ML20116M764
| ML20116M764 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/1989 |
| From: | Sierra Club |
| To: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| 2.206, NUDOCS 9608210066 | |
| Download: ML20116M764 (15) | |
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- X1 '780 nly DBN Woud UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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PETITION FOR IMMEDI ATE ACTION TO PROTECT PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY 1
FROM UNDUE RISKS POSED BY LACK OF QUALITY ASSURANCE COMPLIANCE AT WOLF _C _ REEK GENERATING STATION, BURLINGTON, KANSAS.
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SIERRA CLUB KANSAS CHAPTER, P.O. Box 272 Submitted by:
Wichita, KS 67201-0272 Date:
January 30, 1989
.os 9608210066 890130 PDR ADOCK 05000482 3
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
I.
Jurisdiction _
This petition to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is filed pursuant to 10 CFR $2.206 by the Kansas Chapter of the Sierra Club, which has more than
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2,000 members within 200 miles of Wolf Creek Generating Sta Nuclear Regulatory Commission institute a proceeding pu Kansas.
j to modify, suspend or revoke a license or for such other action as may be proper.
l II. Action Requested O This petition requests immediate NRC action to preven l
This petition requests that the operating licenses for the Wolf Creek Generating Station be suspended until corrective actions to achieve assurance Kansas.
The grounds adequate protection of public health and srfety have been taken.
for these requests are summarized in the body of this petition.
III. Acclicable Laws _
A.
Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50_
This Appendix is entitled " Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Powe and Fuel Reprocessing Plants."
to the Quality First Program carried out by the Kansas Gas & Electric Company at Wolf Creek Generating Station in Burlington, Kansas:
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" Nuclear power plants and fuel reprocessing plants include structures, systems, and components that prevent or mitigate the consequences of postulated accidents that could cause undue risk to the health and This appendix establishes quality assurance safety of the public.
requirements for the design, construction and operation of thoseThe pertine structures, systems and components.
this appendix apply to all activities affecting the safety-storing, cleaning, erecting, installing, include handling, shipping,ing, maintaining, repairing, refueling and operat inspecting, testing,in this appendix, " quality assurance" comprises all modifying. As used those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system or component will perform satisfactorily in service."
The Appendix sets forth procedural requirements as to who is responsib assurance:
"The authority and duties of persons and organizations performing activities affecting the safety-related functions of structures, U
systems, and components shall be clearly established and delineated in writing."
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in ng The Appendix makes it clear that Quality Assurance involves much more than merely l
creating a program and a flowchart of authority:
"The quality assurance functions are those of (a) assuring that an l
appropriate quality assurance program is established and effectively
- executed and (b) verifying, such as by checking, auditing, and inspection, l
that activities affecting the safety-related functions shva been j
correctly performed."
In addition, independent professional judgments and corrective actions are essential:
l "The persons and organizations performing quality assurance functions l
shall have sufficient authority and organizational freedom to identify
,i Quality problems, to initiate, recommend or provide solutions; and to Such persons and organizations l
verify implementation of solutions.
performing quality assurance functions shall report to a management level such that this required authority and organizational freedom, l Q including sufficient independence from cost and schedule when opposed J
to safety considerations, are provided."
l The Appendix requires documentation:
"This program shall be documented by written policies, procedures, or instruc-l tions and shall be carried out throughout plant life in accordance with l
those policies, procedures or instructions."
The Appendix also requires periodic review of the overall Quality Assurance effort" l
"The program shall provide for indoctrination ad training of personnel performing activities affecting quality as necessary to assure that suitable proficiency is achieved and maintained. The applicant shall regularly review the status and adequacy of the quality assurance program. Management of other organizations participating in the quality assurance program shall r sulariv revi
- tne statv ame =eacu==v or tnat aart or the au=2ity l
i O assurance program which they are executing."
Even if these regulations were not a part of the Code of Federal Regulations in 4
1984, common sense would cause any competent manager of a nuclear power plant to meet each and every one of these requirements to assure the health and safety i
of that manager's own employees as well as that of the general public.
j -o...
The law has traditionally required Radioactive materials are inherently dangerous.
a greater degree of care from those managing inherently dangerous activities.
B.
This regulation requires a report to the NRC of each deficiency found in design and construction "which were it to have remained uncorrected, could have affected adversely the safety of operations of the nuclear power plant at any time throughout the expected lifetime of the plant, and which represents (1) a significant breakdown in any portion of the quality assurance prugram required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission", or (2) a significant deficiency in the final design so that it does not conform to the safety analysis report or construction permit, or (3) a significant deficiency in construction or significant damage i-I 2
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'X1 *180 nId DBN Woud conform to the safety analysis report or construction permit, or to otherwise establish its adequacy to perform its intended safety function, or (4) a significant deviation from performance specifications that will require extensive evaluation, redesign or repair to establish its adequacy to perform its intended safety function or to conform to the safety analysis report or construction permit.
The construction permit holder is to inform the NRC of each reportable deficiency within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of its dixcovery and submit a written report within 30 days.
The written report is to contain " sufficient information to permit analysis and evaluation of the deficiency and of the corrective action."
C.
NRC's Lonastandino Requirement of Manacement Competence and Intecrity NRC has periodically found management of nuclear power plants to be culpably negligent in failing to instill a sense of respect and integrity in quality assurance programs, failing to fix precisely within a company the responsibility for carrying out quality assurance programs, and failing to apply quality assurance concepts. See for example g
16 NRC 281 (1982).
A pervasive scheme of Quality assurance management practices that have made it impossible for management to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system or component of a nuclear power plant will perform satisfactorily in service would fall into the category of culpable negligence as that term has been used by NRC in imposing penalties. Management activities and omissions which resulted in closing hundreos of quality assurance investigative files with only superficial investigative efforts, transparently limited documentation, meaningless verification of corrective action and premature closures of issues which merited further investi-gation (in the words of NRC's investigator H. Brooks Griffin) would fall into the category of culpable negligence as that term has been used by NRC in imposing penalties and suspending operating licenses.
Management with superior knowledge, skill and intelligence in the nuclear power industry is held to a higher standard of behavior than the reasonably prudent person, but even common knowledge and ordinary judgment would recognize unreasonable danger o()
in management actions and omissions described in this petition that occurred and may continue to occur at Wolf Creek Generating Station. Every reasonable precaution suggested by experience or prudence is required in the handling of ultrahazardous materials such as nuclear fuel. Some management actions and omissions described in this petition may rise to conscious indifference to consequences, amounting to a willingness that they shall follow, w...
Dr. Robert Peter Gale and Thomas Hauser, in their book Final Warning, The Leoscy of Chernobyl (Warner Books, Inc.1988) state that one inhaled plutonium atom wnich decays ano emits an alpha particle inside the human body is able to cause cancer.
The public cannot afford to risk the consecuences of the defective Quality assurance program at Wolf Creek Generating Station, which has been managed with a callous indifference to human life and to human health.
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IV. Grounds for Relief From the inception of its Quality Assurance program to date, management at A.
the Wolf Creek Generating Station, Burlington, Kansas has ignored real. safety concerns.
This petition relies on NRC's Office of Investigation Case No. 4-86-004, FOIA 87-811 (also known as FOIA 87-800) for specific facts noted herein. Petitioner has access only to the expurgated version of this case report. That version includes censored transcripts of interviews of Robert L. Scott, Charles Snyder and Glenn Also Koester conducted by H. Brooks Griffin of the NRC Office of Investigations.
l included are Mr. Griffin's censored summaries of the allegations that triggered the NRC's investigation as well as censored summaries of interviews he conducted with Charles Hill and John Johnson. Mr. Griffin's analysis of the results of his investigation is also included.
Petitioner wishes to note that the materials available to it apparently minimize the deficiencies in the Quality First Program as it was managed from August, 1984, i
through March, 1985, due to the large portions of censored information in the version of Case No. 4-86-004 available to it. Examples of information not available i
to the public are the names of persons in Griffin's discussion of wrongdoers, i
names of many persons mentioned by those Griffin interviewed, names of Quality l
First investigators who were fired or transferred out of Quality First, paragraphs of Griffin's summaries of interviews, and paragraphs of Griffin's discussion of i
allegations bearing on his conclusions regarding wilfulness and intent (a third I
of a page or more was censored on at least ten of these fifteen pages).
Petitioner submits this petition based on an expurgated version of the case investigation which does not describe the full extent of the problems in the if Petitioner had access to the unexpurgated version of Quality First Program, as does the NRC, an even stronger case for relief could no Case No. 4-86-004, doubt be presented. Petitioner urges the NRC to consider the entire unexpurgated l
O report of this investigation in its evaluation of this petition.
H. Brooks Griffin of the Office of Investigations concluded:
- 1. Little corrective action related to Quality First investigations had 4
occurred by the original fuel load date of December, 1984.
- 2. Verification of corrective action by Quality First "was not meaningful."
- 3. "In many instances" safety concerns were closed after " superficial 2
investigative effort and transparently limited documentation, all of which was accepted by Q1 supervision."
- 4. Interviews of those raising safety concerns were summarized in one or two sentences resulting in too little information to launch a meaningful in-vestigation in many cases.
- 5. Meaningless investigations occurred which resulted in " premature closures of issues which merited further investigation."
- 6. Failure to evaluate the pipe cleanliness issue was inconsistent with the 4
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- n igen3g3g objective need to effectively investigate that issue.
- 7. Kansas Gas & Electric Company managers changed investigative conclusions of their staff members in at least two significant cases.
- 8. Quality First essentially dropped allegations of harassment, intimidation, falsification, discrimination and drug use on the site and did not investigate them for their potential adverse effect on plant safety nor did it penalize wrongdoers.
- 9. Some investigators were removed from their jobs by Kansas Gas & Electric Company managers as a result of their aggressive Quality First Program investigations when they refused to limit the scope of their investigations after related or additional safety concerns surfaced in the course of an investigation.
O Despite inese ane otner findings which wi11 be eescribed in mo shortcomings identified in the Q1 program, it is concluded that the evidenes gathered does not substantiate wrongdoing on the part of KG & E management i their conduct of this voluntary program."
According to Appendix 0 to 10 CFR Part 50, quality assurance is not voluntary but mandatory.
- Backcroun_d
, A<ansas Gas & Electric Company (KGE) created the Quality First Program (Ql) in March,1984, choosing Owen THERO, a contract employee of KGE, to be Team Leader THERO reported to KGE Quality Assurance (QA) Manager, William In mid-February the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel had concluded of the program.
RUDOLPH.
During those hearings, the licensing hearings for Wolf Creek Generating Station.
Nuclear Awareness Network, a registered intervenor, had produced former site j
THERO said employees with allegations concerning construction deficiencies.
fQ RUDOLPH esked him to investigate those witnesses' concerns in a timely manner to determine whether they would delay licensing. After further discussions with THERO, RUDOLPH established Q1 to conduct exit interviews of site employeesA w regardless of which firm had employed them.
by Glenn K0 ESTER, KGE's vice President, Nuclear, who retains that title but no K0 ESTER is now also longer has day-to-day responsibility for Wolf Creek, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation.
An A videotape explained Q1 to exiting employees about to be interviewed.
allegation hotline and walkin interviews were also available to employees.
The NRC investigative record shows a lack of agreement as to the purpose of Ql.
K0 ESTER told NRC that Q1 was created to investigate safety allegations made by employees and to identify deficiencies that needed to be corrected before Wolf Creek was licensed.
THERO said Q1 was also to determine the root cause of problems and to determine the full extent of the potential problems, not just to deal with the symptoms.
THERO came to believe He saw Q1 as an independent investigative organization.
i KGE management wanted quick resolution of problems and did not wish to broaden investigations based on new information developed during an investigation.
U THERO said Q1 was not created to cover up issues but to e i<
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instead of to NRC or to intervenor groups, buts its mission changed.
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Documents Shredded; Blackballino In early August, 1984, Richard GRANT, KGE Manager of Quality, was made interim supervisor of Ql, replacing RUDOLPH. K0 ESTER said NRC had encouraged him to remove RUDOLPH from Q1 because of a potential conflict of interest between RUDOLPH's cupervision of both Q1 and QA. RUDOLPH remained in Charge of QA. TERO and
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Charles HILL, the first Q1 investigator hired, thought a document shredding incident j
had lead to RUDOLPH's replacement at Ql. They told NRC that while an inspector l
was in the Q1 trailer making allegations during his exit interview, RUDOLPH, supervisor of Q1 at the time, ordered Security to search the inspector's truck j
RUDOLPH called THERO into his office later that day and, laughing, for documents.
i told THERO the inspector was going to have a hard time proving anything because j
Security had found some documents in his truck and destroyed them after RUDOLPH l
had read them.
Another KGE employee wrote a report on RUDOLPH's actions. RUDOLPH
! Q was later accused of blackballing the same inspector so that he was not hired j
st Arizona Public Service (APS), as verified by APS employees. A Q1 investigator l
substantiated that the blackballing had occurred in tape recorded interviews of two APS employees. HILL said within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of those interviews, K0 ESTER ordered that all Q1 tape recorders be turned in to him. At the time NRC reviewed the blackballing file, the conclusion had been changed to " unsubstantiated" without the knowledge of the Q1 investigator. THERO told NRC that K0 ESTER had j
ordered removal of the tape recorders after an employee alleged sexual harassment by a senior KGE manager.
2.
Q1 Manacement Recrean12ed Q1 had hired about ten more investigators by August, 1984, including Robert L.
SCOTT, who was brought in by GRANT. SCOTT had been employed by Bechtel Power Corporation since 1973 as was hired at Wolf Creek as a Bechtel employee to be a Q1 investigator.
SCOTT was assigned to one case, which he did not complete, before Q1 was reorganized later that month. HILL said the Q1 investigators O
referred to SCOTT as "Bechtel Bob" because he always searched for means to invalidate allegations instead of investigate them. In August, 1984, Q1 was split into two groups, an interview group supervised by THERO, and an investigator Charles SNYDER was then named Manager of Q1,,
groups supervised by SCOTT.
SCOTT and SNYDER assuming control from RUDOLPH and reporting directly to GRANT.
THERO was told KGE wanted a controlled the course of the Q1 investigations.THERO was a contract employee and so was SC permanent KGE employee to head Q1.
SNYDER, on the othr hand, had been employed by KGE since 1980 as a project He had represented KGE at its rate case hearings in construction engineer.
KDESTER chose him to be Q1 Manager while SNYDER was himself the subject early 1984.
THERO believed j
of allegations under Q1 investigation regarding pipe cleanliness.
there was a conflict of interest to SNYDER's being named to manage Q1 while that investigation was pending.
i 3.
Case Closure Rate Leaped At SNYDER's first meeting with Q1 staff, many investigators heard him say he had o
a mandate to close all of the open Q1 investigations by December, 1964, so they would not interfere with the fuel load date. He was also heard to say to the U group that if anyone present could not do the work SN SCOTT did not recall hearing this and SNYDER denied saying it.
other employment.
K0 ESTER said no pressure was placed on Q1 management or investigators to Nevertheless, Griffin of NRC discovered that prior close the cases by December.
to August, the average case closure rate per investigator was four cases a month 6
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- X1 * % gy and by November it was eleven cases per investigator with a staff of about 24 Some investigators in November closed one or more Q1 files each investigators.
Griffin stated to SCOTT that a single harassment case usually took him day.
SCOTT's response was that the streamlined procedures about three months to close.
and better tools available to the Q1 investigators by November explained t6e SNYDER said some investigators were particularly knowledge-increased closure rate.
Griffin able and did not have to expend as much effort to resolve the issues.
noted that many of the files contained very little documentation to support the conclusions one way or another and told SCOTT that the investigations were not
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When Griffin asked him what amount of documentation he meaningful or thorough.
required as a supervisor, SCOTT said he could not answer that without a specific case When he was asked if documents were ever purged from the files, SCOTT example.
said he had at one point asked his investigators to throw anything not relevant SNYDER said it to the case away to eliminate the need for extra file cabinets.
Many Q1 was never his intent to require full documentation of investigations.
investigators thought the program had been streamlined to the point it was meaning-Griffin found that although there were O
less, superficial, and had no integrity.
still some open cases left in Decemoer, 1984, the vast majority had been closed Griffin concluded that an ainordinate number" of cases were by December, 1984. closed in a very brief period of time and that was why the Q1 program tnree NRC reviews since 1984.
4 Tape Recorders Confiscated He told NRC K0 ESTER confiscated the tape recorders after Q1 was reorganized.
that he had learned Q1 had tape recctded interviews with people who had not known K0 ESTER said they were being recorded under THER0's management of the program.
U when he heard about this, he asked KCE Legal about K0 ESTER denied that tney were confis-the practice of tape recording interviews.
cated as a result of an allegation of sex discrimination or to decrease the Griffin noted specificity and detail of allegations made to 01 interviewers.that m No interview Q
made by an employee, even though the interviews tock up to an h Detail that might have aided investigation was missing.
confiscated.
some of the investigators said there was not enough information about some allegations to be able to investigate and files were closed for that reason.
SCOTT responded that he wanted the interviews distilled to make the allegations as specific as possible, although sometimes that lead to vagueness in the files.
Griffin noted that some information was apparently lost forever because it was not documented and investigators no longer had access to existing employees.
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Investicators Hamstrung He narrowed the scope of the SNYDER made fundamental changes to the Q1 program.
program to address only issues he or SCOTT deemed directly related to the He and SCOTT ordered Q1 investigators to allegation made to the Q1 interviewer. refer their investigative findings co The referral was department involved for whatever action it deemed appropriate.
No mention made by a newly created form, which allowed the Q1 file to be closed.The other options of the additional findings was to be included in the Q1 file.
Q1 investigators had concerning new problems they di This narrowed call Q1 and make a new allegation to the program run by SNYDER.
focus was carried to ridiculous extremes; for example, each weld was dealt with 4
separately rather than a length of pipe inspected to determine the extent of the 7
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-welding problem.
it. Both SCOTT and SNYDER denied they limited the amount of time allowed for investigations, an allegation made by many Q1 investigators. Under SNYDER, Q1 referred a number of allegations to other departments or organizations which resulted in the closing of the Q1 files because SNYDER did not follow up off allegations he transferred out of Q1 to make sure they were investigated and either substantiated or found to be without merit. SNYDER admitted to NRC that some subcontractors were reluctant to respond to Q1 forms raising new allegations.
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Falsification Mishandled l
SNYDER did not assign Q1 investigators to determine how extensively falsifications For example, color-coded drawings of welds had adversely affected plant safety.
SNYDER said a reevaluation of encased bolted and welded connections been falsified.
j and of lot and heat numbers had occurred, but Q1 did not attempt to learn why the inspection supervisors had falsified the drawings or whether they had falsified 1
any other inspection drawings. Apparently, Q1 did not follow through to ensure i
that the supervisors were penalized for falsifications. A second instance of falsifications involved the Crawford company sending the same acid etch test with its order of fittings for four years, although procedures required a new scid KGE's engineering cepartment subsequently recommended etch test with each order.
deletion of the acid etch test requirement, which SNYDER apparently accepted without question. No punishment was meted out to Crawford Company for violating the procedures for the four years prior to deletion of the acid etch test requirement.
7.
Investigators Muzzled SCOTT and SNYDER also prohibited 01 investigators from discussing their cases To explain this, SNYDER told NRC each investigator was qualified U
with each other.to perform the job alone and the prohibition was to make them mroe produ SNYDER said investigators could still draw on the technical expertise of fellow employees.
Investigators told Griffin they had understood the prohibition to SCOTT said the prohibition was O
be total, applying both on and off the job site.to cut down on wasted time and SCOTT could a co-worker to resolve a case they could go through SCOTT to get it.
not provide an example of a situation in which he had investigators work together.
8.
Wrongdoers Ionered J"".
NRC's investigator Griffin noted that about 100 Q1 investigations between August which included harassment, intimidation, and December, 1984, dealt with " wrongdoing",ivities. Griffin concluded Q1 usually falsification, discrimination and relatd act dropped these issues as Q1 concerns, based on his review of ma One allegation SNYDER was questioned about involved an electrical supervisor who allegedly set quotas for his inspectors. The file showed cnly that the supervisor denied it, although another substantiated allegation in a separate file had shown significant problems with welds related to work inspected by that group.
SNYDER said to NRC that the investigation should have been more extensive.
Apparently wrongdoers were not disciplined as a result of findings in Q1 investi-Only hardware problems were perceived as safety threats under SNYDER's gations.
management.
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Investicators' Conclusions Chanced; Investicators Fired l
SNYDER admitted changing the conclusion regarding RUDOLPH's alleged blackballing of an individual inspector to " unsubstantiated" based on his own review of the i
j facts. Q1 and KGE's Legal Department had also jointly investigated allegaf. ions that RUDOLPH was taking kickbacks, according to SNYDER. SNYDER said they concluded i
Rt,00LPH had received money under a contract for services related to another nuclear j
site.
e'nother example of an investigator's conclusions being changed involved the only f
case SCOTT had been assigned prior to reorganization of the Q1 program in August, l
1984 It concerned one subcontractor's Corrective Action Report (CAR) program, specifically a charge that forty-one (41) CARS had been revised at the request j
SCOTT narrowed of management to change the portions that were no longer effective.
the scope of the investigation to those CARS that had been revised and did not look at the CAR program as a whole. He was more than halfway through his inves-i O
tisation when at was rearsa,12ee, and he toie "Re tnat up to th t ooint he h e i
not seen any evidence of management pressure to revise CARS and said they were
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logical revisions. CARS were a higher-tiered document than Q1 forms, and the Q1 program closed its file if a CAR existed on the same topic. The concern was reassigned to a new Q1 investigator who chose a different investigative approach.
When SCOTT periodically reviewed the status of the investigation with the new investigator, whose nan has been censored frcm the public report, SCOTT stated he did not see the rdevance of the broadened scope of the investigation, which continued for over a month. SCOTT told NRC this investigator at tone point said,
" man, just tell tre what you want, and I'll write anything you want." SCOTT had answered thet he wanted conclusions based on facts and a systematic approach, he told NRC. SCOTT did not perceive the investigator's statement as an expression of U
frustration. Shortly thereafter, the investigator turned in his draft report, which was handwritten. SCOTT read it and concluded this investigator was not capable of handling or did not understand his assignment and SCOTT fired the investigator that same day with SNYDER's concurrence. SCOTT put the handwritten report into a file with SCOTT's notes on the termination and gave it to SNYDER.
O The CAR case was then reassigned to yet another investigator, who concluded that the original allegation was substantiated based on one CAR that had been repeatedly revised.
NRC found that KGE Legal had a copy of the handwritten report of the terminated investigator, which had also substantiated the allegation and found some other SCOTT chose not procedural inadequacies which SCOTT thought were irrelevant.
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to give credence to the findings of the terminated investigator because of the manner in which he scoped the investigation and not to give access to that ha9dwritten report to the next investigator assigned to the case. SCOTT denied any intent to bury the terminated investigator's conclusions, noting that the nui. Investigator reached the same conclusion that the original allegation had SCOTT had instructed the terminated investigator to report his broader merito concerns as new allegations and transfer them to the responsible firms for followup, but be had instead continued to investigate those concerns himself.
NRC concluded that significant findings of the terminated investigator were never addressed as a result of SCOTT's actions. SCOTT did not know if anyone had ever followed up on the terminated investigator's findings. SNYDER said since Legal had a copy of the handwritten report, it could not be considered discarded.
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Another aggressive investigator who determined that records required by the American Welding Society related to traceability were incomplete, missing or inaccurate for up to 70% of the steel used at Wolf Creek was removed from Qi l
l and placed back in QA.. The issue was transferred to Bechtel to be resolved by walkdown inspections and sampling, according to HILL. HILL and THERO thou@t l
this demotion had intimidated most of the remaining Q1 staff and inhibited their l
independence.
f The structural steel traceability allegation had been made by two different allegers, one of whom told HILL later that he had subsequently been fired for tardiness.
HILL said that another Q1 investigation had demonstrated that the tardiness charge was untrue, after which KGE telephoned the terminated employee and asked him to i
j drop his harassment allegation. The result was that both allegers were removed j
from Q1.
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- 10. Conflicts of Interest Allowed Teo
' O A c-tinuing tne-in tne waC investigati-was confucts of interest.
had hired investigators with backgrounds in quality assurance. SNYDER told NRC that he did not believe quality assurance auditors were very good investigators.
He had hired engineers. SNYDER told NRC he thought the best investigators for construction activities were construction employees, the best for startup activities were startup employees, and the best for operational activities were operational employees. He said he believed these investigators could exercise objectivity even when they investigated their own departments.
Before SNYDER took over management of Q1, he supervised the construction group.
Dissolvo Dissolvo tape had been used to construct argon dams inside the pipes.
U' tape has a high halide concentration, which is recognized as tend THERO said stress corrosion cracks in stainless steel under pressure and heat.
the allegation was that an extensive amount of the tape had been left inside the HILL had written a Quality Program Violation Report on the issue, with pipes.
As head of Ql, SNYDER was responsible for investigating which SNYDER disagreed.
his own previous work as construction supervisor, which was not conducive to O
HILL said the construction records were so poor SNYDER could not objectivity.
demonstrate that the pipes had been cleaned, so he gave in to HILL and agreed to correct the problem but took no actual corrective action. SNYDER told NRC the issue was addressed on a higher-tiered document which would resolve all He also said THERO's ability to comprehend the issues was related allegations.
THERO said KGE had started hot functional testing prior to the resolution limited.
of this issue, which THER0 thought improper. He believed SNYDER had been told
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to close the issue so it would not prevent licensing. NRC concluded Q1 should have further evaluated existing and related concerns about internal pipe cleanliness regardless of the existence of the higher-tiered document.
- 11. Druo Alleoations Buried SCOTT The handling of drug use allegations was the final area explored by NRC.
said when he joined Q1 he was told one particular investigator with a criminal SCOTT said he could investigation background would handle ali drug allegations.
not recall whether he had assigned all drug allegations to that individual or whether SNYDER did the assigning or just how they were handled or who else handled THERO said drug tnem or whether they were transferred outside Q1 for handling, but that THERO had no indicati;ons that these drug use allegatio 9
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investigated. Some of these allegations were made against senior KGE management i
and quality control employees of another firm. HILL.said FOUTS asked Security j
to run criminal record checks on the alleged users and if no record existed, FOUTS dropped the information. SNYDER said Q1 interviewers took drug allegations but l
referred them to FOUTS, KGE Operations, or to Security for investigation. *SNYDER l
believed Security eventually handled all drug allegation investigations after they had first passed through other departments. Q1 closed its file upon transfer.
John JOHNSON began as Chief of Security at Wolf Creek Generating Station in 1980.
j He recalled that in 1984 he had been asked to run criminal record checks on ten i
subcontractor supervisors for Ql. None had criminal records. At the time, J
Security had not been informed about the drug allegations so no investigation was done by Security. The name of the person to whom the results of the record checks was referred is censored in the public report.
In late 1984 JOHNSON said he received no instructions from his superiors as to what to do with other drug allegations he received from FOUTS, Q1 or elsewhere.
O no requirement was in piece tnat he refer the resuits of any eruo investloation back to Q1. He was to informally let FOUTS know is Security verified a drug allegation. JOHNSON said Security had searched some vehicles and some work areas and about a dozen employees had been terminated as a result. About one month after Q1 began to refer drug allegations to Security, FOUTS asked for formal feedback from Security. Thereafter, JOHNSON's department made handwritten responses to FOUTS, which JOHNSON thought might have been placed in Q1 files to close them t
NRC did not find those reports in closed files on drug allegations.
ou,.
JOHNSON said when Security received a drug allegation from only one source,
,. Security did not investigate the allegation.
Ir a second independent source of the allegation surfaced, Security would usually follow up with investigation.
o Employees Employees were only terminated if drugs were actually found by Security.
were tested for drugs on site beginning in 1986, well after the March, 1985 actual fuel lead date. Security also exchanged information with the local sheriff's department. JOHNSON said the work of any individual who had performed Quality-related work who was terminated for drug use was reviewed to see if O
someone else had had to sign off on the employee's work.
If no secondary reviews had occurred, JOHNSON thought the employee's work was Itinspected. Note that the Q1 files showed no followup on drug allegations files and no corrective action.
NRC concluded that Q1 did not investigate drug allegations prior to fuel load.
All Q1 seemed to do was shuffle paper when drug allegations were involved. Q1 viewed reports of drug use as information Security may have wished to add to its files and use in its own limited response to drug use problems in 1984 and early 1985.
B. from the inception of operations at Wolf Creek Generating Station in Burlington, Kansas, management has repeatedly failed to safeguard the integrity of its quality assurance programs and has failed to demonstrate management competence to address and resolve real safety concerns.
In a 1982 decision involving Metropolitan Edison Company at its Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1, 16 NRC 281 (1982) the tRC found that licenses to be culpably negligent in failing to install in its operating staff a sense of respect for its training and testing program (page 296); that "...there was a failure to fix U.
precisely within the company the responsibility for preserving the integrity of the training and testing program, and in particular, there was a failure to extend quality assurance and quality control concepts to the training program" (page 297);
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"...that the cognizant officials in the Nuclear Assurance Division failed to recognize i
that training is an activity which must comport to the concepts of operational f
safety Quality control as set out in Appendix B to Part 50" (page 300) and NRC fined the operator $100,000 for its failure to safeguard the integrity of its program.
The cumulative impacts'of va::ious management activities and omissions described in NRC's Office of Investigation Case No. 4-86-004 and summarized in this petition demonstrate clearly lack of management competence and failure on the part of l
management to preserve the integrity of the Quality assurance programs at Wolf Creek.
I Not only did these management inadequacies occur in 1984 and 1985, but according i
to various subsequent NRC reports and newspaper interviews they continue to be a problem at Wolf Creek Generating Station.
On March 22, 1988, the Kansas City Times quoted from an NRC notice of violation to
-O Kansas Gas and Electric and Kansas City Power and Light that accompanied a demand "In addition...we are concerned that your management oversight for a $100,000 fine:
for the evaluation of the root cause of problems and taking prompt and effective corrective actions as demonstrated by several examples of repetitive Licensee Event Reports in similar areas has been inadequate."
On April 8,1988, the Kansas City Star reported that Wolf Creek had been cited for three violations in 1988: violating procedures for controlling access to restricted areas, inadequately inspecting reactor seals that developed leaks which caused the plant to shut down for three weeks, and failing to develop proper procedures for inspecting seals.
On June 26, 1988 the Kansas City Star reported that Wolf Creek had received the lowest mark P0ssible for its Quality control programs in an annual NRC report.
"The report also criticizes The article in the Kansas City Star also said:
the plant's Quality Assurance program for failing to identify safety-related problems on a timely basis. For instance, managers failed to ensure the repair O
of defective equipment designed to make sure high levels of chlorine didn't seep into the control room."
On July 21, 1988, Joe Callan, director of the division of reactor projects for NRC Region IV was quoted in the Kansas City Star / Times as saying that it appeared that Wolf Creek management had improperly sought "short-term" solutions toHe told safety problems without determining the underlying causes of problems.
1 the newspaper that corrective actions "were often superfiC181 and didn't get to the root cause of the problem."
On January 14, 1989, the Kansas City Times reported that Joe Gilliland of NRC Region IV had said on January 13th that NRC had been concerned about the failure of Wolf Creek operators to notify federal officials about problems with diesel generators.
The inescapable conclusion is the Wolf Creek Generating Station is still not in full compliance with Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 or 10 CFR Part 50.55(e) specifically.
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NRC's actions to date provide no reason to conclude that the acknowledged C.
safety problems at Wolf Creek Generating Station have been resolved or will be resolved within a reasonable period of time.
Despite instructions from NRC Region IV and one $100,000 fine, management at Wolf Creek Generating Station as recently as January, 1989, has failed to comply with NRC regulations regarding quality assurance and safety of operations, including reporting requirements. Nearly four years after the initial fuel load Wolf Creek management still fails to identify root causes of problems that impact operating safety and still fails to take prompt and effective corrective action according to NRC Region IV spokespersons and NRC 's annual Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance reports.
According to the conclusions of H. Brooks Griffin in NRC's Office of Investigation Case No. 4-86-004, nearly 66% of the conclusions used to close Q1 complaintsThe about alleged wrongdoing could not be supported by facts or documentation.
Q NRC investigation showed that management at Wolf Creek G functions have sufficient independence from cost and schedule that they have sufficient authority and organizational freedom to identify quality problems, to initiate, recommend or provide solutions; ano to verify implementation of solutions.
There is no inoication that the management of Wolf Creek Generating Station has reopened each of its quality assurance files which do not comply with Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 to bring them into compliance and determine for once and for all which operating safety concerns still require corrective action in 1999.
Despite detailed information developed by its own investigators showing the clear potential for jeopardy to operating safety caused by wrongdo U drastic increases in case closure rates; falsification of records investigative files; limitation of scope of safety problem investig i
findings; failure to discipline supervisors found to have harass O
conclusions without justification; conflicts of interest; and routine burying of 4-86-004 allegations of drug use on the site, incredibly NRC concluded in C NRC continues to find tret irregularities it notes in its reports do not rise to the level that they must be specifically addressed or penalized by fines, safety.
according to news reports described in the preceding section of this petition.
f The NRC's obligation to ensure operating safety continues after the license is The United States Supreme Court held that "...public safety is first, last and a permanent consideration in any decision on the issuance of a construction issued.
Power Reactor Development permit or a license to operate a nuclear facility."
NRC retains Corp. v. Int'l Union, 367 U.S. 396, 402, 81 S.Ct. 1529,1532 (1961).
jurisolction after a plant is licensed to operate "...to ensure that the highest safety standards are maintained." 367 U.S. 402, 81 S.Ct. 1532. In 1977, the NRC responded to a petition by the Union of Concerned Scientists that:
"Where the information demonstrates an undue risk to public health and safety, the Commission will, or course, take prompt remedial action, including shutdown of operating facilities, as it has in the past."
Petition for Emeroency and Remedial Action, CL1-78-6, 7 NRC 400 at 405 (1978).
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operate; it must provide a sound technical reason why it advances that assertion.
Petition for Emercency and Remedial Action, CLI-80-21, 11 NRC 707, 715(1980).
A statement concluding that no wrongdoing is found without any explanation of why hundreds of pages of documents and the investigator's own specific findings do not result in sny threats to operating safety, such as Mr. Griffin's conclusion at the end of Case No. 4-86-004, does not satisfy this requirement.
D.
For all of these reasons, the following relief is requested:
1.
auspension of the operating license for Wolf Creek Generating Station, Burlington, Kansas; 2.
prior to reinstating the operating license:
s.
the NRC should reopen its Office of Investigations Case No. 4-86-004 to provide sound technical reasons for its conclusion that this O*
nuclear nower piant is safe enovoh to operate in saite of all of its investigative conclusions regarding quality assurance problems; b.
the NRC should review all of its information on quality assureTe at Wolf Creek developed subsequent to the issuance of Case No. 4-S6-004 and covering operations at Wolf Creek thnugh 1989 to provide sound technical reasons for its conclusion that this nuclear power plant is safe enough to operate; all correct ne actions determined by NRC to be necessary to achieve c.
a level of operating safety that complies with federal regulations should be incorporated 3. conditions of the operating license and if they are not met the operating license should be re cked; d.
that the following persons whose activities were detailed in Mr. Griffin's report of Case No. 4-86-004 so as to show their failure to safeguard the integrity of Wolf Creek quality assurance programs and their lack Oi of competence to identify and resolve real safety concerns, be barred from any and all involvement or participation in activities at Wolf Creek Generating Station whether as a salaried employee, a contract employee, a consultant, a volunteer, a management or any other position:
(i) William Rudolph (ii)Glenn Koester (iii) Robert L. Scott (iv) Charles Snyde:
(v) any other individual whom the EC determines has prevented Wolf Creek Generating Station from complying with federal Quality assurance regulations in a culpable m!.nner.
l' Respecfully submitted, L U KANSAS CHAPTER OF TM SIERRA CLUB 14
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