ML20147A768

Annual Operating Rept for 1987

ML20147A768
Person / Time
Site:	General Atomics
Issue date:	02/23/1988
From:	Asmussen K GENERAL ATOMICS (FORMERLY GA TECHNOLOGIES, INC./GENER
To:	Rubenstein L NRC
References
67-1179, NUDOCS 8803010335
Download: ML20147A768 (14)

Text

V G A Technologies O A Technologies Inc.

PO BC estce SAN MGO CAL FCAV A 92138 t619; 455M February 23, 1988 67-1179 Mr. Lester Rubinstein, Director Standardization and Special Projects Directorate Division of IHR Licensing-B U.S. tbclear Regulatory Ccumission m shington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Facility License R-67; Docket 50-163 Suhnittal of Annual Report (3 copies)

Dear Mr. Rubenstein 2e following is an annual report for GA 'Itchnologies Inc.'s (GA)

TRIGA mrk F reactor (License R-67) prepared in the same format as that required for GA's Mrk I (R-38). hhile the Technical Specifications for Mark F require no annual report, the nurrbered sections below are the secticos referred to, for exa:rple, in Section 9.6(e) of the Technical Specifications for GA's Mark I TRIGA reactor (License R-38, Docket 50-89).

PART It A brief narrative summary of (1) operating experience (including experiments performed), (2) changes in facility design, performance characteristics and operating procedures related to reactor safety occurring during the reporting period, and (3) results of surveillance tests and inspections.

1. Operatina Dcrerience

%e Mark F reactor was in operation during 1987 mainly to provide steady-state irradiation for experiments related to thermionic device tests. tb p21 sing operations were performed. % e steady-state operations included extended irradiations of thermionic devices and occasional out-of-core irradiation of samples.

During this year, experience associated with the Mark F FLIP fuel tram uranium, reported first in 1978, then in successive years, is unchanged, mis situatico causes no problen, but is, as before, under continuous scrutirrf. Several indications of this effect were cbserved in 1986, but none were serious.

We operating schedule during all of 1987 was the following.

Typical irradiation runs lasted 1,500-2,500 continuous hours, after which the reactor was shut down and the several thermionic p02p

'\

\ \

m'* miasm m, R

~~--

DCD

devices were renoved frca the core and inspected using the '

underwater neutron radiography (NR) rig and the came Mark F reactor as the neutron source. We NR inspection cycle took '

typically 5-7 days, after which the long term irradiation was l restaned; typically, the reactor power for thermionic irradiation was selected in the range 1450 to 1500 kW. . Occasional inspection cycles were longer when additional reactor related activities were required.  ;

In the course of the year, certain license amendnerts were granted.

(a) An amendment now permits the routine use of IRJ (20 wtt-20%

enrichment to 30-20) TRIGA fuel either as a full core loading or togetner as a mixed core with FLIP fuel elenents (70%

enriched) or with standard high hydride (9 wtt, 20% enriched)  ;

fuel elements, or in any ccabination thereof.

(b) We NRC has unilaterally inposed a new limitation on reactor operations so that the reactor will not be deliberately operated abcne 1500 KW except for pulsing operations. %is eliminates the possibility of operating at 110% to check 6.he power scram settings, t

(c) A license amendment has been issued to extend the testing of thermionic devices from 20,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> to a maximum of 40,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> for each device.

(d) A license amendoent has been issued that increases frca four to seven the ntnber of thermionic devices that can be tested sinultaneously, t

2. Chances in Facility Desian, Performance Characteristics, and Operatina Procedures All of the essential mechanical design changes in the facility parsuant to the long term thermicnic tests were incorporated in '

1984 and discussed in that year's Annual Report. None of the operations during 1985,1986, and 1987 involved any changes in l

reactor performance characteristics. All of ' the operation was 1 steady-state; no pilsing operations were involved. %e continuous  !

operation (namely at 168 hours0.00194 days <br />0.0467 hours <br />2.777778e-4 weeks <br />6.3924e-5 months <br /> / week) is essentially unchanged.

l Minor changes in the Operating Procedures were made mainly to  !

clarify the intent since most were written when 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> / week ,

operaticn was in effect. %e changes in facility design during 1987 were mainly in the reactor and auxiliary instrumentation.

Where appropriate, a 59.59 review was performed and all required  :

j a@rovals were obtained (see Part V). l i

)

4 i

(a) A bypass capability has been installed with instrumentation secured under lock and key. Wis facility permits one to selectively bypass any of the individual license rquired safety channels so that a faulty unit can be replaced at power without interrupting a long run. Chly the Physicist-in-Charge or Associate Physicist-in-Charge has access to this instrument rack, thuc requiring their awrwal before any maintenance work can be performed on safety channels while the reactor is in the continuous mode of operation.

(b) A two-out-of-three scram circuit was designed, tested, and installed on the Mark P console. %is serves mainly to prevent an isolated "glitch" in one of the safety circuita fra needlessly interrupting a long run. his circuit takos advantage of the fact that several redundant safety channels are in use.

(c) A new set of gaskets was installed on the doors and two hatches for the Mark P reactor rom. his improved the tightness of the air confinment for the reactor rom.

(d) Mditional CCIV cameras and monitors of the facility and surrounding areas were installed to prwide additimal surveillance capability for the Mark F reactor operators during round-the-clock operations.

(e) The main improvement in operating procedures was in the method of performing the power calibratim. We method is the same; namely, calorimetric. However, by controlling the conditims nuch more precisely, it is possible to perform a calibration that reproduces previous calibratims to about 2%. Se most significant changes were to (1) end the power calibration at an elevated tank tmperature that is the same as the routine running taperature for emtinuous operatims, and (2) to hold the reactor power constant during the calibration run using the in-core self-powered detectors (SPD) as the power ronitors rather than the out-of-core power indicators.

(f) 'Ib attspt a reductim in scra:rs caused by sparking within the UP/DN switches for the control rods, a replacement rod ccatrol assembly was constructed containing the UP/DN and SCPM buttons, the Ctv(Ittr lights, the manual scram bar, and the K1 disable switch. Wis unit was built using new rwitches (Master specialty) with an irproved design and installed during one of the normal NR shutdowns. Ib further sparking problems were experienced.

(g) The NRC has unilaterally inposed an operating limit such that the reactor power cannot intentimally be operated above 1500 kW except for Iulsing.

3. Surveillance tests and inspect!ons were perfonned as required by Sectima 4.0, 5.0, and 6.0 of the Mark F Technical Specifications.

A stmaary of results is presented below.

Fuel Surveillance he reactor fuel was measured for bending and length changes and inspected visually. his surveillance occurred on 6/8/87. Except for one element (WN 6403), all other elements were acceptable and passed all tests. %e five fueled follower control rods were also examined and found to be satisfactory. Several fuel elements (approximately 26), discussed last year, were continued cn an i increased frequency of inspection. It was one of these elements that failed the annual fuel test. However, it is encouraging to note that sane of these 26 elements are slowly improving as a function of time, mainly due to the fact that after each inspecticn the orientation of each element is changed by 180 degrees.

%e first of the extra inspections occurred on 2/6/87. All elements passed the mininun requirements. Of these, 17 passed the 1/32-inch bend test and 10 would not pass but did pass the 1/16- ,

inch test. On the next test, 9 would not pass the 1/32-inch test i and 1 failed the 1/16-inch license required test. On 10/19/87, 19 passed the 1/32-inch bend test indicating a gradual improvement in the status.

It nust be noted carefully that none of the 26 or 27 elements that are receiving special attention are in danger of releasing fission products. %e surface effects noted in earlier years are not ,

related to release of fissico products. We piblic health and i safety is in no way at increased risk frca these elements.

control Ibd Surveillance

]

We fuel follower control rods were inspected on 6/9/87 and were found to pass satisfactorily the surveillance tests. All passed the 1/16-inch bend test. he annual and semiannual rod calibratico tests were all normal.

Pulsino System Surveillance Since the start-up of the thermionic test program in January 1985, no pulse assenbly (rod, rod drive, piston, etc.) has been in the core. Only five control rods with standard control rod drives have been in use in 1985, in 1986, and in 1987, i

Reactor Safety Surveillance As specified in the 'Iw:hnical specifications, channel tests of the reactor safety system charnels, channel calibratims of the power level mmitoring channelr, and calibration of the temperature and channel checks of the fu si elenent tagerature-measuring channels were perfomed. 'Ihe tes ts were performed at least as often as required, and the resultt were satisfactory. Early in 1985, a license amendaent reducai the minimun frequency for power calibration to semiannuallf. A power calibration is required also for operatimal reasons Aning each start-up after the shutdown for neutron radiography of thermionic devices. 'Ihis occurs also about every 1,500-2,500 hours0.00579 days <br />0.139 hours <br />8.267196e-4 weeks <br />1.9025e-4 months <br /> of operatim, or every 10-15 weeks.

'Ihe pwer calibrations required a change greater than 5 percent in 5 power monitor channels during 1987.

'Ihe area mmitor and survey systens were under surveillance during this reporting period. 'Ihe frequency of calibration was as indleated below.

Continuous Air Monitor Alarm setpoints were checked weekly when there was reactor operation. 'Ibe systen was calibrated seniannually with two Sr-90/Y-90 sources in front of the detector (9,520 and 110,000 DPM).

Eberline Area Monitors Cperation was checked with a source every two weeks; calibration was perfomed seniannually with a nominal 4 mci Cs-137 source.

Portable survey Meters

'Ihe Eberline B02 and PO2A meters, the Ludlum pancake GM meters (Model 3), and the IEE SHOOPY (neutron) meters were calibrated semiannually in the GA Technologies calibration facility.

PARr II: A tabulation showing the energy generated by the reactor (in megawatt-hours) . .

7he energy generated in 1987 by the Mark F reactor was 10,642.825  !

megawatte.51rs. 'Ihe bar graph on the following page shows a monthly '

distribution of power generated. ,

PARP III: 'Ihe ntaber of emergency shutdowns and inadvertent scrams, i including the effect, if any, m the safe operation of the reactor, and the reasons for any corrective maintenance required, if any.

l

TRIGA MARK F USAGE FOR 1987 (Mw-Hrs) 1058 1038 1020 1022 1016 1023

_ _ m f,' >' '

U+ ))

W 981 b g.  ?

+

A 's

/r 4 _, .:QL 946 ,

r &. . ,~,<.

.,e ,'

s. ,n'- ,,

i.,

, _,, y_ $

" ) ,, $! $,,

e,',' . .

g g; '

A, fR,' _^ i

', 'j';f ' -

'_ '< 4; A,k,'

, ' l,

'{:l-l

f?;

' ~ ,'

~; 'Sh ,

i , - -

Wy ,/-

./_ l4 4

'  !.-f .

730 '/

l,

v. ,-

, 703

~

,..  : ,, 3, '

m

/ p/'

{g!:g . g. .;l' ,\ ' '

sk, f, , C i /- .s, /r .

'$',:,f ,

638  !? ;J in' #' a i

4 -

- /

g n m, pf a.w . .

~.

c... 4,y" y y, . 'y h

l '

ld . -% Y,' ig Q <, .';l y.;;.,,,}'18 4 /, jy

,, s 4, m,: . .

m , . . , s

,s  %;-

',K. , . ? .

', , ' , ' . -};; p f 9; };,el y ',;

+,,-

' s , , 'p, ' ,,, g .  %.

$s-

,,1 +

,4 n.:.

n. s- x u ',, n '; '

s M 468 g M r' y-  ?  : G jy,

,, ~ ?e' #n. w[ ,

~,,g.. "

/  : 4,k & ,j.; . . ;. 49'

.g, ',,

s

/' < , .p . ,s l-;c 99;,' ., [9,.

p 9 f

k\ ,,. , ;[ Qj'; ' 7,0 'y s

[l';'s' ,n . n' ,

s' S 'n:l$ , :n . :;6~' , ,w

g'f.4 q.

pp jb,1 ,'.

% ;i

y. v#% e, pf.

@:. - %Q,i

%., - b- 9; ' , r.;va 7 v '.f:

.y: ;g -

'(' n ,i y -r. 'n

/g:Q fy sy ,_p K:jf ' ' -

'o-  ?:;, f '; y,,  ;:l79

,>' /p p y_ !: 7 .z9 y ~-- 7,,  ;;:6'.

i L.

..g ,,  ;:g~g..

',, c,

,r. ; j

g

.<, ,'- 'c i 9y

./ 3,,

c,y:., ,

un w x

^ffd h '

hf'a

( 21 f,g D,,

m:

<;f .

. kk

/-

y[, s; if p.

1987

1. 01/05/87 one of three power channels (Kl) scramed when the op-erator switched the range the wrcog way during the start-up. Were was no safety implicatim.

2. 02/04/87 An external scra:n by the thermicnic bus bar cooling switch while making unannounced equipnent adjustments during neutron radiography. Administrative control was quickly reestablished. No safety consequences since all the themionic devices were rcrnoved frcan the core.

3. 06/03/87 One of the three power channels (K3) scramed due to a spurious interruptico of AC power to the ameter. A faulty power strip was replaced by one connected to the uninterruptable power sugly (UPS). We faulty strip was rcsncued frcan service. %ere were no safety implicaticus.

4. 06/11/87 'No scre.s were caused by stuck UP button for a control rod or sparking of the rod UP/DN cwitches.

One of the switches was replaced in an effort to eliminate the prcblern. %ere were no related fallures in the safety circuits.

5. 06/23/87 A replacement Keithley channel had a factor of 2x difference in its analog and digital readouts (optical relay). %is led to an analog scram even though the reactor was scarcely more than half power. %ere was no safety significance.

6. 06/25/87 An operator error scramed the Jactor when the Keithley range owitch was turned down scale instead of upscale.

7. 07/01/87 A light bulb burned out in the optical relay systen for a power channel (K2) causing a power scram. ?b safety issues were involved.

8. 07/31/87 Another occurrence of the sparking of cne of the five DOWN (DN) buttons caused an inadvertent scra:n. Pour of these rod switches were replaced in addition to the K1 disable relay switch arri the K3 power channel optical relay circuit. Wis additicnal preventive maintenance was intended to reduce the likelihood of future scrams.

9. 10/02/87 A change made to the themicnic vacutra ptrnp rower cuwly drew too nuch current frcin the uninterruptable power cupply (UPS), lowering its outtut voltage. We result was a high voltage scrarn cn the tower channels

(due to low voltage). %e pnp was repowered frcn the facility AC lines rather than UPs. %e reactor was cn a rise to full power when the scram occurred. %ere was no safety significance.

10. 10/04/87 One of the thermionic devices falled and gave a low current scram. %e safety syste performed the functico intended.

11. 12/04/87 An external scram was caused by a site-wide per outage. Outage lasted 51/3 hours. Ib safety issues were involved.

PART Ty: Discussion of the major maintenance cperaticos perfomed (k! ring the period, including the effect (if any) en the safe operation of the reactor, and the reasons for any corrective maintenance required.

1. 01/29/87 he radiation monitor for the air filter was taken out of service due to a recent continuous alarm conditica during site Wwer outage. Repairs were cade and the unit was returned to service on 2/2/87.

!b safety issue was involved because of extensive redundant instrumentation.

2. 02/11/87 A repair was made to the underground 6" primary cooling lines. A short section developed pin hole prforations and was replaced with WC piping, he very slightly radioactive earth was sent to Icw level waste. A conscientious effort was devote $ to seeking evidence of additicnal chlorine in the tank water which might adversely affect the fuel cladding.

After several examinations over a 6-nonth period, no increase in chlorine was found (as was predicted).

A ccrt:en fill manifold for the water systs for the Mark I and Mark P reactors was also installed.

Iater in the year, action was taken to remedy another sicw leak traced to the old Mark III (R-100) cooling syst s . Wis cooling systs was still partly connected to the present Mark I and Mark F systm.

On 6/6/87 the entire Mark III underground system was severed and isolated frca the present cooling lines.

We very slightly radioactive soil (pico Curies) was left in place to decay. W e radioactive species were identified arxl were under the cognizance of the Health Physic Surveyor who ascertained when the ra-dioactive control was no longer needed.

_q_

Wis leak (in the Mark III underground systen) was discovered by analyzing carefully the daily decrease in the Mark F water level during the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> / day operation.  % e decrease ranged frca 0.8-1.0 inches / day. Under normal conditions we expect a decrease of : 0.32 inch / day due to evaporation.

After isolating the Mark III system, the daily decrease in the Mark F water level returned to normal.

3. 02/26/87 Protective covers were installed on the IN2 and IN3 high voltage test witches previously installed on the Mark F console. Wis will prevent accidental scrams during extended runs by inadvertently pushing one of these witches.

4. 03/03/87 A central radiatico alarm panel was installed in the auxiliary (left hand) instrumentaticn rack. A Push-to-Test witch tests both the light annunciators and the evacuation horn for the Mark F reactor rocm.

Wis provided centralization for the ntnerous manual-ly oprated safety alarms and will improve the re-sponse time should an operator need to activate the systs.

5. 04/16/87 Pepairs were made to the 2 Mi cooling tower for the Mark F facility cooling syst s. Wis systen was not recently cooling as effectively as it shwld,

a. cleaned wiper arm in thermostat;

b. replaced broken CN-OPP Ewitch for tower danper motor controller (this was major cause for loss of tenperature control);

c. readjusted loose linkage for damper control;

d. tightened all belts on hi-speed fan motor.

6. 04/15/87 he PJt-14 amplifier en the water mcnitor was repaired I since it was reading lower than normal and returned to service 4/28/87.

7. 06/10/87 As part of the ongoing project to improve the Mark F i console instrummtation, a replacement auxiliary console instrtnent rack was installed. W e location of all radiation monitors (air, water, cell top, l etc.), the argon stack monitor instrtmentation, ,

primeter alarm panel, security CCIV monitors, in- l core self powered detectors (SPDs) instrumentation, l l

l

l

. l l

strip chart recorders for power acnitoring, and the radiation alarm status indicators was in this rack. l

'Ihis provided a centralized location for all auxiliary instrumentatien.

8. 06/11/87 'Ihe 12 tutton stuck ca rod il causing a scram on overpower. 'Ihe entire switch assembly for this rod was replaced with a raw one. 'Ite safety implications were minor. After being reviewed by the Safety cr=mittee, approval was given to return to power.

9. 06/23/87 A direct electrical short to ground was experienced with the DOWN (DN) button for rod #4. 'Ihis caused a reactor scram. Barrier guards were replaced on all the UP/DN switches and the offending switch was  ;

i replaced. After safety review, the reactor was  ;

returned to Iower. l

10. 06/24/87 As a result of a power channel (K2) scram and earlier drift problens, we replaced the K2 detector with a new ccupensated ion chaser (operated in the unecupensated mode).

! 11. 07/15/87 'Ihe remote readout for the Radiation Area Monitor (RAM) was installed in the right hand console panel.

12. 07/28/87 Installation of the old Mark III demineralizer bed l (12 cu. ft. capacity) on the Mark F reactor was i

! started. It is in addition to the several standard

! mall capacity units already on the Mark F system.

Ite resin bed whien was put on line 10/24/87 allows l reduced personnel exposure during the operation to l

change the ion exchange resin since this larger capacity systen allows the change to take place on line with no direct personnel contact. ,

13. 07/31/87 A direct electrical short to ground occurred with the .

DN button on rod 43. 'Ihis time all DN/UP switches i for rods 1, 3, 4, and 5 were replaced. In addition the light in the o;tical relay for the K3 power channel was replacec, as preventive maintenance.

By 10/1/87 a new rod control panel was fabricated and 1 installed under a 10 CFR 50.59 review. See Item 15  !

below for the 10/1/87 console modification.  !

14. 06/26/87 New M7GNDHLIX underpressure gauges were installed on the HEPA f11ter (0-4") and the underpressure (0-0.5'). 'Ibe requires.ents for absolute filter I

i I

l l

t

i i

i pressure drops have changed since circa 1965. 'Ihe DP

• for a change in filters is now 4" of H 20. '

1

15. 10/01/ 87 Major console modifications were made with a 10 CFR 50.59 review and approval. 'Ihe improsenents and t changes included: j j a. two 2-out-of-3 scram circuits for power and fuel ,

tenperature channels;

b. additional trip relay contacts to accesmodate ,

) changes; j i

c. scram reset panel to allow reset of a tripped i i

channel during powered operation. It is key j protected and key enabled. 'Ite keys are held by senior facility management; l

d. the high voltage trips were wired in series with  ;

, the respective power channels; i i

i e. a reactor CN light enable switch mcned to the t left hand panel above the wide range chanral; [

f. a scram reset enable light added to console to irdicate that the trip reset panel is not 1ccksd l 1 off; L

g. the rod control panel was replaced with a new one with all new UP/DN switches; the manual scran bar ,

a was replaced with a scram switch;  :

j h. all Sm outputs were consolidated at 'IB10 to be l available for thermionics data acquisition systen;

i. "first scram out" box moeted behind panel; and i

j. a new digital conductivitv meter was installed in l the right hand console panel.  ;.

j  !

l l

16. 10/01/87 Fabricated and installed a template at bottcn of Mark l i F tank to facilitate the precision installation of  ;

the out-of-core irradiatica facility in reproducible  ;

. close proximity to the reactor core.  !

1 j PART V: A stannary of each change to the facility or procedures, l tests, and experiments carried out under the conditions of 10 CFR l' 50.59 is presented below.

I t

j I

r

1. 04/13/87 %e 'IRIGA Safety Canittee reviewed the potential safety issues related to use of a small selection of PVC piping to replace about 6 feet of underground altanina pipe in the primary coolant system. No safety issues were discwered; plans to examine for increased chlorine content of the tank water were established.

No additimal chlorine was detected.

2. 06/16/87 A more detailed procedure was established to perform power calibrations. Se need was to reestablish power by calibratim to within i 24 after each NR procedure.

We imprweents included (1) use of the in-core self powered detectors to hold the reactor channel power constant during the calorimetric power calibration and (2) terminating the power calibration at the final tank water temperature normally used in the thermicnic runs

( 36 i 10C). As a result of the use of these pro-cedures, the power calibratica met the experimenters needs.

3. 08/20/87 Modiff eations to the Muk F Safety Instrumentation were reviewed and a;prwed by a 10 Cm 59.59 review. his set of modificaticms involved installation of a 2-out-of-3 scram logic circuit; installation of a scran reset capability--controlled by PIC or APIC-that allows a line reset of a trip as well as a line replacement of a f aulty ccaponent; and installation of a replacement control rod drive switch panel with inprwed hardware and circuitry design to replace the original, aging hardware. All aspects of safety were compared under the earlier systen and the new systen. All aspects of safety were met with the new circuitry and reliability was found to be vastly inprwed.

PARP VI: A stenary of the nature and amount of radioactive effluents released or discharged to the environs beyond the effective control of the licensee is measured at, or prior to, the point of such release or discharge.

During the calendar year 1987, 1.26 curies of Argon-41 were released from the facility to the atmosphere.

All liquid and solid wastes were transferred to GA's Sm-696 licensed Easte Processing Facility for ultimate disposal. Solid wastes are packaged and shitped to an authorized disposal facility. Liquid wastes are handled in a similar manner, or anall quantities of low level licuid wastes may also be released into the namicipal sewerage system wnthin the limits and criteria specified by a[plicable local, state and U.S. NRC regulations.  ;

t i

r--

PARP VII: A description of any ettvirculmental surveys performed outside the facility.

There have been no significant changes to the Divircrimental atrveillance Program during 1987.

PARP VIII: A stannary of radiation exposures received by facility personnel and visitors, including the dates and time of significant exposure, and a brief ==n/ of the results of radiation and contamination suryciya performed within the facility.

Facility Personnel Whole Body Exrosures for the Year 1987: (RDO Jiish h Averace nrier of Dnployees Monitored . . 20 0.68 0 0.232 Nonfacility GA Personnel Whole Body Exposures for the Year 1987_: (RDO Jiish w Average nunber of anployees Monitored . . 19 0.34 0 0.053 The majority of these exposures were received at other facilities cn the GA site.

Contractor /custczner Personnel Whole Body Exposures for the Year 1987: (REM) 111gh M Averace nanber of Persons Mcnitored . . . 73 0.61 0 0.06 Visitor Whnle Body Exrosures for the Year 1987: (RDO Hish n Average nader of Persons Monitored . . . 46 0.55 0 0.036 Poutine Wipe Surveys l

Righ Wim 264 Edpn/100 can2  ;

Average Wipe 10 fdgn/100 crn2 ,

Low Wipe C5 Edpn/100 can2 ,

i Routine Radiation Measu_r_ements l High 100 nesvhr 8 1 foot f Average 10 mansvhr 9 1 foot i Low 0.4 mRevhr 6 1 foot l i

u 1

s --

t Should you desire additicnal information concerning the above, please contact me at (619) 455-2823.

Very truly yours, ,

nad e. W  ;

Keith E. Asmussen, Manager [

Licensing, Safety and ,

Nuclear Ccsupliarce l REA/mk l cc: John B. Martin, U.S. NRC Region V ,

i h

i f

I e

{

, -. . . _ , . . . . _ - . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ . . , . _ , , _ - . . , _ , - _ . . . . . . . , , . , - _ . _ , _ , _ . .