ML041910310

Reactor Plant Event Notification Worksheet, En# 37839, Facility: Susquehanna LLC

ML041910310
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	05/14/2004
From:	Meter J PP&L
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CR-319646, EN-37839, FOIA/PA-2004-0243
Download: ML041910310 (14)

Text

Mc.Y-25-2004 14:22 US NRC SUSO RES OFFICE t'(U t)42 4t'el 1". kv FORN 3U1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL.ATORY CO0M~ISSION 2000,

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'11.onStwe W "IMAIrathUeir o" ETS are Vf~kld. On~egat.phorw niwmibmg. I TIIC-ATIoNTIME FACILUTY OR ORAN'IZATION UIT NAME OF CALLER CALL Lux(r SUSQUEHANNALLC2 Gordon E.Robinson 1(570) 542.3907 ENT TIME & ZONE EVENT OATE POWEMODE BEFORE RMD AFTER M5 ESIT 0311412001 0h1 I5 0,MIS EVENT CLASSIFICATION$ I-r on-Emr~i0Cy 0R 50.72(bj M(A) sr%o S~capSo4t AlN GENERAL. EMERGEN4CY GEWAAEC Tj Ts ~_1~AD M )RkS Cape"IF ANI SITE AREA DAERGENCY SITIAAECII "r. Rnporwmmpg i~cyCFR 58.12(br1 (oXC) Ccne" of Pad Ralw m ALERT ALEJMAEC 10) TS Req~irod 510 ASW tv)P) Aceident Mkdlas Ai UNUSUAL. EVENT ULYJLAAfiCl _LrI(vAI ECCS Dlechasgi to ICS ACC (i3) Oil1eis Merdica AM 5172 NON-EmERGENCY (44 nod w~nrII~u __CvJ11 RPS Ame~ton (scww RP (di) LOU. Corrinw4srim PHSCAL SECURITY (73.71) 0000 W_~iI 0(1414 NOWl1a8o APR 604Day Optl~aml 10 CVA 50.73(aX)(1 MATERIAUECXPOSUIRE 0B? 644r. on.Ermirgency 10CFRtSO.72(b)(3) x irid SpecdSed Sw Aawion PNW FffNES5 FOR DUTY FIT I(0)(AI Deqgde Cncridlb A0G otar Llrst afld Rargviast fId-ttfyl OTHER L"SPIECJFIED REC*JT tSat l c&.eWl LM)Uwkbd CaitmAR I_______________

INFORMATION ONLY tJNF NAI SE f~ 5sanA amAIESPI N2 DESCRIPTIONI cb: sysie'Yu affected. a0.4asarm & Vi~t Wk§ir' i&gngJ c-Aul. *"a*oft0 ever ani plainL edbtuuan orcm ~ pleni#0d. sic. IColwe an bwiv)

I ZETRACTION OF ENS NOTIFICATION # 37839 I REPLACE WITH 60 - DAY NOTIFICATION OF NVAUD SYSTEM ACTUATIO5S ENS Notification # 37839 documented that the loss of the Unit 2 Division I RPS power supply on 3/14101

• equired an 8-hour ENS notification for actuation of a containment isolation signal that affected multiple iystems and a loss of a safety function required to remove residual heat (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(l)(A) and i0CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) respectively). After subsequent evaluation of the event, the reportability Jetermination is being changed to retract the e-hour notification and provide the required a 60-day ENS

,otification for an invalid actuation that affected multiple systems. See the discussion bow:

rhe initial condition was reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), loss of safety function that is needed to remove residual heat. A subsequent review of the event and reporting requirements by PPL has concluded that the event is not reportable per this Section of the rule. In this case the 37-rrinute Interruption did r.t and would not have prevented the fulfillment of the RHR shutdown cooding function.

The original notification stated that an actuation of a containment isolation signal that affected multiple systems was reportable as an 8-hour ENS notification per 10CFR5O.72(b)(3)(Qv)(A). For this event, a half-scram while the unit was shutdown, was the result of an invalid signal since it was due to loss of RPS power. Except for critical scrams, invalid acfuations are not reportable by telephone under IOCFR50.72.

Therefore this 60-day optional report, as allowed by IOCFR50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10 CFR50.73(a)(2Xiv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting isolation valves in more than one system.

NOIICTON E NO WLL BE PI1H1G UNIUSUA&L OR NOT UNRDERST0007 D3 YES t(En I404) IM NO ITATE(s) __ X ____ 10 ALL SYSTEMS FLINICTION AS REOUIRMD E YES 03 NO WEAaIn mboq)

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EVENT DESCRIPTION (Coal~nuod ftm-n frrnQ 115:08 on March 14, 2001 with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0%power, the primary power supply to the Nab leactor Protection System (RPS) power distribution panel was lost when the Motor-Geneator (MG)

et generator in that division failed. This resulted In Primary Containment Isolation System actuations icluding isolation of an Residual Heat Removal shutdown cooling suction valve and other automatic

.ystem initiations. RPS as well as other plant systems functioned as designed in response to the ivent The 'A' RPS distribution panel was swapped to alternate power and all isolations were reset

)y 16:10. The loss of power was due to a failure of the WAY RPS M-G set generator. The generator ailed due to a manufacturing defect of an internal conductor connection. The failed generator was eplaced and other Ilikein-kind generators will be inspected. There were no safety consequences or

ompromises to the health or safety of the public. This event has been entered into the site-specific orrective action program for resolution. Internal and industry events were reviewed to assess If a

)eneric problem exits with this type of generator. No evidence of similar failures was found, which ndicates that a generic problem does not exist.

rhe NRC site Resident Inspector has been notified c A', icT: L4Cy 7 T cOw e I':.

57U '4c 4i'4 H.U4 MAY-25-2004 MAYt-25-2004 14:22 14: 22 US NRC US NRC SUSQ RES OFFICE SUSQ RES OFFICE 570 tA! 4t)'eJ H.W4 REPORTABLITY DETERMINATION CONDITION REPORT NO. 1 I f PART I DETAILS OF IMMEDIATE REPORTABILITY DETERMINATION Immediate NRC Reporting Required: C NO [l YES PER NRC NotificationMade: 0 NO DYES Type: 01 HR C14HR O 8HR 24 HR BASIS FOR DEERMINATION:

Completed By Date Shift Supervisor Date PARr 2 DETAILS OF FQLLOW4UP REPORTABILIIY DETERMINATION Reportable: P Y N El P Per Special Report Q Y r N 0 P PerSection Repoftable Per IOCFR50.9I1OCFR21: Q Y lp N 0 P Referred to Nuclear Licensing: Y El N Date: "I Report Duo Date: f Basis for Determination:

Oopleted By Exp. Svcs. eraig or Nuc. Ucensing Supervision Form NDAP-OA-0720-1, Rev. 3. Page 1 of 1 (File R48-2) (Electronic Forn) r

USNRC5US RE M~iY25-00414:3 OFICE 70 42 573P.0 MAY-25-2004 14:23 US NRC SUSO RES OFFICE 570 542 4573 P.05 9;4 q REVISED REPORTABILITY DETERMINATION FOR CR 319646 ENS Notification # 37839 documented that the loss of the Unit 2 Division I RPS power supply on 3/14/01 required an 8-hour ENS notification for actuation of a containment isolation signal that affected multiple systems and a loss of a safely function required to remove residual heat (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and I OCFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) respectively).

After subsequent evaluation of the event, the reportability determination Is being changed to retract the 8.hour notification and require a £0-day ENS notification for an Invalid actuation that affected multiple systems. See discussion below.

System Actuations The original notification stated that an actuation of a containment isolation signal that effected multiple systems was reportable as an B-hour ENS notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). For this event, the actuation resulted in a half-scram while the unit was shutdown and was invalid since it was due to loss of RPS power not a valid signal. Page 49 of NUREG-1022 Rev. 2 states, "except for critical scrams, invalid actuations are not reportable by telephone under 10CFR50.72". Therefore, an 8-hour notification was not required. Per NDAP-QA-0720 Rev. 7 attachment K, appendix A, the event Is reportable as either a 60 day written report per 10 CFR60.73(aH2)(lv)(A) or a 60 day ENS notification per 10CFR60.73(a). The 60-day ENS notification option will be used.

. ,S b..4, Loss of Safety Function The initial condition was reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), loss of safety function that is needed to remove residual heat. A subsequent review of the event and reporting requirements by Licensing and Operations has concluded that the event is not reportable per this section of the rule.

NUREG-1 022 Rev. 2 states "a single failure that defeats the safety function of a redundant system is reportable even if the design of the system, which allows such a single failure to defeat the function of the system, has been found acceptable. For example, If a single RHR suction line valve should fail in such a way that RHR cooling cannot be initiated, the event would be reportable".

I

570 542 4573 P.06 MiY-25-2004 MAY-25-2004 14:23 14:23 US NRC US RES OFFICE SUSO RES NRC SUSO bF:F'ic0 570 542 4573 P.06 This section of the NUREG was originally believed to describe the event in CR 319646 sinoe both trains of RHR shutdown cooling have a common suction line that isolated when the HV251009 valve closed. A more detailed analysis of the above NUREG section shows that the event in CR 319646 does not meet this guidance.

The key phrase in the example is "... Forexample, if a single RHR suction line valve should fall in such a way that RHR cooling cnnot be initiated, the event would be reportable". The suction line valve closed but it did not fail in a way that would have prevented RHR shutdown cooling from being initiated. NUREG -

1022 Rev. 2 page 53 states '..several different expressions such as 'would have,

'could have, "alone could have,'and 'reasonable doubt' are used to charactenze this standard. In the staff's view, all ofthese should be judged on the basis ofa reasonable expectation of preventing fulfillment of the safety functions. It has been determined, for the reasons described below that it is not a reasonable expectation that the event prevented fulfillrent of the RHR shutdown cooling function.

There is no automatic initiation of RHR shutdown cooling, the system is manually aligned and operated in accordance with approved procedures. In the event on 3/14/01, the RHR shutdown cooling suction valve (HV251F009) isolated to the closed position when the Unit 2 division I normal RPS power was lost, but loss of the normal power supply did not create a situation in which the valve could not be opened in a time frame commensurate with normal expectations for aligning the system. The following supports this conclusion:

Operations personnel used approved procedures to swap Unit 2 RPS division 1 to its alternate power supply. This action restored power to -V251 F009 and the normal suction path for RHR shutdown cooling was restored within 37 minutes of the isolation. This was within the 1-hour completion time required by dondition C of TS 3.9.7.

• The reactor was in Mode 5 with the reactor cavity flooded and cross-tied to the spent fuel pool. The reactor coolant temperature increased less than 2 degrees F.

• TS basis 3.9.7 states that "..operation (either continuous orintermfttent) of one subsystem can maintain and reduce the reactor coolant temperature as required".

• Technical Specfication 3.9.7 contains a note that allows both RHR shutdown-cooling subsystems to be removed from operation for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> per 8-hour period. This is consistent with the TS Basis for 3.9.7 which states that the RHR system is not required to mitigate any events or accidents evaluated in the safety analysis. The RHR system is required for removing decay heal

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to maintain the temperature of the reactor coolant and was retained in the Technical Specifications as an important contributor to risk reduction.

The event did not create a condition that was adverse to RHR shutdown cooling with respect to the most limiting single failure that it is designed to accornmodate, i.e., a Loss of Offsite Power with an additional failure of one of the RHR shutdown cooling suction valves.

FSAR section 5.4.7.1.1.1(2) states "the design basis for the most limiting single failure for the shutdown cooling mode of RHR is that the shutdown line isolation valves can be opened by hand (Section 5.4.7.1.5) and that the plant can then be shut down using a single RHR heat exchanger and its RHR Service Water loop. Shutdown to 212 degrees F can be achieved within about 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />, which is acceptable. If the shutdown line cannot be opened manually, the alternate shutdown cooling systems described in Section 15.2.9 are capable of acceptable shutdown heat removal."

• FSAR section 5.4.7.1.5 stales "...Shutdown suction and discharge valves are required to be powered from both offsite and standby emergency power for purposes of isolation and shutdown following a loss ofotfsite power. In-the event either of the two shutdown supply valves fall to operate, and the shutdown supply valves cannot be opened by hand, alternate shutdown cooling is established in accordance with plant procedures".

In this case the loss of the Unit 2 division I normal RPS power supply did not and would not have prevented either of the RHR shutdown cooling suction valves from being opened electrically or by hand.

Conclusion The reportability determination for CR 3119646 is being changed to retract the 8..

hour notification and require a 60-day ENS notification for an invalid actuation that affected multiple systems.

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570 542 4573 P.08 14:24 US NRC US SUSQ RES NRC SUSO OFFICE RES &F'itt 570 542 4573 P.OE3 MF4Y-25-2004 MAY-25-2004 14:24 RElRAC:TION OF ENS NOTIFICATION # 37839 / REPLACE WITH 60 - DAY NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SYSTEM ACTOATIQNS.

ENS Notification # 37839 documented that the loss of the Unit 2 Division 1 RPS power supply on 3/14101 required an 8hour ENS notification for actuation of a containment isolation signal that Effected multiple systems and a loss of a safety function required to remove residual heat (10CFR50.72(bX3)(iv)(A) and I OCFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(8) respectively). After subsequent evaluation of the event, the reportability determination is being changed to retract the 6-hour notification and provide the required a 60-day ENS notification for an invalid actuation that affected multiple systems. See the discussion below.

The initial condition was reported per 1CFR50.72(b)(3Xv)(B), loss of safety function that is needed to remove residual heat. A subsequent review of the event and reporting requirements by PPL has concluded that the event is not reportable per this section of the rule. In this case the 37-minute interruption did not and would not have prevented the fulfillment of the RHR shutdown cooling function.

The original notification stated that an actuation of a containment isolation signal that affected multiple systems was reportable as an 8-hour ENS notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). For this event, a half-scram while the unit was shutdown, was the result of an invalid signal since it was due to loss of RPS power. Except for critical scrams, invalid actuations are not reportable by telephone under 10CFR5O.72. Therefore this 60-day optional report, as allowed by IOCFRRS.73(a)(1). is being made under the reporting requirement in 10 CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting isolation valves in more than one system.

At 15:08 on March 14, 2001 with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0% power, the primeary power Supply to the "A" Reactor Protection System (RPS) power distribution panel was lost when the Motor-Generator (MG) Set generator in that division failed. This resulted in Primary Containment Isolation System aduations including isolation of an Residual Heat Removal shutdown cooling suction valve and other automatic system initiations. RPS as well as other plant systems functioned as designed in response to the event. The "A"RPS distribution panel was swapped to alternate power and all isolations were reset by 16:10. The loss of power was due to a failure of the "A" RPS M-G set generator. The generator failed due to a manufacturing defect of an internal conductor connection. The failed generator was replaced and other like-in-kind generators will be inspected. There were no safety consequences or compromises to the health or safety of the public. This event has been entered into the site-specific corrective action program for resolution. Internal and industry events were reviewed to assess if a generic problem exits with this type of generator. No evidence of similar failures was found, which indicates that a generic problem does not exist.

MRY-25-2004 14:24 US NRC SUSO RES OFFICE 570 542 4573 P. 09 The NRC site Resident Inspector has been notified f.

SNCSUQRSOFC 142 MAY-25-2004~~~~~

MAY-25-2004 14:24 US NRC SUSO RES OFFICE 570 542 4573~ P.1kW

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REPORTABILITY DETERMINATION CONDITON REPORT No. Page 1 of 319646 ...

PART 1 DETAILS OF IMMEDIATE REPORTASILgTY DETERMINATION Immediate NRC Reporting Required: 0 NO [DYES PER see below NRC Notifcation Made: El NO Z YES Type: O 1 HR Q 4 HR 23 8 HR Q 24 HR BASIS FOR DETERMINATION-Unit2 was hI Modo5 on the ffth daYof s 10d Refueaand Inspoction Outage. Al 1508 hours0.0175 days <br />0.419 hours <br />0.00249 weeks <br />5.73794e-4 months <br />, the unitexped-Orcod en unexpected loss of Division 1 RPS Power supply. The loss of power was a resudt of the Eloecical Prolecton Assenby (EPA) A & C breakers and notor generator output breaker tripping. The caue is under investigation.

The lass of power caused the RHR Shutdown Cooling auction valve HV251 F009 to close. This is 2 romrn suction valve to both divislorns of RHR and rusultod in the compolto loss of RHR Shutdown CoolIng. In accordance with I CCFR51.72(bX3)(v) this repreaenra a loss of tha a safety system which removes residual heat ond roWuk an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ENS call.

In addition to the Isolation of RHR SDC. RWCU Isolated due to containment valve HV244F001 closing, and UMnl 2 HVAC Zone 3 (refuel floor) isolated. These isolatons constitute an actuation of a Containnment Isolation signal thtsffected rnulilplo systems, and Is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(IvXA).

Tom Middleton I 03114/01 _ lk, ) I ;fLf/o I Completed By Date Shift Supervisor Date PART 2 DETAILS OF FOLLOW-UP REPORTADILU1Y 1 ETERN11ATION Reportable: OY ON OP Per Special Report: OY ON DP Per Section Reportable Per 10CFRSD.9/1 OCFR21: JY ON OP Referred to Nuclear Licensing: 0Y Q N Date:

Rpport Due Date:

Basis for Determination:

/ IDt Completed By Date Supv. Operating Exp. Svcs. Date or Nuc. Llcensing Supervision Form NDAP-OA-0720-1, Rev. 3, Page 1 of 1 (File R48-2) (Electronic Form) y.

MPY-25-2004 14:24 US NRC SUSO RES U-FICL PAnr 1nF7 NRC FORM Ml U.S. NUCLEAR REcNW.IORY cOUISSIO (I2.20001 OP ERA'rnct CENTER REACTOR PLANT EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSH-EET EN # 3 7 8 Zc NRC OPENAnloN ELEPHONE MUMMA~: PMMARY .3014¶.1Z00 cW1043244#r. BACKUPS -(I"1 301451.Odat w SOO44".4'.

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CA1SusQUEHANA LLC2 obert R. Boesch 1(570) 542.3907 EVENT TINE &ZONE 1EVENT DATE POWERWOOE BEFORE POWERMODEAP1ER 18ETO143142001 O%/015 0%J 5 EVENTCLASSFICATIONS I-Mr. Non-Ememm 1CFR5O.72[ I) - vA) SgftSO Capobft QJNA IGENERAL EMERGENCY GENIAEC TS 4aijoii ADE X 1(v)B) MJR C~apaW AIM SITE AREA EMERGENCY SiT/AAEC 441r. Nown.EAtwooncy IS CFR Sa.721b)(21 I(wXC) Conb'u of RMd Rekusa AII4C ALEAT ALEJAACC I~ TS RecFi BiD so ASH- (vXD) Actklsnl Ml1Soaum kN UNUSUAL EVENT LAA'EC (VX ECSCSiaC~roCatRC ACCS Ct) OPWC~e Medical MAW 50.72 NON.!EUERGENCY lies ne couu __ O RPS Acution (srmm) ARPS W LNIWaCO~flfWAVd"L414 ACOI4 PW~SICAL SECURIiY (73.71) DOD0 __jM On~sw NoWcafimAPR 604>av OpdarWa 10 CFR 50.3t(e)(1)

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OTHER UNSPECIFIED R.POMTw -L"Mh"Ckn ael _____________________________ I WONQ INFORJATIDN ONLY NNF X JIVYAI Sp.aTedSyimActua4Iean -AS NONR DIESCRIPTION Ircludck sylbo I. C5.fI&Th~&J1dg4ri.~ue.o'~fvnC n.~~aIk, rCamd (Cot~nw,.o~'back)

'Unit 2 was in Mode 5 on the fifth day of its 10th Refuel and Inspection Outage. At 1508 hours0.0175 days <br />0.419 hours <br />0.00249 weeks <br />5.73794e-4 months <br />, the unit experienced an unexpected loss of Division I RPS Power supply. The loss of power was a result of the Electrical Protection Assembly (EPA) A & C breakers and motor generator output breaker tripping. The cause is under investigation.

The loss of power caused the RHR Shutdown Cooling suction valve HV251F009 to close. This is a common suction valve to both divisions of RHR and resulted in the complete loss of RHR Shutdown Cooling. The reactor Currently has its head removed with the reactor cavity flooded up with the gates to the spent fuel pool removed. A Supplimental Decay Heat Removal system was in service at the time, but was not considered fully capable of decay heat removal. Reactor coolant temperature increased less than 2 degrees during the 37 minutes SDC was out of service. The RPS power supply was switched to Its altemate supply ^dADC was restored at 1545 hours0.0179 days <br />0.429 hours <br />0.00255 weeks <br />5.878725e-4 months <br />. In accordance withOCFR50.72(b)(3)(v)this represents a loss offi a safety system which removes residual heat and requires an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ENS call.

In addition to the isolation of RHR SDC, RWCU isolated due to containment valve HV244F001 closing, and UWit 2 HVAC Zone 3 (refuel floor) isolated. These isolations constItute an actuation of a Containment Isolation signal that affected mulitple systems, and is reportable per I OCFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

C-a~*ir.+- GT-rk-'JDLJF NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL&E O UAiNUSUAL OR NUNDERSTOC7 0 YES {Emplob No NRCRESIDENT X _, _____ _

STATE(s) X OALL SYSTEMS FUNCTION AS REOUIRED? E YES 0 NO (Emdn bn)

LOCAL OTHER GOV AGENCIES _ _ _ ODE Of OPERATIMATED S RADOIT`INSAL INFO ON BACK)

UEDAIPRESS REAlSE _ ItUTL CORRECTED SIRMART DATE. J14/0`1 l0 ES 0 NO N14 S0FAi ml (I3.2mCm t9D ON RECICLED PAPER

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DAM-5-00 14:2 ._..__.___

US NRA SUS RE OC ____ 57 542 457 MPY-25-2004 14:25 US NRC SUSO RES OFFICE 570 542 4573 P.12 DSS Home DSS Quick Navigation Search Again M '.>* CONDITION REPORT FACT printChart SHEET Status Info 1 Event Info I Affected Objects I Actions Taken I Significance Rvw I Evaluation I Trend Info I Action Items I Workflow History I Attached Media STATUS INFORMATION CR Number: 319646 Sub Type/Sub Cat: CR Lead Group: 312GL-PDC-NSE ELEC LEAD Significance Level: Level 2 Cause Determination Reso Due: 04/14/2001 Status: ARCHIVING Reso Cmplt: 04/16/2001 EVENT INFORMATION Event Date - Originator Problem Statement 03/14/2001 03:30PM GOIN*IAMES W LOSS OF DIV I RPS 2CBS003A-A AND 2CBS003A-C EPA BREAKERS TRIPPED ALONG WITH THE M/G SET OUTPUT BREAKER CAUSING LOSS OF DIV I RPS WHILE UNIT IN CONDITION S. CUCK ON REFERENCE INFO.

BUTTON AND ATTACHED MEDIA TO SEE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

AFFECTED OBJECTS Object Category ID Description Design Component 2CBS003A-A RPS MG SET A EPA BREAKER 2CBS003A-A Design Component 2CBS003A-C RPS MG SET A EPA BREAKER 2CBS003A-C Unit/System 258A RPS REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM Document 319646 LOSS OF DIV I RPS PRELIMINARY ACTIONS TAKEN Action Date Action Taken By Action Text Not Assigned Not Assigned No Text Available ACTION PLAN ITEMS Item Nuimber Responsible Group Assigned To *Priority Due Date

-^ Status 320040 381-CRA-RPT DETERM CODDINGTONwCORNELIUS 2 03/29/2001 CLOSED T

Description:

PROVIDE REPORTABILITY FOLLOWUP FOR CR 319646. CR DESCRIPTION; 2CBSO03A-A AND 2CBS003A-C EPA BREAKERS TRIPPED ALONG WITH THE M/G SET OUTPUT BREAKER CAUSING LOSS OF DIV I RPS WHILE UNIT IN CONDITION S.

Completed Action Taken By Actions Taken:

03120/2001 03:AM CODDINGTONWCORNEUUS T The loss of the Division 1 RPS power supply resulted In the loss of RHR shutdown cooling. The loss of RHR shutdown cooling represents a loss of a safety system which removes residual heat. This loss Is reportable In accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) and 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(v).

327888 330-AR/CR CLOSURE PENDING SCOTT*MARGARET 5 11/11/2002 CLOSED

Description:

ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE: DURING ESTABLISHED RPS WORK WINDOWS, REMOVE THE END BELL FROM RPS M/G GENERATORS, (1G201A & B, 2G201B), AND INSPECT AND REPAIR ANY DAMAGE OR LOOSENESS NOTED WITH THE CONNNECTING WIRES AND TERMINATIONS. REPLACE THE THYRITE. REF: CR'S 325794, 325799 AND 325801.2CBS003A-A AND 2CBS003A-C EPA BREAKERS TRIPPED ALONG WITH THE M/G SET OUTPUT BREAKER CAUSING LOSS OF DIV I RPS WHILE UNIT IN CONDITION 5. CLICK ON REFERENCE INFO. BUTTON AND ATTACHED bttp://nimsprod:9301/nims/plsql/pkg dss fact sheet.switchboard?win num=3 19646&leg . 5/19/2004

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Action Action Taken By Actions Taken:

Completed 08/20/2002 0W:AM SCOTTsMARGARET Closed - no further action A review of all open CRAS was performed by OES In July of 2002. During that review, the CRAs were classified as Correct (the action was required to correct a Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ)). Prevent (for prevent recurrence where the action was derived from some form of causal analysis and was determined necessary to prevent recurrence), or Related. This review was performed with the intent of removing CRAs from the database that did not come under Appendix B Criterion 16 (i.e., those that are 'Related"). As a result of the CRA backlog review, this CRA was closed because it was not cost effective.

SIGNIFICANCE REVIEW Screening Summary:

PER SCREENING 3/15/01, THIS IS A LEVEL 2 CAUSE DUE TO THE ENS PHONE CALL.

Past Occurrences:

No Comment Provided Significance Review:

No Comment Provided Interim Actions:

No Comment Provided Classifier:

HELSEL*LISA S EVALUATION Investigation:

No Comment Provided Safety Assessment:

No Comment Provided Causes:

• No Comment Provided Use-As-Is/Repair:

No Comment Provided ATTACHED MEDIA Attached Document Type Description Comment 24017785.PDF ATTACHMENT Reportability Determination - CR 319646 25403584.PDF ATTACHMENT Reportability Determination (5/14/01) - CR 319646 25408765.PDF ATTACHMENT ENS Notification Worksheet - CR 319646 TREND INFORMATION Trend Code Trend Code Value DEFICIENCY TAG TAG NOT APPLIED EQUIPMENT OPERABILITY OPERABLE NO ADDL FOLLOWUP None.

REPORTABILITY 8HR 10CFR50.72(B)(3)(IV)A&B ENS Notification was made on DETERMINATION 03/14/01 at 1802. EN# 37839.

REPORTABILITY SHR 10CFR50.72(B)(3)(V)&(VI) ENS Notification was made on http://nimsprod:9301/nims/plsq!Ipkg dssfactsheet.switchboard?wrmnum=3 19646&1eg':. 5/19/2004

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. 'HT--Z)-aeQf4 14; Id:: Ub- NK. s)UDU NES OFF I CE 570 542 457.3 P. 14 DETERMINATION 03/14/01 at 1802. EN# 37839.

A06-SELF IDENTIFICATION WORK GROUP SELF ID A12-CR HOLD TAG TAG NOT APPLIED A08-IDENTIFIED BY OPERATIONS A07-METHOD OF ALARM DISCOVERY A02-EVENT CATEGORY RPS EVENTS A1O-EQUIPMENT TYPE BREAKER/CONTACTOR/CONTRI DLLER A09-PROCESS TRENDING PLANT OPERATIONS CODES A04-REPORTABILITY YES A09-PROCESS TRENDING MATERIAL CONDITION CODES A10-EQUIPMENT TYPE GENERATOR/INVERTER/MOTOF k GEN A13-MAINT RULE FF YES CYCLE NUMBER UNIT 2 10TH REFUEL CYCLE RELATED INFORMATION Type ID Priority Relation Type: Status:

PCWO 319647 2 CORRECT CONDITION ARCHIVED 2CBS003A-A AND 2CBS003A-C EPA BREAKERS TRIPPED ALONG WITH THE M/G SET OUTPUT BREAKER CAUSING LOSS OF DIV I RPS WHILE UNIT IN CONDITION S OSSCR 319648 1 RELATED CLOSED 2C8S003A-A/2CBSO03A-C LOSS OF DIV I RPS CRA 320040 2 CORRECT CONDITION CLOSED PROVIDE REPORTABILITY FOLLOWUP FOR CR 319646. CR DESCRIPTION: 2CBS003A-A AND 2CB5003A-C EPA BREAKERS TRIPPED ALONG WITH THE M/G SET OUTPUT BREAKER CAUSING LOSS OF DIV I RPS WHILE UNIT IN CONDITION 5.

AR 325801 NA RELATED CLOSED REMOVE THE ENDBELL, CLEAN, INSPECT AND REPAIR ANY DAMAGE OR LOOSENESS NOTED WITH THE CONNECTING WIRES AND TERMINATIONS. REPLACE THE THYRITE. (REFERENCE CR 319646)

CPA 327888 5 RELATED CLOSED ACTION TO PREVENT RECURRENCE! DURING ESTABLISHED RPS WORK WINDOWS, REMOVE THE END BELL FROM RPS M/G GENERATORS, (1G201A & B, 2G201B), AND INSPECT AND REPAIR ANY DAMAGE OR LOOSENESS NOTED WITH THE CONNNECTING WIRES AND TERMINATIONS. REPLACE THE THYRITE. REF: CR'S 325794, 325799 AND 325801.2CBS003A-A AND 2CBS003A-C EPA BREAKERS TRIPPED ALONG WITH THE M/G SET OUTPUT BREAKER CAUSING LOSS OF DIV I RPS WHILE UNIT IN CONDITION S.CLICK ON REFERENCE INFO. BUTTON AND ATTACHED MEDIA TO SEE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

LIC 330959 1 RELATED CLOSED GENERATE LER 388/01-003-00 IN WHICH THERE WAS A LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING FOR UNIT 2. (REF. CR 319646) STATUS: LER WAS NOT NEEDED, 60 DAY ENS NOTIFICATION #37839.

CLOSED 5/21/01.

NRC 356436 NA RELATED CLOSED NRC COMMITMENT, ENS #37839 RE: U2 EXPERIENCED AN UNEXPECTED LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING DUE TO TRIPPING OF VARIOUS POWER SUPPLY BREAKERS. (REF. CR 319646) ACTION:

INSPECT AND REPAIR ANY DAMAGE OR LOOSENESS NOTED WITH CONNECTING WIRES AND 31 http://nimspTod:9301/nimslplsql/pkg dss fact sheet.switchboard?wm num3 96 4 6 &leg ... 5/19/2004

MPY-25-2004 14:26 US NRC SUSQ RES OFFICE 570 542 4573 P.15 TERMINATIONS IN RPS M/G SETS 1G201A AND B, AND 2G201B. (REF. CRA 327888, PCWO'S 325912, 325913 AND 325914).

AR 423754 NA RELATED CLOSED INSPECTION UNDER WO #325913 FOUND THAT THE LUG OF THYRITE WIRE IN 1G2018 WAS LOOSE. AS ALLOWED BY THE WORK PLAN, A NEW BLUE STRIPE QUARTER INCH STUD LUG WAS CRIMPED ON TO THE WIRE. THE CONDITION HAS BEEN CORRECTED. WO #325913 WAS INMATED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE OF EVENT CR 319646 WHERE A LOOSE LUG ON A THYRITE WIRE CAUSED THE LOSS OF RPS MG SET 2G201A. WITH THE COMPLETION OF THIS WO, ALL THYRITE LUG INSPECTIONS IN THE UNIT 1 & 2 RPS MG SETS ARE COMPLETE.

WORKFLOW HISTORY Action Step Name Performed By Date COMPLETE IDENTIFY GOIN*JAMES W 03/14/2001 04:01:00 no comment provided COMPLETE OPER EVAL PETRILLA III*JOHN J 03/14/2001 09:17:00 no comment provided COMPLETE EVAL RPTBL BURNS*GARY D 03/15/2001 03:01:00 no comment provided COMPLETE SS RPTBLTY BOESCH 3KROBERT R 03/15/2001 08:26:00 no comment provided COMPLETE SCREEN SPROUT*SHERRY A 03/15/2001 01:45:00 no comment Provided COMPLETE CLASSIFY MASICH* MELODY I 03/1S/2001 03:35:00 no comment provided COMPLETE CR ASSIGN SCHECHTERLY*ROBERT R 04/16/2001 11:14:00 no comment provided COMPLETE CR ACTPLAN * ' 1/10/2001 12:29:00 no comment provided COMPLETE APLAN APPR SCHECHTERLY*ROBERT R 11/10/2001 12:29:00 no comment provided COMPLETE IDENTIFY GOINUJAMES W 11/10/2001 12:29:00 no comment provided APPROVE AP WORKING GARREN*DEBRA L 09/26/2002 09:57:00 hardcopy Add On Data Name Type Description Active NO DATA AVAILABLE Status Info I Event Info I Affected Objects I Actions Taken I Significance Rvw I Evaluation l Trend Info If Action Items I Workflow History I Attached Media http://nimsprod.9301/nims/plsql/pkg-dsshfact-sheet.switchboard?wm-num=3 19646&leg...... 5/19/2004 TOTAL P.15