ML20198H349

Forwards Interim Deficiency Rept Re Crosby Main Steam Safety Valve Ring Setting.Issue May Be Generic

ML20198H349
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook, 05000000
Issue date:	03/06/1985
From:	Ebneter S NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Baer R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE)
Shared Package
ML20198H325	List: ML20198H319 ML20198H349 ML20198H369
References
FOIA-86-266 NUDOCS 8605300283
Download: ML20198H349 (1)

Text

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o, UNITED STATES y/,"

y. j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION E REGION I

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'+, ,o# KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406 MAR OG 7965 MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert L. Baer, Chief, Engineering and Communications Branch, IE FROM: Stewart D. Ebneter, Director, Division of Reactor Safety, Region I -

SUBJECT:

POTENTIAL GENERIC ISSUE CONCERNING CROSBY SAFETY VALVES The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you of a potentially generic issue which may affect operating nuclear facilities.

Region I received a construction Deficiency Report, 10 CFR 50.55(e), from Public Service of New Hampshire involving the steam generator safety valves for the Seabrook Station, Enclosure 1. In an effort to determine the appro-priate vent stack size for these valves, full flow testing was performed at . ,

Wyle Laboratory. The test parameters required the valve opening to be meas '  !

ured in order to confirm the valve travel of 1.12 inches. Under varying vent '

stack sizes, the maximum valve travel achieved was 50% of the required value.

The guide ring setting was adjusted from the factory value of +150 to 0 in order to achieve the full travel. The Regional staff contacted the Chief Engineer of Crosby Valve Company, Mr. Dick Zohorsky, telephone (617) 384-3121, on February 7, 1985, to discuss the cause of the problem and determine if a Part 21 Report is appropriate. Crosby Valve was only generally aware of the problem, and had not received enough information to make a full assessment of the problem. We erged Crosby to expeditiously resolve this problem and evaluate the generic impact on operating nuclear facilities.

The Regional staff is tracking this matter and will keep your office apprised of any major development. For further information, contact H. Gregg ~of my staff at FTS:488-1295.

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Tt wart D. Ebneter, Director Division of Reactor Safety cc w/ enclosure:

S. Collins, DRP R. Gallo, DRp A. Cerne, SRI ,

8605300283 860521 PDR FOIA MURPHY 86-266 PDR g

SEABROOK STATION Engin:sring Offico Pub 5c Service of New HampeNro Mew Hampshire Yan1cee Division January 17, 1985 SBN- 751 l T.F. Q2.2.2 j l

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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Attention: Mr. Richard W. Starostecki, Director Division of Project and Resident Programs

References:

(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket ,

Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 l (b) Telecon of December 21, 1984, A. L. Legendre, Jr. (YAEC) to J. Grant (Region I)

Subject:

Interim 10CFR50.55(e) Report, " Main Steam Safety Valve Ring Setting Deficiency"

Dear Sir:

We previously reported [ Reference (b)] a potential 10CFR50.55(e) item to Region I regarding the apparent deficiency in Crosby Main Steam Safety Valve ring settings. The deficiency was discovered at Wyle Labs during full flow testing of the Crosby valves to detetuine the proper vent stack size. In order to determine full flow, the valve disc travel was measured and a disc travel of 1.12 inches was confirmed to us as being required by Crosby Valve Company via telecon on December 3, 1984 The tests determined that the disc )

only traveled approximately 50% of the required distance with 3% accumulation.

The same limited disc travel occurred on later tests with larger diameter vent stacks. After discussions with Crosby, the ring setting was adjusted. The valve was retested and the required disc travel was achieved.

The problem and its reportability occurs because uncorrected reduced valve disc travel may invalidate certain assumptions on the Main Steam System

~in the FSAR Accident Analysis. The Seabrook FSAR Accident Analysis performed ]

by Westinghouse Corporation assuces that the Main Steam Safety Valves are fully open with 3% accumulation. The ring settings are adjusted at Crosby Valve Company and the valve disc travel is not normally measured to confirm the required lift in field test.

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$nitt.d Stetso Nuclscr R2gulatery Crmmiccien Attention: Mr. Richard Starostecki, Director Page 2 In conclusion, we are performing additional testing on the Crosby Main Steam Safety Valve to verify the ring setting problem without any stack in-fluence whatsoever, and to determine the new ring settings. The results of these tests will be reported in a future interim 10CFR50.55(e) report by March 31, 1985.

Very truly yours,

)(,v, s4~h"3I J. DeVincentis, Director Engineering and Licensing cc: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 1

I

• " William S. Jordan, III

' Diana Curran ,

• - *Hirkon, Weies & J:rdan 20001 S Strsst N.W. Crentwood Board cf Colcctmen RED Delton Road Suite 430 Brentwood, New Hampshire 03833 Washington, D.C. 20009 Robert G. Perlis Office of the Executive Legal Director . Edward F. Meany U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Designated Representative of g Washington, DC 20555 the Town of Rye 155 Washington Road Robert A. Backus, Esquire Rye, NH 03870

. 116 Lowell Street '

P.O. Box 516 Calvin A. Canney Mancehster, NH 03105 City Manager City Hall Philip Ahrens, Esquire 126 Daniel Street Assistant Attorney General Portsmouth, NH 03801 Department of the Attorney General Augusta, ME 04333 Dana Bisbee, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Mr. John B. Tanzer Office of the Attorney General Designated Representative'of 208 State House Annex the Town of Hampton Concord, NH 03301 5 Morningside Drive Hampton, NH 03842 Anne Verge, Chairperson Board of Selectmen Roberta C. Fevear Town Hall y Designated Representative of South Hampton, NH 03642 the Town of Hampton Falls Drinkwater Road Patrick J. McKeon Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Selectmen's Office 10 Central Road Mrs. Sandra Cavutis Rye, NH 03670 Designated Representative of the Town of Kensington Carole r. Kagan, Esq.

RFD 1 Atonic Safety and Licensing Board Panel East Kingston, NH 03827 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Jo Ann Shotwell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Mr. Angie }Lehiros Environmental Protection Bureau Chairman of the Board of Selecteen Department of the Attorney General Town of Newbury One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Newbury, MA 01950 Boston, MA 02108 Town Manager's Of fice Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Town Hall - Friend Street U.S. Senate Amesbury, Ma. 01913 Washington, DC 20510 (Attn: Tom Burack) Senator Gordon J. Humphrey 1 Pillsbury Street Diana P. Randall Concord, NH 03301 70 Collins Street (Aten: Herb Boynton)

SE4 brook, NH 03874 Richard E. Sullivan, Mayor Donald E. Chick City Hall Town Manager Newburyport, MA 01950 l Town of Exeter l 10 Front Street Exeter, NH 03833 J

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• 2 g' ati . UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION awou s *

$[s gh &' G pq y $31 PARK AVENUE n No or enuss:4. PENNSYt.VANIA 19405 JUN 101985 MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert L. Baer, Chief, Engineering and Generic Communication Branch, IE FROM:

Jacque P. Durr, Chief, Engineering Branch, Division of Reactor Safety, RI g

SUBJECT:

POTENTIAL GENERIC ISSUE CONCERNING RING SETTINGS OF CROSBY SAFETY VALVES Our memorandum to you dated March 6,1985, Enclosure 1, advised you of a poten-tial generic issue concerning ring settings which produce only 50*,, lift on Crosby Steam Generator Safety Valves (SG-SVs). A 10 CFR 50.55(e) Construction Deficiency report was issued by Public Service of New Hampshire (PSNH) advising of the ring setting problem at Seabrook Station. Our major concern was not with the installation at Seabrook, a plant under construction, but that opera-ting plants could have SG-SVs that may not achieve full lift; whereby, actual flow capacities and/or accumulation pressure are not representative of analyses.

We have held several phone conversations with both PSNH and Crosby to determine if the observed effects on otherlift deficiences are common to this model of valve and possible plants.

this fact. To date, we have been unsuccessful in establishing  %

PSNH sent us a copy of the Ivyle test data, Enclosure 2, which we forwarded to MEB (NRR). PSNH is planning additional tests to resolve their specific installation problem. In our conversations with Crosby, we were told they were awaiting a purchase order to perform testing. Regarding Cresby's response, we believe there should be a stronger commitment and confirmation e

that their factory guide ring sett1ng of +150 is correct if such is the case, Based on our review of the PSNH/Wyle test data of the Crosby 6R10 SV (this valve is in the "R" orifice size category), it is apparent that design lift is not achieved with the factory ring settings. We call to your attention that the "R" orifice is at the upper end of commercial valve sizes and has a nozzle bore dia. of 4.513 in. (16.00 sq. in. area). Generally, the capacity certifi- 3- '

cation and functional tests required by ASME Section III are performed by the 9 , _ . . . , .

valve coefficient of discharge method where the manufacturers testing is done '

on much smaller valves and the design is then extrapolated to the larger size valves.

This raises the concern that functional demonstration of these large SVs may never have been performed. Additionally, the problem may extend to other SG-SV suppliers.

We are recommending that NRC Headquarters advise licensee's of the problem through an IE Information Notice, Bulletin or Generic Letter and request licensee's to show that their SG-SVs have full lift.

H. Gregg of my staff is available to provide assistance or additional infor-mation at FTS 488-1295.

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• / Jacque P. Durr, Chief Engineering Branch, DRS, RI

Enclosures:

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S. Ebneter, Director, DRS S. Collins, ORP R. Gallo, ORP A. Cerne, SRI F. Cherny, NRR H. Gregg, EB

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9, l SSINS No.: 6835 "

IN 86-05 i

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 J p N- f 6 -@e' p c, January 31, 1986 7

IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-05:

MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE TEST FAILURES AND RING SETTING ADJUSTMENTS Addressees:

All pressurized-water-reactor (PWR) facilities holding an operating license (0L) or a construction permit (CP).

Purpose:

This notice is being provided to alert recipients of a potentially significant problem pertaining to spring actuated main steam safety valves that may possess less than the full-rated flow capacity. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem at their facilities.

However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constit' te u NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

NRC is continuing to obtain and evaluate pertinent information. If specific actions are determined to be required by NRC, an additional notification will be made.

Description of Circumstances:

In the fall of 1984, Public Service of New Hampshire sent the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) for its Seabrook plant to Wyle t.aboratories for full-flow testing to determine the proper vent stack size. To determine full flow, Wyle measured discCogpany.

Valve and Gage travel of the model number 6R10 valves manufactured by the Crosby The results of the tests indicated that the valves could not achieve

(+155 notches).

the required disc travel with the factory set ring setting develop required steam flow capacity.The Adequate disc travel lift was achievedeven not attainable was 50% of the with the largest diameter tailpipe.

Additional ring settings.tests were done in July 1985 to determine the appropriateness of the Specifically, the tests were to determine if the "as-shipped" ring' settings of the valves would allow the required disc travel with minimum tailpipe backpressure and to determine the effects on valve disc travel for a range of backpressures between 180 and 390 psig. During these tests, the upper (guide) ring required discsetting travel.wasThis adjusted from +155 to 0 and then to +25 to achieve the is a substantial adjustment. Subsequently, the t

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IN 86-05 Janusry 31, 1986 Page 2 of 2 licensee consulted with the valve manufacturer and agreed on ring settings of

+25 for the ring (see guide figure 1).ring and -25 (the original setting) for the lower (nozzle)

Full flow, full size tests of the sort described in this notice are not normal-ly performed by the licensee or valve vendor for large secondary safety valves, nor are they required by the ASME Code,Section III. Instead the valves are certified by extrapolations on data from tests of smaller valves.

The MSSVs on most PWRs, while not necessarily the same model or manufacturer as those at Seabrook, are generally at the upper end of the valve size range.

This raises the concern that full-sized flow demonstratien may never have been performed for many MSSVs and these may have incorrect ring settings. In addition, similar problems with ring settings have been found when full size tests were performed for PWR primary safety valves. Thus, these MSSVs may not be capable of providing full relief capacity in accordance with facility design requirements.

NRC is continuing to obtain and evaluate pertinent infornation. If specific actions are determined to be required by NRC, an additional notification will be made.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.

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dward . Jordan, Director Divis n of Emergency Preparedness an Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement Technical

Contact:

Mary S. Wegner (301) 492-4511 Attachments:

1. Figure 1, Typical Main Steam Safety Valve

2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices l

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Attachment 1 IN 86-05 i

January 31, 1986 I

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_ . _ _ _ . _ _ __. _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ . . _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ , . . _ . _ _ . _ _ . , _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ , _ _ _ . . ~ . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _

e Attachment 2 9 IN 86-05 January 31, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUE 0 IE INFORMATION NOTICES Information Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 86-04 Transient Due To Loss Of 1/31/86 All power reactor Power To Integrated Control System At A Pressurized Water facilities holding an OL or CP Reactor Designed By Babcock

& Wilcox 86-03 Potential Deficiencies In 1/14/86 All power reactor Environmental Qualification facilities holding Of Limitorque Motor Valve an OL or CP Operator Wiring 86-02 Failure Of Valve Operator 1/6/86 All power reactor Motor During Environmental facilities holding Qualification Testing an OL or CP -

86-01 Failure Of Main Feedwater ~ 1/6/86 All power reactor Check Valve Causes Loss Of facilities holding -

Feedwater System Integrity an OL or CP And Water-Hammer Damage 85-101 Applicability of 10 CFR 21 12/31/85 All power reactor "

To Consulting Firms Providing facilities holding g Training an OL or CP 85-100 Rosemount Differential 12/31/85 All power reactor Pressure Transmitter Zero facilities holding Point Shift an OL or CP 85-99 Cracking In Boiling-Water- 12/31/85 All BWR facilities Reactor Mark I And Mark II having a Mark I or Containments Caused By Failure Mark II containment Of The Inerting System 85-98 Missing Jumpers From Westling- 12/26/85 All Westinghouse house Reactor Protection designed PWR System Cards For The Over-facilities holding Power Delta Temperature Trip an OL or CP Function t 1

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i OL = Operating License CP = Construction Permit ,  !

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