators were able to reset the fans and pumps which were tripped
. by the brief power interruption.
Since the reactor is cooled by natural convection, its continued operation did not involve any safety issue.
The nanentary interruption was apparently short enough not to trip the Thermionic safety systen.
PART IV:
Discussion of the major maintenance operations performed during the period, including the effect (if any) on the safe operation of the reactor, and the reasons for any corrective maintenance required.
1.
2/22/88 Unclogged the strainers and spray nozzles for the 2 W cooling tower.
Inproved the cooling rate.
2.
5/14/88 Changed the 10 cubic foot resin bed for the demineralized systen.
Inproved the control of water conductivity in the reactor pool.
The operation involves an enlarged resin bed and requires attention to details to limit man-Rem personnel exposures and facility contamination.
3.
6/15-16/88 Retaoved, repaired and reinstalled control rod drives for rods Nos. 3 and 4.
4.
6/17-10/88 Replaced control rod drives Nos. I and 5 with spare units. Sent removed units for repair.
5.
9/5-14/88 Pressure regulator failed in make up water line for the 2-W cooling tower.
Switched to backup cooling system to repair and improve the 2-W tower water supply system.
Improvements included the installation of sight glass, sump level and flow alanns and. their respective annunciators in the reactor control room.
At the same time, the tower was cmpletely drained, cleaned and recoated with a protective layer of tar.
Returned to inproved op-eration.
6.
9/30/88 The 300 Anp fuse for the high speed fan in the 2-W tower burned out.
The operators shifted the cooling temporarily to the four 1/2-W towers until electricians could be found to replace the fuse. No safety issue was involved.
f 7.
11/21/88 The bearings in the primary cooling pump niotor and J
the punp shaft were replaced.
No safety issue was I
involved because of the natural convective cooling for the Mark F reactor.
l l
t
. In addition to the above listing of mainly major maintenance items, a large number of routinc maintenance items received attention in 1988.
None of these involved safety issues.
These items included the following:
repaired chart recorder for replaced broken G-M detector self-powered detectors--
in water monitor; replaced pens in same unit; relocated facility area replaced assorted fan belts on radiation monitor readout; blowers and fans; replaced magnet light bulbs added sight glass and level e
for control rod system; for the 2 Mi sump water; repaired small leak in flow changed filter in demineral-monitor for demineralized izer system; 1
system; replaced pump in demineral-installed 3 new self-powered izer system; detectors.
PART V:
A sunmary of each change to the facility or procedures, tests, and experiments carried out under the conditions of 10 CFR 50.59 is presented below.
1, 5/20/88 Under a 10 CFR 50,59 application, the Safety Comnittee was asked to review an extensive console consolidation of status alanns/ scrams /tripass indications for same auxiliary systens and customer experiments.
The safety camnittee approved the changes since it was clearly demonstrated that no unreviewed safety issues were involved in as nuch as the same funct ions were being perfonned; the circuitry was simplified with the expectation of better reliability, and the operation was functionally less complex.
2.
7/7/88 The Safety Cmmittee reviewed and approved the additions to the Written Procedures for certain aspects of the Thermionic Test operation. Normally, the reactor pool water temperature nust be maintained at the 36
- 1*C es requested for the thermionic tests.
The referenced addition to the Written Procedures provides guidance to the reactor operator when it becames impossible to maintain the 361*C.
The goa' is to provide steps to be followed to limit the temperature rise to values that will not endanger the thermionic devices and will at the same time minimize the likelihood that the reactor / thermionics
. test must be terminated due to excessive pool water temperature.
It should be noted that the reactor itself will tolerate nach hotter pool water than will the Thermionic devices.
PART VI: A sunmary of the nature and amount of radioactive effluents released or discharged to the environs beyond the effective control of the licensee as measured at, or prior to, the point of such release or discharge.
During calendar year 1988, 1.719 curies of Argon-41 were released fr a the facility to the atmosphere.
All liquid and solid wastes were transferred to GA's NRC licensed (SNM-696) Waste Processing Facility for ultimate disposal.
Solid wastes are packaged and shipped to an authorized disposal facility.
Liquid wastes are handled in a similar manner, or small quantities of low level liquid wastes may also be released into the municipal sewerage system within the limits and criteria specified by applicable local, state and U.S. NRC regulations.
PART VII:
A description of any environmental surveys performed outside the facility.
There have been no significant changes to the Environmental Surveillance Program during 1988.
PART VIII:
A sunmary of radiation exposures received by facility personnel and visitors, including the dates and time of significant exposure, and a brief sunmary of the results of radiation and contamination surveys performed within the facility.
Facility Personnel Whole Body Exposures for the Year 1988:
(REM)
High Low Average Number of Employees Monitored..
20 0.860 0
0.149 Nonfacility GA Personnel Whole Body Exposures for the Year 1988:
(REM)
High Inw Average Number of Employees Monitored..
13 0.450 0
0.081 The majority of these exposures were received at other facilities on the GA site.
D
.a V
. Contractor / Customer Personnel Whole Body Exposures for the Year 1988:
(REM)
High low Average Number of Persons Monitored...
72 0.575 0
0.038 Visitor Whole Body Exposures for the Year 1988:
(REM)
High Low Average Number of Persons Monitored...
31 0.120 0
0.007 Routine Wipe Surveys High Wipe.
~ 2153 p%rn/100 crtF Average 4*
p3pn/100cnf Iow Wipe
$1 pdpm/100 crtF Routine Radiation Measurements High 32 mrem /hr @ 1 foot Average 4
mrem /hr @ 1 foot Iow 0.4 mrem /hr @ 1 foot
- The highest wipe result, 2153 dpn/100 cn?, was not used in obtaining the average because it was an unusual occurrence and not representative of " average" conditions.
Should you desire additional information concerning the above, please contact me at (619) 455-2823.
Very truly yours, Keith E. Asmussen, Manager I
Licensing, Safety and Nuclear Compliance KEA/mk cc: John B. Martin, NRC Region V l
1
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