ML20150C240
| ML20150C240 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/1986 |
| From: | Thero O QUALITY TECHNOLOGY CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20150C176 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-87-800 NUDOCS 8803180097 | |
| Download: ML20150C240 (67) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:+ v i s t . . . .. . .
- , ' % k-r: 4.-
1 1 2 3 4 STATEMENT OF: OWEN L. THER0 5 6 DATE: August 21, 1986 7 8 PLACE: Quality Technology company 9 Lebo, Kancas 10 11 INTERROGATOR: Mr. Donald D. Driskill, Director, and 12 Mr. H. Brooks Griffin, Investigator 13 Office of Investigations Field Of fice 14 United States Nuclear Regulatory 15 Commission - Region IV 16 611 Ryan Plaza Drive 17 Arlington, Texas 76011 l l 18 l 19 SHORTHAND REPORTER: Ms. Janene M. Hill, CSR, RPR 20 otm3YMHostetler & Associates
, # g3,tetetd7 1
9200 West 67th Street 3 tM t. 21 22 g- Sha n.e sission, xansas ee202 l .. 24 op2GNE mem
/
2 , k , PAGC CF M PAOC) r4586 '-:&OA---------------------------------------------------- ,
~
6,?ev7D @a=EliFR =S im yMe d]f esppgpp 880a14 HAYSB7-600 pop
t . . .. . . 2 ( 1 Q. For the record, this is an interview of Owen 2 Thero, speiled T H E R 0, who is employed -- and would you 3 give your title again? 4 A. President, chairman of the board, Quality 5 Technology Company. 6 Q. The location of this interview is Lebo, Kansas. 7 The date is August the 21st, 1986. The time is 11:48 a.m. 8 At this interview are Owen Thero, and on behalf of the 9 NRC, Don D. Driskill, Director, Office of Investigations 10 Field Office - Region IV, and myself, H. Brooks Griffin, 11 Investigator. This interview is being transcribed by the 12 court reporter. ! 13 Owen, would you please stand and I'm going swear 14 you to the contents of your testimony. Do you swear that 15 the testimony you're about to give is the truth. The 16 1 whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God? 17 A. Yes, I do. 18 Q. Owen, would tell me what your background is 19 prior to joining or starting up QTC? l 20 A. I started out with the General Electric Company 21 in October of 1956. Started out in aircraft and warning 22 with a radar station. Got an opportunity to go to Cape 23 Canaveral to work in the ATLAS missile program in the 24 reliability field. I did that, stayed there for several ( I was married in Florida to a Florida gal. 25 years.
@& ASSOCIATES WClElIFR l
In s . ... . 3 f 1 Went to Syracuse, New York, to take t ra i n i n*3 on . 2 the ATLAS ground guidance system. Went to Cheyenne, 3 Wyoming, and installed the original ATLAS system. Worked 4 at Lowry Air Force base in the Titan II program. Went to 5 Vandenberg Air Force base. I was in on over a hundred 6 minuteman launches in the quality assurance and quality 7 control field as a supervisor in 1964 in the first 8 maneuvering ballistic re-enter system. 9 Became a manager of quality assurance / quality 10 control with General Electric in the mid '60s. Progressed 11 up the ladder with them into management of quality 12 assurance and tests. 13 In 1974 was involved with the building of 14 nuclear power BWR systems with the General Electric l 15 Company. There my responsibilities were in the 16 environmental qualification and all testing and all 17 inspection and quality assurance responsibilities involved 1 ! 18 in General Electric BWR units. I've worked all over the 19 world, Taiwan, Japan, Italy and in many of the nuclear 20 plants in the United States, General Electric units. 21 In 1979 I left General Electric and formed my
. 22 own corporation, Thero Special Services, Incorporated.
i 23 Received a contract to develop an inspection program at 24 Duane Arnold Energy Center in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. l 25 Went to Kansas Gas & Electric, Wolf Creek in,
}-Kb'lE 1El & ASSOCtATES PC W
'4
( . . . 4 [ let's see, 1981, to davelop a surveillance program that 1 2 was a requirement of the NRC placed on KG&E. They hired 3 me to develop and run that organization which I did. 4 Let's see, in 1984, early 1984, I think it was March of 5 '84, we formed ths Quality First group of which I was the 6 team leader until I left KG&E in 1984, October of '84. I 7 then took several assignments in Clinton, Illinois, to 8 take part in their concerns research group. I did a 9 Quality First review for Braidwood Commonwealth Edison in 10 Braidwood, Illinois. Did a design review in Oak Creek and 11 was a project manager for the employee response team for 12 the Tennessee Valley Authority at Watts Bar nuclear 13 plant. We terminated that contract in April of this year, 14 and I've been working here to try to develop business for 15 QTC. 16 Q. All right. One of the things we'd appreciate, 17 if you could, give us the background on the Q1 program at 18 Wolf Creek in origins of the program, your involvement and 19 your supervisory role over that program. 20 A. During the ALSB hearing in Fredonia, Kansas, 21 Nuclear Awareness Network, which is a registered 22 intervenor group, put forth a petition to set aside 23 licensing of Wolf Creek. They had six or seven Daniel 24 employees or ex-Daniel employees, I don't re, member if they 25 were all current employees or not, that had gone to the TEIIFR
& ASSOClATES INC
4 5 1 NAN organization with allegations concerning the safe
. 2 construction of the Wolf Creek facility.
3 This petition was accepted even though it was 4 late, filed late, by the ALSB because of the nature of it 5 and the, quote, evidence that the Nuclear Awareness 6 Network had. Bill Rudolph was assigned the responsibility 7 to determine if these concerns were valid or not. He 8 asked me to join him in this investigation. I was a 9 technical person aware of hardware requirements. 10 Q. Off the record. 11 (Whereupon, there was a discussion off 12 the record.) 13 Q. Back on the record. We've been off for ( 14 approximately two minutes at which time Mr. Thero answered 15 a telephone call. Owen, could you return to your 16 narration? i 17 A. Sure. Mr. Rudolph asked me to assist him since l 18 I was a hardware person, knew the ins and outs of l 19 construction at Wolf Creek, knew of my background and 20 wanted some guidance and some help. Bill Rudolph was the 21 QA manager. I was a consultant to Bill, and he wanted to 22 get to the bottom of the issues to see what the people 23 had, what kinds of problems they had, were they valid or 24 not and would it indeed delay the licensing of Wolf 25 Creek. ( I
'IEILEl
& ASSOCIATES.IPC l mos,ato mcoasso.at Mmas 8 0 Son 69 e ostRLAN vs u s ww.st vsscs s er tet.: x * .o Papa:
wsAs em W .s 42: m:
g .. . 6 1 If the petition was upheld by the t.L3B it wculd { 2 have meant somewhere between eight and twelve months' 3 delay in licensing. Of course KGLE did not want to go 4 througr. that delay if they could at all avoid it. 5 Nobody in KG&E was aware of the concerns that 6 the former Daniel employees had brought up. It was the 7 first time they were aware of it, was when it hit the 8 news. We found out who the individuals were, made visits 9 to their house, interviewed these people. I investigated 10 their technical concerns, and basically I was not able to 11 substantiate their concerns. 12 For example, one of them I can remember, one of 13 the concerns was an employee nad kept a list of quality 14 programs for a year and a half, had turned them over to 15 Daniel management and they were thrown in the basket. It 16 turned out that the list was made, quote, a year and a 17 half ago on a half a sheet of paper or an envelope 18 actually given to the Daniel management, and he didn't 19 know what had happened to it. 20 I investigated, found out that those concerns 21 had been resolved. The problem was that they didn't feed 22 the information back to the individual so he didn't know 23 what had happened and, subsequently, felt that since he 24 didn't hear anything that they were thrown away, but it 25 was that kind of an effort, and I can remember when we s - sm TELFA MGSmeto pacsgsso.4 Mpcensts F$ 6620d p o Bor a'43
- ovtRL.APO uassa5 PARK CiTV uo t'6142' M52 sw AA*,(( v $$cN s $ it' > .**J C'00 t
A ( , 7 1 were ridino to -- Bill and I were driving to, I think it 2 was Kansas City to interview a person, I mentioned to Bill that this is just the tip of the iceberg. We're starting 3 4 to lay people off. IC there are disgruntled workers, 5 they're going to continue to hit the press and you really 6 need a program within KG&E that identifies these. 7 Obviously the QA program isn't working, otherwise these 8 concerns that they cane up with would have been dealt 9 with, and you need some kind of a mechanism to interview 10 people bef ore they ever leave so that you have a shot at 11 knowing what's coming up and I would be glad to help and 12 develop such a program. 13 Bill assigned Mike Linsey the responsibility of 14 going to Palos Verdes since they had a program which 15 interviewed people. They had a hot line, and KG&E adopted 16 the Quality First program as a stop-gap measure to make 17 sure that exiting people or people that had a concern had 18 a mechanism to voice it within KG&E before they got 19 outside into the press or into the NAN organization or the 20 GAP organization, and it was mainly a very positive 21 program that was intended to identify concerns that people l l 22 felt they could not get addressed through the normal 23 channels. It was intended for us, KG&E, to know what i 24 those problems were and not have surprises at the last 25 moment and interfere with licensing. ( , EJA a4ssocesx l MG4'tM0 Nt$50A M*084*5
+...er..e . t 4 a . : < ge - , s., 4.,e.
Q ( _
~.
.1
, 8 t i 1 And I was asked to be the team leade: on that 2 job. I accepted that position, and se started i 3 interviewing exiting employees. We had a mechanism where 4 they could walk in at any particular time or call us on a l 5 hot line. So from KGEE's standpoint, it was one where it l 6 was to show the NRC and the public that they were 7 concerned and that they -- 8 Q. When did you begin operation of Q1? ! 9 A. I believe it was in March or April. 10 Q. Of 1984? ! 11 A. '04. 12 Q. Okay. ' lou were in charge of Q1; is that 13 correct? 14 A. Correct, I was. 15 Q. Could you tell, how many members did you have on 16 your staff? 17 A. Well, it started out with myself 18 Chip Hill, one other. I can't . So I had three 19 interviewers -- oh, but that was the original group. It 20 21 was basically three quality interviewers and investigators 22 and for wrongdoing kinds of investigation since he 23 had a background with th and had had done some work - 24 for KG&E and KG&E trusted him. So that was basically c 25 three or four people.
-w tn p e a ,pe&~
& ASSOCLATES INC mssnMo actm Macenas
..
- o 60 ' 5 : c 3."P /* !$. W , , ,
f _ _ _
A ( - . . 9 1 Q. What activitiec were you all peiforming other 2 than interviewing exiting employees? 3 A. We manned the hot line. We took care of any 4 walk-in interviews and we performed investigations of 5 those activities. With the start of the very first week I 6 can remember we took in several concerns. Some of them 7 were substantial looking concerns that might affect the 8 operation or even the licensing of the plant, and we 9 increased the staff. I remember we took some people from 10 the QA organization in the surveillance group and f rom the 11 audit group to enlarge the staff so that we could start 12 investigating these concerns. 13 Q. Did KG&E formalize the Q1 program by writing a ( 14 charter or procedure which described the mandate that Q1 15 was given? 16 A. Yes, sir. 17 Q. What kind of document was that contained in? l 18 A. That was in a procedure. It was -- I don't 19 remember the number of it, but it was a published, 20 approved procedure that defined the program and what our l l 21 charter was and how we were to operate and report and log 22 and track and so forth. It spelled out the basis of what 23 the Quality First program was, l 24 Q. Who authorized the creation of the Q1? What was [ l 25 the highest level in the utility? l 1E11FR
& ASSOCIATES. INC.
asc41sto enortsso.g ogn gas l P o Box 4589 e ovtRLuo Panx (S 64204 l !a A A%(f Y $$ CN r$ <9'2,262 0@ *
- ANSA 5 0 ** 'M t'6i aP 6C52
^s 10 1 A. Mr. Koester was directly involved with it. I l
2 know that it was approved by Mr. Cadman who was -- wac he 3 a chairman, president? Something. I guess he's as high 4 in KGGE as you can go. In fact, he made a tape that we 5 were to play which introduced the Quality'First program, a 6 videotape, which we showed to the exiting people. Wilson 7 Cadman was in favor of it as were the KP&L and KPCO. 8 Q. So the procedure identified admission statement 9 and also identified your authority? 10 A. Authority and the mechanism for how you do the 11 job. 12 Q. I have not seen the procedure is the reason I 13 ask these questions. Did it also contain any kind of 14 information which would indicate how you would address any i l 15 information which you had received? 16 A. Yes, how you would address it both to the 17 concerned employee and to the management, the effective 18 , management, and a closing report that informed the 19 employer of the results of it, give the feedback to the 20 employee and report to Mr. Koester. 21 Q. You indicated that one of the employees was 22 responsible for wrongdoing issues. Did this encompass l 23 drug investigations? 24 A. We wanted it to. We felt that we had the 25 capability to get other law enforcement people, ex-people (
}-{b' E R
& ASSOCMTES. Itc
=weaso mtm maw ews .er se e 3a s v . 4 4 tat "
- mas .-*a s+
y r - '
i t .. 11 1 in the business that were not involved with KG&E. We I 2 could do a more independent review, but KG&E management 3 wanted that kind of investigation to be done in-house by 4 their security peop'.e. So that was a charter that we were 5 never able to realize. 6 Q. In the first month or two that Q1 was operating, 7 did the number of allegations increase? 8 A. Yes, it did. 9 Q. Did the number of employees that were exiting 10 increase also; is that -- 11 A. Well, we got -- as the word spread about what we 12 were about and the approach that we used and our attitude 13 with respect to -- we were representing the employees, is 14 really the kind of program that we wanted to make sure 15 that everybody was aware of. When somebody came in to us, 16 we looked at that particular allegation through the 17 concerned person's eyes, not through management's eyes. 18 We wanted to represent them and to make sure that what 19 they saw actually was the case. If we could prove it, 20 fine; if we couldn't, then we at least gave them a fair 21 shake and they were not upset with the results. 22 So that kind of credibility we felt was very 23 important. Otherwise, we would get no inputs and people 24 wouldn't come forward, and we'd have the same problem with 25 it hitting the press. So our integrity and the EIFR
& ASSOCIATES. INC MuiMO Ntm Moonttes P o Bor 4500
- ovtW PARK KS 66204 SMAWNtt W$$CN K$ t3 N20100
- rANSA$ CifY MO 816:421 4052
e t , .. . . 12 1 credibility of the pr ogram was paramount, and we had to I 2 sell ourselves to each one of the employees through the 3 way we investigated the things, the way we interviewed 4 them, the way we handled their confidentiality. That 5 would make the difference between the program making it 6 and not making it. 7 So we were very careful about how we conducted 8 ourselves and how we represented their concerns. We 9 didn't try to bias them with -- make the matters worse 10 than they actually were but wanted to give them a fair 11 shake to make sure that what they saw either was correct in their eyes or was not correct. So once the word got 12 13 out how we were doing business and the issues we were 14 willing to tackle, then more and more people came forward 15 to us. 16 We had more walk-in interviews and we had more i 17 hot line interviews, which indicated that there was a 18 faction out there that was not in the lay-off mode but 19 needed to be heard from, they elected not to go to an 20 interview program of everybody, but to give them the 21 opportunity to come in if they wanted to through the hot l l 22 line or the walk in, but to exit interview everybody. 23 Q. As the number of people coming forward with 24 concerns increased, was there any backlash; did they 25 suffer any kind of repercussions for having brought their MiFR
& ASSOCLATES. INC atas'tuto pacqm atpomitas
- O Box ase9 e ovtRuND PARK E3 66204
$x AA+.it utSCN w$ PP M2 C'00 *
- ANSAS C 'T 90 is't' 42' Kt2
s .. . .. . 13 1 concerns to Q1 at tais time? 2 A. Yes, there was that indication. We had tried to ( 3 keep things confidential. It was very difficult to do 4 that the way the program was set up. The trailer was 5 there in plain view. We didn't limit the amount of time 6 that somebody could stay there. In other words, we didn't 7 say You best only stay here 15 minutes. If you have a 8 concern, we'll get you off site. 9 KGEE felt that when somebody came in they wanted 10 us to stick with it until we got everything out and limit 11 the amount of overtime or the amount of time that we would 12 spend off site. That certainly had an impact on 13 identification of concerned individuals. Somebody comes (. 14 in and stays four hours, you know, it wasn't to pass the 15 time. So they were marked people in the organization. 16 The supervisor knew who was at Quality First and 17 how long they were there, and for example, the telephone 18 calls, the numbers were supposed to be confidential, and 19 yet we could not get control of the telephone bill when it 20 would come in and have it come only to Q1. It went to 21 everybody else, and it didn't take much of an investigator 22 to find out who was associated with what telephone call. 23 So we felt -- we did the best we could with 24 confidentiality, but the program wasn't totally supportive 25 of -- just by the nature of the way we had to do business. TE1EL
& ASSOCIATES WC moswe etm aemas eo ser asse . onw pinx as eerse s au.tt u"- 4..o)es2em . msAs car uo is's> 4 i ect:
\
. . . , u; 14 ,
i' 1 Q. Did you ever have any employees recontact you [ 2 and say that they had been -- their jobs had been 3 adversely affected as a result of contacting Q1 while they 4 were still employed there? 5 A. Yes, we did. 6 Q. Did you address those as independent or 7 individual allegations? 8 A. Yes. We opened a file on them. 9 Q. Did you substantiate any of those allegations 10 that their job situation had changed as a result of coming 11 to Q1. 12 Q. Yes, a couple of then come to mind. 13 Q. What are the names; do you recall? g 14 A. I'm not sure the spelling of this. 15 was one of them. He was a start-up engineer that had come 16 to us through a walk-in interview, it wasn't an exit 17 interview, and had dentified some concerns. 18 came to us with some concerns. 19 Subsequently to the interview in the way his name was 20 exposed to KG&E management -- was interfered with in getting further employment in nuclear business. Those are 21 22 two names that come to mind. There may be others, but 23 that's been some time ago, and my memory isn't probably 24 what it should be. 25 Q. Owen, as the number of allegations increased,
< & ASSCC%TES INC
[){ '
)
MG4't4 0 av/tm Mpca'tes P o Box dm
- CMR.APO PA8tK K$ 24.'0e SHANNtt um K$ t9131262CtCC
- KA%AS C.fY uo 816) 4216c52
's s
15 1 did you have conversations with KG&E managers about how ( 2 you were going to deal with these -- this increased 3 backlog of concerns, and did any specific managerc within 4 KGGE express concern that this activity was taking place 5 and could create problems for the utility? 6 A. I can remember several talks about needing some 7 help, some investigators especially. I can remember one 8 instance and I complained to Glenn Koester about it. I 9 told Mr. Koester, I went in and asked for 13 additional 10 investigators and all that happened was I lost three. 11 Mr. Rudolph had taken three of my investigators 12 out of the organization stating that Quality First was not
- 13 an NRC requirement but the audit program was and they were 14 behind on their audit so they needed some people and they 15 took them from Quality First program. I can remember that 16 as one instance.
17 Q. As the program developed and the number of 18 allegations increased, did you attend any meetings or have 19 any conversations with upper managers in the utility 20 concerning how these were going to be resolved before 21 licensing? 22 A. I did. 23 Q. Would you explain? 24 A' . I did. I'd indicated that the seriousness of
~
25 some of them, if they were substantiated, could have a
}. [CEE u;R & ASSOCIATES. LNC 4341MQ pacrtsscut Mpcages P o tot ases e CNTR t .AW Pp( R$ 66204
$M A*%tE US$<*i a$ r913) Ot24'00 e KAN$A$ C@ MQ 4316; d}} 6C$2
i s 16 1 direct impact on their ability to license. I indicated 2 that what we were doing was, in our investigation, was 3 that if we would find a problem -- for example, if we were 4 out investigating a bad weld and we found a structural 5 piece was missing that we would report that as a problem. 6 We would continue our investigation, even though it may 7 not soley be focused in on that one little item, but that 8 there was a root cause and what wa were going after was 9 root cause determination. Management had a hard spot with 10 that because it was time-consuming, and what they were 11 after was quick resolution of the problem so they could 12 get on with licensing the plant. 13 I can remember when we were formed in March or 14 April, it was formed because the ALSB meeting had been 15 held and the intervenor group was there so it wouldn't 16 have been long before KG&E was going to go after a 17 license. They were not going to be able to license if 18 they had quality problems on substantiated or 19 uninvestigated quality problems. So they were very 20 interested in licensing. It was costing them a lot of 21 money every day that licensing was postponed. So it was a 22 lot of pressure from a schedule standpoint to get the item 23 resolved in a very timely manner, and the way we were 24 investigating looking for root cause interfered with that 25 schedule. ( F WlEILEL & ASSOCIATES INC atosveo raartsso*t Mammas e o Bos 85e9
- CNtmLAND PARK FS 6tJA
!=AA%t 9 55 CN a5 >9'T ?t? t *% *
- A'sSAS 0 % VC -t'ti 47' 608 2
4 4 17 1 Q. Did they eventually add other investigators 2 and/or additional personnel to participate in the Q1 3 program? 4 A. Well, they reorganized the group. They broke 5 the group up into two separate organizations. One was an 6 investigation group, and the other was an interview group, 7 and instead of myself being in charge of the program, I 8 was replaced by Mr. Snyder, and I was made the team leader 9 of the interviewers, and a fellow by the name of Bob Scott 10 was made the team leader of the investigators and we both 11 reported to Chuck Snyder. 12 Q. When did this change take place with Snyder 13 entering the picture or taking over Q1? 14 A. The exact date, I'm not even sure I can give you 15 the exact mor.th, but I believe it was around September of 16 1984. 17 Q. By that time how many personnel were involved in 18 working within the Q1 program approximately? 19 A. Probably somewhere in the neighborhood of 15. 20 Q. What was Snyder's background that -- why was he 21 brought in to take over Q1 in your opinion? 22 A. Well, he had done a very good job of dealing 23 with the Kansas Commission when they came in to do a 24 prudency review. He was the interface to justify the 25 management actions that had taken place over the past l-jWlEILEl & ASSOCIATES. INC m sonmo martssos ecrtas P o Son 4589 e CNtmLAND PAk w$ 66204 Saw.Et V$$ cN
- 5 t5 242 0'T *
- ANSAS C n W .t'ei 42' d2
4 s . . - 18 1 several years, the past 10 years of construction. He was
' 2 instrumental in justifying the actions that had taken 3 place, and in Glenn Koester's eyes he was very loyal to 4 him and was willing to do whatever it took to get the job 5 done.
6 Prior to that time he was the manager of s 7 construction. He left the construction job and went to l 8 INPO as the KGGE needed representative to INPO. So I 9 think he was there a year before coming back and taking 10 the astignment to interface with the Kansas Commission, 11 KCC, Kansas Commerce Commission. I think that's what it's 12 called. 13 Q. Were you given an explanation of why Sny/er was 14 being brought in? 15 A. Yeah, they wanted a permanent KGGE employee in 16 the position, is what was explained to me. 17 Q. Do you think that was an accurate reasoning for 18 why Snyder was brought in and you were put over the 19 interview team? 20 A. Well, I didn't think it was an accurate 21 representation at all. Up to that point in time Chuck was 22 a contractor himself. I don't know what the circumstances 23 were for him to join KG&E as a permanent employee, but it 24 was very obvious to me that the approach the program was 25 taking with myself leading the group and their lack of
~
'I E R
& ASSOCIATES. NC.
atWtMD PacFt$$0 4 48.*'tas P o Son 4*A9 e 04RLA)O PARE K5 64204 SM A/.*,t t u sS C N s 5 ;t' 3> MI C'00 e santa $ C.'y 90 t't.423 &st
s g . 19 1 control over how the investigations were to be conducted 2 atid the recults of those that I obviously was a problem to 3 them. 4 Q. Your background is in QA/QC, but if I understand 5 you correctly, Snyder's background was in construction 6 activities at Wolf Creek? s 7 A. That's correct. 8 Q. So by taking over Q1 would he then be taking 9 allegation; a large part of which would be on construction 10 problems at Wolf Creek? 11 A. Correct. In fact, I can remember one of the 12 cases that had to do with the pipe cleanliness task force 13 which Chuck Snyder was the head of. Back in -- let's see 14 if I can remember the year -- well, back in the early 15 parts of construction when they were putting in the large 16 and small bore pipes they were using a tape that was 17 called dissolvable tape or Dissolvo, D I S S 0 L V 0, 18 tape. It was intended to be a purge dam for argon gas to 19 keep the gas concentrated and make better welds in pipes. 20 The tape was used extensively throughout the whole 21 facility in all stainless steel applications. 22 I.t was found later, much later in the 23 construction cycle, that this tape, the adhesive of the 24 tape contained halogens, chloride, very, very high in 25 chloride which was detrimental to stainless steel and when S& ASSOCIATES. INCE11FR mwswo mcrisscm movs P o SOst 4S89
- CYtRLA>O P ARM KS 66204
$w Ae.tt u sS CA s$ itt 31;t2 C'00
- O'45A5 0 A 90 8'6t 42'CS2
g . - 20 1 subjected to stresc and temperature could cause in 2 intergranular atress corrosion cracking which causes pipe 3 failures. 4 Snyder was in charge of looking in the ends of 5 pipes and looking for debris. I guess they opened up a 6 pipe cap one time and found a dead cat in there. So they 7 started tightening up on leaving tools and tool boxes and 8 equipment and parts and so forth in pipes which if flushed 9 into heat exchangers or into the vessel or whatnot would 10 have caused a lot of problems. 11 The allegation that we had that we were 12 investicating was that there was an extensive amount of 13 this dissolvable tape still left in the pipes. Since ( 14 Snyder was now our boss and the allegation was such that 15 they, I guess they call it the pipe cleanliness monitor 16 team had not done an adequate job or had not done the job 17 they should have, we were actually investigating our boss, l and he was aware of everything that was going on. He had 18 ( i
; 19 a hard spot with that.
20 Q. Well, did he allow the investigation to take 21 place? 22 A. Well, he couldn't do much to stop it other than 23 just to tell me not to and then I would have taken some 24 kind of action. 25 Q. How was this issue resolved?
& ASSOCIATES.rNC MwtM0 pactissoA 4poa'sas P o Box e589
- CNTRLAPO PAAR R$ M20e e a AN$A$ C A 90 g4 421 MJ
$w46*.tt u $$oN us rt'3) t2 0100 l
i 21 1 A. I have no idea. f 2 Q. Was it resolved after you left? 3 A. It was resolved after I left. I was very 4 concerned about the way it was being resolved, and I wrote 5 Mr. Snyder a letter stating what had to be done in order 6 to adequately resolve this issue. I was really concerned 7 about the fact that they started up the hot functional 8 tests before we had resolved the issue, and once you 9 subject it to heat, you know, you've already started the 10 -- what do they call it, the molecular erosion of the 11 metal. 12 So, I wasn't able to stop hot functional, and I 13 felt that they certainly shouldn't go into operation 14 before they cleansed the pipes, the critical pipes, of all 15 of this adhesive. Just pulling the tape off left the 16 adhesive residue if you didn't scrub it and flushing of 17 the pipe during normal flushing operation was not an 18 abrasive flush. It would just remove debris. It was not 19 scrubbing the tape adhesive off. So the tape residue was 20 still there regardless of what happened to the rest of the 21 tape whether it was pulled off or whether it dissolved 22 with water. So we were very concerned about that and that 23 issue was not resolved by the time we left. 24 Q. So this allegation came in prior to hot 25 functional testing?
}-jCS E LEL
& ASSOCNES INC wontwo sacrim menas P o 60s 4*A9 e ostRLa>O PAAE FS 64204
$ws ANtt u $5 C*e K$ rsth ?62C10C * '4N$A10 '* 93 l'6) dtt t.M2
6 22 1 A. Correct. [ 2 Q. Was a consciouc decision made that in spite of 3 the fact that thic allegation was ctill unreJolved, was e 4 conscious decision made to go ahead with hot functional 5 testing? 6 A. Yes, sir, it was. 7 Q. Was Mr. Snyder, did he offer an opinion or are 8 you aware of what his position was on this issue? 9 A. Well, Chuck explained to me there during the 10 last few days that their charter was not to find Dissolvo 11 tape, that they were out to look for debris and that he 12 felt that they had done an adequate job of that. He said 13 that he was not aware at the time that the task force had ( 14 been formed in doing their job that Dissolvo tape was an 15 issue. That may be the case, but it didn't mean that you 16 didn't have to go back and redo, send cameras up the pipes 17 or take pipes apart or do whatever you had to do in order 18 to assure yourself that this tape was, you know, actually 19 removed. 20 Q. Did quality engineering make a decision on this 21 issue prior to hot functional testing? 22 A. I'm not just too sure who made the decision to l 23 go on with it, but it was made. I know that Mr. Rudolph ' was aware of it and aware of my concerns regarding it, but 24 25 I don't know that Mr. Rudolph was in a position to stop t' WlEILE1 s wc_ we.swo mam macaw P o Dos 4589
- ovtMO Pa*K 4 667>4 SMa* Nil utSo'. <315 P M2 0$00
- m>%AS C ft W '0'6. 4216MJ l
23 1 1 that. That wa: a very key event, and if you slipped hot 2 dunctional, you slipped all the other activities and it 3 became a real pressure on the schedule and the dollars, 4 and they were having trouble enough getting dollars in the 5 outside world through bonds or loans or whatever to risk 6 another million and a half dollars a day construction 7 costs or whatever it was costing them. 8 Q. At the time that Snyder took over, do you know 9 if there was a mandate from senior managers in the utility 10 to try to close all open issues before a specific date so 11 that licensing could be concluded? 12 A. Absolutely, absolutely. There was a scheduled 13 mandate and it affected how allegations were ( 14 investigated. As I explained for you earlier, what we 15 were after was resolving the issue. When an employee 16 would come in and see specific detail that he wanted to 17 complain about, he may not know all of the circumstances 18 around that particular problem. He may know that there l 19 was a job that wasn't done properly, but he may not know 20 that the job wasn't done properly because the person I ( l 21 wasn't qualified, didn't follow procedures, didn't use the 22 right materials, wasn't trained properly and so forth. 23 Our investigations were intended to get to the l 24 bottom of it and resolve the root cause issue and 25 implement corrective action so it didn't happen again. TEl1FR mas ac ai wigoeacriuo A m m es e o por aws e ovt%A*C paan as u>os
$mah%([ V $$ (% '$ t') 2(2 0* M
- 81'4$4$ $ S VC l'6' 42' 6?.2 l
l
o 24 1 That was our charter. That was the way we did our ( 2 investigations. This changed dramatically. If we were to 3 find a problem, any kind of a problem associated with that 4 defect, Mr. Snyder changed our program such that we would 5 turn that concern over to the QA organization, and it was 6 up to them to resolve the issue but that Quality First was 7 out of it. 8 Q. So by then the charter for Q1 had changed; is 9 that right? 10 A. Yes, it had dramatically. 11 Q. Was that also proceduralized? 12 A. Not that I'm aware of. We -- Chuck Snyder -- I 13 shouldn't say we. Chuck had a procedure that said if you ( 14 find a problem, turn it over to QA on a transmittal and we 15 did that. So his responsibility was to identify the 16 concern and get it into QA's hands. 17 Q. So the change that was made here when QA-1 was l 18 originally set up to some degree -- or rather Q1 -- i 19 investigators were to resolve certain types of issues? 20 A. Correct. 21 Q. And form conclusions I presume? i . i 22 A. Correct. 23 Q. Were you also and originally was it set up so if 24 it -- if a situation was substantiated or an allegation l 25 was substantiated and applied to a certain area that you
@& ASSCCATES itJClEILEl MG4MMD Pecst SSC*.a6 M*Cp'tes
- P o por 45H e ovtRLAN0 Papa as eggs
$=aA%t t v $$c+. e S 1* 712t? t'X . s &N$a$ C *w 'r sati 4;' ert? [
'l
- - m -
-------,-_ye p. , . - ---,a , n _--,--m .na-n,-yy
, ,_,,m,.-,,g.- -,.,,m- ,, , - - r w ---- -
25 1 were to rupply that area with this information so they 2 could take corrective action? 3 A. Corr ec t . 4 Q. If I understand what you're saying when Snyder 5 took over once the issue was identified, then QA was 6 responsible for not only either determining whether it 7 could be substantiated or not but also then corrective B action; is that right? 9 A. Well, to some extent that's right. I'll use the 10 analogy of the allegation being a bad weld and we went out 11 and found out that not only was it a bad weld but the 12 material was wrong and there was a strut from the hangar 13 missino. The fact that it was the wrong material used and 14 a missing strut was turned over to QA to investigate and 15 resolve. We were no longer in that loop. If we found 16 that not only was the weld bad but the procedure was bad, 17 the people weren't qualified, then that would go over to 18 QA. All we were intending to do was to get that weld 19 replaced or put on an NCR and then say it was fit for 1 20 service and use as-is. 21 So we were really -- the scope of our activities 22 and especially in the follow-up and the corrective action, 23 we did follow up and we made sure that not only was the 24 weld replaced but we made sure that the procedure was l 25 changed. We made sure the people were trained and j M m'l Ec-s1 ec 1ER. MG4'tM3 8MWt$$CPe4 MPom'ta5 8 0 00145e9
- odRLAM) PARK KS 662o4
$ DAM (( V$$CN 83 ;9'11 MM'3)
- s>NSAS ctv uo .s'6i 42' 6052
26 1 whatever. We were involved with the follow-up with the 2 corrective action. So when we got back to the employee we 3 would say this is what we found. It was substantiated. 4 These were the actions that were taken and this is how it 5 was corrected. So that was a very time-consuming effort. 6 There's no doubt about it, but from our perspective we 7 were not a schedule oriented organization. Quality First 8 was not responsible for cost or schedule. 9 We were responsible for getting concerns, 10 investigating the concerns and getting them resolved. 11 Once the schedule aspect and the money aspect entered into 12 it and put those pressures on us, then the program became
- 13 less and less effective.
14 Q. Was the decision made to start passing the 15 concerns to QA for corrective action -- well, for 16 investigation and corrective action, was that decision i 17 made because licensing was nearing and these issues had to 18 be addressed in a more timely manner and either corrected l 19 or resolved in some manner or other so that they would not 20 be open items at the time of licensing? 21 A. Absolutely. 22 Q. Owen, are there any specific -- you've given a 23 few examples, but are there any specific issues that you 24 recall which you believe were not adequately addressed or 25 that we were improperly addressed by Q1 because of
'lEILEFL MG434) NEh M POm44
) , P o DOI 48A9
- CP44LA8C PA8K E$ MKA
!=a6*.t! Mt3CN e S
20 tape issue. What were the primary dangers involved in 21 this situation at the time that you were addressing it 22 while with Q1? 23 A. Well, the 211egations were from the start-up 24 people that saw excessive amounts of Dissolvo tape being i [ 25 flushed out of the system during their initial fluahing ( . [Kb'IEILEL & ASSOCIATES NC sesswo messo* govs P o sC 4W9 e ovteLA*C PADR al e47A SMAAN(( t 4$cN 83 9'3) ?t24% o R &nd$A$ C@ MQ ,gigt glt V$) c i t
. _ . _ . , , , . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . . , _ _ _ . , . , . , ._.,.,,_.____.,,.,__.,___.m , y.. y - _ - . , _ . _ ,_
28 1 cycle. If the Dissolvo tape, if I remember right, if it ( 2 was not subjected to heat, then it we>uld be a color of 3 gray, for example. If it were placed in the direct 4 vicinity of the welding activity, it's called the heat 5 a*fects .e , if it's in that zone, it heats up the pipe, 6 . heats up the tape and it turns the tape a different 7 color and it would come out black. 8 Q. During the -- 9 A. During the flushing cycle extensive amounts of 10 this black substance was being flushed out of the pipes, 11 and it was reported to us as an a13egation. That's what 12 got us started. So there were two problems. One, the 13 tape was left in and not cleaned out, and the second one (- 14 was that it was in the heat affected zone which started 15 the molecular breakdown of the stainless steel through the 16 heat and you actually could start having some 17 intergranular stress corrosion cracking occurring. 18 That process would start. These pipes are very 19 thick. They're big pipes, and it doesn't happen l 20 overnight, but it's a process that continues. Once the 21 chloride is in the pipe, it's there forever. Once it's 22 heated, the process continues forever. So ultimately 23 what's going to happen is you're going to have pipes 24 breaking, rupturing, putting steac, contaminated water 25 whatever, releasing it into an area it's not supposed to
}-KEIEEL & ASSOCRTES INC sEGSM atD paos E $504, as acegas P o Ecs saat e Ost atA@ s A*u s S 66X4
$=ae.t g u ?$ C+. 8 5 9* r M2 POC *
- W5 21 : S A*2 t't: s: A ? ?
29 1 be. It's supposed to be contained in the pipes, not 2 dumped on the floor. 3 The other area that we had problems with was in 4 the external pipe cleanliness. We had allegations about
. 5 improper swipe tests being performed where they go out and 6 you pass a piece of material over the pipe and then you 7 look at it and analyze it and let's make sure that it's 5
8 clean. We found that there were no controls on the 9 cleaning of the pipe and once it was cleaned that it was 10 protected so that it didn't get cement, dust dumped on it 11 which has high chlorides in it. We found out that the 12 pipes were -- the swipe tests were being conducted in 13 specific areas where they would only clean this small part
-( 14 of the pipe, and they'd come back in and swipe that area 15 and it would pass, but the rest of the pipe would be 16 dirty. Those were all scheduled kinds of decisions that 17 were made in order to speed up the process but not meet 18 the requirement. So those were two areas of concern.
19 Getting back to the flushing. They had so many
. 20 systems being flushed at one time, you couldn't tell what 21 particular system that Dissolvo tape was coming from, 22 whether it was one that was really essential or one that t
l 23 was wasn't so essential, by that meaning that the pipe 24 wouldn't be heated up to a temperature where the corrosion 25 cracking were to start. If you can eliminate that, it x LER,
& ASSOCtATES. INC MGs740 *eogssou m,cmtsts P o Box e549
- CM8LMO PAPE KS 66J04
$ maw %it US$oN a$ 1131 M;C'OC
- UN$A.S C:TY Mo it'6s a;s et;
30 1 doesn't matter if it's in other pipes or not because the 2 reaction won't occur. It has to have heat and it has to 3 have stress. 4 So if you don't know where the tape is, if 5 you're flushing critical systems along with noncritical 6 systems, you can't assume that it's not in a critical 7 system. So we wanted to make sure that everything was 8 clean. That didn't occur to my knowledge before they 9 left, but the bad part about it was they went through hot 10 functional without knowing that all of this tape residue 11 had been removed. 12 INTERROGATION 13 BY MR. DRISKILL: 14 Q. If I may interject something here. Here are 15 some files, numbers that identify the various concerns and 16 a file number. Th has approximately 15 17 allegations on it. Some of which are substantiated, l l 18 others of which are not. No. 2 is procedural violations l 19 did not follow steps and bypass inspection hole points. t l 20 They hide -- it says wipe test but swipe -- 21 A. Well, wipe or swipe -- 22 Q. That's a swipe test. Packages dropped off 23 without wipe test in package. Loop test not cleaned prior 24 to inspection and wipe test not being conducted, l i 25 Inspector told to shut up and not tell inspectors the wipe ( ' l j W EEL
& ASSOCATES. NC m osn m o e t m m o rt %
9 0 SOi ASP 9 e ost % AND Pa#= u $ M xa l
O 31 1 test taken where clean, so on and so forth. I believe [ 2 that's the area you're talking about? 3 A. Right. I'll tell you what's worse, on that one 4 the NRC inspector himself was told by the NRC Region IV to 5 shut up and to accept what KGEE had said. 6 Q. Who was the inspector? 7 A. I think was the guy's name. 8 He took Scott Schum's (ph) place when Scott left 9 and was working with us and we found -- we 10 substantiated that there were no controls. We 11 substantiated that the pipes were dirty, but we also 12 substantiated that probably 90 percent of the piping in 13 the plant was already insulated. It's not an easy task to 14 remove this insulation especially in the quantities. I 15 know tha ,came into the trailer and said he'd been 16 pulled off of it, told to get off it, that it was a 17 resolved issue, that KGGE had resolved the issue and, you 18 know, he was not happy with that. i 19 Q. Did he say who told him to get of f of it? 20 A. I don't remember. He did -- 21 Q. Was that an NRC official? 22 A. It was an NRC official, one of his bosses. I
. 23 don't know who it was.
24 Q. There was another thing I saw here, it was 25 QCI64060, pipe hangars are rusting from condensation. i
~
W XIFR & ASSCCLATER K 6, ga#~ 8G4440 Psior($50A atson3ses
' P o a32 490
- CNTPILAAC PAma as g204 l SM AAEf WESCW s3 PS M20'00 . uA%AS CiN W ,l'ti a2' 052 1
~~
32 1 These pipes are wrapped with plastic and are not reeleaned [ 2 prior to installation of insulation. That was another 3 claim that was unsubstantiated. 4 Then we hav which has insulation 5 installed on pipe. Insulation was exposed to moisture 6 prior to installation and a couple of other things. So I 7 suppose these have just a number of investigations S relative to pipe cleanliness sets -- 9 A. Right. 10 Q. -- they were involved in? 11 A. Right. c 12 Q. Which related to this particular issue in 13 addition to the Dissolvo tape matter? 14 A. You know, there were, this is a two-step process 15 in the external pipe cleanliness -- and the way KGEE 16 resolved the issue in our opinion was not valid. I'll i 17 explain that a little bit. It was a requirement to clean i 18 the pipe externally to a point where it passed the wipe 1 19 test or the swipe test. 1 l 20 Q. Uh-huh? i
, 21 A. So that the chlorides, the halogens that contain 22 the chlorides were removed to an acceptable level. Then l
l 23 you put on an insulation over that that had a silicone in 24 it that absorbed chlorides, would actually absorb it and 25 to keep the chlorides off of the pipe. The specification i (" - WlE LEL
& ASSOCIATES. INC 404140 8aaim 497a6 P o 80145a0
- CMRLAND PAmt 53 scod WANEE WS$oN a5 t90 2624100
- EANSAS CA W #T sit Ft2
33 1 prior to the installation of the insulation was one Jet of 2 parameters. They had a different set.of parameters for ( 3 insulated pipe. You could pull that pipe off and you 4 could read a different reading, but those were two 5 separate issues. 6 I remember they pulled off a piece of pipe, and 7 they said that it was high -- it was higher than the 8 original construction spec, but once the insulation is j 9 installed, it can be a different requirement. Well, it 10 was different than the Westinghouse spec, you know. John 11 Bailey's explanation just in our opinion didn't hold water 12 at all. It was invalid. It was -- 13 Q. Is there an ASME or other code requirement that 14 relates to this particular issue that provides some kind 15 of guidelines? 16 A. No, this is the manufacturer's design. If you 17 remember a few years ago when intergranular stress 18 corrosion cracking became a problem in BWR's and they shut
'19 down BWR's all over the country, they found out why it's l 20 caused, so that manufacturers like Westinghouse and GE and j , 21 so forth wrote process specs that controlled the amount of 22 chlorides. They controlled it in the material that could 1
23 come into contact with stainless steel like the Dissolvo l l 24 tape for example. They didn't even know about the 25 ] Dissolvo tape problem until they put a spec or, how much
& ASSOCMTES INC IEILER at G4 gas o peosisso., g aceq og P O sCx alot e obtut PARE as 64204
$xAnstt WSSON m3 (9131 M24100
- 8.ANSAS Cm uo it'46 42140$2
34 1 chloride could come into contact with the pipe, and when [ 2 they analyzed the tape and found out it was a magnitude 3 times higher than the specification allowed, then they 4 knew they had a problem, but shoot tney were years down 5 the pipe. That was a very expensive operation to go back i 6 and redo the job. 7 Q. Yeah. 8 A. So you'll see in the resolution of that external 9 pipe cleanliness how they engineered around it to keep 10 from taking the insulation off causing that schedule 11 delay, cleaning the pipe and doing the job right. l 12 Q. With respect to this whole issue was there ever 13 any recommendation made by Q1 or you that 50.S$(e) be 14 submitted? 15 A. We sure did, absolutely. We thought it was a 16 55 (e) . We felt that they needed to pull the insulation 17 off of the pipe and they needed to clean it since we had 18 found that there were no controls from the time TMI i i 19 cleaned the pipe until owens-Corning installed the 20 insulation. This stuff would be left exposed for days in i I 21 a construction environment. They would take a swipe test; i 22 10 days later, they'd go out and put insulation on it. 23 They wouldn't wrap the pipe. Well, that's no good. 24 You're supposed to do -- so many hours before you install j 25 the insulation, you're supposed to wrap it, protect it and
@& ASSOCIATES. INClEl1FR nec.4 nato =:eassa =aca tes Po SOna'Je e odUNo POE ES 66204 SmAANE( W $$CN K$ c913 262 0100
- uW Ce uo itto @ m2 L
r
. ~ .-
35 1 so fo'rth. They didn't do that. ( 2 We went down there after we had found the We found no procedural I 3 falsification of records issue. 4 control over the cleaning and swiping and the wrapping of p 5 the pipe. We found that they used no protective clothing 6 while they were doing this. 7 Even after that, when we found those problems 8 and construction put into effect certain controls to try 9 to limit this, they implemented a procedure and Chip Hill 10 and I went down to watch some wrapping of the pipe. They 11 had gone in and clenned this loop that you had just read l 12 about, Loop 1, they'd gone back in and reeleaned it. 13 That's a huge piece of pipe, if you remember looking at j (, that loop, it's huge, I don't know, 30-inch pipe. They 14 15 had no protective clothing. It was hot down in that, in I
. 16 the containment, it was really hot. Sweat was pouring off l
17 of these workers. They were dragging. They were laying { 18 on the pipe -- they were wearing T-shirts that the shirts 19 were pulling up, their armpits are wiping on the pipe. 20 Sweat is being deposited. They weren't cleaning it up. 21 They were putting insulation on. I 22 We went back and complained about that and told 23 them, hey, you're not doing the job right. You still 24 aren't doing the job right. You didn't get the sessage. 25 You've got to pull that stuff off and clean it again. IEllFR
& ASSCCtATES. LNC i
4G6740 poortm moopines
! Po son 4540
- ost%No PAA as e6 Joe SHAA%Et W$$oN K5 (9131M2 0t00
- aANSAS CITY wo ism e W ,
}
+=
36 1 Well, that just didn't happen, just didn't happen. 2 Q. Well, this goes back to another issue of when 3 you were identifying these problems, did you receive KULE 4 management's support in ensuring that prsblems were 5 corrected? 6 A. Well, there was a lot of visibility. We even 7 involved the NRC in it, went to the resident trailer and 8 informed them of it. It was an issue that had a lot of 9 tension, and they issued a stop-work, I believe it was a 10 stop-work, until they could get control of the situation. 11 What I just explained to you was that even after all of 12 the visibility and all of the folderol about this thing, 4 13 they st411 didn't fix the problem. 14 C. But in these instances where you identified 15 people not doing what th'ey were supposed to be doing after 16 these new procedures were put into place, did Rudolph or 17 anybody else take steps to see? 18 A. Well, yeah, as I understand it -- and I left 19 shortly af ter that -- as I understand it, they made them 20 wear protective clothing from then on. Well, how about 21 the pipe that was, you know? 22 Q. Done? 23 A. Yeah. How about that piece of pipe? Why didn't 2e they pull that insulation off and reelean the pipe? To me 25 it just didn't make sense. You have two phases, you have
}--]WlE LFA& ASSOCLATES PC 4 asim D '80t $5CNat 4 mortg Poto 45s9 . ost % ANO P@* 4 E'on
$maA%tt US$CN <$ Sir M2 0100 . e assa! ; w go ,g 4 4; g;52
37 1 past actions, what happened in the pas't, what's happening
/ 2 new and corrective action in the future. The fact that 3 you take care of corre'tive action in the future and t
4 everybody wears gloves and smocks and, you know, keeps the 5 sweat from pouring on the pipes may fix everything in the i 1 6 future, but how about the 9u percent of everything that i 7 had been done in the past? 8 Q. So they didn't go back and take care of all 9 those things? 10 A. Right. 11 Q. Is that correct? 12 A. That's right. 13 Q. That's one of your problems? 14 t. That's one of our problems with the whole thing, 15 and they engineered it away because obviously it's closed 16 and they licensed the plant. I think you'll find that the 17 engineering justification is not sound. i 18 INTERR0GATION 19 BY MR. GRIFFIN: 1 20 Q. Why don't we drop back a minute to -- we've been i1 l 21 asking you about specific issues that you addressed. I l l 22 want to drop back for a minute and ask you about the 23 structure of the organization, Q1. At some point in time I i. 24 you switched from reporting to Rudolph to reporting to 25 Grant. What caused this change?
~
@& ASSOCIATES WClEl1 FR MG4'tuc paortssoA anscenes P o 80s asse e owtm.ApC PARK K5 66204 ,
$xAAAtt WS$CN E5 (91312520100
- ON5AS C tv u0 rs'6)4214c52 [
w 38 1 A. Well, Snyder took over. It was our point all [ 2 along, even from the start, if I can remember, I told them
) I would not accept the job reporting to 4 was down the chain of command. He reported to Rudolph, 5 and they had me reporting to fwhoreportedto h 6 Rudolph who reported to Grant who reported to Koester, and i
j 7 I felt that the prc7 ram needed management visibility, and 8 we needed to get to the top man with some problems, and we i 9 didn't need all of these organizational roadblocks in the 10 way. 11 So I told them I would not work for them and l 12 reporting tojllllllf So he changed it and had me b 13 reporting to Rudolph. I still felt that we needed to ( 14 report at a minimum to Glenn Koester or up the chain f ar 15 enough so that if we found significant problems, that
. 16 there would be some independence there and he could force 17 corrective action.
18 When the transition took over, Snyder took i 19 Rudolph's place. It was so that he would report -- Snyder 20 report directly to Glenn Koester, but administrative 1y, 21 sign the time card and so forth report to Dick Grant. 22 Koester wanted his man in there. Snyder was his man. 23 I felt that organizationally it was a lousy move 24 because in order for Snyder to talk to Koester, he'd have 25 to go around Grant and then Grant might get upset because Oi EILER, m:anwo mtm mewnes
- 5. a A N* r vt3 C+. 59 $ T &% at r ev s.a's s,-e s
39 1 Koester would Jay how about t his particular aspec t and 2 Grant wouldn't be aware of it, you know. [. 3 That left that organi:ational problem in place, 4 and I thought that was a lousy way to do it, but basically 5 Rudolph was replaced because Koester wanted his person in there and wanted control of it, and there were enough 6
' 7 problems with the allegations made against Rudolph that it 8 wasn't -- you know, Rudolph was obviously not the one to 9 be heading up Quality First when his skirts weren't clean.
10 Q. What was the relationship between the incident
- 11 involving Mr. n which his truck was searched for 12 documents at the time that he was making allegations to 13 Q1? How did that incident -- what was the relationship
(
\ 14 between that incident and the eventual change between i
15 reporting to Rudolph and reporting to Koester or Grant; 16 did those come about the same time? 17 A. Well, yeah, they were pretty much in the same
; 18 time frame. You have to understand that from March to 19 October may seem like a long time, but it's not really, 20 especially in a construction job that's taken 10 years to 21 get going. The circumstances were that 22 I believe, was an inspector. He was involved in doing walk-downs and was complaining to .e Quality 23 24 First organization that what he was finding in the field 25 and reporting to his management was not what was getting 4 o /
& ASSOC %TES. FC 4GSM40 8%M$50.% qaceqse p o sou asse e odW PAM as eeJoe W(E W550% as tt0 2624100
- OMA$ C h W l'ti a214052
40 1 reported and not what was being corrected. that his [ 2 repor t s w t r.a being suppressed, that his concerns weren't 3 getting identified and written up properly. So he came to 4 us. 5 He was being -- he was exiting, and Rudolph, 6 since he was in the quality organization, wanted everybody 7 to go through it, but he knew that was vocal and he 8 knew that he was a problem child. You know who the 9 gripers are and who they aren't, and Rudolph knew that he 10 potentially could have some problems. 11 During the interview he asked me i had
. 12 anything, and I told his, yeah, he -- of course I still 13 worked for Rudolph. He was my boss. He asked me a
(. 14 question and I answered it. I said that he had indicated 15 that he had kept records, his personal records of what he 16 had reported and what was indeed finally and formally 17 issued as reports and that they were different and it 18 showed proof positive that people were messing wit.h his 19 reports and were not properly reporting everything. 20 With that, Rudolph contacted security because, I 21 had indicated that had evidence. I didn't know where the evidence was. He didn't say where it was. He 22 23 didn't say I have things out in my truck, but they knew he 24 was leaving and they wanted to make sure that he didn't 25 have anything in his truck. So they had security break
- curg& ASSOCNES PC 4 0.41 4 0P'easg m m acmaso zxon P o O s'29 . CM RW Pant m3 64204 t-wNit WWC*i ES PE M2 0sto . m,A4&$ CD WO ig16t 429 6M2
41 1 into his vehicle. [ 2 Q. Owen, how did you know that your conversation or 3 your response to Rudolph led directly to him ordering that 4 the truck be searched; did he later tell you that? 5 A. Yeah, he told me after eft. In fact, it 6 was a joke I can remember -- what you need to do is get 7 ahold of investigation that he performed 8 on this and reported back to, I think it was probably 9 Foster in legal, KGLE legal. 10 He called me into the office after eft 11 and he was laughing about it and he said, you know, 12 is going to have a hard time proving anything. I said, 13 What do you mean? He says, Well, we got into his truck t 14 and sure enough he had some things and before I knew it 15 security had destroyed the stuff, i 16 Q. Did Rudolph give you any indication that he had 17 reviewed what they had taken from truck? l I 18 A. Yes, uh-huh. Yeah, he told me that he had 19 looked at it and that he had walk-down inspection results 20 that ad initiated. 21 Q. So these would have been site documen'ts or 22 copies of site documents? 23 A. Well, I guess everything that -- even if it's 24 your own personal notes, I guess everything could be 25 considered site documents -- msn & ASSOCATES PC cace
. _=.sssue . . _ ==>sm . . _ n ow WAAN(t WS5CN a5 (113i 2t20@ * 'A%A5 CJY W i6'6i ati ES I
l
42 1 Q. Well, I mean what I'm trying to do is make a 2 distinction on here, were there individual notes and site 3 documents and other things possibly? 4 A. You know, I really don't know exactly the extent 5 of everything that was taken or destroyed, but I do know 6 tha original handwritten notes that he had kept 7 during his inspections that were subsequently transferred 8 into or supposed to be transferred into formal reports was 9 contained in that truck and were destroyed. 10 Q. How did you come by that information? 11 A. By He told me what he had. He said he had 12 kept all his original information, and I said, In order to 13 investigate this properly I need copies of that. Sd would l ( 14 you, when you get to wherever you're going, would you make 15 copies and send them back to me? He said, I'll do that. 16 He called me back a week or two later, I don't remember 17 what the time was and said, I can't find the information 18 that I need. It's probably back in my house in 19 I think he lived there i
~
20 Q. S didn't even know that his truck had 21 been opened and the information had been removed from it? 22 A. That's correct. 23 A. I don't know that he knows to this day. 24 Q. Would the Q1 report on this incident still be in 25 tact, still be on site? manc c,9 c 4 7 o,f> d " u sscc m s w:4w o mcrium mmmw P 0 DCs asas e ost Aa*C P AAE m3 66FA WNit w",5C% al,913) 262cico e na%AS CR WO .8i6i 421052
43 1 A. Should be. [ 2 Q. Okay. 3 A. But, anyway, to expar.d on your question of the 4 tie to the removal of Snyder, it wasn't long after that 5 incident that as made an offer to go to work 6 in Arizona Public Service at Palos Verdes, ent to 7 that site, took an interview and'with the exception of 8 having a formal offer made to him in writing was offered 9 employment with Arizona Public Service. 10 Wheq was asked to give his resume, I guess 11 you fill out a form for security purposes of where he was 12 employed and who the contact was, ut down Bill 13 Rudolph. Bill Rudolph was contacted by Arizona Public 14 Service. Rudolph's conversation with Arizona Public ! 15 Service resulted in the offer being withdrawn for 16 nd they hired somebody else. When that happened 17 to alled me at the Quality First trailer and 18 submitted another concern, a new concern stating that he 19 had been blackballed. 20 Q. Did you all pick this up as an allegation to be 21 investigated? , 22 A. Yes, we did.
- 23 Q. Was that one resolved before you left?
24 A. It was resolved before I left, j u t '. before I 25 lett. acs a sum /es
& AssoCATES ec me.snmo msesso* =ow P o Don 45Pt
- CNTNa@ Pama a3 6Lrm S a**.tt usSCN m3 t9531252030 e aANsa4 C
- w .gisia2ie:62
O 44 1 Q. And what was the resolution on that one? f 2 A. Well, our investigators and myself found enough 3 information that would indicate that the conversation 4 between Bill Rudolph and Arizona Public Service had indeed 5 resulted in the offer being withdrawn an ing the 6 opportunity to go to work for Arizona Public Service. We 7 were convinced of that even though we did not get a, 8 quote, confession from Arizona Public Service people that 9 that was the result. They said that they hired somebody 10 that had more experience. 11 We had had enough information to indicate to us 12 that that conversation indeed did influence -- it wasn't a 13 normal kind of discussion where if you were to call me and 14 say ver'ify this person's employment from these dates, 15 verify that person's salary and would you rehire. It was 16 more extensive than that. There was dialogue between 17 them. 18 So we knew there was enough information given to 19 Arizona that Bill Rudolph did influence their decision on 20 hirin So we reported it that way, and my report 21 went in to Chuck Snyder, and Chuck Snyder changed that 22 report indicating that indeed there was no evidence nor 23 reason to think that Bill Rudolph influenced APS's 24 decision and the report went in differently. Instead of 25 being substantiated, it vss unsubstantiated. _ cs mums m azwcmyr-
=wimo anyim suasw P o DDR 4*AS
- 04 AA@ D AAE s.S Etd
* $nAAsti W$$CN a,$ $2 25210 e uNSAS CA W it's 42' E42
45
'1 Q. Did Snyder offer you any explanation as to why
/ 2 he drew a conclusion just the opposite of that which was 3 drawn by the investigator?
4 A. Yeah, he did. He felt that there wasn't enough 5 evidence to substantiate the fact and that if you didn't 6 have direct evidence, you couldn't justify it. 7 Q. Was Q1 held to its standard in proving beyond a 8 reasonable doubt, so to speak, that something was true to 9 draw a conclusion? 10 A. In hardware concerns of course. You know, you 11 had to have a spec that you violated. In terms of 12 intimidation and harassment, 210 cases for example, there 13 is an awful lot of circumstantial and admissible evidence 14 that would indicate that, yes, indeed this event had taken 15 place. That has always been enough to substantiate or not 16 substantiate a particular -- the evidence is not quite so 17 clear in those cases. I i 18 Q. Well, while Q1 was in effect other than the l 19 hardware problems, more like the 210 stuff that you're 20 talking about, were the conclusions arrived at by the Q1 21 investigators generally accepted? 22 A. Generally they were. 23 Q. Okay. Could you tell me about, on a different 24 subject, could you tell me about the removal of 25 from the Q1 program back to QA? m-- (- '
- wayL 7Djo406
& ASSOC %TES PC m:.swe racnm es.csvc, P o Donasse e CMu@ PW m,5 eate
$x4%!! W SSCA R$ t31.WC':0 * #ANSAS C A ho ,I'6) 42' k%2
47 1 him, removing him from that particular position because [ 2 was right. 3 Q. Was he replaced because of this issue? 4 A. Absolutely. 5 Q. Were you told that? 6 A. Absolutely. I was told by both Dick Grant and 7 by Bill Rudolph that that was the reason he was being 8 removed, that he was immature, that he could not deal with 9 the issues and that he was emotional about it. 10 Q. Did they also say he was technically incorrect 11 about it? 12 A. Did not. 13 Q. About his interpretation? 14 A. They did not. 15 Q. Was this issue resolved while you were still 16 with Q1? 17 A. It was not resolved. It was ongoing while I was 18 there, but it was not a reselved issue. I don't know how 19 it came out. 20 Q. Okay. Could you tell me about Bob Scott's entry 21 into Q1 and what position he held and what his duties 22 were? 23 A. That was kind of a clandestine operation to say 24 the least. Bob was brought in to my understanding from 25 Dick Grant to be an investigator to work for me as an
% MEL P, PE~
& ASSOCLArts WC as a q g a peopt sstw g ecett as P o Ma awe Cp.1% AJO PLAR a.$ M,104 MA*Nt! W $$cs a$ fti), M2cico e R. ANSA 5 C.N LO t't' 42' 44G
. i 48
, 1 investigator. I found out from the start that he was ,
I ( 2 being treated differently than ju.et an investigator. I j 3 gave him an' assignment. He didn't work on it, and he was 4 placed in some training in some classes that I didn't . 5 require him to be in. He was given documents to review 6 that I didn't require on the required reading list, and he 7 had let it slip to somebody in QA that he was brought in 8 to replace me, i 9 So I went to Dick Grant and I said, What's with a 10 Bob Scott? He's obviously not an investigator because 11 he's not investigating what I ask him to. He's not doing j 12 what I ask him to. He's being placed in other situations r 13 and he has indicated that he's going to replace me at this 14 facility. Is that the truth? j 15 I can remember to this day he got very red 16 faced, Dick did, and he started searching through his
- 17 desk, and he pulled out a bible and he placed his right
{ i 18 hand on it and raised his left, and he says, I swear to 19 you that he is not here to replace you. 20 I didn't need a sworn statement. I just wanted 21 him to tell ne why he was there. It wasn't shortly after 22 that that Mr. Koester called me in and sitting there was i j 23 Chuck Snyder, Bob Scott, Bill Rudolph, Dick Grant, myself, 24 and he said, We are reorganizing the Quality First l 25 function. I want a permanent KGEE employee in the s
; $_.IEILEFL wwwo o.i= =.c.w sa e
PoDO.A45,00 o.WatL&4 . u #AM w ems.3 46J04. . 4v m
! - n m .
. ,. s 49 1 position of the lead of thi: program, and I am removing I E111 Rudolph from any involvement in Quality First. I am 2
3 putting Bob Scott ac the investigation group leader, you 4 as the interview group leader and you will report to Chuck 5 Snyder. That was intended to make things move faster and 6 to put the appropriate attention where it needed to be, in 7 his words. 8 Q. When Snyder took over. did he have any meetings 9 or conversations with staff which he laid out the new 10 mandate for what changes he was going to implement in Q1 11 and the direction it would take? 12 A. The only meeting that I remember was one where 13 he gave everybody an ultimatum that said if you want to 14 work the way I want to work, fine. If you don't, then go 15 find employment elsewhere, and he came out with a series 16 of menos that were intended to direct the effort. 17 I had meetings with him because I reported 18 directly to him about the menos and about the way he was 19 organizing the Quality First program and I had some hard 20 spots with that, with the way that we were not 21 investigating root cause. We were not closing out 22 issues. We were not doing follow-ups to verify corrective 23 action and so forth. I had some problems with the way 24 Quality First was going. 25 Q. Owen, one of the things that's come to the NRC's [fb'lEILEL & ASSOCLATES eC answo mstm wonas P o (C14SP9
- CN1%UC PW a$ gyja
*pAAst E V $$CS * $ ;1't .42 C'OC
- m.aNSAS 0 W 90 t t6i 47' 6MJ
50 1 attention has been that either while you were still with 2 Q1 or after you left that, that reporte and conclusions in 3 Q1 reports were sometimes changed by the supervisors in 4 the program and that in some of these cases the 5 investigators totally did not agree with these changes and 6 fought with the supervisors and they continued to not 7 agree with the changes and they felt that the conclusions 8 that ultimately were reported in these Q1 reports were 9 untrue and inaccurate and were done totally or 10 specifically for the purpose of laying issues to rest. 11 During the time that you were still with Q1, did 12 anybody ever raise that kind of -- take that position with 13 you? 14 A. Did somebody come to me and tell me that? I 15 believe so, and I'd have to go back and look at the 16 evidence, but one person that comes to mind would b 17 I believe that's I'm not sure. He had j 18 some concerns along that line. And I felt that what he 19 was telling me was sufficient that the NRC need -- should 20 De involved in that, and I remember leaving that interview 21 with him and going over and getting, pulling Dick Denise 22 out of his of fice and asking him to come over and take 23 part in this interview. He did. He came over and once I 24 the interview started, he excused me from the meeting. ( 25 So I really don't know what all went on and what l iLEL W,/2aG ( Cb' s -m m j ,w m .. . - P o 60s *See . CNTUC PAJ*u KS E204 5=AA%tt w SSON t$ M 2524500 *
- 7 % CA W i8's 42i &%2 l
l
t l 51 j 1 concerns had, but I know thA had some j 2 problems with Chuck along thos- lines. had 3 problems alonq those lines and tasked to me about rome 4 concerns he had. Of course I've already discussed the 5 issue over the black balling with I know that 6 went on directly so -- because it was my letter he ) 7 changed. O t h e r . .. ., c .;
- l 8 Q. Atter you lett Q1, did you receive any !
l 9 subsequent information on this issue -- 10 A. Yes, I did from )wholeftWolfCreek 11 and I hired him when I was still at Tennessee, and he told 12 se that Quality First was a farce after I left and that he i 13 really had some knock-down, drag-out sessions with the ( 14 person who replaced me who he worked er. 15 So I also heard fro ' ho was the ! 16 secretary, came by my house one night and had some j 17 files tha ad reproduced, and I cautione pn that 18 because I wasn't there to protect you know, to go to 19 bat to and that was probably doing something 20 that if they found out might get in deep trouble, and l 21 I cautione about that, but had told me about the 22 problems that were going on there. 23 ad heard through the grapevine, 24 you know, that there were continuing problems with the l l 25 Quality First or that their primary mission was to close j TE1EL 4 7e v 20 snams ec / /EE ! 4 3414 0 84CF(h 4 U14 P 0 s0s 4680 e Critu@ Paas a3 60t4
$nAAs.(( usse a3 $3) M24100 e s#4A3 C n W A'l> 42' 4062
52 1 out flies, not to resolve issues. So that in my opinion 2 was the direction that Quality First was taking with the ( 3 advent of Chuck Snyder and with my leaving certainly. 4 Q. Owen, let me ask you some questions about a 5 specific issue. I don't know if you were involved with 6 this, but there apparently was an allegation presented to 7 Q1 regarding traceability on valves that were broken down 8 and later re-assembled, did you have any contact with that 9 issue? 10 A. If I'm not mistaken, that was still while I was there, and I think I even had start looking 11 12 into that, and he found out that KGLE was doing Section 11 13 work and didn't have an approved Section 11 program and 14 wasn't keeping track of parts and they were getting mixed 15 up between valves and so forth. So the material 16 traceability went to pot, and I believe that that was a 17 substantiated finding. 18 Q. Okay. 19 A. Yeah, we found that there was absolutely no 20 control once the operations maintenance department had disassembled valves and reassembled. There just wasn't 21 any material control at all. We also found that they were 22 doing work outside of the scope of Section 11. They were 23 24 doing mere than Section 11 authorized.
. '5 INTERROGATION
( -
%KH usscces ec ]P/8 u
. , . . - , , , _ _ ~ . , , , ,
. m ., .
--...s_._....s- . _ . . . -
e 53 i 1 BY MR. DRISKILL: 2 Q. You've got a couple of quys working for you over
) in our office in Tennessee and they wvrked in the QA i
4 department I guesc over for Rudolph -- 5 A. Uh-huh. 6 Q. -- back during '84 time frame when this business
- 7 with these valves occurred and somehow after my 8 conversations with Chip Hill, we were just talking about
> 9 the QA program and some of the things -- and a couple of 10 these fellows, and I've got their names somewhere, started i 11 talking about this same valve not knowing that Chip and I i f 12 had touched on it. 13 Anyway, I don't remember how extensive it was, ; L 4 f 14 but they were talking about that apparently as a result of l 15 some of the findings Q1 had part of the corrective action 16 was to do a sampling program on all these valves to . 17 determine if they were okay, and one of the guys, one of l 18 these two fellows that knew about this thing was saying 19 that they had selected certain valves -- they'd i t preselected certain valves and made sure that they were 20 21 okay for the purpose of this paper sampling program. Have j 22 you ever heard anything about that? ; f 23 A. Yeah. I'd heard that that was a fact. To tell 24 you the truth, Don, I don't even remember who I heard it { 25 from or how -- but I was aware that that was going on, and (
@& ASSCrtATES NClElLEFL ;
l answo e=crim mac=1% . l p o o ese . ostsae ,ans as ex.4 ww.t wm as nmoco . om em o is eistisou ; i !
s \ 54 4 i 1 you know, that's just in keeping with the philosophy of l
;. 2- g.etting the plac+ licensed and operating.- You know, you [
i i
, 3 can't introduce ef fective remedial and corrective action l 1 I I 4 that's time-consuming and hope to license and run the {
i
- 5 plant in a timely manner, and when your goal is to license ;
1 6 and run versus solving your problems, those kind of 7 decisions are made. , i i- 8 MR. DRISKILL: Yeah. b
'i i
INT 2RROGATION j l 9 t i "
, 10 BY MR. CRIFFIN: !
(
, 11 Q. Owen, the -- I think we've already estabil.shed j 12 earlier in the interview that Q1 didn't handle A ru 13 investigations, but I presume you took a good deal of f 14 information on this subject; is that right?- [
a [ - 15 A. Correct. { 16 Q. What would you do with that information once you ; J' 17 received it? ; i 18 A. We would turn it over to security and to Gary l 19 Fouts. There was another area that we did not investigate 1 / i 20 and that was any area that was not directly hardware f [ 21 related but was cost and schedule related. The problem we , l. 22 had with that, turning all of those cases over to cary i 23 Touts, was that we got no feedback to know if the incident i 24 affected quality or not or if they were adequately
.. 25 investigating it, and we got no feedback so we could get I l
@& ASSOCATES NCEILER etsagasa peorem susgenas t
! f P o Ma 4tse e 041W puw as e6x's ! Snan%tt US5ces al S3 M24100 e ums Cm wo ,ais> 4tt n2 ( [ i I _ . _ __ _ .._ _ _ , _ _ _ _ _ _, ._ _ , _ __ g
55 1 back to the individual that came to us with the concern
/ 2 and tell then how it was resolved.
3 So the program had some real weaknesses in it i t. 4 the cost and schedule area and in the drugs area because 5 we never knew if the results of the investigation into the 6 drugs was substantiated or not and what the effect on 7 quality was. We elt that we were more qualified through 8 people like nd others that we could get that had been 9 professional investigators versus security guards. You 10 know, we felt there was some real problems in that area 11 that could affect quality that were never investigated 12 properly or tied to quality issues. 13 Q. Well, do you know what security was doing with (, the information about drug users or dealers on site? 14 15 A. I don't have any evidence to indicate to me that 16 they were doing any investigations at all. 17 Q. Were there a lot of drug terminations while you 18 were in Q17
' 19 A. There were some. They did some checks at the I i 20 gates. They did do some toolbox checks, gang box checks, 21 and there were some tereinations, but as far as the 22 specific cases of how they were resolved and did it affect 23 quality or not, that's what -- a hard spot that we had 24 with hot - It was a walk-in case and -- or that 25 is a hot line case, I'm norry.
( i - CElElR. m m m ec 6W8 . me,es=oac uso* m o ng P o KI 45e9
- CNT%A)O Pa% E$ MyA 1-'*%t t wiS CA al i'1 MJ C'T e u eastm wo s's et w$?
56 1 Part of the 4llegations in there were about - , 2 Daniel construction senior management involved in drug 3 parties and use and sales of drugs, and we felt that that 4 was pretty darn significant, and we started an 5 investigation on that, and we were pulled off that in a 6 hurry, and then that investigation was blown because the 7 list of people that we turned over to security was turned 8 in to Daniel, and they were told to fire these people, and 9 of course, it was the same people that carried the list
, 10 into, you know, so that was out in a hurry.
11 Q. Do you know if anybody was terminated from that 12 list? 13 A. Nobody was terminated from that list. Not for ( that reason. They're probably all out of there now 14 15 because from, you know, the job is over, but that whole 16 thing was blown. We felt that if your quality management 17 is under the influence or using cocaine or controlled
, 18 substances, what the heck does your progran look like and 19 what's the effect. I don't krow how that was resolved.
i 20 You're going to have to tell ne at some point in time how 21 HOT 25.was closed. I'd be very interested to knew. 22 Q. You touched on earlier this incident involving 23 black balling of n his application for employment 24 with APS. I understood that tape recordings were made of 25 conversations with people during that investigation; is
-DTiflFRussccus ec 6xob raC /
. m . . ~ .c.w 5"'A'*tIha ! 5 yMP a as c sej g + 4;, my
57 1 that right? ( 2 A. Well, it wasn't only that inves Liga tion. Whin 3 people would allow it, we would prefer to have a t a pe 4 recording. Once people got over the fear of a recorder 5 being there it was -- you know, a pencil is a pretty 6 visible weapon, you know, and you know if you're there 7 staring at somebody and you're writing all the time, it 8 makes them nervous, and we felt that we couldn't do 9 justice to an interview, especially an extensive 10 interview, by taking notes. Otherwise, you'd be taking 11 notes and there wouldn't be a court reporter here. 12 So we tried to use the tape recorder as much as 13 possible when -- we'.i always ask the person and if they 14 felt comfortable doing that, some didn't and when they 15 didn't, then we'd have two people in the roon and one 1 16 sitting away from it, out of the line of sight, and trying l 1 17 to do the best we could by taking notes, but a case that 1 ! . 18 comes to aind where we used a tape recorder was a sexual 4 i , ' l 19 harrassment case 20 I think that's probably what 21 you're alluding to, isn't it? 22 Q. Well, actually what I'm working up to is 23 eventually there was suspension of use of tape recorders? A. Yeah, that had o do wit We 24 25 were interviewing and I went 1111 4,acnD
~
succesm / l 4G4'IfEO P80tS50e% N80m48ts ' j P o BCx dSe9
- CNEW PARK. AS 66204 swar.'.t! 9 !$ cN = $ r9'r 252 C'CC e OMA$ C W W vggg) apt ggp l
9 .. I d several hours with We had I 2 the transcriptic,n submitted to Glenn Koester. The next 3 day Glenn Koester came in, had all of our tape recorders 4 confiscated, all of our taper, blank tapes and complett.d 5 tapes removed from the files, and we were not allowed from 6 that point on to do anymore taping. 7 Q. Did Glenn say why he didn't want tapes used 8 anymore? 9 A. Did not. 10 Q. Do you know what he did with the tape recordings 11 and/or transcripts of tape recordings? 12 A. I have no idea. There was some very, very 13 damaging evidence in that recording. I can only suppose (- 14 that once he saw it or even heard the tape that he didn't l l 15 want that much evidence accumulated. That's the only 16 thing I can -- l 17 Q. What was the subject contained on those tapes? , 1 l' 18 A. There was several subjects. There was sexual 19 harassment. There was falsification of tests, test scores
- 20 for reactor operators. There was falsification of the 21 MMPI, psychological profile tests. I can't renenber all 22 the aspects, but those stick out in my mind. Those were 23 the major points. Sexual harassment was, as I said, 24] C 25
( . d S ASSOCtA*1 tc moewo mytuow mew P o 80x 45e9 e ovtRLAND PA#x ES 66204 twa* NEE US$CN "$ S t M2 0$00
- 5 A%AS C A V3 (8'6 42' 6052
D
/ of 59 1
he was 2 p'utting pressure on them. He was making advances to them. 3 Q. On that particular case even thcugh the tape was 4 picked up was the case pursued? 5 A. Not by us. The same time that they confiscated 6 our recording equipment they removed the original file and 7 sent that file to legal department in Wichita. 8 Q. To be investigated? 9 A. To be investigated. 10 Q. Did you ever hear what the results of that was? 11 A. No, sir. That was one of the problems when 12 something would leave our control. Like I explained to 13 you when we would turn a case over to Gary Fouts f or 14 investigation, resolution or over to security, the l 15 feedback would not be back to us so we could close the 1 1 l 16 file and close the loop, get back to tne individual and to 17 determine if what they had found had any influence on 18 quality. That was a real weakness in the Quality First 19 program. Can we take a little break? 20 (Whereupon, a recess was taken.) 21 INTERROGATION 22 BY MR. DRISKILL: 23 Q. Owen, I've just got a couple of things here I'd 24 like to ask you that are in +he notes of someone else who 25 was making notes before this investigation was ever really CSE_Rs-muc
"
- d* E mos w ee o t m m o w P o BoF 45e9 + ovtRL40 PARE K5 MTA
$w AA**E E M'5SCN Ki t 33 2624100
- 5.ANSAS C:'y u0 -8166 4216012
e w 60 1 kickad off, but one of the things that they were concerned ( 2 about or one of tha questions that they put down here to 3 try to answer when this investigation was started was 4 whether the Q1 program was used by management tc, cover up 5 or preclude workers' concerns or allegations from reaching 6 say the NRC or someone else. 7 A. Well, certainly the utility would rather receive 8 the problems themselves and resolve them themselves rather 9 than have them go to the NRC for example. 10 Q. I understand. 11 A. And I think the NRC would rather have the 12 licensee resolve their issues. We were formed to make 13 sure that the avenue was there so that the employees that 14 were on site and tt.ose that were terminated pr'or to that . l 15 point could call in or could walk in or cou'.d write 16 letters or whatnot and have their concern addressed. J. t 17 was not meant for a cover-up. 18 I would not have been associated with it had I 19 even had the foggiest notion that it wasn't an upfront, . 20 legitimate program. In fact, when Stevie Stephens of the 21 Nuclear Awareness Network put in the paper that it was 22 just another whitewash attempt, this Q1 thing, I was 23 personally offended by it. I was really upset about it. 24 The fact that we defeated her in her attempt to 25 intervene in the hearings and the LSB rules in our favor
'IE LEl
& ASSOCIATES. INC MGS' tat 0 PaCFtS5chaL at80a4es Po BCx 4589
- ovtRL40 PARK nS M204 SaA* net M:SSoN KS tt13) 262c100
- UNSAS CifY MO i816) 4214c52
e 61 1 and not hers, I guess might have given her that opinion, l 2 but I can guarantee you that the program was set up with 3 the best intentions and we implemented the program with 4 the best intentions. 5 Q. You feel like that it was later misused to cover 6 up either -- or to prevent the honest and complete 7 investigation of some of the allegations and presenting 8 some of those allegations in -- it was used to prevent 9 presentation, at least in a document of allegations that 10 people had in an honest and fair way; you think it was 11 misused in that manner? 12 A. Well, and I understand I'm under oath and I'm 13 looking you square in the face. And I'll tell you that 14 the concept of the program enanged- Had the concept of ( 15 the program not changed, I would still be there if they l i 1G would have extended the cont?/tet. I left because the way 17 the Quality First program was being managed, the direction 18 it was taking and the way they were trying to manage the i 19 results of the program. l I do not think that the Quality First program l 20 l i 21 was implemented in the late stages of the licensing, 22 getting to the licensing, in the spirit that it was 1 23 originally intended to be. That changed. 24 It became a bigger problem to KG&E than a l 25 solution, and we always felt that by the utility knowing
'lEl LER.
& ASSOCIATES. INC asosveo reissom neartas Po 80x 45e9 e ovtstLAW PARE. KS 66704 l
$dAedt U $$cW p$ $31M2 WOO
- ONSAS C'TY 40 (8$ 4216050
e 62 1 what their problems are no matter how late it is it gave 2 them the opportunity to honestly resolve them. When they 3 were not in the position where they wanted to do that or 4 where they felt that we in the Quality First program were 5 the problem and not the problem itself, then I left. I no 6 longer wanted to be associated with that program. Life 7 was too short to fight it. 8 Q. You believe that Chuck Snyder and other people 9 in the Q1 program at a later date -- well, I know we 10 talked about several instances of changing conclusions and 11 directing investigations being conducted with such a 12 limited scope it would preclude a fair finding of the
, 13 truth. Do you believe that that occurred on a much
(- 14 greater scale than we've discussed today? 15 A. Oh, I thitek we've put it in the right 16 perspective, Don. I think that by the fact that the 17 program was so fragmented and the tracking of all of the { 18 concerns went away to where Quality First no longer kaew 19 how things were being resolved and so forth and these were l l 20 all done to expedite the closing of a specific item and a 21 specific file that that certainly was the outcome, that 22 it, that you're right that that's exactly what happened. 23 Q. Do you think this was done with the knowledge of l l 24 Mr. Koester and Mr. Grant and the management officials who 25 were responsible for how the Q1 program was being run?
'lE L Ell
& ASSOCIATES.ItC MGs'tMD perft$s0 4 Macert4 P o Sor 4ses e ovtstLArc PAAx n$ 662c4 Sa A* NEE u:55CN Ks et13) Mici00
- UNSAS C3 90 l'6; 421 Rat l
. - - - . . - . - , . , . . . - . - _ - - . . . - , ~ . . - -
e 63 1 A. I can guarantee you that Chuck Snyder wouldn't f 2 do anything that didn't receive the acceptance of either 3 Dick Grant or Glenn Koester. They were fully aware of the 4 direction that Q1 was headed. They were very interested 5 in getting issues closed, rightfully so. We all wanted 6 issues to close and we wanted the plant to run. That's 7 why we were there. There wasn't anybody there, including 8 myself, that didn't want to see that turbin run, but we 9 wanted to see it done such that it met the requirements 10 and those weren't cosmetic problems that we were working 11 on and the problems that Q1 were coming up with were not 12 cosmetic problems, but they needed to be addressed and 13 they needed to be resolved with good firm management 14 control and that went away. 15 Q. I don't have anything else. 16 INTERROGATION 17 BY MR. GRIFFIN: 18 Q. To put a cap on the statement, at the time that 19 you left Q1 and based upon the conversations that you have 20 had with people who remained in the Q1 program after you 21 left it, do you believe that between the time you left and 22 the time that that plant was licensed that significant 23 issues remained unresolved? 24 A. Oh, oh, I certainly believe that. 25 Q. If we talked to some of the people that you have (' .
}-{E .EILEL & ASSOCIATES. PC moewe reotm macarta P o 601 d'd9 e CMRLAND PAAR KS 66204
$MAWNit V $$CN r$ 14 M2 000 *
- ANSA 5 CW 90 <6'6 42'ecs:
- i. ..
64 1 mentioned here today, do you think we'll be able to ( 2 identify specific issues that were still being worked and 3 may have renained unresolved before the plant was 4 licensed? S A. There's that possibility. It's a long time, you 6 know, between, a couple of years and you're working at 7 other places. You lose, you know, it's hard to remember 8 that, but I think they probably would be able to help you, 9 especially if we could get back into some of the records 10 and so forth. 11 Q. All right. 12 MR. GRIFFIN: Anything else?
~
13 MR. DRISKILL: No. 1< Q, Owen, have Don or I threatened you in any manner
- 7. S or offered you any rewards in return for this statement?
l 16 A. No. 17 Q. Have you gliven this statement freely and 18 voluntarily? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. Is there anything that you would care to add to 21 the record? 22 A. Can I spank OI a little bit?
. 23 Q. No.
l 24 (Laughter.) ! 25 MR. DRISKILL: Sure, you can say ( I
@& ASSOCIATES. INClEIFR usawe eisso* *vw P o 8on asse e 04RLuc Putx. As eeJoe SMAANtt W'SSCN K$ 9'31262 4100
- RANSAS C@ W <316) 4216052
9 65 1 whatever you want. 2 A. Let me say that I'll repeat a little bit of what ( 3 happened when I had an exit interview with Dick Denise. 4' Q. Okay. 5 A. Dick was upset, I guess, is the word when he 6 found out that I was leaving, and he wanted to find out 7 the reason, and I spcnt 4 1/2 hours with him, and I 8 haven't seen any results from that interview. I haven't 9 seen any results from, up until today's meeting with the 10 results of what Bill Ward did and had to say. I think the 11 issues that I'm bringing up today are certainly not new 12 and this isn't the first time they've been expressed to 13 the officials of the NRC, and to allow a plant to go on to 14 be licensed and to operate under those conditions and to 15 just now be receiving the attention it's receiving, I 16 think is a travesty. 17 Q. Well, in response to what you've said, I 18 understand your concern. All of the concerns related to 19 this issue remain open items with the NRC. The -- and we 20 are now preparing to initiate a full field investigation 21 into what we've talked about here today, and certainly the 22 plant having been licensed, you know, whatever information 23 came before apparently was not sufficient to stop 24 licensing, and I don't think Don or I either one are
, 25 familiar enough with the technical issues to know whether 1El1FR
& ASSOCIATES. INC-neosugo mcrisum apeanas Po tox 4589 + ovtRLAW PARE KS 667A SHwNtt US$m KS (9G 2524100
- KANSAS CITY uo rets;a214CS2
a a ., d 66 1 it should have been licensed or not. { 2 Because it has been licensed will not cause ue 3 to narrow the scope of our upcoming invectigation nor will 4 it alter whatever outcome that we would -- whatever 5 conclusion would logically be drawn from whatever facts we 6 gather. I know that's probably not much solace to you, 7 but we haven't r.ad an opportunity to -- OI has not.had the 8 opportunity to address all these issues prior to Wolf 9 Creek receiving a license, but the issues do not go away 10 for the commission. It will be investigated. 11 A. I understand that and I take my hat off to you 12 for being here, and that's why I'll cooperate with you to 13 the fullest extent. I'm just disappointed in the system. 14 Q. I appreciate that. Thank you. 15 16 - 17 18 l 19 20 l 21 22 l 23 l 24 l 25 C-LELEll
& ASSOCIATES INC M36740 pacrtum Macains P o Don 4589
- CP.TAA@ PAAk KS E'04
$xawivtt us$CN n$ (912 2624100
- KANSAS Ce uo (316) 4214052
i' . ...,. . . . y . .. 1 CERTIFICATE i 2 3 4 I, Janene M. Hill, a Certified Shorthand Reporter of 5 the State of Kansas, do hereby certify that I appeared at 6 the time and place first hereinbefore set forth, that I 7 took down in shorthand the entire proceedings had at said 8 time and place, and that the foregoing constitutes a true, 9 correct and complete transcript of my said shorthand 10 notes. 11 12 13 -
/ .
.J1 ll ;
( 14
- " b b '3d-2anene M. Hill T M ---
15 Certitied Shortha:,d Reporter of the State of Kanse.s I 16 17 l 18 l 19 l
- 20 21 22 23 24 25 C
IE11FR
& ASSOCRTES,INC aesswo messom mortas eo ecx asse e ovtatANo PAAE_ K$ $QDe
$xA* Sit WSSCN s.$ ath 20 0100
- KANSAS CR Mo it'ei4214ct1
( l}}