ML20149N113

Annual Operating Rept for 1987

ML20149N113
Person / Time
Site:	General Atomics
Issue date:	02/22/1988
From:	Asmussen K GENERAL ATOMICS (FORMERLY GA TECHNOLOGIES, INC./GENER
To:	Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
38-1180, NUDOCS 8803010277
Download: ML20149N113 (12)

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GA Technologies Inc. i

. PO BOX 85608 0 ,; . SAN DEGQ CAUFORNIA 92138 V (619) 455-3000 February 22, 1988 38-1180 Mr. IAster Rubenstein, Director Standardization and Special Projects Di;ectorate Division of PWR Licensing-B U.S. melear Regulatory crnmission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Fac211ty'Licenar >.od; Docket 50-89 SLda.ittal of N nual Report (3 copies)

Dear Mr. Rubanntein:

'1he following is an amual report required by the applicable 'ax

hnical i specifications of GA 'Itchnologiss' (GA) Mark I 'IRIGA reactor (License

. F38). 'Ihe present report covers the operation for the year 1987.

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'1he numbered sections below are those referred to in Section 9.6e of the Technical Specifications for the Mark I 'IRIGA reactor.

PART I A brief narrative sunmary of (1) operating experience (including experisets cerformed), (2) changes in facility design,

! performance characteristic and operating procedures related to reactor safety occurring during the reporting period, and (3) results i

of surveillance tests and inspections.

1. 'the Mark I reactor was operated during the year to provide 184 p11ses (Pt.lse Nos.11053 to 11236) and ntanerous steady-state irradiatims for experiments. 'the operations included:

activatim analysis, neutron radiography, King furnace high-tenperature studies of reactor fuel, ntanerous irradiations of electronic piece parts and pieces of equipnent, training and i

r requalification exercises for operator trainees, and testing of I cannercial reactor instrinnentatim. 'the nLater of samples for l neutron activatim analysis and radiochenistry was 1,909.

'Ihe above types of activities are the normal ones generally experienced over the past 30 years. In addition to these, two L- extW noeratims were conducted. In one, a high temperature in-core furnaw ' wing furnace) was operated continuously at 18500C for 16 days to test ador; fuel. In the other, an extended series of tests were conducted under the application of 10 CFR 50.59 towards development of a new, fully digitized and ocmputerized control and instrumentatim systen for research g 2,0 l

reactors. 'these tests were performed under a continuing progran P v R. DCD L

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that was described in the 1986 Annual Report for the same facili-ty. Following completion of this extensive test program, the Mark I reactor is expected to be routinely operated using the new system.

During this year, three reportable occurrences arose with this facility. Early in the year, on January 5,1987, one of the control rods failed to drop into the core when the reactor was scramed. %e problem was traced to mechanical interference fra a protective screen that had been installed many years ago on each control rod assembly to prevent debris fra floating into the control rod dashpot area. After review, the screens fra all control rods were permanently removed since the screens thenselves were a more likely source for further problems than any benefit that might accrue from their continued used. Se second report-able occurrence (April 1987) involved a flawed pulsing operation when an operator failed to reduce the core excess reactivity fra the measured $3.33 to below the $3.25, value required by the Technical Specifications. %e third occurred on October 30, 1987, during an effort to continue operatims temporarily with a faulty transient rod microewitch. % e intent was to bypass the faulty microswitch but the wrong microswitch was bypassad. The micro-switch actually bypassed is used to provide cne of the license required interlocks (Table II, Item 3 in Technical Specifica-i tions). Reactor operations were imediately suspended after the error was discovered and management was notified. In none of these cases was there any safety issue. In the first case, the stuck rod criteria was met; in the second, the pulse rod itself was worth cnly $2.64 so that no chance existed to insert more than

$3.00 (the license limit); and in the third, the standard operating procedures prevented inadvertent pulsing from the steady '

state mode.

2. %e cnly change to operations occurred when the NRC unilaterally imposed a change in the Technical Specificaticos requiring that the reactor power not be intentionally raised above 250 kW except for pulsing operations.

3. %e surveillance tests and inspections were performed as required by Secticos 3.0, 4.0 and 5.0 of the Technical Specificaticos.

Scme results are presented belcv.

Fuel Surveillance ne fuel was inspected visually and for bending and length changes on December 21, 1987. All elements were satisfactory.

Control Bod Surveillance ne visual inspection for deterioration was conducted Decenber 12, 1987. All control rods were found to be in satisfactory condition.

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,t-U Pulsim System Surveillance The mechanical w.-s of the p.tising system (pulse control.

rod, . air- piston,-lip seal, anvil, and accoulator) were inspected, cleaned as required, lubricated, and ramammehled on June 4,1987, - i and Decesber 21, 1987. The ~ drive maasehly was empletely '

diamaammhled and rebuilt to original standards of performance on ,

November 5,1967. '

M r Safety surveillance ,

4 As specified in the Technical specificatims, channel tests of the .

reactor safety system channels, channel calibrations of the power ,

level monitoring channels, calibratim of the temperature .

maamiring channels, channel checks of the power-level measuring i channels, and channel t: hecks of the fuel elanent tenprature maamiring channels were performed. The tests were performed at least as often as required, and the results were satisfactory. In ., i i

no case was a required safety channel scran found to be operating i

outside the specified safety limits. The reactor power-level

, mmitoring channels were calibrated at least monthly during the .

reporting period. Five individual neutron detectors were checked during each of the twelve calibrations; fourteen adjustments of  ;

more than 5 percent were required during the year. An additional l 14 power calibrations were performed for a variety of reasons:  :

same to train new operators; same in the process of. developing an- >

isproved calibration technique; and s ee simply to repeat or check ,

earlier results.

l l The monitor and survey systems were under surveillance during the s i reporting pericd. The frequency of calibrations was as indicated l

below.

I Continuous Air Monitor

, Alarm setpoints were checked daily. The system was calibrated semiannually with two Sr-90/Y-90 sources in front of the detector (9,520 and H0,000 DPM) .

Eberline Area Manitors Operation was checked daily; alarms were activated in response to a source every two' we.ths; calibration was performed semiannually with a nainal 4 mci Cs-137 source.

Portable survey Meters the Iberline R02 and R02A meters, the Laditun pancake GM meters (Model 3), and the LFE SNOOPY (neutron) meters were calibrated semiannually in GA's calibration facility.

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ww JtEtll: ' A tabulation shwing the energy. generated by the reactor (in' regenratt-hours) . .

'1he energy generated in 1987 by the Mark-I was 144,975 kilwatt-hours (145 megawatt-hours). 'Ihe acccupanying bar graph shows reactor usage '

- en a acnthly basis kring the year.

PANE III: 'Ihe nLabor of energency shutdowns and inadvertent scrams, l including the_ effect, if any, on the safe operatim of the reactor, and the reasons for any corrective maintenance required, if any.  ;

'Ihe total number of scrans in 1987 was 38. 'Ihe increase to 38 from 10 in 1986 is not t:r=-!+1ed since the total operating time increased <

frw 25 NGI in 1986 to 145 Mel in 1987, an increase by about a factor i-of six.. 'Ihese 38 acrans fall generally into the following three  :

categories:  ;

1. Operator error 4

2. Spurious scrams, large changes in core 24 i i or experiment arrangement, etc.

3. Specifically associated with tests on new, 10 ,

digital console.

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of the above, the 10 associated with the new console tests and the 24  ;

associated with operations deserve additional discussion. Fcr the l i tests with the new console, the safety systems for both consoles were in operation minultaneously all the time during these tests. Of these  ;

I 10 scrams, m were due to errors in the software and hardware in the

! Data Acquittitim which is part of the new Instrunentation and Control System in & new ocuputer, and others were due to failures in the l initial operation of the new console irstrumentation.

, None of these l had any affect on the safe operation of the reactor. Progressively l during the test phases, the new console has been improved to such an extent that, as regards spurious scrams, it is now considered as reliable as the old console.

'Ibe 24 acrans that occurred during normal operations were due to a variety of causes. Of these, 9 were due to spurious glitches in the Percent Power 2 channel amplifier aa===hly. 'Ibe offending w.ent is an out-of-stock item no longer available. We are seeking a ceplete replacement for the amplifier board. 'Ibe scram occurs infrequently and does not present a problem for routine operations.

However, during this year we had noch lenger runs, one lasting 16 days uninterrupted except for the taexpected scrams. A disproportionate ramber occurred during the longer duration runs. Four of the 24 acrans were caused by worn connectors in tle junction box for the

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several fuel ther gles. We have replaced the junction box with now caponents having better design features. None of these tenpera-ture scrans empreised safety because, with the scram logic, failure of continuity in a 'IC lead autmatically scres the reactor. %e ,

remaining 10 acrans were caused by a variety of causes. For example, I me was dae to an unexpected loss of gain in the linear start-up channel. As a result, before the operator could reach full power as indicated on the linear channel, the reactor screened on the safety channels. In other cases, loose connections in the external acran bus to the auxiliary channels (cich are used as safety scran channels for

experiments) and a blown fuse in he ?.C main supply to some of the auxiliary channels caused several M the acruns. Permanent inprove- "

ments have been made in the aux 111ary ocnsole to prevent sucb '

occurrences in the future. In two or three cases, the scram sehi.e of the auxiliary power channel was set too close to the full power >

(but well below the license required 1104). n is variation in setting resulted frem switching the Keithley power channel detector back and forth between the new and old consoles chiring testing.  ;

It may be categorically stated that none of the 38 acrams in 1987 were  !

of such consequence as to have ADZ effect on safe operation of the +

reactor. In addition to the corrective steps noted above, Part IV ocntains a more emplete discussion of major maintenance operations. .

Aging reactor and instraent ccaponents, and lack of spare parts in '

certain instances necessitated an extensive program of repairs and  ;

replean=nt of parts be undertaken as evidenced by the number of' maintenance operations this year.

l PART IV: Discussion of the major maintenance operations performed i during the period, including the effect (if any) on the safe operation  :

L l of the reactor, and the reasons for any corrective maintenance i required. .

1. 01/03/87 h e water box had developed leaks at its welded seams in recent years. In the past, repairs were attetpted 3 l by spot welding the leaks. %is time, it was removed '

from service, its welds ground down and 2-inch -

alumina angles were welded on all lower edges. ,

Returned to service 1/6/87. No further leaks were f cbserved. t i 2. 01/05/87 he safety rod stuck up due to the protective screen '

that was applied too tightly to the outside of the  ;

dashpot assenbly. S e event was reported to NRC and  !

sometime later approval was obtained to remove the  :

protective screens fra the support barrel. We  !

screens were intended to prevent floating debris irca  !

entering the control rod dashpot. But use of the screen itself became a potential problem. On 4/30/87 all screens were removed with approval of NRC and the  !

'IRIGA Safety Caunittee. [

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3. 02/06/87 -'the underground alumintaa cooling pipes for the Mark 1-and Mark F resectors were repaired with FVC replace-  !

monts' for:a few feet cd piping which bed developal leaks fra pitting due to the' surrounding gravel. t the repairs were oospleted this day. Scne ' alightly .;

radioactively contaminated earth ~was hauled away for '

disposal.- NRC was notified and they inspected the '

repairs. '!he '!RIGA Safety Canaittee approved the 3 stops taken in the repairs of the cooling system.  ;

-4. 02/06/87 A minor console sodification was exle.no that the li Mark I cooling water- can be turned ON/OFF at the console. 'this replaced the former arkvardly located .

wall mounted switches located away fran the console.

'the Mark I conductivity acmitor failed he to an open

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resistor in the bridge network. Returned to service 3/13/87. . Auxiliary instrtmentation was used in the

• i interim to assure adequate control of con &ctivity.

6. 03/12/87 After the transient rod air heme developed a leak it was replaced with a new one. No safety consequence.

, 7. 05/11/87 'the in-core cadmita lined di.y tube (in use for '25 t years) was removed frca service when a pinhole water  ;

leak developed in its lower extremities. It was

1. replaced with a spare unit.

i l- 8. .05/21/87 'the reg rod drive asaembly (#188) failed when a drift '

, pin fell out allowing the gear train to slip.

i Replaced with unit #183. Ntaber 188 was repaired arxl returned for use as a apare on 5/22/87. No safety issue involved because ths control rod itself was i

free to fall into the core as needed. i

9. 06/18/87 A temperature channel (F'P-1) scrasned during a pu3ee. .

'this was a spurious tx: ram due to loose wiring in the

'!C patch panel in the Mark I cable trench. Wiring  :

was retightened and the ranctor was returned to  !

service.

10. v6/25/87 During the start-up of the Mark I and e.fter an I i

external scran re.covery, the central transient rod  :

('IR) cylinder could not be driven down from its UP [

position. Trouble was traced to a broken power lead .

to the drive motor. Wconnected the wires and t i

returned TR drive to service.

No safety issue was involved because tM control rod j itself was frae to drop into the core as needed, t l

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11. 06/24/87 On this day the fuses to the AC power'for the fan in the #3 cooling tower blew out. On 10/27/87 the fan actor itself developed shorts in.its windings. (%is was likely the reason for the blown fuses on 6/24/87.) Just at that time _the bearings on the coupler shaft of the 10 HP pump failed. On 10/29/87 the 10 HP system was returned to service after repair.

12. 07/06/87_ Installed a new instrianented thermocouple'(E) fuel element ~.(#10078 E) in B2 core position. Se #2122 E element was removed because all three' of its Es had failed.

13. 07/08/87 he center E elment in the new E fuel element (2122 E)- became intermittent.

% e annual reactor inspection (12/21/87) indicated that insulation had

~ chafed on the E elements. %ese were reinsulated,

- returning all three E elements to reliable service on 12/;'1/87.

14. 07/17/87 On thia date, and subsequently on 08/08/87, 08/19/87, 11/16/ 37,12/10/87 .rxi 12/22/87, a series of problems developed with the standard and reg rod control rod drivet. La most cases, the gear train slipped due to a broken roll pin. In same cases, the repaired drive

unit would drift up or down when returned to service even after the usual adjustaents were made to the

• trim pot or fixed resistances. Additional fixed resistances were required to solve the problem.

. Great care is exercised in the installation and testing of control rod drives because of the relation i

to reactor control. BoMver, An none of these cases was there any ccuprouise on reactor safety. Se control rods themselveen were always free to drop into the core as needed.

15. C8/26/87 'Ib meet new standards on pressere measurements for

- absolute HEPA filters, a 0-4 inch 'H 0) MAGNEHELIX 2

gage was installed.

16. 08/31/87 After an electrical short developed in the windings of the old domineralized water pung motor, a new one was installed.

17. 09/12/87 A new panel with state-of-the-art cos@onents was installed for the auxiliary console to replace old meters and switches.

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18. 10/16/87 A new E patch panel was installed. .this '

one uses bundled 'tC wiring instead of separate 'IC wires running frm the trench to the console. 'the purpose ,

was to reduce the number of scrans due to 'IC wiring problems with worn cu r. s ts..

19. 10/30/87 'the central transient rod (CIR) air latching microswitch became intermittent. In an effort to

. provide acceptable temporary operation, a microawitch l was bypassed. Unfortunately, the wrong microswitch

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was bypassed thus rendering inoperative one of the license required interlocks. 'this was discovered during check out of the facility but was reported to ,

the NRC even though this may not have been a t reportable occurrence. 'the entire transient rod drive assenbly was removed and sent ti the shop to be ca pletely rebuilt. 'the rebuilt tystem was reinstalled 11/05/87. Its operation is now much .

quieter and anoother, i

~20. 11/23/87 During a 24-hour per day,16-day run for lrx: ore King furnace irradiations, a series of spuriors scrams vocunal in the Percent Power 2 channel. Since the  !

frequency of occurrence was significantly high, it was hypothesized that the higher than normal RF power that was used to heat the furnace for this run was

, the cause of the frequent scrams. To complete the ,

i run, the output of this channel was bypassed since  !

two other power channels in use met the license  ;

requirements.

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After the run terminated and the channel bypass was removed, the spurious scrans continued even with the King Furnace power CFF. '!h3 cause has been traced to >

a flawed cuar.at in the amplifier in the channel.

No spare amplifier boards are available at this time, although we are still looking. Originally the

. ocuponents for these boards were specially selected and matched for proper performance. 'Ihe parts are no ,

longer manufactured.

~ Since the intermittent scran is normally infrequent u and not likely to occur during the normal runs which  :

are short (5-30 minutes), the present channel will be  !

continued in service while we seek a replacement. '

21. 11/30/87 During a long term (16 day) cent.muous run, the efficiency of the two cooling towers steadily ,

decreased. He found clogged strainers on the  ;

secondary water sumps. After cleaning the strainers, l

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0-the efficiency imprwed dramatically, taking the average pit. water -tesperature fran : 390C to : 230C.

'A long. term imprwesent progran has been started to clean. out - the susps themselves, a task to be-performed early in 1988.

22. 12/07/87 Se third power channel-(Auxiliary Keithley) became erratic. Trouble was. traced to the W power supply

-for the C1c. Cleaning the dirt and lint from-the-

' high voltage jacks remedied the problem.

23. 12/09/87 A wcin out rechargeable battery in the RM-14 AIR 4 FILTTR Monitor was replaced. he battery failed during an extended plant power ' outage on 12/04/87.

%e Rit-14 was returned to service on-12/10/87.

L '24. 12/21/87 During the semiannual check of the central transient rod air cylinder, we found the protective rubber boot inside the shock absorber cracked. Wis is only a minor problem. We boot will be replaced as soon as a replacement part- can be supplied by the manufacturer.

PART V: A- stannary of each change to the facility or procedures, testaf and experiments carried our under the conditions = of sectim l 50.59 of 10 CFR 50.

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1. 04/13/87 Apprwal to Remove . .;eens fra the Mark I (.bntrt i l Bod Dashpots.

Appewal to renwe these screens that were istalled under an earlier 10CFR50.59 was obtained frar the

'!RIGA Safety Casaittee. At the earlier time, the installation of screens was intended to prevent debris from drifting into the dashpot area. Renoving

, and reinstalling these screen each year during the

, annual inspections required special care that the E

screens thanaalves didn't became a source of i

problems. In December 1986, the reinstallation of the screens after the annual inspection involved in-l stalling a TyWrap just tightly enough to cause the l piston (in the dashpot) to jan. Wis prevented the rod fran falling after a scran. Se screens were ranwed and the problan disappeared.

l-l 2. 04/ 13/87 Review and Appewal for Installaticn of PVC Pipe Section in Cold Leg of Mark F/ Mark I Cooling System.

l Isaks due to pitting of the aluminum cooling line i caused by the surrounding gravel were detected. A l

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, 'short secticr. of pipe (<3 meters)- was replaced with PVC pipe. The very slightly radioactive soil was removed to low level wante disposal. No increase'in detechable &lorine was observed in the reactor tank

- water (primary) fra any chlorine'lanched fra the PVC section of the cooling lines.

3. 12/02/87 As part of the ongoing test under 10 CPR 50.59 to install and test the new c<mputerized (digital) console, a stepping motor was installed to operate the' safety control rod drive. Appropriate approvals were stained.

4. 12/21/87 A 50.59 approval was obtained to perform specified routine operations during the Phase III/IV of the test on the new Digital Console. The purpose of the review was to assure that no safety issues were involved by the specified routine operation to be con & acted while operating the reactor with the Digital Console in Phase III or Phase IV of the test program. ,

PARP VIt A sunmary of the nature and amount of radioactive effluents released or discharged to the environs beyond the effective control of the licensee is measured at, or prior to, the point of such release of discharge.

During the calendar year 1987, 0.03 curies of Argon-41 were released fra the facility to the atmosphere.

All liquid and solid wastes were transferred to GA's St96-696 licensed Waste Processing Facility for ultimate disposal. Solid wastes are packaged and shipped to an authorized disposal facility. Liquid wastes are handled in a similar manner, or anall quantities of low level liquid wastes may also be released into the manicipal sewerage system within the limits and criteria specified by applicable local, state, and U.S. NRC regulaticns.

PARP VII: A description of any envirormental surveys performed outside the facility.  ;

There have been no significant changes to the Envirorseental Surve11ance [

Program during 1987. j PARP VIII: A susunary of radiation exposures received by facility personnel and visitors, including the dates and time of significant -

exposures, and a brief mamary of the results of radiaticn and ,

contamination surveys performed within the facility. '

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Facility Personnel Whole Body Exposures for the Year 1987: (REM)

High Law Averaae number of Diployees Monitored . . 20 0.68 0 0.232 Nonfacility GA Personnel Whole Body Exposures for the Year 1987: (REM)

High Iow Averaae mmber of Biployees Monitored . . 19 0.34 0 0.053

'Ihe majority of these exposures were received at'other facilities at the CA site.

Contractor /Custcmer Personnel Whole Body Exposures for the Nr-1987: (REM)

High Lgg Average mmber of Persons Monitored . . . 73 0.61 0 0.06 visitor Whole Body Exposures for the Year 1987: (REM)

High Law Averaae mmber ut Pt caons Monitored . . . 46 - 0.55 0 0.036 Routine Wipe Surveys High Wipe 123 edpa/100 cm2 Average Wipe 2 edpn/100 cm2 Im Wipe <25 Edpn/100 cn2 Routine Radiation Measurements High 2.6 mRen/hr 81 foot Average 0.2 mrem /hr 91 foot Im 0 mRen/hr 81 foot should you desire additional information ccrioerning the above, please contact me at (619) 455-2823.

l Very truly yours, j i

Keith E. Asmussen, Manager i Licensing, Safety and '

mclear Caupliance I

KEA/ Ink i oct John B. Martin, U.S. }RC Region V i

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