ML100620116
| ML100620116 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 02/09/2010 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | |
| References | |
| Download: ML100620116 (478) | |
Text
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REPORTNUMBER:_~2~OO~9~-3~O~1~ _______________ _ DRAFT RO WRITTEN EXAM CONTENTS: D Draft RO Written Exam (75Q (7SQ with ES-401-5Information) ES-401-S Information) Location of Electronic Files:
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Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 1 Group # 1 KIA # 007EG2.1.19 Importance Rating 3.9 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery: Ability to use plant computer to evaluate system or component status Proposed Question: RO 1 Which ONE of the following Safety Function(s) in 1/2-EOP-01, "SPTAs", can be FULLY evaluated by using the Qualified System Parameter Display System (QSPDS)? A. ONLY RCS Pressure Control B. ONLY Core Heat Removal C. Core Heat Removal & RCS Heat Removal D. RCS Pressure Control & RCS Heat Removal 1
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): A. Correct. Only RCS Pressure Control acceptance criteria can be fully met by use of QSPDS by indications of Pressurizer Pressure and RCS subcooling. B. Incorrect. Partially correct but does not include RCS Core Heat removal acceptance
~ T can be determined from QSPDS and not RCP & CCW status.
criteria since only Loop L'. C. Incorrect. Partially correct but does not include RCS Heat Removal acceptance criteria because only T-avg can be determined for QSPDS. S/G levels or S/G pressures and does not show indication of the MSR TCV Block valves. D. Incorrect. Partially correct but does not include either RCS Core or RCS Heat Removal due to reasons stated in B & C. Technical Reference(s): 0711407,1-EOP-01 0711407, 1-EOP-01 (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: 07024073-02 _0=--:7-=0-=2-'.40-=-7-=3=--0.::..::2=--______ (As avai available) lable) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge _X'--'--__ _X'--'----____ Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 55.43 Comments: 2
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: {>; 25 STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS 9 of 17 : PROCEDURE NO.: IPRC)CEDIURE 2-EOP-01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0o OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) RCS PRESSURE CONTROL INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o D 4. DETERMINE RCS Pressure Control acceptance criteria are met: A. VERIFY Pressurizer A.1 11if Pressurizer pressure is less than pressure is between 2300 psia, aQs"fsfQ} Q} 1800 and 2300 psia. and the PORV(s) are OPEN, Then PERFORM ANY of the following:
- 1. OVERRIDE the open PORV(s).
- 2. CLOSE the associated PORV block valve(s).
A.2 11 Pressurizer pressure is less than 1f 1736 psia, Then ENSURE ALL of the following:
- 1. SIAS has ACTUATED.
- 2. CIAS has ACTUATED.
- 3. ONE RCP in EACH loop is stopped.
B. VERIFY Pressurizer B.1 RESTORE and MAINTAIN Pressurizer pressure is trending to pressure between 2225 and 2275 psia pSia a(fQf f),o/Q/ between 2225 and by performing ANY of the following: 2275 psia.
- 1. ENSURE proper operation of the Pressurizer Pressure Control System.
- 2. Manually OPERATE heaters and spray.
. C. VERIFY RCS subcooling is C.1 11 RCS subcooling is less than 20°F if at least 20°F. or RCP(s) exhibit cavitation, Then STOP ALL RCPs.
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REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: .. 25 STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS 10 of 17 PROCEDURE NO.: 2-EOP-01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 o OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) 4.0 CORE HEAT REMOVAL INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS ACTiONS D 5. DETERMINE Core Heat Removal acceptance criteria are met: 1f ccw is LOST to the RCPs for greater If yeS A. VERI VERIFY FY at least ONE RCP is RUNNING A.1 than 10 minutes, and supplied with CCW. Then STOP ALL RCPs. B. VERIFY Loop ilT ~T is less than 10°F.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 25 STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS ';~ ( PROCEDURE NO.: 11 of n: 2-EOP-01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) Res HEAT REMOVAL INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o D 6. DETERMINE RCS Heat Removal acceptance criteria are met: A. VERIFY at least ONE S/G A.1 PERFORM BOTH of the following: has BOTH of the following conditions: 1. ENSURE Main Feedwater flow is available.
- S/G level is between 20 and 83% NR 2. CONTROL Main Feedwater flow to restore S/G level to between
- Feedwater is available 60 and 70% NR.
and level is being restored to between 60 and 70% NR A.2 PERFORM BOTH of the following:
- 1. ENSURE Auxiliary Feedwater flow after AFAS actuation.
- 2. CONTROL AFW flow to restore S/G level to between 60 and 70% NR.
B. 11 EITHER of the following If conditions exist,
- 2B AFW Pump is 2A or 28 the ONLY source of Feedwater
- Main or Auxiliary Feedwater flow can NOT be re-established Then STOP ONE RCP in EACH loop.
(Continued on next page) (Continued on next page)
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REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 25 STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS 12 of 1 PROCEDURE NO.: 2-EOP-01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) Res HEAT REMOVAL INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 6. (continued) 6. (continued)
C. VERIFY RCS TAVG TAVG is C.1 If RCS TAVGAVG is greater than 535°F, between 525 and 535°F. Then CONFIRM that at least ONE S/G is removing RCS heat:
- 1. ENSURE feedwater is being restored to at least ONE S/G.
- 2. ENSURE SBCS or ADVs are restoring RCS TAVGAVG to between 525 and 535°F.
C.2 If RCS T AVG is less than 525°F, TAVG Then CONFIRM S/G steam and feed rates are NOT excessive:
- 1. ENSURE feed flow is NOT excessive.
- 2. ENSURE SBCS or ADVs are restoring RCS TAVGAVG to between 525 and 535°F.
C.3 If T COLD is approaching or less than 500°F, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
- 1. ENSURE at least ONE RCP is STOPPED.
- 2. INITIATE Emergency Boration to achieve adequate SDM.
(Continued on next page) (Continued on next page)
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 25 STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS : 13 of 17 PROCEDURE NO.: 2-EOP-01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 }
.0 OPERA 4.0 OPERATOR TOR ACTIONS (continued)
ReS HEAT REMOVAL INSTRUCTIONS INSTRUCT!ONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 6. (continued) 6. (continued)
(continued) o. O. VERIFY VERI FY S/G pressure is 1f S/G pressure is greater than 915 psig 0.1 If between 835 and 915 psig (930 psia), (850 and 930 psia). Then ENSURE the SBCS or ADVs are restoring S/G pressure to less than 915 psig (930 psia). 0.2 1f S/G pressure is less than 835 psig If (850 psia), Then ISOLATE steam lines from the S/G:
- 1. ENSURE SBCS valves are CLOSED.
- 2. ENSURE ADVs are CLOSED.
0.3 1f If S/G pressure is less than 735 psig (750 psia), Then CLOSE the MSIVs. 1f S/G pressure is less than 585 psig 0.4 If (600 psia), Then ENSURE MSIS has ACTUATED. E. ENSURE the FOUR MSR E.1 CLOSE ALL TCVs using the MSR TCV Block Valves are Reheat Control Panel. CLOSED. F. ENSURE the MSR Warmup Valves are CLOSED. G. If1f maintaining a vacuum is desired, Then ENSURE MV-08-814, Spillover Bypass Valve, is CLOSED.
0711407, Rev. 15 Page 65 of 83 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY aSPDS CORE
SUMMARY
PAGE UNIT 1 QSPDS o CORE
SUMMARY
101 CORE HEAT REMOVAL CONTROL RCS/UPPER HD SATURATION MAR 1 48 DEG F SUBCOOLED CET SATURATION MARGIN 1 77 DEG F SUBCOOLED REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL 2 100% REPRESENTATIVE CET TEMP 3 575 DEG F CET BELOW TECH SPEC MINIMUM REQUIREMENT (OR BLANK) ISAT 211 II RVL 212 II CET 2131 SYS ERROR (TlR.CO/(}711407 -ComSummU 1-RB) (TIRCOI0711407-CoreSummUI-R8) FIGURE 26
0711407, Rev. 15 Page 66 of 83 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY ( UNIT 1 QSPDS SATURATION MARGIN PAGE o SATURATION MARGIN 211 SATURATION MARGIN 1 DEG F PSI UPPER HEAD
'UPPER 48 SUBCOOLED 65 SUBCOOLED
_ RCS RCS 104 SUBCOOLED 121 SUBCOOLED CET 77 SUBCOOLED 97 SUBCOOLED INPUTS UPPER HEAD TEMP 603 DEG F
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B1 i~~~ HOT LEG 1A1 TEMP HOT LEG TEMP 602 DEG F 602 DEG F COLD LEG 1A2 TEMP 548 DEG F COLD LEG 1 B1 TEMP 1B1 547 DEG F REP CETTEMP 575 DEG F PRESSURIZER PRESSURE 2250 PSIA ISAT 211 II RVL 21211 CET 2131 SYS ERROR (TIRCO/0711407-SaIMarUI*R7) (TIRCOI0711407-8atMarUHl7) FIGURE 27
0711407, Rev. 15 Page 68 of 83 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY UNIT 1 aSPDS SUBCOOLED MARGIN PAGE o SUBCOOLED MARGIN 311 DEGF DEG F PSI LIMITING 48 646 SUBCOOLED SUBCOOLED UPPER 48 646 HEAD SUBCOOLED SUBCOOLED ".- RCS 104 SUBCOOLED 1221 SUBCOOLED CET 77 976 SUBCOOLED SUBCOOLED ISAT SAT 211 II RVL RVL 21211 CET 2131 SYS ERROR (TIRCOl071 407-SubcMalgmU 1*R8) (TIAGO/071"'"f401-SubcMalginU '-RBj FIGURE 29
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier Tier# # 1 Group # 1 KIA # 008AA1.06 Importance Rating 3.6 Ability to operate and I/ or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: Control of PZR level Proposed Question: RO 2 Given the following conditions on Unit 1: 1:
- 1-EOP-03 "LOCA" is being implemented
- Pressurizer Pressure 900 psia and slowly lowering.
- T HOT is 508°F and slowly lowering.
- Pressurizer Level is 70% and slowly rising.
- Rep. CET 515°F and slowly lowering.
- Both Steam Generators are 25% Narrow Range and rising with total AFW flow of 350 gpm.
- Both Steam Generator pressures are 660 psia slowly lowering.
- ECCS flow is 650 gpm.
- Containment Temperature is 185°F and slowly lowering.
{ Which ONE of the following states the strategy that should be implemented? Cooldown and - _- _- _-_ -_- A. throttle ECCS flow to allow Pressurizer level to lower to meet the Inventory Control Safety Function. B. ensure 1-EOP-99, Figure 2 is being maintained. Subcooling requirements take precedence over Pressurizer level. C. depressurize to maximize ECCS flow. Maximizing ECCS flow takes precedence over Pressurizer level and subcooling. D. throttle ECCS flow as Pressurizer level approaches 100%. Preventing Pressurizer level from going solid takes precedence over subcooling requirements. 3
Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: pressurizer level does not meet desired level of 30-68% but subcooling is not met so ECCS throttling is not allowed. B. Correct: subcooling takes precedence over Pressurizer level. C. Incorrect: depressurizing to maximize ECCS flow is only allowed if Figure 1A 1A subcooling requirements are met. D. Incorrect subcooling takes precedence over Pressurizer level. Technical Reference(s): 1-EOP-03 LOCA (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: _0_7_0_2_82_4_-_18 _07_0_2_8_2_4-_1_8_ ___ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank# Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 7 55.43 5,6 Comments: 4
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: PAGE: *.*************. 39 IApPENDICES V\PPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA SHEETS 118 ~ tJ.1ii~5 118oL155 PROCEDURE NO.: .....* i 1-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 FIGURE 2 ****.*.i/!i*.* . iir*i.***.* **
- SAFETY INJECTION FLOW VS. RCS PRESSURE (Page 1 of 1) 1300 II 1I 1T 1r 1I I NOTE 1200 This curve represents minimum expected 1
I~ - SI Flow. If measured flow is less than this p 1100 figure, Then SI System lineup should be I~ I -
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R E 1000 r\\ verified.
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S S u - R 900 z I E 800
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R 700 \ R P E 600 \ U S S 500 \ /' / in oPT'ion
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0 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 TOTAL SAFETY INJECTION FLOW (gpm) (PIEOPII-EOP-99-F2-ROj (PIEOPII-EOP-99-F2-RO)
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: PAG 23 STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS 8 of 18 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1
.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) 4.0 RCS INVENTORY CONTROL INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE Rising Pressurizer level with concurrent lowering RCS Subcooled Margin are symptoms of a Pressurizer Steam Space LOCA.
Do 3. DETERMINE RCS Inventory Control acceptance criteria are met: A. VERIFY BOTH of the A.1 RESTORE and MAINTAIN Pressurizer following conditions exist, level between 30 and 35% by performing ANY of the following:
- Pressurizer level is between 10 and 68% 1. ENSURE proper operation of the
( Pressurizer Level Control System.
- Pressurizer level is trending to between 2. Manually CONTROL Charging and 30 and 35% Letdown.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 26 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT ( 17 of 67 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE ALL of the following are necessary for restoration of Letdown:
- Instrument Air
- Non-essential sections of MCCs 1A6 and 186 energized
- SIAS and CIAS reset o 24. Restore Letdown 11 Letdown is ISOLATED,
!f and BOTH of the following conditions exist,
- HPSI throttle criteria are met
- Letdown is needed or desired
( \ Then PERFORM BOTH of the following: A. DIRECT HP to monitor the VCT hallway for rising radiation levels. B. RESTORE Letdown. REFER TO Appendix P, Restoration of Components Actuated by ESFAS. ESF AS. o 25. Maintain Pzr Level 30 to 68% When HPSI throttle criteria is met, Then MAINTAIN MAl NTAI N Pressurizer level between 30 and 68% by ANY of the following: A. CHARGE via normal path 11 the Charging Header is NOT A.1 !f and OPERATE Letdown. available, Then CONSIDER charging to the HPSI header. REFER TO Appendix T, Alternate Charging Flow Path to RCS Through Aux. HPSI Header. B. THROTTLE HPSI flow AS NECESSARY.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 26 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 67 cif67 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ff ATTACHMENT 2 PLACEKEEPER FOR LOCA (Page 4 of 4) STEP INSTRUCTIONS STATUS START DONE
*58. Restore Letdown D D
*59. Verify RCS is NOT Water Solid D D
*60. Establish a Pzr Bubble D D
*61. Maintain Pzr Level 30 to 68% D D D D
*62. Maintain RCS within Figure 1A or 1B Limits D D
*63. Maintain SIG Level 60 to 70% NR D D
*64. Evaluate Need for RCS Cooldown D D
(
- 65. Exit LOCA if RCS Cooldown is NOT Desired o D D
*66. Borate the RCS for SDM D D
- 67. Cooldown the RCS (to SOC) D D
*68. Depressurize the RCS to SOC SDC oD D
*69. Block MSIS and SIAS D D
*70. RCS Void Elimination D D
*71. Restore Offsite Power D D
*72. Verify Single Phase Natural Circulation D D
*73. RCP Restart D D
*74. SIT IsolationNenting D D
*75. L TOP Initiation LTOP D D
*76. Align Control Room HVAC D D
*77. Reset Safety Systems D D
*78. Exit to SOC Operation D
* - Continuously Applicable or Non-Sequential Step END OF ATTACHMENT 2
The RCP trip strategy is implemented. Two RCPs may have already been tripped during SPTAs, and will remain running if greater than minimum subcooling can be maintained. If minimum RCS subcooling can not be maintained, all four RCPs are tripped. Prolonged RCP operation during LOCA's of a certain size and location can result in increased severity of the event. Conversely, for smaller LOCAs where steam generators are needed for heat removal, forced circulation enhances the operators ability to combat the event. After an SIAS/CIAS actuation, steps are taken to ensure CCW and Control Bleedoff are restored to the RCPs within ten minutes of being lost to ensure seal integrity. If this restoration cannot be accomplished, the RCPs are tripped and the seal cooling is secured to prevent future inadvertent cooling water to admitted to hot seals, potentially causing damage. The seals are designed to maintain their pressure boundary capabilities with cooling isolated provided the pumps are secured and not restarted. The SI and charging flow rate are checked to determine that the maximum possible amount of water is being injected into the RCS. If any SI or charging pump that should be operating won't start or SI flow is not in accordance with the figure, the operator should check the following: a) verify that electrical power is available to the valves and pumps; b) verify the valve lineup from control board indications; c) verify auxiliary systems necessary for SI and charging operations. It must be noted for small break LOCA events, however, that the maximization of charging and SI can result in excess RCS inventory, possible filling of the pressurizer to a solid condition. These conditions cause a PTS concern upon RCS heatup, fluid expansion, and subsequent RCS pressure excursion. Operators must remain aware of these concerns and terminate/throttle SI flow when termination criteria are met. Specific criteria are established to ensure that SI is not terminated or throttled until all potential indicators of inadequate core cooling are within acceptable ra nges. .4Z~ji1~~j~t~~W:@1:~~~Yfrn0S,I!\I~ie'0i0irringi~;taJf4~~'~J1e~~'@Jie'Il'I'Ge0ve;ftfi~i1E~;0@0'IID~eOOltS;;;a~ej, ranges. Actions to maintain subcoolfng take pre@(jif@lence over PTS G@mee'~J;:).s;JaI'lGl~ operaj\L.r§J~r§&a:l"lji@j!ie~~tdill'a:&:'iI'.;*ma~7~1)"e~rre(j}(E!ssa'¥{;,"tD2~a1l~Mfi'4:d~,eilll"llie;£Sl!li"i~B~~~~ o pe ~?~tQL§,~~ ..Qa:l;JJ.i£?:!'§led~ that jtmayo'e?necessar,y:{:tQ;?lL@wthJ:e.'~pr;e'6s"8l7i:C'f,q01§~
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REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 39 PPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA SHEETS APPENDICES I----------------~ 116 of 155 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 FIGURE 1A RCS PRESSURE TEMPERATURE (Page 1 of 1) (Containment Temperature Less Than or Equal to 200°F) CAUTION The RCP NPSH curve assumes one pump is operating in each loop. RCP instrumentation should be monitored for seal and pump performance in accordance with 1-EOP-99, Table 13. 2400 2400** An~I"'AIOI!u_""::U!o'"'tI ~R..mRCO ~'~'-"";"~~-f"H-~"''~'~~
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u 1000 "oS SOO 800 200 ==*====~ 0** (J 100 soo 400 500 sao 700 aoo 800 Indi~atl!id ReS Indicated Temperature (F) RCS TemJ>'jratui'& RCS Res Pressure Range Required QSPDS Subcooled Margin Reading (Rep CET) eET) 2250 psia to 1000 psi psia a 1000 psia to 500 psia Less than 500 psia
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26 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 15 Qf 67 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 20. HPSI Throttling Criteria 11 HPSI pumps are operating, and ALL of the following conditions are satisfied,
- RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to minimum subcooling II Pressurizer level is at least 30%
and NOT lowering
- At least ONE S/G is available for RCS heat removal with level being restored to or maintained between 60 and 70% NR
(
- Rx Vessel level indicates sensors 4
\, through 8 are covered, or NO abnormal differences (greater than 20°F) between T HOT and Rep CET temperature Then THROTTLE SI flow. REFER TO Appendix S, Safety Injection Throttling and Restoration. o 21. HPSI Pump Restart Criteria 11 ANY of the HPSI throttle criteria can NOT be maintained, Then RESTORE SI flow. REFER TO Appendix S, Safety Injection Throttling and Restoration.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 26 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 14of67 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1
.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) 4.0 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
~hile NOTE Maintaining subcooling as low as possible while still within the limits of Figure 1A or 1B will lower the break flow rate and minimize the severity of the accident.
o 18. Depressurize RCS to SDC SOC CONTROL the RCS depressurization SOC entry conditions using ANY of to SDC the following: A. DEPRESSURIZE the RCS using Main or Auxiliary Pressurizer sprays. B. 11 HPSI throttle criteria are met, ( Then CONTROL pressure by throttling SI flow. REFER TO Appendix S, Safety Injection Throttling and Restoration. CAUTION RCS inventory and containment conditions safety functions should be under positive control prior to blocking safeguards signals. Safety functions should be closely monitored for degradation. Manual actuation of ESFAS may be necessa ma necessary should conditions warrant. o 19. Block MSIS and SIAS As the RCS cooldown and depressurization proceed, PERFORM BOTH of the following: A. 11 MSIS is NOT present, Then BLOCK automatic initiation of MSIS. B. 11 SIAS is NOT present, Then BLOCK automatic initiation of SIAS.
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier Tier## 1 Group # 1 KIA # 011EK3.14 Importance Rating 4.1 Large Break LOCA: RCP tripping requirement Proposed Question: RO 3 A Loss of Coolant Accident has occurred on Unit 1 with the following conditions:
- RCS T-hot is 512°F.
- Pressurizer Pressure is 1120 psia.
Which ONE of the following describes the RCP operating strategy and the reason for such? Trip: A. ALL RCP's to conserve RCS inventory. B. ALL RCP's due to loss of RCP NPSH. C. ONE RCP in each loop to enhance RCS heat removal. D. ONE RCP to reduce the potential of core uplift. 5
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. Stopping all RCPs is unnecessary at this time since subcooled margin is met. B. Incorrect Stopping all RCPs is unnecessary at this time since 1-EOP-03 basis for the limit is based on meeting NPSH limits. C. Correct. Per 1- EOP-03 Loss of Coolant Accident trip one RCP/loop. D. Incorrect. Partially true while1-EOP-01 SPTAs does require one RCP be secured if T-cold is less than or approaching 500°F due to core uplift concerns 1/RCP per loop is secured since the event is a LOCA not an overcooling event so one RCP in each loop is stopped. Technical Reference(s): 1- EOP-03 , 0711824 (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0_7_0_2_8_24_-_0-,-6_ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available)
---'-07:-..;0=----2---=8-=2_4----=0---=6________
Question Source: Bank # PSL 2001 NRC Exam Question 54 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5,10 55.43 Comments: 6
1.5.4 Reactor Coolant Pump Trip Strategy The LOCA operational strategy directs the operator to trip two RCPs (one in each loop) if pressurizer pressure is less than 1600 [1736] psia (SIAS setpoint which is above the maximum pressure plateau for a SBLOCA). This action may have already taken place in the SPTAs, in which case the operator would simply verify that two RCPs in opposite loops have been tripped. If RCS subcooling is less than 20° F (or minimum subcooling), the operational strategy directs the operator to trip all four RCPs. If minimum RCS subcooling is satisfied, the other two RCPs remain in operation unless one or more of the RCP operating requirements (e.g. temperatures, oil pressure, motor amps) are not satisfied. In such cases, any pump which does not satisfy these requirements would be tripped. If the operator cannot confirm that a LOCA has occurred, and EOP-15 is entered, the RCP trip strategy in EOP-15 is identical to EOP-3. The Trip 2/Leave 2 strategy has two goals. First, it maintains forced RCS circulation for non-LOCA depressurization events, and for LOCA events in which the rate of RCS inventory loss is not duly exacerbated by leaving two RCPs in service. Second, it ensures that all four RCPs are tripped for LOCAs in which the RCS leak rate may challenge RCS heat removal capability if forced circulation is continued. If the LOCA procedure is implemented when no charging pumps are available and no significant RCS leak exists, stopping all four RCPs at 1600 [1736] psia would severely inhibit the operator's ability to reduce RCS pressure to the point where HPSI pumps could restore RCS inventory, since neither main or aux spray would be available. Conversely, continuing to run two RCPs for LOCAs in which the RCS inventory loss is great enough to challenge the subcooling margin acceptance criteria carries a separate risk. Under these conditions, forced circulation tends to increase the total inventory loss. Shortly after NPSH is lost, it is likely that the remaining RCPs will have to be tripped due to loss of subcooled margin. In this scenario, RCS inventory will be much less than it would have been if the RCPs were tripped earlier in the event. 0711824 Rev 06, Page 19 of 66 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
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~R-EV-IS-IO~N-N-O-.:------~P~R~O~CE=D-U=RE=T=IT~LE~:--------------------------~~PA~G=E:------~
PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 26 LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT 8 of 67 8of67 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 6. Maximize SI Flow If
!f SIAS is present, Then PERFORM ALL of the following:
A. ENSURE ALL available SI Pumps are RUNNING. B. VERIFY adequate SI flow. B.1 TAKE actions to restore SI flow: REFER TO Figure 2, Safety Injection Flow vs. RCS Pressure. 1. ENSURE electrical power to SI pumps and valves.
- 2. ENSURE correct SI valve alignment.
- 3. ENSURE operation of necessary auxiliary systems.
C. ENSURE ALL available !f the Charging Header is NOT C.1 If Charging Pumps are RUNNING. available, Then CONSIDER charging to the HPSI header. REFER TO Appendix T, Alternate Charging Flow Path to RCS Through Aux. HPSI Header. o 7. RCP Trip Strategy A. If!f RCS pressure is less than 1600 psia, Then ENSURE ONE RCP in EACH loop is STOPPED. B. If!f RCS subcooling is less than minimum subcooling, Then ENSURE ALL RCPs are STOPPED. C. If!f CCW is LOST to the RCPs for greater than 10 minutes, Then STOP ALL RCPs.
3.2.5 RCS Pressure Control relates to the maintenance of RCS fluid in a subcooled condition in order to adequately remove decay heat. Best estimate analyses reveal that for a relatively uncomplicated reactor trip, pressure will remain within the range of 1800 to 2300 psia. The limits are adequate to ensure adequate RCS subcooling and to prevent lifting a primary relief or safety valve. If the pressurizer pressure control system functions properly and pressurizer level is above the heater cutoff setpoint, then pressurizer pressure should be trending to 2225 to 2275 psia. Contingency actions are directed at observing proper operation of pressurizer heaters and spray by the PPCS. Failing that, actions are directed at restoring or maintaining pressure 2225 to 2275 psia, with manual control of pressurizer heaters and spray. If pressurizer pressure decreases to or below the SIAS setpoint, then an SIAS should be initiated automatically. If this does not occur, then the operator should manually initiate an SIAS. While performing the Standard Post Trip Actions, the operator is instructed to trip one RCPs in each loop if pressurizer pressure decreases to less than 1600 [1736] psia following an SIAS. An SIAS is specified to distinguish between a controlled and an uncontrolled depressurization. If two RCPs are tripped early in the event, it can be demonstrated that the plant can be maintained in a safe condition regardless of event diagnosis. This action provides the operator with maximum flexibility for plant control while still ensuring a conservative approach to event recovery. Two RCPs are also tripped if only one motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump is available. Analysis has shown that one motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump is not sufficient to keep up with the heat removal demands generated by decay heat and all four RCPs in operation. All RCPs will be tripped if a minimum of 20°F RCS subcooling is not met or signs of cavitation exist. 3.2.6 Core Heat Removal is related to circulating cooling fluid in a subcooled state through the core to remove decay heat. The acceptance criteria assume RCPs are running, supplied with CCW for seal, motor and bearing oil cooling, thereby providing the small loop LlT <<10°F) expected with decay heat. 0711822, Rev. 6 Page 17 of 45 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
REVISION REVISION NO.: NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: PAGE: 23 STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS of 18 12 @f PROCEDURE PROCEDURE NO.: NO.: 1-EOP-01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) Res HEAT REMOVAL INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 6. (continued) 6. (continued)
C. VERIFY RCS T AVG is TAVG C.1 11 RCS TTAVG AVG is greater than 535°F, between 525 and 535°F. Then CONFIRM that at least ONE S/G is removing RCS heat:
- 1. ENSURE feedwater is being restored to at least ONE S/G.
- 2. ENSURE SBCS or ADVs are AVG to between restoring RCS T AVG 525 and 535°F.
C.2 11 RCS TAVG AVG is less than 525°F, ( Then CONFIRM S/G steam and feed rates are NOT excessive:
- 1. ENSURE feed flow is NOT excessive.
- 2. ENSURE SBCS or ADVs are restoring RCS T AVG to between TAVG 525 and 535°F.
C.3 11 TCOLD COLD is approaching or less than 500°F, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following:
- 1. ENSURE at least ONE Rep RCP is STOPPED.
- 2. INITIATE Emergency Boration to achieve adequate SDM.
(Continued on next page) (Continued on next page)
Page No. SPTA1-16 SPTA 1-16 EOP DEVIATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS EOP
Title:
Standard Post Trip Actions EOP Procedure No.: 1 - EOP - 01 Revision No. 23 Corresponding EPG
Title:
Standard Post Trip Actions EPG Revision No.: 5.2 EOP Step/Attachment No.: Contingency Action 4 If Pressurizer pressure is less than 2300 psia, and the PORV(s) are OPEN, Then A.1 !f PERFORM ANY of the following:
- 1. OVERRIDE the open PORV(s).
- 2. CLOSE the associated PORV block valve(s).
A.2 If
!f Pressurizer pressure is less than 1600 psia, Then ENSU ENSURE RE ALL of the following:
- 1. SIAS has ACTUATED.
- 2. CIAS has ACTUATED.
3.
- 3. ONE RCP in EACH loop is stopped.
B.1 RESTORE and MAINTAIN Pressurizer pressure between 2225 and 2275 psia by performing ANY of the following:
- 1. ENSURE proper operation of the Pressurizer Pressure Control System.
- 2. Manually OPERATE heaters and spray.
C.1 If
!f RCS subcooling is less than 20°F or RCP(s) exhibit cavitation, Then STOP ALL RCPs.
(
Page No. SPTA 1-17 EOP DEVIATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS EOP
Title:
Standard Post Trip Actions EOP Procedure No.: 1 - EOP - 01 Revision No. 23 Corresponding EPG
Title:
Standard Post Trip Actions EPG Revision No.: 5.2 Corresponding EPG Step/Attachment No.: 4 EOP Deviations from EPG:
- 1. Action to override the PORVs closed is a plant specific additional step.
- 2. Under Contingency step A.2, the tripping of one RCP in each loop was added when pressurizer pressure is less than 1600 psia. This is a plant specific additional step.
- 3. The EPG Contingency Actions 4.1 and 4.2 separately delineate the checking for proper operation of the Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PPCS) and taking corrective actions using the PPCS controllers in Manual. The EOP combines these steps in Contingency Action 8.1.
- 4. The contingency steps for RCS Pressure Control were reformatted to align more closely with the instructions. This was done as a human factors improvement.
Technical Justifications for Deviations:
- 1. Overriding the PORV closed is a plant specific addition. The response time for override is much quicker and ensures that the RCS does not continue to depressurize following lifting of the PORVs due to a failure.
- 2. PSL-ENG-SEIS-01-046 (Unit 1 PSTG EOP Setpoint Document) gives a detailed justification for tripping one RCP in each loop, once RCS pressure reaches 1510 psia. The EOP uses the setpoint of 1600 psia, as the plateau, for tripping one RCP in each loop. The setpoint of 1600 psia was chosen because it is the setpoint for the SIAS entry condition. The engineering limit, for the RCPs, is based on the reactor coolant pump suction pressure that meets or exceeds the minimum thafmeets net positive suction head and pump seal pressure requirements. This setpoint was chosen for human factor considerations and for a greater margin of conservatism, to help ensure reliability of the RCPs.
- 3. EOP Contingency step B.1 combined the contingency steps 4.1 and 4.2 of the EPG. The function and intent of the EPG is maintained.
- 4. Reformatting and aligning the contingency steps is a human factors improvement.
The function and intent of the EPG is maintained.
SP'TA 1 Page No. SPTA ..27 1-27 EOP DEVIATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS EOP
Title:
Standard Post Trip Actions EOP Procedure No.: 1 - EOP - 01 Revision No. 23 Corresponding EPG
Title:
Standard Post Trip Actions EPG Revision No.: 5.2 Technical Justifications for Deviations:
- 1. The FSAR discusses the uplift forces on the core and components that are caused by the Reactor Coolant System flow. As RCS temperature decreases, water density increases, and this results in an increase in hydraulic lifting forces. The maximum loading condition indicated in the FSAR is for an inlet temperature of 500°F. Below this temperature the loading is reduced by stopping one of the four RCPs, thus reducing the potential for core uplift. The EOP contingency step to emergency borate when Tcold is approaching 500°F is a plant specific step. The step was included to ensure adequate shutdown margin is maintained as a result of a possible uncontrolled cooldown. RCS temperature should be approaching 532°F on a normal [uncomplicated] plant trip. If RCS temperature, post trip, had dropped significantly below 532°F, then possible plant failures may be evident [ie.,
stuck open MSSV, filed open ADV, failures with the Steam Bypass Control ( J System, overfeeding the Steam Generators]. The decision to use Tcold of 500°F is plant specific. As stated in ADM-25.04, "A sufficient Shutdown Margin ensures that; (1) the reactor can be made subcritical from all operating conditions, (2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controlled within acceptable limits, and (3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inadvertent criticality in the shutdown conditions. Shutdown Margin requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration and RCS T avg. The most restrictive condition occurs at end of life, with Tavg at a no load operating temperature, and is associated with a postulated steam line break accident and resulting in a uncontrolled cooldown." Therefore, RCS temperature should not be approaching 500°F in a normal [uncomplicated] plant trip. Thus, to ensure an adequate shutdown margin is maintained this contingency step was placed in EOP-1. The intent of the EPG is maintained.
- 2. The requirement to close the MSIVs at 750 psi psiaa is based on limiting excessive cooldown. The steam generator pressure specified is well above the MSIS setpoint and represents a value below which an Excess Steam Demand Event can be concluded to be occurring. Closing the MSIVs isolates the SBCS.
- 3. Closing of the MSR TCV block valves and/or TCVs is necessary to ensure that continued flow will not result in lifting of MSR relief valves. Challenging these relief valves could result in an undesired and continuous steam flow path.
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 1 Group # 1 KIA # 015AK2.08 Importance Rating 2.6 RCP Malfunctions: Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) and the following: CCWS Proposed Question: RO 4 Unit 1 is operating at 100% power when the following events occur:
- ONE of the CCW radiation monitors has just gone into alarm.
- CCW Surge Tank level is 80% and rising.
- DCS Computer point 33x194_A 1B1 RCP CL Tube Lk Vlv Cis I/ Pwr FA is in alarm.
- RCP 1 B1 lower seal temperature is increasing.
- HCV-14-11 B1, Seal Cooler Isolation Valve, indicates closed.
1)Which
- 1) Which ONE of the following has closed HCV-14-11B1?
- 2) What actions should the crew take?
A. 1) High radiation in the CCW system.
- 2) Make preparations to shut down the unit and trip the 1 B1 RCP.
B. 1) High radiation in the CCW system.
- 2) Override open THEN perform a down power. Trip the 1B1 RCP when the Unit is shut down.
C. 1) High seal cooler outlet temperature.
- 2) Make preparations to shut down the unit and trip the 1B1 RCP.
D. 1) High seal cooler outlet temperature.
- 2) Override open THEN perform a down power. Trip the 1B1 RCP when the Unit is shut down.
7
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: High radiation only closes the CCW vent from the CCW surge tank. B. Incorrect: High radiation only closes the CCW vent from the CCW surge tank. HCV 11 B1 is capable of being override open but with stated conditions should not be performed. C. Correct: D. Incorrect: HCV-14-11 B1 is capable of being override open but with stated conditions should not be performed Technical Reference(s): 1-0310031 Component Cooling (Attach if not previously provided) Water Excessive Activity Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: ~PS~L-_0_7_02_2_0_2_-0_8_ _P_S_L_-_0_70_2_2_0_2_-0_8__ _ _ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Bank# / Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) \ New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 --- 7 55.43 Comments: 8
(1~ ~ ~I~if\
~~~N~O-.:-----'~P~RO~C~ED~U~R~E~TIT~L~E:--------------------------~~--~--~
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 22 COMPONENT COOLING WATER EXCESSIVE 6 of 19 PROCEDURE NO.: ACTIVITY 1-0310031 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 7.2
.2 Subsequent Operator Actions INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 1. Notify Health Physics and Chemistry Department of CCW excessive activity.
- 2. Determine the primary leak rate per 1-0SP-01.03, Reactor Coolant System Inventory Balance.
- 3. 1f plant is in Mode 3 though 6 (SIAS Blocked), Then perform safety function status check of Low Mode Off-Normal Procedure for current plant condition.
- 4. Inspect the following components for 4.
indication of RCS inleakage:
~Verify A. Verify RCS inleakage in leakage from the A. 1f RCP seal cooler leakage is
..,." RCP(s}
RCP(s) seal cooler is NOT occurring indicated, Then: by the following:
- 1. NO unexplained increase in RCP 1. Monitor RCP seal cavity lower seal temperature. tem peratu re per ONOP 1-0120034 (Reactor Coolant Pump Off-Normal).
- 2. DCS Computer Points are NOT 2. 1f DCS Computer Points in alarm: 33X193_A,33X293_A, 33X 194- A or 33X294- A
- 33X193_A, 1A1 RCP CL are in alarm, Then ensure Tube Lk Vlv Cis I/ Pwr FA the Hx Isol. Valve has been )
closed and GO TO ONOP
- 33X293_A, 1A2 RCP CL 1-0120034 (Reactor Tube Lk Vlv Cis I/ Pwr FA Coolant Pump Off-Normal).
- 33X194_A 1 B1 RCP CL Tube Lk Vlv Cis /Pwr FA
- 33X294_A, 1A2 RCP CL Tube Lk Vlv Cis I/ Pwr FA
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 22 COMPONENT COOLING WATER EXCESSIVE 7 of1~ PROCEDURE NO.: ACTIVITY 1-0310031 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 4. (continued) 4. A. (continued) 2fj~{i0rMak"p:re!58'f§lioffS"t6's'l1:ut
- 3. Make preparations to shut At@!'0Wrr~t:Hlli;haJ?ll?tr:ip:the down unit and trip the*..*
.;a~tf?Qt~~:~@Ps;tf*;re"qni'red~g, affected RCP if required.
Refer to ONOP 1-0120031 (Excessive Reactor Coolant System Leakage). B. Verify that the outlet temperature of B. if a sample
!f Hx indicates the sample heat exchangers (Hx) possible leakage, Then go to does NOT indicate possible leakage. Appendix A, Isolation of the Sample Heat Exchangers.
C. Verify RCS inleakage from the C. if the letdown
!f heat letdown Hx is NOT occurring by the exchanger indicates following: possible leakage from RCS
( to CCW, Then go to Appendix B, Isolation of the letdown Heat Exchanger. Letdown
- 1. Indicated flow on FIA-2202 (L TON Flow) is consistent with the number of charging pumps operating.
- 2. Indicated pressure on PIC-2201 (L TON pressure) is consistent with the setpoint on PIC-2201.
- 3. CHECK TR-09-5A, Pint 3, TE CCW from Letdown Ht. Exch.
12, CCWfrom O. !f shutdown cooling is in service, O. if the SOC heat exchanger
!f Then verify RCS inleakage from the indicates possible leakage SOC heat exchanger is NOT from RCS to CCW, Then go occurring by the following: to Appendix C, Isolation of the SOC Heat Exchanger.
- 1. PR 3307 (LPSI Pressure) is NOT decreasing.
;:a N
N
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 1 Group # 1 KIA # 022AA1.08 Importance Rating 3.4 Ability to operate and /I or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: VCT level Proposed Question: RO 5 A RCS leak is in progress on Unit 1. Given the following at time 12:30:
** 50% power and +--*. ~.
** V2504, RWT to Charging pumps, is closed and racked out.
** Pressurizer Level is 58% and ~. +--*.
** Letdown Flow is 29 gpm.
** ALL Charging Pumps are running.
** VCT Level is 40% and .J.-. J...
** RCP 1A 1 1A1 CBO: 1.4 gpm
** RCP 1B1 CBO: 1.4 gpm
** RCP 1A2 CBO: 1.4 gpm
** RCP 1 B2 CBO: 1.3 gpm Which ONE of the following would be the expected time that a loss of Charging would occur?
(Assume NO Operator actions are taken.) A. 12:37 - 12:38 B. 12:39 - 12:40 C.12:41 -12:42 D. 12:53 - 12:54 9
( Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. Could be chosen if the 15% reset value for low level swap to the RWP instead of 5%. B. Incorrect. Could be chosen if CBO is not included in calculation for leakrate. C. Correct At 5% VCT level the VCT outlet will close and since V2504 is inoperable Charging pumps will lose suction. Calculated leak rate is 97.5 GPM. VCT is - 34 gal /%. VCT level 12.12.+ must drop 35% to take it to the 5% level. At 2.87%/min drop it will take about 12.12. + 12:30
=12:42 D. Incorrect. Could be chosen if Pzr Level of 67gal/% is used in place of 34 gal/%
Technical Reference(s): 0711205, 1-0SP-01.03 (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0_7_0_2_8_5_9-_0_3-,-,_05_ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) _0_7_0_2_8_59_-_0-'3,'--0_5___________ ( Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # 960 (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Comments: 10
Single Question Report ( \ QID#: 960 Objective: 0702860-08 System:ONP System: ONP Rev: 0 Cog Level: 1 KA # ROO.5 SROO.5 A tube leak is in progress in Unit 2 on S/G 2A. Given the following:
- Pzr pressure: 2229 psia and rising - Pzr level: 59% and steady - VCT level: 49% and lowering - LD flow: 29 gpm - Charging pumps 2A & 2B 2S running - RCP 2A 1 CSO:
CBO: 1.3 gpm
- RCP 2S2B11 CSO:
CBO: 1.2 gpm
- RCP 2A2 CBO:
CSO: 1.4 gpm
- RCP 2S2 2B2 CSO:
CBO: 1.1 gpm Assuming no additional leakage from the RCS to other sources, determine the leak rate into S/G 2A. A. 5 gpm B. S. 54 gpm C. 59 gpm D. 98 gpm Reasons the choices are right or wrong. Correct answer is B. A. B. C. D. Source Ref: Open Ref: Revision Notes: Question Use History Page 1 of 1
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: PAGE: .*....*. .**. 11 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM INVENTORY BALANCE 9 df22 of 22 PROCEDURE NO.: ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 1-0SP-01.03 L.,. 4.1 RCS Leak Rate Determination (continued)
- 3. (continued)
Initial Conditions Final Conditions Notes Difference 2 hour minimum desired Min Date: - -I- -I- - Date:- -I- -I- - unless not at steady state. Time: Time: (Ch....a. (Chg. Pump data excluded) T coLD coLo : OF of T coLD : of Held constant <<.1°F) ** OF of B.A. BA B.A. Integrator: Integ rato r: Always Negative - gal. Integrator: PMW PMW Integrator: Integrator: Always Negative - gal. Zinc Inj. Zinc Inj. Totalizer: - Totalizer: Always Negative - gal.
+ if final> initial VCT Level: % VCT Level: % - if final < initial ( ) gal.
-°2,,, (% change x 33.8l!al.
33.8 gal. per %)
+ if final> initial
( Pzr Level: % Pzr Level: % - if final < initial ( ) gal.
*.1f!£i&1 (% change x 67.04 gal. per %)
Always Negative O.T. a.T. Level: % O.T. a.T. Level: % N/A if final < initial - gal. (% change x 16.5 gal. per %) 30 minute minimum required. Notify SNPO to mark Notify SNPO to mark Always Negative. Seal Tank level for ALL Seal Tank level for ALL N/A if final < initial
- gal.
available Chg. Pps.
- available Chg. Pps. *
(1 inch = =0.54 gal.)
- Data should be recorded for any pump hydraulically connected to the system.
** If Tcold is NOT held constant, consideration should be given to repeating calculation when conditions permit.
- 4. DETERMINE Total Leakage of RCS by COMBINING differences of the following:
- B.A. Integrator - gal.
- PMW Integrator - gal.
- Zinc Inj. Totalizer - gal.
- VCT Level ( ) gal.
- Pzr Level ( ) gal.
Total Leakage - gal.
0711205, Rev. 22 Page 11 of 101 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY thermal stress on the charging line penetrations into the RCS. Normally, the regenerative heat exchanger reduces the letdown flow temperature to about 265°F. This letdown outlet temperature is maintained via the heat exchange process between returning charging water and the RCS letdown. If the Regenerative Hx outlet temperature exceeds 460°F, an alarm on RTGB-105 RTGB-1 05 annunciator M-28 will actuate. If the temperature reaches 470°F, a close signal to isolation valve V2515, is provided. The pressure on the tube side of the regenerative heat exchanger is approximately that of the RCS. The tube side of the heat exchanger is monitored for ~P, which will cause the letdown flow to be isolated by closing V2516 at 275 psid. On
- i1P, Unit 1, an anticipatory alarm at 235 psid (annunciator M-7) will alert the operator to an abnormally high differential pressure.
Letdown Level Control Valves - LCV-211 OP/Q LCVs 211 OP and Q are used during normal and off-normal operations in conjunction 220 1-P and Q, and the charging pumps to with the backpressure control valves PCVs 2201-P maintain pressurizer water level. The letdown flow rate is maintained by level control valves LCV-211 OP and Q. These valves are normally controlled via the signals received from the Pressurizer Level Control System, which is discussed in detail in Lesson Text 0711206. Normal letdown flow is 40 GPM. A device known as the "letdown limiter" (L Y-111 0) limits the position of the LCVs in order to maintain flows between 29 and 128 GPM. The flow rate of 29 GPM corresponds to a -1.0% pressurizer level deviation and the 128 GPM flow rate corresponds to a +9.0% pressurizer level deviation. Hence, when level is decreasing and reaches -1.0%, the control system will limit flow from the pressurizer to 29 GPM, and when pressurizer level is increasing and reaches +9.0%, the control system will open the LCV to allow a maximum of 128 GPM outflow from the pressurizer. 29 GPM was established as the minimum flow necessary to prevent excessive thermal stresses on the regenerative and letdown heat exchangers during anticipated transients. 128 GPM is closely associated with the maximum charging flow of 132 GPM minus the 4 GPM leakage flow from the RCP seals.
0711205, Rev. 22 Page 17 of 101 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY (VGCH) via an air operated valve and backpressure regulator valve. The hydrogen gas can be replaced with nitrogen gas from the nitrogen supply system for maintenance periods. VCT pressure alarms are actuated on an annunciator at a high pressure of 65 psig and low pressure of 4 psig. The VCT level is normally controlled within the band of 40-55 [54]% as indicated by LlC-2226 on RTGB-105 [205]. VCT level control can be accomplished manually by the Control Room operator or automatically by the Reactor Makeup Water and Boric Acid supply system. VCT level control is selected by the Makeup Mode Selector switch, HS-2210 located on RTGB-105. (Refer to Figure 3) The following discussion assumes that HS-221 0 is in the AUTO position. The other positions are further discussed under Boron Concentration Control. Assume that the reactor has just tripped. A rapid cooldown of the RCS occurs and the pressure level decreases. The pressurizer level control system senses the lower pressurizer level and causes the letdown control valve to reduce letdown flow. There is now a mismatch between the letdown flow into the VCT and the flow leaving the VCT to the charging ( pump; the VCT level decreases. Although the makeup system is normally in manual, if set to automatic when VCT level drops to 40%, an automatic makeup signal occurs and makeup of a blended solution of boric acid and primary makeup water is initiated. The selected boric acid pump starts, the boric acid and reactor makeup water flow control valves (FCV-221 OY, FCV-221 OX) open to their preset positions, and header isolation V2512 opens. Automatic makeup continues until the VCT level returns to 55 [54]%, at which time the BA pump stops and the header isolation and flow control valves close. The operator will be alerted by an annunciator if VCT level decreases to 35 [37]%. Should VCT level decrease to 5% as sensed by LT-2227, the charging pump suction will transfer from the VCT to the RWT. The charging pump suction from the RWT (V2504) will open and the normal suction from the VCT (V2501) will shut. This ensures a supply of borated water is available.
0711205, Rev. 22 Page 18 of 101 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY If LT2227 should fail high, the Divert Valve (a 3-way air operated valve), V2500, would open while the charging pumps continue to draw off the VCT. At 5%, due to the failed LT, the VCT Discharge fails to close and the RWT outlet fails to open. Since the gravity feed valves, (V2508, V2509), the Load Control Valve, (V2525), and the Emergency Borate Valve, (V2514), are in Manual and only open on SIAS or by HS manipulation, the charging pumps will become gas bound and will trip on low suction pressure. Upon conditions of increased letdown flow as demanded by the pressurizer level control system, VCT level will tend to increase. Increasing water level can also cause excessive pressure in the VCT as the gas is compressed into a smaller area. When the level reaches 88 [92]% (Unit 2 reset 83%), valve V2500 will automatically divert the letdown flow to the waste management system thereby precluding further level increase. The handswitch for V2500 must be in the auto position to accomplish this function. Summary of System Actions vs VCT VeT Level ( \ Unit 1 Unit 2 90 t 94 t VCT High Level Alarm 88 t 92 t Divert Valve to WMS (V2500) 83 ~ Divert Valve to VCT (V2500) 55 t 54 t Auto Makeup Stops if in AUTO 40 ~J, 40 ~ Auto Makeup Starts if in AUTO 35 ~J, 37 ~ VCT Low Level Alarm 0 VCT Lo-Lo Level Alarm 5%1 5/1 50/1 VCT Outlet (V2501) Valve Closes(Reopens at 15% t) Charging RWT Suction (V2504) to Charg Opens (Closes 15% t) CHARGING Charging flow is the feed portion of the feed and bleed process used for RCS purification. As discussed in the previous section, the letdown flow, after being purified, is directed to the VCT.
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 KIA # 025Ak1.01 Importance Rating 3.9 Loss of RHR System: Loss of RHRS during all modes of operation Proposed Question: RO 6 Given the following:
- 2A SOC Train is in operation.
- RCS Level is at 29 feet 10 inches.
- Reactor Vessel Head is installed.
Which ONE of the following could result in RCS Pressurization and a loss of inventory should a loss of SOC occur? A. Removal of the Cold Leg Manways prior to removing Hot Leg Manways. B. Removal of the Hot Leg Manways prior to removing Cold Leg Manways. C. Installing the Cold Leg Nozzle Dams prior to installing the Hot Leg Nozzle Dams. D. Installing the Pressurizer Manway prior to installing the Hot Leg Manway. 11
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): A. Correct: as RCS is pressurized from heatup due to loss of SDC, RCS inventory is
'pushed' down and out the cold legs due to the hot legs still blocked off due to nozzle dams installed.
B. Incorrect: hot legs open allows RCS pressure relieved, inventory will not be pushed out the cold leg. C. Incorrect: D. Incorrect Technical Reference(s): 2-NOP-01.04 RCS Reduced (Attach if not previously provided) Inventory and Mid-Loop Operation Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: 0702801-01 _0-'-7'--'0'-2-=.8-'-0_1--"0_1________ (As available) ava ila ble) ( Question Source: Bank # 2149 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X _X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 10CFR 55.41 8,10 55.43 Comments: 12
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 38 RCS REDUCED INVENTORY AND MID-LOOP OPERATION 7 of 151 PROCEDURE NO.: 2-NOP-01.04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 2.1 Precautions (continued) NOTE IF the Reactor is de-fueled AND the temporary reactor head is installed, THEN the sequence of steam generator primary side manway and nozzle dam installation / removal can occur in any order. (Section 7.1.3 Management Directive 11)
- 7. To prevent RCS pressurization and loss of inventory in the event that SDC SOC becomes inoperable, steam generator primary side manway and nozzle dam removal/installation shall be performed in the following sequence per 2-MMP-01.05, Unit 2 Steam Generator Primary Side Maintenance: (Section 7.2 Commitment 1)
(Section 7.2 Commitment 2) A. Hot leg manways shall be removed prior to cold leg manways. B. Cold leg nozzle dams shall be installed prior to hot leg nozzle dams. (
- c. Hot leg nozzle dams shall be removed prior to cold leg nozzle dams.
D. Cold leg manways shall be installed prior to hot leg manways.
- 8. xcessive drain down flow rates, even at RCS levels well above Excessive Mid-Loop, can cause air entrainment and vortexing in the SDC SOC system, which can result in LPSI pump cavitation and air binding.
- 9. IF time to core boiling is less than 30 minutes AND the OPERATING LPSI pump is stopped, THEN containment closure needs to be immediately implemented. Containment closure activities shall continue until at least one loop of SOC SDC is OPERATING and maintaining RCS temperature less than or equal to the temperature required for the current plant condition. (Section 7.2 Commitment 4)
(
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 1 KIA # 026AK3.02 Importance Rating 3.6 Loss of Component Cooling water: The automatic actions (alignments) within the CCWS resulting from the actuation of the ESFAS Proposed Question: RO 7 ONLY on _(1 )_ _ will MV-14-18, CCW Header A Supply to Fuel Pool HX, receive a SIAS close signal to ensure (2) _ _ . A. 1) Unit 1;
- 2) enough CCW Flow is available to essential ESF components during a LOCA.
B. 1) Unit 1; 1;
- 2) train separation in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA).
C. 1) Unit 2;
- 2) enough CCW Flow is available to essential ESF components during a
( LOCA. D. 1) Unit 2;
- 2) train separation in the event of a Design Basis Accident (DBA).
( 13
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect, This is only a Unit 2 valve and interlock. Could be chosen if student mixes up the unit differences. B. Incorrect. Same as A. C. Correct. Unit 2 isolates the supply headers on BOTH A & B Trains of supply of CCW to the SFP HXs on a SIAS to ensure ESF components served by CCW have adequate flow following a LOCA D. Incorrect. Could be chosen if student has an inaccurate recall of the basis behind the close action on SIAS. Technical Reference(s): DBD-CCW-2 (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: PSL-OPS-SYS-0702209-02 & (As available) 11 Question Source: Bank # ( Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge - X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5,10 55.43 Comments: 14
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St. Lucie Unit 2 Document No. DBD-CCW-2 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Revision 2 Design Basis Document Page 85 COMPONENT PARAMETER WORKSHEET Section 9.H.1 Component 10 ID Description I-MV-14-17 & -19 FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER I-MV-14-18 & -20 ISOLATION VALVES A. Parameters See Values B. Value Power 480V 480VSA&SBSA& SB Operator Motor F ail Position Fail As-Is
/Closing Time ::;; 60 Secs
- 60 Protection Circuit Breaker &
Thermal Relay Control Manual/SIAS
/Actuation C. Sources f
- 1. Drawing No 2998-G-083 (Ref 29) i
- 2. Calculation EC-192 (Ref 66)
- 3. Drawing 2998-B-235 (Ref 65)
- 4. Drawings 2998-B-327 Sheets 228,229,230,231 228, 229, 230, 231 (Ref 40)
- 5. Reg Guide 1.106 (Ref 102)
- 6. St Lucie Unit 2 Admin Procedure 2-001 0125A, DS OS 8A18B D. Background/Reason for Value These motor operated valves are designed to fail as-is since the need for continual fuel pool cooling rules out the possibility of using a "fail-closed" valve and the closure requirement on a SIAS eliminates a "fail-open" design.
There is one supply and one return valve from each essential header. Valves I-MV-14-17 & -19 are the essential header supply and return valves from the "B" header and I-MV-14-18 & -20 are the essential supply and return header valves from the "A" header. The "B" header valves are the normal supply (and return) valve(s) for the fuel pool header (Source 1). Only one essential header will be supplying the fuel pool header at anyone time, which helps maintain separation of redundant essential headers (Source 1). This is accomplished by using a "Kirk-Key" interlock type of control switch, which utilizes a single key for both essential headers supply and return valves. The key is "captured" in the "Open" position and can only be removed in the "Locked-Closed" position. The single key switch operates the supply and return valve of the respective header simultaneously (Source 4). (
St. Lucie Unit 2 Document No. DBD-CCW-2 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Revision 2 ( Design Basis Document Page 86 Although the respective supply and return valves operate together via either the local or remote switches during normal operation, only the supply header valves get a "close" signal on a SIAS (Source 4). Isolation of the fuel pool header on a SIAS ensures enough CCW flow is available to the essential Engineered Safety Features (ESF) components during a DBA LOCA. Fuel pool cooling is not considered an essential heat load for accident mitigation purposes and is therefore isolated. In addition to the control room key switches, manual control is also provided from locally mounted key-switch stations, which also employ a Kirk-key operated switch that is normally maintained in the "Locked-Remote" position, which disables the local stations (Source 4). In order to minimize the possibility of valve operator malfunction due to faulty protective devices, the valve operator motor overloads are maintained in the "bypass" condition except when the valve is being tested. Per Source 5, the overload protection is utilized only during valve testing to protect and to provide information of valve/operator status in case of any malfunctions. During all other operating conditions the overload protection is disabled, but actuation of the overload relays is annunciated in control room. There is no design basis information concerning the closing time requirement of the I valves. However for operability considerations, the procedurally required time is \. specified in Source 6.
St. Lucie Unit 2 Document No. DBD-CCW-2 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Revision 2 Design Basis Document Page 83 COMPONENT FUNCTIONS Section 8.H Component 10 ID Description I-MV-14-17 & -19 FUEL POOL HEAT EXCHANGER I-MV-14-18 & -20 ISOLATION VALVES Safety-Related Functions
- 1. Shall isolate fuel pool heat exchangers from CCWon receipt of SIAS.
- 2. Shall passively maintain CCW system pressure boundary integrity.
Quality Related Function
- 1. One set (I-MV-14-17 and I-MV-14-19, from header A or I-MV-14-18 and I-MV 18 from header B) shall pass the required flow to provide fuel pool cooling at all times except after an SIAS Signal signal to I-MV-14-17 and I-MV-14-18.
Not Nuclear Safety Functions
- 1. None
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 1 Group # KIA # 027AK1.01 Importance Rating 3.1 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction: Definition of saturation temperature Proposed Question: RO 8 Unit 1 is operating at 100% power when the selected channel LT -111 OX, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, fails LOW. What effect will this failure INITIALLY have on the following Actual Pressurizer Parameters? (Assume NO operator actions are taken.) Pressurizer Pressure Saturation Temperature A.t t B.'!" B.~ ,!.. C.~ C.'!" t ( \ D. t ,!.. 15
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): A. Correct. Despite the fact that Pressurizer heaters are cutout by the low level interlock, the reduction in letdown in response to the error in actual (failed low level) and setpoint which would be 66% will cause actual Pressurizer level to rise compressing the bubble which results in both increases in pressure and saturation temperature. B. Incorrect. Could be chosen if student thinks the effect of losing the heaters outweighs the effect of rising Pressurizer level. C. Incorrect. Pressurizer level will rise due to the reduction in letdown and the start of the backup charging pumps. D. Incorrect. Partially correct but saturation temperature varies in change the same as Pressurizer pressure. Technical Reference(s): 0711206 for level channel (Attach if not previously provided) failure, Steam Tables for Tsat relation to Pressure Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: 0702206-04 & 08_ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) _0_7_0_2_2_0_6-_0_4_&_0_8 Question Source: Bank# Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 8,10 55.43 Comments: 16
0711206, Rev. 17 Page 76 of 124 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY TABLE 1 - Selected Level Channel Failures SELECTED LEVEL CHANNEL FAILS HIGH AUTOMATIC RESPONSE TO FAILURE
- High/Low level alarm (+ 10% deviation) [67%]
- Maximum letdown - letdown (128 gpm) exceeds charging flow (+ 9.2% Deviation)
- All heaters on, all but one charging pump off (+ 3.6%)
PLANT RESPONSE TO FAILURE
- Actual PZR level and pressure decreases
- High/Low level alarm on operable channel at -5% deviation
- Low/Low level alarm on operable channel, all heaters Off at 28 [27]%
- TM/LP trip at 1887 [1900] psia OPERATOR ACTION
- Shift to operable level control channel SELECTED LEVEL CHANNEL FAILS LOW AUTOMATIC RESPONSE TO FAILURE LURE
- High/Low level alarm and standby charging pumps On (-5% Deviation)
..,.,inimum
- Minimum Letdown (29 gpm)
- Low/Low Level Alarm, All heaters Off 28% [27%]
- Opens all 480V heater power supply contactors[opens 4160V breaker on respective side and 480V power supply contactors on the other side]
PLANT RESPONSE TO FAILURE
- Actual PZR level and pressure increases
- High/Low level alarm from operable channel (+10% Deviation) [67%]
- Spray valves open on high pressure
- High Pressurizer pressure reactor trip at 2400[2370] psia OPERATOR ACTION
- Shift to operable level control channel
- On Unit 1, select operable channel on Low Level Cutout switch
* [On Unit 2, select LEVEL on the Backup Interlock Bypass Keyswitch]
- Reset/Close 480V heaters as necessary
0711206, Rev. 17 Page 9 of 124 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Electrical immersion heaters, installed in the bottom of the Pressurizer, are used during normal operation to maintain Pressurizer water temperature at 653°F (saturation temperature for 2250 psia). The Pressurizer Level Control System (PLCS) maintains Pressurizer water level at a temperature dependent programmed level to allow for expansion and contraction of the RCS, in the power range. From 532°F to 572°F, the RCS is operated as a constant mass system. This is accomplished by the Pressurizer level setpoint increasing as power is raised and decreasing as power is lowered.
- This programmed level provides an adequate steam volume to compensate for pressure and temperature transients.
- Also provides sufficient inventory to prevent intrusion into the relief valves, or heater uncovery on expected RCS volume changes due to temperature change.
A plant heatup resulting in an insurge to the Pressurizer would raise the Pressurizer water ( level and compress the steam volume. Pressurizer pressure would increase as the steam volume is compressed. Some of the steam would condense into water as saturation temperature increases, and limit the pressure increase. A plant cooldown resulting in an outsurge from the Pressurizer would lower the Pressurizer water level, expanding the steam volume. Pressurizer pressure would decrease as the steam volume expands. Some of the water in the Pressurizer would flash into steam as saturation temperature drops, and limit the pressure decrease. This inherent pressure control of condensation and vaporization is dependent on Pressurizer liquid temperature. The Pressurizer temperature is maintained at the saturation temperature for the desired system pressure. Whenever actual pressure begins to deviate from saturation conditions, the inherent pressure control features will act to minimize the deviation. The Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PPCS) monitors RCS pressure and maintains it at the desired value by varying the thermal output of the proportional heater banks, and ( by energizing the backup banks of heaters during periods when they are needed to recover system pressure from moderate pressure reductions.
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 1 Group # 1 KIA # 038EG2.4.18 Importance Rating 3.3 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture: Knowledge of the specific bases for EOP's Proposed Question: RO 9 Unit 2 is in 2-EOP-04, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, with a Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP). The 2B S/G has been isolated and the close fuses for RCPs 2B1 & 2B2 have been removed. Which ONE of the following states the reason for removal of the close fuses? To prevent an inadvertent RCP start, upon power restoration, that could result in: A. RCP seal failure. B. a positive reactivity event. C. operating RCP's outside of NPSH requirements. ( D. a pressure spike that could lift the secondary safeties. 17
Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. Not a RCP seal concern. This may be chosen if operator mistakes 2-NOP-01.02 limits and precautions for starting a RCP during normal not EOP conditions. B. Correct Per 2-PSTG-04 & 2-EOP-04. This step is used to prevent adding positive reactivity as a result of a slug of reduced boron water passing thru Reactor in the isolated loop. C. Incorrect. This could be chosen if student mistakenly applies 2-EOP-04 procedure Note concerning NPSH. D. Incorrect. This may be chosen if operator mistakes 2-NOP-01.02 Caution on starting a RCP with differences in temperature between S/G and RCS. Technical Reference(s): 2-PSTG-04, S/G Tube Rupture, (Attach if not previously provided) 2-EOP-04, S/G Tube Rupture, 2-NOP-01.02 RCP normal Operating Procedure Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: _P_S__L_---'-O_P--'-S_-0-'7-'0-"2__ _PS_L-_O_P_S_-_07_0_2_8_2_5_-1_2 82_5=--__ 12-'--___ _ _ _ _ (As avai Iab Ie ) available) Question Source: Bank # Bank# Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge
-X- -
X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 --- 10 -- - 55.43 - 1- - 1 Comments: 18
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: 24 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE PROCEDURE NO.: 2-EOP-04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS D 29. Disable RCPs in the ISOLATED SIG S/G loop Ji ALL RCPs have been STOPPED,
!f Then DISABLE BOTH RCPs associated with the ISOLATED S/G:
A. PLACE the associated Oil Lift Pump control switch in OFF. B. REMOVE the CLOSE fuses for the associated RCP breakers. CAUTION Backflow to the RCS can reduce the RCS boron concentration. It is highly ( desirable to minimize backflow while in Natural Circulation. The exception to this is the need to allow backflow solely as a means of preventing S/G level from exceeding the indicating range. Steaming the isolated S/G to atmosphere should only be performed as a last resort. o 30. Maintain ISOLATED SIG Level less than 90% NR MAINTAIN the ISOLATED S/G level less than 90% NR by ANY of the following methods:
- Lowering RCS pressure to below isolated S/G pressure (back flow is the MOST preferred method)
.,* Blowing down the isolated S/G to the MST
- Steaming the isolated S/G to the condenser
- Steaming the isolated S/G to atmosphere (steaming to atmosphere is the LEAST preferred method)
Page No. EOP DEVIATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS EOP
Title:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture EOP Procedure No.: 2 - EOP - 04 Revision No. 24 Corresponding EPG
Title:
Steam Generator Tube Rupture Recovery EPG Revision No.: 5.3 EOP Step/Attachment No.: Instruction Step 29
!f If ALL RCPs have been STOPPED, Then DISABLE BOTH RCPs associated with the ISOLATED S/G:
A. PLACE the associated Oil Lift Pump control switch in OFF. B. REMOVE the CLOSE fuses for the associated RCP breakers. Corresponding EPG Step/Attachment No.: 26 EOP Deviations from EPG:
- 1. The EOP step differs from the EPG step with the addition of placing the associated
( Oil Lift Pumps control switches in 'Off' and removing the 'CLOSE' fuses to the associated breakers of the stopped RCPs. Technical Justifications for Deviations:
- 1. The EPG instructional step has the operators disable the RCPs in the affected loop to prevent an inadvertent start. The EOP step provides a little more detail to ensure the associated RCPs do not restart. The intent of this step is to prevent starting a RCP in the loop with the isolated steam generator and rapidly adding r~jf~~g!~~~Si>.FQm2'S<i.)fi!l6E;}*flfr8\f:e~'!~wlter positive reactivity as the result of a slug of reduced boron concentrated water
~~~~~~~'MiIf,(i)1lJ~'h~f<9~~h~~~~ie1~1'(
passing through to the reactor. By placing the associated Oil Lift Pumps control switched in the 'Off' position and removing the 'Close' fuses of the associated RCP breakers, an inadvertent start of RCPs would not be possible. The intent of the EPG is maintained. Amplifying Bases Information: CEN-152, EPG Bases, Disable RCP Restart
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# Group # K/A# 055EA1.06 Importance Rating 4.1 Station Blackout: Restoration of power with one EDG Proposed Question: RO 10 Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when it experienced a Station Blackout (SBO). Given the following events and conditions:
- Unit 2 has had a Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP).
- 2B EDG failed to start and can NOT be started.
- 2A EDG is supplying the 2A3 4.16 KVAC bus.
- 2AB 4.16 KVAC bus is lined up from 2A3 4.16 KVAC bus.
- BOTH Unit 1 & & 2 SBO Cross Tie Breakers are open.
- ALL associated Normal/Isolate Switches are in Normal.
Based on these plant events and conditions: ( 1) Which of the following are the expected indications of the SBO Crosstie Breaker Permissive Lights in BOTH Control Rooms?
- 2) Which of the following are the manipulations needed to restore power to the 1AB 4.16 KVAC bus?
A. 1) Unit 1 ON Unit 2 OFF
- 2) Close Unit 1 SBO Cross Tie Breaker prior to closing Unit 2 SBO Cross Tie Breaker.
B. 1) Unit 1 ON Unit 2 OFF
- 2) Close Unit 2 SBO Cross Tie Breaker prior to closing Unit 1 SBO Cross Tie Breaker.
C. 1) Unit 1 ON Unit 2 ON
- 2) Close Unit 1 SBO Cross Tie Breaker prior to closing Unit 2 SBO Cross Tie Breaker.
D. 1) Unit 1 ON Unit 2 ON
- 2) Close Unit 2 SBO Cross Tie Breaker prior to closing Unit 1 SBO Cross Tie Breaker.
19
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): A. Correct. The receiving unit that is in SBO will have its permissive light lit. and close their SBO tie breaker first. B. Incorrect close Unit 1 Tie Breaker prior to Unit 2 .Could be chosen if student confuses the status of the Units thought Unit 2 in SBO. C. Incorrect Unit 2 permissive light OFF. Could be chosen if student confuses the status of the Units and thought Unit 2 in SBO or does not know how permissive light works on non-SBO unit. C. Incorrect. Unit 2 permissive light OFF. Could be chosen if thought Unit 2 in SBO or fails to recall SBO Cross Tie breaker operation sequence. Technical Reference(s): 0711502 EDG Text Figures 38 (Attach if not previously provided)
& 39, 1-EOP-99 APP-V Section 2.
( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _P_S_L_-_O_P_S_-O_7_0_2_50_2_-_07 _P_S--,-L _ _ _ _ (As available)
-_O_P_S_--,-O7_0'-2-".5'-0_2-'-0_7____
Question Source: Bank # 107 and 759 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Comments: 20
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UNIT 1 - STATION BLACKOUT 4160V SWITCHGEAR CROSSTIE CROSS TIE LOGIC DIAGRAM EDG ~ LEGEND U 20211 1A CLOSED 0 BRKR 6RKR TRIPPED IlL 1::;. 6 LOCAL EDG 16 lB 20401 CLOSED rx: 1AB 1AB UNDER~~----~ UNDER VOLT ACTIVATED IX I ____~~~ r- ~ CONTROL ROOM NOT BRKR
~
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REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: ...; .. 1_ _ _39 3,;...;9~_---r~PPENDICES APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA SHEETS 1----------1 101 of 155 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 "i; . . . . . .* . APPENDIX V RECEIVING AC POWER FROM UNIT 2 USING SBO CROSSTIE (Page 3 of 7) Section 2: Receiving Power from Unit 2 D 1. When Unit 2 is ready to supply power to Unit 1, Then PERFORM ALL of the following: D A. CLOSE the Unit 1 SBO crosstie breaker, 4160V SWGR 1AB 1AB UNIT X-TIE BKR (20501). D B. REQUEST Unit 2 CLOSE their SBO crosstie breaker, 4160V SWGR 2AB UNIT X-TIE BKR (2-20501). D C. VERIFY the 1AB 4.16 KV bus has power restored. D 2. ALIGN the selected train Vital 4.16 KV bus to the 1AB 4.16 KV bus by CLOSING the TWO crosstie breakers: ( 1AB to 1A3 (..J) ('1/) 1AB to 1 B3 (..J) 1B3 ('1/) 1AB-1A3 (20505) _ _ 1AB-1 B3 (20504) _ _ 1AB-1B3 1A3-1AB (20208) _ _ 1B3-1AB (20409) _ _ D 3. VERIFY the selected train Vital 4.16 KV bus has power restored. D 4. li TWO If Unit 2 EDGs are RUNNING, Then GO TO Section 3, Restoring Loads With TWO Unit 2 EDGs Running. D 5. li only ONE Unit 2 EDG If is RUNNING, Then GO TO Section 4, Restoring Loads With ONE Unit 2 EDG Running. D 6. li Unit 2 has Offsite Power, If Then GO TO Section 5, Restoring Loads With Unit 2 Offsite Power. End of Section 2
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # Tier# 1 Group # 1 K/A# 056AK1.01 Importance Rating 3.7 Loss of Off-site Power: Principle of cooling by natural circulation Proposed Question: RO 11 While performing 2-GOP-305, Reactor Plant Cooldown - Hot Standby To Cold Shutdown, with SIAS blocked a Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP) occurred with the failure of BOTH Diesel Generators to start. Plant conditions indicate:
- Pressurizer pressure is 1520 psi psiaa and lowering.
- T -hot is 548°F and steady.
T-hot
- T -cold is 542°F and steady.
T-cold
- Rep-Cet is 552°F and steady.
- A and B ADV's are 40% open
- Pressurizer Level is 32% and lowering.
- BOTH S/G Levels are 24% Narrow Range and constant with 2C AFW flow rate of 150 gpm per S/G.
- RVLMS sensors 1-8 are covered.
Based on the present plant conditions, which ONE of the following:
- 1) Procedures will be FULLY implemented?
- 2) is the current method of heat removal and which parameter, if increased, would have the GREATEST impact on enhancing natural circulation?
A. 1) 2-0120039, Natural Circulation Cooldown.
- 2) Single Phase Natural Circulation. Increasing both ADV's output to 80%.
B. 1) 2-0120039, Natural Circulation Cooldown.
- 2) Two Phase Natural Circulation. Increasing AFW flow to 200 gpm per S/G C. 1) 2-0NP-01.01, Plant Condition 1 S/G Heat Removal LTOP NOT in effect.
- 2) Single Phase Natural Circulation. Increasing both ADV's output to 80%.
D. 1) 2-0NP-01.01 Plant Condition 1 S/G Heat Removal LTOP NOT in effect.
- 2) Two Phase Natural Circulation. Increasing AFW flow to 200 gpm per S/G.
21
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. Safety functions not being met (both EDG's OOS) required Low Mode ONP 2-ONP-01.01 to be fully implemented. B. Incorrect Procedure implementation incorrect, two phase natural circ. Incorrect, increasing AFW flow incorrect. C. Correct, due to both EDG's not running, safety functions will not be met. With safety 12-0NP-01.01,, Plant Condition 1 S/G Heat Removal LTOP NOT in functions not met 12-0NP-01.01 Effect is required to be FULLY implemented. Opening ADV's from 40-80% open have a greater effect in enhancing Natural Circ than increasing AFW flow 50 gpm. D. Incorrect Procedure correct, others parts incorrect. Technical Reference( Reference(s):s): 2-0120039 ONP Natural (Attach if not previously provided) 2-0NP-01.01,, Circulation & 2-0NP-01.01 Plant Condition 1 S/G Heat Removal and LTOP not in effect Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: 0702858-08 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) _0_7_0_2_8_58_-_0_8 Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or att.ach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10CFRPart55 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 8,10 55.43 Comments: 22
ttv t lV
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REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: 19A PLANT CONDITION 1 STEAM GENERATOR 5 of 166 PROCEDURE NO.: HEAT REMOVAL LTOP NOT IN EFFECT 1-0NP-01.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 3.10 ,-]"7
,-[7 CR 01-0714, SDC 1A Relief Valve Lift 3.11 PCM 04059, Feedwater Control Replacement - Phase 2 4.0 RECORDS REQUIRED 4.1 Normal log entries.
5.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS
- 1. An Emergency Operating Procedure is NOT currently in use.
AND
- 2. An Emergency Operating Procedure is NOT exited directly to this procedure.
AND
- 3. Any of the following conditions exist.
( A. Shift Supervisor directs that LMONP be entered. B. LMONP Safety Function Status Checks for the current plant conditions are NOT being met. C. Off-Normal Operating Procedure NOT adequately mitigating the event. D. Any condition, or pattern of symptoms, with no immediately apparent diagnosis or cause OR for which off-normal guidance can NOT be identified.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: PAGE: A 1+" 19A PLANT CONDITION 1 STEAM GENERATOR ( 114 ofil!1166 t 66 PROCEDURE NO.: HEAT REMOVAL LTOP NOT IN EFFECT 1-0NP-01.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 * .:::: '.~ '.* APPENDIX A SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK SHEET i'.************. (Page 3 of 14)
- 2. MAINTENANCE OF VITAL AUXILIARIES (AC)
SAFETY ACCEPTANCE CHECK -V CHECK" FUNCTION CRITERIA MVAC-1 Startup Transformer Vital 4.16 KV Bus At least one energized I I I I I I I (1A30r1B3) (1A3 or 1 B3) from a startup transformer. MVAC-2 ( ;~em*ei:9;e;R~~;Di~s:~I*:G~h~rta;t6*r~ Emergency Diesel Generator~ Vital 4.16 KV Bus ii;~~;I§asi;*h:~§;~h@r~j~E3~ At least one energized I II
- r .~~"",,.
(1A3 or 1B3) .ii:;?";'from
.,:;'j";;;,'; its own
;,; ,.;..< EDG. ,
'.: i ' < .. ';,;.' .,': f I I I I MVAC-3 Unit to Unit Crosstie Vital 4.16 KV Bus At least one energized (1A3 or 1 B3) from Unit 2. I I I I I I iI
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 35C NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN 50f34 5 of 34 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-0120039 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 6.1 Immediate Operator Actions: None 6.2 Subsequent Operator Actions: INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE
- It takes approximately 15 minutes for natural circulation to fully develop.
- This procedure may contain steps that could adversely affect reactivity.
ENSURE that proper consideration and appropriate briefings occur prior to performance of steps that could challenge reactivity.
- 1. ENSURE natural circulation is being 1. ENSURE proper control of Steam maintained in at least one loop by the Generator feeding, steaming, RCS following criteria: inventory and pressure control.
( A. Loop llT 6T (T-hot minus T-cold) less than (50°F). B. Hot leg temperature constant or lowering. C. Cold leg temperature constant or lowering. D. RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to minimum subcooling based on Rep CET Temperature. E. No abnormal difference (greater than E. If QSPDS subcooling display 20°F) between T HOT and Rep CET is unavailable, subcooled Temperature. margin may be determined by subtracting T T-hot
-hot from Pressurizer water temperature (TI-1101).
(TI-11 01). INITIAL_ __
- 2. SAMPLE the RCS and Pressurizer surge line to determine boron concentration and dissolved Hydrogen.
INITIAL_ __ _ _
~------------------------------------------------------------~ Vl ~
~
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 35C NATURAL CIRCULATION COOLDOWN 26 of 34 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-0120039 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 FIGURE 1 RCSPRESSURETEMPERATURE RCS PRESSURE TEMPERATURE (Page 1 of 1) CAUTION When below the RCP Seal Requirement Curve, RCP instrumentation should be monitored for indication of pump Cavitation. For minimum seal requirements, RCP operation below 250 pSia psia should be avoided. 2400 210 p 2200 n r*** L c 20001 2000 J 1
~j ,i U 1800 h
( i 1600 F R 110 1400 p R 1200 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1200 1 < ****.*.......***......*. + .............. E ~~ S i c I
.J 1000 U
E 800 q t*..> 5 600 a 400 200 0o 0 200 400 600 700 800, (pIOPSI'I.o12tX13WFtg. fR'<eltomj (PIOPSI1.fJ120039iFlg 1iRev.O/lif)
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 19A PLANT CONDITION 1 STEAM GENERATOR 153 of 166 PROCEDURE NO.: HEAT REMOVAL L LTOP TOP NOT IN EFFECT 1-0NP-01.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 FIGURE 3 RCS PRESSURE TEMPERATURE (Page 1 of 1) (Containment Temperature Less Than or Equal to 200°F) CAUTION The RCP NPSH curve assumes one pump is operating in each loop. RCP instrumentation should be monitored for seal and pump performance in accordance with 1-EOP-99, Table 13. 2400 2200 . 2000 . 11800
!lOO ' Ma.:imum Suocooled' ro
""8"
'ill 1600
,g, S,
~
g e'~" 0: Il. 1400 1400'
~
,~N
'C:
'"'"~ 1200 e'~"
Il. 0..
"0
'8
~
'll
.>2
,<..2 1000 Minimum Sub(;ooled"
~
"Q E
SOO 800 RCPNPSH ReqUIrement'" 600 600, " 400
'I~clud"s rn5trum9~t Uncertainties 200 Shutdown 0o o0 100 200 300 400 (;00 500 600 700 800 Indicated Res ReS Temperature (F)
Re uired QSPDS Subcooled Mar 40 to 180°F 50 to 170°F 80 to 160°F
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier Tier# # 1 Group # 1 KIA # 057AA2.04 Importance Rating 3.7 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: ESF system panel alarm annunciators and channel status indicators Proposed Question: RO 12 Unit 1 is operating at 100% when a loss of the 120 VAC Instrument Bus 1MA occurs. Which ONE of the following Control Room alarms would NOT be expected? Q-19 1B SIG A. Q-191B S/G PRESS MSIS CHANNEL TRIP B. Q-16 CNTMT RAD HIGH CIS CHANNEL TRIP C. R-10 ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ATI FAULT D. R-11 CNTMT PRESS HIGH CSAS CHANNEL TRIP { \ 23
Proposed Answer: D Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. Expected alarm since MSIS is an ESF that deenergizes to trip so the channel is in a trip condition on loss of power. Student may choose if there is an incorrect association with the loss of A ESF channel and the 1B S/G Press MSIS Channel Trip. B. Incorrect. Expected alarm since CIS is an ESF that deenergizes to trip so the channel is in a trip condition on loss of power. Student may choose if there is an incorrect association with the loss of the 'A' 120 VAC Instrument Bus and the radiation indication failing low. C. Incorrect. Expected due to tripping of all the (except RAS & CSAS) A ESFAS channels when ATI A TI circuit runs its tests on the 'A' Channel will see power loss as a test failure and activate the alarm. D. Correct. Unlike other ESFAS channels like the MSIS and CIS, a CSAS channel trip requires power to energize to trip so this alarm would NOT be expected on a loss of the MA 120 VAC Instrument Bus. Technical Reference(s): 1-ARP-01-Q 16 & 19, 1-ARP- (Attach if not previously provided) 01-R 10 10& & 11, 0711401, CWDs 8770 -B - 295, 295,331 331 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0_7_0_2_4_0_1-_0_8 _0_7_0_2_4--'-01_-_0_8_ _____ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge - X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 43.5 45.13 Comments: 24
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REV DATE BY APPROVED -REV APPROVED REV DATE DATE BY APPROVED APPROVED _ TA ... I 15, DATKTAN I'HZ IpI I":; lq77 f<L A-N ilAI I, ~.~ I.,o.,~ tt ~AIN STEAM
!~AIN STE.AM ISOL VALVE BLOC.K-B
REVISION: PROCEDURE TITLE: PANEL: OA ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE Q PROCEDURE NO: WINDOW: 1-ARP-01-Q16 1-ARP-01-Q 16 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 16 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL Q CNTMT RAD HIGH CIS CHANNEL TRIP Q-16 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT: BA104 (CIS) E~@"JY1~~ ESC-MA 8.9 R/hr (Modes 1-4) BA204 (CIS) ESC'~M;S$ ESC-MB 79.9 mR/hr (Mode 6) BA304 (CIS) ESC-MC BA404 (CIS) ESC-MD ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. RIS-26-3-2 thru RIS-26-6-2, Containment Radiation, above the applicable alarm setpoint.
- 2. Annunciator 0-26, CNTMT RAD HIGH CIS CHANNEL PRE TRIP, ALARMED.
- 3. Affected ESFAS Containment Radiation CIS Bistable TRIP light LIT.
OPERATOR ACTIONS:
- 1. !f 11 at least two of the ESFAS Containment Radiation channels are greater than 8.9 R/hr, Then ENSURE
( CIS is actuated.
- 2. IMPLEMENT 1-0NP-26.02, Area Radiation Monitors.
- 3. !!
if a Reactor Trip occurs, Then GO TO 1-EOP-1, Standard Post Trip Actions. 11 an ESFAS Containment Radiation channel is failed, Then IMPLEMENT 1-0NP-99.01, Loss ofTech
- 4. !f of Tech Spec Instrumentation.
CAUSES: Alarm may be caused by EITHER of the following conditions:
- Containment Radiation high due to an RCS leak or fuel handling accident
- Radiation monitoring instrument failure
REFERENCES:
- 1. CWO 8770-B-327 SH 295, 457, 454, 439
- 2. I&C 1-1400052
~
uj[ f~~ t~~~
~R=E~V=IS=IO=N~:------~P=R=OC=E=D~U=R~ET=I=TL~E-:---------------------------------,~P~A~N=EL-:--~
r=RE~V~IS~IO~N~:-------'~PR~O~C~E~D~U~RE~T~IT~L~E-:-----------------------------------,~PA~N~E~L:-----. o ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE Q PROCEDURE NO: WINDOW: 1-ARP-01-Q19 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 19 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL Q 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 8. 20 1B SIG PRESS 18 18
- 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 MSIS CHANNEL 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 TRIP 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 Q-19 DEVICE: LOCATION:N: SETPOINT:
BA110 (MSIS) ESC-MA 615 psia BA210 (MSIS) ESC-MB 615 psia psi a BA31 0 (MSIS) BA310 ESC-MC 615 psia BA41 0 (MSIS) ESC-MD 615 psia ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. PI-S023A1B/C/D, 1B S/G Pressure, indicates less than or equal to 615 psia.
- 2. Affected channel ESFAS 1B S/G Pressure MSIS bistable TRIP light LIT.
OPERATOR ACTIONS: 1f at least two of the ESFAS 1B S/G Pressure channels (PI-S023A1B/CID) indicate below 615 psia, Then
- 1. !f ENSURE MSIS is actuated.
( if a Reactor Trip occurs, Then GO TO 1-EOP-1, Standard Post Trip Actions.
- 2. !!
1f an ESFAS 1B S/G Pressure channel is failed, Then IMPLEMENT 1-0NP-99.01, Loss ofTech Spec
- 3. !f Instrumentation.
CAUSES: Alarm may be caused by EITHER of the following:
- Excessive Steam Demand due to steam line/valve malfunction
- 1B S/G Pressure ESFAS instrumentation failure
REFERENCES:
- 1. CWD S770-B-327 sheets 295 and 379 CWO
- 2. I&C 1-1400052
REVISION: PROCEDURE TITLE: PANEL: o ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE R PROCEDURE NO: WINDOW: 1-ARP-01-R10 1-ARP-01-R 10 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 10 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL R 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 lID 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 ENGINEERED 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 SAFEGUARDS 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 ATI 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 FAULT 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 R-10 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT:
~~JFi: ATI Fault Relay ESC-SA Actuated ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. Red ATI FAULT light is LIT.
- 2. ATllight stays LIT or does NOT LIGHT for at least one of the ESFAS module inputs to ATI Test Panel.
OPERATOR ACTIONS: II NOTE II II ATI Fault annunciator will NOT reflash if an additional fault occurs when annunciator ISis ALARMED II
- 1. If
!f the ATI FAULT light is NOT LIT and the ATI system appears to be functioning properly, Then DIRECT
( I&C to troubleshoot and repair the ATI annunciator.
- 2. If
!f the ATI FAULT light is LIT, Then PERFORM the following:
A. DETERMINE which EFSAS Bistable is affected. B. DIRECT I&C to troubleshoot and repair the affected channel.
- 3. If
!f an ESFAS channel is failed, Then IMPLEMENT 1-0NP-99.01, Loss of Tech Spec Instrumentation.
- 4. MONITOR the ESFAS Bistables and instrumentation as directed by the US.
CAUSES: Alarm may be caused by EITHER of the following conditions:
- At least one of the ESFAS Trip Bistables did NOT TRIP at 5% above the trip setpoint. This includes alarm when a trip bistable is BYPASSED. Individual ATI Test Panel light will remain LIT during sequencing.
~'M"'~. ** At least one of the ESFAS Trip Bistables TRIPPED at 5% below the trip setpoint. Individual ATI Test Panel light will NOT light during test sequencing.
REFERENCES:
- 1. CWO 8770-B-327 sheet 331 CWD
P {~/~ };ry f/;;!~ b~
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.1":/ ~RE~V~IS=IO=N~:-------'~P~R~O~CE~D=U~R=E~T=IT~LE~:----------------------------------~~P~AN~E~L-:
~R~EV~IS~IO~N~:-------'~P~R~O~C~ED~U~R~E~T~IT~LE~:-----------------------------------,~P~AN~E~L-:----, -----
o ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE R PROCEDURE NO: WINDOW: 1-ARP-01-R11 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 11 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL R CNTMT PRESS HIGH CSAS CHANNEL TRIP R-11 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT: BA 102 (CSAS) BA102 ESC-MA 9.38 psig BA202 (CSAS) ESC-MB 9.38 psig BA302 (CSAS) ESC-MC 9.38 psig BA402 (CSAS) ESC-MD ESC-MO 9.38 psig
,ALARM CONFIRMATION:
)!,LARM 1,ff~iPIS-07-2A12B/2C/2D,
- 1. PIS-07-2A12B/2C/20, Containment Pressure, indicates greater than or equal to 9.4 psig.
- 2. Affected channel ESFAS Containment Pressure CSAS bistable TRIP light LIT.
If,,i;\ffected OPERATOR ACTIONS: 11 at least two of the ESFAS Containment Pressure channels (PIS-07
- 1. !f (PIS-07-2A12B/2C/2D)
-2A12B/2C/20) indicate above 9.4 psig, Then ENSURE CSAS is actuated.
( if a Reactor Trip occurs, Then GO TO 1-EOP-1, Standard Post Trip Actions.
- 2. !f 11 an ESFAS Containment Pressure channel is failed, Then IMPLEMENT 1-0NP-99.01, Loss ofTech
- 3. !f of Tech Spec Instrumentation.
CAUSES: Alarm may be caused by EITHER of the following conditions:
- Containment Pressure high due to RCS leak or steam leak
- Containment Pressure ESFAS instrumentation failure
REFERENCES:
- 1. CWD 8770-B-327 sheets 295, 293, 294 and 296 CWO
- 2. I&C 1-1400052
0711401, Rev. 15 Page 11 of 57 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY signal is received by each actuation module, the red "1/5" light on the respective actuation module will energize. The "1/5" light indicates that one of the five inputs into the actuation module (four bistables inputs and one test input) is providing a trip signal. On Unit 1, the ATI panel is located just below the train A isolation modules on cabinet MA [located on cabinet SA]. This panel contains a series of indicating lights and a Reset Pushbutton. The ATI is capable of continuously monitoring the performance of the ESFAS and proving calibration of the bistables to within 5% of the required setpoint. The test system works by inserting a series of test signals or pulses into the trip bistables and then monitoring the output of the actuation modules. The 2 millisecond ATI test signal is not of sufficient duration to actuate the system. The signal is sent to selected bistable groups in
'~ the sensor cabinets to satisfy the 2-out-of-4 logic matrix. The first ATI pulse does not meet the bistable trip setpoint and the second ATI pulse exceeds the trip setpoint. The bistable passes a trip pulse through the isolation modules and actuation modules. The lamp associated with the automatic test unit flashes on for a quarter of a second during the undertrip test and remains off during the rest of the test cycle. [The ESFAS bistable trip lights and actuation trip lights, also blink sequentially as the bistables are tested.]
( If the first pulse causes the bistable to output a trip voltage, then an ATI fault is indicated by the ATI test lamp not energizing in its proper sequence. An ATI fault is also indicated if the second pulse caused the bistable to output a nontrip voltage, resulting in the ATI test lamp remaining energized. In addition, the ATI checks and annunciates failures for the outputs of the isolation modules and the actuation modules. The ATI does not check the output relays, and in addition will fail to detect some failures where a single actuation module fails to an actuated position. Each failure mode is identifiable to an individual channel because of the physical arrangement of the lamps on the front of the ATI.AT!. The test lamp pattern sequentially blinks from the left to the right interrogating two bistables at a time until the 34 actuation bistables are tested. Faulty operation of the ESFAS circuitry will result in an annunciator R-1 0 [0-2], ENGINEERED SAFEGUARDS ATI FAULT alarm on RTGB 106 [206], as well as the ATI failure lamp on the ATI test panel. On each of the measurement channels, there is a manual test panel. See Figure 5 [Figure 6]. The manual test panel is provided for I&C to set, and periodically verify, the bistable trip setpoints.
0711401, Rev. 15 Page 16 of 57 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
- Block is an operator manual function performed by key switches with NORM/BLOCK positions on RTGB 106 [206].
- A block can only be initiated when 3-out-of-4 pzr pressure channels reach 1725 [1836]
psia decreasing, which actuates annunciator R-6 [R-8] SIAS CHANNEL NB A/B ACTUATION BLOCK PERMISSIVE. The amber light at the key switch illuminates until the operator places it in block.
- Annunciator R-7 (R-8) [R-9 (R-10)], SIAS CHANNEL A (B) ACTUATION BLOCKED, on RTGB 106 [206], indicates that the SIAS is blocked. The amber light will go out and red light will come on.
- Automatic block removal occurs when 2-out-of-4 channels reset, and the red light will go out.
Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIS [CIAS)) [CIAS]) ( A CIS [CIAS] automatically actuates the cntmt isolation system and supporting systems as listed in EOP-99.
- A CIS [CIAS] is actuated by SIAS, or by either 2-out-of-4 high cntmt pressure (5 psig
[3.5 psig]) signals, or 2-out-of-4 high cntmt radiation (10 Rlhr R1hr in modes 1 through 4, 90 mRlhr in mode 6) signals.
- PISCIS [CIAS] is a de-energize to actuate signal.
There are four independent cntmt pressure transmitters (PT-07-2A, B, C, and D) and four independent cntmt radiation monitors (RD-26-3, 4, 5, and 6). The operation of the measuring channels, actuation channels, isolation modules, manual and automatic testing, and output relays of the CIS [CIAS] is similar to the operation of the SIAS. Refer to Figure 14. The CIS [CIAS] is also divided into groups for testing purposes.
- CIS [CIAS] is not provided with blocking modules. If auto SIAS is blocked, CIS [CIAS]
can only be automatically actuated as a result of high cntmt pressure or radiation.
0711401, Rev. 15 Page 17 of 57 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Separate control switches for manual initiation of each actuation train (SA and SB) of the CIS [CIAS] are provided on RTGB 106 [206]. As with the SIAS, these switches have RESET/AUTO/CIS [CIAS] ON positions and are provided with a "Think" Pushbutton to prevent accidental actuation. SIAS must be reset prior to the reset of CIS[CIAS]. This may require RTGB 106[206] keyswitch blocking of the SIAS signal if Pzr. pressurizer is below the SIAS actuation setpoint. Several annunciators associated with CIS [CIAS] actuation on RTGB 106 [206] are:
- 0-15 [P-13], CNTMT PRESS HIGH CIS CHANNEL TRIP
- 0-16 [P-5], CNTMT RAD HIGH CIS CHANNEL TRIP
- 0-5 [P-3], CIS CHANNEL AlBA/B ACTUATION
- 0-25 [P-23], CNTMT Press Hi CIS PRETRIP
- 0-26 [P-15], CNTMT Rad Hi CIS PRETRIP Containment Spray Actuation Signal (CSAS)
A CSAS automatically actuates the Containment Spray System and supporting systems as listed in EOP-99.
- A CSAS is actuated by 2-out-of-4 HI-HI cntmt pressure (10 psig [5.4 psig]) signals AND a coincident SIAS signal.
- CSAS S is an energize to actuate signal.
There are four independent cntmt pressure transmitters (PT- 07-2A, B, C, and D). Note that these are the same transmitters used for the SIAS and CIS [CIAS] signals. The operation of the measuring channels, actuation channels, manual and automatic testing, and isolation modules of the CSAS is similar to the operation of the SIAS. Like the SIAS and CIS [CIAS], the CSAS is divided into groups for testing purposes.
- The CSAS output relays are designed to be energized to actuate in order to prevent spurious spray system operation on a loss of power to one of the two 125V DC buses.
0711401, Rev. 15 Page 18 of 57 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
- CSAS is NOT provided with blocking modules.
Separate control switches for manual initiation of each train of the CSAS are provided on RTGB 106 [206]. These switches have the similar positions and are operated in the same way as those previously described. Several annunciators associated with CSAS actuation on RTGB 106 [206] are:
, . . R-11 [S-17], CNTMT PRESS HIGH CSAS CHANNEL TRIP
- R-1 [S-7], CSAS CHANNEL AlB ACTUATION Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS)
An RAS automatically transfers the suction of the Safety Injection Pumps and the Containment Spray Pumps from the RWT to the cntmt sump. This is accomplished by opening the two sump outlet valves while simultaneously closing the RWT outlet valves and ( closing the pump miniflow recirculation valves to the tank. Unit 1 has a key switch to allow auto action to close the miniflow recirculation valves
- The cntmt sump outlet valves open within 30 seconds.
- The RWT outlet isolation valves close within 90 seconds.
- Concurrent with the transfer of the pump suctions, the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pumps are automatically stopped to prevent forcing core rubble out reactor vessel and into RCS due to high flow.
The different stroke times of the RWT isolation valves and cntmt sump outlet valves ensure the safeguards pumps have adequate NPSH at all times during operation. RAS automatic actions are detailed in EOP-99.
* (4' [5.67']) signals.
RAS is initiated by 2-out-of-4 low RWT level ,(4' (5.67' is typically rounded to 6'.)
- RAS is an energize to actuate signal.
There are four independent level transmitters (LT-07-02A, B, C, and D).
0711401, Rev. 15 Page 20 of 57 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) The MSIS terminates blowdown of steam from both S/Gs and stops the normal feedwater flow to both S/Gs by closing the main steam and main feedwater isolation valves. On Unit 1, an MSIS signal trips the main feedwater pumps, the heater drain pumps, and the condensate pumps. A list of the components activated by the MSIS is given in EOP-99.
- MSIS is actuated by 2-out-of-4 low S/G pressure (600 psia) signals [and/or 2-out-of-4 high cntmt pressure (3.5 psig) signals.]
- MSIS is a de-energize to actuate signal.
There are four independent channels of S/G pressure transmitters for each S/G (PT-8013A, B, C, and 0 and PT-8023 A, B, C, and D). [On Unit 2, the cntmt pressure trips for MSIS come from a common cntmt pressure bistable used for SIAS.] As shown in Figure 17, an initiation signal, generated by either channel, will actuate the ( isolation of both S/Gs. It should be noted, however, that the ESFAS system does not "auctioneer" S/G A & B pressures. The 'A' actuation channel looks only at 'A' S/G pressure and actuates 'A' train MSIS on 'A' S/G low pressure only. The same is true for B actuation channel. This means that it requires 2 of 4 low S/G pressure signals from the same S/G to actuate an A or B MSIS signal. The operation of the measuring channels, actuation channels, isolation modules, output relays, and manual and automatic testing of the MSIS is similar to the operation of the SIAS. It is also divided into groups for testing purposes.
- MSIS is provided with a manual block for low S/G pressure actuation to permit shutdown depressurization of the Main Steam System without initiating MSIS. The block is a manual operator action performed by a NORM/BLOCK spring-return key switch on RTGB 106 [206].
- The block can only be initiated when 3-out-of-4 S/G pressure channels reach 700 psia .
decreasing.
0711401, Rev. 15 Page 21 of 57 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
- When 2-out-of-4 S/G pressure channels exceed 700 psia, the block is automatically removed.
The following annunciators are associated with blocking MSIS on RTGB 106 [206]:
- 0-18 (0-20) [P-18 (P-20)], MSIS CHANNEL A (B) ACTUATION BLOCK PERMISSIVE
- 0-8 (0- 10) [P-8 (P-1 0)),
0)], MSIS CHANNEL A (B) ACTUATION BLOCKED Control switches and "Think" pushbuttons for manual initiation are located on RTGB 106 [206]. This switch operates the same as the Manual Initiation Switches previously described. Other annunciators associated with MSIS on RTGB 106 [206] include: t.~ 0-17 (0-19) [P-17 (P-19)], 1A (B) S/G PRESS MSIS CHANNEL TRIP [MSIS 2A (B) S/G PRESS LOW CHANGE TRIP]
- 0-7 (0-9) [P-7 (P- 9)),
9)], MSIS CHANNEL A (B) ACTUATION ( MSIV Interposing Relay Circuit Since the MSIS circuitry does not auctioneer the S/G pressure signal, another circuit must be used to actuate both MSIS trains if only one S/G pressure is low. This additional circuit is the interposing relay circuit. Although the 'A' train is described, both trains are identical. The 'A' train MSIS signal is sent to the 'A' MSIV closing circuit (energizes to close) which in turn sends signals to close the other 'A' train components. A separate relay in the 'A' MSIV closing circuit is also energized and this relay sends a signal to the 'B' MSIV closing circuit to close the 'B' MSIV. The 'B' MSIV closing circuit then sends a signal to close the rest of the 'B' train components. This separate relay is the interposing relay located in RTGB 106 [206].
* [Unit 2 MSIS logic has been modified to prevent spurious trips caused by pulling fuses while performing DC ground isolation. The power loss (125V DC) caused by pulling fuses, caused de-energization of the MSIS isolation relays on the opposite side S/G.
These isolation relays are located externally to the ESFAS cabinets. A separately fused 125 VDC power supply in cabinets "SA and SB" prevents a recurrence.]
i \ Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# Tier # 1 Group # 1 KJA# 058AK3.01 Importance Rating 3.4
-3.4- - -
Loss of DC Power: Use of control power by DIG's Proposed Question: RO 13 The 1A1A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) (EOG) is running fully loaded during a surveillance. A loss of DC control power to the 1A 1A EDG occurs. Which ONE of the following is the method to manually trip the EDG for the above conditions? A. Depressing the engine mounted emergency trip pushbutton. B. Depressing the emergency trip pushbutton on the Control Room RTGB. C. Manually actuating the overs overspeed peed trip (OST) mechanism. D. Manually actuating the Lockout Relay. ( ( 25
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. Engine mounted pushbuttons are inoperable with loss of DC control power. B. Incorrect. Unit 1 does not have emergency trip pushbuttons on the RTGB. This is applicable to Unit 2 only. C. Correct. DC control power supplies the shutdown solenoids and the interface between the Local Engine Mounted Emergency Shutdown Pushbutton and the overspeed trip mechanism solenoid on Unit 1 EDGs. With a loss of DC power the Only means to stop EDG is via mechanical overspeed trip because it stops injection of fuel into engine by mechanically latching the injector rocker arm. D. Incorrect. Lockout relay handle is to reset the lockout relay, not to actuate the lockout relay. Also loss of DC control power will not allow the lockout relay to actuate. Technical Reference( s): CWO 8770-B-326 0711501, CWD (Attach if not previously provided) Sheet 956, 957 ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: (As available) Learning Objective:
-0702501-18 -19 Question Source: Bank #
Bank# Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge -X
- X- - -
Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5,10 55.43 Comments: 26
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 1 Group # 1 1 l KIA # KJA# 058~3.01 0581,\K3.01 Importance Rating Loss of DC Power: Use of control power by DIG's
/
/
Proposed Question: RO 13 /
/
A fire has occurred in the 1A 1A EDG room while the EDG is run Ing. The SNPO presses the Local run,{lng. Engine Mounted Emergency ~hutdown Pushbutton but the th~EDGDG continues to run. J/" Which ONE of the following is the reason that the EDG EDG"did id NOT stop?
/
if A. 1A EDG started on a SIAS. IJ B. 1A EDG started on a Loss 0 O!~ffsite Power.
,}'
C. Loss of DC Control powe powej I D. Loss of MCC-1A7 / (
,j JI
\r
\
//
/
/
/
25
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect .While this will prevent EDG shutdown if attempted at the EDG Control Panel Start/Stop switch or Emergency Trip pushbutton SIAS does not block trip capability at the Local Engine Mounted Emergency Shutdown Pushbutton. B. Incorrect. Same as A but with respect to a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) instead of SIAS. C. Correct. DC control power supplies the shutdown solenoids and the interface between the Local Engine Mounted Emergency Shutdown Pushbutton and the overs overspeed peed trip mechanism solenoid on Unit 1 EDGs. With a loss of DC power the Only means to stop EDG is via mechanical overspeed trip because it stops injection of fuel into engine by mechanically latching the injector rocker arm. D. Incorrect. While MCC-1 MCC-1A7 A7 supplies EDG auxiliaries it does not supply the trip circuit for the EDG. Technical Reference(s): 0711501, CWO 8770-B-326 (Attach if not previously provided) Sheet 956, 957 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0_7_0_2_5_0_1-_1_8_&_19 _0_7_0'-2_5--'-01_-_1--'-8-'.&_1-=9_ ______ _ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X -- Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5,10 55.43 Comments: 26
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0711501, Rev. 22 Page 51 of 130 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY [The Unit 2 Lockout Relay has different actuation logic than Unit 1. For Unit 2, only the electrical trips are direct inputs to the Lockout Relay circuit. Any trip of the Unit 2 Lockout Relay causes the Shutdown Relay to actuate. All engine generated trips, (including over-speed) actuate the Shutdown Relay, which must pass through an EDG output breaker "closed" contact, to actuate the Lockout Relay. The Unit 2 Lockout Relay MUST be reset FIRST, to reset the Shutdown Relay.] On Unit 1, the over-speed alarm and lockout are enabled above 200 RPM. Failure to reset the over-speed latch will result in the EDG being inoperable with no local alarm present. The alarm and Lockout Relay will actuate when the EDG reaches 200 RPM.
"Fail-To-Start" Relay It is ALWAYS necessary to reset the Unit 1 "Lockout" Relay [Unit 2 "Emergency Shutdown" Relay] if a "Fail-To-Start" condition is sensed:
(
- Unit 1 "Fail-To-Start" Relay requires >200 rpm within 10 seconds to prevent lockout relay operation. (To clear, RESET the Lockout Relay on local EDG control panel)
* [Unit 2 "Fail-To-Start" Relay requires >100 rpm OR Jacket Water pressure >20 psig on either engine within 9 seconds to prevent shutdown relay operation. (To clear, PRESS the "Emergency Reset" pushbutton on either local engine control panel, or on the local EDG control paneL)]
Emergency Shutdown - Unit 1 There are no emergency trip pushbuttons located in the Unit 1 Control Room. The Ilocal EDG control panel has as an emergency trip pushbutton. This sends a signal to the Lockout Relay, which in turn energizes the governor oil dump solenoids on both the 12 and 16 cylinder governors.
- Dumping governor oil back to its sump allows the fuel racks to move to the closed fuel position, to immediately stop the EDG and bypass the normal 10 minute cool down.
- This button is DISABLED whenever a SIAS, under-voltage/degraded-voltage, or 3-to-2 tie-breaker open, emergency start signal is present.
0711501, Rev. 22 Page 52 of 130 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
- Any successful Unit 1 Emergency Trip PB shutdown requires the operator to reset the Lockout Relay at the local EDG control panel.
Each engine also has a local, engine-mounted, control panel emergency trip pushbutton.
- This local engine control panel emergency trip pushbutton signal is sent directly to the over-speed trip mechanism solenoid, and is NOT blocked during an emergency
- This actuates the over-speed trip device, which causes the fuel injectors to be held closed. The lockout relay is also energized, provided the EDG speed was >200rpm, preventing a restart.
Because over-speed is one of the two trips not bypassed by Emergency Mode operation, these engine mounted push buttons CAN BE USED AT ANY TIME.
- If either of the engine-mounted pushbuttons have been used, both engine's over-speed trip mechanisms AND the EDG Lockout Relay have to be reset.
Resetting the over-speed trip lever simply requires the operator to press the trip lever downwards until it latches in place, riding against the limit switch. Refer to Figure 22. The Over-Speed Trip (OST) mechanism, on either engine, can be manually actuated to trip the EDG. This is performed by depressing (approx. % Y2 inch) the over-speed trip lever and holding it, while rotating the latching mechanism and holding it in the de-latched position. When released, the over-speed trip lever moves to its tripped condition, which causes injector actuation mechanisms to rotate away from actuation cam motion, locking injectors into a fully downward, no-fuel position, with no further actuation strokes, until the OST is reset. The over-speed limit switch sends electrical signals to trip the other engine's over-speed solenoid, and actuate the EDG Lockout Relay.
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HybROGEN NNEH-COO'LED TURB1'NE HYDROGEN IINNER-COOLED TURB I'NEG8NERA GENERATOR T:OR ' 1 q;OD MV;A. .85 PF, ,58SCR,: 58 SCR,* bO PS I.GIG CALCULAtED CAPASI UITyqURVES CALCULATED CAPABI L'lTY CURVES 632868 Capability Curve FIG. 1
0711307, Rev. 16 Page 42 of 110 TRAINING USE ONLY MAIN GENERATOR CALCULATED CAPABILITY CURVES The capability of a hydrogen-cooled generator is limited by the hot spot temperatures in various elements of the machine, such as the stator winding copper, the rotor winding copper, and the stator iron, and by the temperature differential across the insulation of the windings. Anyone of these points may be the limiting factor, depending on the load, power factor, or gas pressure being carried on the machine. Generally, hot spot temperatures cannot be measured directly, so that temperature must be measured at points as close to the predicted hot spot point. The difference between the observed temperature and the actual hot spot is a variable, which is dependent on the configuration of the machine, as well as on the load. Figure 16 shows the capability curve for the main generator. The curve is drawn so as to limit the hot spot temperatures in the stator and rotor windings, and in the stator core (end turns) , to practical operating values, and to limit the temperature differential across the insulation of the windings. The curve also includes protection for underexcited conditions where the generator will pull out of synchronism with the system. Certain relationships between terminal voltage, power (MWs), reactive power (MVARs), and hydrogen pressure must exist to maintain the main generator within design operating ( bands and keep the machine in synchronism with the system. The generator capability curve, as shown in Figure 16, provides guidance to ensure we normally operate the generator such that we do not challenge protective circuitry or cause damage to the generator components. Figure 16 illustrates the capability curves at 22 KV for three different hydrogen pressures. Operation in the range between zero power factor and the rated lagging (over-excited) power factor of 0.85 is limited by rotor field winding temperature (i.e., (Le., along curve 1, between points A and B). This portion of the curve gives operation with rotor (field) amps constant at the nameplate value corresponding to the hydrogen pressure under consideration. It can also be seen that, by increasing generator hydrogen pressure, the allowable field current can also be increased. The increased allowable field current is due to the increase in the cooling capability.
0711307, Rev. 16 Page 43 of 110 TRAINING USE ONLY The region between the PSL rated lagging (over-excited) power factor of 0.85 and a leading (under-excited) power factor of 0.95 is limited by stator winding temperature (Le., (i.e., along curve 2, between points B and C). Operation on this portion of the curve corresponds to constant stator amperes. In this region, the field current will vary with load and power factor but will always be less than the maximum allowable value. Stator core temperature is the limiting factor between 0.95 and zero power factor leading (i.e., curve 3, between points C and D). Due to the distortion of the flux in the air gap between the DC field and the AC armature (Stator) considerable flux will work on the exposed ends of the stator coils causing overheating. At this point the system is supplying too much reactive power to the stator field. Loss of excitation or very low excitation is the concern identified on Curve 4. With a further excitation reduction the generator will run more like an induction motor. Heavy currents will circulate on the face of the rotor especially at the rotor winding end turns causing overheating. The generator may also pull out and the fall back into synchronism with the ( system. This Out of Step condition will result in a succession of severe impacts that cumulatively will cause damage to the shaft, shaft coupling, or stator mounting.
0711307, Rev. 16 Page 1 00 of 11 0 100 TRAINING USE ONLY GENERATOR CAPABILITY CURVE 800 800 60 PSIG A 700 is' 0 w w I-0 () 600 LAG (OUT) x >< w w a: w w 500 6~ 400 300 200 - (/) (f) 100 a:
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REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 58 REACTOR PLANT STARTUP - MODE 2 TO MODE 1 I -- 1 -- -- -- ---------1 i 90f64 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-GOP-201 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 NOTE Extended Power Operations with less than all four Moisture Separator Reheaters in service shall have a documented engineering analysis on a case by case basis. 4.12 111
~1 A Moisture Separator Reheater may be removed from service or placed in service while the unit is in operation. A 50°F instantaneous change of steam temperature to a Low Pressure Turbine is allowed provided a maximum rate of change of 100°F 1 hr is NOT exceeded.
4.13 111
~1 The high initial response exciter is designed to respond to system disturbances too rapid for operator intervention prior to the onset of major equipment damage. If any voltage excursion was limited and controlled, Then ensure the following parameters are within allowable limits:
Generator amperes Less than or equal to 26 kiloamps per phase Generator terminal voltage 21 KV to 23 KV Exciter field current Less than or equal to 310 amps 283 4.16 KV bus voltage 2A3 and 2834.16 3.95 KV to 4.35 KV 4.14 SEQUENTIAL VALVE is the preferred mode of valve control for the turbine. The turbine may be in SINGLE VALVE or SEQUENTIAL VALVE control mode while performing this procedure. Close monitoring of the turbine is required to ensure positive control is maintained based on the mode selected and the current power level. 4.15 The differential temperature between the base and the cover of the High Pressure Turbine Cylinder shall not exceed 100°F. 4.16 Main Generator reactive load should be maintained greater than or equal to 50 MVARs in the lag (out): This limit is imposed by Power System Technical Services to account for a 3-phase fault at Midway's 500/230 KV auto transformer. 4.17 114
~4 During the pressurization of the Unit 1 Main Steam System, the possibility exists for the Turbine to roll of the Turning Gear or increase speed unexpectedly. This could result in the development of an electrical field in the Main Generator due to residual magnetism.
4.18 1113
~13 During turbine latching activities the possibility exists for the 15% bypass valves to transfer to their post trip state, manual action to reset them may be required to maintain steam generator levels.
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Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 1 Group # 1 KIA # KJA CE05EK2.1 Importance Rating 3.3 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer: Components and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, signals. interlocks, failure modes, modes. and automatic and manual features. Proposed Question: RO 17 Unit 2 was at 100% power when a Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP) has occurred. Following the Reactor trip a steam leak occurs inside the Containment on the 2A S/G. The following conditions now exist:
- 2A S/G is 590 psia.
- 2B S/G is 615 psia.
- Containment pressure is 3.1 psig.
* "Main Steam Isolation Valve", HCV-08-1A, is CLOSED.
* "Main Steam Isolation Valve", HCV-08-1 B, is OPEN.
Which ONE of the following identifies the status of Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) and the ( Main Steam Isolation Valves?
- 1) MSIS Channel 'A' has actuated on:
- 2) HCV-08-1 B:
A. 1) low 2A S/G pressure and has closed HCV-08-1 A.
- 2) will NOT close until 2B S/G pressure reaches MSIS Channel 'B' setpoint.
B. 1) low 2A S/G pressure and has closed HCV-08-1A.
- 2) should have also closed.
C. C, 1) high Containment pressure AND low 2A S/G pressure closing HCV-08-1 HCV-08-1A. A.
- 2) should have also closed.
D. 1) high Containment pressure AND low 2A S/G pressure closing HCV-08-1A. HCV-08-1 A.
- 2) is open due to failure of MSIS Channel 'B' to actuate.
33
Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. Interposing relays in the MSIS circuitry should have also closed HCV-08-1 B. B. Correct. MSIS Channel A is actuated by low 2A S/G pressure below 600psia closing HCV-08-1 A. Interposing 08-1A. interposing relays in the MSIS circuitry should have also closed HCV-08-1B. HCV-08-1 B. C. Incorrect. Have not yet reached the MSIS setpoint of 3.5psig D. Incorrect. Have not yet reached the MSIS setpoint of 3.5psig and Interposing relays in the MSIS circuitry would have also closed HCV-08-1B HCV-08-1 B Technical Reference(s): 2-EOP-99 Table 5 Main Steam (Attach if not previously provided) Isolation Signal, Signal. 2-EOP-01 SPTAs Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ~C-=-a:..=lc-=-ul:..=ac.:..:toc..:.r
~C-"-a--,,Ic-,,-,-u-,-Ia-,-,to,--r~ _ _ _ __
Learning Objective: _ 0.: . . :7. . . :0:. : :.2. . . :4-=.01.;. . .-. .: . .02=---_ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) _0_7_0_2_4_01_-_02"----_ availa ble) Question Source: Bank # ( Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 55.43 Comments: 34
i Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO
\
Tier # Tier# 1 Group # 1 K/A# CE05EK2.1 Importance Rating 3.3 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer: Components and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features. Proposed Question: RO 17 Unit 2 was at 100% power when a Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP) h occurred. Following the Reactor trip a steam leak occurs inside the Containment on 2A S/
- 2A S/G is 590 psia.
- 28 S/G is 615 psia.
2B
- Containment pressure is 3.1 psig.
- Main Steam Isolation Valve, HCV-08-1A, is CL SED.
- Main Steam Isolation Valve, HCV-08-1 B, 8, is EN.
Which ONE of the following states the status of ain Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) and the Main Steam Isolation Valves? (('\. A. MSIS Channel 'A' has tuated on low 2A S/G pressure and has closed HCV-08-1A. HCV will NOT close until 2B 28 S/G pressure reaches MSIS Channel 'B' '8' setpoin . B.
- 8. MSIS Channel' has actuated on low 2A S/G pressure and has closed HCV-08-1A. H V-08-1B V-08-18 should have also closed.
C. tuated on high Containment pressure AND low 2A S/G pressure HCV-08-18 should have also closed. V-08-1A. HCV-08-1B D. MSIS hannel 'A' has actuated on high Containment pressure AND low 2A S/G ressure closing HCV-08-1A. HCV-08-1B HCV-08-18 is open due to failure of MSIS Ch nnel 'B' '8' to a uate.
/
33
( Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. Interposing relays in the MSIS circuitry should have also closed HCV-08-1 B. B. Correct. MSIS Channel A is actuated by low 2A S/G pressure below 600psia closing HCV-08-1A. Interposing relays in the MSIS circuitry should have also closed HCV-08-1B. HCV-08-1 B. C. Incorrect. Have not yet reached the MSIS setpoint of 3.5psig D. Incorrect. Have not yet reached the MSIS setpoint of 3.5psig and Interposing relays in the MSIS circuitry would have also closed HCV-08-1 B Technical Reference(s): 2-EOP-99 Table 5 Main Steam (Attach if not previously provided) Isolation Signal, 2-EOP-01 SPTAs Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Calculator Learning Objective: _0-'0702401-02
---7_0'--2_4--'-0_1----'0_2_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available)
------------------------~
Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) ( New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 --- 7 55.43 Comments: 34
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA 143 of 156 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 TABLE 5 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION SIGNAL (Page 1 of 1) A Train (,f) (-V) B Train (,f) (-V)
~~
~"N"~rE
~
,";!'f:;l An MSIS signal generated from EITHER A or B Train will cause ALL MSIS components to actuate due to interposing relays in the MSIS circuitry.
o D 1. ENSURE Main Steam Hdr AlB Isolation Valves CLOSED.
- HCV-08-1A -
- HCV-08-1 B o
D 2. ENSURE Header AlB Bypass Valves CLOSED.
- MV-08-1A -
(
- MV-08-1B o
D 3. ENSURE Feedwater Hdr AlB Isol Valves CLOSED.
- HCV-09-1A -
- HCV-09-1 B
- HCV-09-2A -
- HCV-09-2B END OF TABLE 5
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 25 STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS PROCEDURE NO.: 13 of 17 2-EOP-01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) ReS HEAT REMOVAL INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 6. (continued) 6. (continued)
(continued) o. O. VERIFY S/G pressure is 0.1 11 S/G pressure is greater than 915 psig between 835 and 915 psig (930 psia), (850 and 930 psia). Then ENSURE the SBCS or ADVs are restoring S/G pressure to less than 915 psig (930 psia). 0.2 11 S/G pressure is less than 835 psig (850 psia), Then ISOLATE steam lines from the S/G:
- 1. ENSURE SBCS valves are
( CLOSED.. CLOSED
- 2. ENSURE ADVs are CLOSED.
0.3 11 S/G pressure is less than 735 psig (750 psia), Then CLOSE the MSIVs. 0.4 11 S/G pressure is less than 585 psig (600 psia), Then ENSURE MSIS has ACTUATED. E. ENSURE the FOUR MSR E.1 CLOSE ALL TCVs using the MSR TCV Block Valves are Reheat Control Panel. CLOSED. F. ENSURE the MSR Warmup Valves are CLOSED. G. 11 maintaining a vacuum is desired, Then ENSURE MV-08-814, Spillover Bypass Valve, is CLOSED.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 25 STANDARD POST TRIP ACTIONS 14 of 17 PROCEDURE NO.: 2-EOP-01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) CONTAINMENT CONDITIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS D 7. DETERMINE Containment Conditions acceptance criteria are met: A. VERIFY Containment A.1 if Containment pressure is at least pressure is less than 2 psig. 3.5 psig, Then ENSURE ALL of the following conditions exist,
- 1. SIAS has ACTUATED.
- 2. CIAS has ACTUATED.
- 3. MSIS has ACTUATED.
(
- 4. ALL available Containment Fan Coolers are RUNNING.
A.2 If Containment pressure is at least 5.4 psig, Then ENSURE BOTH of the following conditions exist,
- 1. CSAS has ACTUATED.
- 2. EACH Containment Spray header flow is at least 2700 gpm.
B. VERIFY NO Containment B.1 If Containment radiation is greater than Radiation Monitor alarms 10R/hr, or rising trends: Then ENSURE CIAS has ACTUATED.
- CIS Radiation Monitors
- Containment Atmospheric Monitors (Continued on next page) (Continued on next page)
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 1 Group # 1 K/A# CE05EK2.1 Importance Rating 3.3 Loss of Main Feedwater: Components and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features. Proposed Question: RO 18 Unit 1 is 60% power with BOTH 1A & 1B MFW Pumps running when an inadvertent Channel 'A' Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS) occurs resulting in a Reactor trip. Which ONE of the following describes restoration of S/G Levels following the Reactor trip? A. Manual AFAS 1 & 2 is required to restore BOTH 1A & 1B S/G Levels. B. MFW Pump 1B will restore 1B S/G Level. Auxiliary Feedwater will automatically restore 1A 1A S/G level. C. Auxiliary Feedwater will automatically restore 1B S/G Level. Manual AFAS-1 is required to restore 1A 1A S/G Level ( D. Auxiliary Feedwater will automatically restore BOTH 1A & 1 B S/G Levels. 35
Proposed Answer: D Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. AFAS 1 & 2 will auto actuate to restore S/G levels 1B S/G to restore level but MFW is B .Incorrect. Partially correct in that AFW will feed the 1B isolated isolated to both S/G s and all MFW pumps have tripped. C. Incorrect. Partially correct but AFW will restore Both S/Gs D. Correct. A MSIS will isolate both MFIVs and MSIVs and trip both MFW, Condensate, and Heater Drain Pumps. This will leave only AFW to automatically feed both S/Gs. Manual AFAS only required if auto fails per OPS-521. Technical Reference(s): 0711408, 1-EOP-99 Table 5, (Attach if not previously provided) OPS -521 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: PSL-OPS-SYS-408-LPC- (As available) 0702408-13 Question Source: Bank # Bank# ( Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge - X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Comments: 36
ST. LUCIE PLANT OPS-521 ( OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT POLICY Rev. 13 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE Date 03/31/09 IMPLEMENTATION Page 10 of 16
- 1. (continued)
J. ESFAS Actuation:
- 1. The blocking or termination of ESFAS actuation is only allowed during normal plant cooldown, as directed by Operating procedure and during emergency recovery, when directed by the EOPs or the Technical Support Center.
- 2. Under no circumstances shall the automatic actuation of ESFAS be blocked when the actuation limits are being approached in an uncontrolled plant condition. Operators shall NOT manually terminate the operation of ESFAS actuated components during an emergency, except as allowed by plant procedure.
- 3. If a valid ESFAS actuation occurs, then the operating crew should NOT exit EOP-1 to EOP-2. EOP-1 should be exited to one of the optimal recovery EOPs or EOP-15 for the following reasons:
- a. The optimal recovery EOPs contain procedural steps to
( determine the extent of the damage.
- b. EOP-2 entry conditions assumes an uncomplicated trip has occurred. A valid ESFAS actuation is NOT an uncomplicated trip.
- 4. If a spurious invalid ESFAS actuation occurs in any plant mode, Then perform the applicable EOP 99 table prior to restoration of components.
- 5. Manual initiation of AFAS is allowable under the following circumstances:
- a. Automatic actuation of the system did NOT occur after the appropriate time delay has elapsed.
- b. When cooling down the RCS using only one Steam Generator, if the operable Steam Generator is affected by the AFAFAS AS rupture identification circuit.
- c. During the loss of off-site power conditions, after AFAS actuation, if one feedwater header pressurizes before the other.
This assumes neither feed header is ruptured.
ST. LUCIE PLANT OPS-521 OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT POLICY Rev. 13 EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE Date 03/31/09 IMPLEMENTATION Page 11 of 16
- 1. J. (continued)
(continued)
- 6. Manual initiation of AFAS should NOT be done during other scenarios because it defeats the rupture identification circuit. This does NOT prevent a crew decision to manually operate AFW components, start pumps and open valves, if deemed necessary.
- 7. ESFAS Actuation: Use of ESF Override features in EOPs
- a. When opening a valve that was closed by SIAS or CIAS, increased awareness 1 / monitoring should be employed on that system to detect a release to the environment via that flow path.
- b. Increasing RAB radiation indications, loss of Containment sump inventory and unexpected Containment depressurization are all examples of Containment boundary leakage which may have been created by operator action, and should be considered when taking these type of actions.
( K. Manual Override of MFIV Following AFAS Actuation (Unit 2):
- 1. Do NOT override and open MFIV from within EOP-1. This overrides a safeguard signal prior to diagnosing the event.
L. CCW to RCPs:
- 1. SPTAs S PT As take precedence over restoring CCW.
- 2. Restore CCW to RCPs when an RCO is available AND the attention required to restore does NOT adversely affect the maintenance or recovery of other safety functions.
M. Excess Steam Demand event guidance while implementing EOP-05, Excess Steam Demand, and EOP-15, Functional Recovery.
- 1. Regardless of the rate of RCS pressure and inventory reduction during an Excess Steam Demand, RCS pressure SHALL NOT be intentionally lowered to enhance inventory addition into the RCS unless the RCS Inventory Control Safety Function can NOT be maintained otherwise.
- 2. If if a Main Steam Safety Valve is stuck open, or was stuck open, causing entry into an EOP, Then the affected Steam Generator shall be considered faulted until the Safety Valve is gagged, even if the Safety Valve reseats. The Steam Generator shall NOT be un isolated unisolated until the Safety Valve is gagged.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 39 ~PPENDICES PPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEETS 1 -- 1 - --
- -1 1 141 of 155 PROCEDURE NO.:
1-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 TABLE 5 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION SIGNAL (Page 1 of 2) A Train (,J) (-.J) C..J) B Train (,J) NOTE An MSIS signal generated from EITHER A or B Train will cause ALL MSIS com onents to actuate due to interposing components inter osin rela relayss in the MSIS circuitr circuitry.. o 1. ENSURE Main Steam Hdr AlB Isolation Valves CLOSED.
*" HCV-08-1A
- HCV-08-1 B HCV-08-1B o 2. ENSURE AlB Hdr MSIV Bypass Valves CLOSED.
- MV-08-1A
( ** MV-08-1 B o 3. ENSURE Main FW Isol Valves to AlB S/G SIG CLOSED.
- HCV-09-07
- HCV-09-08 o 4. ENSURE Main Feedwater Pumps STOPPED.
** 1A MFW Pump
- 1B MFW Pump o 5. VERIFY Main Feedwater Pump 1A/1 B Discharge Valves CLOSED.
- MV-09-1
- MV-09-2
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 39 ~PPENDICES PPENDICES 1 FIGURES 1 TABLES 1 DATA SHEETS ( 142 of 155 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 TABLE 5 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION SIGNAL (Page 2 of 2) A Train C'./) (-'1/) B Train (-'1/) (-V) R~ 0:,6 ENSURE Heater Drain Pumps STOPPED.
** 1A Htr Drain Pump -
** 1B Htr Drn Pump -
O~~7. ENSURE Condensate Pumps STOPPED. 01>7.
- 1A/1C Cond Pump -
** 1B/1 C Cond Pump -
( END OF TABLE 5
0711408, Rev. 22 Page 64 of 102 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY auctioneered low pressure signals are fed as inputs to the RPS, and are used to provide a RTGB 104 [204] alarm and a low steam generator pressure reactor trip at 600 [626] psia. This trip terminates the power excursion associated with a main steam line break (MSLB). These transmitters are also used to generate a main steam isolation signal (MSIS). Main steam isolation valve closure is accomplished by channeling the signal through the AUTO position of the main steam isolation valve control switch and then applying it to the close circuitry of the main steam isolation valves. MSIS actuation logic is processed by the ESFAS cabinet and differs slightly from the RPS logic for reactor trip. All four pressure transmitters for each SG are individually compared in a 2/4 logic. Either SG sensing low SG pressure at 600 psia (both units) will cause a MSIS to actuate in both SGs and their associated components. MSIS IS isolates the SGs by closing the main steam isolation valves and the main steam ( bypass isolation valves (for both units), the feedwater isolation valves (for both units), the Unit 1 main feedwater pump discharge valves, and trips the Unit 1 MFW pumps,
- heater drain pumps, and condensate pumps. [Unit 2 MFW, heater drain pumps, and r-nrV'Ionsate condensate pumps are NOT tripped due to differences in FW isolation valve design.]
To protect the plant from events associated with secondary system malfunctions that may cause asymmetric primary loop temperatures, another reactor trip associated with steam generator pressure has been installed. The TM/LP auxiliary reactor trip occurs when steam generator pressures differ by 135 [120] psid. This setpoint ensures that asymmetric steam generator transients (ASGTs) are within the accident analysis results of the loss of forced Res ReS flow accident, to prevent ASGTs from being the limiting accident.
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# Tier # 1 Group # 2 KIA # 003AG2.1.28 Importance Rating 4.1 Dropped Control Rod: Knowledge of the purpose of major system components and controls Proposed Question: RO 19 Given the following on Unit 2:
- 100% power steady state, MOC MaC
- Control Element Assembly (CEA) # 2 of Shutdown Group A drops to the bottom of the core.
- ALL required IMMEDIATE operator actions of 2-0110030, CEA Off-Normal Operation and Re-alignment, have been taken.
- CEA # 2 has been determined to be operable.
( The interlock that is required to be bypassed to withdraw CEA # 2 is _ _ _ _ and the design basis for the interlock is _ _ _ _ _ __ A. 1) CEA Motion Inhibit.
- 2) to prevent CEA withdrawal or insertion when abnormal CEA alignment is detected.
B. 1) Shutdown Group Interlock Bypass.
- 2) to prevent CEA withdrawal or insertion when abnormal CEA alignment is detected.
C. 1) CEA Motion Inhibit.
- 2) to prevent Shutdown CEA withdrawal when Reg Group CEA's are NOT at the Lower Electrical Limit.
D. 1) Shutdown Group Interlock Bypass.
- 2) to prevent Shutdown CEA withdrawal when Reg Group CEA's are NOT at the Lower Electrical Limit.
37
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): A. Correct. CMI must be bypassed due to the CEA deviation and the basis is per FSAR. B. Incorrect Partially correct but not the Shutdown Group Interlock Bypass. C. Incorrect. Wrong basis. D. Incorrect. For reasons stated in B & C. Technical Reference(s): FSAR Chapter 7 section (Attach if not previously provided) 7.7.1.1.6 page 354, U 2 RPS DBD, 2-0111030 APP-I Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0_7_0_2_4_0_5-_1_0 _0.::....7'--'0'--"2-'4...:..0.::....5--'1....::..0_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # ( Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X_ __
--,--,X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 ---
7 55.43 Comments: 38
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 57A CEA OFF-NORMAL OPERATION AND 26 of 33 PROCEDURE NO.: REALIGNMENT 2-0110030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX I REALIGNMENT OF ONE DROPPED CEA (Page 1 of 2) NOTE For alignment of CEA(s) while in Mode 3, only Step 3 of this appendix must be performed.
- 1. The CEA should be recovered by a slow, smooth withdrawal using small increments of movement. Preferably, the movement increments should be three steps (2 1/4") or less. The period of time for recovering the CEA should be at least 10 minutes, but within the time allowed by Tech Specs.
- 2. Reactor power shall be maintained at or below the power level which resulted from the CEA insertion by boration while withdrawing the dropped CEA.
- 3. Realign the dropped CEA by performing the following:
A. Place the mode select switch in manual individual mode. B. Select the dropped CEA on the individual CEA selection switches. C. Select the group of the dropped CEA on the group select switch. D. " Depress and hold the CEA motion inhibit bypass pushbutton. E. Depress then release the bypass enable pushbutton. F. Withdraw the affected CEA and check for smooth operation and normal indications.
- 4. Following the return of the CEA to its group, operation should be maintained at the existing power level until advised by Reactor Engineering in order to allow assessment of resultant power distributions and lor azimuthal tilts.
NOTE It may be necessary to operate at this reduced power for as long as 24 to 36 hours in order to reduce the azimuthal oscillation and the resulting values of FFTT RR,, T q ,, F\y and ASI resultin resulting from a dropped CEA.
- 5. Notify the Reactor Engineering supervisor when CEA is realigned.
7.7.1.1.6 Analog Display System (ADS) The neutron flux and distribution is controlled, in part, through insertion and/or withdrawal of CEAs. The Analog Display System (Figure 7.7-6) utilizes the signals from the reed switch position transmitters to display the CEA positions on a cathode ray tube (CRT) to the operator (refer to Subsection 7.5.1.4). Reactor power signals, derived from the Reactor Protection System through isolation in accordance with IEEE 279-1971 are utilized with the CEA position signals in the ADS to provide alarm and motion inhibit signals for specific improper CEA movements. The ADS contains logic which detects certain abnormal CEA configurations such as: CEA deviation within a control group; CEA inserted to or below the power dependent insertion limit; improper CEA group sequencing or overlap; regulating CEA groups withdrawing before all shutdown CEAs are fully withdrawn and shutdown CEA groups inserting before all regulating CEAs are fully inserted. Upon detection, the ADS initiates CEA motion inhibit (CMI) signals to the CEDMCS and alarm signals to the annunciation system and CRT display'The CMI signals are generated to prevent the specific improper CEA movement from continuing." continuing .
- 7.7.1.1.7 Boron Control System The RCS boron control is accomplished by dilution and boration. Refer to Subsection 9.3.4 for a discussion of the Chemical and Volume Control System. To allow the operator to maintain the required boron concentration in the reactor coolant, the volume control tank contents are maintained at a prescribed boron concentration either manualry manually or automatically. To assist the operator in maintaining the proper boric acid concentration in the Reactor Coolant System, recorders indicate reactor makeup water flow and boric acid makeup flow, which can be used to
( determine whether boration or dilution is occurring. Sampling of the reactor coolant is used to determine boron concentration. At a given power level, the boron concentration and CEA position determines reactor coolant temperature. Because of the long time required to change the boron concentration, boron is used to compensate for slow change of power. By adjusting the boron concentration, the CEAs can be withdrawn to provide an adequate shutdown margin. 7.7.1.1.8 Incore Instrumentation System The Incore Instrumentation System monitors neutron flux distribution within the reactor core. There are maximum of 56 incore instrument assemblies with four self powered rhodium detectors in each assembly. The assemblies are uniformally distributed in the reactor core. The four detectors in each assembly are axially distributed along the height of the core at 20, 40, 60 and 80 percent of core height. This permits representative three dimensional mapping of the neutron flux in the core. The rhodium detectors produce a delayed beta current proportional to the neutron flux in the detector region. ( 7.7-6 Amendment No. 17 (12/06)
1[66Yjj.;
,vJ,t ~;\I~ ~t:' f}lctJ ~l,\~
St. Lucie Unit 2 Document No. DBD-RPS-2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM Revision 2 Design Basis Document Page 5 Quality-Related Functions
- 1. Provide the capability to periodically test the RPS actuation logic during power operation to ensure the system meets the minimum acceptable redundancy requirements.
References:
IEEE IEEE Standard 279-1971 Section 4.10 10CFR50 Appendix A Criterion 21 IEEE Standard 338-1971 Safety Guide 22
- 2. Provide circuits to automatically remove operational bypasses at specified steam generator pressures and reactor power levels to ensure protective functions are operable when required by the safety analysis.
Reference:
IEEE Standard 279-1971 Section 4.12
- 3. Provide indication of system status at each stage of the actuation logic to enable the operator to assess system operability and verify completion of protective actions.
(
Reference:
IEEE Standard 279-1971 Section 4.20
- 4. Initiate a PORV open signal to mitigate challenges to the RCS pressure boundary integrity when abnormally high RCS pressure is sensed as indicated by the presence of two out of four high pressurizer pressure trip signals.
Reference:
St. Lucie Unit 2 UFSAR section 7.2 _5. _ Initiate a CEA Withdrawal Prohibit signal (CWPjto (CWP).;to block the addition of positive reactivity via control rod withdrawal when abnormal operating conditions are sensed as indicated by any of the following:
- Two out of four high startup rate pretrip signals are present
- Two out of four high power pretrip signals are present
- Two out of four LPD pretrip signals are present
- Two out of four TM/LP pretrip signals are present
Reference:
St. Lucie Unit 2 UFSAR section 7.7 Not Nuclear Safety Functions None (
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 KIA # 028AK1.01 Importance Rating 2.8 Pressurizer Level Malfunction: PZR reference leak abnormalities Proposed Question: R020 RO 20 Unit 2 is 45% power steady state. A leak on the reference leg tap associated with selected Pressurizer (Pzr.) Level Controller LT111 OX occurs. Assuming NO Operator actions what will be the response of the Pressurizer Pressure Level Control System (PPLCS)? Indicated Pzr Level Actual Pzr Level A. decreases increases B. increases increases C. increases decreases ( D. decreases decreases ( 39
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. Could be chosen by student if inaccurately recalls from GFES that a reference line break on a wet leg level detector will eventually fail the indicated reading high due to Pref
~P to decrease as seen by the detector.
dropping causing i1P B. Incorrect. Could be chosen if student misunderstands that the PPLCS responds to rising level with an increase in letdown flow. C. Correct. A leak on the reference leg will result in indicated Pzr level rising which thru LlC-111 OX controller output increasing to reduce letdown and thus actual Pzr level lowers. 1110X D. Incorrect. Could be chosen by student if inaccurately recalls from GFES that a reference line break on a wet leg level detector will eventually fail the indicated reading high due to Pref dropping causing ~Pi1P to decrease as seen by the detector. Technical Reference(s): NUC-GFP-CMP-007, 0711206 NUC-GFP-CMP-007,0711206 (Attach if not previously provided) level control. ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: NUC-GFP-CMP-007-09, PSL- (As available) OPS-0702206-18 Question Source: Bank # PSL 2006 NRC Exam Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 8,10 55.43 Comments: 40
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& Light NUCLEAR OPERA TlONSTIONS TRAINING Objective 9F 4.5 REFERENCE LEG FLASHING If a vessel containing saturated water and steam has a pressure decrease below saturation pressure (Le., emergency depressurization), water in the reference leg of a level measuring instrument may flash to steam. Some time will elapse before the reference leg water can be refilled from the condensing chamber. This is called reference leg flashing. This causes an erroneous reading in the brief period the reference leg is re-filling. The DP cell senses a smaller differential pressure due to the reduced height of water in the reference leg. The smaller differential pressure will indicate a vessel water level that is greater than the actual level. This is illustrated in Figure 28.
FILL NNECTION CONNECTION CONDENSING MAXIMUM POT DETECTABLE LEVEL "WET" REFERENCE MINIMUM ( LP DETECTABLE LEG LEVEL DRAIN VALVE LIQUID Figure 28 Closed Tank with Reference Leg Flashing 90, E Objective 9D, 4.6 ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS ON OPERATION As previously discussed, variations in temperature and pressure can affect the reference leg density and subsequently the accuracy of the level measurement. These same density variations can be caused by the ambient conditions that level instruments are exposed to, specifically the Containment Building. Level-measuring differential pressure cells are not directly affected by changes in ambient pressure. Any pressure variations in the environment are felt on both sides of the open vessel DP level instrument and subsequently cancel each other. The dry and wet reference leg level detectors are only exposed to system pressure and therefore are not affected. NUC-GFP-CMP-007 FOR TRAINING PURPOSES ONL Y REV. 0 Page 97 of 189
0711206, Rev. 17 Page 123 of 125 125 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY PRESSUR~ERLEVELPROGRAM PRESSURIZER LEVEL PROGRAM PZR LIQUID PZR LEVEL VOLUME, FT3 IN % OF SPAN r-----------------------------------~-100 r-------------------------------------~100 800 ---+--
~--+--66 66 [63]
( 700 67 GAL/% 600 500 33 460 400--~~--4-r_----~~----~------~~--~-0 400--~~--~~------~------r_----_,~~--~0 572 TAVG,%F 532 550 560 570 580 ( (rIRCo/071120a-F32-R8) (TIRCO/0711206*F32-R8) FIGURE 37
0711206, Rev. 17 Page 48 of 125 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY (
- PT-1103 supplies an open permissive to SOC Suction Valves, V3651 and 3481.
- PT-1104 supplies an open permissive to SOC Suction Valves, V3652 and V3480.
Setpoint is :5267 S;267 psia for both PTs. UNIT2 UNIT 2 PT-1103, PT -1103, 1104, 1105 and 1106 perform the following functions. (Refer to Figure 35)
- Open SIT outlet isolation valves on rising pressure at 500 psia. (1103/1104/1105/1106 open V3614N3624N3634/V3644 respectively)
- LTOP actuation of the PORVs on rising pressure at 470 psia. Refer to T.S. 3.4.9.3 for the temperature setpoints.
(Using 2/2 Logic, 1103 and 1104 open V1474; V14 74; 1105 and 1106 open V1475) (
- Alarm on rising pressure to alert the operator of PORV actuation.
- Supply an open permissive to the SOC suction valves at :5276 S;276 psia.
(1103/1104/1105/1106 input to SOC Valves V3652N3481N3480N3651 respectively)
- Supply a close interlock to the SOC suction valves at ~500 psia .
psia.
. . . PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM Overview The Pressurizer Level Control System (PLCS) is composed of two redundant control channels, Channel X and Y, which perform the following functions: (Refer to Figure 36)
- Maintains Pressurizer level at programmed setpoint during steady state operation.
- Reduces letdown flow during a decreasing Pressurizer level transient.
- Increases letdown flow during an increasing level transient.
0711206, Rev. 17 Page 49 of 125 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
- Provides signals to start and stop the standby charging pumps [pump].
- Provides alarms to warn of channel failure or misoperation of the system.
- Energizes all Pressurizer heaters on a high level deviation.
- Provides heater low level trip protection; with ability to cutout a defective channel.
- Provides level indication on two level indicator controllers and a level recorder.
Except for the low-low level Pressurizer heater cutoff and low-low level alarm features, all automatic level control functions operate on deviation from level setpoint. The level setpoint signal applied to the Pressurizer Level Control System originates in the Reactor Regulating System (RRS).
- Comprised of two redundant channels, each of which generates a level setpoint
( according to a program based on T AVG.
- T AVG is used as the setpoint for programmed level, as opposed to first stage turbine pressure or T REF, because it is the change in average temperature which directly causes the change in coolant specific volume, and therefore in Pressurizer level.
One RRS channel is selected to provide the setpoint signals to the level control system by means of a selector switch located on RTGB-104 [204].
- The Pressurizer level program is depicted in Figure 37.
- The range of T AVG traversed from no load to full load is 532°F to 572°F.
- Level is programmed to be higher at increased values of TAVG, AVG , which is another way of saying that Pressurizer level is controlled higher at higher power levels.
- Level program has a minimum level of 33% and a maximum level of 66% [63%].
- The program between these two extremes is linear with respect to TAVG.
0711206, Rev. 17 Page 50 of 125 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
- Letdown level control valves (LCVs) are throttled to maintain letdown flow rate equal to charging flow according to the analog level control signal
- Standby charging pump(s) automatically cycle through a pair of level bistables, starting and stopping as necessary. Refer to Figure 36.
The automatic control and protective features (including alarms) associated with Pressurizer level, together with setpoints for each unit, are tabulated on the following page. (
0711206, Rev. 17 Page 51 of 125 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY UNIT 1
SUMMARY
OF PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL ACTIONS PZR. LEVEL (ROUNDED) (ROU NDED) AUTOMATIC ACTION
+10% DEVIATION HIGH PRESSURIZER LEVEL ALARM (INCREASING)
* +9% DEVIATION
.+9%
+4% DEVIATION MAXIMUM LETDOWN (128 GPM) (INCREASING)
- ALL HEATERS ON
- BOTH BACKUP CHARGING PUMPS RECEIVE STOP SIGNAL 0% DEVIATION NORMAL LEVEL (SETPOINT FROM RRS)
-1% DEVIATION
- MINIMUM LETDOWN (29 GPM) (DECREASING)
- FIRST B/U CHG. PUMP "STOP" SIGNAL (INCREASING)
-2% DEVIATION
- SECOND B/U CHG. PUMP "STOP" SIGNAL (INCREASING)
-3% DEVIATION FIRST B/U CHG. PUMP "START" SIGNAL (DECREASING)
-4% DEVIATION SECOND B/U CHG. PUMP "START" SIGNAL (DECREASING)
(DECREASING)
-5% DEVIATION LOW PRESSURIZER LEVEL ALARM, ALL CHG. PUMPS GET BACKUP "START" SIGNAL (DECREASING) 28 % INDICATED LEVEL ALL PRESSURIZER HEATERS OFF (DECREASING)
( UNIT 2
SUMMARY
OF PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROL ACTIONS PZR. LEVEL (ROUNDED) AUTOMATIC ACTION 67% INDICATED LEVEL HIGH PZR LEVEL ALARM (INCREASING) PACB ALARM
..+9% DEVIATION MAXIMUM LETDOWN (128 GPM) (INCREASING)
+5% DEVIATION HIGH PZR LEVEL ALARM (INCREASING) RTGB 103
+4% DEVIATION
- ALL HEATERS "ON" SIGNAL
** B/U CHG. "STOP" SIGNAL (INCREASING) 0% DEVIATION NORMAL LEVEL (SETPOINT FROM RRS)
-1% DEVIATION ** MINIMUM LETDOWN (29 GPM) (DECREASING)
** B/U CHG. PUMP "STOP" SIGNAL (INCREASING)
-3% DEVIATION ** B/U CHG. PUMP "START" SIGNAL (DECREASING)
-5% DEVIATION LOW PRESSURIZER LEVEL ALARM, B/U CHG. PUMP GETS BACKUP "START" SIGNAL (DECREASING)
WITH CHANNEL X <27%; "A" SIDE 4160V PZR HEATER X-27 % INDICATED LEVEL FORMER FEEDER BKR TRIPS AND "B" SIDE HEATER POWER SUPPLY CONTACTORS OPEN. WITH CHANNEL Y <27%; "B" SIDE 4160V PZR HEATER X-FORMER FEEDER BKR TRIPS AND "A" SIDE HEATER POWER SUPPLY CONTACTORS OPEN.
0711206, Rev. 17 Page 52 of 125 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Level Control Channel Signal Development The selected RRS channel level setpoint signal is continuously fed to both Pressurizer level control channels and to a two-pen level recorder located on RTGB-103, LR-111 0, where it drives the blue pen. The red pen on LR-111 0 tracks actual level as sensed by the selected level control channel. Level control channel selector switch, HS-111 0, on RTGB-103 is a two-position switch, CH. XlCH. Y, which selects which channel provides the automatic level control functions. Refer to Figure 38. Pressurizer level control channels, X & Y, are identical, consisting of a diaphragm type sensor with an electronic force balance transmitter.
- Range of 0 to 360". Levels are given in percent of this span.
(
- Both channels provide a low level trip signal at 28 [27]% to their associated heater cutoff bistable, LC-111 O-XL (YL):
On Unit 1, deenergizes all Pressurizer heaters by OPENING their respective power supply contactors, and causing a Low-Low level alarm on RTGB-103.
- [On Unit 2, TRIPS the respective side 4160V PZR heater x-former feeder BKR and OPENS opposite side heater power supply contactors. Also causes a Low-Low level alarm on the PACB]
- The heater cutoff and low-low level alarm functions are the only ones to operate off of a fixed level setpoint (28 [27]% of span).
As discussed in the pressure control section, on Unit 1 only, the Low Level Cutout switch, located on RTGB-103, allows a failed low level control channel to be disconnected from the low-low level heater cutoff circuit. Level indicator U-111 OY has a NORMAL/ISOLATE selector switch at Isolation Panel 1[2]A which electrically isolates level indication in the control room and transmits the level signal
0711206, Rev. 17 Page 53 of 125 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY ( to LI-111 OY-1 on the HSCP. The high-low level alarm is triggered by a high level deviation of +10% [67%] as sensed by LA-111 O-XH (YH) or by a low level deviation of -5% as sensed by LA-111 O-XL (YL). These level alarm bistables are differential bistables that compare the actual level signal signa!. In addition to triggering the high-low level alarm on low level, to the level setpoint signal. LA-1110-XL (YL) also sends a backup start signal to the standby charging pumps [pump]. The low-low level alarm and the high-low level alarm features are continuously and simultaneously provided by both level control channels, regardless of which one is selected on the channel selector switch, HS-111 O. Each control channel also provides level inputs to its respective level comparator (LC) and level indicator controller (LlC), which are tabulated below.
- The corresponding components in each channel perform duplicate functions.
( CHANNEL X CHANNEL Y LC-1110-XH LC-1110-YH LlC-1110X LlC-1110Y Bistable Level Control In addition to the backup start signal to the standby charging pumps [pump] provided by LA-111 O-XL (or YL) at a level deviation of -5%, bistable control is also provided by LA-1110-XL LC-1110-XH (or YH), which at a level deviation of +3.6% energizes all Pressurizer heaters and sends a backup stop signal to the standby charging pumps [pump]. Bistable (start-stop) control of the standby charging pumps [pump] is provided by level LC-111 0-1 and LC-1110-2. comparators, LC-1110-1 LC-111 0-2. However, these bistables receive as their input the analog output signal from LlC-111 OX (or Y) and therefore are covered under "Analog Level Contro!." Control." Analog Level Control (
. . Pressurizer level proportional controller, LlC-111 OX and Y, located on RTGB-103 [203],
provides a 4 to 20 ma DC current output signal used to regulate the letdown flow rate by
0711206, Rev. 17 Page 54 of 125 1 25 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY throttling letdown flow control valve(s) LCV-2110P or LCV-2110Q. Refer to Figure 39.
- Normally operated in REMOTE, where the selected RRS channel provides a temperature dependent programmed level setpoint.
- If selected to LOCAL, controller output is determined by either:
AUTO - deviation from the manually adjusted setpoint, or MANUAL - manual control of the output signal.
- LED on the controller face energizes to indicate which setpoint is selected.
LlC-111 LlC-1110X OX (Y) analog output signal is applied to the Letdown Flow Controller, HIC-111 0, located on RTGB-105 [205]. Refer to Figure 38.
- AUTO/MANUAL control station provides manual control of the letdown control valves while charging pump control remains in automatic.
In the AUTOMATIC mode, HIC-111HIC-1110 0 simply passes the analog control signal ( provided by LlC-111 OX (Y). In the MANUAL mode, output control signal is adjusted by means of a manual increase/decrease pushbutton.
- Electrical control signal is converted to a pneumatic signal for positioning the valves.
High-low signal limiter, LY-1110, limits the electric signal passed to the letdown level control valves: minimum of 29 gpm for input signals corresponding to a level deviation of -1.0%, maximum of 128 gpm for input signals corresponding to a level deviation of +9.0%.
- The signal limiter can be bypassed by means of a two-position, key-operated, NORMAL/BYPASS switch, located on RTGB-105[205].
- The BYPASS position allows the letdown flow Control valves to be fully opened or closed to facilitate reestablishing letdown flow following letdown isolation.
0711206, Rev. 17 Page 55 of 125 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Either or both letdown level control valves can be selected by means of HS-111 0-1, a three-position, 211 OP/BOTH/211 00 maintained contact selector switch, located on RTGB-105 [205].
- Air operated level control valves fail closed on loss of air/power.
Letdown control can be transferred from HIC-111 0 to HIC(EP)-111 0, a manual control station located at the HSCP:
- NORMAL/ISOLATE selector switch located on one of the isolation panels in the cable spreading room.
- When the selector switch is in ISOLATE, HIC(EP)-111 0 is completely isolated from the level control system, and a control room alarm is triggered.
The analog control signal is applied to level comparators, LC-111 0-1 and LC-111 0-2, which are dual setpoint bistables that exercise start-stop control over the standby charging pumps [pump]. ((
- Level deviation setpoints for starting and stopping the standby charging pumps are tabulated below. [The Unit 2 second standby charging pump is not used.]
FIRST STANDBY SECOND STANDBY CHARGING PUMP CHARGING PUMP START -3% DEVIATION -4% DEVIATION STOP -1% DEVIATION -2% DEVIATION (
0711206, Rev. 17 Page 125 of 125 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY PRESSURIZER LEVEL CONTROLLER LIC-1110X LlC-1110X (Y) DIGITAL DIGITAL DISPLAY DISPLAY SELECTOR I 57.54 0 REMOTE (RRS) 100 - R PROCESS VARIABLE 90 BARGRAPH 80 LOCAL ( 70 60
~r.J
~~ RAISE & LOWER SET POINT SET POINT 50 BARGRAPH 40 AUTO 30 20 ...0 ~
MANUAL 10 §~
~.-:::
D MANUAL OUTPUT 0 ~ OUTPUT INCREASE! INCREASE/ INDICATION 0 DECREASE BARGRAPH
- T 0D" o *
- 100 100 OIIllIlIl!IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIlIi 011111111111111111111111111111 (T/RCO/0711206-F3~-R8)
(TIRCOI0711206-F34-R8) FIGURE 39
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier Tier# # 1 Group # 2 KIA # 032AA2.09 Importance Rating 2.5 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation: Effect of improper HV setting Proposed Question: RO 21 During a Nuclear Instrument (NI) surveillance by I&C a check on detector input power supply voltage was found to be HIGH by 100 VDC. Which ONE of the following Nls is MOST affected by this condition? A. Unit 2 Logarithmic Startup B. Unit 1 Wide Range Log Safety C. Unit 1 Linear Power Range Safety ( D. Unit 2 Excore Neutron Wide Range 41
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): A. Correct. Only the Unit 2 Logarithmic Startup detector uses a proportional counter as detector type. Proportional counters are sensitive to applied voltage to the detector in that small increases will increase the detector output. Since the Unit 2 Logarithmic SU detector has a high voltage cutout at 10,000 cps misadjusting the detector voltage will cause the HV cutout sooner than expected and thus cause a loss of source range nuclear instrumentation. Additionally on the channel with the voltage misalignment the Boron Dilution Alarm system and Audio Count Rate (if it is the selected channel) will be lost. B. Incorrect. Uses a Fission Chamber that operates in the Ion chamber region which is not as susceptible to improper voltage settings as is a proportional counter. Also there is no hi-voltage cutout associated with this detector. Plausible if student does not understand the relation between detector voltage and detector type used the Unit1 WR Log Safety NI. C. Incorrect. Uses a Uncompensated ion chamber which is not as susceptible to improper voltage settings as is a proportional counter. Also there is no hi-voltage cutout associated with this detector. Plausible if student does not understand the relation between detector voltage and detector type used the Unit1 Linear Range safety NI. D. Incorrect. Same type detector as B. Plausible if student does not understand the relation between detector voltage and detector type used the Unit 1 WR Excore NI. Technical Reference(s): 0711403 (Attach if not previously provided) ( ------------------------- Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: ~07_0_2_4_0_3_-0_1_ _0_7_0_2_4_03_-_0_1 __ __ __ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X
-~~-
Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 43.5 45.13 Comments: ( 42
0711403, Rev. 15 Page 5 of 74 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY (fission fragments-resulting ionizations) of their interactions are detected almost instantaneously, thereby providing real time actuation signals which halt (through a trip or control rod motion inhibit) any detected anomalies in time to prevent exceeding any analyzed power limits. A common radiation detector consists of a gas filled tube with a center electrode insulated from the outer can of the detector and connected by wires to an external power source and counting instrumentation. The neutron sensitive material is either coated on the inside of the can or included in the gas which occupies the space inside the detector. See Figure 1. The wall of the tube serves as the negative electrode (cathode) and an insulated central element or wire serves as the positive electrode (anode). An external voltage is applied across the electrodes by a variable high-voltage power supply. The meter represents the output circuitry that processes and displays the signal generated by the detector. ( As incident neutrons and gamma enter and interact with the target material, ionizations occur in the gas. The ions and free electrons are then attracted to the electrode of opposite polarity, inducing a current flow in the external meter circuit. The magnitude of the current flow can be related to the intensity of the radiation field. The current vs. radiation intensity relationship is not always direct or proportional. The current vs. radiation intensity relationship can be varied by changing the voltage applied to the electrodes. The effect of varying the applied voltage on a given detector, in a constant field of a particular type of radiation, is shown by the gas-filled detector response curve. As illustrated in Figure 2, this curve has six regions.
- In the Recombination Region (I), the applied voltage is so low that the resulting electrostatic force exerts essentially no attraction upon the ions and most ion pairs recombine before they are collected.
In the Ionization Region (II), the applied voltage creates an electrostatic force of sufficient strength to move the charges away from their point of origin with a net drift velocity in a direction of opposite polarity. The type and energy level of each incident radiation will result in a fixed number of ion pairs and all ion pairs produced
0711403, Rev. 15 Page 6 of 74 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY are collected. Our Fission Chambers and Uncompensated Ion Chambers for Units 1
& 2 operate in this region.
- In the Proportional Region (III), the applied voltage results in an electrostatic force of sufficient intensity to accelerate the ions produced by radiation. The action of the accelerated ions will ionize the gas further. This process of secondary ionizations is called gas amplification. Although more ions are collected than produced by the radiation field, the number of ions collected is still directly proportional to the number originally produced. Our Unit 2 BF3 Startup Log detector operates in this region.,
region.
- In the Limited Proportional Region (IV), the higher applied voltage causes even more gas amplification. In this situation the number of ion pairs collected is no longer directly proportional to the number produced.
** In the Geiger-Mueller Region (V), the applied voltage is so high that one ionizing event leads to an "avalanche" of secondary ionization, causing all of the gas to be
( ionized. While the tube is saturated no further ionization can be detected. This period is called dead time. The period that must elapse until the avalanche is collected and a new ionizing event can produce a new avalanche is called the resolving time.
- In the Continuous Discharge Region (VI), the applied voltage is sufficient to cause current to arc continuously between the electrodes without an ionizing event. In this region, measurement of ionizing events is not possible.
The detector response curve demonstrates that the magnitude of current flow in the external meter circuit is a function of the applied voltage, as well as of the incident radiation field intensity. BASIC NEUTRON DETECTORS Being electrically neutral, neutron induced ionization occurs from the neutron being captured in a nuclei and subsequent fission event. The two types of materials most commonly used to cause this interaction are uranium and boron. Unit 2 source range monitors use a BF3 proportional gas detector and Units 1 & & 2 both use Uncompensated
0711403, Rev. 15 Page 57 of 74 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY GAS-FILLED DETECTOR CHARACTERISTIC CURVE LIMITED CONTINUOUS IONIZATION PROPORTIONAL DISCHARGE RECOMBINATION
~
1' PROPORTIONAL
~ 1 GEIGER
~ 1
+ +
II vV fC-W '" III IV VI rAe, <:.- ~Y} V.C/C ~i',} NUMBER OF ION PAIRS COLLECTED PER EVENT (TIRCOIV7I1403*F2-R9) ITIRC0I0711403*F2*R9) APPLIED VOLTAGE FIGURE 2
0711403, Rev. 15 Page 24 of 74 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY LOGARITHMIC STARTUP CHANNEL, UNIT 2 Each of the two log startup channels utilizes a boron trifluoride (BF3) detector assembly. Figure 11 illustrates the radial positioning of the detector wells located on the periphery of the reactor. Figure 18 illustrates the axial positioning of an individual detector assembly, in relation to the core midplane. The detector assembly is a can that contains four detector tubes. 4 separate detector tubes effectively increases the detector target area to the incident neutron-flux, thereby providing the high degree of sensitivity required during low flux conditions. Each tube interior is filled with boron trifluoride gas (BF3). Tubes operate in the Proportional Region of the detector characteristic curve, and exhibit gas amplification that makes them very sensitive. Tubes have a DC potential of 2500 volts applied to them.
- Powered from Reactor Regulation cabinets.
Unit 2 Logarithmic Startup Channel Circuitry As illustrated on Figure 18, the detector output is fed to a preamplifier. The preamplifier is located in containment, reducing the effects of plant electrical noise and cable attenuation by amplifying the detector output signal. The output of the preamplifier is an analog pulse signal that is proportional to the neutron-flux. The discriminator converts this signal into a square wave compatible with the rest of the startup circuitry. This is accomplished by amplifying the signal and passing it through a comparator. The comparator removes gamma-induced pulses by rejecting all input pulses that fall below a preset threshold level. The output of the comparator is a spiked signal, the frequency of which is proportional to the neutron-flux. The function of the log count rate circuit is to provide an analog output voltage
0711403, Rev. 15 Page 25 of 74 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY I, proportional to the log of the square wave input Signal. signal. This function is accomplished by passing the square wave signal through a series of log counter circuits. The output of the counter circuits is a DC voltage proportional to the log of the input pulse count rate.
- The output of the log count rate circuit is displayed locally on a front panel meter.
The meter has a log scale that ranges from 1 to 10 55 cps
- A Startup Count Rate Recorder is also located on RTGB 204.
- The high counts-per-second bistable monitors the log count rate output and actuates a HIGH START-UP CPS alarm light at -10,000 cps cps..
*. To prolong the life of the detectors, voltage is automatically removed when power exceeds -10,000 cps.
- The operator can also manually remove detector voltage with the switches mounted
( on RTGB 204. 4
- MUST manually energize the detectors when decreasing power (at 4 %)
following shutdown.
- A pushbutton on the drawer enables viewing either the Startup or Control Channel detector voltage.
Audible Countrate Circuitry The audio count rate (ACR) circuit provides an audible indication of startup detector counts. Because the range of the startup channel is from 1 to 10 55 counts per second, it is necessary to divide the input count rate to provide the operator with a discernible audio level change during increasing or decreasing counts. The divider network provides a voltage that is proportional to the input frequency. This voltage level is used as an input to a tone generator. The tone generator is capable of producing five tone output frequencies, dependent on the input voltage, increasing in frequency with counts. ( ( The audio count rate circuit provides two audio outputs. One supplies an audio signal to speakers located in the containment, and the other supplies speakers in the control
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# Tier # 1 Group # 2 KIA # 036AA1.02 Importance Rating 3.1 Fuel Handling Accident: ARM system Proposed Question: RO 22 On Unit 2 a spent fuel bundle has been dropped while being transported across the Spent Fuel Pool by the Spent Fuel Handling Machine. The status of the Fuel Handling Radiation Monitors as indicated on PC-ii PC-11 are: SA SB GAG-OO? Red GAG-OOB Red GAG-009 Amber GAG-010 GAG-Oi0 Amber GAG-011 Amber GAG-012 Red At the same time Unit 2 dropped their fuel assembly Unit 2 had a spurious CIAS actuation and has NOT been reset. Which ONE of the following correctly describes the status of the Fuel Handling Building ( Ventilation System? A. It remains in its normal configuration. B. Normal ventilation isolates but Spent Fuel Pool exhaust does NOT transfer to the Shield Building Ventilation exhaust system. C. Normal ventilation isolates and Spent Fuel Pool exhaust transfers to BOTH trains of the Shield Building Ventilation exhaust system. o Normal ventilation isolates and Spent Fuel Pool exhaust transfers to ONLY one train of the Shield Building Ventilation exhaust system. 43
( Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): A.lncorrect, A. Incorrect, Could be chosen if student forgets high alarms meeting the 2/3 logic for channel B. B. correct. The 2/3 logic is met on train B by two detectors in high as indicated by the Red status on GAG-OOB. CIAS on Unit 2 to prevent lineup to the SBVS. Normal FHB Vent will isolate when either train of radiation monitors go into 2/3 logic as indicated by two B C.lncorrect. The 2/3 logic is met on train B by two detectors in high as indicated by the Red status on GAG-OOB. Either of the two trains with 2/3 logic isolates the normal ventilation flowpath, and then aligns it to the SBVS exhaust units provided Unit 2 does not have a CIAS actuation signal present. Since there was a CIAS actuation ONLY the normal ventilation flowpath was isolated. D. Incorrect. Could be chosen if either student does not recall or mixes up the channel logic with the train specific logic used with the Control Room Radiation Monitors and does not recall the affect a CIAS will have on the lineup to SBV. Technical Reference(s): 0711601 Auxiliary Building (Attach if not previously provided) Ventilation Systems Text, 0711411 U2 RMS Text, 2-0NP-26.020NP 26.02 ONP Area Radiation Monitors, Containment ( Systems DBD Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: PSL-0702602-41, 0702601-12 & (As available) 13 Question Source: Bank # Bank# 2095 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 Comments: Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO ( 44
~t:VI"IUI" NO.:
REVISION PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 6 AREA RADIATION MONITORS ( PROCEDURE NO.:
;99 of 18 2-0NP-26.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 14.2 4.2 Fuel Handling Building Radiation Monitors (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 2. (continued)
B. EVACUATE the fuel pool area and INSTRUCT personnel to remain on the landing outside the Fuel Handling Building door until monitored for contamination. c. C. CONTACT Security to ensure all personnel have exited the FHB. NOTE There are a total 6 Spent Fuel Pool Area monitors divided into 2 groups. Two out of three HIGH alarms on either train will initiate all actions. SA Train SB Train RC-26-7 (GAG-~O?) (GAG-OO?) RC-26-8 (GAG-008) RC-26-9 (GAG-009) (GAG-01O) RC-26-10 (GAG-010) RC-26-11 (GAG-011) RC-26-12 (GAG-012) D. 11 EITHER of the following conditions exists:
- Two or more SA Train FHB monitors are in HIGH alarm condition
- Two or more SB Train FHB monitors are in HIGH alarm condition Then PERFORM the following:
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE; PAGE: 6 AREA RADIATION MONITORS 10 of 18 PROCEDURE NO.: 2-0NP-26.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 , 4.2 Fuel Handling Building Radiation Monitors (continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
~D.
.2. D. (continued)
- 1. VERIFY the following fans 1.1 STOP the following fans at are OFF: the HVAC panel or locally as
- HVS-6, Fuel Pool Supply conditions allow:
Fan
- HVS-6, Fuel Pool Supply
- HVS-7, Fuel Handling Fan Bldg Supply Fan
- HVS-7, Fuel Handling
- HVE-15, Fuel Handling Bldg Supply Fan Bldg Exhaust Fan
- HVE-15, Fuel Handling
- HVE-16A, Fuel Pool Bldg Exhaust Fan Exhaust Fan
- HVE-16A, Fuel Pool
- HVE-16B, Fuel Pool Exhaust Fan Exhaust Fan
- HVE-16B, Fuel Pool
- HVE-17, Fuel Bldg Swgr Swg r Exhaust Fan
( Area Exhaust Fan
- HVE-17, Fuel Bldg Swgr (local indication only) Area Exhaust Fan
- 2. VERIFY the following FHB 2.1 PULL the following fuses to dampers are CLOSED: FAIL CLOSED the applicable dampers (located behind the
- 0-33, Fuel Hdlg Bldg HVAC panel):
Inlet Damper
- 0-35, Fuel Hdlg Bldg
- 120V AC SA F-21 Outlet Damper (0-29/0-31 )
(0-2910-31
- 0-29, Fuel Pool Inlet
- 120V AC SA F-80 Damper (0-33/0-35)
- 0-31, Fuel Pool Outlet Damper
- 120V AC SB F-21 (0-30/0-32)
(0-3010-32)
- 0-34, Fuel Hdlg Bldg Inlet Damper
- 120V AC SB F-80
- 0-36, Fuel Hdlg Bldg (0-34/0-36)
Outlet Damper
- 0-30, Fuel Pool Inlet Damper
- 0-32, Fuel Pool Outlet Damper
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE;," PAGE: .**i
'\:-' /'"
6 AREA RADIATION MONITORS 11 of 1i'18 PROCEDURE NO.: 2-0NP-26.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 4.2 Fuel Handling Building Radiation Monitors (continued)
~
INSTRUCTIONS D. (continued)
- 3. VERIFY the following CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 3.1 PERFORM the following on components are aligned as the HVCB:
indicated:
** FCV-25-30, Fuel ** OPEN FCV-25-30 at the Handling Emerg Vent HVAC panel Vlv, is OPEN.
** FCV-25-32, SBVS ** CLOSE FCV-25-32 at the Isolation Valve, is HVAC panel CLOSED.
- HVE-6A, SBVS Exhaust
- START HVE-6A at the Fan, is ON. HVAC panel
( ** FCV-25-31, Fuel ** OPEN FCV-25-31 at the Handling Emerg Vent HVAC panel. Vlv., is OPEN.
- FCV-25-33, SBVS
- CLOSE FCV-25-33 at the Isolation Valve, is HVAC panel.
CLOSED.
- HVE-6B, SBVS Exhaust
- START HVE-6B at the Fan, is ON. HVAC panel.
( SIMPLIFIED FUNCTIONAL DIAGRAM FOR \ SPENT FUEL POOL 2 OF 3 LOGIC ASSEMBLIES RELAY CONTACT STATUS FROM MONITOR RM-80: CONTACTS OPEN ON HIGH RADIATION ALARM AND WHEN MONITOR IS IN SERVICE
/~-----------------~~----------------~
~-------------------~~----------------~\..
SA MONITORS SB MONITORS
~---~II
..---_-----11 I III~--~
11----_-----. r---------------------------- 1 r--------- --- --- -------------1 1 1 1------------- --- --- ---------j1
,'f 1
1 1r 1J ,'r 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 OF 3 LOGIC 1 1 1 1 2 OF 3 LOGIC 20F3LOGIC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .. ~ ISOLATION 1--..,: - , 1 1 1 ~~. B~ 1 1 1 1 BOX 1 1 1 ( : . - - - - - - - ; - 1_:---;:---; ISOLATION : 1 1 1 1 1 1 BOX BOX r+-4. I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 7 I 1 I I 1 1 1 1 1
,,I.
r
,Ir 1
1 1 1 1 I I 1 1 11 OR 11 1I I OR 1 I OR 1 1 1 I I 1 1 I I ,J 1 I 1 1 1
- ENERGIZE : ENERGIZE I ALARM 1 ALARM 1
I RELAY I 1 RELAY 1 1 1 1 1 1 IL ____________________________ 1 11____________________________ ..J
~---------------------------- ----------------------------~
LOGIC ASSEMBLY LOGIC ASSEMBLY SAFETY TRAIN SA SAFETY TRAIN SB (TIRC0I0711411*F20-R5) (TIRCOI0711411-F20-R5) RELAY CONTACT STATUS: CONTACTS OPEN WHEN RELAY IS ENERGIZED TO DE-ENERGIZE ALARM RELAY Figure 4 0711411 Rev 11, Page 64 of 78 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
0711601 R16 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Unit 1 Fuel Pool Exhaust Fans (HVE-16A and HVE-16B) HVE-168) The Fuel Pool Exhaust Fans are each 100% capacity fans. Each has a capacity of 10,350 din. cfm. Nonnally only one fan is running. The fans are powered from 480V MCC-1A8MCC-IA8 and MCC-1B8. Each fan is equipped with an air operated inlet damper which auto opens on start of the respective fan. The dampers fail closed. These fans can be controlled by local start/stop pushbuttons or by spring return STOP STOP/NORM/START
/NORM/START control switches on RTGB-I06.
RTGB-106. Indication lights are provided on the RTGB. Flow switches are located in each exhaust duct. Low flow alanns annunciate in the Control Room. Note: EPIP-09, Offsite Dose Calculations, uses a conservatively high flow rate for certain fans as an added safety analysis safety margin. For example, it uses 11,385 dincfm for the 1-HVE-16 fans. Unit 2 Nonnal operation of the Unit 2 Fuel Pool Ventilation System is similar to Unit 1. (Refer to Figure 10.) ofthe ( The Supply Fan (2-HVS-6) draws air from the atmosphere through prefilters. The air is discharged to the fuel pool area. The Exhaust Fans (2HVE-16NB) (2HVE-16A/B) pull air from the fuel pool area and draw it through prefilters, HEP HEPAA filters, and charcoal adsorbers. The Exhaust Fans discharge the air to the fuel handling building vent stack. The Unit 2 Fuel Pool Ventilation System has a different physical configuration than Unit 1 to allow the Shield Building Ventilation System (SBVS) to provide emergency ventilation from the Fuel Handling Building in the event of a fuel handling accident. Unit 2 is equipped with pool exhaust duct work, supply and exhaust dampers and cross connect duct work with SBVS to provide a flowpath to the SBVS. (Refer to Figure 12.) The system is required to maintain a negative pressure of 0.125 in wg in the Fuel Handling Building after actuation of a FHB High Radiation Signal.
. . Radiation levels in the spent fuel pool area are monitored by 6 radiation monitors. These radiation monitors are divided into 2 trains of of33 monitors each and designated Train A or Train B. If If22 out of3 of 3 radiation monitors in either train detect a high radiation condition, the Fuel Pool Ventilation System is automatically reconfigured.
( Page 52 of87
0711601 R16 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY normal fuel pool ventilation flowpath is isolated and secured by the following actions: The nonnal (
- 1. Fuel Pool Exhaust Fans 2-HVE-16AIB 2-HVE-16A/B stop due to the radiation signa1.
signal.
- 2. Fuel Pool Supply Fan 2-HVS-6 stops due to both exhaust fans being stopped.
- 3. Fuel Pool Isolation Dampers (D-29, 30, 31, 32) close.
- 4. Fuel Handling Building Dampers (D-33, 34, 35, 36) close.
- 5. Equipment Room Fan 2HVE-17 stops.
The SBVS cross-connect flowpath is established as follows:
- 1. FHB to SBVS cross connect valves FCV 30 and FCV 31 open
- 2. SBVS Nonnal Normal Suction Isolations FCV 32, FCV-25-33 FCV-25-32, FCV-25-33 shut
- 3. SBVS Exhaust Fans 2HVE-6A/6B start on High Rad on 2/3 monitor on either Train.
- 4. Dampers FCV-25-11 and FCV-25-12 open to provide outside air intake to supplement the air being drawn from the fuel pool area. Makeup air to the fuel pool area is from inleakage.
- 5. SBVS Exhaust Fan Dampers (D-23, D-24) Throttle to maintain proper negative pressure in the Fuel Handling Building.
- 6. PDS-25-17A (B) Measure the differential pressure between the fuel pool area and the outside atmosphere. FCV-25-11/12 FCV 11112 Open at -2.0 in wg. Dampers D-23124 D-23/24 will throttle to maintain
(
-0.2 in wg.
\).,'V
~V If a CIS [CIAS] signal is received, the SBVS cross connect flowpath is terminated tenninated regardless of high radiation in the fuel pool area. The FHB to SBVS cross connect valves (FCV-25-30/31) will shut.
SBVS nonnal normal ventilation path valves (FCV-25-32 and FCV-25-33) will open. The net effect is that if there is a high radiation condition in the spent fuel pool area and CIS [CIAS] concurrently, Fuel Pool Ventilation System supply and exhaust fans will stop, fuel pool isolation dampers will close, Fuel Handling Building supply and exhaust fans will stop, and the Fuel Handling Building isolation dampers will close to isolate the Fuel Handling Building. SBVS exhaust fans will start and nonnal normal ventilation flowpath isolation valves will open. ( Page 53 of87
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v St. Lucie Unit 2 Document No. DBD-CNTMT-2 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Revision 2 Design Basis Document Page 42 To maintain offsite doses and control room doses within analyzed values, the shield building annulus must be maintained at sub-atmospheric pressure. To ensure the vacuum conditions will be maintained, automatic actuation features are provided to start the second standby unit (assuming it was manually shutdown and placed in standby), if the running unit fails. The shield building vent system also receives an automatic start signal during spent fuel handling accidents. In this mode, the system provides a filtered
, release path for the fuel handling building ventilation system exhaust stream.
Valves FCV-25-32 and -33 automatically close (and valves FCV-25-30 and FCV-25-31 automatically open) on a fuel handling building high radiation signal. High radiation was selected as the control variable because it provides the most direct indication of an accident. Manual start capability is provided for surveillance testing. (
St. Lucie Unit 2 Document No. DBD-CNTMT-2 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Revision 2 Design Basis Document Page 242 COMPONENT FUNCTIONS Section 7.4.12.1 Component ID ID Description FCV-25-30,31 FHB Ventilation System Branch Isolation Valve Safety-Related Functions "IfJIIII
- 1. Shall remain closed during LOCA conditions to prevent fission products (i.e.,
containment leakage) from bypassing the shield building vent filters and leaking to the outside environment. 2.
..".. Shall automatically open on a fuel handling building high radiation signal to align the suction of the SBVS fans to the FHB ventilation system. This is necessary to keep radiation releases within 10CFR1 00 limits during spent fuel pool accidents.
OCFR 100
- 3. Shall passively maintain the integrity of the shield building vent system ductwork.
Quality Related Functions None ( Not Nuclear Safety Functions None
St. Lucie Unit 2 Document No. DBD-CNTMT-2 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Revision 2 Design Basis Document Page 246 COMPONENT PARAMETER WORKSHEET Section 77.4.12.2c A.12.2c Component I D Description A. Parameter Controls B. Value FHB High Radiation Signal; CIAS C. Source 1. St. Lucie Unit 2 UFSAR, Section 6.2.3.2.2 (Ref. 10.1.1) D. Background/Reason for Value These valves must open during spent fuel handling accidents to prevent the release of radioactivity to the outside environment. High radiation was selected as the control variable because it provides the most direct indication of an accident.
, Although a LOCA concurrent with a spent fuel handling accident is not a design basis event for the plant, a CIAS will override the FHB radiation signal and initiate depressurization of the shield building annulus (Source 1).
( (
St. Lucie Unit 2 Document No. DBD-CNTMT-2 CONTAI NMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT Revision 2 Design Basis Document Page 247 COMPONENT PARAMETER WORKSHEET Section 7.4.12.2d Component 10 ID Description FCV-25-30,31 FCV-25-30, 31 FHB Ventilation System Branch Isolation Valve A. Parameter Operator Type B. Value Motor C. Source 1. St. Lucie Unit 2 UFSAR, Section 6.2.3.2.2 (Ref. 10.1.1) D. Background/Reason for Value These valves perform a safety function in both the open and closed positions. For example, the valves must remain closed during the initial stages of a large break LOCA to prevent fission products (i.e., containment leakage) from bypassing the shield building vent filters and leaking to the outside atmosphere - through the fuel handling building. The shield building is pressurized during this period so all out flow must be filtered prior to release to maintain offsite doses within analyzed limits. The valves must automatically open (and remain open) during spent fuel handling accidents to provide a filtered release path for the fuel handling building exhaust system. This action also maintains offsite doses within analyzed limits. To satisfy both of these conditions, the valves are equipped with "fail as-is" operators. A "fail as-is" operator will keep the valve in its preset position, regardless of any external fault condition. The consequences of using an operator that changes state upon failure would be detrimental to both safety functions. Most large diameter butterfly valves are equipped with electric motor operators or pneumatic operators. Motor operators were chosen in this case because they satisfied all of the design requirements with minimal hardware and accessories. Pneumatic operators could provide the required failure mode but were eliminated because they would require safety grade air or an accumulator system to operate under post-accident conditions.
St. Lucie Unit 2 Document No. DBD-CNTMT-2 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS Revision 2 Design Basis Document Page 248 Since shield building depressurization is the primary function of the system, controls are provided to automatically close the FHB branch lines (and open the annulus suction lines) upon receipt of a CIAS. It should be noted, however, that the occurrence of a LOCA during a spent fuel handling accident is not a design basis event for the plant (Source 1). Offsite power would have to be available to accomplish the override function. ( (
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valve is opened automatically when the annulus differential pressure reaches one inch wg negative. The check valve in the cooling line is designed to have a pressure drop of not more than 3.0 inch wg and to open at 1.0 inch wg negative to provide vacuum control in the system and to allow outside air to cool the filters. The SBVS is also interconnected to the spent fuel pool area exhaust duct. Upon receipt of a high radiation signal in the fuel pool area, the exhaust air is directed to the SBVS S BVS filtration units. un its. The motor operated butterfly valves FCV-25-30 and 31 open and the exhaust fans start automatically. Motor operated valves FCV-25-32 and 33 close to isolate the annulus. Although a fuel handling accident inside the F HB concurrent with a LOCA is not considered a design basis event, a CIAS overrides the Fuel Handling Building high radiation signal and initiates the depressurization of the Shield Building annulus. The Fuel Handling Building Ventilation System is further discussed in Subsection 9.4.2. Each of the SBVS intake trains is also connected to the Continuous Containm enUHydrogen Purge System. This connection, manually initiated from the control room, provides hydrogen purge capability while minimizing offsite radiological consequences. T he Continuous ContainmenUHydrogen Purge System description is provided in Subsection 9.4.8.8. Both SBVS subsystems are automatically started by a CIAS or high radiation rad iation signal from the Fuel Handling Building. One can be manually shut down and placed in the standby mode. The standby subsystem automatically restarts if the operating subsystem should fall. The cross connection valve is opened from the control room to assure air flow through the failed system. Detectors in the charcoal char coal beds annunciate tem peratures exceeding 200 OF. of. The design basis review to determine the maximum expected differential pressure has been completed for motor-operated butterfly valves FCV-25-32 and FCV-25-33 in response to NRC Generic Letter 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance. ( FCV-25-29 and FCV-25-34 were removed from the GL 89-10 program. 6.2.3.3 Design Evaluation 6.2.3.3.1 Performance Requirements and Capabilities Each of the two full capacity fan-filter trains of the Shield Building Ventilation System, along with the Shield Building, are designed to fulfill the performance requirements stated in the design bases in Subsection 6.2.3.1. The analysis of the functional capability of the SBVS to depressurize and maintain a uniform negative pressure within the Shield Building annulus is performed for the 9.82 ft2 ft2 double ended suction leg slot break LOCA using the WATEMPT computer code described in Appendix 6.2B. The description of the development of the pipe break mass and energy release rate and the containment initial conditions are contained in Subsection 6.2.1. Any additional initial conditions or changes from those listed in Subsection 6.2.1 are contained in Table 6.2-49. The same heat transfer coefficients are applied whether the surface temperature exceeds the annulu s atmosphere or the annulus atmosphere temperature exceeds the surface temperature. 6.2-47 Amendment No. 18 (01/08)
Tier# 1 Group # 2 K/A# 037AK3.07 Importance Rating 4.2 Steam Generator Tube Leak: Actions contained in EOP for S/G tube leak Proposed Question: RO 23 A Steam Generator Tube Rupture has occurred on 1B S/G with the following plant conditions:
- 1 RCP in each loop is running.
- T-avg is 475°F.
- 1B S/G isolation is complete.
- 1B S/G pressure is 840 psia.
In accordance with 1-EOP-04, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, the RCS pressure band should be _(1)_ to: _(2)_. be_(1)_ A. 1) 790 - 890 psia;
- 2) meet RCP seal requirements AND to minimize RCS leakage into the S/G.
B. 1) 790 - 890 psia;
- 2) allow control of ruptured S/G level while minimizing dilution AND to
( minimize RCS leakage into the S/G. C. 1) 740 - 940 psia;
- 2) meet RCP seal requirements AND to prevent lifting a secondary safety valve.
D. 1) 740 - 940 psia;
- 2) allow control of ruptured S/G level while minimizing dilution AND to prevent lifting a secondary safety valve.
( 45
( Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. Partially correct but not a seal requirement limit. B. Correct. -+50psia band for RCS pressure around faulted S/G pressure to limit leakage into S/G 'vvhile while restricting backflow from the S/G that could lead to dilution of the RCS. C. Incorrect. Partially correct but upper pressure limit should be 890psia. Basis on lower limit not a seal requirement limit and upper pressure band not concerned with lifting S/G safety valves. D. Incorrect. Not 100 psi band. Basis on upper pressure band not concerned concerned with lifting S/G safety valves. Technical Reference(s): 1-EOP-04 S/G Tube Rupture (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _P_S_L---'O_P_S_-_0_70_2_8_2_5_-0_7 _P_S_L_-_O_P_S_-O' __
---'-0_2--'-82_5=---_07_ __
_ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # 2259 ( Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5,10 55.43 Comments: 46
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 23 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 11 of 46 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE RCP operation is desirable while depressurizing the RCS during a SGTR event.
- RCP operation takes precedence over equalizing primary and secondary pressures.
- Monitor RCPs for cavitation as the NPSH curve is approached and exceeded.
- Maintain minimum subcooling within the limits of Figure 1A.
o 11. Depressurize the RCS 11.1 If RCS pressure can NOT be LOWERED and MAINTAINED PERFORM a controlled RCS within the specified criteria, ( depressurization as follows: Then OPERATE the PORVs or RCGVS to reduce pressure. A. MAINTAIN RCS pressure within ALL the following criteria (listed in order of priority):
- Within the limits of Figure 1A, 1A, RCS Pressure Temperature
- Less than 930 psia
- Above the minimum pressure for RCP operation
- Approximately equal to the most affected S/G pressure (within 50 psia)
B. OPERATE Main or Auxiliary Pressurizer spray. C. If HPSI throttle criteria are met, Then THROTTLE SI flow. REFER TO Appendix S, Safety Injection Throttling and Restoration.
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 1 Group # 2 KIA # 051AG2.4.35 Importance Rating 3.8 Loss of Condenser Vacuum: Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects. Proposed Question: RO 24 Unit 1 is performing a startup and is attempting to draw a vacuum in the Main Condenser. The Control Room has directed the NPO to place the 1 B Hogging Ejector in service. The NPO throttles V16203 open to approximately 200 psig steam pressure and then opens V12576, 1B B Hogging Ejector Inlet from Cndsrs Isol. Little to no steam flow from the Hogging ejector exhaust is observed. Which ONE of the following is the most probable cause of little to NO steam flow from the Hogging ejector exhaust and the Operator response? A. Steam pressure is to low. Open V16203 to approximately 400 psig steam f !\ pressure. B. Steam pressure is to low. Verify proper operation of PCV-12-29 Steam pressure control valve to SJAEs. C. The Hogging ejector is experiencing Ejector stalling. Request permission from the Control Room to place the 1A Hogging Ejector in service. D. The Hogging ejector is experiencing Ejector stalling. Close V12576, 1B Hogging Ejector Inlet from Cndsrs Isol. 47
Proposed Answer: D Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: 200 psig steam pressure is correct to Hogging ejectors. 400 psig steam pressure is correct for Steam Jet Air Ejectors, not Hogging ejectors. B. Incorrect: PCV-12-29 is steam pressure regulator for SJAE. Hogging ejectors steam pressure control is strictly manual valve control using V16203. C. Incorrect: Placing the other Hogging ejector in service will not correct the 'stalling' condition. The 1A Hogging ejector will also be in a 'stalled' condition. D. Correct Technical Reference(s): ONP-1-0610031 Loss Of (Attach if not previously provided) Condenser Vacuum Appendix A ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _07_0_2_8_6_0--'0_8 _0-"-7'--'0:. .: 2:. . : .8. :. . 60-"----=-0..:. . 8_ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge - X X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 --- 10 55.43 5,13 Comments: 48
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 60 6D LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM 16 of 16 PROCEDURE NO.: ONP-1-0610031 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 APPENDIX A PLACING HOGGING EJECTORS IN SERVICE (Page 2 of 2) NOTE An Operator Aid has been placed at the Hogging Ejectors. Any revision to this section of the procedure shall verify the validity of the Operator Aid and, if changes are necessary, a Label Request shall be initiated to incorporate these chan changeses on the new Operator Aid Plaque.
- 2. !f placing 18 If 1B Hogging Ejector in service, Then PERFORM the following:
A. OPEN V08181, MS To Hogging Ejector Isol. NOTE Approximately 3 turns ODen on V16203 is approximately 200 psig. Approximatel B. THROTTLE OPEN V16203, Aux Stm to 18 1B Hogging Ejector Isol, to maintain 200 psig on PI-12-488, PI-12-48B, 181B Hogging Ejector Stm Press. t\ CAUTION An abnormal condition, such as no steam flow ow or intermittent steam flow from the Hogging ejector exhaust is indication of Ejector stalling and can lead to rapid loss of condenser vacuum if the inlet from the condenser is not immediatel immediately isolated. C. OPEN V12576, 18 1B Hogging Ejector Inlet from Cndsrs Isol. D. OPEN V12847, 1A111N18 B Cndsr Crosstie to SJAE/Hogging Ejectors 1501.Isol. E. When 181 B Hogging Ejector is in service, Then REMOVE SJAE(s) from ;:a
;0 OJ o
service in accordance with 1-NOP-12.07, Condenser Air Removal System Operations. NOTE PI-12-48B are maintained closed during Hogging Ejector Isolation valves for PI-12-488 operation to maintain gauge fidelity. Operation of these valves should be limited to verifying veri in the operating 0 eratin steam pressure ressure of the Ho in E*ector. Hogging Ejector. F. ~3 CLOSE V16204 and V16205 (PI-12-488 (PI-12-48B Isolations). END OF APPENDIX A
~ ~\ ~~J REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: ';
29 AUXILIARY STEAM SYSTEMS - PLACING IN SERVICE 15 of 22 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-0820020 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 8.3 Placing Auxiliary Steam to the Steam Jet Air Ejectors In Service (continued)
- 1. (continued)
VALVE NO. DESCRIPTION POSITION INITIAL TIME DATE V08427 VOS427 PIC-12-29 1501 Isol (TG8/42/N-6/E-D) (TGB/42/N-6/E-D) OPEN V08265 VOS265 PCV-12-29 Hi Side 8ypass Bypass (TG8/46/S-5/E-D) (TGB/46/S-5/E-D) CLOSED VOS266 V08266 PCV-12-29 Low Side 8ypass Bypass (TG8/46/S-5/E-D) (TGB/46/S-5/E-D) OPEN V1616S V16168 (TGB/47/N-6/W-C) PS-12-31 Root (TG8/47/N-6/W-C) OPEN V16169 (TGB/47/N-6/W-C) PS-12-31 Root (TG8/47/N-6/W-C) OPEN I V12512 PI-12-32A 1501 Isol (TG8/72/S-8/W-C) (TGB/72/S-S/w-C) OPEN V12513 V12514 PCY-12-.29
,.PI-12-32B 1501 PI-12-328 Isol (TG8n2/S-8/W-C)
PI-12-33A 1501 (TGB/72/S-S/w-C) Isol (TG8/69/S-8/W-C) (TGB/69/S-S/W-C) Pressure Control Valve to SJAEs (TG8/41/S-5/E-D) (TGB/41/S-5/E-D) OPEN OPEN AUTOJ.SET
.r.;;-.Ann-#
@400#
V12515 PI-12-33B 1501 PI-12-338 Isol (TG8/69/S-8/W-C) (TGB/69/S-S/W-C) OPEN V12004 Aux. Steam Supply to SJAE A Intcndsr (1st Stage) 1501. Isol. (TG8/71/S-8/W-C) (TGB/71/S-S/w-C) CLOSED V12007 Aux. Steam Supply to SJAE A Aftcndsr (2nd Stage) 1501.Isol. (TG8/70/S-8/W-C) (TGB/70/S-S/w-C) CLOSED V12010 Aux. Steam Supply to SJAE 8 (1 st Stage) 1501. B intcndsr (1st Isol. (TG8/71/S-8/W-C) (TGB/71/S-S/w-C) CLOSED V12001 Aux. Steam Supply to SJAE 8 B Aftcndsr (2nd Stage) 1501. Isol. (TG8/70/S-8/W-C) (TGB/70/S-S/w-C) CLOSED
'~I'
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 1 Group # 2 KiA # KJA# 060AA2.02 Importance Rating 3.1 Radwasle ReI. The possible location of a radioactive gas leak with the assistance of PEO, health physics and Accidental Gaseous Radwaste chemistry personnel. Question: Proposed Question: R025 RO 25 Unit 1 is in Mode 1, 100% power with the following conditions:
- Waste Gas Decay Tank (WGDT) 1A 1A was recently filled << 24 hours ago) and is currently isolated.
- Waste Gas Decay Tank 1B is in service. .
- Waste Gas Decay Tank 1C has been isolated for 6 months. V6565 "Waste Gas Stop valve".has been opened and the release has just commenced.
- Prior to commencing the gas release, WGDT pressures were locally verified to be:
o 1 1AA WGDT pressure is 155 psig o 1B WGDT pressure is 15 psig o 1C WGDT pressure is 150 psig 15 minutes after the release is started the following is noted by the crew: (
- Annunciator N-38, WASTE GAS DISCH RAD HIGH alarms.
- Channel 42 (Waste Gas Radiation Monitor) blue FAIL light is energized.
- The SNPO reports WGDT pressures are as follows:
o 1A WGDT pressure is 115 pSig psig and stable o 1B WGDT pressure is 20 psig and very slowly rising o 1C WGDT pressure is 120 psig and stable
- 1) Which ONE of the following is the cause of annunciator N-38
- 2) the status of the Waste Gas Radiation Monitor is:
WGOT 1A is cross connected to WGDT 1C. A. 1) WGDT 1C. V6565 is open.
- 2) failed and V656S B. 1) WGDT 1C is cross connected to WGDT 1B.
2). functioning as expected and V656S V6565 is closed C. 1) WGDT 1C is cross connected to WGDT 1B. V6565 is open ..
- 2) failed and V656S D. 1) WGDT 1 1A A is cross connected to WGDT 1C 2). functioning as expected and V6S65 V6565 is closed 49
\ Proposed Answer: 0 Explanation (Optional):
A. Incorrect. The BLUE fail light on the Waste Gas Rad Monitor is normally lit when the rad monitor is functional B. Incorrect. WGDT 1B pressure is rising so it could not be cross-tied with WGDT 1C C. Incorrect. WGDT 1B pressure is rising so it could not be cross-tied with WGDT 1C. D. Correct. The 1A WGDT has been inadvertently cross tied to the 1C WGDT and a valid high radiation alarm has occurred which caused V6565 to auto close and N-38 to come in. The BLUE fail light on the Waste Gas Rad Monitor is normally lit when the rad monitor is functional. Reference( s): Technical Reference(s): 1-0NP-26.01,1-ARP-01-N38 (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _O-=-5~Oc.::2,-=-O--,--19,,--...::..O-=-9 0502019-09 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As availa available) ble) ( Question Source: Bank # 3314 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 - 5- - Comments: ( 50
3E PROCESS RADIATION MONITORS PROCEDURE NO.: 1-0NP-26.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 4.6 Gaseous Waste Monitor INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 1. ENSURE V6565, Plant Vent from GST and GOT FCV, is CLOSED.
- 2. NOTIFY Chemistry that release was terminated.
- 3. DETERMINE alarm validity by performing the following:
A. DEPRESS and RELEASE the C.1 !f If there is a source check check source (C.S.) button to malfunction, ensure the alarm is NOT Then NOTIFY I&C. caused by a stuck check source. B. TEST the CALI BRATE circuit: CALIBRATE B.1 !fIf proper response is NOT seen when function switch is placed to
- 1. PLACE the function CALIBRATE,
( selector switch to the Then NOTIFY I&C. CALIBRATE CALI BRATE position.
- 2. VERIFY the meter responds as expected.
- 3. PLACE the function selector switch to NORMAL.
C. VERIFY the blue FAIL light is C.1 NOTIFY I&C of component energized, indicating power failure .. available and no component failures. D. VERIFY increased or increasing trend on FR-6648, Waste Gas Radiation.
PROCEDURE TITLE: OA ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE 1-ARP-01-N38 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL N WASTE GAS DISCH RAD HIGH N-38 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT: 63XJRT -6628 63x/RT-6628 RTGB-105 De-energized K42A Rad Monitor Cabinet B Variable (High-High) K42C Rad Monitor Cabinet B Detector Failure ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. V6565, Waste Gas Stop Valve, indicates CLOSED on RTGB-105.
- 2. FRlRR-6648, Liquid Monitor Channel 42, indicates a rising trend to the Release Permit setpoint on RTGB-105.
- 3. FR/RR-6648, Gaseous Monitor Channel 42, indicates discharge flow STOPPED on RTGB-105.
OPERATOR ACTIONS:
- 1. ENSURE V6565, Waste Gas Stop Valve, indicates CLOSED on RTGB-105.
( 2. VERIFY FRlRR-6648, Gaseous Monitor Channel 42, indicates flow STOPPED on RTGB-105.
- 3. GO TO 1-0NP-26.01, Process Radiation Monitors.
CAUSES: This annunciator may be caused by a high radiation detected in the gaseous waste monitor or by a monitor malfunction (ratemeter or detector failure). The high radiation trip setpoint is based on the limits of the Release Permit. REFERENCES 1. CWD CWO 8770-B-327 sheets 456, 562, 573 and 590
- 2. P&ID 8770-G-078 sheet 163A
- 3. TEDB
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 1 Group # 2 KIA # 060AA2.02 Importance Rating 3.1 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rei. The possible location of a radioactive gas leak with the assistance of EO, health physics and chemistry personnel. Proposed Question: RO 25 Unit 1 is in Mode 4 with a Reactor Coolant System degasification in progres
- Waste Gas Decay Tank 1 A was recently filled << 24 hours ago and is currently isolated.
1A o 1A WGDT pressure is 155 psig. 1A
- Waste Gas compressor 1A 1A is in service and aligned to aste Gas Decay Tank (WGDT) 1B.
o 1B WGDT pressure is 15 psig.
- Waste Gas Decay Tank 1C has sufficiently deca ed (> 6 months) and is currently aligned for release via V6565.
o 1C WGDT pressure is 150 psig. Shortly after the release is started the following curs: (
- Annunciator N-38, WASTE GAS 01 H RAD HIGH alarms.
- The SNPO reports WGDT pressur, s are as follows: 1A 140 psig; 1B 20 psig; 1C 140 psig.
** Area radiation levels have rema' ed constant.
Which ONE of the following is t cause of the accidental gas release and what action is required to be taken to stop the release? A. 1) Waste G s Compressor 1A is discharging into Waste Waste Gas Decay Tanks 1A & 1C.
- 2) Ensure losed valves: V6579, V6597, V6701, V6582, and V06825.
B. 1) Was e Gas Compressor 1A 1A is discharging into Waste Gas Decay Tanks 1 A & 1B. 1A
- 2) E ure closed valves: V6565, V6745, V06823, V6579, V6592, and V6582.
d valves: V6565, V6588, V6599, V6584, V6580, and V6598. 49
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. With 2 WGDTs cross connected the Waste Gas Compressor will discharge to the tank with the lowest pressure (WGDT B). Could be chosen by the student if he thinks that the WGDTs are cross connected allowing A & & C to decrease and B to increase. Proposed alignment does not isolate cross connected tanks. B. Incorrect. This would not cause V 6565 to close on high radiation. Could be chosen by student if he thinks that when the Waste Gas Compressor is aligned to the WGDTs A & & B, WGDT A pressure could decrease while the WGDT C pressure rises. Proposed alignment does not isolate tanks. C. Correct Once the release is started, the radiation alarm (due to short lived precursors in WGDT A) along with the equalized pressures between WGDTs A & C implies that these two tanks are cross connected. This alignment effectively isolates WGDT A from WGDT C. D. Incorrect A leaking relief valve would cause area radiation levels to increase due to leakage past the valve stem. This could be chosen if student thinks that a lifting relief valve will lower the pressure in the A WGDT without causing area radiation levels to rise. Technical Reference(s): 8770-G-078 Sheet 163A (Attach if not previously provided) ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: 8770-G-078 Sheet 163A Learning Objective: _0_5_0_2_0_1_9-_0_9 0502019-09 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank# Bank # 3314 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 55.43 _5-,--_
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Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO \. Tier # Tier# 1 Group # 2 KIA # 061AK2.01 Importance Rating 2.5 ARM System Alarms: Detectors at each ARM location Proposed Question: RO 26 Which ONE of the following will Automatically actuate the Unit 1 Containment Evacuation alarm? A. Channel A High Range Rad Monitor in Alert B. Channel B CIS Rad monitor in Pre-Trip C. Channel A High Range Rad Monitor in High Alarm D. Channel 0 D CIS Rad monitor in Trip ( 51
Proposed Answer: 0 D Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect Alarm is not generated by the High Range Rad Monitor B. Incorrect. Logic is set on CIS monitoir trip not pre-trip. C. Incorrect. Same as A D. ~ CIS radiation monitors in trip will auto actuate the Containment Building Correct. % Evacuation alarm. Technical Reference(s): 0702410 handout (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0_7_0_2_4_10_-_0_6 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) _0_7_0_2_4_1_0-_0_6_________ Question Source: Bank # Bank# Modified Bank # 652 (Note changes or attach parent) New ( Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X X- - - Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Comments: 52
Single Question Report QIO#: 652 QID#: Objective: 0702411-09 System: RMS 2 Rev: 1 Cog Level: 1 KA #072.K4.01 R03.3* SR03.6* What is the minimum logic and setpoint to Automatically initiate the Unit 2 Containment Evacuation Alarm? A. 1/4 CIAS monitors in Alert B. 2/4 CIAS monitors in Alert C. 1/4 CIAS monitors in Hi Alarm D. 2/4 CIAS monitors in Hi Alarm Reasons the choices are right or wrong. Correct answer is A. A. B. e. C. D. Source Ref: Open Ref: Revision Notes: Removed color from answers. Conflict with other question Question Use History HLC-18 Final, 0720022, 7/29/2007 HLC-17 System Block 6 Exam, 0720238, 5/1 0/2005 HLC-16/SRO-12 SYSTEMS BLOCK 6 EXAM, 0720219, 6/20103 6/20/03 Page 1 of 1
Attachment 2 UNIT 1 RMS AREA MONITORS MONITOR/CHANNEL DETECTOR AUTO FUNCTIONS T.S. ODCM EPIP TYPE General Area GM II CIAs.?~ ~/1Hi~Hi Hi-Hi..*.~~~i~Ii~Jj~~L~ v..
*CIS / 3,4,5,& 6 GM CIAS on .. 2/4 On Hi-Hi 3.3.2.1, RCB 90' 9~@li<ltliJ.ati0l-\f~I~Hf)'1~osec CB evacuation Alarm 30sec 3.3.3.1,3.9.9 ...
then stops in C'R"Bufwili thEin'stopsln' CR but will continue to sound in CB. Use key # 74 on Rad panel to silence or prevent alarm. FSAR has at least a 15 min life post accident from hostile RCB environment. CB High Range / 58,& 59 IC 3.3.3.1 09 & 11 Offsite Dose RCB 90' Assessment & Core Damage Assessment Post LOCA /52,& 53 IC 090ffsite Dose RAB NE & NW Fan Room Assessment Fuel Pool /7 GM 3.3.3.1 FP Area I( ' ..
" Fuel Pool Canal /8 GM 3.3.3.1 (Backu p for Fuel ....
FP Area N & SW Wall I Pool) PROCESS MONITORS MONITOR/CHANNEL DETECTOR AUTO FUNCTIONS T.S. ODCM EPIP TYPE LRW / 43 y Scintillation Closes FCV-6627X. Used for 3.3.3.9 both units' releases. S/G Blowdown / 44,& 45 y Scintillation Closes 1 BD OC isolation 3.3.3.9 FCV-3(7) and, 1 S/G sample isolationFCV-5(9) for each S/G. Sample valves can be overridden and reopened to allow for sampling. . .. CCW / 56,& 57 y Scintillation Divert CCW Surge Tank vent COT. to CDT.
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& 13B booster fans, and 13A &13B closing 4 Toilet & Kitchen room dampers.
I 0702410, Rev. 10 Page 23 of 25 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 1 Group # 2 KIA # CE09EK3.3 Importance Rating 3.7 Functional Recovery: Manipulation of controls to obtain desired operating results during abnormal, and emergency situations. Proposed Question: RO 27 Given the following:
- Unit 1 has entered 1-EOP-15, Functional Recovery Procedure.
- The RO has been directed by the Unit Supervisor to establish Hot and Cold Leg Injection per 1-EOP-99 Appendix 0, 'Simultaneous Hot and Cold Leg Injection' using the most preferred method.
The most preferred method will be to align: A. Either 1A or 1B B HPSI Pump directly to the Hot Legs. B. Either 1A or 1B LPSI Pump through the SOC Warm-up lines to the Hot Legs. C. 1A HPSI pump thru the Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray line to the Hot Legs. ( O. 1A Containment Spray Pump through the Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray line to the Hot Legs. \ 53
Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. Plausible because this is the Unit 2 lineup. B. Correct .Preferred lineup per 1-EOP-99 APP-O Simultaneous Hot and Cold Leg Injection C. Incorrect Plausible because this is the first alternate lineup on Unit 1 D. Incorrect. Plausible because this is the second alternate lineup on Unit 1. Technical Reference(s): 1-EOP-151-EOP-99 1-EOP-15 1-EOP-99 APP-O (Attach if not previously provided) Simultaneous Hot and Cold Leg Injection Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0-'-7'--'0. .: . .2'-"'2. .: . .07_-.. :-....::0-'4________
--,-07,--0,--2,--2....::..0-,-7 . .0. .: . .4_ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) avai lable)
Question Source: Bank # Bank# 1951 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5,10 55.43 Comments: 54
Single Question Report QID#: 1951 Objective: 0702207-04 System: ECCS Rev: 0 Cog Level: 2 KA #G.2.2.3 R03.1 SR03.5 A large break LOCA has occurred on Unit 1. Which of the following describes the primary method for Hot Leg Injection? A. HPSI pump via auxiliary spray line. B. LPSI pump via Hot Leg suction line. C. HPSI pump via dedicated Hot Leg injection line. D. Containment Spray pump via Hot Leg suction line. Reasons the choices are right or wrong. Correct answer is B. A. B. alternate method C. Unit 2 only has installed Hot Leg injection line D. second alternate method Source Ref: 0711207 Emergency Core Cooling and Containment He Open Ref: Revision Notes: Question Use History HLC-16 PreAudit Quiz 12,0717028,711212004 12,0717028,7112/2004 HLC-16 PreAudit Quiz 8 (HLC-14A NRC), 0717020, 6/312004 6/3/2004 HLC-16/SRO-12 IPT-4 EXAM, 0720229, 3112/2004 Page 1 of 1
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 39 PENDICES I/ FIGURES I/ TABLES I/ DATA SHEETS PPENDICES SHE 1 ~6 ~f,:~{55 PROCEDURE NO.: +4 1-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 FIGURE 1A RCS PRESSURE TEMPERATURE (Page 1 of 1) CAUTION The RCP NPSH curve assumes one pump is operating in each loop. RCP instrumentation should be monitored for seal and pump performance in accordance with 1-EOP-99, Table 13. 2400 2000 181)0 1800 << :i i,eE:'" 1600 e
...e Q.
- I Cl..
1400 141)0 S~
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.s 800 81)0 600 4DO 200=====
200 1M zoo 300 400 500 600 700 soo Il1dlcat~d h1dlcat~d Res Tem:pl)fature IF) TemfX\fature (f) RCS Pressure Range Required QSPDS Subcooled Margin Reading (Rep CET) 2250 psia to 1000 psia 1000 psi a to 500 psia Less than 500 psia
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: 39 NDICES I/ FIGURES I/ TABLES I/ DATA SHEETS PPENDICES SHEET PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 APPENDIX 0 SIMULTANEOUS HOT AND COLD LEG INJECTION (Page 1 of 8) NOTE This appendix contains 4 sections. Selection of the appropriate section is discretionary based on present plant conditions and equipment availability.
- PUrnpt~roughth~oBp'~~ite Sections 1 and 2 utilize the LPSI Pump through the opposite train Hot Rj19~c*preferred Leg Suction and is considered the most *~~~~~;~~!1gdi;;
method
- Section 3 utilizes the 1A HPSI Pump through the auxiliary sprays and is considered the first alternate method
- Section 4 utilizes the Containment Spray Pump through the opposite Leg Suction and is considered the second alternate method train Hot Le Section ection 1: Aligning 1A LPSI for Hot Leg Injection CAUTION This section can ONLY be used if ANY of the following conditions are met:
- RAS actuation has occurred
- LPSI Pumps meet STOP criteria D 1. VERIFY 80TH BOTH of the following conditions exist:
D RCS pressure is less than 200 psia. D RCS to Containment differential pressure is less than 100 psid. D 2. PLACE 80TH LPSI Pumps in STOP. D 1A LPSI Pump D 1B LPSI Pump D 3. ALIGN the 18 LPSI Pump as follows: D CLOSE V3207, LPSI Pump Discharge Isolation Valve (CRAC). D CLOSE V3432, LPSI Pump Suction Isolation Valve (CRAC). D OPEN MV-03-1 B, B SOC SDC Warm-up Va (CRAC).
REVISION NO.: ENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHEET 1-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 APPENDIX 0 SIMULTANEOUS HOT AND COLD LEG INJECTION (Page 2 of 8) ection 1: Aligning 1A LPSI for Hot Leg Injection (continued) Section o 4. ENSURE LPSI Header Injection Valves are CLOSED. o HCV-3615, LPSI Header to Loop 1A2 Valve D o HCV-3625, LPSI Header to Loop 1A1 Valve D o HCV-3635, LPSI Header to Loop 1B1 Valve D o HCV-3645, LPSI Header to Loop 1B2 Valve D o 5. OPEN the 1 B LPSI Hot Leg Suction Valves. o V3651 , SOC D SDC Loop 1B o V3652, SOC D SDC Loop 1B oD 6. CLOSE V3206, 1A LPSI Pump Discharge Isolation Valve (CRAC). ( o 7. PLACE FCV-3306, SDC D SOC Return Flow, keyswitch in AUTO. o 8. PLACE FIC-3306, SDC D SOC Return Flow, controller in MAN. o 9. ADJUST FIC-3306, SDC SOC Return Flow, controller to 100% output. o 10. VERIFY FCV-3306, SDC D SOC Return Flow valve is OPEN. CAUTION IfV3206, If 1A V3206, 1 LPSII Pump Discharge Isolation Valve is not opened A LPS immediately after LPSI Pump amps stabilize, LPSI Pump damage could occur. o 11.START 1A LPSI Pump. D o 12. When 1A LPSI Pump amps stabilize, D Then OPEN V 3206, 1A 1A LPSI Pump Discharge Isolation Valve (CRAC). o 13. VERIFY Hot Leg Injection flow is greater than 250 gpm on FI -3332. D End of Section 1
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE:. ., .~>! 39 I-P-RO-C-ED-U-R";'E";"NO-.:---1
~PPENDICES NDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA SHE SHEETS 6~~'rJ5 IfilK RENO.:
1-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 r:
- APPENDIX 0 ~E
~
i \I~j~!:f 1:~ SIMULTANEOUS HOT AND COLD LEG INJECTION (Page 3 of 8)
~1D1'Tlnn 2: Aligning 18 Section 1B LPSI for Hot Leg Injection CAUTION This section can ONLY be used if ANY of the following conditions are met:
- RAS actuation has occurred
- LPSI Pumps meet STOP criteria o 1. VERIFY 80TH BOTH of the following conditions exist:
ORCS pressure is less than 200 psia. ORCS to Containment differential pressure is less than 100 psid. o 2. PLACE 80TH BOTH LPSI Pumps in STOP. o 1A LPSI Pump o 1B LPSI Pump o 3. ALIGN the 1A LPSI Pump as follows: o CLOSE V3206, LPSI Pump Discharge Isolation Valve (CRAC). o CLOSE V3444, LPSI Pump Suction Isolation Valve (CRAC). o OPEN MV-03-1A, A SOC Warm-up Valve (CRAC). o 4. ENSURE LPSI Header Injection Valves are CLOSED. o HCV-3615, LPSI Header to Loop 1A2 Valve o HCV-3625, LPSI Header to Loop 1A1 Valve o HCV-3635, LPSI Header to Loop 1B1 Valve o HCV-3645, LPSI Header to Loop 1B2 Valve o 5. OPEN the 1A LPSI Hot Leg Suction Valves. o V3480, SOC Loop 1A o V3481 , SOC Loop 1A
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: 39 PENDICES I/ FIGURES I/ TABLES I/ DATA SHE PPENDICES SHEETS ( PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 APPENDIX 0 SIMULTANEOUS HOT AND COLD LEG INJECTION (Page 4 of 8) l~el~(IOn Section 2: Aligning 18 LPSI for Hot Leg Injection (continued) o 6. CLOSE V 3207, 1B LPSI PUMP Discharge Isolation Valve (CRAC). o 7. PLACE FCV-3306, SOC Return Flow, keyswitch in AUTO. o 8. PLACE FIC-3306, SOC Return Flow, controller in MAN. o 9. ADJUST FIC-3306, SOC Return Flow, controller to 100% output. o 10. VERIFY FCV-3306, SOC Return Flow, valve is OPEN. CAUTION If V3207, 1B LPSI Pump Discharge Isolation Valve is not opened immediately after LPSI Pump amps stabilize, LPSI Pump damage could occur. o 11.START 1B LPSI Pump. o 12. When 1B LPSI Pump amps stabilize, Then OPEN V3207, 1B LPSI Pump Discharge Isolation Valve (CRAC). o VERI FY Hot Leg Injection flow is greater than 250 gpm on FI-3322.
- 13. VERIFY End of Section 2
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: 39 NDICES I/ FIGURES I/ TABLES I/ DATA SHE PPENDICES SHEETS PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 APPENDIX 0 SIMULTANEOUS HOT AND COLD LEG INJECTION (Page 5 of 8) Section on 3: Aligning 1A HPSI for Hot Leg Injection CAUTION This section can NOT be used if a HPSI Pump has been STOPPED due to pump low flow considerations post RAS. One HPSI Pump must remain running post RAS with injection flow to the cold legs for core decay heat removal. D 1. ENSURE all THREE charging pumps are in STOP. D 2. DIRECT an Operator to perform the following charging system alignment: COMPONENT 10 COMPONENT NAME ('J) POSITION (...J) V2336 1C Charging Pump Disch Isol LOCKED CLOSED V2337 1B Charging Pump Disch Isol LOCKED CLOSED - V2339 1A Charging Pump Disch Isol LOCKED CLOSED - V2340 Charging Pump Disch Hdr to Aux HPSI Hdr Isol LOCKED OPEN - NOTE ualified for a harsh environment and may fail to open. SE-02-3 is not qualified open oD 3. ALIGN Pressurizer sprays as follows: o D A. ENSURE Main Spray Valves are CLOSED. o D PzrSprayValve PCV-1100E, Pzr Spray Valve 11B2 B2 oD PzrSprayValve PCV-1100F, Pzr Spray Valve 1B1 o D B. ENSURE Auxiliary Spray Valves are OPEN. oD SE-02-3, Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Valve oD SE-02-4, Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Valve oD 4. ENSURE BOTH Charging Header isolation valves are CLOSED. o D SE-02-1, 1B1 Loop Charging Isol o D 1A2 Loop Charging Isol SE-02-2, 1A2
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: 39 DICES I/ FIGURES I/ TABLES I/ DATA SH PPENDICES SHEETS PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 APPENDIX 0 SIMULTANEOUS HOT AND COLD LEG INJECTION (Page 6 of 8) l:selctloln Section 3: Aligning 1A HPSI for Hot Leg Injection (continued) NOTE MV-02-1 is normally de-energized and CLOSED at power. MV-02-2 is normally de-energized and OPEN at power. o 5. ALIGN RCP Seal Injection as follows: o ENSURE MV-02-1, RCP Seal Injection (Isolation) is CLOSED. o ENSURE MV-02-2, RCP Seal Injection (Throttle) is OPEN. o 6. ENSURE 1A HPSI header injection valves are CLOSED. o Hdr to Loop 1A1 Valve HCV-3617, Aux HPSI Hdrto o HCV-3627, Aux HPSI Hdr to Loop 1A2 Valve ( o Hdr to Loop 1B1 HCV-3637, Aux HPSI Hdrto 1B1 Valve o HCV-3647, Aux HPSI Hdr to Loop 1B2 Valve NOTE Charging Flow Indicator FIA 2212 maximum indication is 150 pm. Chargin
,~.
o VERIFY
- 7. VERI FY Hot Leg injection flow rate is greater than 150 gpm as indicated on FIA-2212, Charging Flow Indicator.
End of Section 3
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: 39 PPENDICES NDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA SHEE SHEETS PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 APPENDIX 0 SIMULTANEOUS HOT AND COLD LEG INJECTION (Page 7 of 8) ection 4: Aligning Containment Spray for Hot Leg Injection Section CAUTION This section can ONLY be used if ANY of the following conditions are met:
- RAS actuation has occurred
- LPSI Pumps meet STOP criteria D 1. VERIFY ALL of the following conditions exist:
D RCS pressure is less than 200 psia. ORCS D RCS to Containment differential pressure is less than 100 psid. ORCS o The selected Containment Spray train has been terminated. D D 2. PLACE BOTH LPSI Pumps in STOP. o D 1A LPSI Pump o D 1B LPSI Pump NOTE Pump~has If a HPSI Pump has been stopped due"to due to pump low floW flow considerations post RAS then the preferred Containment Spray Pump Pump to use for Hot Leg in"ection is the one NOT bein used to rovide HPSI Pump subcoolin In"ection subcooling. D 3. !f the 1A 1A Containment Spray Pump is being used, Then OPEN V3456, A SOC SDC Hx Outlet Isol Vlv. D 4. !f the 1B Containment Spray Pump is being used, Then OPEN V3457, B SOC SDC Hx Outlet Isol Vlv. D 5. CLOSE V3206, 1A 1A LPSI Pump Discharge Valve (CRAC). D 6. CLOSE V3207, 1B LPSI Pump Discharge Valve (CRAC). D 7. ENSURE CLOSED V3452, A SOC SDC HX Inlet Isolation Valve (CRAC). D 8. ENSURE CLOSED V3453, B SOC SDC HX Inlet Isolation Valve (CRAC).
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: 39 NDICES I/ FIGURES I/ TABLES I/ DATA SHEETS PPENOICES PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 APPENDIX 0 SIMULTANEOUS HOT AND COLD LEG INJECTION (Page 8 of 8) Section on 4: Aligning Containment Spray for Hot Leg Injection (continued) D 9. !f using the 1B Containment Spray Pump for hot leg injection, Then OPEN ALL of the following: o D SOC Warm-up Va (CRAC) MV-03-1A, A SDC oD V-3480, SDC SOC Loop 1A oD SOC Loop 1A V-3481, SDC D 10.!f using the 1A Containment Spray Pump for hot leg injection, Then OPEN ALL of the following: oD SOC Warm-up Va (CRAC) MV-03-1 B, B SDC oD SOC Loop 1B V-3651, SDC oD SOC Loop 1B V-3652, SDC 1B oD 11.ENSURE LPSI Header Injection Valves are CLOSED. o D HCV-3615, LPSI Header to Loop 1A1 Valve oD HCV-3625, LPSI Header to Loop 1A2 Valve o D ~_'::- HCV-3635, LPSI_. Header to Loop 1B1
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~. ,-~ ~_" ... ~.~._4 ._. ~.
- .~' ,
o D HCV-3645, LPSI Header to Loop 1B2 1B2 Valve oD 12. START the Containment Spray Pump aligned for Hot Leg Injection. oD 13.PLACE HCV-3657, SDC SOC Temp Control, keyswitch to MAN. D 14.ADJUST 14.AOJUST HIC-3657, SDC SOC Temp Control, controller to the full open position. oD 15.ENSURE HCV-3657, SDC SOC Temp Control Valve, is OPEN. oD 16.VERIFY Hot Leg Injection flow is greater than 250 gpm on ANY of the following instruments: oD FI-3322 (1A Containment Spray Pump) oD FI-3332 (1 B Containment Spray Pump) End of Section 4 END OF APPENDIX 0
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: 36A APPENDICES I/ FIGURES I/ TABLES I/ DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX 0 SIMULTANEOUS HOT AND COLD LEG INJECTION (Page 1 of 4) NOTE If a HPSI Pump has been throttled post-RAS due to excessive flow, the HPSI pump that is NOT throttled should be used for simultaneous hot and cold leg injection. ion 1: Aligning 2A HPSI for Hot Leg Injection Section o 1. OPEN V3550, To Hot Leg 2A Valve. D o 2. OPEN V3540, To Hot Leg 2A Valve. D o 3. CLOSE V3656, Pump 2A Discharge Valve. D o 4. VERIFY flow to the 2A Hot Leg is greater than or equal to 250 gpm on ANY of D the following instruments: ( o FI-3315, HPSI To Hot Leg D o FR-3317, HPSI To Hot Leg 2A Flow D o 5. if!f ONE HPSI Pump is RUNNING, D Then ENSURE flow to the Cold Legs is greater than or equal to 250 gpm by the TOTALof TOTAL of all FOUR of the the following instruments: o FI-3321 , HPSI Loop 2A D 2A11 Flow o FI-3311, HPSI Loop 2A2 Flow D o FI-3331, HPSI Loop 2B1 Flow D o FI-3341, HPSI Loop 2B2 Flow D OR o FR-3313/ D FR-3313 / 3323, HPSI Loop 2A2 & & 2A1 Flow o FR-3333/ D FR-3333 / 3343, HPSI Loop 2B2 & 2B1 Flow
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: 36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE URE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDiX 0 APPENDIX SIMULTANEOUS HOT AND COLD LEG INJECTION (Page 2 of 4)
"' .... T* ...... 1: Aligning 2A HPSI for Hot Leg Injection (continued)
Section o 6. if TWO HPSI Pumps are RUNNING, Then ENSURE flow to the Cold Legs is greater than or equal to 440 gpm by the TOTAL of all FOUR of the following instruments: o FI-3321, HPSI Loop 2A12A 1 Flow o FI-3311, HPSI Loop 2A2 Flow o FI-3331, HPSI Loop 2B1 Flow o FI-3341, HPSI Loop 2B2 Flow OR o FR-3313 1I 3323, HPSI Loop 2A2 & & 2A1 Flow o I 3343, HPSI Loop 2B2 & FR-3333 13343, & 2B1 Flow ( End of Section 1 End (
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: ( 36A APPENDICES I FIGURES I TABLES I DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX 0 SIMULTANEOUS HOT AND COLD LEG INJECTION (Page 3 of 4) Sectionon 2: Aligning 28 HPSI for Hot Leg Injection o 1. OPEN V3551 V3551,, To Hot Leg 2B Valve. o 2. OPEN V3523, To Hot Leg 2B Valve. o 3. CLOSE V3654, Pump 2B Discharge Valve. o 4. VERIFY flow to the 2B Hot Leg is greater than or equal to 250 gpm on ANY of the following instruments: o FI-3325, HPSI To Hot Leg 2B Flow o FR-3327, HPSI To Hot Leg 2B Flow o 5. !f ONE HPSI Pump is RUNNING, Then ENSURE flow to the Cold Legs is greater than or equal to 250 gpm by the TOTAL of all FOUR of the following instruments: o FI-3321, HPSI Loop 2A 1 Flow o FI-3311, HPSI Loop 2A2 Flow o FI-3331, HPSI Loop 2B1 Flow o FI-3341, HPSI Loop 2B2 Flow OR o FR-3313 I 3323, HPSI Loop 2A2 & 2A1 Flow o FR-3333 I 3343, HPSI Loop 2B2 & 2B1 Flow
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: 36A APPENDICES / FIGURES! APPENDICES! FIGURES / TABLES! TABLES / DATA PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX 0 SIMULTANEOUS HOT AND COLD LEG INJECTION (Page 4 of 4) l~e4::tIOn Section 2: Aligning 28 HPSI for Hot Leg Injection (continued) o 6. 1f TWO
!f HPSI Pumps are RUNNING, Then ENSURE flow to the Cold Legs is greater than or equal to 440 gpm by the TOTAL of all FOUR of the following instruments:
o FI-3321, HPSI Loop 2A 1 Flow o FI-3311, HPSI Loop 2A2 Flow o FI-3331, HPSI Loop 2B1 Flow o FI-3341, HPSI Loop 2B2 Flow OR o FR-3313/ 3323, HPSI Loop 2A2 & 2A1 Flow FR-3313!3323, o FR-3333 / 3343, HPSI Loop 2B2 & 2B1 Flow FR-3333! ( End of Section 2 END OF A~PENDIX APPENDIX O. a. (
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # 003K1.02 Importance Rating 2.6 Reactor Coolant Pump: RCP motor cooling and ventilation Proposed Question: RO 28 Which ONE of the following describes the RCP Motor Cooling air flow path and what affect will loss of CCW to the motor coolers have?
- 1) Air flows:
- 2) A Loss of CCW to the RCP Motor will result in:
A. 1) into motor via louvers and shaft rotor blowers, passed thru two air coolers, and then exhausted to Containment.
- 2) Containment air heating up prior to the RCP motor.
B. 1) into motor via louvers and shaft rotor blowers, passed thru two air coolers, and then exhausted to Containment.
- 2) the RCP motor heating up prior to the Containment.
( C. 1) thru two air coolers via louvers and shaft rotor blowers, into the motor, and then exhausted to Containment.
- 2) the RCP motor heating up prior to the Containment.
D. 1) thru two air coolers via louvers and shaft rotor blowers, into the motor, and then exhausted to Containment.
- 2) Containment air heating up prior to the RCP motor.
55
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): A. Correct Containment air cools the RCP motor and it is then cooled prior to discharge back to the Containment. B. Incorrect Partially correct but with a loss of CCW the Containment air is heated prior to the RCP motor. C. Incorrect Could be chosen as this type of arrangement is used for cooling in the IA Compressors. D. Incorrect.Same as C Technical Reference(s): 0711202 (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: __ 07_0_2_2_0_2-_0_4 _0-=--7,--,0,--2_2...c..0_2 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available)
--"0--'4_______________ ava i Ia b Ie)
( Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 2 to 9 55.43 Comments: (, 56
0711202, Rev. 19 Page 23 of 95 ( FOR TRAINING USE ONLY between successive starts of the motor. The stator also provides the major structural support for the upper bearing housing and motor upper assembly. Motor Air Cooling The s~~'~11.1i_m~.~"_.lillt_.lli~ftl§rI:~'s e motor air coolers serve to cool the air discharged to containment from each motor's
'fIir~~._It.~niWmc.
airto water heat exchanger. Refer to Figure 14. This reduces the heat load on containment cooling. Each RCP motor is equipped with two heat exchangers, each with a finned-type jacket (optimum air-to-surface area) surrounding cooling coils. CCW is circulated through the coils to remove heat from the jacket. During extended shutdown periods when the RCPs are idle, moisture may form on the motor internal surfaces. Since this could cause insulation breakdown and eventual premature motor failure, electric heaters are installed in the air space in the RCP motors. The heaters are controlled by separate control switches located in each RCP cubicle. The heaters are powered from power panel PP-104, located on the 19-foot elevation of the Auxiliary Building. Normally the heater control switches are left in the ON position and energized or de-energized from the feeder breaker (which supplies power to all the heaters) in PP-104. armature', the rotor consists of the: Besides the motor armatur8',
- rotating element of the anti-reverse rotation device
- flywheel
- upper and lower motor guide bearing journals
- rotating thrust bearing elements
- shaft that couples them together Anti-Reverse Rotation Device The anti-reverse rotation device prevents reverse rotation of the motor (and therefore pump) when idle to limit the magnitude of motor starting current and prevent motor winding damage from high temperatures due to excessive starting current. Refer to Figure 14.
A major benefit of the device is that it limits reverse flow through an idle RCP that would bypass the reactor core. Other benefits include minimizing wear of the seals and
0711202, Rev. 19 Page 81 of 95 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Rep MOTOR UPPER GUIDE BEARING UPPER UPPER OIL OIL _ _-I-_ _ _ __ .....
--+------II~
RESERVOIR
......1 - - - -
1..... FLYWHEEL MOTOR
......1
, ..... f--- ---- -- -+ t- ---- --- WINDING (STATOR)
, . , MOTOR AIR
. COOLERS ANTI-REVERSE ROTATION DEVICE LOWER GUIDE BEARING
----t---+--a._1
---t----I-_........
LOWER OIL 1-----+----
, .....1 1 - - - - - - RESERVOIR THRUST_~==f:::====~~~*
THRUST ___-4--------~--.- BEARING-BEARING (UPPER) (LOWER) (TIRCOI0711202-FI9-R7) (TIRCO!0711202-FI9-R7) FIGURE 14
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # KIA # 003K6.02 Importance Rating 2.7 Reactor Coolant Pump: RCP seals and seal water supply Proposed Question: RO 29 In accordance with 1-NOP-01.02 RCP Operation, which ONE of the following states the use of RCP Seal Injection? Seal Injection should _ __ _ (1 )_ __ _ in service to an uncoupled pump _ __ _ (2) _ A 1) NOT be placed;
- 2) because seal damage may occur.
B. 1) NOT be placed;
- 2) due to potential leakage from the seal surfaces not mating.
C. 1) be placed;
- 2) to keep contaminants on the surface of the Reactor Vessel water from
( entering the seals. D. 1) be placed;
- 2) to lubricate the seal surfaces as the pump is rotated for aligning and coupling.
( 57
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): A. Correct. Per management directive 7 based on CR 2005-15317 the N9000 Seals were damaged by operation of Seal Injection with the pump uncoupled so a Precaution was added to the NOP for RCPs on both Units. B. Incorrect While partially correct the reason is not correct .Could be chosen by the student if incorrectly misapplies this requirement to Seal Injection where as it is actually a step necessary for a RCP start from idle conditions. C. Incorrect. Could be chosen if student only recalls the purpose of seal injection and does not recall the limitation placed on uncoupled RCPs by 1-NOP-01.02. D. Incorrect Could be chosen if student does not recall the limitation placed on uncoupled RCPs by 1-NOP-01.02. Technical Reference(s): 1-NOP-01.02 (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: _0_7_0_2_8_0_1-_0_1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) _0-'-7'--'0'-2_8-'-0_1-_0_1________ avai lable) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge - X X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Comments: ( 58
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: , 23 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATION 50f73 5 of 73 \ PROCEDURE NO.: 1-NOP-01.02 ST. S1. LUCIE UNIT 1 2.0 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 2.1 Precautions 2.1.1 Reactor Coolant Pump
- 1. Due to fuel uplift concerns, the fourth RCP shall NOT be started until RCS temperature is greater than 500°F.
- 2. Extended operation of oil lift pumps without starting a RCP will result in elevated lower bearing temperatures. The maximum thrust bearing temperature allowed is 170°F. Upon reaching this temperature, either stop the oil lift pumps or start the RCP as conditions permit.
2.1.2 RCPMotor Unless an emergency condition exists, an RCP should NOT be tripped until motor amps have returned from the starting current level to the normal operating level. ( 2.1.3 RCP Seals
- 1. RCP Seal Temperatures A. Operation with seal cavity temperature above 250°F decreases seal operating life and should be kept to a minimum.
B. During start of an idle RCP when RCS temperature is greater than 450°F, lower seal cavity temperature may exceed 250°F. The RCP may be started provided lower seal cavity temperature is less than or equal to 300°F. C. If lower seal cavity temperature is greater than 300°F on an idle RCP, the RCS should be cooled until lower seal cavity temperature is less than or equal to 250°F to minimize seal degradation. The pump should NOT be started until SCE has evaluated the condition of the seal.
- 2. Placing Seal Injection in service to an uncoupled Reactor Coolant Pump may result in significant seal damage. (Section 7.3 Step 7)
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 23 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATION 6 of 73 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-NOP-01.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 2.1.3 RCP Seals (continued) 3. 3.. Seal injection is required to be in service when filling the RCS from below the Seal Cartridge to above the Seal Cartridge (approx 32.5 to 33.5 ft elev) to prevent contaminants on the surface of the Reactor Vessel water from entering the seals. Continued use of seal injection when filling above the level of the Seal Cartridge is NOT required.
- 4. It is acceptable to fill the RCS from below the 33 foot elevation (63 LI-1117 -1) to above the 33 foot elevation with seal injection inches on U-1117 isolated to an RCP (coupled or uncoupled), without pump seal degradation.
- 5. If the RCPs are operated below the minimum pressures or longer than the maximum 12 hour limit identified on Attachment 1, Minimum RCS Pressure for RCP Operation, seal degradation can occur.
- 6. When an RCP is stopped, Controlled SleedoffBleedoff (CSO)
(CBO) flow should be maintained until RCS temperature is less than 200°F. 200DF. ( (Section 7.3 Step 1)
- 7. Each seal stage should reduce the pressure across the seal by approximately 1/3. For Example, if RCS pressure is 310 psia psi a and VCT pressure is 40 psi a psia (25 psig), the total pressure across the seals is 270 psia (310 - 40 =270). Each seal should reduce RCS pressure by approximately 90 psia (270 / 3 =90) =
- 8. During RCP operation when RCS pressure is less than or equal to 400 psia, observe the following precautions:
A. Maintain VCT pressure between 25 and 30 psig. B. Operations that fluctuate VCT pressure such as gas purging should be avoided. C. Seal pressure instrument accuracy may be limited at low RCS pressure. D. Monitor seal pressure regularly to verify pressure breakdown of at least 25 psid across each stage. IF seal breakdown pressure of at least 25 psid is NOT being maintained, THEN, if possible, raise RCS pressure as soon as possible to provide the 25 psid across each seal.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 23 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATION 7 of 73 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-NOP-01.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 2.1.4 CCW Flow
- 1. If CCW flow is lost to an operating RCP, motor bearing and seal damage can occur unless CCW is re-established within 10 minutes.
- 2. If CCW flow is lost and can NOT be re-established within 30 minutes, seal damage could occur unless CSO is isolated within 30 minutes of losing CCW.
- 3. When oil lift pumps are operating, the oil reservoir levels should be closely monitored to detect any oil leaks.
- 4. If CCW is isolated to the RCP oil reservoir coolers, the oil lift pumps should NOT be operated for more than 5 minutes. During maintenance, the oil lift pumps can be operated for longer periods without cooling water as long as the motor shaft can be rotated.
- 5. Operation of RCP 1 1A1 A 1 at RCS pressures less than 1100 psipsiaa will result in higher than normal vibration levels. Operation of RCP 1 1A1 A1 at RCS pressures of less than 1100 psia should be avoided.
(
- 6. If the RCS has been diluted since the RCPs were stopped, pockets of diluted water could be forced through the core when the RCPs are started which could result in localized criticality.
CAUTION If the RCP restart section is being entered from an EOP: Ensure single phase natural circulation has been in effect for at least 20 minutes prior to restart, due to boron mixing concerns. 2.1.5 RCP Restart Criteria When CCW is lost to the RCPs for greater than 30 minutes, CSO shall be isolated and natural circulation cooldown shall be initiated within 4 hours to ensure the seals are operated within conditions for forwhich which qualification testing has proven the seals will maintain acceptable leakage levels. The RCPs shall NOT be restarted until reliability of the seals has been evaluated. (Section 7.3 Step 8)
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 23 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP OPERATION 25 of 73 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-NOP-01.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 4.1 Initial Conditions for Starting an RCP (continued) IINITIAL Nfl'tAL
- 13. (continued)
- RCP Seal Temperature: Less than 300°F
- 14. IF RCPs are being started for RCS fill and vent, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. WHEN the RCP seals have vented for at least 30 minutes, THEN VERIFY a steady stream of flow from the seal vent lines listed below for the RCP(s) to be started: COMPONENT COMPONENT DESCRIPTION CONDITION INITIAL NUMBER 1A1 RCP CONTROLLED BLEEDOFF STEADY V1300 UPSTRM OF FE-1150 VENT FLOW 1A2 RCP CONTROLLED BLEEDOFF STEADY V1301 UPSTRM OF FE-1160 VENT FLOW 1B1 RCP CONTROLLED BLEEDOFF STEADY ( V1302 UPSTRM OF FE-1170 VENT FLOW 1B2 RCP CONTROLLED BLEEDOFF STEADY V1303 UPSTRM OF FE-1180 VENT FLOW
- 15. IF RCPs are being started for continuous operation, THEN PERFORM the following:
A. ENSURE SE-01-1, RCP BLEED CNTMT ISOL, is OPEN. B. ENSURE V2505, RCP BLEEDOFF, is OPEN. C. ENSURE CBO flow is within the acceptable range of Attachment 2, RCP Seal Leak-Off Flow Rate VS RCS Pressure, for the RCP(s) to be started.
- RCP 1A1
- RCP 1A2
- RCP 11B1 B1
- RCP 1B2
I \ Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # KIA # 004A4.05 Importance Rating 3.6 Chemical and volume Control: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Letdown pressure and temperature control valves Proposed Question: RO 30 Given the following:
- The Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) is operating on solid pressure control.
- LCV-221 0 P and Q are in service and in MANUAL.
BOTH LCV-2210
- BOTH PCV-2201 P and Q are in service and in AUTO.
- A system malfunction has caused RCS pressure to RISE.
Which ONE of the following describes the system malfunction? A. Letdown pressure transmitter PT-2201 failed HIGH B. Selected Pressurizer pressure transmitter PT-11 OOX failed HIGH C. Letdown pressure transmitter PT-2201 PT -2201 failed LOW D Selected Pressurizer pressure transmitter PT-11 OOX failed LOW ( 59
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. If PT -2201 failed high, indicated pressure is higher than the AUTO setpoint so the PT-2201 PCV's would respond by acting to make actual RCS pressure lower by opening up (i.e. cause back pressure to lower) B Incorrect. PT-11 OOX is used to control pressure when there is a bubble in the Pressurizer (i.e. not solid). These controllers are maintained in manual when not in service and a transmitter failure would not impact RCS pressure. C. Correct. If PT-2201 failed low, indicated pressure is lower than the AUTO setpoint so the PCV's would respond by acting to make actual RCS pressure higher by closing(i.e. cause back pressure to raise) PT-11 OOX is used to control pressure when there is a bubble in the Pressurizer D. Incorrect. PT-1100X (i.e. not solid). These controllers are maintained in manual when not in service and a transmitter failure would not impact RCS pressure Technical Tech nical Reference(s): Reference( s): System Components: Basic (Attach if not previously provided) automatic pressure controller response (lesson plan 0702205) 0711205 CVCS Text ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0_7_0_2_2_0_5-_0_3_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As avai
---"-07'--0'--2=2....::..0-=-5-'--0....::..3________ available) lable)
Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Comments: 60
0711205, Rev. 22 Page 13 of 101 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY The outlet temperature is normally -100°F. At 135°F an alarm is actuated on RTGB-105 annunciator M-1 O. o. If the temperature increases to 140°F, the purification ion exchangers are bypassed via the air operated 3-way valve V2520. Additionally, flow to the Radiation Monitor is isolated by valve V2521. Letdown Pressure Control Valves - PCV2201 P/Q The Letdown Pressure Control valves provide the final means of letdown pressure reduction prior to the purification subsystem. The purpose of these valves is to maintain sufficient pressure in the letdown heat exchanger to prevent flashing of the letdown flow. Under conditions of maximum letdown flow with minimum charging flow, the inlet temperature of the letdown heat exchanger may approach 450°F. This high temperature water would readily flash to steam if pressure was low. Therefore the selected pressure control valve will modulate to maintain the letdown heat exchanger outlet pressure at the setpoint (normally 430 psig). Under conditions of maximum letdown flow, the letdown heat exchanger inlet pressure will be approximately 50 psi \ greater than the outlet pressure. The inlet pressure will therefore be sufficient to prevent flashing at the inlet. Normally, only one of the two backpressure control valves is required. The desired
. valve is selected by a handswitch HS-2201 located on RTGB-105 RTGB-1 05 and then controlled PIC-2201 .
by a pressure controller PIC-2201. iilIlIiIi'i.i Letdown heat exchanger outlet pressure, as sensed by PT-2201, is transformed into an electrical signal and then sent to PIC-2201 where it is compared to a setpoint determined by the operator. Any imbalance between the pressure signal and the pressure setpoint will generate a valve position control signal that is sent to the appropriate backpressure control valve via selector switch HS-2201. The output of the pressure transmitter is also sent to an alarm bistable and will annunciate both high and low pressure conditions on annunciator M-5. The high pressure condition alarms at 500 [510] psig and low pressure is annunciated at 390 [395] psig. A hand indicator controller (HIC-2201 (HIC-2201)) is located on the remote shutdown panel to provide direct control of the backpressure control ['P' valve only] valves. (This capability is administratively not used. Accidents
- 5. Intermediate Pressure Letdown Relief, V2345
- a. Protects intermediate pressure letdown piping and letdown Hx
- b. Setpoint 600 [650] psig
- c. [Unit 2 only, TIA 6660 on relief line annunciator on PACS PACB 2]
- 6. Letdown Heat Exchanger
- a. Cooled to allow use of IX
- IX resin melt @ >150°F
- b. Cooled by CCW EO-8e EO-Be
- LDHX TCV controller on RTGS RTGB 105 [205]
- Normal outlet T - 100°F
- 7. Letdown Backpressure Control Valves
( a. 2 valves in parallel
- One in service @ NOP
...* ~.
Set to maintain 430 [450] psig upstream of LDHX to prevent flashing in the LDHX.
- c. Control board select switch located on RTGS-105 RTGB-105 [205]. EO-38 EO-3B
- d. 'P' valve can be controlled from HSCP
- 8. Letdown Flow Indication - FT-2202 EO-3D
- a. RTGS RTGB 105
- b. High letdown flow alarm -140 gpm
- 1) Alert operator of excess RCS inventory loss
- 9. Low-Pressure Letdown Relief V-2354 [V2531]
- a. Protects low pressure piping, purif. Filters, low exchangers, and letdown strainer 0702205, Rev. 18, Page 8 of 48 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# Tier # 2 Group # 1 KIA # 004G2.4.31 Importance Rating 4.2 Chemical and volume Control: Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures. Proposed Question: RO 31 Unit 1 is at 100% power when the following alarm is received: Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet Temp High M-28 If the temperature continues to rise which ONE of the following AUTOMATIC system responses would you expect to see and what are the required Operator actions? A. Letdown isolation valve V2516 closed. Start additional Charging pumps to clear alarm then re-establish letdown flow. ( B. Letdown isolation valve V2515 closed. Start additional Charging pumps to clear alarm then re-establish letdown flow. C. Letdown isolation valve V2516 closed. Stop ALL running Charging Pumps. D. Letdown isolation valve V2515 closed. Stop ALL running Charging Pumps. (, 61
Proposed Answer: D Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: Both parts incorrect. B. Incorrect: When restoring Chg. And Letdown the FIRST Charging pump is started prior to opening letdown. Starting ADDITIONAL charging pumps is not correct. C. Incorrect: V2516 closes on Regen Hx. i'1P 6P of 275 psia not temperature. D. Correct: Reference(s): Technical Reference( s): 1-ARP-01-M28 (Attach if not previously provided) 1-0NP-02.03 Charging and Letdown Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: PSL OPS SYS 205 LPC Obj. (As available) 12a Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # ( ----- (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 10-- 55.43 ---
~--
3 Comments: ( 62
REVISION: PROCEDURE TITLE: PANEL: ( 1 ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE M PROCEDURE NO: WINDOW: 1-ARP-01-M28 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 28 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL M 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 REGENERATIVE REGENERA liVE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 HEAT EXCHANGER 25 26 27 If&I 29 30 31 32 OUTLET TEMP 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 HIGH 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 M-28 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT: TIC-2221/150 RAB/RTGB-105 460 F 460°FD ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. TIC-2221, Regenerative HX Outlet Temperature OPERATOR ACTIONS:
NOTE II c.v2515, 470°F. II V2515, Letdown Stop Valve, automatically closes when letdown temperature reaches 470DF.
- 1. GO TO 1-0NP-02.03, Charging and Letdown. ;0
( CAUSES: Alarm may be caused by EITHER of the following:
- Reduction or loss of charging flow due to pump or system failure
- Excessive letdown flow due to valve or system failure REFERENCES 1. CWO 8770-B-327 sheet 150
- 2. P&ID P&IO 8770-G-078 sheet 120B
- 3. TEDB TEOB
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 14A CHARGING AND LETDOWN 5 of 24 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-0NP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 1. if.
~-:-
ifIf letdown flow is lost, - Then- STOP
'"the the charging pumps.
A. RETURN the charging pump control switches to AUTO. CAUTION Severe thermal stress and flashing may occur in the Regenerative Heat Exchanger if letdown flow is NOT immediately isolated.
- 2. if charging flow is lost, Then
!f 2. ISOLATE Letdown by the following:
ISOLATE letdown. A. CLOSE V2515, Letdown Stop Valve. B. CLOSE V2516, Letdown Cntmt ( Isolation Valve. NOTE With Charging and Letdown, isolated pressurizer level will lower slowly due to RCP controlled bleedoff flow.
- 3. if charging and letdown flow has
!f been lost, Then MAINTAIN Reactor power and RCS temperature constant to minimize pressurizer level deviations.
- 4. VERI FY all applicable automatic actions have occurred. Appendix A contains a listing of expected automatic actions.
- 5. if charging and letdown flow has
!f been lost, Then DETERMINE the cause.
- 6. if a charging system leak has
!f occurred, Then ISOLATE the leak and refer to applicable Technical Specifications for guidance.
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# Tier # 2 Group # 1 KIA # 005A1.07 Importance Rating 2.5 Residual Heat Removal: Determination of test acceptability by comparison of recorded valve response times with Tech-Spec requirements. Proposed Question: RO 32 The valve stroke test of Loop 2A SDC Suction Valve (V3480) has been conducted per OP 001 0125A, Surveillance Data Sheets, with the following results: Open 40.1 sec Closed 42.3 sec Below are the Data Sheet 10 Criteria. 2A Stroke Dir. Min Allowed Max Allowed Limit Time V3480 Shutdown Open 31.0 41.9 45.5 Cooling Suction Closed 29.8 40.2 43.8 ( Which ONE of the following states the required action, if any, and the status of the valve? A. The stroke times are less than the Limit Time, NO action required. B. Declare the valve inoperable and initiate a 24 hour Condition Report. C. Retest the valve. If the retest meets the allowable time NO further action required. D. Retest the valve or declare the valve inoperable. If retested and outside the allowable time, initiate a Condition Report and analyze the data verifying that the new stroke time is acceptable within 96 hours. ( 63
Proposed Answer: 0 Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. This could be chosen if student does not recognize that exceeding the allowed time has consequences. B. Incorrect. This would be chosen if student believes that the violation of the allowed time automatically causes the valve to be declared inoperable were as this action would only apply if outside the limit time. C. Incorrect. Partially correct the valve can be retested but a CR must be written within 30 days. to verify stroke time. D. Correct, Per OP-2-001 0125A Technical Reference(s): OP-2-0010125A (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: 0904724-02 (As available) ( \ Question Source: Bank # HLC-18 Audit Exam question 93 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5 55.43 Comments: ( 64
v
!tY y
f}J~/'~ f~~/'" V'
~R~EV~I~SI~ON~NO~.-:------"P~R~O~C~ED~U~R~E~T~IT~LE~:-----------------------------r.~~~~--_,
~R=EV-IS=I~ON--NO~.-: ------~P~R~O=C~ED~U~R=E=TI=TL~E~:----------------------------~P~A~G~E:~------,
119 SURVEILLANCE DATA SHEETS 66 of 224 PROCEDURE NO.: OP-2-0010125A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 C DATA SHEET 10
.Q ~ NON*CHECK VALVES CYCLED DURING COOLDOWN, COLD AND HEATUP NON-CHECK
§ a5a3 CONDITIONS C E Q) ::J
(]) :::l E 0u (Page 1 of 10) >- ::J
- l 0
...Jg~
Z"Oo - l Z"OO....J 1. Conduct a valve cycle, stroke time and failure test as specified for the listed valves. o ~ ~ << c"Oi= c"01= Z Z 2. Pre-lubrication of valves will violate the intent of as-found condition testing required oZ _U 0" (1J c 00
..c'-
"O 0 C
by 10 CFR 50. Maintenance that can directly affect the outcome of the surveillance I-"O~ <<Co 0::;:00.;:;
-=(1J.l::;
shall NOT be performed prior to testing. ..::;cc c:: C C a::: .Q 8 0::: 3 Valves designated as Fast Acting have a maximum allowed stroke time of o .~ 00 (1J
- u.(])..c L1.Q)..c 2.0 seconds. As with other valves, if the stroke time is less than 1 second, then Z .... ..... :t:o
='=o -~~W a:::
0::: .\::
.;:: ~ - record the time as less than 1. If the measured stroke time is greater than or equal o ~~ !:!:: -g to 1.0 second, record the exact time. If the stroke time exceeds 2.0 seconds, L1.
- u. -f6 Q) u
(]) 0 0:: 0::: W declare the valve inoperable.
~~ >
Q)a.. (])Q.W W
..... 00
.... (1J o0 ...... <<
f- 4. Valves in this datasheet may be stroked in any order. order . Q) Qj =
'+-
= 0 co 5. Enter stroke time, review results and determine stroke time acceptability as follows:
A. Valves with measured stroke times greater than the Limiting Stroke Time or which fail to exhibit the required change of the valve stem or disc position shall immediately be declared inoperable in accordance with NOP-1 00.01, Equipment Out-Of-Service and a Condition Report initiated. B. Valves with measured stroke times outside the Allowable Stroke Time Range but less than the Limiting Stroke Time shall require the following actions be taken:
- 1. The valve shall be immediately retested or declared inoperable.
NOTE If a Condition Report exists with an analysis allowing the valve stroke time to be outside its Acceptance Range and the valve stroke time is below the Limitin Stroke Time, then a new Condition Report is not required. Limiting
- 2. If the valve is retested and the second set of data does not meet the Allowable Stroke Time Range, a Condition Report shall be initiated to analyze the data within 96 hours to verify the new stroke time represents acceptable valve operation, or the valve shall be declared inoperable.
S_2_0PS DATE _ _ _ __ DOCT Data Sheet OP-2-0010125A DOCN OP*2-0010125A SYS OPS COMP _ _ _ __ ITM DS-10
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 119 SURVEILLANCE DATA SHEETS ( *Sl of 224 PROCEDURE NO.: OP-2-0010125A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 DATA SHEET 10 NON-CHECK VALVES CYCLED DURING COOLDOWN, COLD AND HEATUP CONDITIONS (Page 2 of 10)
- 5. B. (continued)
(continued)
- 3. If the valve is retested and the second set of data meets the Allowable Stroke Time Range, a Condition Report shall be initiated to analyze the th cause of the initial deviation within 30 days.
C. Valve stroke times within allowable limits are acceptable.
- 6. Verify valves in post-test position where specified.
- 7. Verify power restored to valve operators if removed for testing.
- 8. Independently verify valve stroke is within allowable stroke time range or reference Condition Report number.
( Reactor Control Operator I have reviewed the requirements of this procedure including other surveillances performed during uring this procedure, if any (i.e., datasheet(s), PMT sheet(s}, sheet(s), etc.}. etc.). Any deviations, abnormal normal results, equipment problems, failures, or human performance issues must be documented ocumented via a Condition Report for each individual item. item .
.R.# _
C.R.# __ __ __ __ __ __ I/ I/ SM IUS
/ US Date
PAGE~t~ REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 119 SURVEILLANCE DATA SHEETS PROCEDURE NO.: 71 of 224
. :'**.. .:;:~~~~1;~~:';;:(.:~
OP-2-0010125A ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 DATA SHEET 10 NON-CHECK VALVES CYCLED DURING COOLDOWN 11 COLD AND HEATUP CONDITIONS (Page 6 of 10) Valve Stroke within Allow. Range I.V. LV. Satisfact-Stroke Time (seconds)/Direction (seconds)fDirection (Initial) Date orily System Valve Exercise Enter Restored Position Test Valve Stroke Min. Actual Max Limit. LV. I.V. Required Instrument Valve No. System Description (Initials) Dir. Allow. Stroke Allow. Time (Initials) After Test # Mode Remarks/Method Open N/A 2.0' 2.0' ,* Fast Acting Valves V1464' Vent to Quench Tank LC Closed N/A 2.0' 2.0' Open N/A 2.0' 2.0' V1465' Vent to Containment LC Closed N/A 2.0' 2.0' Open N/A 2.0' 2.0' V1466* V1466' Vent to Accumulator LC Closed N/A 2.0' 2.0' A Shutdown Cooling Open 31.0 41.9 45.5 I' V3480 V3480 Open Suction Closed 29.8 40.2 43.8 A Shutdown Cooling Open 30.2 40.8 44.4 V3481 Open Suction Closed 29.2 39.6 43.0 V3545 is normally a locked open valve. Certain Shutdown Cooling V3545 Open 30.0 40.6 44.1 See Note SOC SDC train alignments may require this valve to be Suction Tie closed. See 2-NOP-03.05 for desired position. B Shutdown Cooling Open 31.9 43.1 46.8 V3651 Open Suction Closed 30.8 41.6 45.2 B Shutdown Cooling Open 32.0 43.2 47.0 V3652 Open Suction Closed 31.9 43.0 46.8
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # 006K2.04 Importance Rating 3.6 Emergency Core Cooling: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: ESFAS operated valves Proposed Question: RO 33 Unit 2 is operating at 100% power when the feeder breaker to MCC-2B5 (2-40520) trips open. How many HPSI and LPSI Cold Leg Safety Injection valves have been deenergized? HPSI Valves LPSI Valves A.11 A. 1 B. 2 1 C.2 2 ( 0.4 D.4 2 1 1~ 65
Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. This could be chosen by the student if he mistakenly believes that only 1 HPSI cold leg injection valve is powered by MCC-2B5. B. Correct 2 HPSI cold leg valves HCV-3616 & 3646 and I LPSI cold leg valve HCV-3645 loses power and are not available. C. Incorrect. Only 1 LPSI injection valve is powered by MCC-2B5 D. Incorrect. Only 2 HPSI and 1 LPSI cold leg injection valves are powered by MCC-2B5. Technical Reference(s): 2-EOP-99 Figure 2, 2-ADM- (Attach if not previously provided) 03.01C 03.01 C Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: 2-EOP-99 Figure 2 Learning Objective: _0702207-07 _-----'------'-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) _0_7_0-=2=2-=-07'----=-07-'----_______ Question Source: Bank # Bank# l\ Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New xX Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge -=X~_
~X~ __ _
Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7
---=---
55.43 Comments: ( 66
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: VOLTAGE: 0 UNIT 2 POWER DISTRIBUTION BREAKER LIST 480V ( PROCEDURE NO.: MOTOR CONTROL CENTER CONTROL CENTER: 2-ADM-03.01C 2-ADM-03.01 C ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 MCC 285 2B5 480V MCC 285 Reactor (Page 3 of 4) CUBICLE CWO BKR. NO. EQUIPMENT NOTES NO. NO. FRONT SECTION (continued) 2-42042 LF1 574/ Reactor Cavity Sump Pump 2B CRN 98012-9165 1781 (Secondary 1501. Isol. Device in KR4) 2-42043 LF2 1781 Lighting Panel Transf. LP-213 CRN 98012-9165 (Secondary 1501. Isol. Device in KR4) 2-42044 LF3 -- 480V Pwr Recpts. #227, 232, 258, 232,258, 262,266,227,232 2-42045 LF4 1465 CEDMCS / ERDADS Encl Air PCM 02077, Rev 2 Handling Unit HVA-5B & Duct Htr EHC-HVA-5B 2-42046 LF5 585 Waste Management Sys. 2B Heat Tracing Transf. 2-42047 LF6 -- Non-essential Feed REAR SECTION 2-42048 AR1 272 Safety Injection 2B-2 Disch Valve V-3644 2-42049 AR2 266 LPSI Flow Control Valve HCV-3645 2-42050 AR3 1010 Static Inverter 2B 2-42051 AR4 -- SPACE 2-42052 AR5 166 Boric Acid Gravity Feed Valve V-2509 2-42053 BR1 292 Hydrazine Pump 2B 11- 2-42054 BR2 267 HPSI Flow Control Valve HCV-3646 2-42055 BR3 477 Electric Equipment Room Supply Fan 2HVS-5B 2-42056 CR1 1170 Ctrl Rm North Exh. Fan Isol. Valve FCV-25-14 2-42057 CR2 261 HPSI Flow Control Valve HCV-3616 2-42058 CR3 1802 Battery Charger 2-BB 2-42059 DR1 277 HPSI Pump Discharge Vlv V-3654 2-42060 DR2 1163 Intake Structure Exh Fan 2HVE-41 B 2-42061 DR3 1002 Battery Charger 2B 2-42062 ER1 609 Aux. Feedwater Pump 2B Discharge to Stm Gen 2B Valve MV-09-10 2-42063 ER2 611 Aux. Feedwater Pump 2B Discharge to Stm. Gen. 2A Valve, MV-09-14 2-42064 ER3 525 HVE-3B Reactor Support Cooling CRN 98012-9165 Fan (Secondary Isol. Device in BF3) 2-42065 FR1 235 HP Safety Injection to Hot Leg 2B Valve V-3523 2-42066 FR2 236 HP Safety Injection to Hot Leg 2B Valve V-3551 (
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 36A APPENDICES / FIGURES / TABLES / DATA 126 of 156 PROCEDURE NO.: SHEETS 2-EOP-99 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 .: TABLE 1 SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION SIGNAL (Page 2 of 11) 11 ) Section 1: RTGB-206 (continued) ('.I) A Train (") B Train Cv) 0D 6. ENSURE HPSI Header Valves OPEN.
- HCV-3627 -
- HCV-3617 -
- HCV-3637 -
- HCV-3647 -
- HCV-3626 -
lflii'
- HCV-3616 -
((~
- HCV-3636 -
oD ""
- HCV-3646
- 7. ENSURE LPSI Pumps RUNNING.
- 2A LPSI Pump -
- 2B LPSI Pump -
o 8. ENSURE LPSI Header Valves OPEN. D
- HCV-3625 -
- HCV-3615 -
HCV-3635 HCV-3645
( Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # 007A4.10 Importance Rating 3.6 Pressurizer Relief / Quench Tank: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Recognition of leaking PORV/code safety Proposed Question: R034 RO 34 Unit 1 is at 100% power. Pressurizer Safety valve V1200 discharge temperature has increased from 150°F to 220°F over the last 10 minutes. Which ONE of the following could have caused this temperature increase? A. Placing the Pressurizer on Recirc. B. Removing the Pressurizer from Recirc. C. Lowering the Quench Tank pressure from 3 psig to 0.5 psig. D. Raising the Quench Tank pressure from 3 psig to 6 psig. ( ( \ 67
Proposed Answer: C ( Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: Placing Pzr. on recirc requires pressure controller setpoint reduced from 2250 to approx. 2220 psi psiaa due to the controller not having proportional plus reset control function. This results in a possible pressure excursion and makes PORV/Safety valve leakage plausible. Maintaining normal operating pressure is directed by procedure when placing the Pressurizing on recirc. B. Incorrect: The same is true (above) when removing Pzr. From recirc. Controller setpoint must be adjusted from 2220 psia back to 2250 psia. C. Correct: Lowering pressure to <1 psig, as stated in precautions and limits of procedure could result in PORV/Safety valve leakage. D. Incorrect: raising pressure within normal operating band is not a concern Technical Reference(s): 1-NOP-01.07 Quench Tank (Attach if not previously provided) Operation Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: (As available) ((, Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X _X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 7 55.43 5 to 8 Comments: ( 68
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 4B QUENCH TANK OPERATION PROCEDURE NO.: 4 of 15 1-NOP-01.07 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 3.0 PREREQUISITES INITIAL 3.1 The Waste Gas System is aligned and available to the extent that the Quench Tank can be vented to the containment surge header. US 3.2 The Nitrogen Supply System is aligned and available to the extent that Nitrogen can be supplied to the Quench Tank. US 3.3 The Primary Water System is aligned and available to the extent that Primary Water can be supplied to the Quench Tank. US 3.4 The Liquid Waste Management System is aligned and available to the extent that the Quench Tank can be drained to the Reactor Drain Tank. US 3.5 Appendix A, Quench Tank Valve Alignment, has been completed. US (
\
4.0 PRECAUTIONS / LIMITATIONS 4.1 The Quench Tank rupture disc blowout pressure is 100 psig. 4.2 V1242, Quench Tank Relief Valve, setpoint is 70 psig. This relief valve discharges to the Containment atmosphere. 4.3 The Quench Tank temperature should be maintained less than 120°F to ensure design limits for the Quench Tank are not exceeded. 4.4 V6781 , Quench Tank for N2 Press Reg, is normally set to maintain 3 psig (2 to 4 psig) pressure in the Quench Tank. 4.5 Quench Tank pressures of less than 1 psig could increase the possibility of PORV and Pressurizer Safety Valve leakage. 4.6 Cooling the Quench Tank to less than 115°F could increase the possibility of PORV and Pressurizer Safety Valve leakage. 4.7 Normal Quench Tank level is 55% to 65%. If normal level is NOT maintained, the rupture disc blowout pressure could be exceeded during a Quench Tank design event. ( 4.8 If the Quench Tank water level is less than 40%, the inlet sparger will be uncovered.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 9B REACTOR OPERATING GUIDELINES DURING STEADY I-P-RO-C-E-D-UR-E-N-O-.:---I I-P-RO-C-E-D-UR'-;E;";N;"'O-.:---I STATE AND SCHEDULED LOAD CHANGES 12 of 15 2-GOP-101 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX A PRESSURIZER RECIRCULATION GUIDEliNES GUIDELINES (Page 1 of 2) NOTE
- The purpose of placing the Pressurizer on recirculation is to keep the Pressurizer and RCS boron concentration within 25 ppm when changing RCS boron concentration.
- From measured data, the estimated time in minutes to correct a greater than or equal to 25 ppm boron mismatch by operating 6 Backup Bank heaters may be determined as follows:
Time (in minutes) to correct mismatch = [(pzr ppm - RCS ppm)- 25 ppm] x 3 11.. (,;,p;U~~~l~\f@'lfl'il!t~~'li['~i~~'f1izemol~b'fecipGul@ti To place the Pressurizer on recirculation: Off: A. PLACE all available Backup Bank heater control switches to ON. ( B. Slowly REDUCE the AUTO setpoint on PIC-11 OOX or PIC-11 OOY, the selected "Pressurizer Pressure" controller, to i~£'mat@tajtli"9(:)rJl!~J~OI{~rati'l"lg''; maintain normal operating
~r~S~~~~i' pressure. >.,~' :, .*>....' * .' > .
c. C. OBSERVE HIC-11 00, "Pressurizer Spray" output and PCV-11 00E/11 OOF, "Pressurizer Spray Valve" position indication to verify Main Spray flow. NOTE Normally, the required number of Backup Bank heaters in service is dependent upon:
- 1. The magnitude of thermal losses from the system, including leakage to the Quench Tank.
- 2. The number of heater elements out of service.
The normal configuration is to have enough Backup Bank heaters in service to keep the Proportional Bank heaters at approximately 50% output.
- 2. '~J~a~~~~t~\~~ii~j~B~£~~~~;;;~!1jfJ;r;~'irr~lillati:on:"
To take the Pressurizer off recirculation: A. REMOVE the additional Backup Bank heaters from service one at a time by returning the control switch to AUTO. B. ADJUST the AUTO setpoint on PIC-11 OOX or PIC-11 OOY, the selected "Pressurizer "P Pressure" ress uri z e r Press u re" co ntro II e#;;i!i&t~~ilI~@ltaj~~R1~,/['Qii)ii!Ji~;~~r~t~rn:ge,~')1e,~~~~;, controller, to maintain
~n.n'\,::~,:"",,,,, - ---.':: ~-:~~-'.- - -'_" ;;-_-_:_',~'
normal operating
.'_"<<,'~.' '_-_::,,::-,;;::'>,~':; '_' :">~:" _. ,,'- . -
pressure.
,-" - "'-', -.' ;-\,s",~s,,-g<--
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# Tier # 2 Group # 1 KIA # 00SA4.10 00BA4.10 Importance Rating 3.1 Component Cooling Water: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Conditions that require the operation of two CCW coolers Proposed Question: RO 35 Unit 2 is in Mode 4 cooling down for a refueling outage. As the Unit transitions from Mode 4 to Mode 6, which ONE of the following states the required CCW equipment OPERABLE I AVAILABLE during this transition? (Assume Mode 6, refueling cavity level is 19 feet above the Reactor Vessel Flange and Mode 6 equipment status requirements in accordance with 0010145 Shutdown Cooling Controls.) Mode 4 Mode 6 A. Two independent CCW Two CCW pumps OPERABLE loops OPERABLE Two CCW HX's AVAILABLE ( B. Two independent CCW Two CCW pumps AVAILABLE Loops OPERABLE One CCW HX AVAILABLE C. One CCW pump and HX OPERABLE One CCW pump OPERABLE and one CCW pump and HX One CCW HX OPERABLE AVAILABLE D. One CCW pump and One CCW HX One CCW pump AVAILABLE Operable One CCW HX AVAILABLE ( 69
( Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: Mode 4 correct, Mode 6 incorrect, CCW pumps are required to be available, not operable. Only one HX required to be available. B. Correct: T.S. requires two independent loops operable in Mode 4. Mode 6 requires two CCW pumps available and one HX available C. Incorrect: D. Incorrect: Technical Reference(s): 0010145 Shutdown Cooling (Attach if not previously provided) Controls 2-NOP-03.05 Shutdown Cooling T.S. 3.9.8.2 T.S.3.7.3 ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: 0902723-02 _0_9.:.....0'--2_7_2_3-_0_2_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 ---
~~-
7 55.43 Comments: 70
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 28 SHUTDOWN COOLING CONTROLS 3 of 11 PROCEDURE NO.: 0010145 ST. LUCIE PLANT .' . 1.0 TITLE SHUTDOWN COOLING CONTROLS 2.0
.0 REVIEW AND APPROVAL See cover page 3.0 SCOPE 3.1 .1 §11 Purpose This procedure provides management controls which are necessary when a unit is on shutdown cooling. Related procedures, policies, process sheets and outage schedules contain specific implementation actions which are broadly described in this procedure procedure..
3.2
.2 Discussion
( Industry experience and analysis have shown that accidents while on shutdown cooling can pose a legitimate risk to reactor safety. A suitable margin of conservatism, often in excess of existing Technical Specification LCOs, shall exist in areas of equipment availability and work controls, to ensure shutdown cooling function is not jeopardized. This awareness and conservatism is even more essential during reduced inventory and mid loop conditions. 3.3 Authority Plant General Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant 3.4 Definitions
- 1. ,-r2
~2 Equipment Status:
-,~1f(
B. Operable I/ operability - a system, subsystem, train, component or device is capable of performing its specified function as delineated by Technical Specifications. Operating - a system, subsystem, train, component or device is in operation and is performing its specified function. C. Available - a system, subsystem, train, component or device is capable of performing its specified function; however, it may NOT be operable by Technical Specifications.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 43 ( SHUTDOWN COOLING 16 of 153 PROCEDURE NO.: 2-NOP-03.05 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 3.0 PREREQUISITES AND INITIAL CONDITIONS INITIAL 3.1 Prerequisites
- 1. VERIFY SDC has been directed by one of the following procedures:
- 2-GOP-305, Reactor Plant Cooldown - Hot to Cold Shutdown
- ONP 2-0120039, Natural Circulation Cooldown
- EOPs
- 2-NOP-01.05, Filling and Venting the RCS 3.2 Initial Conditions NOTE The following Tech Specs address SDC operability: 3.4.1.3, 3.4.1.4.1, 3.4.1.4.2, 3.9.8.1, 3.9.8.2.
(
- 1. IF two loops of SDC are required to be OPERABLE by technical specifications, THEN ENSURE the following:
f' (Section 7.1.3 Management Directive 6) A. Two LPSI pumps are OPERABLE and powered from separate 4160 VAC buses. B. Two SDC heat exchangers are OPERABLE and CCW flow is available to both SDC heat exchangers. C. One 4160 VAC emergency bus is OPERABLE, powered from offsite power, and is capable of being supplied by an OPERABLE emergency diesel generator. D. One other 4160 VAC emergency bus is available powered from offsite power. E. One emergency diesel generator is OPERABLE. F. ENSURE the following 125 VDC electrical equipment status: (1 ) (1) One vital 125 VDC bus is OPERABLE, energized, and is supplying the same electrical train as the operable EDG. (
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 43 SHUTDOWN COOLING 17 of 153 PROCEDURE NO.: 2-NOP-03.05 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 3.2 Initial Conditions (continued) INITIAL
- 1. F. (continued)
(2) One vital 125 VDC battery is OPERABLE, energized and is aligned to the operable vital 125V DC bus. (3) One battery charger is OPERABLE and energized and is supplying the operable vital 125V DC bus. (4) One other vital 125 VDC bus is available and energized. (5) One other 125 VDC battery is available, energized and aligned to the available vital 125 VDC bus (the battery may be non-vital if aligned per plant procedures). (6) One other battery charger is available and energized and supplying the available vital 125V DC bus (the charger may be non-vital if aligned per plant procedures ). ( G. ENSURE one ICW pump is available, operating and powered from the same train as the OPERABLE emergency diesel generator. H. ENSURE one other ICW pump is available and capable of being placed into service if the operating ICW pump fails. I. ENSURE one CCW pump is available, operating and powered from the same train as the OPERABLE emergency diesel generator. J. ENSURE one other CCW pump is available and capable of being placed into service if the operating CCW pump fails. K. ENSURE at least one CCW heat exchanger is available and in-service.
- 2. IF one loop of SOC is required to be OPERABLE by technical specifications, THEN ENSURE the following:
(Section 7.1.3 Management Directive 6) A. One LPSI pump is OPERABLE and powered from the same train as the OPERABLE emergency diesel generator. (
REFUELING OPERATIONS LOW WATER LEVEL LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
. .3.9.8.2 7 116 Two independent shutdown cooling loops shall be OPERABLE and at least one shutdown cooling loop shall be in operation.**
aAPPLICABILITY: _: MODE 6 when the water level above the top of the reactor pressure vessel flange is less than 23 feet. ACTION:
- a. With less than the required shutdown cooling loops OPERABLE, within 1 hour initiate corrective action to return the required loops to OPERABLE status, or to establish greater than or equal to 23 feet of water above the reactor pressure vessel flange, as soon as possible.
- b. With no shutdown cooling loop in operation, suspend operations that would cause introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the boron concentration of Technical Specification 3.9.1 and within 1 hour initiate corrective action to return the required shutdown cooling loop to operation. Close all containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere within 4 hours.
( SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.8.2 At least once per 12 hours:
- a. At least one shutdown cooling loop shall be verified to be in operation.
- b. The total flow rate of reactor coolant to the reactor pressure vessel shall be verified to be greater than or equal to 3000 gpm.
gpm.**
- The reactor coolant flow rate requirement may be reduced to 1850 gpm if the following conditions are satisfied before the reduced requirement is implemented: the reactor has been determined to have been subcritical for at least 125 hours, the maximum RCS is ~ 117°F, temperature is.::: 11 rF, and the temperature of CCW to the shutdown cooling heat is ~ 8rF.
exchanger is.::: 87°F.
** One required shutdown cooling loop may be inoperable for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing, provided that the other shutdown cooling loop is OPERABLE and in operation.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-9 3/49-9 Amendment No. 48, eG, +e, 4S, 00, +e,~,
~, 139, 146
PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION J3.7.3i 7 At least two independent component cooling water loops shall be OPERABLE.* APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION: With only one component cooling water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.3 At least two component cooling water loops shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manual, power-operated or automatic) servicing safety-related equipment that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.
- b. At least once per 18 months during shutdown by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety-related equipment actuates to its correct position on an SIAS test signal.
- When CCW pump 2C is being used to satisfy the requirements of this specification, the alignment of the discharge valves shall be verified to be consistent with the appropriate power supply at least once per 24 hours.
Upon receipt of annunciation for improper alignment of the pump 2C motor power in relation to any of its motor-operated discharge valves positions, restore proper system alignment within 2 hours. ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/47-13
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # 008K4.01 Importance Rating 3.1 Component Cooling Water: Knowledge of CCWS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Automatic start of standby pump Proposed Question: RO 36 Unit 2 is operating at 100% power with the following:
- 2A and 2B CCW pumps running.
- ALL AB busses are aligned to the B side.
The 2C CCW pump is aligned and started to replace the 2B CCW pump. The 2B CCW pump is stopped in preparation to remove it from service for PM. The 2B CCW pump is yet to be placed in 'Pull to Lock' when the following occurs: At time 0220 a Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP) occurs and BOTH Diesel Generators start and load. At time 0225 a LOCA with subsequent SIAS occurs. Which ONE of the following states the status of the CCW pumps? ( At time 0221 : At time 0226: A. ALL three CCW pumps are running. ALL three CCW pumps are running. B. ALL three CCW pumps are running. 2A and 2C CCW pumps are running C. 2A and 2C CCW pumps are running. ALL three CCW pumps are running. D. 2A and 2C CCW pumps are running. 2A and 2C CCW pumps are running. 71
Proposed Answer: C ( Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: All three pumps will not be running. CCW pump breakers stay closed if previously closed and stay open if previously open for the EDG loading on loss of power. They all receive a start signal on SIAS if not in 'Pull to Lock' so all pumps NOT in pull to lock will start on SIAS and load on the EDG. B. Incorrect: see above C. Correct. D. Incorrect, see above Technical Reference(s): 0711209 Component Cooling (Attach if not previously provided) Water Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: PSL OPS SYS 209 LPC Obj. (As available) 4&6 Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Comments: ( 72
071 ~~~~' 1~e~d!<::::}~~I~~~~:! . . ............. ....) 0711209, Rev . .11.-<:.... '{ Deleted: 7 Page 11 of ll,,,,. *** .. rD~i~t~d*;**8h mmmm ..... mmO,
)
FOR TRAINING USE ONLY'>. ONLY',:**. :.[)~I~~~~:~ .m******************** ........ ...............................................) m... J
'.', ,.! Deleted: 80
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71 :"::::"::: ' ' ' ' ' ' ':::::::-,"::::: ,,::,,:-:,,;:-:::::::-::::::::::"\ The CCW pump motors are powered from the safety-related 4160 volt AC buses which
\.
~~!~~~~:~~.!.~mmm.mmmm.J
'(1 Deleted: 6970
.............................................................. ......... - /
are loaded onto the Emergency Diesel Generators upon a loss of off-site power (LOOP). If a LOOP occurs, the normally running CCW pumps 'A' and 'B' would restart immediately [.the CCW breaker does not ope[lJ'mmmmmmm __ mmmmmmmmm.mmm ... <,::'~e~;!;~i~~~e~t::irSIX secon~.lo.~dJ P;;;;;;~~;;;'ii~;;~;h~CCWnp~;;;;;~~;~m mnnm mnm n .. n mm mn mny) ;;,;:;"~~::~;:,':;:: :::~,"re .
\. should be changed to match Unit 1.
Pump Power supply 'i. The eew pump is started
~~. immediately to prevent flashing and 1A 1A3 4160 volt AC bus ~; void formation due to heating of
'.: . stagnant eew in the containment 1B 1 B3 4160 volt AC bus ~:.. coolers (from the LOeA or EDSE). If 1C 1AB 4160 volt bus (normally aligned to the 1B3 4160 volt AC bus) :. \ . the eew pump restart was delayed.
\\\ i water hammer from the mixtures
- \\ I could cause a rupture of the eew I
..... , piping J 2A 2A3 4160 volt AC bus 2B 2B3 4160 volt AC bus
\} Deleted:. ..
**\*:tl>=let=d:............... .. ................. J
\l Deleted: *11 2C 2AB 4160 volt bus (normally aligned to the 2A3 4160 volt AC bus) It Deleted: 11
~-~- _ _ _I-.J The CCW pumps can be operated from two locations~. locations~m. __ ....
______ .. __m .... ____.m
. ________ . ______ __ m .. m._ ...,/,{
____________ /{~D_e_le_te_d-,: Deleted: 1I"--_ 11 _ _ _ _--.J
- NORMAL operation by the respective control switch at the RTGB 106 [206] in the control room. The circuit NORMAL/ISOLATE switch, located at the 4160 VAC switchgear, is in the NORMAL position. Each pump control switch has five positions:
( START which starts the pump STOP which stops the pump PULL TO LOCK (... .................................... ..........................'1 The standby CCW pump .fQ!")!rQ~ CCW pump swi!9hjl}.o!I"D.~JI~ 'f'l., f.<?!'l!r.<?~.?\<I{l1~hjl}.<?!:IT1.aJly .~.t.J~I~~JQ~J?9.~t.j§m ........
'.9')-'atJ~IC?E3J()()[2g.61~m. ::****{D~i~-;d:(~;;;:;;ii~~c1-m
__ ~.:/'\ Deleted: (normally 'e') ..............-. I The standby
. t '
maintained d' main alne In th in the PULL TO LOCK e PULL TO LOCK position. 't' POSI Ion. Tflis Th' f' IS configuration t' con Igura Ion prevents preven s the t th e "<'.~~!,!,~~:~:
::1 Deleted: ss ===="""'===",
""?""'"'""""""""""""'""=""" "'--"'~'-""-"'.-"'.",""" """~
i1 Deleted: is i standby pump from AUTO starting for a SIAS and/or LOOP condition, I'~---------'; thereby ensuring that only one CCW pump would be loaded to one EDG and preventing an overload condition. condition, The time that a standby pump is not in PULL TO LOCK is minimized to the time just prior to starting it. The standby pump would be taken from PULL TO LOCK to AUTO GREEN FLAG for a very short time prior to starting the standby pump. Once the running pump is stopped, its control switch would be taken to PULL TO LOCK. Green Flag after STOP ( \
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 16 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM 14 of 102 PROCEDURE NO.: OPERATION 2-NOP-14.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX D STARTING THE 2C CCW PUMP ON THE B HEADER WITH THE HEADER PRESSURIZED (Page 1 of 1) CHECK
.0 1.0 Starting the 2C CCW Pump on the B CCW Header with the header pressu rized.
pressurized. CAUTION
* ~7 Do NOT operate two CCW Pumps on the same bus during Modes 1-3 (SIAS NOT Blocked) with NO CCW Pumps operating on the other electrical bus.
1.1 Ensure the valves are aligned to support running the 2C CCW Pump on the B CCW header:
- 1. MV-14-1, Hdr A from CCW Pump 2C (RTGB-206) CLOSED
- 2. MV-14-3, Hdr A to CCW Pump 2C (RTGB-206) CLOSED
- 3. MV-14-2, Hdr B from CCW Pump 2C (RTGB-206) OPEN
- 4. MV-14-4, Hdr B to CCW Pump 2C (RTGB-206) OPEN
- 5. SB14137, 2C CCW Pump Suction LOCKED OPEN
- 6. SB14152, 2C CCW Pump Disch LOCKED OPEN 1.2 Check the 2C CCW Pump for proper lube oil level.
1.3 Start the 2C CCW Pump (RTGB-206). Start. 1.4 Locally check the pump for proper operation. 1.5 Verify system pressure and pump amps stabilize. 1.6 STOP the 2B CCW Pump (RTGB-206). 1.7 Place the 2B CCW pump control switch in the PULL TO LOCK position. 2.0 After review by Unit Supervisor is complete, this appendix may be discarded. END OF APPENDIX D
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # K/A# 010K1.08 Importance Rating 3.2 Pressurizer Pressure Control: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the PZR PCS and the following systems: PZR LCS Proposed Question: RO 37 Unit 2 is operating at 90% power with the following conditions:
- H-17 PZR CHANNEL X LEVEL HIGH/LOW, is in alarm.
- H-9 PZR CHANNEL X PRESS HIGH/LOW, is in alarm.
- Pressurizer (PZR) level is slowly rising.
- Letdown flow is dropping slowly.
- ALL PZR heaters are ON.
- BOTH Spray Valves indications are RED and GREEN.
Assuming NO OPERATOR actions are taken, which ONE of the following would cause the observed conditions? A. LCV-211 OP, Level Control Valve is drifting CLOSED. B. PCV-2201 P, Pressure Control Valve is drifting OPEN. C. The controlling PZR level channel has failed LOW. D. The controlling PZR level channel has failed HIGH. ( 73
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): A. Correct: B. Incorrect: will cause a slight increase in letdown and PZR level control valves will respond to control level. PZR level will not change enough to cause pressure to rise and spray valves to open. C. Incorrect: will cause PZR heaters to de-energize. D. Incorrect: will cause letdown to decrease. Technical Reference(s): 0711206 Pressurizer Pressure (Attach if not previously provided) and Level 2-0120035 Pressurizer Pressure and Level ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0-'0702206-06 0_'_6-_0_6________ (As available)
-'0'--2_2___
Question Source: Bank# Bank # 2407 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 2 to 9 55.43 Comments: 74
D,"] 0 (JI
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~
~R~EV~IS~IO~N~N~O~.:------~PR~O~C~E~DU~R~E~T=IT~LE~:----------------------------~P~A~G~E:----~~
26 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 9 of 15 PROCEDURE NO.: NO.: 2-0120035 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
.2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 1. (continued)
G. !f If (LOOP) Loss of Offsite Power has occurred with diesel generators supplying power and pressurizer level is greater than 27%, Then perform the following to regain pressurizer heaters:
- 1. Manually close the breakers for pressurizer heater on 4160V buses Bkr 2-20204 on 2A3 bus Bkr 2-20403 on 2B3 bus.
- 2. Manually reset the backup heater B11 and B4 only (200 kw breakers B
( each).
- 2. ABNORMAL PRESSURIZER LEVEL 2.
CONDITION NOTE Appendix "B" contains a listing of pressurizer levels which are associated with automatic actions. A. Verify selected RRS channel is A. !f If the selected RRS channel operating properly. has failed, Then shift to the operable channel.
- 1. NAVIGATE to the SBCS inputs screen on either FW FPD and reset the TAVE signal, if required.
B. Ensure backup charging pump starts B. !f If automatic actions have NOT and letdown flow is decreasing, or occurred, Then manually the backup charging pump stops and control charging and letdown letdown flow is increasing, whichever flow as required. is applicable. (Appendix "B" contains expected automatic responses.)
REVISION SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 26 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE AND LEVEL 10 of 15 PROCEDURE NO.: 2-0120035 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 2. (continued)
(continued) 2. (continued) (continued) C. Verify level anomaly is NOT caused C. Slow the rate of change of by a large rate of change in T-avg. T -avg or stabilize until level anomaly is controlled. D. Isol. Valves", Verify "Letdown 1501. D. !f letdown has isolated, Then V-2515, V-2516, and V-2522 are secure charging and refer to open. 2-0NP-02.03, Charging and Letdown. E. Verify selected pressurizer level E. !f selected level control valve is control valve (LCV-211 OP / NOT operating properly, Then LCV-21100) LCV-2110Q) is operating properly. take manual control of level control valve and refer to 2-0NP-02.03, Charging and Letdown. F. Verify selected letdown pressure F. !f selected pressure control control valve (PCV-2201 P / valve is NOT operating PCV-2201 0)Q) is operating properly. properly, Then take manual control of pressure control valve and refer to 2-0NP-02.03, Charging and Letdown.
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # 010K3.02 Importance Rating 4.0 Pressurizer Pressure Control: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PZR PCS will have on the following: RPS Proposed Question: RO 38 Unit 1 is at 100% power with the following:
- Pressurizer Pressure control channel X is selected for control.
- HIC-1100, Pressurizer Spray Valve Controller indicates '0' (minimum) controller output.
Based on these plant conditions:
- 1) PT-11 PT-1100X OOX has failed:
- 2) assuming NO OPERATOR action, the plant will:
A. 1) LOW.
- 2) trip on TMLP.
( B. 1)LOW.
- 1) LOW.
- 2) trip on High Pressurizer pressure.
C. 1) HIGH.
- 2) trip on TMLP.
D. 1) HIGH.
- 2) trip on High Pressurizer pressure.
75
Proposed Answer: B ( Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: Part 1 correct, all heaters would be on with no spray. part 2 incorrect, HIC-1100 showing '0' output indicates a fail low of pressurizer pressure. ('0' output means full proportional heater output in response to a low pressure condition) B. Correct C. Incorrect: Part 1 incorrect. If PT11 OOX failed high, HIC-11 00 would indicate 100% output, which would result in 100% spray valve open signal. D. Incorrect: Both parts incorrect as previously stated above. Technical Reference(s): 0711206 Pressurizer Pressure (Attach if not previously provided) and Level Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0_7_0_2_2_06_-_1_6_ _0_7_0_2_2_0_6-_1_6 __ _______ _____ (As available) ( Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 7 55.43 Comments: 76
0711206, Rev. 17 Page 78 of 124 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY TABLE 3 -* Selected Pressure Channel Failures SELECTED PRESSURE CHANNEL FAILS HIGH AUTOMATIC RESPONSE TO FAILURE
- High/Low pressure alarm (2340 psia)
- Proportional heaters minimum (+25 psi) [all heaters Off]
- valve( s) full open (+100[75] psi)
Spray valve(s)
- Backup heaters in AUTO Off (2220 psia) [all heaters Off]
PLANT RESPONSE TO FAILURE
- Actual pressure decreases
- High/Low pressure alarm on operable channel (2100 psia)
- TM/LP trip at 1887 [1900] psia OPERATOR ACTION
- Shift to operable pressure control channel r
(
- Restore heaters as necessary SELECTED PRESSURE CHANNEL FAlLS FAILS LOW
~,'6'MAAQ AUTOMATIC Ii(illCI RESPONSE.MWPiTO P#I~!~
{91 FAILURE _4
- Proportional heaters on maximum (-25 psi)
- Backup heaters in AUTO On (2200 psia)
- High/Low pressure alarm (2100 psia)
- Spray valve(s) close (if open)
PLANT RESPONSE TO FAILURE
- Actual PZR pressure increases
- High/Low pressure alarm operable channel (2340 psia)
- High Pressurizer pressure reactor trip if actual PZR pressure reaches 2400[2370] psia OPERATOR ACTION
- Shift to operable pressure control channel
- Restore heaters as necessary
0711206, Rev. 17 Page 117 of 124 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY HEATER AND SPRAY PROPORTIONAL CONTROL PROP HEATER THERMAL SPRAY VALVE OPENING OUTPUT % OF MAX %OFMAX PROP SPRAY HTRS VALVES 66.6 83.3 r--- 100% ~ 100%
~ I
~
~
, I I
~ I
~ I
~ I
~ I
~ I 80% ~ I 80%
~ I
~ I
~ I
~ I
~ I
~ I
~ I
~ I
~ I 60% ~ I/ 60%
~
~
~
~
I I I/ I/
~ /I
~ I
~ I
~ I/
~ I/
( 40% ~
~ I/
I 40%
~
/I
~ I
~ I
~ I
~ I
~ I/
~ I 20% ~ I 20%
~ I
~ /I
~
~
~ ,
I
/I
\33.3/
~
1\ /I
~ I/
O%~------.-------,-------.-~'I----~------~------.---,---.------,-,-----+-O%
'/
O%~------r------r------.-+---~------~----~---.--'------.-.----~O% g 0% ~ 90% 2225~ 2225 (TIRCOI0711206*F28*R8) (TIRC0I0711206*F28-R8j PIC-1100 PIC*1100 % OUTPUT ( UNIT 1 = ( - - ) (UNIT (UNIT2= 2 = (----) PIC-1100 XCV) PIC*1100 X(Y) OUTPUT SIGNAL
%OFMAX FIGURE 32
( Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# Tier # 2 Group # 1 KIA # 012A3.03 Importance Rating 3.4 Reactor Protection: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RPS, including: Power supply Proposed Question: RO 39 Unit 1 is in Mode 1. A loss of the MA 120 VAC Instrument Bus occurs. Which ONE of the following states the response of the Reactor Protective System as a result of the loss of the Instrument Bus? A. Two (2) Trip Circuit Breakers open due to a loss of power to one (1) uK" "K" Relay. B. Two (2) Trip Circuit Breakers open due to a loss of power to two (2) uK" "K" Relays. C. Four (4) Trip Circuit Breakers open due to a loss of power to one (1) uK" "K" Relay. ( D. Four (4) Trip Circuit Breakers open due to a loss of power to two (2) uK" "K" Relays. ( 77
Proposed Answer: D Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: Four Trip Circuit Breakers and two "K" relays B. Incorrect: Four Trip Circuit Breakers C. Incorrect: two uK" "K" relays D. Correct Technical Reference(s): 0711404 RPS Lesson Text (Attach if not previously provided) 1-0970030 120V Instrument AC System (Class 1E) / QSPDS Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: PSL OPS SYS 404 LPC Obj. 17 (As available) ( Question Source: Bank # Bank# Modified Bank # 2773 (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X ---____ _X---' Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Comments: ( 78
REVISION SION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: PAG 14 120V INSTRUMENT AC SYSTEM (CLASS 1 E) / 50f23 PROCEDURE NO.: QSPDS 1-0970030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 7.0
.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS 7.1 .1 Immediate Operator Actions INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 1. .If a reactor trip occurs,
!f Then carry out 1-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions Actions..
7.2
.2 Subsequent Operator Actions
- 11. Loss of an Instrument Bus: 1.
NOTE RPS, ESFAS and AFAS will be in a 1 out of 3 logic on loss of one instrument bus and 4 TCBs will be tripped. Table 1 contains a listing of additional instrumentation supplied by the instrument buses. su lied b A. Ensure plant operating parameters are stable by comparing redundant, non-affected instrumentation. ( B. Determine which instrument bus has been lost by checking annunciators A-43, B-43, A-53, B-53 and RPS cabinets MA, MB, MC orMD. or MD. C. §1!f
§1.1f the affected instrument bus C. §1!f
§1.1f instrument bus cannot be was being supplied by its energized, within 2 hours, inverter, Then, within 2 hours, Then:
place the affected instrument bus onto its respective maintenance bypass bus as follows:
- 1. For 11MA MA and 11MC, MC, refer to 1.
- 1. .If 1 (one)
!f Instrument Bus is Appendix A. not energized from its associated inverter, Then re-energize the Instrument Bus within 2 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
0711404, Rev. 13 Page 38 of 97 ( FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
** Shorting of the pairs of trip contacts in the logic ladders prevents the matrix trip relays from being released. These failures can be detected during matrix relay testing by observing that the trip relays do not drop out.
- Grounds in the logic matrix have no effect and are indicated by the ground detection circuits. Application of external voltages to the matrices have no effect due to the system being ungrounded.
- Single 120VAC instrument power supply failures to a logic matrix causes 4 TCBs to open on one side. See Figure 3. This is due to de-energization of only two logic matrix relays in a logic matrix. In the case of a loss of instrument bus MA, two logic matrix relays are lost in logic matrices AB, AC & AD. The loss of these logic matrix relays result in opening trip path contacts in trip paths 1 & 2. When K relays 1 &
2 de-energize the drop out of the TCB undervoltage trip relays and pickup of the shunt trip relays will open TCBs 1, 5, 2, & 6. Assuming a normal electrical lineup no plant trip will occurr occurr.... A loss of both power supplies results in a de-energization ( of all four logic matrix relays causing all 8 TCBs to open tripping the plant.
- Loss of a single 125 VDC power supply will result in a reactor trip dueJodue.to the loss two instrument buses MA/MC on loss of "A" 125VDC or MB/MD on loss of "B" VDC. In the case of a loss of "A" 125VDC power is lost to all 4 logic matrix relays of logic matrices AB & & AC and to the undervoltage trip relays for TCBs 1,5,3 & 7.
1, 5, 3 & All 4 Trip paths & & associated K relays are de-energized which forces TCBs 1thru 8
. to open as the undervoltage trip relays of all the TCBs and the shunt trip relays of TCBs 2, 6, 4 & & 8 operate. See Figure 3.
- Failure of the trip relays of a logic matrix to deactivate has no effect since there are six logic matrices, whose trip relay contacts will initiate trip action and cause the protective action to be completed.
- The use of two breakers in series, to provide a trip action, negates the effect of the failure of one trip relay or TCB.
- By use of local isolation transformers, single grounds in the TCB control relay circuits have no effect. Local ground detectors provide indication should grounds occur.
Single Question Report QID#: 2773 Objective: 0702503-05 System: ONP System:ONP Rev: 0 Cog Level: 1 KA # RO SRO Unit 1 was operating to 100% power when the MA 120 VAC Instrument Bus was lost. Which one of the following statements correctly describes:
- 1. The complete set of actions that occur, and
- 2. Which procedure should be used to mitigate the casualty?
A. 2 TCBs open due to a loss of power to 1 "K" Relays. Enter OP-1-0970030 (120 V Instrument AC System (Class 1E)) B. 4 TCBs open due to a loss of power to 2 "K" Relays. Enter OP-1-0970030 (120 V Instrument AC System (Class 1E)) C. 4 TCBs open due to a loss of power to 1 "K" Relay. Enter OP-1-0970030 (120 V Instrument AC System (Class 1E)) D. ALL TCBs open due to a loss of power to 2 "K" Relays. Enter 1-EOP-01 (SPTA) Reasons the choices are right or wrong. Correct answer is B. A. B. C. D. Source Ref: 1.0711503
- 1. 0711503 pages 29-30 KA SYS 012 Reactor Protection System (RPS) A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the conse Open Ref:
Revision Notes: Loss of DC power CAR Question Use History Page 1 of 1
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 2 K/A# 013A2.03 Importance Rating 4.4 Engineered Safety Features Actuation: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based Ability on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations; Rapid depressurization Proposed Question: RO 40 Unit 2 is performing a cooldown per 2-GOP-305, Reactor Plant Cooldown - Hot Standby To Cold Shutdown, for a refueling outage with the following conditions: Time: 11 :30
- RCS pressure is 1750 psia.
- RCS temperature is 504°F.
- 2A & 2B S/Gs are 720 psia.
Time: 11 :31
- 2A Steam Line ruptures outside Containment and just upstream of the MSIV.
- RCS pressure is 1640 psia psi a and rapidly lowering.
(
- S/G pressures are 580 psia and rapidly lowering.
- 1) What automatic ESFAS actuation(s) are expected?
- 2) Which procedure will be implemented to mitigate the event?
A. 1) BOTH MSIS, and SIAS
- 2) 2-EOP-05, Excess Steam Demand B. 1) ONLY MSIS
- 2) 2-EOP-05, Excess Steam Demand C. 1) BOTH MSIS, and SIAS
- 2) 2-0NP-01.01 Plant Condition 1 Steam Generator Heat Removal LTOP Not in Effect D. 1) ONLY MSIS D.1)ONLYMSIS
- 2) 2-0NP-01.01 Plant Condition 1 Steam Generator Heat Removal LTOP Not in Effect) 79
Proposed Answer: 0 Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. Only MSIS will automatically actuate since MSIS has NOT yet been blocked. Also the correct procedure to enter will be 2-0NP-01.01 not 2-EOP-05. B. Incorrect. The correct procedure to enter will be 2-0NP-01.01.not 2-EOP-05 since SIAS should have been blocked per 2-GOP-305. C. Incorrect. Only MSIS will automatically actuate since MSIS has not yet been blocked. D. Correct. SIAS should have been blocked per 2-GOP-305 when RCS pressure was - 1836psia. MSIS has not yet reached its block permit at 685psia (503°F) as stated in 2-GOP-305. This will allow an auto MSIS actuation to occur but NOT an auto SIAS actuation. Technical Reference(s): 2-0NP-01.01 Plant Condition 1 (Attach if not previously provided) Steam Generator Heat Removal LTOP Not in Effect, 2-GOP-305, Reactor Plant Cooldown - HSB To CSD.2-ARP P18 Annunciator Response Procedure Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: _0-,-7,--0,-2~8....:..1-=-3--=0_1________ _0_7_0_2_8_13_-_0_1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Bank# Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5
-=---
55.43 - 5 Comments: 80
PROCEDURE TITLE: PANEL: 1A ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE P PROCEDURE NO: WINDOW: 2-ARP-01-P18 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 18 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL P MSIS CHANNELA CHANNEL A ACTUATION BLOCK PERMISSIVE P-18 P*18 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT: MSIS CHA CH A ESC-SA 2A Steam Generator Press 685 psia Permissive ALARM CONFIRMATION:
~ 685 psia.
- 1. PI-8013A thru PI-8013D , 2A Steam Generator Pressure, indicate :$
- 2. CS-330-2, MSIS Block Channel A, AMBER light LIT.
- 3. MSIS 3/4 Block light LIT.
OPERATOR ACTIONS:
~ 685 psia.
- 1. VERIFY PI-8013A thru PI-8013D indicate :$
- 2. 11 ~ 685 psia, three out of four ESFAS Steam Generator pressure safety channels indicate :$
lfthree Then TURN CS-330-2 to the BLOCK position.
- 3. VERIFY ANNUNCIATOR P-8, MSIS CHANNEL A ACTUATION BLOCKED, is alarmed.
( CAUSES: 2A Steam Generator Pressure has lowered to 685 psia during a plant cooldown.
REFERENCES:
- 1. CWO 2998-B-327 SH 330
- 2. 2-IMP-69.02
- 3. VTM 2998-15662
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 19 PLANT CONDITION 1 STEAM GENERATOR 5 of 167 PROCEDURE NO.: HEAT REMOVAL - LTOP LTOP NOT IN EFFECT 2-0NP-01.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 3.8 ,-r1
~1 CR 98-1016, 1A 1A Boric Acid Makeup Pump Trip (PM 98-08-069) 3.9 ,-r2
~2 VTM 2998-2908, RCP Motor Operation 3.10 ,-r3
~3 VTM 2998-19781, RCP N9000 Seals 4.0 RECORDS REQUIRED 4.1 Normal log entries.
5.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS 5.1 An Emergency Operating Procedure is NOT currently in use. AND 5.2 An Emergency Operating Procedure is NOT exited directly to this procedure. AND ( 5.3 Any of the following conditions exist.
- 1. Shift Supervisor directs that LMONP be entered.
- 2. LMONP Safety Function Status Checks for the current plant conditions are NOT being met.
- 3. Off-Normal Operating Procedure NOT adequately mitigating the event.
- 4. Any condition, or pattern of symptoms, with no immediately apparent diagnosis or cause OR for which off-normal guidance can NOT be identified.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 20 EXCESS STEAM DEMAND 4 of 39 PROCEDURE NO.: 2-EOP-05 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 2.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS 2.1 BOTH of the following conditions exist,
- 1. EITHER of the following have occurred:
- 2-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions, have been performed
- The event initiated from Mode 3 and SIAS has NOT been blocked
- 2. Plant conditions indicate that an ESD has occurred; ANY of the following may be present:
- Loud noise indicative of a high energy steam line break or stuck open MSSV
- Lowering RCS TAVG caused by the rise in RCS heat removal
- Rise in feedwater flow until MFIVs are closed on MSIS
- Possible rise in Containment temperature, pressure and sump level
(
NOTE: Ensure that the most recent revision of the selected procedures discussed in this lesson are reviewed prior to presentation. I. INTRODUCTION A. SELF INTRODUCTION Write name and extension on board B. OBJECTIVES
- 1. These objectives provide the RCO candidate Review objectives to ensure with knowledge needed to pass an NRC exam required knowledge is understood and operate the plant.
II. INSTRUCTIONAL PRESENTATION A. IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY Review lesson sequence
- 1. Plant malfunction or failure requiring EO-1 implementation of an ONP in modes 3, 4, 5 or 6 with SIAS blocked.
- 2. Implement most applicable ONP if one exists, CE basis document CENPSD-AND 707 (CE Nuclear Plant Strategies Document) refers to the If the ONP is one based on Reactivity (R), Heat LMONPS as Low Mode Removal (HR), or Inventory Control (IC), then Functional Recovery Guidelines also implement the SFSC for the LMONP which fits the current plant configuration (conditions at Desk RCO assesses the SFs the time the malfunction occurred). The Optimal independent of the Unit ONPs (those that are implemented along with Supervisor. Chart 1 is used to the SFSC of the Lower Mode ONPs) direct the keep track of the SF in service.
operator to perform the applicable SFSCs. This is done in the hierarchy of
- With full entry into the LMONPS it is Chart 1. The applicable success assumed that a serious event has occurred paths have guidance to further and at a minimum two/four RCPs are stabilize the particular success stopped, core alterations/fuel movement path.
stopped, and containment closure is evaluated. The operators first priority is to perform the actions necessary to restore a success path to service. This part is the same as EOP 15.
- 3. Optimal ONPs:
OptimalONPs: ATT-1.3
- a. Loss of Safety Related DC Bus IC, HR
(
- b. RCS Excessive Leakage IC 0702813, Rev. 03, Page 3 of 14 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE; PAGE: 19 PLANT CONDITION 1 STEAM GENERATOR 24 of 167 PROCEDURE NO.: HEAT REMOVAL - LTOP NOT IN EFFECT 2-0NP-01.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 SAFETY FUNCTION: RCS Inventory Control IC SI INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 1. If SIAS has NOT actuated and RCS level is decreasing, Then initiate SI flow as necessary to restore and maintain RCS level at the desired level.
- 2.
- 11 any of the following conditions are If 11 SIAS has NOT actuated, Then If met: manually actuate SIAS.
A. Containment pressure is greater than or equal to 3.5 psig. B': RCS pressure is below 1736 pSia psia and decreasing uncontrollably. Then verify SIAS actuated.
- 3.
- 11 SIAS has been actuated, Then:
If A. Verify that SI flow, is in progress per Figures 6 and 7. s. B. ~3 EVALUATE the time CCW has s. B. EVALUATE the time CCW been interrupted to the RCPs and has been interrupted to the PERFORM ALL of the following: RCPs and take the following actions as appropriate:
- 1. If CCW has been LOST to the 1. 11 ccw If CCW is NOT restored RCPs for less than 10 minutes, to the RCPs within Then RESTORE CCW to the 10 minutes, Then STOP RCPs. REFER TO 2-EOP-99, ALL RCPs.
Appendix J, Restoration of CCWand CCW and CSO CBO to the RCPs.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: PAGE:. 27A REACTOR PLANT COOLDOWN - HOT STANDBY 15 of 83 PROCEDURE NO.: TO COLD SHUTDOWN 2-GOP-305 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 INITIAL NOTE The SIAS Block keyswitch spring rin returns to the normal (lef!L position. 6.12 . At approximately 1836 PSIA, Annunciator R-8, SIAS Channel Actuation Block Permiss, will alarm. When this occurs, BLOCK SIAS as follows: 1. 1, VERIFY Annunciator R-8, SIAS Channel Actuation Block Perm iss, is in alarm. Permiss,
- 2. BLOCK A Channel SIAS as follows:
A. VERIFY the amber light above the "SIAS Block Channel A" keyswitch is lit. B. Momentarily PLACE the "SIAS Block Channel A" keyswitch in the BLOCK position. c. C. VERIFY the red light above the "SIAS Block Channel A" keyswitch is lit. -I/- ( IV D. VERIFY Annunciator R-9, SIAS Channel A Blocked, is in alarm. -I/- IV
- 3. BLOCK B Channel SIAS as follows:
A. VERIFY the amber light above the "SIAS Block Channel B" keyswitch is lit. 8. B. Momentarily PLACE the "SIAS Block Channel B" keyswitch in the BLOCK position.
- c. VERIFY the red light above the liS"SIAS lAS Block Channel B" keyswitch is lit.
-/-
IV D. VERIFY Annunciator R-10, SIAS Channel B Blocked, is in alarm.
-I/-
IV
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 27A REACTOR PLANT COOLDOWN - HOT STANDBY 19 of 83 PROCEDURE NO.: TO COLD SHUTDOWN 2-GOP-305 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 INITIAL NOTE If the cooldown is for a refueling outage there will typically be a Chemistry hold of up to six hours prior to commencement of cooldown less than 500°F. 6.16 if an RCS cooldown has not yet been started, Then START it now. If REFER to Step 6.6. 6.17 CONTINUE to reduce RCS temperature and pressure. NOTE
- The setpoint for the MSIS block permissive is 685 PSIG S/G pressure.
This corresponds to an RCS temperature of approximately 503°F.
- The Block keyswitch spring returns to the normal (left) position.
on. 6.18 When Annunciators P-18, MSIS Chnl A Actuation Block Permiss, Perm iss, and P-20, MSIS Chnl B Actuation Block Permiss, come into alarm, Then BLOCK MSIS as follows:
- 1. BLOCK A Channel MSIS as follows:
A. VERIFY VERI MSIS FY Annunciator P-18, MSI S Chnl A Actuation Block Perm iss, is in alarm. B. VERIFY the amber light above the "MSIS Block Channel A" keyswitch is lit. c. C. Momentarily PLACE the "MSIS Block Channel A" keyswitch to the BLOCK position. D. VERIFY the red light above the "MSIS Block Channel A" keyswitch is lit.
-/-
IV E. VERIFY Annunciator P-8, MSIS Chnl A Actuation Blocked, is in alarm.
-/- IV
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # KIA # 013G2.2.42 Importance Rating 3.9 Engineered Safety Features Actuation: Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry level conditions for Technical Specifications Proposed Question: RO 41 Unit 2 is at full power when the following conditions occur:
- Normal Charging flow was lost due to a rupture in Containment downstream of V2429, Charging Pump Disch at Penetration #27 Isolation.
- The alternate Charging flowpath to the RCS through the HPSI header is being aligned.
Which ONE of the following Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) will require the EARLIEST Technical Specification action during this alignment and why? A. LCO 3.0.3, Limiting Conditions for Operation, due to ALL Charging pumps placed in STOP. ( B. LCO 3.5 2, Emergency Core Cooling Systems, due to the B HPSI header being inoperable. C. LCO 3.1.2.2, Reactivity Control Systems, due to loss of a Boron injection flowpath. D. LCO 3.4.3, Pressurizer, due to the reduction in Pressurizer level from RCP Controlled Bleed-Off flow with NO charging flow. ( 81
Proposed Answer: A ( Explanation (Optional): A. Correct. Tech Spec 3.0.3 is applicable when all 3 Charging Pumps are in STOP. B. Incorrect. The A HPSI header is inoperable when using this alignment. Plausible if the candidate thinks that the B header is used for the alternate charging flowpath. C. Incorrect. A boron injection flowpath is not lost during this alignment. Plausible if the candidate thinks that loss of the normal charging flowpath constitutes loss of an injection flowpath. D. Incorrect. Pressurizer level LCO will eventually require action, but 3.0.3 will be most limiting. Technical Reference(s): 2-0NP-02.03, Charging and (Attach if not previously provided) Letdown. Appendix B Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: _0_9,-0_2_7_2-,--3-_0~6 0902723-06_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # 2006 NRC Exam Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X _X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7,10 55.43 2,3 Comments: (\ 82
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: . 15B CHARGING AND LETDOWN 15 of 26 PROCEDURE NO.: 2-0NP-02.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 APPENDIX B ALTERNATE CHARGING FLOW PATH TO RCS THROUGH THE A HPSI HEADER (Page 1 of 8) INITIAL CAUTION Use of this flowpath has the potential for lifting V3417, 2A HPSI Pump charging Disch Hdr Relief, once a char in pump is started. NOTE
** Letdown will NOT be available while charging through A HPSI header due to loss of cooling flow through the regenerative heat exchanger.
** Refer to Table 1 for alternate char in flow path valve list.
charging
- 1. 1f If charging flow is lost due to a rupture or component failure downstream of V2429, Charging Pump Disch at Penetr # 27 Isol, Then PERFORM the following:
CAUTION ( When all charging pumps are in the STOP position, Tech Spec. 3.0.3 is icable. applicable.
~A. STOP the charging pumps one at a time and LEAVE control switches in the STOP position.
....c.n
;0 B. PLACE 2A HPSI PP in STOP.
NOTE Closure of V3656, 2A HPSI Pump Disch, will render the A HPSI Header inoperable. C. LOCK CLOSED V3656, 2A HPSI Pump Disch. NOTE
§2 During a fire event local manual operation of the A HPSI Header Isolation valves may be required. If A Train is the protected train, HCV-3617 should be used. If B Train is the protected train, HCV-3637 should be used.
D. OPEN ONE of the following valves:
** HCV-3617, Header A to Loop 2A2 Valve.
** HCV-3627, Header A to Loop 2A1 Valve.
** HCV-3637, Header A to Loop 2B1 Valve.
** HCV-3647, Header A to Loop 2B2 Valve.
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS. _~..::rf",k; 'C"-",.- , .... '" 4-3/4.5.2 . ECCS SUBSYSTEMS:~:":):~ERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 5' a?3.5.2 ft* Two independent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:
- a. One OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump,
- b. One OPERABLE low pressure safety injection pump, and
- c. An independent OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water tank on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal, and
- d. One OPERABLE charging pump.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 1,2, 2, and 3*. ACTION:
- a. 1. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable only because its associated LPSI train is inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE
( status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- 2. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable for reasons other than condition a.1., restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within-the within'the following 6 hours.
- b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected safety injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-3 3/45-3 No, 400, 119 Amendment No.
3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.0.1 Compliance with the Limiting Conditions for Operation contained in the succeeding specifications is required during the OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified therein; except that upon failure to meet the Limiting Conditions for Operation, the associated ACTION requirements shall be met. 3.0.2 Noncompliance with a specification shall exist when the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation and/or associated ACTION requirements are not met within the specified time intervals. If the Limiting Condition for Operation is restored prior to expiration of the specified time intervals, completion of the ACTION requirements is not required. 3.0.3 When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met, except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within 1 hour, action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in:
- 1. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours,
- 2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and
- 3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours.
Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the ACTION requirements, the ACTION may be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the Limiting Condition for Operation. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications. This specification is not applicable in MODE 5 or 6. 3.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified condition shall not be made when the conditions of the Limiting Condition for Operation are not met and the associated ACTION requires a shutdown if they are not met within a specified time interval. Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or specified condition may be made in accordance with ACTION requirements when conformance to them permits continued operation of the facility for an unlimited period of time. This provision shall not prevent passage through or to OPERATIONAL MODES as required to comply with ACTION statements. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications. ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/40-1 Amendment No. 33 corrected
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# Tier # 2 Group # 1 KIA # 022A2.05 Importance Rating 3.1 Containment Cooling: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Major leak in CCS Proposed Question: RO 42 R042 Unit 1 is at 100% power when a rupture in the 1A 1A CCW header occurs. The crew has entered 1-0310030 "Component Cooling Water Off Normal Operation". As a result of the actions carried out in the above procedure, how has Containment Cooling been compromised and what possible actions must be taken if Containment cooling continues to degrade? A. Partial loss of CCW flow to the A and B Containment Coolers. If Containment air temperature exceeds 120°F Restore air temperature within 45 minutes or initiate a Reactor trip and carry out EOP-01, EOP-01 ,
"Standard Post Trip Actions".
( B. Partial loss of CCW flow to the A and B Containment Coolers. If Containment air temperature exceeds 120°F perform a down power lAW 2-0NP-22.01, "Rapid Down Power" to be in Hot shutdown within 5 hours. C. Total loss of CCW flow to the A and B Containment Coolers. If Containment air temperature exceeds 120°F Restore air temperature within 45 minutes or initiate a Reactor trip and carry out EOP-01, "Standard Post Trip Actions". D. Total loss of CCW flow to the A and B Containment Coolers. If Containment air temperature exceeds 120°F perform a down power lAW 2-0NP-22.01, "Rapid Down Power" to be in Hot shutdown within 5 hours. 83
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: Total loss of CCW flow due to A header isolated lAW the CCW procedure listed, however the CCW procedure listed also has guidance for partial loss of CCW flow. i.e. only one CCW pump available, CCW headers are crosstied so partial loss of flow is plausible. B. Incorrect: second part also incorrect. >120°F requires a Reactor trip not a rapid down power. Hot shutdown within 5 hours is correct, however the 5 hours is from the initial loss of the fan coolers. C. Correct D. Incorrect: First part correct. Second part incorrect as stated in B above. Reference( s): Technical Reference(s): 1-0310030 Component Cooling (Attach if not previously provided) Water Off Normal Operation 1-0NP-25.01 1-ONP-25.01 Loss of RCB Cooling Fans Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0._0_7_0_2--'
- . . 7:. . .;0:. .: 2:. .:-8.86-' -2_-_08-'
. .: . 6=-2-. ---_
-:;.0. .: . 8_ ____
__ _ (As ava ilable la ble)) ( Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5 '--- 55.43 - 5- - Comments: 84
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # KJA# 022A2.05 Importance Rating 3.1 Containment Cooling: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Major leak in CCS Proposed Question: R042 Unit 1 is at 100% power when a rupture in the 1A CCW header occurs. The crew has entered 1-0310030 'Component Cooling Water Off Normal Operation.' As a result of the actions carried out in the above procedure, how has Containment Cooling been compromised and what possible actions must be taken if Containment cooling continues to degrade? A. Partial loss of CCW flow to the A and B Containment Coolers. If Containment air temperature exceeds 120°F Restore air temperature within 45 minutes or initiate a Reactor trip and carry out EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions. ( B. Partial loss of CCW flow to the A and B Containment Coolers. If Containment air temperature exceeds 120°F Restore air temperature within 4 hours or be in hot standby within the next 6 hours. C. Total loss of CCW flow to the A and B Containment Coolers. If Containment air temperature exceeds 120°F Restore air temperature within 45 minutes or initiate a Reactor trip and carry out EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions. D. Total loss of CCW flow to the A and B Containment Coolers. If Containment air temperature exceeds 120°F Restore air temperature within 4 hours or be in hot standby within the next 6 hours. ( 83
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: Total loss of CCW flow due to A header isolated lAW the CCW procedure listed, however the CCW procedure listed also has guidance for partial loss of CCW flow. i.e. only one CCW pump available, CCW headers are crosstied so partial loss of flow is plausibe. B. Incorrect: second part also incorrect. T.S. requires restoration of temperature in 8 hours not 4 hours. Our procedure requires the unit to be tripped within 45 minutes of exceeding 120°F. C. Correct D. Incorrect: Our procedure requires the unit to be tripped within 45 minutes of exceeding 120°F. Technical Reference(s): 1-0310030 Component Cooling (Attach if not previously provided) Water Off Normal Operation 1-0NP-25.01 Loss of RCB Cooling Fans Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: 0702862-08_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) _07_0_2_8_6_2-_0_8 ( Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 5 55.43 5 5- -
---=---
Comments: ( 84
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 3 LOSS OF RCB COOLING FANS ( 12 of 17 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-0NP-25.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 6.4 Loss of Containment Fan Cooler INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
""" -~,I.L'T~mlll*'"* .: .**.*"
CAUTION
-~7~!~.~~~<W\-
- Containment~~"8nCoo'le'rs'
§1,2 Sufficient Containment Fan Coolers (HVS-1A, (HVS-1 A, HVS-1 B, HVS-1 C and HVE-1 D) are required to be in operation to maintain Containment air temperature less than or equal to 120°F. This is necessary to maintain the reactor vessel support structure within design basis. Operator action is required within 45 minutes, to restore air temperature to less than or equal to 120°F or initiate reactor trip and cooldown to at least Hot Shutdown. The total time from the loss of Containment Fan Coolers to Hot Shutdown is 5 hours.
* §3 If a running Containment Fan Cooler is stopped for reasons other than the monthly fan cooler surveillance, but is capable of starting on SIAS, Then the associated offsite power circuit is required to be declared inoperable. A Condition Report is required for Engineering to evaluate the conditions to determine offsite power operability status.
- 1. ATTEMPT one start of the Containment 1. 11 fan does NOT start, Then Fan Cooler. PERFORM the following:
A. PERFORM Appendix 0, Containment Cooling Fan Local Breaker Operations. B. ATTEMPT one start of all available Containment Fan Coolers. C. 11 any fan does NOT start, Then NOTIFY the following:
- Maintenance Supervisor
- EM D. REFER TO Tech Specs 3.6.2.1.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 40 COMPONENT COOLING WATER- WATER - ( 13 of 23 \ PROCEDURERE NO.: OFF-NORMAL OPERATION 1-0310030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 6.2
.2 Subsequent Action (continued)
- 3. B. (continued)
- 8. Quickly REDUCE the CCW flow through the 1A CCW HX to less than 14,600 GPM, as read on FIS-14-1A, A CCW Header Flow, by isolating CCW flow to components, as necessary:
- a. One Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger (approx. 4000 GPM)
COMPONENT 10 COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL SB14348 Supply Hdr A to 1 Su A SDC Hx Isol 1A CLOSED OR COMPONENT 10 ID COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL ( SB14357 Supply Su 1B SDC Hx Isol I Hdr B to 1B CLOSED
- b. Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger (approx. 3500 GPM).
COMPONENT 10 COMPONENT NAME POSITION INITIAL SB14208 Su SupplyI Hdr N to Fuel Pool Hx Isol CLOSED
- 9. PLACE the following control switches in STOP on RTGB-106:
- 0
.j:>.
o
- 1B HPSI Pump
- 1B LPSI Pump
- 1B Containment Spray Pump
- Containment Cooler HVS-1 C
- Containment Cooler HVS-1 D
- 10. CONSULT Tech Spec 3.7.3.1 due to loss of a Heat Exchanger.
- 4. If a CCW Header is ruptured, Then PERFORM the following:
A. Rupture of the A CCW Header.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 40 COMPONENT COOLING WATER - PROCEDURE NO.: OFF-NORMAL OPERATION 1-0310030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 k '. 6.2 Subsequent Action (continued)
- 4. A. (continued)
NOTE CCW has been lost to the following: 1A HPSI Pump
"\;~~~!;a~Id~t1dai1'~~;I£l~~,i:!il~!p.:nr~Q,~~'fill~~~0trl~r~~Y 1A and 1 B Containment Fan Coolers 1A SOC Heat Exchanger 1A LPSI Pump 1A Containment Spray Pump CAUTION Loss of component cooling water flow through any of the heat exchangers listed below can result in severe thermal stress and flashing upon re-admittance of cooling flow:
1A HPSI Pump 1A and 1B Containment Fan Coolers 1A SOC Heat Exchanger 1A 1A LPSI Pump ( 1A Containment Spray Pump
- 1. CLOSE HCV-14-8A and HCV-14-9, A Header Ties to Non-Essential Header.
- 2. CLOSE SB 14126, Surge Tank A Header Isolation Valve.
- 3. STOP the CCW Pump currently supplying Header.
1A CCW Pump OR 1C CCW Pump 1l';{:f.};~41~'il':':l',S1¥i:J3i:'f\(e~f'~neltfC)qlb:wlffg~Wc5f'§0ifgff~fitff"Sf~0j9~ljif'RT'G:B'01j,~6?~
- 4. PLACE the falloW1rrg 'iOORfFol switchg~ffi-;:(ST()P:~6n-'RTG'B:1'n6:
C
- 1A HPSI Pump
- 1A LPSI Pump
- 1A Containment Spray Pump
- COllJainR;l@nt Cooler HV£~<1"A
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAG PAGE: ./ 40 COMPONENT COOLING WATER - ( PROCEDURE NO.: OFF-NORMAL OPERATION 1-0310030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 6.2 Subsequent Action (continued)
- 4. A. (continued)
- 5. If plant is on Shutdown Cooling, the primary side of 1 1AA SOC Heat Exchanger must be isolated by closing V3452, Primary Side Inlet.
- 6. LOCATE and ISOLATE the leak, if possible.
B. Rupture of the B CCW Header. NOTE CCW has been lost to the following: 1B HPSI Pump 1C and 10 Containment Fan Coolers 1B SOC Heat Exchanger 1B LPSI Pump 1B Containment Spray Pump ( CAUTION Loss of component cooling water flow through any of the heat exchangers listed below can result in severe thermal stress and flashing upon re-admittance of cooling flow: 1B HPSI Pump 1C and 10 Containment Fan Coolers 1B SOC Heat Exchanger 1B LPSI Pump 1B Containment Spray Pump
- 1. CLOSE HCV-14-8B and HCV-14-10, B Header Ties to Non-Essential Header.
- 2. CLOSE SB14127, Surge Tank B Header Isolation Valve.
- 3. STOP the CCW Pump currently supplying Header.
1B CCW Pump OR 1C CCW Pump
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE DURE TITLE: PAGE: 40 COMPONENT COOLING WATER-PROCEDURE NO.: OFF-NORMAL OPERATION 1-0310030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 6.2 Subsequent Action (continued)
- 2. B. ((continued) continued)
CAUTION 1f 1AB AC and DC Busses are not all completely powered from the B side, If Then do NOT take Technical Specification Credit for the 1C CCW pump until alignment has been completed.
- 6. PLACE the 1B CCW Pump Control Switch to the pull to lock position.
- 7. VERI VERIFY FY the pressures and flows return to normal.
- 8. 1f the 480V Load Center 1AB If 1AB AND DC bus 1AB 1AB are not completely aligned to the A side, Then REALIGN the 480V Load Center 1AB and DC bus 1AB to the A side per 1-NOP-52.02, Alignment of 1AB 1AB Busses and Components.
C. Loss of two (2) CCW Pumps ( wIM'-'fJ~ CAUTION
- Refer to ONOP 1-0NP-25.01, Loss of RCB Cooling Fans, for appropriate direction.
* §1,2 Sufficient Containment Fan Coolers (HVS-1(HVS-1A, A, HVS-1 B, HVS-1 Cor HVE-1 D) are required to be in operation to maintain Containment air temperature less than or equal to 120°F. This is necessary to maintain the reactor vessel support structure within design basis.
Operator action is required within 45 minutes, to restore air temperature to less than or equal to 120°F or initiate reactor trip and cooldown to at least Hot Shutdown.
- 1. ,-r3
~3 1f the health and safety of the public is in jeopardy, Then If ATTEMPT ONLY ONE restart.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 40 COMPONENT COOLING WATER - ( PROCEDURE NO.: OFF-NORMAL OPERATION 9 Of, 23 1-0310030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 6.2 Subsequent Action (continued)
- 2. C. (continued)
- 2. If only one CCW pump is available and running, Then PERFORM the following:
- a. ENSURE all non-essential header valves are open:
- HCV-14-8A, 1A CCW Header Supply to the N Header
- HCV-14-9, N Header Return to the 1A CCW Header
** HCV-14-8B, 1B CCW Header Supply to the N Header
- HCV-14-10, N Header Return to the 1 1B B CCW Header
( CAUTION The maximum allowable single pump flow is limited to 10,800 gpm.
- b. ISOLATE the following additional loads on the CCW System to maximize available flow to vital components and minimize the potential for runout flow on the available pump.
- 1. Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Inlet Valve SB 14208
- CLOSED (located adjacent to fuel pool HX in FHB)
- 2. Shut down any operating boric acid concentrators and isolate CCW flow to the concentrators.
CCW Supply to Boric Acid Concentrators SB 14218 - CLOSED (located overhead in letdown level & pressure control valve (P&Q) room - north end).
- c. VERIFY RCP Cooling Water Low Flow annunciators have cleared. (Annunciators J-19, J-20, J-21 & J-22).
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ( AIR TEMPERATURE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.5 Primary containment average air temperature shall not exceed 120°F. APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. ACTION: With the containment average air temperature> 120°F, reduce the average air temperature to within the limit within 8 hours, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.5 The primary containment average air temperature shall be the arithmetical average of the temperatures at three of the following locations and shall be determined at least once per 24 hours: Location ( a. Containment fan cooler No. 1A air intake, elevation 45 feet.
- b. Containment fan cooler No.1 B air intake, elevation 45 feet.
- c. Containment fan cooler No.1 C air intake, elevation 62 feet.
- d. Containment fan cooler No.1 0 D air intake, elevation 45 feet.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1 3/46-13
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 KIA # 026A1.01 Importance Rating 3.9 Containment Spray: Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CSS controls including: Containment Pressure Proposed Question: RO 43 Unit 1 is in 1-EOP-15 'Functional Recovery'. As Containment pressure increases which ONE of the following states the MINIMUM Containment Cooling equipment that will meet the Containment Temperature and Pressure Control safety function for the specific Containment pressure I Temp? Containment pressure / Temp. Containment cooling equip. A. 1.5 psig 125°F Cont. Cooling Fan One Cant. B. S. 11 psig 140°F Two Cont. Cant. Cooling Fans C. 30 psig 160°F Cant. Cooling Fans Three Cont. ( D. 40 psig 190°F 1A CS pp with 2800 gpm flow AND TWO Cont. Cant. Cooling Fans ( 85
Proposed Answer: 0D Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: If temperature was <120°F this would be correct B. Incorrect: >10psig
>1 Opsig requires four Containment Coolers OR either condition 1,2 or 3 of Containment Temperature and Pressure control safety function C. Incorrect: requires four coolers D. Correct Technical Reference(s): 1-EOP-15 Functional Recovery (Attach if not previously provided)
Attachment 1 0711828 Functional Recovery Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0_7_0_2_8_28_-_06 0702828-06 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge - X X- -- Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 5 55.43 Comments: ( 86
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 27A FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.: 176 ~r205 1-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 :;: ATTACHMENT 1 SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK SHEET (Page 14 of 16)
- 7. CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE Containment Spray, CTPC-3 SAFETY ACCEPTANCE FUNCTION CRITERIA CHECK -V
-,J Condition 1 TWO Containment Flow in EACH I I I I I I I Spray Headers header is at least 2700 gpm AND Containment pressure Less than 42 psig I I I I I I I OR
( Condition 2 FOUR Containment Running I I I I I I I Coolers AND Containment pressure Less than 42 psig I I I I I I I OR Condition 3 TWO Containment Running I I I I I I I Coolers AND ONE Containment Header flow is at I I I I I I I Spray Header least 2700 gpm AND Containment pressure Less than 42 psig I I I I I I I ( END OF SAFETY FUNCTION 7
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: "1,;,: 27A FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY ( 175 dr205 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 },.. ' ATTACHMENT 1 SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS CHECK SHEET (Page 13 of 16)
- 7. CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE Normal Containment Cooling, CTPC-1 SAFETY ACCEPTANCE FUNCTION CRITERIA ...j CHECK -../
Containment Less than 120°F I I I I I I I Temperature AND Containment Less than 2 psig I I I I I I I Pressure ( Containment Coolers, CTPC-2 SAFETY ACCEPTANCE FUNCTION CRITERIA ...j CHECK -../ Containment At least I I I I I I I Fan Coolers TWO Running AND Containment 0 230°F Less than 230 F I I I I I I I Temperature AND Containment Less than 10 psig I I I I I I I Pressure
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 27A FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.: 149 df205 1-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 4.8 CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE & & Success Path 1 - Normal PRESSURE CONTROL - CTPC-1 Containment Fans INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 1. Ensure Containment Cooling ENSURE at least ONE Train of Containment Fan Coolers is RUNNING. o 2. 2. Verify CTPC-1 Satisfied 2.1 !f Containment Temperature & Pressure is still in jeopardy, VERIFY CTPC-1 (Normal Then GO TO the next Containment Fans) is satisfied by appropriate Containment BOTH of the following conditions Temperature && Pressure being satisfied: success path.
- Containment temperature less than 120°F
(
- Containment pressure less than 2 psig
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 27A 27A FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY 151 of 205 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1
,/
4.8 CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE & Success Path 2 - Emergency Emergen PRESSURECONTROL*CTPC~ PRESSURE CONTROL - CTPC-2 Containment Fans (continued) ((continued) continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o02.2. CTPC-2 Satisfied Verify CTPC*2 2.1 !f Containment Temperature & Pressure is still in jeopardy, VERIFY CTPC-2 (Emergency Then GO TO the next Containment Fans) is satisfied by appropriate Containment ALL of the following conditions being Temperature & Pressure satisfied: success path.
- At least TWO Containment Fan Coolers are operating
- Containment temperature less than 230°F
- Containment pressure less than
( 10 psig (
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 27 27A A FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.: 152of295 1-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 .. 4.8 CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE & Success Path 3 - Containrnalllld ContainmentSilra¥ PRESSURE CONTROL - CTPC-3 INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 1. Ensure Containment Spray Actuation 1.1 Manually START/ALIGN CSAS components. REFER TO Table 3, Containment if Containment pressure is greater If Spray Actuation Signal. than 10 psig, Then ENSURE BOTH of the following:
- CSAS has ACTUATED CSAShasACTUATED
- Containment Spray flow is at least 2700 gpm from EACH header DD 2. Containment Spray Termination
( !LCS lLCS pump(s) are operating and ALL of the following conditions are satisfied,
- Containment pressure is less than 5 psig and stable or lowering
- Containment Spray is NOT required for Containment cooling
- Containment Spray is NOT required for HPSI subcooling
- Containment Spray is NOT required for iodine removal Then TERMINATE Containment Spray ONE train at a time.
REFER TO Appendix P, Restoration of Components Actuated by ESFAS.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: I PAGE::i':?!,'::~:;~:: *. PAGE: 27A FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.: 153 of ~r~.Q5 205 1-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 ,i.:*****. 4.8 CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE & Containm:eg.t;S!fi)*~a.¥ Success Path 3 - ContainmeritSF>tay PRESSURECONTROL-CTPC~ (continued) ( continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 3. Verify CTPC-3 Satisfied 3.1 !f Containment Temperature & Pressure is still in jeopardy, VERIFY CTPC-3 (Containment Then PURSUE Containment Spray) is satisfied by ANY of the Temperature and Pressure following conditions: Control and other jeopardized safety Condition 1: functions simultaneously. A. BOTH Containment Spray 3.2 EVALUATE further conditions and systems are operating, actions to restore Containment with at least 2700 gpm flow Temperature and Pressure EACH. Control: B. Containment pressure is less A. The urgency of other ( than 42 psig. jeopardized safety functions. Condition 2: B. The rate of change of containment temperature and A. At least ONE Containment Spray pressure system is operating, and potential for damage to the with at least 2700 gpm flow, containment. and at least TWO Containment Fan Coolers are operating. C. The feasibility of restoring a success path by restoring ALL B. Containment pressure is less of the following: than 42 psig.
- Vital auxiliaries necessary to operate systems or components in the success paths
- Manual operation of valves
- Use of alternate components to implement a success path
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 KIA # 039G2.4.2 Importance Rating 4.5 Main and Reheat Steam: Knowledge of system set points. interlocks and automatic actions associated with EOP entry conditions. Proposed Question: RO 44 R044 Which ONE of the following is performed during EOP-01 'Standard Post Trip Actions' on Unit 2 but NOT on Unit 1 for a Reactor trip from 100% power? (assume uncomplicated Reactor trip) A. Closing the Spillover Bypass valve MV-08-814. B. Placing the ADV's in AUTOMATIC. C. Closing the MSR block valves. D. Depressing the 15% Main Feedwater bypass valves reset pushbutton. ( ( 87
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect; Spillover Bypass valve MV-08-814 is closed on a Reactor trip for both units if vacuum is to be maintained. B. Incorrect: although Unit 2 ADV's are required by Technical Specifications to be kept in manual at >15% power (Unit 1 ADV's are not Tech. Spec. related) placing Unit 2 ADV's in AUTOMATIC is not performed in EOP-01 for an uncomplicated trip. C. Correct: Unit 1 MSR block valves are closed automatically on a Reactor trip, Unit 2 MSR block valves are required to be manually closed. D. Incorrect: reset of the 15% Feedwater bypass valves is not normally performed for an uncomplicated trip. This is normally performed on a trip from lower power when AFAS (AFW) is not expected and Main Feedwater is to be controlled. Technical Reference( s): Reference(s): 0711304 Main Steam (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: 0702304-06 (As available) Question Source: Bank# Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge -'X'--'---__ _X-'-___ __ Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Comments: ( 88
0711304, Rev. 18 Page 37 of 91 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Section 3/4.7.1.1
- Requires all main steam safety valves be operable to ensure overpressure protection for the S/Gs and main steam piping.
Section 3/4.7.1.5
- States that both MSIVs will be operable to ensure steam line isolation capability during normal and abnormal operation.
- MSIVs must also be operable to fulfill the containment isolation function.
- In order to be considered operable, the MSIVs must be capable of shutting within 6.0 [6.75] seconds after receiving a manual or automatic shut initiation signal. If
( inoperable MSIVs cannot be shut or made operable, the plant must be placed in hot shutdown within 12 hours. 3/4.7.1.7] [Section 3/4.7.1.71 Addresses operation of the Unit 2 ADVs and their associated block valves. All valves must be operable in Mode 1. All Unit 2 ADVs must be in a manual above 15% power. With Reactor power greater than or equal to 5% but less than 15%, NO more than one ADV per S/G shall be in automatic control. Unit 1 ADVs are not controlled by Tech Specifications. However, they are procedurally controlled to be in manual above 15%. Section 3/4.7.2.1
- Addresses S/G pressure/temperature limitations.
0711301, Rev. 26 Page 45 of 119 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY The MFRVs can be operated in three ways. Local manual operation can be accomplished with the actuator handwheel. Pneumatic operation is accomplished by means of a signal from the feedwater regulating system in automatic, or by manual control on RTGB-102. MFRV signal generation and operation is discussed in detail in Steam Generator and Feedwater Control System text, 0711408. Bypass flow control around the MFRV is available by assuming manual control of either the or 100% bypass valves, and shutting the MFRV and the MFRV inlet block valves, MV-09-5 and MV-09-6. The 15% Bypass Valves, LCV-9005/9006 are air operated, fail closed (on loss of air or power), globe valves that are used during plant startups and shutdowns for low flow conditions. They may also be utilized at full power (in conjunction with the 100% Bypass Valve) during the off-normal event of MFRV problems. Additionally, if a turbine trip signal is generated, the 15% bypass valves will automatically open to a position equivalent to 5% full flow (- 15% open). ( This flow allows for decay heat removal without causing excessive cooldown of the plant. A bypass pushbutton restores control of the 15% bypass valve to the MIA Station on the RTGB . This signal will also auto-reset when at least 60 seconds has elapsed since the Turbine Trip signal and SG level is > 45%. This will clear the 5% flow position and return the valve to the control mode it was in prior to the trip (typically Auto). If the previous position was Manual, the valve will remain at the 5% flow position (its last position) but is movable with Manual signals from its MIA Station. If the previous position was Auto, it will respond by returning the current level (45%) back to setpoint (65%). This could result in an overcooling of the RCS and must be monitored closely. Both units have an annunciator that alarms when LCV-9005/6 LeV-g005/6 are in the 5% flow control mode. The 100% bypass valves, MV-09-3 and MV-09-4, are motor-operated gate valves that will allow 100% of the flow necessary for full-power operation of its associated SG. They are not normally used for plant operation. The Unit 1 100% bypass valves receive an auto closure for 35 seconds on a SG High Level Override signal of 82% or on a turbine trip signal. The Unit 2 100% bypass valve only responds to control switch position. (
0711304, Rev. 18 Page 32 of 91 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
- On Unit 1 only, the block valves automatically close on,a turbin~jrip.
- Unit 1 and Unit 2 MSRs have the same operational modes, however, the two Units' MSRs function differently due to the fact that the 8" TCVs have different valve internals.
- On Unit 1, the TCV's flow is directly proportional to the valve position.
- [On Unit 2, the 8" TCVs are constructed such that when the valves are a bit past half-open, maximum steam flow is attained. To provide more precise control, four additional 3" TCVs are utilized.]
- Operational mode, valve position indication, LP inlet temperature indication and a manual valve position potentiometer are located on the reheater control panel in the control room, as illustrated on Figure 19.
The following table describes the modes of operation for the reheater control panel. REHEATER CONTROL PANEL MODES MODE DESCRIPTION Ramp Automatically starts the 2 hour timed lift curve of the 8" [3"] reheater TCVs. 400°F Positions TCVs to attain 400°F at hottest LP turbine inlet. (See note.) Hot Start Positions TCVs to the 400°F position in 30 seconds from the fully open or closed position. (See note.) Manual Operator can select and hold a valve position with the manual control knob Reset The reheater control system is reset to zero control valve position and holds it until another mode is selected. NOTE: Hot start and 400°F modes are not used at PSL. NOTE: The reheater control panel controls the 8" [3"] TCVs. NOTE: The open/closed lights on the reheater control panel are for the 8" TCVs.
- On Unit 1, when the RAMP startup is initiated, the four TCVs slowly open over 2 hours.
( Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # 059A2.04 Importance Rating 2.5 Main Feedwater: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Feeding a dry S/G Proposed Question: RO 45 Unit 1 has implemented 1-EOP-15 'Functional Recovery' due to a total loss of feedwater. Once Through Cooling (OTC) has been established 15 minutes ago. The 1A Auxiliary Feedwater pump is now available as a feedwater source. BOTH Steam Generator levels indicate '0' Wide Range level. Which ONE of the following states the Auxiliary Feedwater flow rate that should be initiated to the Steam Generator(s) and the bases for the flow? A. Feed BOTH Steam Generators with flow as low as possible for the first 5 minutes due to water hammer and thermal shock concerns of the feed ring. B. Feed ONE Steam Generator with flow less than 150 gpm for the first 5 minutes due to water hammer and thermal shock concerns of the feed ring. ( C. Feed BOTH Steam Generators with flow as low as possible for the first 5 minutes due to thermal shock concerns of the Steam Generator tubes. D. Feed ONE Steam Generator with flow less than 150 gpm for the first 5 minutes due to thermal shock concerns of the Steam Generator tubes. ( 89
Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: only ONE Steam Generator should be fed. When using Auxiliary Feedwater, flow should be controlled to <150 gpm. The statement 'as low as possible' is applicable when using Main Feedwater only due to the fact the Main Feedwater instruments cannot be read at such low flow. B. Correct: C. Incorrect: only ONE Steam Generator should be fed. Feed ring water hammer concerns not SG tube thermal shock. D. Incorrect: Feed ring water hammer concerns not SG tube thermal shock. Technical Reference(s): 1-EOP-15 Functional Recovery (Attach if not previously provided) 0711827 Loss of Feedwater Event and Procedure Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: 0702827-10 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) _0_7_0_2_8_27_-_1_0 ( ~------------------------- Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge - X X - -- Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 -
~--
5 5- - 55.43 5
-C.-_ _
Comments: ( 90
REVISION NO,; NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: TITLE; PAGE: PAGE; 27A FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY ( PROCEDURE NO,; NO.: of205 131 of i05 1-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 4.6 RCS and CORE HEAT REMOVAL- Success Path 3 - Once-Through;. Once-Through-HR-3 (continued) Cooling (continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS iitt_tY~leNv~ CAUTION Initial feedwater feed water flow should be 'controliedto'less controlled to less than 150 gpm if using Aux Feed and as low as possible if using Main Feed or Condensate for the first 5 minutes, for water hammer and thermal shock concerns. o 4. Replenish SIG Inventory A. Attempt to RESTORE Auxiliary Feedwater to at least ONE S/G by considering ALL of the following:
- 1. If BOTH of the following
!f 1.1 Manually START/ALIGN AFAS conditions exist, components.
- S/G levels are below 19,5%
19.5% NR (
- AFAS has stopped timing Then ENSURE AFAS has ACTUATED, ACTUATED.
- 2. If ANY of the following
!f 2.1 !f Control If Room operation of the conditions exist, 1C AFW Pump is unsuccessful, Then take local control.
- Mechanical or electrical REFER TO Appendix G, Local overspeed of the 1C Operation of the '1 C' Auxiliary AFW Pump has occurred Feedwater Pump.
- Steam binding of an AFW Pump is suspected
- Unit 1 CST is unavailable, and use of Unit 2 CST is desired
- Crosstying of Auxiliary Feedwater Discharge Headers is desired Then RESTORE Auxiliary Feedwater components.
REFER TO 1-0NP-09.02, ( Auxiliary Feedwater. (continued on next page)
3.4.4 If Feedwater is Restored, Feed at <150 gpm for >5 min., do not Feed a Dry S/G if Another is Available. ( If feedwater is restored, the following guidance is provided to avoid damage to the steam generator feed ring. When feedwater is regained and steam generator level is below the feed ring, the operator should limit feedwater flow to 150 gpm for five minutes. Steam generator water level should be restored to the normal band as soon as possible. There is no analytical correlation between feedwater flow rate and the conditions to preclude feed ring failure. A flow rate of 150 gpm has been recommended as a procedural limit based on the fact that no significant waterhammer has been observed during testing or operation with flow rates of that magnitude. Additionally, 150 gpm has been traditionally accepted as a flow limit by industry and the NRC for waterhammer protection. The five minute duration of this limited flow is conservatively based on twice the refill time for the 350 gallon feed ring. In the event that refilling of portions of the main feedwater piping must be considered, this time would have to be adjusted accordingly. 3.4.5 If Feedwater is not Restored and S/G Levels are >30% ~30% NR and a Condensate Pump is the Only Available Source of Feedwater, Begin a Cooldown and Depressurization of the S/G's. If feedwater to at least one steam generator has not been restored, the EOP directs depressurization of the steam generators to establish an alternate, low pressure feedwater source (if available). The EOP method selected was use of the atmospheric steam dumps. This action must be performed expeditiously to ensure that pressure is reduced to an acceptable point before
~30% N.R. level in both S/G's analysis has steam generator level is lost. With ;::::30%
shown that sufficient inventory exists in the S/G's to cooldown to the necessary S/G pressure (;;::600 (;::::600 psia). If S/G levels are <30% N.R, the cooldown shall not be attempted. Also, RCS depressurization will facilitate safeguards pump flow should once-through cooling become necessary. The cooldown rate specified (between 50°F and 100°F per hour) assures that the Tech Specifications SpeCifications of 1OO°F/hr is not exceeded. The limit of subcooling ensure adequate fluid conditions surrounding the core are maintained. 0711827, Rev. 7 26 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
3.4.6 If Both SIG Levels are Less than 1S% 15% WR or if Tcold Increases (Uncontrollably) 5°F SOF or Greater, then Implement the Functional Recovery Procedure and Initiate Once-Through Cooling. For the total Loss of Feedwater event, as long as at least one steam generator has a wide range level of at least 15%, the adequate ReS heat removal is implicitly being maintained. This level is based on ensuring that once-through cooling is initiated prior to steam generator dryout. If once-through cooling is initiated after SG heat removal capability is lost, and feedwater is not regained, core damage will occur because ReS pressure will remain above HPSI pump shutoff head for too long a period of time. At least one SG having at least 15% of wide range level is required. This value is based on a wide range level uncertainty of +/-1 0% plus a 5% margin to ensure that come SG inventory exists. An additional criterion requires the operator to monitor ReS Tc to ensure temperatures are stable or decreasing. This criterion assumes that no operator or plant initiated actions have caused a momentary, correctable reduction in ReS heat removal (e.g., ADV is closed automatically or manually). If both S/G levels are less than 15% WR or if ReS increases (uncontrollably) 5°F or greater, then the operator is instructed to implement the Functional Recovery Guideline and to initiate once-through cooling. In this case, initiation of once-through cooling is conducted concurrently with implementing the functional recovery procedure. 3.S 3.5 Supplementary Information
- 1. The operators should not add feedwater to a dry steam generator if another steam generator still contains water. Re-establish feedwater only to the steam generator that is not dry. If both steam generators become dry, refill only one steam generator to reinitiate core cooling.
( 2. During all phases of a plant cooldown, monitor ReS temperature and pressure to avoid exceeding a cooldown rate greater than Technical 0711827, Rev. 7 27 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
( Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # 059A3.03 Importance Rating 2.5 Main Feedwater: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MFW, including: Feedwater pump suction pressure Proposed Question: RO 46 Unit 2 is at 48% power steady state conditions with the following:
- 2A and 2B Condensate pumps are running.
- 2A Main Feedwater pump is running.
Which ONE of the following will result in the automatic trip of the 2A Main Feedwater pump? A. Main Feedwater suction pressure indicates 270 psig. B. 2A Condensate pump trips. C. 2A Main Feedwater pump suction valve indication changes from OPEN to ( CLOSED. (indication only) D. Main Feedwater pump lube oil pressure indicates 5 psig. 91
Proposed Answer: A ( Explanation (Optional): A. Correct: 275 psig low suction pressure trip B. Incorrect:: flow <50%. Would be correct at >50% flow C. Incorrect: valve indication is for start logic only, not trip logic D. Incorrect: lube oil pressure trip <4 psig Technical Reference(s): 0711301 Condensate Feedwater (Attach if not previously provided) Heater Vents and Drains Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: : .0702301-04 _0.---------------------------
.c7c.. .:O:. =2:. : .3. .:.-01-'--:. : .0:. : .4_ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available)
Question Source: Bank # 2122 ( Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge -X- - -_ _X'-'--_ - Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 7-- - 55.43 Comments: 92
0711301, Rev. 26 Page 41 of 119 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY The MFW Pumps will trip under the following conditions: (Refer to Figure 21.)
- Lube oil pressure <4 psig.
- Operating pump suction pressure <275 psig.
- Electrical fault (instantaneous overcurrent or differential current)
- Both running condensate pumps are stopped.
- MFW pump suction flow ::;2500
- 2500 gpm after pump running greater than 15 [30] sec and low flow for greater than 10 sec.
- Hi-Hi SG level ~90% [;:::83%].
- 6.9 KV undervoltage
- Loss of one condensate pump with total feed flow >50% and both MFW pumps running.
(Loss of condensate pump trips its respective side feedwater pump)
- MSIS (Unit 1 only)
The >50% feedwater flow signal and < 50% feedwater flow signal come from DCS and are the result of summing Feedwater Pump Suction flows. They are separate DCS digital outputs. The
< 50 % flow signal goes to the start circuit of the FWP and the> 50% flow goes to the trip
( circuit of the FWP. Each MFW Pump motor has a thrust bearing and two radial journal bearings, which are lubricated and cooled by oil from the MFW Pump oil system. Each MFW Pump's oil system has a shell-and-tube heat exchanger for oil cooling. The heat exchanger is supplied with cooling water from the Turbine Cooling Water system. Refer to Figure 22.
- Forced oil lubrication for the MFW Pump and motor is supplied by a shaft-driven, positive displacement pump mounted on the end of the pump shaft. This pump supplies oil for the MFW Pump and motor bearings. Refer to Figure 22.
- An adjustable relief valve is established for the MFW Pump lube oil system, such that the setpoint is adjusted for pressures suitable for the MFW Pump running status, to assure proper lubrication and reduce unnecessary operation of the Auxiliary Oil Pump:
- MFW Pump OFF - Setpoint is approximately: 11.5 psig
- MFW Pump ON - Setpoint is approximately: 6.5 - 7.0 psig
(
0711301, Rev. 26 Page 40 of 119 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY ( On a turbine trip signal, the MFW pump recirculation valves will receive an AUTO open signal and will open for any running feedwater pump (Le., motor breaker is closed). The recirculation valve will close when its associated pump is stopped (Le., motor breaker is opened) and/or a Turbine Trip signal has cleared (Le.,(i.e., turbine relatched - EH header repressurized). At that time, the recirculation valves will close. The valves fail open on a loss of instrument air and fail closed on loss of electrical power. Only one MFW pump is normally running when plant power is less than 45%. The standby MFW pump will automatically start if the running feedwater pump TRIPS and the control switch for the idle pump is in the AUTO or RECIRC position, provided the pump start interlocks are met. The standby MFW pump will only auto start if the running MFW pump automatically trips (it will not start if pump is intentionally stopped).. IIIM_Ii& stopped). To start a MFW pump, "l1p, the following interlocks must be met: (Refer to Figure 20 for the logic for a manual start of a MFW pump. The logic does not depict the auto start of the MFW pump discussed above. The interlocks are the same for the auto start of the MFW pump.)
- Lube oil pressure >8 psig.
- MFW pump suction valve is open.
- MFW pump suction pressure >275 psig.
- Two condensate pumps are running, or total feedwater flow is less than 50% and one condensate pump is running.
The MFW pump discharge valve will open after the pump starts.
( Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # 061 K5.01 061K5.01 Importance Rating 3.6 Auxiliary I/ Emergency Feedwater: Relationship between AFW flow and RCS ReS heat transfer Proposed Question: RO 47 R047 Given the following:
- Unit 2 has evacuated the Control Room due to a fire and has implemented 2-0NP-100.02 'Control Room Inaccessibility'.
- The Unit was tripped four (4) hours ago and is currently in Hot Standby (532°F).
- Condensate Storage Tank (CST) level is 40 feet.
- Steam Generator levels are being maintained constant at 63% Narrow Range using 2A and 2B Auxiliary Feedwater pumps (AFW).
- Steam Generator pressures are 900 psi psiaa using the AOV's.
It is desired to be on SOC entry conditions in 16 hours. Which ONE of the following is the approximate Auxiliary Feedwater flow rate (Per Steam Generator) that will accomplish this? ( (assume linear AFW flow rate through the cooldown) A. 75 gpm B. 90 gpm C. 105 gpm O. 120 gpm 93
( Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect; value if applicant did not include Fig. 3 which is water needed to remove sensible heat. B. Incorrect; value if applicant used 20 hours to reach SOC instead of 16 hours. C. Correct: 142000 gal for decay heat removal, plus 58200 gal for sensible heat removal. Total 200,200 gallons divided by 960 minutes equal 208 gpm total. Question asked per SG so 105 gallons per SG. O.lncorrect; value if '0' time since trip instead of 4 hours post trip as stated in stem. Technical Reference(s): ONP-2-1 00.02 Control Room (Attach if not previously provided) Inaccessibility. Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Figures 3 and 4, 2-0NP-2-100.02 Control Room Inaccessibility. ( Learning Objective: PSL -OPS _P_S.::....L--' O-'-P-'-S-'00702864
------------------~~-----
Obj.
'-7-=.0-'-28-"-6'-4_0-"--' 2,8
---'bj-'-.2-",-,-8__ (As avai available) la ble )
Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 --- 5 55.43 Comments: 94
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 24 CONTROL ROOM INACCESSIBILITY 79 of 87 PROCEDURE NO.: 2-0NP-100.02 ST. LUCiE LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 3 CONDENSATE REQUIRED FOR COOLDOWN Te Tc (Page 1 of 1) (84,046) 9 .,..*..,..-,*****,****,*********'*.,.....,.***'**..,..-r*..,.**.,.***,****.,..**.,.***,****.,..-****,.****,*-,*.,........--,...,...,..****,**_,-**.,..*.,.**T****.,..**"**TT***,.***,****,***.,..***,****,*****,*****,****.,..***,.**._..,.-'-.. ,,-..,...'. . _. ., . .,.....*...,.. ., (74.646) 8 {65,246} (65.246) 7 (55,849) -**-R:~t=:::*:*==:===i+:~=!",l. . . . . . . . . . ,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (55,849) i................................................ J . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . j............................................../ Desired Te::::: (46,454) (46.454) 5 F 32S"F (37,058) (37.058) 4 1*******..**_*....***,*"********,,****+,,..*_*..****....**,,****.........;."_*****,, '350 OF ~".......,................~****.*******.+.."............................+"......"..........."""""""..."."",,,,' 400°F (27,663) 3 450"F 450°F (18,268) 22 500"F 500°F (8,873) 11 Condensat9 Condensate Required in 0 Feet Feet 0 +."*. ,..,.,'f .*...,., . . ,'
""1 I I +.**,****,1,*****.***,****
il'ITI ,.,..,.+,. r ,'T'''''''''"[T"'+', ****" ** 1 "I""""r+""","T '***rT*,*:'.*lj**T*T*'**'*,*****,.* I r i (Gallons) (Gaflons) 600 550 500 450 400 350 300 INITIAL Tc (OF) (PIOSPJ2-0NP-100.02IFig.4IRev.OItIf) (PIOSP12-0NP-I00.02IFig.4IRev.Ol/1fJ 5 E;,.j".;~ d £V'1?J (/A;t. D ?:,,' /104 ; Tt) te,o j) p;o~e' 17-C[::('7- !I 16 I
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 24 CONTROL ROOM INACCESSIBILITY ( PROCEDURE NO.: 80 of 87 2-0NP-100.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 FIGURE 4 ". TIME UNTIL SHUTDOWN COOLING REQUIRED -VS CONDENSATE AVAILABILITY (Page 1 of 1) (375,535) (375.535) 40 (328,474) 35 (281,426) 30 (23<1,418) (234,418) 25 (187,423) 20 (140,444) 15 l1me After Shutdown (93,446) (93.446) 10 oHours 4 Hours (46,454) 5 ( 16 Hours Condensate Available in 0 0o 4 6 1 , 1 20 24 28 26 32 Feet 2 6 (Gallon$) (Gallons) Time Remaining until Shutdown Cooling is Required (Hours) (pIOPSI2-0NP-I00.02JFig.:3IRev.0Itif) (PiOPS/2*0NP*100 O2IFJg 3/Rev.O/l1f)
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # 062G2.4.4 Importance Rating 4.5 AC electrical distribution: Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters which are entry level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures. Proposed Question: R048 RO 48 The following annunciator is received on RTGB 101 with Unit 1 at 100% power: 4 KV SWGR 1A3 6, CURRENT t. TRIP B-14 Which ONE of the following states the:
- 1) Status of the 1A3 4.16 KVAC bus?
- 2) Procedure that would be implemented?
( A 1) The Bus is energized from the Diesel Generator.
- 2) 1-0NP-47.01 Loss of A Safety Related AC. Bus B. 1) The Bus is de-energized but the 1 A Diesel Generator is running.
1A
- 2) 1-0NP-47.01 Loss of A Safety Related AC. Bus C. 1) The Bus is energized from the Diesel Generator.
- 2) 1-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions D. 1) The Bus is de-energized but the 1A Diesel Generator is running.
- 2) 1-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions 95
Proposed Answer: B ( Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: 1) Incorrect: Diesel running but breaker does not close on faulted bus.
- 2) Correct: even if Diesel Loaded on bus 1-0NP-47.01 Loss of A Safety Related AC Bus is correct procedure until bus energized from normal source.
B. Correct C. Incorrect: 1) Incorrect: Diesel running but breaker does not close on faulted bus. 2) If bus was 1A2 4.16 KV bus 1-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions would be correct. Unit would trip on low SG level due to loss of Condensate and Feedwater Pump. D. Incorrect: 1) Correct: Diesel running but breaker not closed 2) If bus was 1A2 4.16 KV bus 1-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions would be correct. Unit would trip on low SG level due to loss of Condensate and Feedwater Pump. Technical Reference(s): 1-0NP-47.01 Loss of A Safety (Attach if not previously provided) Related A.C. Bus 0711502 Main Power Distribution Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0-=-.7:. . :0:.=2:. .:. 5-=-02=--:. .:. 0-=-7_ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) 0702502-07 Question Source: Bank # Bank# Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 10 - - '- 55.43 - 2 2- ---- Comments: 96
REVISION: PROCEDURE TITLE: PANEL: OA ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE B ( PROCEDURE NO: WINDOW: 1-ARP-01-B 14 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 14 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL 8 4 KV SWGR 1A3 L\ CURRENT dCURRENT TRIP 8-14 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT: 86-1 A-3/924 1 A3 4.16KV Bus Cubicle 6,1-20206 1A3 6, 1-20206 Actuation of 87-1A-3, 87-1 A-3, A,B,C Relay 87-1A-3, A,B,C/924 1 A3 4.16KV Bus Cubicle 6,1-20206 1A3 6, 1-20206 87-1A-3, A,B,C Differential Current Relay ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. Any/all of the following:
A. The 11A3 A3 4.16KV Bus lockout relay handle is pointing to the 10 O'clock position. B. The lockout relay BLUE light on 1A3 1A3 4.16KV Bus is flashing or extinguished. C. Loss of 1A3 4.16KV Bus power as indicated by voltmeter, VM-954, and ammeter, AM-934. D. Loss of A-Side vital 4.16KV and 480V AC loads. E. Auto start of 1A DG. OPERATOR ACTIONS:
- 1. Corrective Actions:
A. Implement 1-0NP-47.01, Loss of A S(Jfety RelatedA;C. B:Jds. B. Review Tech Specs for anY required actions. . CAUSES: An electrical fault on the 1A3 4.16KV Bus or a bus load has actuated a bus differential current relay
REFERENCES:
- 1) CWO 8770-B-327 sheet 201,924, 201, 924, 936, 938, 943, 953
- 2) Relay Setpoint Document 8770-A-452
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 6 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED AC. BUS 5 of 50 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-0NP-47.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 2.2 St. Lucie Unit 1 Control Wiring Diagrams (8770-B-327, 8770-G-272A) 2.3 Unit 1 Technical Specifications 3.0 RECORDS REQUIRED 3.1 Normal log entries. 4.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS 4.1 Loss of a Safety Related AC. Bus as indicated by one or more of the following:
- 1. A loss of power available lights for the 11A3, A3, 1B3 or 1AB 4160V buses.
- 2. Partial loss of control room lighting.
- 3. Any of the following annunciators:
A. A-6 (B-6): Emergency Diesel Generator 1B (1A) Breaker Failure. ( B. A-26 (B-26): Emergency Diesel Generator 1B (1A) Lockout! SS Isolate. C. A-28 (B-28): 4KV Switchgear 1B3 (1A3) I/ 480V Switchgear 1B2 (1A2) I/ UV I/ UT Test I/ Ground. D. A-47 (B-47): 480V Switchgear 1B2 (1A2) Feeders Overload Trip. E. B-48: 1AB Switchgear / 1AB MCC Undervoltage. F. B-49: 480V Switchgear 1AB MCC Feeder Overload Trip. 5.0 EXIT CONDITIONS
§~,t 5.1 The affected AC. bus has been reenergized from its normal power supply.
(
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 6 LOSS OF A SAFETY RELATED AC. BUS 10 of50 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-0NP-47.01 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 APPENDIX A RESTORATION OF 1A3 4160V BUS (Page 2 of 6)
- 1. (continued) INITIAL CAUTION Resetting the differential current lockout relay will immediately result in the closing and the diesel load diesel output breaker closin loading in onto the bus.
E. If no apparent damage exists, one attempt may be made to reset the lockout. F. ATTEMPT to energize the bus from the 1A diesel generator, as follows:
- 1. VERIFY the 1A diesel generator is up to full speed and voltage. ATTEMPT a manual start of the engine if necessary.
( 2. When the diesel generator is ready to synchronize, INSERT the synchronize plug and MAKE only one attempt to close in the 1A1A diesel output breaker 1-20211.
- 3. If the diesel generator did NOT start or is NOT running correctly, SEND an operator to the diesel building to investigate.
G. REFER to applicable appendices to re-power load centers. H. If the bus has NOT been reenergized, Then ATTEMPT to cross tie the bus to the 1A2 1A2 4160V bus as follows:
- 1. ENSURE breakers to be closed are first green flagged.
- 2. ENSURE the 1A2 4160V bus is energized, if deenergized, PERFORM the following as necessary:
- a. If a differential current lockout has occurred, (Annunciator B-13), Then DISPATCH an operator to the switchgear to check for any relay indications or other apparent problems. (L1Current (LlCurrent Relay located on 1-20110 breaker cubicle).
- b. If no apparent damage exists, one attempt may be made to reset the lockout.
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 KIA # 063K2.01 Importance Rating 2.9 DC Electrical Distribution: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Major DC loads Proposed Question: R049 RO 49 Unit 2 was at 100% power when a loss of the 2A DC bus occurs. Which ONE of the following indicates:
- 1) the Auxiliary Feedwater flow control available from the Control Room?
- 2) the 2C AFW pump steam and feed alignment (assume AS AB DC bus aligned to the A side)
The 28 2B AFW pump and header flow control valves to the: A. 1) 2A Steam Generator.
- 2) Steam from the 28 2B Steam Generator to the 2C AFW pump feeding the 2A Steam
( Generator. S. B. 1) 2A Steam Generator.
- 2) Steam from the 2A Steam Generator to the 2C AFW pump feeding the 28 2B Steam Generator.
C. 1) 28 2B Steam Generator.
- 2) Steam from the 2A Steam Generator to the 2C AFW pump feeding the 2A Steam Generator.
D. 1) 26 2B Steam Generator.
- 2) Steam from the 28 2B Steam Generator to the 2C AFW pump feeding the 28 2B Steam Generator.
97
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: 2B AFW pump only available to 2B SG. Steam to 2C AFW pump only available from the 2A SG. B. Incorrect: 28 2B AFW pump only available to 2B SG. Feed from 2C AFW pump only available to 2A SG C. Correct D. Incorrect: Steam from the 2A SG and feed to the 2A SG from 2C AFW pump. Technical Reference(s): PSL OPS SYS 412 TXT (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: PSL OPS SYS 412 LPC (As available) Obj.4,5,6 Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # 670 (Note changes or attach parent)
----~
New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis xX 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 55.43 Comments: 98
( Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # KIA # 063K2.01 Importance Rating 2.9 DC Electrical Distribution: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Major DC loads Proposed Question: RO 49 Unit 2 was at 100% power when a loss of the 2A DC bus occurs. Which ONE of the following states the Auxiliary Feedwater flow control available from the Control Room? (assume AB DC bus aligned to the A side) The 2B AFW pump and header flow control valves to the: A. 2A Steam Generator. Steam from the 2B Steam Generator to the 2C AFW pump feeding the 2A Steam Generator. B. 2A Steam Generator. Steam from the 2A Steam Generator to the 2C AFW pump feeding the 2B Steam Generator. ( C. 2B Steam Generator. Steam from the 2A Steam Generator to the 2C AFW pump feeding the 2A Steam Generator. D. 2B Steam Generator. Steam from the 2B Steam Generator to the 2C AFW pump feeding the 2B Steam Generator. 97
(, Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: 2B AFW pump only available to 2B SG. Steam to 2C AFW pump only available from the 2A SG. B. Incorrect: 2B AFW pump only available to 2B SG. Feed from 2C AFW pump only available to 2A SG C. Correct D. Incorrect: Steam from the 2A SG and feed to the 2A SG from 2C AFW pump. Technical Reference(s): PSL OPS SYS 412 TXT (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: PSL OPS SYS 412 LPC (As available) Obj.4,5,6 Question Source: Bank# Bank # Modified Bank # 670 (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 7 55.43 Comments: 98
Single Question Report QIO#: 670 Objective: 0702412-05 System: AFW/AFAS Rev: 0 Cog Level: 1 KA #013.K2.01 R03.6* SR03.8 Unit 2 was at full power when the 2A 125 VDC bus faulted and de-energized. HOW MUCH of the AFW system remains operable from RTGB 202 immediately following the reactor trip? A. Only the 2B AFW pump and header flow control valves to the 2A Steam Generator are available. B. Only the 2B AFW pump and header flow control valves to the 2B Steam Generator are available. C. The 2B AFW pump and header flow control valves to the 2B Steam Generator and the 2C AFW pump and header flow control valves to the 2B Steam generator remain available. D. The 2B AFW pump and header flow control valves to the 2B Steam Generator and the 2C AFW pump and header flow control valves to the 2A Steam Generator remain available. Reasons the choices are right or wrong. Correct answer is D. A. B. C. D. Source Ref: Open Ref: Revision Notes: CAR 9/06 Question Use History HLC-17 System Block 6 Exam, 0720238, 511 5/1 0/2005 HLC-16/SRO-12 SYSTEMS BLOCK 6 EXAM, 0720219, 6/20/03 Page 1 of 1I
PSL OPS SYS 412 TXT R22 For Training Use Only UNIT 2 - AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM s'~/;Pl( S"P5:,;,fJ/{ HCV-08-1A MAIN STEAM HCV-08-1B (DC) STEAM GENERATOR 2A L.O. .-- STEAM TURBINE AUX. FEED PUMP L.O. A HCV-09-1A HCV-09-2A A LO. t HCV-09-2B B MAIN MAIN ( MV-09-9 A FEEDWATER B FI-09-2A FI-09-2B
@--- _~_ :_~~B FE- _________
SE-09-2 A f---@FR-09-2C B SE-09-3 : 8-- FR-09-2A FC
!-- - @FI-09-2C L.O.
FC 'C__ @
,- -r;:RI I!:Y FR-09-2B
~
PI-D9-7C AUXILIARY AUXILIARY FEED PUMP FEED PUMP 2A 26 L.O. CONDo COND. L.O. L.O. STORAGE TANK UNIT UNIT22 (TIRCOI0711412IF2-RI7) (TIRCO!0711412IF2*R 17) LO. L.O. LO. L.O. L.C. TO UNIT 1 C.S.T. Figure 2 Page 72 of99
PSL OPS SYS 412 TXT R22 For Training Use Only INDICATION RANGE LOCATION ( Auxiliary Feedwater Pump - 2C Aux Feedwater Hdr. C Flow/Pressure 0-600 gpm/1500 psig RTGB 202 Discharge Pressure 0-2000 psig Local Steam Pressure to Pump 2C 0-1200 psig RTGB 202 Feedwater Header Pressure 0-1500 psig RTGB 202 Feedwater Header Pressure 0-1500 psig RTGB 202 Aux Feedwater 2C Discharge 0-400/600 gpm RTGB 202 TABLE 4 - POWER SUPPLIES Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit2 Component Power Supply Component Power Supply AFWP 1A 1A3, 4160vac 1A3,4160vac AFWP 2A 2A3, 4160vac 2A3,4160vac AFWP 1B 1B3, 4160vac 1B3,4160vac AFWP 2B 2B3, 4160vac 2B3,4160vac
~ SG-A)
MV-09-11 (1 C -+ 1-AB-1, 125vdc 1-AB-1,125vdc ~ SG-MV-09-11 (2C -+ PP-255, 125vdc ( A)
~ SG-B)
(1 C -+ MV-09-12 (1C 1-AB-1, 125vdc ~ SG-MV-09-12 (2C -+ PP-254, 125vdc B) MV-09-9 (1A -+~ SG-A) MCC-1A5, ~ SG-A) MV-09-9 (2A -+ MCC-2A5, 480vac MCC-2A5,480vac 480vac
~ SG-B)
MV-09-10 (1 B -+ MCC-1B5, ~ SG-B) MV-09-10 (2B -+ MCC-2B5, 480vac 480vac MV-08-13 (steam from 1-AB-1, 125vdc MV-08-13 (steam from PP-255, 125vdc SG A) SG A) MV-08-14 (steam from 1-AB-1, 125vdc MV-08-12 (steam from PP-254, 125vdc SG B) SG B) MV-09-13 (Cross-tie) MCC-1A5, MV-09-13 (Cross-tie) MCC-2A5, 480vac 480vac Page 65 of99
PSL OPS SYS 412 TXT R22 For Training Use Only normally powered up by the MCC-B5 & B6 buses thru battery chargers. Upon loss of offsite ( and EDG power to the B train it is essential to swap the AB bus to the A train if AFW flow is required prior to draining the 1B battery. The 125V DC power supplies for Unit 2 AFW 'C' pump and valves are located on two levels of the RAB. The 'A' DC bus supplies steam inlet valves from the 'B' steam generator and AFW flow control valves to the 'B' steam generator. The 'B' DC bus supplies steam inlet valves from the 'A' steam generator and AFW flow control valves to the 'A' steam generator. The '2C' TTV is supplied from the 'AB' DC bus. The AB bus is supplied from the 2A DC bus from MCC-A5 thru a battery charger. This electrical arrangement ensures that a total loss of power to one train or Loss of Offsite power will not prevent automatic feed to either S/G. To ensure this MV-08-3 is maintained open. For example: If all AC and DC is lost on the 'A' side, 'B' side motor driven AFW pump and valves would provide feedwater to the 'B' S/G and 'C' AFW pump and valves would provide feedwater to the 'A' S/G. ( The following power panels supply power to Unit 2 AFW components:
- 1. PP 254, -0.5' elevation, by the 'A' SDC Heat Exchanger Room entry
- 2. PP 255, -0.5 elevation, on the Laundry Drain Filter Room wall
- 3. PP 238, 43' elevation, Cable Spreading Room, outside the 2B Battery Room
- 4. PP 239, 43' elevation, 'B' Switchgear Room, between the 'A' and 'B' 125 VDC buses on the North wall Refer to Table 4 - AFW Power Supplies for a comprehensive listing of AFW pumps, MOVs, SOVs, and related power supplies.
Page 31 of99
PSL OPS SYS 412 TXT R22 For Training Use Only I Unit 1 Unit 2 ( Component Power Supply Component Power Supply MV-09-14 (Cross-tie) MCC-1 B5, MV 14 (Cross-tie) MV-09-14 MCC-2B5, 480vac 480vac
~".
MV-08-3 (TTV) 1AB,125vdc MV-08-3 MV-08-3 (TTV) 2AB,125vdc
°'4,:::",,,,*,,,:,°,*,,,
AFWP 1C Control 1AB,125vdc SE-09-2 RTGB-206 Fuse AC SA F8, 120vac AFAS AF AS Cabinet A 1MA,120vac SE-09-3 PP-202, 120vac AFAS Cabinet B 1MB, 120vac SE-09-4 PP-239, 125vdc AFAS Cabinet C 1MC, 120vac 1MC, SE-09-5 PP-238, 125vdc AFAS Cabinet 0 1MO, 120vac 1MD,120vac SE-08-1 PP-218, 125vdc SE-08-2 PP-219,125vdc PP-219, 125vdc Cntrl Pnl htr and MV- PP-203, 120vac i 08-3 motor htr
\
Immersion Htr, Aux Oil PP-204, 120vac Pump AFAS Cabinet A 2MA,120vac AFAS Cabinet B 2MB, 120vac 2MB,120vac AFAS Cabinet C 2MC, 120vac 2MC,120vac AFAS Cabinet 0 2MD,120vac 2MO,120vac Page 66 of99
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier Tier# # 2 Group # 1 KIA # 064K1.02 Importance Rating 3.1 Emergency Diesel Generator Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the ED/G system and the following systems: DIG D/G cooling water system Proposed Question: RO 50 The 1 A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) is running with its output breaker closed for a 1A surveillance run. 45 minutes into the run the EDG trips on high jacket water temperature. It has been 30 minutes since the EDG trip and nothing has been reset on the EDG. Jacket water temperature indicates 190°F. Five minutes later a Loss of Offsite power occurs. The Unit Supervisor directs the SNPO to reset the 1A EDG lockout relay. Which ONE of the following states the 1A EDG response to the lockout relay reset? The EDG will: A. start and load on the bus, but if the high jacket water temperature comes back ( in the EDG will trip. B. start and load on the bus. It will continue to run regardless of the jacket water temperature. C. NOT start until the jacket water temperature lowers to 180°F. D. NOT start until the shutdown relay is also reset. 99
Proposed Answer: B ( Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: would be correct if an undervoltage signal was not in. High jacket water temperature trip is bypassed on undervoltage start signal. B. Correct: 205°F jacket water trip is bypassed on undervoltage start. C. Incorrect: 180°F is normal water temperature. D. Incorrect: shutdown relay reset AND lockout relay reset is Unit 2 only. Unit 1 does not have a shutdown relay. Technical Reference(s): 0711501 Diesel Generators (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0_7_0_2_5_01_-_17-",-1 ~8,,-1_9_ _ _ _ _ (As available) _0_7_0_2_5_0_1-_1_7-'---,1_8-'-,1_9______ ( Question Source: Bank # Bank# \ Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 2 to 9 55.43 Comments: ( 100
0711501, Rev. 22 Page 37 of 130 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY DIESEL GENERATOR COOLING WATER SYSTEM Located inside the EDG building for protection, Refer to Figure 11 [12].
- Cools the engine lube oil, cylinder jackets, and turbocharger after-cooler.
- Maintains lube oil temperature warm for quick-start capability, via immersion heater[s]
and natural circulation of the cooling water.
- Split into a separate subsystem for each diesel engine, designed to independently function to assure that no single failure can prevent cooling the redundant engine.
- Most components are carbon steel.
- Requires no external power source, and does not depend on any external plant cooling system.
Uses ambient air and shaft driven pumps. Radiator fan is driven via a pulley from the engine shaft.
- Demineralized water used for makeup.
- 3-way Thermostatic type TCV, 165°F closes - 180°F fully opens.
\!tl;ii;i~;Wigl;);{t;eJ'B:~~1j~~;~~;;i~~~kt]j~Ia;;~t~~Q~gf1;';~i~b~fi)a\$g:a'(d~il\'i;~gllf;J'etg~'IJ;~~tM(;);<;l'e¥i,Q1f;le[~~i;@.Il;l;;~*~
- High temperature EDG TRIP at 205°F,bypassed' in Emergency Mode.operat,ion.
I \
- Gages (32°F to 392°F) are installed on the inlet & & outlet of each engine.
[Unit 2: High engine outlet temperature at 195°F alarms on the local EDG control panel and in the control room.] Cooling Water Pumps Two centrifugal water pumps are mounted on each diesel engine.
- 12 cylinder pumps & radiator rated for 660 gpm, 5.4 E6 BTU/Hr
- 16 cylinder pumps & radiator rated for 850 gpm, 7.2 E6 BTU/Hr
- Pumps are gear driven directly from the engine crankshaft.
- Radiator fan is shaft driven via pulley and belt.
- Radiator fan blows room air through radiator and out via stack.
- Normal system pressure of 30 to 45 psig.
[Unit 2: Pump outlet low pressure alarm at 23 psig on the local EDG control panel, and the control room.]
0711501, Rev. 22 Page 51 of 130 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY [The Unit 2 Lockout Relay has different actuation logic than Unit 1. For Unit 2, only the electrical trips are direct inputs to the Lockout Relay circuit. Any trip of the Unit 2 Lockout Relay causes the Shutdown Relay to actuate. All engine generated trips, (including over-speed) actuate the Shutdown Relay, which must pass through an EDG output breaker "closed" contact, to actuate the Lockout Relay. The Unit 2 Lockout Relay MUST be reset FIRST, to reset the Shutdown Relay.] On Unit 1, the over-speed alarm and lockout are enabled above 200 RPM. Failure to reset the over-speed latch will result in the EDG being inoperable with no local alarm present. The alarm and Lockout Relay will actuate when the EDG reaches 200 RPM.
"Fail-To-Start" Relay It is ALWAYS necessary to reset the Unit 1 "Lockout" Relay [Unit 2 "Emergency Shutdown" Relay] if a "Fail-To-Start" condition is sensed:
(
- Unit 1 "Fail-To-Start" Relay requires >200 rpm within 10 seconds to prevent lockout relay operation. (To clear, RESET the Lockout Relay on local EDG control panel)
* [Unit 2 "Fail-To-Start" Relay requires >100 rpm OR Jacket Water pressure >20 psig on either engine within 9 seconds to prevent shutdown relay operation. (To clear, PRESS the "Emergency Reset" pushbutton on either local engine control panel, or on the local EDG control paneL)]
Emergency Shutdown - Unit 1 There are no emergency trip pushbuttons push buttons located in the Unit 1 Control Room. The local EDG control panel has an emergency trip pushbutton. This sends a signal to the Lockout Relay, which in turn energizes the governor oil dump solenoids on both the 12 and 16 cylinder governors.
- Dumping governor oil back to its sump allows the fuel racks to move to the closed fuel position, to immediately stop the EDG and bypass the normal 10 minute cool down.
- This button is DISABLED whenever a SIAS, under-voltage/degraded-voltage, or 3-to-2 tie-breaker open, emergency start signal is present.
0711501, Rev. 22 Page 50 of 130 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY ABNORMAL OPERATION ONP 1[2]-0910054, [2]-091 0054, Loss of a Safety Related AC Bus, provides direction for attempting to recover from loss of 4.16 kV safety-related power. EDG Lockout [and Shutdown] Relay
- ~:it~~~:e~~sc:~~~~:n!~'~n,th~e~-~no~r~m"a~e~a~~y~W~mill~e~n~e~~rg~~i~ze~to~~9i~~d~OlFn~;~eMo~f~ht~h~~:;;;~~~~~~
If the diesel is operating in the normal (surveillance) mode and one of the eight following conditions occurs, the EDG Lockout Relay will energize to give a lockout. The acronym, "COREWOOD" may help in memorizing this list:
- Crankcase pressure high at >1" H2 0
- Oil pressure low at <17 [20] psig (Engine oil pressure)
- Reverse power (Generator motoring)
- Excitation low (Loss of generator field)
- Water temperature high at >205°F.
- Over-current
(
- Over-speed*** at 1040 [1035] rpm
- Differential current*** (Current imbalance between the generator and load side of the output breaker)
*** Still Enabled Following Emergency Start Note: The "Fail-To-Start" Relay will actuate the Lockout Relay [Shutdown Relay] of the EDG, even in the emergency mode.
The Lockout Relay trips the EDG to prevent further operation, even in emergency mode, and alarms on the local EDG control panel and in the control room.
- T~
To clear a lockout under normal operation, the condition that caused it must be cleared AND the Lockout Relay on the local EDG control panel must be reset.
** If the Lockout Relay has already actuated and an emergency start is present, the Lockout Relay must still be reset to start the EDG. Emergency operation will
(( remove most input signals, but does NOT block the "Fail-To-Start" Relay.
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # 073K3.01 Importance Rating 3.6 Process Radiation Monitoring: Knowledge Know[edge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PRM system will have on the following: Radioactive effluent releases Proposed Question: RO 51 Which ONE of the following Unit 1 process monitors, that if failed to perform its control function, could result in an unmonitored radioactive effluent release. A. Letdown Process Monitor B. Component Cooling Water Monitor C. Containment Atmosphere Monitor D. Condenser Air Ejector Monitor 101
Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: Letdown process monitor has no control function B. Correct: Hi radiation in CCW system will automatically divert the CCW surge tank to the Chemical drain tank preventing a direct release to atmosphere from the CCW surge tank vent. C. Incorrect: Containment atmosphere has no control function D. Incorrect: Condenser Air Ejector monitor has no control function Technical Reference(s): 0711410 Unit 1 radiation (Attach if not previously provided) monitoring Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: 0702410-09 _0.:c.:7-.:0..::2.....:..4...:-10=---=-09-=--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge _X'-'--_ X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 -- 7 55.43 Comments: 102
Component Cool ing W.ate,r:('iCW{Mbhitors"{GhEHlAels$6"an.g,.57:,)".,.,
/((. '"
There are twatwo Campanent Component Cooling Caaling Water (CCW) Process monitors, manitars, 'One one located lacated in each train CCW header. These monitors manitars are identical to ta the Unit 1 LRW Monitor Manitar (Figure 7). They are NMC-type gamma scintillation scintillatian detector detectar monitors manitars with indicatian indication and annunciatian ann unciation an on the PlOPs d display pa nel. ~~1lt~~~~~~n~i~~t:(~ff~t~~'M~!i&~~f@OI~.t1i.~~I:7t!!i;lfil!jlttC;f'Jll;~ii is pia y panel. These manitars have a cantrol function.
=~~~=~,:::~====
Upan actuatian 'Of a Higlu~;adia'fi"()rv6rFlawpgffZAlarm, the CCW;s:g:ctF§B';;;[.arl'kVentii't Va Ive dive rts from its;:;atrnosp here'pas'ili6na*htfreali'gfls tQ: thej~heRil'iool D rain">¥ClnR::~ Letdown Process Monitor (Channels 40 and 41) The primary purpose purpase of 'Of the Letdown Letdawn Process Monitor Manitar (sometimes (sametimes referred to ta as the gross failed fuel monitor) manitar) is to ta alert plant aperatars operators ta to an increase in caalant coolant activity as quickly as possible. passible. Such an increase would wauld usually be caused by crud released inta into the RCS 'Or or in the CVCS letdown letdawn line. This monitoring man ita ring system is a Victareen Victoreen manitar monitor and cansists consists 'Ofof 'One one sampler and twa readaut modules. two readout madules. One readout readaut module madule is called a Log Lag Ratemeter and the ather other is called the Linear Ratemeter. These ratemeters are ( mounted maunted in the Radiation Radiatian Monitoring Manitaring Panel. The Log Lag Ratemeter, Channel 40, provides indication (gross gamma monitoring). this indicatian manitaring). An increase in specific fission fissian product nuclide activity (Channel 41) along alang with an increase in gross gamma activity (Channel 40) wauld be indicative of would 'Of failed fuel cladding. Letdawn Process Monitor The Letdown Manitar is a trend monitor manitar designed to ta provide indication indicatian 'Of of a passible fuel cladding failure. The alarm setpoints possible setpaints are normally narmally set at a value slightly abave the current background. It is expected that gross activity (and possibly above passibly ladine-lodine-131 activity) will periodically periadically increase above abave the alarm setpaints setpoints due to ta normal narmal plant Cansequently, the alarm will periodically transients (Crud Burst). Consequently, periadically activate and the operator must determine the cause of aperatar 'Of the alarm. If an alarm is received and the ladine- lodine-131 activity has increased and remains significantly abave above the priar prior steady state level, fuel failure can be assumed to ta have 'Occurred. occurred. The Letdawn Letdown Process Monitor Manitar is lacated located in the CVCS letdawn letdown line, (Figure 9), in parallel with the purification purificatian filter but upstream 'Of of the ion ian exchangers. This location lacatian in the system allows allaws a continuous cantinuaus sample at low law pressure and temperature to ta be 'Obtained obtained and 0711410 071141 0 Rev 12 Page 21 of 84 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
TABLE 2 - PROCESS RADIATION MONITORS CHANNEL MONITORED AREA RANGE TYPE NO. DETECTOR "31 Containment Atmosphere (Particulate) 10 to 1066 cpm ~ Scintillation "32 Containment Atmosphere (Gaseous) 10 to 1066 cpm ~ Scintillation
#35 Condenser Air Ejector 10 to 1066 cpm ~ Scintillation 40 Letdown Process Monitor (Gross Activity) 10 to 10 66 cpm y Scintillation 41 Letdown Process Monitor (Iodine) 100 to 1066 cpm y Scintillation
#42 Gaseous Waste Discharge 10 to 1077 cpm ~ Scintillation
#43 Liquid Waste Discharge 10-77 to 10-22 Ci/cc Cilcc y Scintillation
#44 Steam Generator Blowdown 1A 10 to 1066 cpm y Scintillation
#45 Steam Generator Blowdown 1B 10 to 1066 cpm y Scintillation 46 Control Room OIA 1A 10 to 1066 cpm ~ Scintillation 47 Control Room OIA 1B 10 to 1066 cpm ~ Scintillation
( 56 Component Cooling Water 1A 10-77 to 10-22 Ci/cc Cilcc y Scintillation 57 Component Cooling Water 1B 10-77 to 10-22 Ci/cc Cilcc y Scintillation
/I. Required by Technical Specifications.
A
# Required by ODCM = Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual, Chemistry Procedure C-200 0711410 Rev 12 Page 52 of 84 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # 076K4.06 Importance Rating 2.8 Service water: Knowledge of SWS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Service Water train separatJon separation Proposed Question: RO 52 Unit 1 is backwashing the 1B Turbine Cooling Water heat exchanger strainer. TCW heat exchanger SB21215 "TCW heat exchanger (TCW) inlet crosstie valve" is open. With SB21215 S821215 open, which ONE of the following identifies the operability status of the Intake Cooling water trains and the explanation WHY they are Operable or Inoperable? A. BOTH lew ICW trains are NOT operable due to lack of train separation. B. ONLY the 1 B ICW train is NOT operable. Minimum 'B' side heat exchanger flow requirements will NOT be met due to increased flow required to baCkwash backwash the strainer. C. BOTH ICW trains are operable. MV-21-2 and MV-21-3, A and B ICW train to TCW Hxs. ( close on SIAS. D. BOTH ICW trains are operable. The Operator performing the backwash is instructed to close SB21215 during accident conditions. 103
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: train separation is accomplished by MV21-2 and MV21-3 receiving a SIAS close signal, thus isolating the TCW Hxs. and separating the ICW trains. B. Incorrect: backwashing requires flow that would normally be directed to the heat exchangers. Plausible due to DBA assumes minimum ICW flows and maximum ICW temperatures. C. Correct: train separation will be accomplished when MV21-2and MV21-3 close. D. Incorrect: Plausible due to the fact it is permissible for an Operator to standby an open Containment penetration and close a valve to maintain Containment Integrity. This is allowable by Technical Specifications. Technical Reference( s): 1~0640030 Intake Cooling 1-0640030 (Attach if not previously provided) Water System 0711313 Intake Cooling Water System. Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: --,,-07_0,--,2--=-3_1~3--=0---,-5 0702313-05_________ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis xx 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 --- 7 55.43 Comments: 104
( Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # 076K4.06 Importance Rating 2.8 Service water: Knowledge of SWS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Service Water train separation Proposed Question: RO 52 Unit 1 is backwashing the 1B Turbine Cooling Water heat exchanger strainer. TCW heat exchanger Intake Cooling Water (lCW) inlet crosstie valve SB21215 is open. Which ONE of the following states the operability status of the Intake Cooling water trains while the crosstie valve is open? A. BOTH ICW trains are declared out of service. B. ONLY the 1B ICW train is declared out of service C. The ICW trains are operable. MV-21-2 and MV-21-3, A and B ICW train to TCW Hxs. close on SIAS. ( D. The ICW trains are operable. The Operator performing the backwash is instructed to close the crosstie valve SB21215 during accident conditions. 103
Proposed Answer: C ( Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: MV21-2 and MV21-3 are upstream of the crosstie valve and receive a SIAS close signal, thus isolating the TCW Hxs. and separating the ICW trains. B. Incorrect: MV21-2 and MV21-3 are upstream of the crosstie valve and receive a SIAS close signal, thus isolating the TCW Hxs. and separating the ICW trains. C. Correct: train separation will be accomplished when MV21-2 and MV21-3 close. D. Incorrect: Plausible due to the fact it is permissible for an Operator to standby an open Containment penetration and close a valve to maintain Containment Integrity. This is allowable by Technical Specifications. Technical Reference(s): 1-0640030 Intake Cooling (Attach if not previously provided) Water System 0711313 Intake Cooling Water System. Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: { \ Learning Objective: ~0_7_0_2_3_1_3-_0_5 _0_7_0_2_3_1_3-_0_5_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 7 55.43 Comments: 104
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 41A INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM 24 of 6'6 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-0640030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 APPENDIX D BACKWA5HING 55-21-4B TCW HEAT EXCHANGER 5TRAIN STRAINER (Page 2 of 2)
- 13. !f SB21213, 1B TCW Hx ICW Inlet Isol, was THROTTLED OPEN, Then CLOSE 1B SB21213, 1 B TCW Hx ICW Inlet Isol.
1B
- 14. CLOSE SB21365, SS-21-4B Backwashing Drain.
- 15. OPEN SH21366, PDIS-21-7B Dwnstrm Isol.
- 16. OPEN SH21367, PDIS-21-7B Upstrm Isol.
- 17. ICW Train To TCW Hxs.
OPEN MV-21-2, B ICWTrain
- 18. OPEN SH21363, SS-21-4B Vent.
- 19. When water issues, Then CLOSE SH21363, SS-21-4B Vent.
- 20. OPEN SB21213, 1B TCW Hx ICW Inlet Isol.
(
- 21. OPEN SB212002, ICW To 1B OBHX Isol.
\
- 22. CLOSE SB21215, 1A11 1A11BB TCW Hx ICW Inlet Cross-tie Bypass.
NOTE TCW heat exchanger inlet crosstie SB21215 and OBCS heat exchanger
'QTI' *may inlet crosstie SB21200 4 SI:.NjNr.
be left open_at the _.aasJiJj2;g _discretion SM / us of the 8M US if frequent strainer backwashing backwashin is required. re uired.
- 23. CLOSE SB212001, ICW Cross-tie To 1 1A11 Al1 B OBHX Isol.
- 24. When backwash of strainer(s) is complete, Then WASH DOWN area with domestic water.
- 25. !f Steam Generator Blowdown flow was reduced to minimum, Then RESTORE Steam Generator Blowdown flow to the desired flow rate in accordance with 1-NOP-23.02, Steam Generator Blowdown System Operations.
END OF APPENDIX D
( INTAKE COOLING WATER SYSTEM FLOW DIAGRAM TO DISCHARGE CANAL (3;J 1 ? t TCV 14-4A
~~~I;_A ----i~--___,
...-----;'r_3A r -__ ____ ~~______________~ COMPONENT i1.]:r-______
~r-______
TCV 34_-3_B ________.~~
.~
3_4-_3B__________ COOLING HEAT EXCHANGERS rcv TCV 34-3A OPEN SLOWDOWN COOLING SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGERS
---H---
N.C. N.C N.C. (
.JM;;'M~
~~~~ ~S_I_AS_._C
.. ______ ~ ~2 ~
TURBINE COOLING WATER SYSTEM HEAT EXCHANGERS
~'1:'~
,,~t }t <e4t ,,~! ,,~t
~AS-A ~AS-A&~AS-B
~AS'A ~AS'A&~AS'B INTAKE COOLING WATER PUMPS START START START INTAKE COOLING WATER FROM INTAKE APPARATUS SYSTEM (TIRCOI0704201-F6-R8)
(fIRCOI070420 I-F6-RB) FIGURE 2 Page 28 of 59 0711313r.O 0711313 r.O
( Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # 078A3.01 Importance Rating 3.2 Instrument Air System: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the lAS. lAS, including: Air Pressure Proposed Question: RO 53 Unit 1 is at 1 00% power with the 1C Instrument Air compressor in RUN and the 10 1 D Instrument air compressor is in AUTO.
- The 1C Instrument air compressor tripped on low oil pressure.
- Instrument air pressure has now lowered to 105 psig.
Which ONE of the following states the status of the 10 1 D Instrument air compressor? A. RUNNING. The compressor AUTO started when the 1C compressor tripped. B. RUNNING. The compressor AUTO started at 105 psig. C. NOT running. The compressor will AUTO start at 95 psig. i { D. NOT running. The compressor MUST be manually RESET and manually started 105
Proposed Answer: B ( Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: No auto start feature when running compressor trips. B. Correct: auto start at 105 psig. C. Incorrect: auto start is 95 psig on Unit 1 and 100 psig on Unit 2. D. Incorrect: This would be correct if the running compressor tripped on a high pressure condition. The standby compressor will not auto start and must be manually reset and manually started. Technical Reference(s): 0711413 Instrument and Station OY11413 (Attach if not previously provided) Air 1-1010030 Loss Of Instrument Air Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: --,--PS~L---"O_P---"S'---0-=-Y'-'0=-=2C.-4_1-=--3-----'0_4____ (As available) _P_S-'-L_O_P_S_0_7-'-0_24-'-1_3_-0_4____ Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge ,---X--,-_ _
-X- - -
Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 -- 7 Y -- - 55.43 Comments: 106
0711413, Rev. 12 Page 24 of 114 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY in the affected unit increases to >95 psig, the open signal to the cross-tie valve will be removed. Also, if the IA header pressure for the originally unaffected unit becomes <85 psig, the cross-tie valve will close to protect the unaffected unit. For example, if Unit 1 IA header pressure <85 psig, PCV-18-5 will receive an open signal and modulate to maintain 85 psig. Once Unit 1 pressure >95 psig, the open signal is removed and PCV-18-5 is closed. If during this event Unit 2 IA header pressure drops to <85 psig, PCV-18-5 will close. Instrumentation & Controls C & D Compressors Normally one Instrument Air Compressor is operating continuously in RUN with the other compressor selected for AUTO. Pressure is controlled by receiver pressure which operates a solenoid valve through a pressure switch. When de-energized, the solenoid valve admits air from the air receiver to the unloader valve forcing down a ( plunger which depresses the suction valve plates against spring pressure, keeping the plates open, causing the air output of the compressor to stop. A loss of electrical power to th~ . unloading t() . the ~nl~~ding, . .system
~ystElrnYfJlI8~Y~~
will cause. Jby(?()m.pr~~s()r.~().~QI8ad IJr~p/~j.~~~.~i[.Rc~S~u*re the compressor to unload.... If receiyer air pressure should continue to decrease,decre~se, at 105 pSig, psig, theAUTO the AUTO air compressor would startand start and load. Local Control Console (Refer to Figure 6)
- Indications 4 Compressor shutdown alarms (red lights) 5 alarm indicators (amber lights) 1 power available light (blue light)
Annunciator Silence Pushbutton Compressor Shutdown RESET Pushbutton Audible Alarm Horn Elapsed time meter 3 position "Break-Before-Make" Control Switch
- 1) RUN-OFF-AUTO
0711413, Rev. 12 Page 25 of 114 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
- Control Switch RUN [HAND]
- 1) Compressor runs continuously
- 2) In Halfload Condition:
Load @ 115 psig tJ., [110 psig t] J.,] Unload @ 120 psig t [117 psig t]
- 3) Full Load Condition:
Load @ 110 psig tJ., [105 psig t] J.,] Unload @ 118.5 psig t [113 psig t] OFF/RESET [OFF] - Compressor stops AUTO (Reference Figure 20)
- 1) Starts @ Receiver Pressure 105 psig t [100 psig t]
a) Runs in full load configuration b) Unloads @ 118.5 psig t [117 psig t] (
- 2) Continues to Cycle a) Half load mode i) Load @ 115 psig tJ., [110 psig t] J.,]
ii) Unload @ 120 psig t [117 psig t] b) Full load mode i) Load @ 110 psig tJ., [105 psig t] J.,] ii) Unload @ 118.5 psig t [117 psig t]
- 3) Compressor Continues to Run until:
a) Automatic Trip b) Manual Shutdown
- Compressor Automatic Shutdowns (Trips)
- 1) Motor Overload
- 2) High Pressure High Temperature
- High Pressure Cylinder Discharge Air Temp @ 170°C (338°F)
(
0711413, Rev. 12 Page 26 of 114 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
- 3) Low Pressure High Temperature Low Pressure Cylinder High Discharge Air Temperature @ 125°C (275°F)
- 4) Low Oil Pressure Shutdown
- 22 psig decreasing
- Automatically bypassed for 15 sec on Compressor start
- 5) High Discharge Receiver Air Pressure Indicates possible unloader problem Trip setpoint 140 psig increasing Trip Conditions Cause:
- 1) Red Alarm Light on Local Panel
- 2) Local Alarm Horn
- 3) Annunciator Alarm in Control Room
(
- To Restart Compressor After Trip Ensure Trip condition clear Control switch placed in OFF RESET pushbutton depressed Restart Compressor
- Other Alarm Condition Cause amber light but no trip of compressor
- 1) Jacket Water Temperature High 125°F Could indicate possible loss of TCW
- 2) Low Air Pressure 105 psig Possible unloader problem or air leak
- 3) Aftercooler Water Temperature 125°F Possible loss or decrease in TCW
( Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # 078K4.02 Importance Rating 3.2 Instrument Air: Knowledge of lAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Cross-over to other air systems Proposed Question: RO 54 Unit 1 and Unit 2 are at full power when an Instrument Air leak occurs on Unit 1.
- Instrument Air pressure on Unit 1 is 84 psig.
- Instrument Air pressure on Unit 2 is 95 psig.
Which ONE of the following identifies the status of the Instrument Air crosstie valves? PCV-18-6 Inst Air Cross-Tie PCV-18-5 PCV-18-5Inst Inst Air Cross-Tie From I/ To Unit 1 From I/ To Unit 1 A. open open ( B. open closed C. closed closed D. closed open 107
( Proposed Answer: D Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect; PCV-18-6 closed at 95 psig. PCV-18-5 opened at <85 psig on Unit 1. B. Incorrect; PCV-18-6 closed at 95 psig. PCV-18-5 will not close Unit 1 pressure rises to
>95 psig.
C. Incorrect; PCV-18-5 will be open due to Unit 1 air pressure of 84 psig. D. Correct: PCV-18-6 will be closed due to Unit 2 air pressure of 95 psig. PCV-18-5 will be open due to Unit 1 air pressure of 84 psig. Technical Reference(s): 1-1010030 Loss of Instrument (Attach if not previously provided) Air, 2-ARP-01-F30 0711413 Instrument and Station Air 0702413 Instrument and Station Air Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0_7_0--"-2'-4_1_3-_7_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) _0-'-7_0_2_4_1_3-_7 Question Source: Bank # Bank# 1894 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 --- 7 55.43 Comments: 108
REVISION: PROCEDURE TITLE: 1 ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE ( PROCEDURE NO: 2-ARP-01-F30 2-ARP-0 1-F30 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL F 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 UNIT 1 & &2 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 ~NSTRAIR lNSTRAIR 25 26 27 28 29~31 29 fIB 31 32 CROSSTIE CROSST!E 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 OPEN 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 F-30 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT: 33AC /1249 PCV-18-6 closed limit switch Alarm relay energized 33AC /1249 PCV-18-5 closed limit switch Alarm relay energized r--~"*""t--~"""~"""-",,,~,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,",,,,,,,~,, r-'--'W-;~"""-",",-",, -'>" ""_"_""_""'_"'_~~,"""",
" """"" " ",," _,," NOTE NOTE
~C)J".jB"",5,Jn~tL6i.!"J~I9~?,:.T.~E~D5!tOtrmrl)receives
............e.C\t.*.:\.8"'S,_tn,str Air Qr9ss-Tie FrornlTo'Uilifl) receives an open signal when Unit 1 Instr drops to 85 psig, PCV~r8':!)fIlen modulates close to maintain 85 psig in the Air Pressure drops'to-/3S-i:)sig-:PGV--m:S-tne'n Unit 2 Instr Air Header, Header. PCV-18-5 open signal is removed when Unit 1 Instr Air Pressure
_!,"~~0~~Og~:~f~~T;':Ai~'c";;ssjieF;'omITOU'~~1)receives
.!~"~d9:\?s;i~ffi~I~Arr'c~~ss~Ire'fromn=OU~~'*1'Jreceives an a!"l open signal when Unit 2 Instr
~'Air Pressuredrcrpslo' "Air Pressuredro]js to B5'psig.
85-psig. PCV-18-6then PCV-18-6 then modulates close to maintain 85 psig in the Unit 1 Instr Air Header. PCV-18-6 open signal is removed when Unit 2 Instr Air Pressure
"= rises to 95 psi. 3J
( ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. PI-18-9, Instr Air Hdr Press (RTGB-202)
- 2. Local check of PCV-18-5 and/or PCV-18-6 valve position OPERATOR ACTIONS:
1, DISPATCH an operator to locally check operation of the Instrument Air Compressors. 1. 2, 1f
- 2. If a low air pressure condition exists, Then IMPLEMENT 2-1010030, Loss of oflrrstrument lnstrument Air.
CAUSES: The alarm condition may be caused by excessive use of instrurne;-;t"air, instrume;-;t"air, malfunction of Instrument Air Compressor(s) or malfunction of either PCV-18-5 or PCV-18-6. PCV~i8-6.
REFERENCES:
- 1. CWO 2998-B-327, sheet 1249
- 2. P&ID 2998-G-085, sheet 3
- 3. TEDB
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 1 ,. i
/// ----~-
KIA # 078K4.02 / I Importance Rating 3.2 / /l _ _ ~_..__ . cr~over Instrument Air: Knowledge of lAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: ero s-over to other air systems / // Proposed Question: RO 54 Unit 1 and Unit 2 are at full power when an Instrument Air leak occur occurs,.cfn Unit 1. i
- Instrument Air pressure on Unit 1 is 84 psig. / '
- Instrument Air pressure on Unit 2 is 95 psig psig.. /
/
/
Which ONE of the following identifies the status.of status of the Iny!ument InsJrument Air crosstie valves?
/'
fO ff) ~(;.IlI r()
~()~ r'CJ I/.v/'r It 1,;")1"-
rtf (;If).....I
#'"'I / Unit 1'I PCV-18-6 ~PCV-18-5 rpCV.18.5
/
"./
A. open // open B. open /
/ closed C. closed /;'
/
closed
/1
~se~l
/
/
/
I'
/
/
;/
107
Technical Reference(s): 1-1010030 Loss of Instrument (Attach if not previously provided) 2-ARP-0 1-F30 Air, 2-ARP-01-F30 0711413 Instrument and Station Air 0702413 Instrument and Station Air ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: 0702413-7.-_--- - (As available) Question Source: Bank # 1894 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Comments: 108
((\ Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level SRO Tier# Group # KIA # 078K4.02 Importance Rating 3.2 Instrument Air: Knowledge of lAS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provi e for the following: Cross-over to other air systems Proposed Question: RO 54 Unit 1 and Unit 2 are at full power when an Instrumen Air leak occurs on Unit 1.
- Instrument Air pressure on Unit 1 is 84 ps' .
- Instrument Air pressure on Unit 2 is 95 sig.
Which ONE of the following states the stat of the Instrument Air crosstie valves? Unit 1 PCV-18-6 Unit 2 PCV-18-5 A. open open ( B. open closed C. closed closed D. closed open 107
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): A. Correct; PCV-18-6 opened at <85 psig. PCV-18-5 opened at <85 psig on Unit 1. B. Incorrect; PCV-18-6 opened at <85 psig. PCV-18-5 will not close unless Unit 2 pressure drops to <85 psig or Unit 1 pressure rises to >95 psig. C. Incorrect; PCV-18-6 does not close until >95 psig D. Incorrect;: PCV-18-6 will be open Technical Reference(s): 1-1010030 Loss of Instrument (Attach if not previously provided) Air, 2-ARP-01-F30 0711413 Instrument and Station Air 0702413 Instrument and Station Air Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0.::...:7'--'0:..=2'-.:.4-'..13.::...:--'..7_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) 0702413-7 Question Source: Bank # 1894 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 -~-- 7 -- 55.43 Comments: 108
0711413, Rev. 11 Page 23 of 113 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY The timers should be set so that the moisture is expelled and several seconds flow time of dry air is released before the valve closes.
- Air Dryer Dual Chamber System Function: Designed to remove water vapor.
The AM AMLOCLaC DHA dryer is a fully automatic microcomputer controlled system. Each air dryer includes a set of two desiccant chambers and associated support accessories and controls. One chamber is In-Service, and one chamber is Off-Service in a standby or regeneration mode. The air stream being dried is automatically shifted between the two chambers by the computer at 3-6 minute intervals (depending on the moisture load of the desiccant bed).
- Afterfilter Assembly
( Function: Removes desiccant' FINES' which are abrasive and will erode valves, orifices, instruments, and seals if not removed. It removes 100% of particulates greater than 0.9 microns at up to 400 scfm. Instrument Air Unit Cross-tie Unit 1 and Unit 2 instrument air systems can be automatically cross-tied if one unit is losing instrument air pressure. This is accomplished through two pressure control valves, PCV-18-6 (Unit 1) and PCV-18-5 (Unit 2). (See Figure 1.) Both of these valves n~rt1laIIYGI are ..normally osed . .I(oh~*unit*h closed. If one unit has low IA pres~\Jr3<85 aslo'WIA pressure <85 .p~i ~,Jb3JA psig, the IA s:r~s§:-w~ 'I,<~ly.~Jor cross-tie valve for the unaffected unit will open to supply instrument air. The va'ive thecmaffectedunitWill:op3nJosuppJyinstrwmenlair. valve that opened wiilwill modulate to maintain pressure in the affected unit at 85 psig. If the IA header pressure (
0711413, Rev. 11 Page 24 of 113 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY ( in the affected unit increases to >95 psig, the open signal to the cross-tie valve will be removed. Also, if the IA header pressure for the originally unaffected unit becomes <85 psig, the cross-tie valve will close to protect the unaffected unit. For example, if Unit 1 IA header pressure <85 psig, PCV-18-5 will receive an open signal and modulate to maintain 85 psig. Once Unit 1 pressure >95 psig, the open signal is removed and PCV-18-5 is closed. If during this event Unit 2 IA header pressure drops to <85 psig, PCV-18-5 will close. Instrumentation & Controls C & D Compressors Normally one Instrument Air Compressor is operating continuously in RUN with the other compressor selected for AUTO. Pressure is controlled by receiver pressure which operates a solenoid valve through a pressure switch. When de-energized, the solenoid valve admits air from the air receiver to the unloader valve forcing down a plunger which depresses the suction valve plates against spring pressure, keeping the plates open, causing the air output of the compressor to stop. A loss of electrical power to the unloading system will cause the compressor to unload. If receiver air pressure should continue to decrease, at 105 psig, the AUTO air compressor would start and load. ( Local Control Console (Refer to Figure 6)
- Indications 4 Compressor shutdown alarms (red lights) 5 alarm indicators (amber lights) 1 power available light (blue light)
Annunciator Silence Pushbutton Compressor Shutdown RESET Pushbutton Audible Alarm Horn Elapsed time meter 3 position "Break-Before-Make" Control Switch
- 1) RUN-OFF-AUTO
(
lONNa.: REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 34A LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR ( PROCEDURE RENO.: NO.: 7of"23 1-1010030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE
- The automatic cross-tie feature of the Instrument Air System occurs at approximately 85 psig lowering on the affected unit. The cross-tie valve
" on Unit 2 will close if either of the following conditions occur:
- The Unit 2 Instrument Air header pressure lowers below 85 psig.
\
2. If The Unit 1 Instrument Air header pressure rises above 95 psig.
!f Instrument Air header pressure is lowering, Then VERIFY the standby
- 2. If
!f the standby instrument air compressor (1 CorC or 1D) has not instrument air compressor (1 Cor C or 1D) started, Then manually START the has started. standby instrument air compressor (1Cor1D).
(1C or 1D). NOTE The time period that the Service Air header feeds the Instrument Air header through the cross-tie should be minimized to prevent oil intrusion into the Instrument Air header.
- 3. If
!f the Instrument Air header pressure is 3.
still lowering, Then PERFORM the following: A. ENSURE the Service Air Compressor is running, or Service Air is being supplied by Construction Air. B. OPEN SH18718, Service Air Cross-tie to Instrument Air Isol.
- c. If
!f the Instrument Air header is fed c. If
!f oil, water, or crud build-up is from the Service Air header for detected, Then CONTACT greater than 1 hour, Then BLOW Engineering to evaluate DOWN the Instrument Air receiver continued use of the Service tank at V18126 hourly to check for Air System.
oil, water and crud build-up.
REVISION: PROCEDURE TITLE: PANEL: 1 ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE F PROCEDURE NO: WINDOW: 2-ARP-01-F30 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 30 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL F UNIT 1 & 2 INSTRAIR CROSSTIE OPEN F-30 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT: 33AC /1249 PCV-18-6 closed limit switch Alarm relay energized 33AC /1249 PCV-18-5 closed limit switch Alarm relay energized NOTE
- PCV-18-5, Instr Air Cross-Tie FromlTo Unit 1, receives an open signal when Unit 1 Instr Air Pressure drops to 85 psig. PCV-18-5 then thEm modulates close to maintain 85 psig in the Unit 2 Instr Air Headet.
Header. PCV-18-5 open signal is removed when Unit 1 Instr Air Pressure rises to 95 psig.
- PCV-18-6, Instr Air Cross-Tie FromlTo Unit 1, receives an open signal when Unit 2 Instr Air Pressure drops to 85 psig. PCV-18-6 then modulates close to maintain 85 psig in the Unit 1 Instr Air Header. PCV-18-6 open signal is removed when Unit 2 Instr Air Pressure rises to 95 psig. ~
;0 ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. PI-18-9, Instr Air Hdr Press (RTGB-202)
- 2. Local check of PCV-18-5 and/or PCV-18-6 valve position OPERATOR ACTIONS:
- 1. DISPATCH an operator to locally check operation of the Instrument Air Compressors.
- 2. !f a low air pressure condition exists, Then IMPLEMENT 2-1010030, Loss of Instrument Air.
CAUSES: The alarm condition may be caused by excessive use of instrument air, malfunction of Instrument Air Compressor(s) or malfunction of either PCV-18-5 or PCV-18-6.
REFERENCES:
- 1. CWD CWO 2998-B-327, sheet 1249
- 2. P&ID 2998-G-085, sheet 3
- 3. TEDB
- 7. Describe the licensed operator response to:
A. Instrument Air System Low Pressure Alarm. ( B. Instrument Air System Pressure less than 75 psig for prolonged period. C. Loss of Turbine Cooling Water with respect to Instrument Air System. D. Loss of Off-site Power with respect to Instrument Air System. E. Notification by a NLO that Service Air is cross-connected to Instrument Air.
- ST As are also responsible for these objectives.
( 0702413, Rev. 09, Page 37 of of38 38 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY (
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 1 KIA # 103K3.02 Importance Rating 3.8 Containment: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the containment system will have on the following: Loss of containment integrity under normal operations Proposed Question: RO 55 Which ONE of the following would result in a violation of Containment Integrity while the Unit is in Mode 1? A. The Containment Air Lock inner door is inoperable and the outer door is opened to investigate the inoperable inner door. B. A Containment Isolation valve stroke time is in the Alert range. C. A motor operated Containment Isolation valve will NOT fully close with the motor but is closed manually and is de-energized. D. Opening a locked manual Containment Isolation valve in the penetration ( room and stationing an operator in the Control Room to close this valve in the event of an accident. 109
Proposed Answer: 0 D Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: Opening of the outer door is permissible to repair the inner door B. Incorrect: Alert range does not make the valve inoperable, required action would make the valve inoperable C. Incorrect: manually closing the valve and de-energizing is acceptable to meet containment isolation. D. Correct: Operator must be on location at the valve with radio contact to meet isolation criteria. Technical Reference(s): Tech. Spec. bases 3/4.6 (Attach if not previously provided) Tech Spec. 3.6.1.3 Operations Policy OPS-503 Tech Spec Guidance ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: 0902723-02, 0902723-03 _0_9_0_2_7_23_-_0-,2,,---09_0_2_7_2_3-_0_3___ (As available)
----------~---------------
Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge -X--- Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Comments: 110
ST. LUCIE PLANT OPS-503 OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT POLICY Rev. 35 Date 05/04/09 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION GUIDANCE OPERA110NS DEPARTMENT Page 13 of 34 Operational Guidance for Section 3/4.6 3/4.6.2 Depressurization and Cooling Systems 3/4.6.2.1 Containment Spray System Operability The Containment Spray system must remain sufficiently full of water to perform its intended safety functions. The system may remain operable with some gas voids present. If gas is found in the system during venting or ultrasonic testing, initiate a CR for Engineering to evaluate whether the location and quantity of gas adversely affects system operability. Until a Gas Void Management Program (GVMP) is implemented, model Prompt Operability Determinations have been issued to provide interim guidance for voids found in suction and discharge piping. 3/4.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves NOTE
- The inoperable containment isolation valve may be used to provide containment isolation in order to comply with Tech Spec 3.6.3.1
(
- Containment penetration check valves should have Tech Spec 3.6.3.1 applied unless specifically exempted in the tables.
- 1. If the valve is required to be closed by the DBD and/or Tech Spec 3.6.3.1 and needs to be opened for any reason, then apply Tech Spec 3.6.1.1, Containment Vessel Integrity, and refer to ADM-25.04, Technical Specification Bases, for required contingency actions.
- If the option to station an operator at an open containment isolation is employed, then initiate a Data Sheet 30 to require and track communication checks every hour.
SECTION NO.: PAGE: TITLE: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.6 BASES ATTACHMENT 8 OF ADM-25.04 3 of 11~ REVISION NO.: CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 8 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 BASES FOR SECTION 3/4.6 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation, will ensure that the site boundary radiation doses are below the guidelines established for design basis accidents. In accordance with Generic Letter 91-08, "Removal of Component Component Lists from Technical Specifications," the opening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative consideration~~1.,stationing control includes the following considerations: (1) stationing an operator, who is ( in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls,trois, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, on, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment. 3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the accident analyses at the peak accident pressure, Pa (41.8 psig) which results from the limiting design basis loss of coolant accident. The surveillance testing for measuring leakage rates is performed in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program, and is consistent with the requirements of Appendix J of 10 CFR 50 Option Band Regulatory Guide 1.163 dated September, 1995, as modified by approved exemptions.
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:
- a. Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed, and
- b. An overall air lock leakage rate in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. ACTION:
- a. With one containment air lock door inoperable*:
- 1. Maintain at least the OPERABLE air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable air lock door to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or lock the OPERABLE air lock door closed.
- 2. Operation may then continue until performance of the next required overall air lock leakage test provided that the OPERABLE air lock door is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days.
- 3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- 4. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- b. With the containment air lock inoperable, except as the result of an inoperable air lock door, maintain at least one air lock door closed; restore the inoperable air lock to OPERABLE status within 24 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.
- If the inner air lock door is inoperable, passage through the OPERABLE outer air lock door is permitted to effect repairs to the inoperable inner air lock door. No more than one airlock door shall be open at any time.
ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 6-9 ~, 88 Amendment No. Je,
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 2 KIA # 001 K3.02 Importance Rating 3.4 Control Rod Drive: Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CRDS will have on the following: RCS Proposed Question: RO 56 During a Unit 1 Reactor startup, power has been stable for one hour at 15%.
- CEAs are at 110" on group 7.
- The turbine is on line.
- The CEDS control is placed in Manual Individual mode to withdraw one CEA that is 4" below the group.
- When the RCO initially withdraws the rod the control switch sticks in the WITHDRAW position.
As a result which ONE of the following will occur? (Assume NO Operator action) T-ref will increase as power rises; the CEA withdrawal will stop A. T-ave and T-refwill (, when steam bypass demand begins. B. T -ave and T -ref will increase as power rises; the CEA withdrawal will stop when any of the cold leg temperatures exceed 549°F. C. T-ave will increase as power rises; T-ref will remain approximately the same; the CEA withdrawal will stop when T-ave is 6.6°F greater than T-ref. D. TT-ave
-ave will increase as power rises; T T-ref
-ref will remain approximately the same; the CEA withdrawal will stop when a group deviation occurs.
111
Proposed Answer: 0D Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect. The Turbine is normally operated in the IMP OUT mode. Plausible if candidate thinks that an Automatic Withdrawal Prohibit has occurred. B. Incorrect. The Turbine is normally operated in the IMP OUT mode. Plausible if candidate thinks that an Automatic Withdrawal Prohibit has occurred, however, this occurs at 552°F. C. Incorrect. Plausible if candidate thinks that an Automatic Withdrawal Prohibit has occurred. O. D. Correct. The turbine is operated in the IMP OUT mode, therefore, changes in Tave will make minor changes in steam pressure which has a minor effect on Tref (Turbine impulse pressure). CEA Motion Inhibit Circuitry stops the withdrawal on group deviation Technical Reference(s): 1-0NP-0110030, CEA Off- (Attach if not previously provided) Normal Operation and Realignment, 1-ARP-01-K9, K14, K24 0711405, CEOS CEDS SO SD Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: 0702405-09 _0-=-7'---0'---2----'4-'-0---'--5--"0-=-9________ (As available) Question Source: Bank # 2222 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Comments: 112
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 57 CEA OFF-NORMAL OPERATION AND 4 of 33 4of33 PROCEDURE NO.: REALIGNMENT 1-0110030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 3.10 JPN-PSL-SEIS-96-00S, Temporary Use of Gripper Engagement Module in Control Element Drive Module 3.11 St. Lucie Unit 1 Plant Physics Curve Book 3.12 §3 License Event Report 97-009-0, Recovery of Dropped CEA in Excess of Technical Specification Action Statement Time Requirements 3.13 111
~1 PCM 9701S, CEDMCS Upgrade (CPP-ACTM) and PCM 97067, CEDM CPP Hold Bus Addition 3.14 ,-r2 112 NRC Inspection Report 50-335/97-13 4.0 RECORDS REQUiRED REQUIRED 4.1 Normal log entries.
5.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS ( Conditions indicate that one or more CEAS are misaligned or dropped. Anyone or more of the following conditions may exist: s\.~*;:;'5.'
'5.1 CEA position deviation motion block (CEAPDS) alarm (K-24).
5.2 CEA position deviation warning (DCS) alarm (K-1S). 5.3 CEA position deviation limit (DCS) alarm (K-30) (K-30)..
*T 5.4 CEA motion inhibit alarm (K-9).
5.5 Dropped CEA (CEDS) alarm (K-27). 5.6 Automatic CEA withdrawal prohibit alarm (K-14). 5.7 CEA PDILPOlL (K-17) and PPDIL (DCS) (K-16) alarms. 5.8 CEA PDILPOlL (K-23) and PPDIL (K-22) (CRT) alarms. 5.9 Group out-of-sequence (CEAPDS) alarm (K-21). 5.10 Group out-of-sequence (DCS) alarm (K15). 5.11 Reg. CEA short term steady state insertion alarm (L-4). 5.12 CEDS Trouble / Continuous Gripper Voltage High (K-26).
REVISION: PROCEDURE TITLE: PANEL: 1A ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE K PROCEDURE NO: WINDOW: 1-ARP-01-K9 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 9 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 . 10 11 12 CEA 13 14 15 16 17 18 MOTION 19 20 21 22 23 24 INHIBIT 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 K-9 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT: CEDS CEDS Logic Cabinet Multiple inputs IRG CEDS Logic Cabinet Reg Group ~ 10 in. (low limit) Group:::. ISH CEDS Logic Cabinet CEA S 129 In. Shutdown CEA:,: Group Out of Sequence (Withdraw) CEAPDS Computer Reg Group <87.2 in. with next higher Cabinet Reg Group >10 in. Group Out of Sequence (Insert) CEAPDS Computer Reg Group <123.5 in. with next higher Cabinet Reg Group >38.3 in. _ _!Ill", Group Deviation CEDS Logic Cabinet >6 in. differential (high to low) POlL Violation (CEAPDS) PDIL CEDS Logic Cabinet Variable as a function of Q-Power ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. Annunciator K-21, GROUP OUT OF SEQUENCE (CEAPDS), is ALARMED.
( 2. Annunciator K-23, CEA PDIL POlL (CEAPDS), is ALARMED.
- 3. Annunciator K-24, CEA POSITION DEVIATION MOTION BLOCK 8LOCK (CEAPDS), is ALARMED.
- 4. CEA position on CEA Display.
- 5. CEA position on DCS.
OPERATOR ACTIONS:
- 1. DETERMINE the cause of the alarm.
- 2. !!
!f any CEA is misaligned or dropped, Then GO TO ONOP 1-0110030, CEA Off-Normal Operation and Realignment.
CAUSES: This annunciator may be caused by the following:
- Inhibit from Regulating Group (lRG)
(IRG) results when any Shutdown Group CEA is NOT withdrawn to at least 129 inches. This is a Regulating Group Withdraw permissive.
- Inhibit from Shutdown Group (ISH) results when all Regulating Group are NOT inserted to at least 10 inches.
- Group Out of Sequence results when Regulating Groups do NOT conform to the programmed sequence.
- Group Deviation results from the highest and lowest CEA in any group exceeding 6 inches differential.
(POlL) Violation
- Power Dependent Insertion Limit (PDIL)
REFERENCES:
- 1. CWO 8770-8-327 8770-B-327 sheets 399 and 406
REVISION: PROCEDURE TITLE: PANEL: OA ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE K K PROCEDURE NO: WINDOW: 1-ARP-01-K14 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 14 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL K AUTO WITHDRAWAL PROHIBIT K-14 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT: CEDS CEDS Logic Cabinet Multiple inputs TIC-1111Y RTGB-103 T-COLD = =552°F (high) TIC-1121Y RTGB-103 T-COLD = 552°F (high) Steam Bypass Demand SBCS in Cabinet RRS-2 Actuated T-AVGrr-REF Deviation RPUC in RRS Cabinets 1 & 2 6.6°F (T-AVG > T-REF) Dropped CEA (reed switches) CEDS Cabinet Rod bottom reed switch actuated ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. T-COLD indicates greater than 552T
- 2. Annunciator K-25, 1A2/1 B2 COLD LEG TEMP HIGH, is ALARMED.
- 3. Annunciator K-6, STEAM BYPASS DEMAND, is ALARMED.
- 4. T-AVGrr-REF T-AVG/T-REF Deviation exceeds 6.6T
- 5. Annunciator K-13, REACTOR T-AVGrr-REF TEMP HIGH, is ALARMED.
- 6. Any CEA Rod Bottom light LIT.
( 7. Annunciator K-27, DROPPED CEA (CEDS), is ALARMED. OPERATOR ACTIONS: II NOTE I The automatic CEA withdrawal feature has been defeated. The annunciator remains functional. I
- 1. !f If Reactor TRIPS, Then GO TO 1-EOP-01, Standard Post Trip Actions.
- 2. If T-COLD indicates greater than 552°F, Then SELECT the alternate temperature elements on RTGB-1 03.
- 3. If the selected RRS Cabinet indicates abnormal values, Then PLACE the RRS Selector switch to the non-affected RRS Cabinet on RTGB-104, monitoring T-AVGrr-REF, Pzr level and Letdown flow.
- 4. !f If any CEA is misaligned or dropped, Then GO TO ONOP 1-0110030, CEA Off-Normal Operation and Realignment.
- 5. !f If a dropped CEA did NOT initiate the annunciator, Then GO TO 1-GOP-101, Reactor Operating Guidelines During Steady State and Scheduled Load Changes, to restore the abnormal parameter.
CAUSES: This annunciator has multiple inputs and may be caused by the following:
- Steam Bypass Demand: This is indicative of Reactor power being higher than Turbine power. This signal is intended to prevent any increase in reactor power.
- T-COLD indicates greater than 552°F may be caused by faulty input or actual plant conditions.
- T-AVGrr-REF Deviation exceeds 6.6°F may be caused by faulty input, faulty T-AVG or T-AVG/T-REF T-REF calculators in RRS, or actual plant conditions.
- A dropped CEA indicated by CEA Rod Bottom light.
REFERENCES:
- 1. CWO 8770-B-327 sheets 399 and 406
- 2. TEDB
( \
REVISION: PROCEDURE TITLE: PANEL: c 2 PROCEDURE NO: 1-ARP-01-K24 ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 K WINDOW: 24 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 CEA POSITION 13 14 15 16 17 18 DEVIATION 19 20 21 22 23 25 26 27 28 29 30 m MOTION BLOCK (CEAPDS) 31 32 33 34 35 36 K-24 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT: CEAPDS CEDS Logic Cabinet ~5.5
?:5.5 in. (highest to lowest CEA position within a Group)
ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. Annunciator K-9, CEA MOTION INHIBIT, is ALARMED.
- 2. DCS CEA position information.
- 3. CEA position on CEAPDS.
- 4. Backup Display System indication.
OPERATOR ACTIONS:
- 1. If CEA misalignment >7.5" or dropped, GO TO ONOP 1-0110030, CEA Off-Normal Operation and Realignment.
( 2. If CEA misalignment ::;7.5",
- 7.5", realign CEAs in Manual Individual Mode of operation while bypassing CM!.
CMI. CAUSES: This annunciator is the result of the deviation between the highest and lowest CEA in any Group reaching 5.5 inches. A CEA Motion Inhibit results.
REFERENCES:
- 1. CWO 8770-B-327 sheets 399 and 430 CWD
0711405, Rev. 16 Page 28 of 100 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
'%i CEA Motion Inhibit Circuitry A Motion Inhibit signal shall be generated based on the information from the following Alarms:
- CEA Deviation (Shutdown and Regulating Groups)
- CEA Regulating Group Out-Of-Sequence
- CEA Regulating Group Overlap
- CEA Regulating Group Insertion to the Power Dependent Insertion Limit
- CEA Regulating CEA greater than IRG
- CEA Shutdown CEA is less than ISH When the Reactor Power is less than 10-4% rated power, the POlL motion inhibit signal is bypassed via a low power cutout signal (external digital input).
Other Control Interlocks ( Several other control interlocks are provided and are detailed in the following list.
- UPPER GROUP STOP - Stops group CEA withdrawal at 133" withdrawal. This interlock is generated by DCS based on the pUlse-count position indication.
- LOWER GROUP STOP - Stops group CEA insertion at 4.5" from bottom of insertion. This interlock is also generated by DCS based on the pulse-count pUlse-count position indication.
- UPPER CEA LIMIT - RSPT interlock that stops the withdrawal of each individual CEA at 136" of withdrawal.
- LOWER CEA LIMIT - RSPT interlock that stops the insertion of each individual CEA at approximately 1" from the bottom.
SEQUENCE PERMISSIVE (DCS) - A group out of sequence condition prohibiting ( regulating group motion in the manual sequential (MS) and automatic sequential (AS) modes. This permissive is lost if there is greater than a 54" overlap between groups.
0711405, Rev. 16 Page 27 of 100 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY ( Equipment Protective Interlocks Two equipment protective interlocks are provided and are detailed in the following list: AUTOMATIC WITHDRAWAL PROHIBIT (AWP) - Prevents regulating groups from sequ~(lttpl (AS) mode if any of the following conditions g}tt!~~~~!jg;t§~;q\Ji~OtlijJ{4\§},mode being withdrawn in the a,utqmati<:; exist: '*ii" *.... .....*... . / ...* ,',A',';;i£;' "'\",J;;;;i'~N~;.li~ exist:
- Any CEA is dropped as sensed by the reed switches at the zero inch position.
Energizes DROPPED CEA (CEDS) annunciator annunciator..
* , T AVG- T REF deviation as sensed by the reactor regulating system exceeds 6.6°F.
- Cold leg temperature (Tc) is greater than 552°F.
- A demand signal is generated by the Steam Bypass Control System.
( An AWP condition will also energize the AUTO WITHDRAWAL PROHIBIT annunciator, K-14 [18]. NOTE: Although the auto withdrawal in the AS mode has been defeated in both Units, the annunciator still exists. CEA WITHDRAWAL PROHIBIT (CWP) - Prevents the withdrawal of the CEAs in any mode. On Unit 1 this interlock cannot be bypassed. This interlock is generated by the following RPS pre-trips on 2/4 logic:
- TM/LP (Thermal margin/low pressure)
- LPD (Local power density)
- High SUR
- Variable High Power A CWP condition will also energize the CEA Withdrawal Prohibit annunciator.
0711405, Rev. 16 Page 15 of 100 c FOR TRAINING USE ONLY lamps will be illuminated. CEA Control Motion Interlocks The following restrictions to CEA movement are present in any mode of CEA operation:
- No CEA can be withdrawn beyond its upper limit nor inserted beyond its lower limit as detected by the upper and lower CEA limit reed switches and indicated by the corresponding indicator on the CEA core mimic display.
- No CEA can be withdrawn if a CEA withdrawal prohibit (CWP) Signal signal is received from the RPS. This CWP signal also produces a CWP annunciator.
,}. No shutdown group CEA can be withdrawn or inserted in the presence of any of the following inhibiting functions unless the inhibiting functions are overridden by the inhibit bypass controls.
( (POlL) annunciator Power dependent insertion limit (PDIL) Group out of sequence annunciator
,,) - Group deviation annunciator
- All regulating groups are not below 10"
,;t.: No regulating group CEA can be withdrawn or inserted in the presence of any of the following inhibit functions unless the inhibiting functions are overridden by the inhibit bypass controls.
Power dependent insertion limit (PDIL) (POlL) annunciator Group out of sequence annunciator Group deviation annunciator
- All shutdown CEAs are not above 129" CEDS Logic Cabinet The CEDS CEOS logic cabinet consists of four bays in a single cabinet located in the electrical equipment room as shown on Figure 2. It contains power supply drawers, group
\ programmers, individual CEA control modules, and interface relays for the CEDS. CEOS. It receives the various inputs, control signals, and interlock signals from the reactor regulating system, reactor protection system, turbine control system, and DCS. OCS. It provides output to the CPPs and control panel annunciation. The CEDS CEOS LOGIC
0711405, Rev. 16 Page 39 of 100 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Analog Display System (ADS) The ADS is located on RTGB-204 and provides visual, color-coded CEA position indication. Refer to Figures 35 and 36 and Table 1. The color codes include a light blue flashing square in the upper right-hand corner of the screen which indicates the CEA Processor is operating properly in the RUN position. If this light blue indicator is not present, or is displayed continuously, the CEA Processor has gone to an abnormal Halt mode. Various alarms are also color coded on the ADS:
- Yellow color-coded alarms indicate abnormal conditions.
- Purple color-coded alarms indicate a serious failure and generate a CEA Motion Inhibit signal to the CEDMCS.
- Failed sensors are displayed on the ADS monitor as shown on Figure 37.
(
- A faulty CEA displayed in red indicates the respective RSPT power supply's calibration should be checked.
- If the faulty CEA is displayed in green, the sensor and associated wiring should be checked for a short circuit.
The ADS also provides the following alarms:
- CEA GROUP SEQUENCE ABNORMAL indicates that at least one group is out of overlap alignment (87.2" overlap). This condition also causes a CEA motion inhibit.
- CEA PRE-POWER DEPENDENT INSERTION indicates that at least one CEA is about to exceed acceptable insertion limits for the existing power level.
- CEA POWER DEPENDENT INSERTION indicates that one or more CEAs have exceeded the POlL. This condition also causes a CEA motion inhibit. The motion inhibit can be bypassed by depressing the MOTION INHIBIT BYPASS pushbutton.
~ CEA POSITION DEVIATION MOTION BLOCK
0711405, Rev. 16 Page 40 of 100 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY indicates a deviation greater than approximately 6" between CEAs within a group. This condition also causes a CEA motion inhibit. This interlock can also be bypassed by depressing the MOTION INHIBIT BYPASS pushbutton.
- CEA MOTION INHIBIT
- energizes whenever the CEA GROUP SEQUENCE ABNORMAL, CEA POWER DEPENDENT INSERTION, or CEA POSITION DEVIATION alarms are energized.
A second digital display of CEA position is provided on the CEA backup display panel on RTGB-204. The digital LED readout on the CEA Backup Display provides an independent readout of an individually selected CEAs position. The individual CEA is selected by means of two switches located just below the display panel. The CEA Backup Display is used to provide CEA position data should the ADS video monitor fail. Figure 38 shows a simplified block diagram of the ADS. ( Core Mimic Display The core mimic display on RTGB-204 provides only rod bottom indication by means of a single colored light for each CEA. Upper and lower electrical limits are displayed on the CEDMCS panel on RTGB-204. Refer to Figure 40. CEA Motion Interlocks The CEA Motion interlocks described in the Unit 1 section of this text are essentially identical to Unit 2 interlocks with the exception of the following differences: Inhibit on Reg Groups (CMIRP) A Motion Inhibit on the Reg Groups (CMIRP) is generated when any Shutdown CEA is inserted below 129". This inhibit is basically the same as the "ISH" inhibit on Unit 1. Inhibit on Shutdown Groups (CMISH) \. A Motion inhibit on the Shutdown Groups (CMISH) is generated when all Reg groups are not below 10". This inhibit is basically the same as the "IRG" inhibit on Unit 1.
Single Question Report ( QID#: QIO#: 2222 Objective: 0702405-09 System: CEDS Rev: 0 Cog Level: 1 KA # ROO.5 SROO.5
~- ----- -~-----~- -~---------~----~-----------~~--~------------~-----~ --~. --~-~~ ~---------~-----~~ ~
During a Unit 1 Reactor Startup, power has been stable for one hour at 15%.
- CEAs are at 110" on group 7.
- The Turbine is on line.
- T-ave and T-ref are matched.
- The CEDS control is placed in Manual Individual mode to withdraw one CEA that is 4" below the group.
If the RCO continues to withdraw the CEA, which ONE ofthe of the following will occur? A. T-ave T -ave and T-ref T -ref will increase as power rises; the CEA withdrawal will stop when a group deviation occurs. B. T-ave and T-ref will increase as power rises; the CEA withdrawal will stop when Tave is 6.6°F greater than T-ref. C. T-ave T -ave will increase as power rises; T-ref T -ref will remain approximately the same; the CEA withdrawal will stop when a group deviation occurs. D. T-ave will increase as power rises; T-ref will remain approximately the same; the CEA withdrawal will stop when Tave is 6.6°F greater than T-ref. Reasons the choices are right or wrong. Correct answer is C. A. B. C. D. Source Ref: Open Ref: Revision Notes: Question Use History HLC 17 IPT 4 Exam, 0720243, 1113/2006 1Il3/2006 HLC-16 PreNRC Quiz 3,0717036,8/5/2004 3, 0717036, 8/5/2004 HLC-16 PreNRC Quiz 2, 0717034, 7/26/2004 HLC-16/SRO-12 IPT Comperhensive Exam, 0720230, 3/17/2004 3117/2004 Page 1I of 1I
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 2 KIA # 002K4.10 Importance Rating 4.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Knowledge of RCS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Overpressure protection Proposed Question: RO 57 Unit 1 is cooling down for a refueling outage with the following conditions:
- RCS temperature is 300°F.
- RCS pressure is 430 psia.
- BOTH PORV's are selected to Low Range.
A transient occurs and RCS pressure rises to 515 psia with the following in alarm: PZR RELIEF VALVE ANTICIPATORY ALARM H-21 { Which ONE of the following states the status of the PORV's? The PORV's are: A. NOT open but will open if RCS pressure rises to 2: 530 psia. B. NOT open but will open if RCS temperature lowers to::; to:5 240°F. C. OPEN and will NOT automatically close until RCS pressure lowers to::; to :5 510 psia. D. OPEN and will NOT automatically close until RCS temperature rises to 2: 30rF. 113
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): A. Correct: Alarm H-21 setpoint reached but LTOP setpoint is NOT reached. L TOP setpoint is RCS temperature >215°F but < 308°F with RCS pressure 530 psia, B. Incorrect: 240°F is Unit 2 L TOP number. Unit 1 RCS temperature L TOP ~$ 218°F for pressure 350 psia C. Incorrect: PORV's are NOT open D. Incorrect: PORV's are NOT open Technical Reference(s): 1-ARP-01-H21 (Attach if not previously provided) 1-GOP-305 Reactor Plant Cooldown - Hot Standby To Cold Shutdown Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: _P_S_L_-_O_P_S_-0_7_0_2_2_06_-_04 PSL-OPS-0702206-04 _ _ _ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 -- 55.43 Comments: ( 114
REVISION: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAN~L o ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE H PROCEDURE NO: WINDOw: 1-ARP-01-H21 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 21 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL H PZR RELIEF VALVE ANTICIPATORY ALARM H-21 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT: Devices for V-1402: HS-1402/117 RAB/RTGB-103 Low Range TA-1115/100 RAB/RTGB-103 a. 218°F b. 307°F PA-1103-1/100 RAB/RTGB-103 psi a b. 510 psia
- a. 330 psia 74-2/100 RAB/RTGB-103 PORV actuation relay de-energized Devices for V -1404:
HS-1404/117 RAB/RTGB-103 Low Range TA-1125/100 RAB/RTGB-103 RAB/RTG8-103 a.218°F b.307°F PA-11 04-1/1 00 PA-1104-1/100 RAB/RTGB-103 a. 330 psia b. 510 psia 74-4/100 RAB/RTG8-103 RAB/RTGB-103 PORV actuation relay de-energized ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. TR-1115/1125, 1A/1 1Ali B LTOP Cold Leg Temp
( 2. PI-1103, Pressurizer Press Low Range
- 3. PI-1104, Pzr Pressure Low Range OPERATOR ACTIONS:
CAUTION
/;~1K~~;1\\\@~I!>ZY5~~***pt~L6!.dijtlsetp>tJintw PORV LOW RANGE lift setpoints: *. ,. ",.
* 'S~~~I!l~j:~tf~nel!l;'i!a\~§:':~©WJ';),eJi'Ri02e.lsd,~§~"ttl~'~£l£~'l;fZ!,'g]);d,$gi"ea1,~,~~:1f).~SM;5£;FJ.i' 530 psia when RCS temperature is less than 308°F and greater than 215°F
- 350 sia when RCS tem erature is less than or e equal ual to 215°F
- 1. REDUCE RCS pressure p>ressure to a value less than the alarm setpoint setp>oint for the current RCS temperature:
A. If RCS temperature is 30rF 307"F to 216°F, Then LOWER RCS pressure p>ressure below 510 psia. B. If RCS temperature temp>erature is 215°F or lower, Then LOWER RCS pressure p>ressure below 330 psia. p>sia.
- 2. If alarm is NOT valid, Then PERFORM the following:
A. DETERMINE cause of erroneous alarm. B. MONITOR the p>arameter parameter with the failed instrument as directed by the SM 1 I US. CAUSES: Alarm actuates when ALL of the following conditions exist:
- 1. HS-1402 or HS-1404 is in LOW RANGE
- 2. At least ONE of following RCS conditions exist:
.B9Spre~surerises
- RCS pressure rises to to 330psia temperature is ~ 218°F 330 psia when RCS temp>erature
- i"R'{~'&;;~~eS5:!tJ;~~OO~~§~'~Q;;~'i3,~:,'m9;ll':~~~Ill'\~~~j;~f;T)~~~'ltlJ~~.~i~,~.~~J;8!tiF~'Eif:t"d"i§*36)y,:~f;i!(
RCS pressure rises to 510 psia when RCS temperature is > 218°F and ~ 307°F
- 3. PORV actuation relays 74-2 and 74-4 are de-energized de'..energized Els'follows:
as follows: '
- RCS pressure is less than 343.5 p>sia temp>erature is ~ 218°F psi a when RCS temperature
- p>ressure is less than 523.5 psia RCS pressure temp>erature is > 218°F and ~ 307°F p>sia when RCS temperature 307"F
REFERENCES:
- 1. CWO 8770-B-327 sheets 100 and 117
- 2. TEDB
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 20B REACTOR PLANT COOLDOWN - HOT STANDBY 26 of 90 PROCEDURE NO.: TO COLD SHUTDOWN 1-GOP-305 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 INITIAL CAUTION It ~4 The amount of time the SDC System is operated with RCS temperature above 300°F should be minimized. Prolonged operation at elevated temperatures may result in undesirable rates of LPSI Pump seal degradation.
*41 LTOP is required to be placed in service with a setpoint of 530 psia prior to lowering RCS temperature to less than or equal to 281°F. Ref: Tech Spec 3.4.13.
NOTE If common train ECCS work is required, the following step may be bypassed until the completion of the work. The cooldown may continue using the ADVs or SBCS. 6.30 Place the SDC System in service in accordance with 1-NOP-03.05, Shutdown Cooling. 6.31 Direct ENG / CSI to perform Attachment 4 Inspection of Unisolable RCS Valves of 1-0SP-01.06, Reactor Coolant System Leak Test, as soon as practical. us
!f continued RCP operation is desired, Then MAINTAIN RCS pressure 6.32 If between 265 psia and the minimum RCS pressure for RCP operation as determined from 1-NOP-01.02, Attachment 1.
CAUTION Motor Stator Temperatures of the operating RCPs should be closely monitored as RCS temperature decreases. Stator temperature shall be maintained below 311°F. 6.33 Continue to operate the RCPs to cool down the Steam Generators. 4 When RCS temperature is less than 304°F, but greater than 281°F, Then 6.34 place LTOP in service as follows:
- 1. Verify Annunciator H-15, PORV Low Range Condition Select Low, is in alarm.
- 2. Verify Annunciator H-21, Przr Relief Valve Anticipatory Alarm, is NOT in alarm.
NO.: REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 20B REACTOR PLANT COOLDOWN - HOT STANDBY 27 of 90 PROCEDURE NO.: PROCEDURE NO.: TO COLD SHUTDOWN 1-GOP-305 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 6.34 (continued) INITIAL
- 3. Perform the following for V1402, PORV:
A. CLOSE V1403, PORV Block Vlv. B. PLACE the selector switch for PORV V1402 in the LOW RANGE position.
- c. Verify PORV V1402 did NOT open.
D. OPEN V1403, PORV Block Vlv.
- 4. Perform the following for V1404, PORV:
A. CLOSE V1405, PORV Block Vlv. B. PLACE the selector switch for PORV V1404 in the LOW RANGE position. C. Verify PORV V1404 did NOT open. ( D. OPEN V1405, PORV Block Vlv.
- 5. If this is a cooldown for refueling, then perform testing of PORVs V1402 and V1403 in accordance with Data Sheet 24, Valve Testing ;a tv Procedures, of OP-1-0010125A, Surveillance Data Sheets. o 6.35 §1 Prior to decreasing RCS temperature below 270°F, remove one HPSI Pump from service for compliance with Technical Specification 3.5.3.b as follows:
- 1. !fIf the 1A HPSI Pump is to be removed from service, Then perform the following:
A. LOCK CLOSED V3656, HPSI Pump 1A Discharge.
-/-
IV B. Perform Section 3A: 1A HPSI Pump of Appendix D, 0, Cooldown Configuration Control. OR
( Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 2 K/A# KIA # 016K1.06 Importance Rating 3.6 Non-nuclear Instrumentation: Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the NNIS and the following systems: AFW system Proposed Question: RO 58 The following indications are observed on Unit 1: Process S/G 1A1A Channel A S/G 1A Channel B S/G 1 B Channel A S/G 1 B Channel B S/G Level 65% 65% 65% failed LOW S/G Press failed LOW 880 psia 880psia 880psia FW Hdr. Press 1050 psia 1048 psia failed LOW 1045 psi a If the above failed channels are NOT bypassed which ONE of the following failures would result in an AFAS lockout? A. S/G 1B Channel A S/G Level failed LOW B. S/G 1A Channel B FW Hdr Pressure failed LOW C. S/G 1B Channel A S/G pressure failed LOW D. S/G 1B Channel B FW Hdr Pressure failed LOW 115
Proposed Answer: D 0 Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: 2 of 4 S/G level channel failures on the 1B S/G will give AFAS actuation NOT AF AS lockout. AFAS B. Incorrect: 1 channel on 1A S/G and 1 channel on 1B S/G is NOT 2 of 4 on the same S/G. AFAS lockout requires 2 of 4 FW Hdr. Pressure low (150 psia i1P L'.P between S/G's) on same S/G. psi a i1P C. Incorrect: S/G pressure requires 275 psia L'.P between channels of same S/G, not one channel of 1 1AA S/G and one channel of 1B S/G. Technical Reference(s): PSL OPS SYS 412 TXT (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: PSL OPS SYS 412 LPC Obj. 3 (As available) ( Question Source: Bank # Bank# 7 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 2 to 9 55.43 Comments: ( 116
PSL OPS SYS 412 TXT R22 For Training Use Only This independence and redundancy ensures the functional capability of the AFW system under all assumed conditions. Each channel is separated into a front and rear section by a vertical fireproof barrier. The forward section contains the channel control panel, input and power terminal blocks, power supplies, channel monitor/logic circuitry and test relays, and inter-channel fuse blocks. The rear section contains the channel actuation, annunciator and test relays, output fuse enclosure, and output terminal blocks. The logic and power supply circuitry of each channel is cooled by an independent forced air system. SIGNAL FLOW Refer to Figure 18. The signal flowpath for AFAS-1 or AFAS-2 actuation is very similar to that of the Reactor Protection System (RPS). There are six basic steps to an AFAS-1 (2) actuation:
- 1. Inputs (5 per AFAS channel)
- 2. Bistable Units (3 per AFAS channel)
(
- 3. Coincidence Logic Matrices (6 per AFAS)
- 4. Initiation Circuits (4 per AFAS)
- 5. Actuation Circuits (4 per AFAS)
- 6. Component operation The following process measurements are used as inputs for AFAS generation.
Process S/G 1 -S/G- 2 S/G Level LT-9013 A, B, C, 0 LT-9013 LT-9023 A, B, C, D 0 S/G Pressure PT-8013 A, B, C, 0 PT-8023 A, B, C, D 0 FW Header Pressure PT-09-9 A, B, C, 0 PT-09-10 A, B, C, D 0 Refer to Figure 19. The S/G Level input is part of the same instrument loop used by the RPS to generate a LO S/G Level reactor trip. The S/G Pressure input is part of the same instrument loop used by the RPS for generation of the TM/LP (Asymmetric S/G Transient) and Lo S/G Pressure reactor trips and ESFAS for generation of the Main Steam Isolation Page 40 of99
PSL OPS SYS 412 TXT R22 For Training Use Only Signal (MSIS). Later on, this relationship will be discussed in the section dealing with AFAS ( related Technical Specifications. S/G Level and Differential Pressure Bistable Units The Bistable Units compare the inputs to a predetermined setpoint to cause or prevent generation of the AFAS-1/AFAS-2 AFAS-1 /AFAS-2 signals. Each bistable unit is comprised of two parts - a bistable comparator card and a bistable relay card. The bistable comparator performs the input-setpoint comparison. The bistable relay card contains the relays to "relay" signals to (Le., indicators, Rupture ID ckt., etc.). The relays are energized the associated circuits (i.e., during normal conditions and de-energize as conditions dictate. Each AFAS Channel contains six Bistable Units grouped into two groups to generate the AFAS-1 and AFAS-2 demand signals. The grouping is: AFAS-1 AFAS-2 ( LO LVL s/Gs/G --A A LO LVL LVLs/G-B s/G -B PS/G-PS/G-AA < PPS/G-B S/G-B PS/G-B PS/G-B < PS/G-PS/G-AA PFWH - 1 < PFWH FWH-1 FWH-2 -2 PFWH - 2 < PFWH FWH-2 FWH-1 -1 The two Level Bistable Units (Figure 20) are of the single input, fixed setpoint type. Their Trip setpoint is 19% NR on decreasing level and resets at approximately 10% above the trip setpoint. At the Lo Level Trip setpoint, the bistable trips causing the Lo S/G-1 (2) 'T' indicator and a pair of contacts in the Rupture Identification Logic to actuate. One contact opens to de-energize the AFAS Bistable Relay and the second contact closes to enable the Rupture ID Logic. Unless blocked by the Rupture Identification Logic, a channel AFAS-1 (2) signal is generated. When the Pre-Trip and Trip setpoints are reached an indicator light under the channel label plate of the front panel will light (Figure 28). This is a split window indicator labeled 'PT' and 'T'. The indicators are latch on and can be reset by depressing the pushbutton labeled "RESET" when level has recovered above the setpoint. The Pressure Bistable Units (Figure 21) are of the dual input, fixed differential setpoint type (" and work similar to the Level Bistable Units including Pre-Trip and Trip indicating lights on Page 41 of99
PSL OPS SYS 412 TXT R22 For Training Use Only the channel front panel. The two S/G Pressure Bistable Units have a Trip setpoint of 275 psid while the two Feedwater Header Pressure Bistable Units have a Trip setpoint of 150 psid. When the 'A' input decreases to the setpoint dip below the 'B' input, the bistable trips. This causes the bistable relays to de-energize, closing a contact in the Rupture 10 circuit and lighting the appropriate 'T' light on the AFAS Cabinet. Rupture Identification and AFAS-1 (2) Bistable Relays Refer to Figures 22 and 23. Each channel contains a "Rupture 10" circuit for the purpose of preventing its AFAS-1 or AFAS-2 signal from initiating AFW flow to a faulted S/G. The relay contacts from S/G Level, S/G D/P, and FWH D/P are arranged into a logic circuit that controls the state of the AFAS-1 (2) BISTABLE RELAYS for that particular channel. These relays are energized for the normal (untripped) condition. The logic identifies a steam generator as faulted/ruptured if:
- 1. The S/G level is below the AFAS setpoint, and
- 2. The OTHER S/G has not been identified as ruptured, and
- 3. The S/G Pressure is 275 psi less than the other S/G, or the associated FW Header Pressure is 150 psi less than the other FW Header.
S/G is identified as faulted/ruptured, the Rupture Relay will energize to maintain the three AFAS-1 (2) Bistable Relays in the untripped (energized) state and thereby "block" the corresponding AFAS signal in that channel. The Rupture Relay will also disable the Fault 10 feature of the other AFAS signal to ensure that subsequent instrument failure does not AFAS prevent an AF AS to the intact S/G. When a low S/G level causes the AFAS-1 (2) Bistable Relays to trip (de-energize), contacts actuate in one leg of the three corresponding 2/4 Coincidence Logic Matrix Circuits, i.e., the AFAS-1 Bistable Relays in Channel A operate contacts in the AFAS-1 AB, AC, and AD Coincidence Logic Matrices. The normally off Bistable Relay Status lights for that channel (Figure 28) will energize. I i Page 42 of99
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # Tier# 2 Group # 2 KIA # 017K6.01 Importance Rating 2.7 In-core temperature monitor: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following ITM system components: Sensors and detectors Proposed Question: RO 59 The following indications are observed on Unit 1 QSPDS Channel A and Channel B: Channel A Channel B ChannelB CET ???? ?598°F Which ONE of the following states the operability of the above indicated CET's and the potential use of the CET's for further QSPDS calculations? A. Channel A is considered OUT OF RANGE Channels B is considered SUSPECT. Channel A AND Channel B are NOT used for further calculations. B. Channel A is considered OUT OF RANGE Channel B is considered ( SUSPECT. Channel A is NOT USED for further calculations Channel B IS used for further calculations. C. BOTH Channels ARE considered OUT OF RANGE. BOTH channels are NOT used for further calculations. D. BOTH Channels ARE considered OUT OF RANGE. Channel A IS NOT used for further calculations, Channel B IS used for further calculations. 117
Proposed Answer: A A (( Explanation (Optional): A. Correct B. Incorrect: Neither Channel is used for calculations C. Incorrect: Channel B is considered Suspect D. Incorrect Channels is considered Suspect and NOT used for calculations. Technical Reference(s): 0711407 QSPDS (Attach if not previously provided) 1-1150020 Qualified Safety Parameter Display System Operation Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0_7_0_2_4_07_-_0_9 0702407-09 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Bank# 2007 ( Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Comments: 118
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 15F QUALIFIED SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY 6of24 PROCEDURE NO.: SYSTEM OPERATION 1-1150020 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 8.2 (continued)
- 2. c. ( continued)
NOTE
~2 The representative core exit temperature is calculated based on a statistical analysis with practice checks from the input. The out-of-range CET temperature inputs are discarded, the mean CET temperature is calculated from the remaining inputs, the CET temperature inputs are checked within a statistical band around the mean CET temperature. Those inputs falling outside the bands are flagged as suspicious inputs and discarded from the calculation. The mean CET temperature is then recalculated using the remaining inputs.
The process continues until there are no more flagged or discarded inputs. At this point, the CET inputs are considered stable and valid, and the representative CET temperature is calculated. The mean CET temperature is constrained to be plus or minus 30 degrees F of the maximum Hot Leg temperature. Those CET(s) with outputs that are more than plus or minus. 30 degrees F from the mean CET temperature are flagged "suspicious" (with 7) and not used until their values return to less than plus or minus 30 degrees F from the mean CET temperature. Both the out-of-range and suspect inputs are considered invalid, with the out-of-range inputs displayed as all question marks and the suspect inputs displayed as a question mark in front of the displayed value. When saturation margin alarms occurs, either RCS or upper head, the process of identifying suspicious CET temperatures stops. At this point all CET input are considered valid except ( those previously flagged and those out-of-range. Any remaining suspect CET input will be
--01
- u reconsidered in the calculation if it falls within a specific band around the mean CET ....
temperature. () If the number of valid CET inputs is less than nine, the representative CET temperature and the other CET calculated variables will be displayed as all question marks. If the number of CETs operable becomes less than 2 in anyone quadrant, a "CET Below Tech Spec Minimum Requirement" alarm message is displayed. The aforementioned description only holds true for the Core Exit Thermocouple (QSPDS Display Page 213). The above description does not apply to the Subcooled Margin (QSPDS Display Pages 211 and 311). The Subcooled Margin display annotates the CET temperature with a question mark when the CET input data is outside a calculated statistical acceptance/rejection band. This particular statistical acceptance/rejection band is derived by calculating the average value of all valid CETs in the specified range between 40°F and 2295°F, calculating the standard deviation by taking the square root of the sum of the squares. The standard deviation is multiplied by a given ration of 2.33, if the value inputs is greater than 30°F, the CET temperature on the Subcooled Margin is marked as suspect by display a question mark. The increase is suspect CET inputs can be attributed to the core loading. The new fuel assemblies are loaded into the center of the core and the partially burned fuel assemblies are relocated to the outer core perimeter. The center of the core has a higher temperature than the outer perimeter. Per discussion with Reactor Engineering, the expected range of assembly outlet temperature is approximately from 615°F to 562°F. Therefore, the QSPDS will mark CETs as suspect due to the wide delta temperature experienced as a result of the core loading. I&C Department or Engineering will have to determine if CET is inoperable if a determination is required uired and can not be determined by 1-0SP-100.17. 1-0SP-1 00.17.
- 2. Bad Data Alarm - parameter values are replaced with question marks.
0711407, Rev. 15 Page 30 of 83 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY with practice checks from the inputs:
- The out-of-range GET temperature inputs are discarded.
- The mean GET temperature is calculated from the remaining inputs.
- The GET temperature inputs are checked within a statistical band around the mean GET temperature. Those inputs falling outside the bands are flagged as suspicious inputs and discarded from the calculation.
- The mean GET temperature is then recalculated using the remaining inputs.
The process continues until there are no more flagged or discarded inputs. At this point, the GET inputs are considered stable and valid, and the representative GET temperature is calculated. The mean GET temperature is constrained to be +/- 30°F of the maximum Hot Leg ( Temperature. Those GET(s) with outputs that are more than +/- 30°F from the mean GET temperature are flagged "suspicious" (denoted by a '?')"?') and not used until their values return to less than +/- 30°F from the mean GET temperature. Both the out-of-range and suspect inputs are considered invalid, with the out-of-range inputs displayed as all question marks and the suspect inputs displayed as a question mark in front of the displayed value. When saturation margin alarm occurs, either RGS or upper head, the process of identifying suspicious GET temperatures stops. At this point all GET inputs are considered valid except those previously flagged and those out-of-range. Any remaining suspect GET input will be reconsidered in the calculation if it falls within a specified band around the mean GET temperature. If the number of valid GET inputs is less than nine [eight], the representative GET temperature and the other GET calculated variables will be displayed as all question marks. If the number of GET's operable becomes less than 2 in anyone quadrant, a "eET "CET Below Tech Spec Minimum Requirement" alarm message is displayed. In addition any sensor may be temporarily removed from scan and flagged by operating pushbuttons on the front panel of the QSPDS microprocessor.
Single Question Report QID#: 2007 Objective: 0702407-03 System: QSPDS Rev: 0 Cog Level: 1 KA#017.A4.01 R03.8 SR04.1 The Unit 1 'A' QSPDS has displayed one of the Core Exit Thermocouples (CET) as
'suspicious' .
A 'suspicious' CET is displayed on the QSPDS plasma screen as: (assume no other CET abnormalities) A. a question mark in front of the value, and discarded from the calculation. B. parameter value field filled with question marks in the inverse mode, but still used in the calculation. C. system error, and discarded from the calculation. D. setpoint error, but still used in the calculation. Reasons the choices are right or wrong. Correct answer is A. A. B. correct if valid CET inputs <9. C. this is hardware or software error D. mUlti-input calculated value out ofrange/bad this is multi-input ofrangelbad data., Source Ref: 1-1150020 Qualified Safety Parameter Display Syste Open Ref: Revision Notes: System 4 Question Use History HLC-16 PreAudit Quiz 7 (HLC-15 NRC), 0717018, 61112004 6/1/2004 HLC-15 RO NRC 2001, 0717003, 1/1/2001 11112001 HLC-15 SRO NRC 2001, 0717004, 11112001 1/1/2001 ( Page 1 of 1
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # Tier# 2 Group # 2 KIA # 027K5.01 Importance Rating 3.1 Containment Iodine Removal: Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CIRS: Purpose of charcoal filters Proposed Question: RO 60 Unit 1 is experiencing a LOCA and a Loss of Offsite power. ALL safeguards actuated ventilation systems are in service. Which ONE of the following systems is in service to limit the release of Iodine from the Containment and what design feature is installed to improve Iodine removal efficiency? A. Shield Building fans HVE-6A and HVE-6B with charcoal filter trains, demisters to remove water particles and heaters to reduce humidity. B. Shield Building fans HVE-6A and HVE-6B with charcoal filter trains, demisters to remove water particles and heaters to increase the temperature of the discharged air. ( C. Airborne Radiation Removal units HVE-1 and HVE-2 with charcoal filter trains and demisters to remove water particles. D. Airborne Radiation Removal units HVE-1 and HVE-2 with HEPA filters to remove particulate and Iodine and heaters to control humidity. 119
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): A. Correct B. Incorrect: design feature of the heaters is to reduce humidity to increase iodine removal efficiency not to increase the temperature of the discharged air. C. Incorrect: HVE-1 and HVE-2 are NOT post accident units. They are ONLY used during normal operation and are not energized from the Diesel Generators. D. Incorrect: same as above Technical Reference(s): 0711802 Containment and (Attach if not previously provided) Shield Building Ventilation. Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: PSL OPS SYS 602 LPC Obj. 3 (As available) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge ~X'-- X __ Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Comments: 120
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AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY REMOVAL SYSTEM (UNIT 1 ONLY) FUNCTION The Airborne Radiation Removal System removes containment airborne radioactivity in the form of particulate and iodine by recirculating the containment air through high efficiency particulate (HEPA) filters and charcoal adsorbers adsorbers..The** system
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normal operation to lower1..... II_ airborne _toMiWQIM!ij!Mt\1~Ij4;z:;;;;;;;g;wJ!fili'1ih. activity leyels, that permit access without mmd-"IWI.,4IJAiiiiIlWiWGiil_liiiiiltifiI!ilp&l::m6f86g@;;;M84ifiBi'--= exceeding 10CFR20limits, and serves no function fOF post~LOCA dose feductioA. DESIGN BASES All active components of the system are suitable for operation in 120°F ambient temperature and 1 rad/hr of radiation. The following assumptions were made for system performance:
- 1,200 Ib/day reactor coolant leakage into containment
- 0.1 % failed fuel 0.1%
(
- Iodine partition coefficient is 0.1
- 100% of noble gas becomes airborne
- Tritium, in water molecular form, concentrates up to the level determined by the specific humidity
- Mixing efficiency of all airborne constituents is 90%
- All particulates become airborne
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GENERAL DESCRIPTION The containment radioactivity removal system consists of two identical units, HVE-1 and HVE-2, as shown on Figure 19. Each unit is located at an elevation of 23 ft. and draws air at 10,000 cfm from the containment cooling system ring duct. Air is drawn through a bank of HEPA filters. The air then passes through a bank of charcoal adsorbers. The filtered air is then freely discharged to containment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
~,;!~~~f,}~~l~~~;~i;i~~i~l~;~i~*~~!r~~~~j~~j)1~~,~~~t~ajf§iGl~;Pl~rE'~2(:~arei;bE~lt Airborne Radiation Removal units, HVE;-1 .aFi:d"f:'f~E-2, are belt d driven vane-axial riven va ne-axi aI type, and rated for 10,000 cfm at 6" WC. HVE-1 and HVE-2 are powered from 480 VAC MCC 1A5 and1B5, and are controlled with STOP-START switches from RTGB 106. A flow switch in the discharge of each fan provides a fan low flow alarm on RTGB 106, at 2500 cfm.
Normal use HEPA filters are constructed with aluminum separators. Due to hydrogen generation concerns, each HEPA filter used in containment is fabricated from glass media pleated over composition-asbestos separators. Factory tests ensure the filter meets a minimum efficiency of 99.97% when tested with 0.3 micron dioctylphalate ( (DOP) smoke. Periodic in-place leak testing is performed to assure filter integrity. A differential pressure detector senses the pressure drop across this filter bank and provides a HEPA filter high differential pressure alarm on RTGB-106, at 3.0" we ap. The tray-type charcoal adsorbers are filled with iodine-impregnated charcoal. Iodine-impregnated charcoal is capable of removing 99.9% minimum of iodine with 5% in the form of methyl iodide (CH31), when operating at 70% relative humidity and 150 degrees F. A thermocouple senses the temperature of the charcoal adsorber ad sorber and provides indication on RTGB 106 through a temperature recorder. A high charcoal temperature alarm on RTGB 106, actuates at 200°F.
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i fan will automatically start on a low flow of 1500 cfm, as sensed by FS-25-15B for fan A and FS-25-15A for fan B. The exhaust fans have a motor overload trip. Indication of this trip and of the motor control center switch being in ISOLATE are provided by the SHIELD BUILDING VENT EXH HVE-6A (B) MOTOR OVERLOAD SS ISOLATED [SBVS 2 HVE-6A (B) OVERLOAD/SS ISOL] alarms on RTGB 106 [HVCB]. Another alarm associated with the exhaust fans is the SHIELD BUILDING VENT EXH HVE-6A (B) LOW FLOW CIS OVERRIDE [SBVS HVE-6A (B) FLOW LO/CIS OVRD] alarm on RTGB 106 [HVCB]. This alarm is energized by FS-25-14A (B) at a flow of 1500 cfm or if a CIS is present and the fan is secured. Demisters The demisters are located in the upstream portion of the filter subsections. Their function is to remove any water particles contained in the intake air to increase the efficiency of the downstream charcoal adsorbers. Each demister contains six stainless steel demister cells that are 99% efficient for 1-5 micron water particles. The differential pressure across the demister is indicated on local gauges. Local indication of the temperature downstream of the demisters is also provided. ( HEPA Filters
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..........J) located on either side of the charcoal adsorber. Their function is to reduce the particulate activity of the air being exhausted from the shield building prior to it being released to the atmosphere. The HEPA filters are made of glass asbestos and are 99.97% efficient for the removal of 0.3 microns or larger particles. They are designed to function at a temperature of 250°F.
250°F, Each HEPA filter is provided with local differential pressure gauges. The upstream HEPA filter differential pressures are also displayed on RTGB 106 [HVCB] by PDIS Rev. 1fL .... {O;I;t";d:5****** 0711602, Rev.1.9.<---{D;.;i;t;-5*----------- .. j
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8A and PDIS-25-8B which are fed by PDT-25-8A and PDT-25-8B. These pressure differential transmitters also provide the SHIELD BUILDING VENT SYSTEM A (B) HEPA FILTER HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE [SHIELD BLDG HEPA FLT VENT A (B) D/P HI] alarms at a pressure of 3" water. Charcoal Adsorbers Each filter subsection contains 18 charcoal adsorbers for the removal of fission product iodine. The adsorbers contain activated coconut shell impregnated charcoal. They are 99.9% efficient for iodides with 5% in the form of CH31 at 70% relative humidity and 150°F. As humidity and/or temperature increase, the efficiency of the charcoal decreases. To monitor temperature of the charcoal adsorber, each charcoal train has four (TE 25, 26, 27 and 28 for train A and TE-25-31, 32, 33 and 34 for train B) temperature detectors. The outputs of these detectors are displayed on TR-25-2 on RTGB 106 [HVCB]. The SHIELD BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM A (B) CHARCOAL ADSORBERS HIGH TEMPERATURE alarms at 200°F. Temperature downstream of the charcoal adsorbers is measured by .T.S-25-29 _~_I!.~.__.3.5C3I1(Us.C3J~9..d.i~RI?Y.E?~.~Il.I~
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25-2. Local downstream temperature indication is also provided. ( Humidity detectors, M E-25-1 and 2.C3r.e.J)r~\Ii.d.e.dJo. ME-25-1 Jl1~llitorth.e.JI1!~~.~.un1i~ltYJ(). .E?C3~h... 2_~f_~_Rf~y:l~_E?_~J~_!n~~tt()E.t~_E?.Jn!~t_~_l}_lJ':1j9lty_.t()_.E?~~~ ________ ./-.{'-D-e-let-ed-:-2,---------' m._./*{-D_e_let-e_d:_2:..., -----_ charcoal adsorber train. This humidity indication is displayed locally on MI-25-1 and 2. The SHIELD BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM A (B) HIGH HUMIDITY [SHLD BLDG VENT A (B) HUMD HI] alarms at a humidity of 70%. Local indication of the differential pressure for each charcoal adsorber ad sorber is also provided in the HVAC room.
( Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 2 KIA # 028K2.01 Importance Rating 2.5 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Hydrogen recombiners Proposed Question: RO 61 Unit 1 has implemented 1-EOP-03 Loss of Coolant. A Loss Of Offsite Power (LOOP) has also occurred on the Reactor trip. BOTH Emergency Diesel Generators have started and loaded on the bus, however the feeder breaker to the 1A5 MCC tripped open. Which ONE of the following states ALL available Containment Hydrogen removal systems? A. 1A and 1B Hydrogen Recombiners. HVE-7A and HVE-7B Hydrogen Purge fans. 1A and 1 B Hydrogen Recombiners. HVE-7B Hydrogen Purge fan. B. 1A C. 1B Hydrogen Recombiner. HVE-7B Hydrogen Purge fan. ( D. 1B Hydrogen Recombiner. HVE-7 HVE-7A A and HVE-7B Hydrogen Purge fans. ( 121
Proposed Answer: 0 Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: 1A Hydrogen recombiner lost power B. Incorrect: both Hydrogen purge fans have power available. 1A Hydrogen recombiner has lost power. C. Incorrect: both Hydrogen purge fans have power available D. Correct. Hydrogen recombiners powered from MCC 1A5, 1A5, Purge Fans powered from MCC 1A6. Technical Reference(s): 1-ADM-03.01C 1-ADM-03.01 C (Attach if not previously provided) ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _PS_L-_O_7_02_6_0_2_-2_9_ _PS_L_-_O_70_2_6_0_2_-2_9__ _____ _ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Bank# Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X --- Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 7 55.43 Comments: ( 122
ION NO.: REVISION PROCEDURE TITLE: VOLTAGE: OA UNIT 1 POWER DISTRIBUTION BREAKER LIST 480V 480 V PROCEDURE NO.: MOTOR CONTROL CENTER CONTROL CENTER: 1-ADM-03.01C ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 MCC 1A5 480V MCC1A5 MCC 1A5 Reactor (Page 2 of 3) BKR. NO. CUBICLE CWD EQUIPMENT NOTES FRONT SECTION (continued) 1-41232 JF2 -- Lighting Panel T ransf LP-112 1-41233 JF3 -- Lighting Panel T ransf LP-114 1-41234 JF3 -- SPACE 1-41235 JF5 -- SPARE 1-41235A JF6 -- Non-Essential Load Feeder REAR SECTION 1-41236 AR1 268 Aux. HPSI Flow Control Va. HCV-3647 1-41237 AR2 262 HCV-3617 Aux. HPSI Flow Control Va. 1-41238 AR3 -- SPARE 1-41239 AR4 991 Incoming Line no breaker 1-41240 BR1 468 Elect. Equip. Room Pwr. Roof Vent RV-3 1-41241 BR2 - - SPACE 1-41242 BR3 1001 Battery Charger 1A 1-41243 CR1 253 Shutdown Cooling Isol. Va V-3651 1-41244 CR2 -- SPACE 1-41245 CR3 584 Waste Management System Heat Tracing Transf 1A 1-41246 CF4 - - SPARE 1-41247 CR5 - - Lighting Panel Tr. LP-130 1-41248 DR1 -- SPACE 1-41249 DR2 168 Boric Acid Makeup Tank 1A Htr A 1~41250, DR3 279 HPSI Pump Discharge Va. V-3656 1A1251. ~ DR4 597 Hydrogen Recombiner 1A 1-41252 ER1 -- SPACE 1-41253 ER2 1182 Kitchen Exhaust Fan Isol Valve FCV-25-24 1-41254 ER3 476 Aux. Bldg. SWGR Supply Fan HVS-5A 1-41256 FR1 1173 Control Room South Isol. Va. FCV-25-17 1-41257 FR2 -- SPACE 1-41258 FR3 505 Aux. Bldg Supply Fan HVS-4A 1-41259 GR1 608 AFW Pump 1A Disch Va. to S/G 1A MV-09-9 1-41260 GR2 610 AFW Pump 1A Disch Va. to S/G 1B MV-09-13 1-41261 GR3 616 FW Pump 1A Disch Valve MV-09-1 1-41262 GR4 -- LP-131 N/E Transf Blowdown Bldg 1-41263 HR1 -- SPACE 1-41264 HR2 -- 480V PP-135 41264A HR3 - - Not usable 1-41265 JR1 -- Lighting Panel Transf. LP-125
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: VOLTAGE: OA UNIT 1 POWER DISTRIBUTION BREAKER LIST 480V PROCEDURE NO.: MOTOR CONTROL CENTER CONTROL CENTER: 1-ADM-03.01 C ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 MCC1A6 480V MCC 1 1A6 A6 Reactor (Page 1 of 2) Location: Reactor Auxiliary Building 43.0' EI., "A" Switchgear Room Power Supply: 480V Vital Load Center 1A2 1 A2 Cubicle 1A 1 A (1-40218) BKR. NO. CUBICLE CWD EQUIPMENT NOTES FRONT SECTION 1-41301 AF1 835 Intake Cooling Wtr Hdr. A Non-Emerg. Isol Va. MV-21-3 1-41302 AF2 -- SPARE 1-41303 AF3 -- SPARE 1-41304 AF4 -- 480V LP-2C N/E 1-41305 AF5 -- Incoming Line no breaker 1-41306 BF1 485 Post Accident Hydrogen Purge Fan HVE-7A 1-41307 BF2 -- SPACE 1-41308 BF3 244 Minimum Flow Isol. Valve V-3659 1-41309 BF4 493 Outdoor ACC-3A HVA-3A 1-41310 BF5 -- SPACE 1-41311 CF1 468 Elect. Equip. Room Exh. Fan HVE-11 1-41312 CF2 269 Safety Inject. Tank Disch Va. 1A-1 V-3624 ( 1-41313 CF3 263 LPSI Flow Control Va. HCV-3635 1-41314 CF4 265 Aux. HPSI Flow Control Va. HCV-3637 1-41315 DF1 492 Cant. Room Air Condo HVA-3A 1-41316 DF2 175 Boric Acid Makeup Pump 1-B 1-41317 DF3 -- SPACE 1-41318 DF4 115 Reactor Cool Oil Lift Pump P-1 B2-A 1-41319 EF1 259 Aux HPSI Flow Control Va. HCV-3627 1-41320 EF2 170 Boric Acid Makeup Tank 1B Htr. A 1-41321 EF3 174 Boric Acid Makeup Pump 1A 1-41322 EF4 111 Reactor Cool Oil Lift Pump P-1A2-B 1-41323 FF1 174, Normal-Isolate Switches 175 1-41324 GF1 593 Instrument Air Compr 1A 1-41325 GF2 1012 Non-essential Load Breaker 1-41326 HF1 498 SPARE 1-41327 HF2 -- SPACE 1-41328 HF3 515 Off-Class Rm Htg Coil EHC-1 1-41329 HF4 -- 120 / 280V Power Panel PP-120 Transf. 1-41330 HF5 -- Aux. Bldg 480V Power Rcpts. 48,50,51,53 1-41331 HF6 515 Off-Class Rm Htg Coil EHC-2 1-41332 HF7 183 Refueling Equip. 1-41332A HF8 -- Non-essential Feed 3J o
( Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 2 Group # 2 KIA # 029A3.01 Importance Rating 3.8 Containment purge: Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Containment Purge System including: CPS isolation Proposed Question: RO 62 Unit 1 is in Mode 6. Given the following events and conditions:
* "A" train Containment Purge system is in service with suction aligned to the Refueling Cavity.
- The Upper Guide Structure is being lifted.
- A CIAS monitor reads 95 mR/Hr
- B CIAS monitor reads 102 mR/Hr
- C CIAS monitor reads 85 mR/Hr
- D CIAS monitor reads 87 mR/Hr Which ONE of the following statements correctly describes the response of the Containment Purge system?
( A. Containment purge is automatically secured. B. Containment purge remains in its current configuration. C. The Containment purge suction is automatically aligned to the Containment Ring Header. D. The Containment purge discharge is automatically aligned to the Shield Building Exhaust system. 123
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): A. Correct: A and B CIS radiation monitors trip on high alarm (90mR/hr) causing CIAS actuation. B. Incorrect: candidate may not realize that high alarm setpoint is manually lowered from 10 R/hr in Modes 1-4 to 90 mR/hr in Mode 6 C. Incorrect: This is a manual lineup D. Incorrect: The spent fuel pool ventilation is automatically realigned to the shield building on high radiation but not containment purge. Technical Reference(s): 0711410 (Attach if not previously provided) 0711602 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: 0702410-09 _____________ (As available) _0_7_0_2_4_10_-_0_9 Question Source: Bank # 2126 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7 55.43 Comments: 124
containment 180 degrees apart. The detectors are gas filled ion chambers that are capable of detecting high intensity radiation up to 1088 Rlhr. R/hr. The detector generates an analog output signal, which is sent to a Readout module in the Radiation Monitoring Panel in the Control Room. The detectors are Class IE and environmentally qualified (EQ) for post-LOCA conditions. The detectors are required by Technical specifications. The readout module, (see Figure 6), accepts the signal from the detector, conditions the signal, and outputs a signal analogous to the logarithm of the detector current. This signal is measured by an ammeter with a display in units of R/hr. Analog outputs output Signal are provided for a front panel meter, two remote meters, a remote recorder, and a date-logging system. The readout module has two solid-state trip circuits that can be adjusted over the complete meter range. It has a self-checking failure trip that is actuated upon loss of power, high voltage, or loss of Signal from the detector. Each readout module includes low-voltage regulators and a regulated high-voltage power supply. Front panel controls include three alarm lights with reset pushbuttons and a three-position spring-loaded function switch. The function switch allows for normal operation, trip level adjustments, and internal check signal actuation. In the CHECK position, an electric current is generated in the module to produce a mid-scale indication. Test points and adjustment potentiometers are accessible from the front panel. The test points and adjustments are recessed to prevent accidental adjustment. They can be used as a backup source of information for calculating off-site dose during an accident per EPIP-09 and for core damage assesment in EPIP-11. Containment Isolation Signal Radiation Monitors (Channels 3-6) Four Containment Isolation Signal (CIS) Radiation Monitors, spaced 90 degrees apart, provide continuous radiation monitoring in containment. If a 1-out-of-4 high high alarm condition is met, the containment evacuation alarm will sound. This alarm can be silenced in the Control Room at the radiation monitoring panels. 0711410 Rev 12 Page 17 of 84 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
The output signals from these monitors also feed the engineered safety features logic to make up the CIS. If 2 of the 4 CIS monitors reach their preset high high alarm setpoints they will activate Containment Isolation. The monitors are located within the containment 90 foot at 90 degree intervals along the containment vessel wall.
~The The radiation moni:ors (MOd~S 1-4), 90 m.R/hr monitors level alarm is set at less than 10 R/hr (Modes mRlhr ; (mode 6). A setpolnt setpoint of 10 Rlhr R/hr was selected based on response time for the high
- . containment pressure setpoint of 5 psig since both signals feed the CIS circuitry.
I. These radiation monitors are designed to withstand a LOCA containment environment for a period of at least 15 minutes after an accident. Channels 3-6 also activate an annunciator to warn operators of an impending CIS condition. This alarm CNTMT RAD HIGH CIS CHANNEL PRE-TRIP 026 is activated by a high radiation level of 1 R/hr (Modes 1-4) and -60 mR/hr (Mode 6), . If radiation levels rise to the high high alarm settings of 10 Rlhr R/hr (Modes 1-4), 90 mRlhr (mode 6) the alarm CNTMT RAD HIGH CIS CHANNEL TRIP 016 will activate. Fuel Pool Radiation Monitor (Channels 7 and 8) One Area Radiation Monitor is provided in the Spent Fuel Pool area. Channel 7 is required by Tech Specs any time fuel is in spent fuel pool. Channel 8, refueling canal area radiation monitor. may be used if Channel 7 is out of service. PROCESS RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM LIQUID PROCESS MONITORS Liquid Radwaste (LRW) Discharge Monitor (Channel 43) The Unit 1 Liquid Radwaste Discharge Monitor's primary purpose is to continuously monitor and record the activity in the liquid waste being released to the circulating water canal. This monitor will terminate the liquid discharge from the plant if the activity being released exceeds the monitor setpoint. The monitor setpoint is set below the activity release limits. 0711410 Rev 12 Page 18 of 84 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
0711602, Rev. 13 Page 8 of 83 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM FUNCTION The function of the Containment Purge System is to reduce residual iodine, particulate, noble gas, and tritium activity in the containment to allow extended entry of personnel. DESIGN BASIS The Containment Purge System exhausts the containment atmosphere to the environment via a filtered and monitored release path. The system is operated to reduce the levels of radioactive contamination in the containment atmosphere below the limits of 10 CFR 20 so as to permit personnel access to the containment during shutdown and refueling. ( GENERAL DESCRIPTION The Containment Purge Systems in both Units exhaust containment air to the atmosphere when an extended containment entry is required. Refer to Figures 1 and 2. The purge system in each Unit removes residual iodine and particulate activity by filtration prior to exhausting to atmosphere via the plant stack. Due to the fact that the purging evolution replaces containment air with outside air, the concentrations of non-filterable radioactive gases and tritium, if present in containment, are reduced. The suction side of the purge system is connected through a 48" by 48" duct containing damper DPR-25-5B to the containment cooling system ring duct header to assure uniform purging of the containment. A 36" by 14" branching duct from forty air inlets located above the water line in the refueling cavity is also connected to the purge system through damper DPR-25-5A. These air-operated dampers are controlled by the PURGE-REFUELING selector switch on RTGB 106 [HVCB]. DPR-25-5B is 100% open during PURGE and partially open when selected to REFUELING. DPR-25-5A is closed during PURGE and 100% open when selected to REFUELING. The refueling
0711602, Rev. 13 Page 9 of 83 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY sequencing guidelines procedure provides guidance for the use of the switch. Refer to Figures 7 and B. Air then flows from the containment (or the containment and refueling cavity) through FCV-25-4, FCV-25-5, and FCV-25-6, a debris screen, then into a filter housing that is common to two parallel, 100% capacity exhaust fans, HVE-BA and HVE-B8,HVE-BB, which exhaust to the plant stack. Refer to Figure 7. The filter housing consists of a prefilter for dust removal and a carbon HEPA filter for removal of particulates and iodine. Refer to Figure B. The air makeup side of the purge system includes a 12' by 10' intake louver, a bank of medium efficiency filters for duct removal, and three 4B" diameter butterfly isolation valves, FCV-25-1, FCV-25-2, FCV-25-3, then through a debris screen into containment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION ( FCV-25-4, FCV-25-5, FCV-2S-4. FCV-25-6, Containment Purge Supply Valves to HVE-8A188 FCV-2S-S. FCV-2S-6, HVE-8A18B These 4B" air-operated, fail-closed, butterfly valves are operated from RTGB RTG8 106 [HVCB] [HVC8] by the control switches for Containment Purge Exhaust Fans HVE-BA or HVE-B8. Once the control switch is positioned to START, the valves open. When fully BB. open, the valves supply a start permissive to the fan. Indication for open and close valve position is provided on RTGB [HVCB]. Fan shutdown, loss of instrument air, RTG8 106 [HVC8]. or CIS will close the supply valves. Refer to Figure 7. Leakage testing of containment purge valves is performed in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing program.
0711602, Rev. 13 Page 10 of 83 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY FCV-25-1, FCV-2S-2, FCV-2S-1, FCV-25-2, FCV-2S-3, FCV-25-3, Containment Purge Makeup Valves These 4B" air-operated, fail-closed, butterfly valves are operated from RTGB 106 [HVCB] by the control switches for Containment Purge Exhaust Fans HVE-BA or HVE-BB. Once HVE-BA or HVE-BB is started, and a vacuum of 0.5" water gauge (wg) between containment and ambient air exists, the valves will open. This ensures that unfiltered/unmonitored backflow through the makeup air valves will not occur. Once open, the makeup valves seal in, and only close on fan shutdown, loss of instrument air, or CIS. Indication for open and close valve position is provided on RTGB 106 [HVCB]. Refer to Figure 7. Leakage testing of containment purge valves is performed in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Testing program. Containment Purge Valve Travel Limit Stops
- Unit 1 Spring Side
( Restriction on the use of all of the Unit 1 containment purge valves require that travel limit stops be employed for Modes 1, 2, 3, 4 to prevent the valve from going beyond 40 degrees of travel open. This is an FSAR requirement. This stop is attached to the spring side of the actuator, which is positioned into the spring assembly and pins the travel limit screw at the 40 degrees position, as shown on Figure 9, thereby limiting full open travel. This opening has been designed such that critical valve parts will not be damaged by DBA-LOCA loads and that the valve will tend to close when dynamic forces are introduced. During refueling operations, it is permissible to allow the travel limit stop, as shown in Figure 10, to be pinned in the full open position, thereby allowing for full open operation. Any positioning of these stops is performed by I&C Valve group personnel.
- Unit 1 Air Side The air side of the containment purge valve actuator has a travel limiting stop as well. Its purpose is to maintain the valve fully open on a loss of instrument air. The valve is opened, and then the travel limit screw is run in to the full open position, with the pin on the screw closest to the handwheel as shown on Figure 10. This allows
CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM i -- -- ---- -- - -- - - T- -- ------------
- - - - - - - - Ti---1-T @cs R!HGVBC~~6 RTGB106
[HVCBl FS-25-1A RTGB 106
-0t 1 1
-~--0tVCBl
-EJ -
I I 1! 1! L VCB1 REFUEL : : :1 L _____ _____ CIS CIS 1 CANAL FG-25-2 START STANDBY FAN DPR HVE-8A RING25-5B~ 25-58"-... RING "" VENT HEADER GO STACK PRE- CHARCOAL FILTER "C I 80, 6~ 0 86 0[80 I R ~ I [ I 0 :6 0 I R
!I 1 ~
1I I R Ut'H-25-8I::St i 1 1 FS JFS 10 SEC
-~-
~RTGB106 l-- rmL~RTGB
~ [HVCBj
~ ~[HVCBl 106
~ =i=-:~~~L~~--==t=-H-&~-F~:-R-;;~---:
G) G')
-----l C ~----r----------~----T----------~--------'
uLuil FS-25-1B L START STANDBY r--
;;C
;:0 CONTAINMENT
.....1 - - - - - - - - - CONTAINMENT --------.
I ANNULUS ---+ I H&V FAN ROOM I S ! FAN m m 1 --- I 1___ I 1 I 1 I 1 I 1: 1
...... RTGB 106
[HVCBl @ CS _____________ ~ CIS ____ _ l 1I 1 1 1
~_~.
1!.~'!IIll"""' it li 1II 1 1 1 r---------------i----------------I 1I 1I 1 1 11 DIFF. DIFF. 1 DIFF. DIFF. 1 DIFF. DIFF. 1 1 f-----
~---- PRESS f-----
~---- PRESS f-----
~---- PRESS 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S) S S S . S 1 1 1 1 I r1-----
-----1 I I[
I I ! I JI I
} - - - - - - i FAN CONTROL 1 1-----1 }------,
I 1I [1 11 ZS = LIMIT SWITCH I -----r-T--~
-----r-'---' I "'Tl 11 1 1 1
1 1 o
;;0 1 1 ::0 1 1 FILTER 1 1 -I
--{
~
1 1 HIGH DIFFERENTIAL : 80, 8 0180 OUTSIDE PRESSURE 1 Z Z o0
-....I MAKEUP AIR PDIS-25-11A PDIS-25-11AOR OR PDIS-25-11 PDIS-25-11B B : z(;)""0 .....
-...j STOPS FANS :
1~_____ ___________ 1 0l0'l
~_--------_~----~----------_L-
____ ~ __________ J 1I _ _ _ _ ~-----------L------------I 1 1 11 ceo (J) (P 0
,N 1 1 11L _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ HVA-8A INTAKE RM _
H&VINTAKE H&V _ _ :: _ ___ ANNULUS ANNULUS_: _ CONTAINMENT mO'l;;o (TIRCOI0711602*F5*Rllj) (TIRCOI0711602*FS*Rll OO'l(p zQ,:< reo .....
-<ww
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# Tier # 2 Group # 2 KIA # 041A2.02 Importance Rating 3.6 Steam Dump / Turbine Bypass Control: Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SDS; and (b) based on those predictions mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Steam valve stuck open Proposed Question: RO 63 Unit 1 has experienced an uncomplicated Reactor I Turbine trip. 1-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip Actions are complete. The unit is being maintained in Hot Standby conditions using the Steam Dump Control System (SBCS). SBCS controller HIC-8801 is in MANUAL controlling RCS temperature at 532°F. The remainder of the SBCS is in AUTOMATIC. HIC-8801 malfunctions and PCV-8801 goes full OPEN. Assuming NO operator actions, approximately what RCS temperature will be reached before the cooldown is terminated? A. 48rF 487"F ( D.52rF D.527"F 125
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. 48rF is Tsat for 600 psia which is MSIS setpoint B. 504°F is Tsat for 700 psia which is MSIS block setpoint C. Correct: 519°F is Tsat for 806 psia which is SBCS permissive switch setpoint when switch is in auto. D. 52rF is Tsat for 886 psia which is permissive setpoint prior to Reactor trip. Technical Reference(s): PSL OPS SYS 406 TXT R01 (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Steam Tables Learning Objective: _0__7_0_2_4-'-06__-_'_0-'-'3-, ,1_2 _0_7_0_2_4_0_6-_0_3-' --1..: .:._ 2__ ____ avai lable) _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New X X Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis X 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 5 55.43 --- 5 Comments: ( 126
PSL OPS SYS 406 TXT ROlROI FOR TRAINING USE ONLY infonnation routing and if On the other hand, the FPD is dependent on the Plant Data Network for its information perfonned solely from the T-800s the PDN was lost for some reason, system info and control could be performed (which are independent from the PDN). Unit I1 & 2:
- The MIA stations are designated as stearn steam bypass controllers on the RTGB RTGB..
- MIA stations HIC-8801 through 8804 can individually modulate their respective valves when in Pennissive Switch valve permissive Manual provided the Permissive pennissive and condenser vacuum interlocks are pennissivelinterlock (Psec2) is Bypassed for any HIC in Manual. This met. The Low Pressure permissivelinterlock allows cooldown below the Psec2 post-trip setpoint of 837 [850] psia.
- PIC-80lO, when in Manual bypasses the Low Pressure permissivelinterlock PIC-80IO, pennissivelinterlock (Psec2) and directly PCV -8805 AND any other bypass valve that has its controller [MIA Station] in Automatic.
controls PCV-8805 The condenser and Permissive Pennissive Switch valve permissive pennissive must be made up though for any valve operation. This allows cooldown below the Psec2 post-trip setpoint of 837 [850] psia.
* .Jll~1!1.11P1iRlM'i44@lp@Fi1I\§W"'~~"'pen While cooling down with the pennissive switch i,n Auto and MIA Statjon(s) in manual, any open
.iiUii§.d.e";~ilP_II1A"lNiU@';MJ@14GMijf'.';iIUW1iiili._
SBCS valve will c10sewhenthe 806psia(Auto} pennissive is lost. Further cooldown using the pennissive switch in Man. SBCS will require placing the permissive
/
SBCS TEST DRAWER - UNIT 1 ONLY SBes The SBCS test drawer is an integral part of the control system, as well as an accessory for testing. The test drawer contains equipment to convert the input current signals into appropriately scaled voltage signals used in the SBCS calculator. The drawer also contains the relays used in the intemallogic and in the generation of binary outputs and signals. The layout of the test drawer is shown in Figure 3. The SBCS test drawer provides distribution of AC power for the calculator, as well as, for the test drawer itself. DC Power is distributed to the valves' solenoids. The test features include:
- Simulated inputs for use in calibrating, testing, and troubleshooting the system
- Pushbutton signal selector switch
- Five Test Switches*
- 1. System Test Switch (4 positions):
- OPERA TE - Connects system inputs to outputs after time delay. In any position other than OPERATE OPERA OPERATE, TE, the SBCS is unavailable and is annunciated as such (L-24).
Page 23 of 59
PSL OPS SYS 406 TXT R01 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
- Steam Stearn pressure Psecl [Pval] < Pspl (900 psia)
- Steam pressure Psec2 [Pval] < Psp2 (886 psia or post trip threshold 837 [850] psia)
Stearn
- NEITHER of the Quick Open signals (logic NOT satisfied for QO)
- Permissive Switch in OFF deenergizes all permissive solenoids and prevents all SBesSBeS valve operation SBCS PERMISSIVE SWITCH The permissive switch is part of the circuitry that controls the operation of the permissive solenoid valves that allow pressure to be applied to the diaphragm of the bypass valves. The SBes permissive switch mounted on the RTGB 102 [202] apron section enables the operator to select MANUAL, AUTO, or OFF modes. Refer to Figures 17 and 18 for switch locations and Figure 19 for Permissive Logic.
- MANUAL: The permissive solenoids are energized, enabling remote control of the bypass valves provided the low condenser vacuum and emergency off interlocks are met.
- AUTO (normal mode): The permissive relays are energized by any permissive signal from the
( permissive circuitry.
- OFF: Operation of the turbine bypass valves is blocked, as the permissive solenoid valves are ofthe maintained de energized [On Unit 2 this position annunciates L-4, STEAM BYPASS SYSTEM UNAVAILABLE]
When these solenoid valves are de energized and vented to atmosphere, the bypass valves spring close and cannot be opened except by the local valve hand jack. CONDENSER PERMISSIVE/INTERLOCK The condenser permissivelinterlock allows SBeS operation when turbine vacuum is sufficient and prevents SBeS operation when turbine vacuum conditions can NOT support the bypassing of main steam stearn into the condenser. When condenser backpressure, as detected by PS-l 0-9 (located on mezzanine deck of turbine building), is insufficient (setpoint of 12" Hg absolute increasing), the opening ofthe of the bypass valves is blocked in order to prevent damage to the turbine or the condenser. This condition annunciates L-24 [LA], STEAM BYPASS SYSTEM UNAVAILABLE.
- If all the MIA stations are in AUTO when condenser vacuum is lost and subsequently regained, the block is automatically removed without operator action and the valves will reopen as required.
Page 19 of 59
PSL OPS SYS 406 TXT ROI FOR TRAINING TRAINfNG USE ONLY
- The steam pressure permissivelinterlock only effects auto modulation control. Any SBeS SBCS valve in manual control will bypass this permissivelinterlock. This allows using the SBeSSBCS to cool down the RCS to T AVG Res AVO levels below that of these steam pressure setpoints.
- On a reactor trip, the permissive setpoint drops to approximately 837 [850] psia from 886 psia to accommodate the lower post-trip T AVG AVO
- This permissivelinterlock prevents a single failure from either causing OR preventing an actuation VAL VE PERMISSIVE/INTERLOCK The valve permissivelinterlock signal originates in the SBes SBCS control circuitry but is routed through an RTGB-mounted Permissive Switch and goes directly to each SBes SBCS valves' permissive solenoid. This signal is required for either auto or manual operation of any of the SBes SBCS valves. Like the steam pressure permissivelinterlock signal in auto modulation control, the valve permissive signal provides for single failure protection (in all modes of operation) as long as the Permissive switch is in Auto.
Single failure protection is lost when placing the permissive switch in Manual as this bypasses all pre-actuation or anticipatory signals and directly opens all permissive solenoids. This action must be ( perfonned however when using the SBes SBCS to cool down below the QO-2 steam pressure permissive setpoint of 806 psia (as this is the only input left feeding the auto valve permissive circuit under these plant conditions). Refer to Figure 16. Thee valve permissive, once satisfied, energizes a solenoid 3 way valve in the control air signal line from the controllers (via E/P converter and positioner). This valve realigns from venting the SBesSBCS valve actuator to atmosphere, over to an alignment where the Quick Open solenoid output may send an (modulation or a Quick Open) air signal to the SBesSBCS valve actuator. SBCS valve permissive signals allow SBes The SBes SBCS operation and can come from anyone of several inputs with the Permissive Switch in Auto*:
- Steam pressure Psec1 [Pval] >Psp>Pspl1 (900 psia)
- Steam pressure Psec2 [Pval] >Psp2 (886 psia or post trip threshold 837 [850] psia)
- Either of the Quick Open signals (logic satisfied for QO)
- Permissive Switch in Manual provides for a valve permissive signal by bypassing the permissive The SBeS SBCS valve interlock signals prevent SBesSBCS operation and are the opposite of the permissive signals listed above (with the Permissive Switch in Auto*):
Page 18 of 59
VALVE PERMISSIVE LOGIC '"I:i en l' o
'"I:i en
---- Permissive Switch en Permissive Switch----------, in MANUAL _____ NO Emergency OFF, -<
in AUTO Or Condensor Interlock en
-I'>
o
- L_____ -----:[3 0\
--:::~----~~-~-------~~~~~-~"N~------------i
.--- ~ AND
--~
OR ------------- AND -------------
. ~
gg [Pval] __ ~~_~~L~r_~~~ PS ec1 Press> _~_ 900
??_~ _~#
-----------------------------------~
__________ ~ [Pval] [Pvaij : .---I"~
. - - - 1....... VENT
-~~~~?-~!~-~~~-~~~~--
PS ec2 Press> 886 #
----- ---- (850- psi~ P-;';tT~iP
( 850 psia Post Trip)
-)- ---- -- --- ~ --------
--~
QUICK OPEN 1 l INST AIR '"I:i o iO>> ~ Ul -I'> ---~~~~-~-~-~~~-?----------------~
- G) o Ul Q.O. SOLENOID
- 00. SOLENOID /
PERM ISSIVE :
! MAIN STEAM
.,;,.;..;;;..;;.;,;...~.-.~ : CONDENSER
\0 SOLENOID * : L _______________________________ , ~ (TIRCOJ0711406-F10-R6) (TIRCOI0711406-F10-R6) L---~--------0H
~ ____ ~ ________ ~H '"rj SBCS AWP ~
~
DEMAND
~
- SHOWN DENERGIZED FIGURE 19 (Le.,
(i.e., no permissive) c::: en tI1
~
Level RO SRO Examination Outline Cross-reference: Tier# 2 Group # 2 KIA # 075A2.01 Importance Rating 3.2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the circulating water system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of intake structure Proposed Question: R064 RO 64 BOTH units are at 100% power. A tornado has touched down east of A 1A near the intake canal. The intake canal has sustained damage and is full of debris. The following alarms have been received: Unit 1 Unit 2 INTAKE INTAKE WATER LEVEL WATER LEVEL LOW LOW E-17 LA-1 INTAKE INTAKE WATER LEVEL WATER LEVEL LOW LOW M-21 LB-1 Local Intake level is -9.5 foot elevation. Discharge Canal Level is 10 foot elevation. The Unit has entered 1(2)-0360030 'Operational Requirements For The Emergency Cooling Water Canal'. Perform a Unit downpower and: A. open the SE-37-1 and SE-37-2 UHS Barrier valves. Throttle Circulating circulating water pump discharge valves at first sign of pump cavitation. B. open the SE-37-1 and SE-37-2 UHS Barrier valves. Stop the Circulating circulating water pumps as the downpower progresses. C. stop the circulating water pumps as the downpower progresses. Open SE 1 and SE-37-2 UHS Barrier valves when the unit is shut down. D. throttle circulating water pump discharge valves at first sign of pump cavitation. Open SE-37-1 and SE-37-2 UHS Barrier valves when the unit is shut down. ( 127
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: SE-37-1 and SE-37-2 UHS Barrier valves are not to be open until the unit is shut down. Throttling the circulating water pump discharge valves is performed for a HIGH discharge canal level not a low intake canal level. Throttling pump discharge valves on pump cavitation is directed for LPSI pumps on shutdown cooling for off normal conditions. B. Incorrect: SE-37-1 and SE-37-2 UHS Barrier valves are not to be open until the unit is shut down. C. Correct D. Incorrect: Throttling the circulating water pump discharge valves is performed for a HIGH discharge canal level not a low intake canal level. Technical Reference(s): Reference( s): 1(2)-0360030 Operational (Attach if not previously provided) Requirements for the Emergency Cooling Water Canal Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0'0702862-08
-7_0_2_8_62_-_0_8_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available)
( Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 1 55.43 3,5, 13 Comments: (, 128
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 10 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ( PROCEDURE NO.: EMERGENCY COOLING WATER CANAL 6 of 7 2-0360030 S1. LUCIE UNIT 2 ST. 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 1. Evaluate the need to operate the UHS U HS in accordance with the provisions of Technical Specification 3/4.7.5.
- 2. Ensure Unit 1 control room personnel are informed of the low water level condition.
CAUTION
§1 The reactor shall be shut down and placed in Mode 3 within six hours of reaching an intake water level of less than -10.5 feet.
If
!f normal heat sink capability cannot be maintained, Then begin a unit shutdown per 2-GOP-123, Turbine Shutdown - Full Load to Zero Load.
Secure circulating water pumps per ( 2-NOP-21.02, Circulating Water System Operations, as required to reduce the effects of the low water level condition. Implement the Emergency Plan as required in accordance with EPIP-01 EPIP-01,, Classification of Emergencies.
§1 Within 12 hours of placing the 6. If the barrier valves fail to open reactor in Mode 3, open SE-37-1 from RTGB-202, Then:
and SE-37-2, UHS Barrier Valves, to provide cooling water from Big Mud Creek. (RTGB-202). A. Have Unit 1 attempt to open the valves from RTGB-102. B. If the valves still fail to open, Then refer to Appendix A for local operation.
- 7. Continue cooldown of the Reactor Coolant System per 2-GOP-305, Reactor Plant Cooldown - Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown.
END OF SECTION 7.2
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 38 CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM 16 of 82 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-0620030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 7.2 Subsequent Operator Actions (continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE
- Throttling circulating water pump discharge valves to 50% on both units may NOT be necessary to stop the level rise in the discharge canal.
- Prior to throttling any circulating water pump discharge valve more than 50%, it is preferable to throttle all circulating water pumps discharge valves on both units to 50%.
- Throttling all circulating water pump discharge valves on both units equally minimizes the transient and the turbine performance (generation) loss.
Equal discharge valve throttling is suggested unless overridden by other considerations.
- 11. If the discharge canal level rises to 1II!I!lh!I-1,f;"Ia.:!l..al*I*-mQ>I>"'I~~~1I.?J'~l"gl;r:rti:l>:ii:i!~;;~
R~I'~'~',~~~~~~~~..L.~~~~L~':i~
"'--.E.1!i'i'iii!iMmti*~_
14.5 feet, Then PERFORM the following: (
~~l~~D'"
A. COORDINATE throttling of the between
~~~~
circulating pumps discharge valves
~~~~~~l~J~it~,~~..vjtm:e.rwa units as directed by the SM.
B. While throttling the circulating water pump discharge valves, ADJUST turbine power as necessary to maintain the following:
- Condenser backpressure within normal range.
- Condenser differential temperature less than 30°F.
- Discharge canal temperature less than 113°F.
REVISION: PROCEDURE TITLE: PANEL: 1 ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE M PROCEDURE NO: WINDOW: 1-ARP-01-M21 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 21 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL M INTAKE WATER LEVEL LOW M-21 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT: LS-21-5B/1007 IINTKl20/S-3/E-A NTKl20/S-3/E-A -9.0 feet elevation ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. Annunciator E-17, INTAKE WATER LEVEL LOW NOTE The UE EAL is -10.5 foot. Due to lack of level instrumentation, the UE call will conservatively conservativel be made early.
OPERATOR ACTIONS:
- 1. DISPATCH operator to locally check Intake Water Level.
( 2. !f Intake Water Level is confirmed to be less than approximately -9 Feet Elevation, Then PERFORM the J1lntake following: A. Declare an Unusual Event, EVENT/CLASS 13A. B. GO TO ONOP 1-0360030, Operational Requirements for the Emergency Cooling Water Canal. CAUSES: Low intake water level may be created by at least ONE of the following:
- Atmospheric conditions causing Atlantic Ocean level to be lower than normal
* (Le. net, valve or tunnel)
Intake Canal blockage (i.e. REFERENCES 1. CWD 8770-B-327 sheet 1007
- 2. P&ID 8770-G-082 sheet 1
- 3. TEDB
- 4. CR 2009-5243, No Intake Level Instrumentation
REVISION: PROCEDURE TITLE: PANEL: 1 ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE 'E PROCEDURE NO: WINDOW; 1-ARP-01-E17 ST. LUCIE PLANT 17 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL E 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 INTAKE III 25 18 26 19 27 20 28 21 29 22 30 23 31 24 32 WATER LEVEL LOW 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 E-17 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT: LS-21-5A INTKl20/N-3/E-A INTKl20/N-3/E-A < -9 Feet Elevation ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. Annunciator M-21, INTAKE WATER LEVEL LOW /ROA NOTE The UE EAL is -10.5 foot. Due to lack of level instrumentation, the UE call will conservatively be made earl conservativel early..
OPERATOR ACTIONS: ( 1. DISPATCH operator to locally check Intake Water Level.
- 2. 11 Intake Water Level is confirmed to be less than approximately -9 Feet Elevation, Then PERFORM the llintake following:
A. Declare an Unusual Event, EVENT/CLASS 13A. B. GO TO ONOP 1-0360030, Operational Requirements For The Emergency Cooling Water Canal. CAUSES: Annunciator has a remote possibility of being caused by a hurricane occurring at a distance from St. Lucie Plant.
REFERENCES:
- 1. CWD CWO 8770-B-327, Sheet 1007
- 2. TEDB
- 3. CR 2009-5243 No Intake Level Instrumentation L -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~~
;0 ~--------------------------------------------------------------------~~
REVISION: PROCEDURE TITLE: PANEL: 1 ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE LA PROCEDURE NO: WINDOW: 2-ARP-O 1-LA 1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 ,i1 INTAKE WATER LEVEL LOW LA-1 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT: LS-21-5A/1007 INTKl18/S-3/E-A -9.0 feet elevation ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. Local level indication.
NOTE The UE EAL is -10.5 foot. Due to lack of level instrumentation, the UE call will conservatively be made early. OPERATOR ACTIONS:
- 1. DISPATCH operator to locally check Intake Water Level.
11 Intake Water Level is confirmed to be less than approximately -9 Feet Elevation, Then PERFORM the
- 2. if following:
( A. DECLARE an Unusual Event, EVENT / CLASS 13A. B. GO TO ONOP 2-0360030, Operational Requirements for the Emergency Cooling Water Canal. CAUSES: Low intake water level may be created by at least ONE of the following:
- Atmospheric conditions causing Atlantic Ocean level to be lower than normal
- Intake Canal blockage (i.e. net, valve or tunnel)
REFERENCES 1. CWD 2998-B-327 sheet 1007
- 2. P&ID 2998-G-082 sheet 1
- 3. TEDB
- 4. CR 2009-5243, No Intake Level Instrumentation
(
REVISION: PROCEDURE TITLE: PANEL: 1 ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE LB PROCEDURE NO: WINDOW: 2-ARP-01-LB1 2-ARP-01-LB 1 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 1 ANNUNCIATOR PANEL LB INTAKE WATER LEVEL LOW LB-1 LB*1 DEVICE: LOCATION: SETPOINT: LS-21-58/1007 LS-21-5B/1007 IINTKl18/N-3/E-A NTKl18/N-3/E-A -9.0 feet elevation ALARM CONFIRMATION:
- 1. Local level indication.
NOTE The UE EAL is -10.5 foot. Due to lack of level instrumentation, the UE call will conservativel conservatively be made early. OPERATOR ACTIONS:
- 1. DISPATCH operator to locally check Intake Water Level.
- 2. If
!f Intake Water Level is confirmed to be less than approximately -9 Feet Elevation, Then PERFORM the following:
A. Declare an Unusual Event, EVENT / CLASS 13A
- 8. GO TO ONOP 2-0360030, Operational Requirements For The Emergency Cooling Water Canal.
B. CAUSES: Low intake water level may be created by at least ONE of the following:
- Atmospheric conditions causing Atlantic Ocean level to be lower than normal
- Intake Canal blockage (i.e. net, valve or tunnel)
REFERENCES 1. CWD 2998-B-327 2998-8-327 sheet 1007
- 2. P&ID 2998-G-082 sheet 1
- 3. TED8 TEDB
- 4. CR 2009-5243 No Intake Level Instrumentation
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 2 Group # 2 K/A# 086G2.4.18 Importance Rating 3.3 Fire Protection: Knowledge of the specific bases for EOP's Proposed Question: RO 65 Unit 1 and Unit 2 have evacuated the Control Rooms due to fires in the cable spreading rooms. Offsite power is available. 1(2)-ONP-1 00.02 Control Room Inaccessibility is being implemented.
- 1) Which ONE of the following states the Appendix R protected trains?
- 2) Which ONE of the following states the reason one Emergency Diesel Generator overspeed trip levers on each unit are placed in trip?
A. 1) Unit 1 A train components are protected. Unit 2 B train components are protected.
- 2) To prevent a start when the protective trips are disabled due to the
( Normal/Isolate switches placed in ISOLATE. B. 1) Unit 1 B train components area protected. Unit 2 A train components are protected.
- 2) To prevent an inadvertent start from a fire induced short circuit.
C. 1) Both Unit's A train is protected.
- 2) To prevent an inadvertent start from a fire induced short circuit.
D. 1) Both Units B train is protected.
- 2) To prevent a start when the protective trips are disabled due to the Normal/Isolate switches placed in ISOLATE.
( 129
(( Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: B train protected, Diesel Generator protective trips are NOT disabled with Normal Isolate switches in ISOLATE. B. Correct C. Incorrect: Unit 1 B train protected, Overs peed trip placed in trip to prevent inadvertent Overspeed start of Diesel if fire induced short caused a start condition. D. Incorrect: Unit 2 A train protected, Diesel Generator protective trips are NOT disabled with Normal Isolate switches in ISOLATE. Technical Reference(s): 1(2)-ONP-1 00.02 Control Room (Attach if not previously provided) Inaccessibility Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: _0~7,-,0=-=2=-=8-=-6-,-4----,,0-=-8________ _0_7_0_2_8_64_-_0_8_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As avai available) lable ) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 10 55.43 -- 1 -- - Comments: ( 130
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 22A CONTROL ROOM INACCESSIBILITY 10 of 83 PROCEDURE NO.: ,.,:F.<
"?'
1-0NP-100.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 6.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) ..... **if ic
*****x.*O;\}*. . *.* . *.
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION If there is a fire in the Cable Spreading Room or Control Room, only B Train
~ components can be relied on for plant control. A Train components may be
~ used but can NOT be relied upon.
~
- 11. If 1 1f there is a fire in the Cable Spreading Room, Then MANUALLY ACTUATE the Cable Spreading Room halon system as required if auto actuation does NOT occur.
- 12. §?,P
§7\f' 1f at any time the Incoming (Feeder)
If breaker trips or Control power is lost for B essential Swgr, L.C. or MeC, MCC, Then PERFORM Appendix M, High Impedance Fault Actions. ( NOTE
*II Positioning either V2508 or V2509 (-0.5' elevation south of BAMT room) will establish a flowpath from the BAMTs.
*.. V2504 is located in the 1C Charging Pump cubicle.
*.. V2501 is located in the VCT hallway.
- 13. ESTABLISH charging pump suction from BAM tanks by locally ensuring the following components are positioned as indicated, in the order given:
COMPONENT 10 ID COMPONENT NAME POSITION PERF INITIAL V2501 VCT Outlet MOV CLOSED V2504 VCT Bypass MOV CLOSED V2508 1B BAMT Outlet to Emerg Boration OPEN V2509 1A BAMT Outlet to Emerg Boration OPEN (
REVISION NO.: V' PROCI DURE TITLE.Ic PAGE: 22A CON} OL ROOM INACCESSIBILITY 15 of 83 PROCEDURE NO.: /) 1-0NP-100.02 / ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 6.0
.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS\ INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 23. (continued)
B.l B. .!fJ! offsite power is availal:: available, e, Then PERFORM the following
- 1. PLACE BOTH 1A EDG Overspeed trip leve s in TRIP by depressing the e ~gine mounted control parpa el Emergency Trip pus hbutton pushbutton (1 per engine).
NOTE
- Unloaded EDG run time ~hould hould be minimized (less than 30 minutes) to prevent oil soaking. 1-0 P-59.01A!B, 1-0$P-59.01 AlB, 1A!B 1AlB Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly SurvE Surv~illance, iIIance, provides actions to perform if an EDG runs unloaded or at low Ibad Ipad
, (less than 700KW) for more than 4.5 hours.
( I
- Local start of EDG will b}3 b~ required if overspeed levers are placed in TRIP and offsite power's power Is lost.
I I
- c. !fJ! offsite power is avail/able available and control of 1-8 1B EDG is Ipst, lost, Then CONSIDER placing SOTH BOTH 1B EDG Overspeed trip levers in TRIP by depressing the engine mounted control panel Emergency Trip pushbutton (1 per engine).
NOTE A natural circulation cooldown will require a 20.4 hour soak of the RCS at 325 00 F (T-hot) before shutdown coolin cooling ent entry conditions.
- 24. Periodically, as determined by the US, LOCALLY MONITOR the available condensate inventory and ENSURE an adequate supply to CST. (Refer to Data Sheet 4, Determination of Condensate Required to Remove Decay Heat.)
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 24 CONTROL ROOM INACCESSIBILITY 11 of 87 PROCEDURE NO.: 2-0NP-100.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.1 Operator Actions (continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS NOTE HSP control NOT established within 15 minutes following Control Room evacuation is a Site Area Emergency. CAUTION
- If the fire is in the Cable Spreading Room or Control Room, only A train components can be relied on for control of the Reactor and other plant components. B train components may be used but cannot be relied upon.
- For local operation of the valves listed in Appendix J, the thermal overload switch on breaker MUST be in the Maint / Test position.
- 10. When ALL of the following conditions are met:
(
- Appendix B critical actions are complete
- Appendix C is complete
- Appendix D 0 critical actions are complete Then PERFORM the following:
- NOTIFY SM control is established at the HSP
- CONTINUE with procedure
REVISION ION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 24 CONTROL ROOM INACCESSIBILITY 16 of 87 PROCEDURE NO.: 2-0NP-1 00.02 2-0NP-100.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2
./
6.1
.1 Operator Actions (continued)
INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 14. (continued)
G. 11 at any time a spurious ESFAS 1f occurs, Then PERFORM the following:
- 1. ENSURE the following components are positioned as indicated:
COMPONENT COMPONENT NAME POSITION 10 Bkr 2-20201 HP Safety Injection Pump No. 2A TRIPPED Bkr 2-20201 HP Safety Injection Pump No. 2A Close Fuses FUSES PULLED Bkr 2-20202 LP Safety Injection Pump No. 2A TRIPPED ( Bkr 2-20203 Containment Spray Pump 2A TRIPPED Bkr 2-20203 Containment Spray Pump 2A Close Fuses FUSES PULLED Bkr 2-20405 HP Safety Injection Pump No. 2B TRIPPED Bkr 2-20405 HP Safety Injection Pump No. 2B Close Fuses FUSES PULLED Bkr 2-20406 LP Safety Injection Pump 2B TRIPPED Bkr 2-20407 Containment Spray Pump No. 2B TRIPPED Bkr 2-20407 Containment Spray Pump No. 2B Close Fuses FUSES PULLED
- 2. 11 offsite power is available,
!f Then PERFORM the following:
- a. PLACE both 2B EDG Overspeed Overs peed Trip levers in TRIP by depressing the engine mounted control panel Emergency Stop pushbutton (one per engine).
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # Tier# 3 Group # KIA # G2.1.19 Importance Rating 3.9 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of plant computer to evaluate system or component status Proposed Question: RO 66 Unit 1 is performing a down power due to a small Steam Generator tube leak. A loss of the DEH computer has occurred. Which ONE of the following states the status of the DEH control system and how the down power will be performed due to the loss of the DEH computer? downpower DEH control system will be in: A. Turbine Manual. Governor valves will be manually controlled by GV lower pushbutton operating in SINGLE valve mode. B. Turbine Manual. Governor valves will be manually controlled by GV lower ( pushbutton operating in SEQUENTIAL valve mode. C. Operator Auto, however the Governor valves will be manually controlled by GV lower pushbutton operating in SINGLE valve mode. D. Operator Auto, however the Governor valves will be manually controlled by GV lower pushbutton operating in SEQUENTIAL mode. 131
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): A. Correct: Turbine will be in manual, Governor valves will be operated in single valve B. Incorrect: sequential valve not correct C. Incorrect: Control goes to turbine manual D. Incorrect: Control goes to turbine manual and valves operated in signal valve Technical Reference(s): 0711409 DEH Control System (Attach if not previously provided) 1-0NP-22.03 DEH Turbine Control System ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0'--7_0 ___2____4--'--0-'--9-____1_2_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) 0702409-12 Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 --- 10 55.43 Comments: ( 132
REVISION NO.: NO. PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 9 DEH TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM of 24 40f24 4 PROCEDURE NO.: NO. 2-0NP-22.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 3.0 RECORDS REQUIRED 3.1 RCO Chronological Log entries. 3.2 Completed Appendices and completed Data Sheet 1 shall be processed as QA records in accordance with QI-17-PSL-1, QI-17 -PSL-1, Quality Assurance Records. 4.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS 4.1 SYM PTOMS SYMPTOMS
- 1. Transfer - Automatic To Manual
- TURBINE MANUAL pushbutton is depressed on Operator Console B.
- TURBINE MANUAL pushbutton is LIT on Operator Console B.
- MAINT TEST keyswitch placed to TEST on Operator Console B.
(
- Spurious transfer to TURBINE MANUAL.
Loss Of DEH Computer
- TURBINE MANUAL pushbutton is LIT on Operator Console B.
- CONT CO NT OFF light LIT on Operator Console A.
- 3. Loss Of Power Supply To DEH Control Cabinet
** Annunciator 0-19, DEH DC Supply Trouble.
** EMERG POWER SUPPLY light LIT on Operator Console A. A
- TRANS RELAY 24V MONITOR light LIT on Operator Console A. A
** CONT OFF light LIT on Operator Console A. A
** CONT RESET light LIT on Operator Console B.
** TURBINE MANUAL pushbutton is LIT on Operator Console B.
- 4. MANUAL NOT TRACK'G AUTO light is LIT on Operator Console A. A
- 5. High limit pushbutton flashing on Operator Console B.
(
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 9 DEH TURBINE CONTROL SYSTEM ( PROCEDURE NO.: 8 of 24 8of24 2-0NP-22.03 ST. LUCIE UNIT 2 6.2 Loss Of DEH Computer INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS
- 1. 'I'
'f' RECORD initial conditions on Data Sheet 1, Initial Conditions. . NOTE
- The GV Raise and GV Lower pushbuttons operate on an exponential component. The longer the pushbutton is depressed, the faster the change in load will be made.
- Changing Chan change Reactor power.
in Turbine load will chan
- 2. 11 load changes are necessary, Then PERFORM the following:
A. CHANGE load using the following pushbuttons: push buttons: (
- GV Raise
- GV Lower B. PERFORM load changes in accordance with ONE of the following:
- 2-GOP-201, Reactor Plant Startup - Mode 2 to Mode 1.
- 2-GOP-123, Turbine Shutdown Full Load to Zero Load.
- 3. NOTIFY I&C.
- 4. CHECK the following indication:
- CaNT OFF light NOT LIT on CONT Operator Console A.
- CaNT CO NT RESET light LIT on Operator Console B.
0711409, Rev. 14 Page 32 of 69 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
- p. Valve Position Limit Display is lit when button is pushed. The Ref. Display will display present limit in % of full stroke. The Demand display will display present GV position demand. The light flashes when GV position is being limited.
- q. Valve Position Limit Lower and Valve Position Limit Raise are used to change the valve position limit.
- 1) Must select valve position limit display first.
- 2) Rate of change increases the longer the button is held down.
- r. Single Valve - Seq(uential) Valve
- 1) Split lens to indicate status. When transfer is in progress, the original mode is out and selected mode is flashing. When the transfer is complete, the new mode is steady and the other is out.
(
- 2) When the button is pushed, the mode will transfer from one to the other (must be in Operator Automatic).
- 3) Valve will stay in present position if controller shifts to turbine manual.
. Additional valve movements (while in Turbine Manual) will be in Single
. Valve mode (all valves may not be in same position).
0711409, Rev. 14 Page 29 of 69 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
- g. Invalid Request
- 1) Light flashes (no pushbutton) if:
>-~ Operator has attempted to enter unacceptable data
>-~ Operator has requested an improper (attempt to enter demand when GO is lit) or incomplete sequence valve status and number without TV or GV).
- h. Turbine Manual
- 1) Lit when in turbine manual.
- 2) Transfer is initiated by:
>-~ Pushbutton
>-~ Digital computer failure
>-~ Failure of 2 of 3 speed channels if in speed control
>-~ "Maint. Test" key in "Test"
Test
- i. TV Lower and TV Raise are lit and push pushbuttons buttons are operable to lower or raise all TVs (single valve control) if in turbine manual. Both lights are out and TV lower is blocked above 90% open.
- j. push buttons operable in turbine manual. When held down, Fast Action is lit and pushbuttons it changes the valve stroke time from 180 seconds to 45 seconds. Fast Actions should only be used when positioning the GVs for startup, TV to GV transfer, or when rapid closings are required.
- k. GV Lower and GV Raise are lit and operable to lower or raise all GVs (_~ (single ce::' **
valve control)
'_1[1_4 when..... '-=**
in turbine manual. I. Valve Status is used to display position (in % of total travel) of any TV or GV. The light flashes if a LVDT position does not agree with analog output when in auto.
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # Tier# 3 Group # KIA # G2.1.34 Importance Rating 2.7 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of primary and secondary chemistry limits Proposed Question: RO 67 Unit 1 has entered 1-0610030 'Secondary Chemistry - Off Normal' An Action level 3 Steam Generator parameter has been exceeded. Which parameter has been exceeded and what action is the plant required to take? A. Condensate Dissolved Oxygen. Shutdown to Mode 3 as quickly as safe plant operation permits. B. Condensate Dissolved Oxygen. Bring the parameter to below Action level 3 within 24 hours or perform a shutdown to Mode 3 as quickly as safe plant operation permits. ( C. Cation Conductuvity. Shutdown to Mode 3 as quickly as safe plant operation permits. D. Cation Conductuvity. Bring the parameter to below Action level 3 within 24 hours or perform a shutdown to Mode 3 as quickly as safe plant operation permits. 133
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: Dissolved Oxygen (DO) does not have an Action Level 3 value. DO only goes to Action Level 2. B. Incorrect: C. Correct: Cation Conductuvity is an Action level 3 parameter. If level exceeded, shutdown to Mode 3 as quickly as safe plant operation permits. D. Incorrect: immediate shutdown required. Technical Reference(s): 1-0610030 Secondary (Attach if not previously provided) Chemistry - Off Normal COP-05.04 Chemistry Department Surveillances and Parameters ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: - 0702860-08 _0.::...:7'---'0:..::2:..::8-=-60.::...:--=-08-=---_______
-------------------------- (As available)
Question Source: Bank # Bank# Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X- -_
-'X'--'--_
Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 10 55.43 - 5- - - Comments: 134
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: 24A SECONDARY CHEMISTRY - OFF NORMAL PROCEDURE NO.: 1-0610030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 5.3 Subsequent Actions (continued) NOTE
** Due to the operational complexities associated with meeting electrical demands and the potential for degrading equipment as a consequence of subjecting the plant to operational transients, the action levels specified herein should not be construed as absolute. By necessity, senior plant and corporate management must retain the flexibility to deviate from the time limits specified when in their judgement such deviations are warranted by the progress of the recovery, and would not be inconsistent with the stated objectives. If the decision to deviate from the time limit has been made, this fact will be conveyed to the affected units' Control Room by memo from the Operations Supervisor.
** SECONDARY CHEMISTRY ACTION LEVELS:
Three action levels have been defined for taking remedial action when monitored parameters are observed and confirmed to be outside the normal operation value. Normal operating value as it is used here refers to the value of the parameter which is consistent with long-term system reliability. Action Level 1 is implemented whenever an out-of-normal value is detected. Action Level 2 is instituted when conditions exist which ( have been shown to result in some degree of steam generator corrosion during extended full (100%) power operation. Action Level 3 is implemented when conditions exist which will result in rapid steam generator corrosion and continued operation is not advisable.
- 5. COP-05.04, Chemistry Department Contact Chemistry and/or refer to COP-OS.04, Surveillances and Parameters, and classify the severity of the excursion as either Action Level 1, Action Level 2 or Action Level 3.
- 6. Initiate required actions specified for the appropriate Action Level:
** For Action Level 1:
Objective: To promptly identify and correct the cause of an out-of-Guideline value without power reduction. Required Actions:
** For Condensate Dissolved Oxygen (D.O.) events, begin continuous monitoring of Feedwater D.O., ensure Feedwater Hydrazine is maintained greater than 8 times Condensate D.O.
maintained :s; S and ensure Feedwater D.O. is maintained:S; 5 ppb. is > S If Feedwater D.O. is> 5 ppb, take appropriate Action Level actions.
- Corrective actions should be implemented as soon as possible to return parameter to below Action Level 1.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 24A SECONDARY CHEMISTRY - OFF NORMAL i PROCEDURE NO.: 7of'1 3 1-0610030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 5.3 Subsequent Actions (continued)
- 6. (continued)
- For Action Level 1: (continued)
- If parameter is not within normal value range within one week following confirmation of excursion, go to Action Level 2 for those parameters having Action Level 2 values.
- The lack of progressive action criteria for many parameters is not intended to imply that remaining outside the normal range is satisfactory. In these cases, other chemical parameters, specifically associated with known corrosion conditions, are utilized for control.
- For those parameters not having an Action Level 2 value, an engineering justification should be performed for operating above Action Level 1 for an extended period of time.
time .
** For Action Level 2:
( Objective: To minimize corrosion by operating at reduced power while corrective actions are taken. Power reduction should be to a level which will reduce steam generator tube wall temperatures and impurity hideout rates while providing sufficient system flow to maintain automatic operation while the source of the impurity is eliminated. This reduced power level is typically approximately 30% of full power. Required Actions:
- For all Action Level 2 excursions, excluding Loss of hydrazine feed and Condensate Dissolved Oxygen, take immediate actions to reduce power to 28% - 32% using 1-0NP-22.01 Rapid Downpower, at a rate of 10-15 MW/min. This will ensure power is reduced within 8 hours of entering Action Level 2 limits.
- In event of loss of hydrazine feed that is not restored within 8 hours, commence a plant shutdown to Mode 2 per 1-0NP-22.01, Rapid Downpower, at a rate of 10-15 MW/min. When Hydrazine has been restored, the unit may be restored to full power.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 24A SECONDARY CHEMISTRY - OFF NORMAL 90Kj3 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-0610030 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 5.3 Subsequent Actions (continued)
- 6. (continued)
- i ' '~eE]~~¢ti~~;,beMe,I,3:
For Action Level 3: Objective: To correct a condition which is expected to result in rapid steam generator corrosion during continued operation. Plant shutdown will minimize ingress and eliminate further concentration of harmful impurities. Plant shutdown also will reduce further damage to the steam generator by allowing cleanup of the impurities as a result of hideout return. Required Actions:
- SHUTDOWN to at least Mode 3 as quickly as safe plant operation permits regardless of the duration of the excursion in Action Level 3.
- The preferred method to shutdown is to perform 1-0NP-22.01, Rapid Downpower, using a load rate of 10-15 MW/min.
(
- possible .
Remove the main turbine from service as soon as possible.
- After the turbine is off-line, then transfer from main feedwater to auxiliary feedwater as soon as possible.
- Cleanup steam generators by maximizing blowdown or drain and refill as appropriate until normal values are reached.
- Clean up secondary water chemistry using the condensate polisher and/or feed and bleed and/or drain and refill as appropriate until normal chemistry values as determined by the chemistry department are obtained and the leak/source of the contaminant is eliminated.
l
REVISION NO.: GUIDELINE TITLE: PAGE: 3B CONDENSER TUBE LEAK OR AIR LEAK ( 5 of 54 GUIDELINE NO.: CG-11 ST. LUCIE PLANT 4.0 PRECAUTIONS / LIMITATIONS 4.1 Definitions (Steam Generator Parameters)
\Y\\eli:Q'~.~L.e~eJx1',lCondenser Action Level 1 ~ondenser Leak *
~-'-- -,- - . '-" - - -, *.' "-"'._K Cation Conductivity > 0.8 micro mhos per centimeter (IJ.mho/cm)
(Ilmho/cm) Sodium > 5 parts per billion (ppb) Chloride > 10 ppb Sulfate > 10 ppb D.O. (condensate) > 10 ppb Action Level 2 Condenser Leak
- Cation Conductivity > 1 IJ.mho/cm Ilmho/cm Sodium > 50 ppb
( > 50 ppb Chloride Sulfate > 50 ppb D.O. (condensate) > 30 ppb / 50 ppb ** Action Level 3 Condenser Leak
- Cation Conductivity > 4lJ.mho/cm 4llmho/cm Sodium > 250 ppb Chloride > 250 ppb Sulfate > 250 ppb
- Increase in these parameters can be caused by problems other than condenser leaks.
** D.O. may exceed 30 ppb, up to 50 ppb for 24 hours prior to initiating ACTION REQUIRED.
(
SION NO.: REVISION PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 47 CHEMISTRY DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCES 49 of 105 PROCEDURE NO.: AND PARAMETERS 0-COP-05.04 O-COP-05.04 ST. LUCIE PLANT APPENDIX D NUCLEAR CHEMISTRY PARAMETERS (Page 19 of 72) PRIMARY SYSTEM CHEMISTRY ACTION LEVELS (continued)
~ Action Level 1 Objective:
The Action Level 1 value of a parameter represents the threshold value, beyond which plant data or engineering judgment indicates that long-term system reliability may be affected, thereby warranting an improvement of operating practices. Actions to be taken if a parameter exceeds the Action Level 1 Value: a) Efforts shall be made to bring the parameter to below the Action Level 1 value within seven (7) days. b) If the parameter has not been restored to below the Action Level 1 ( value within seven (7) days, a technical review* shall be performed and a program for implementing corrective measures instituted. Such a program may require equipment additions or modifications over the long term.
- It is required that each plant perform a formal technical review for prolonged abnormal water chemistry conditions. The review shall address an evaluation of the condition, informing appropriate levels of management of the existence of the condition and its implications, and the possible corrective measures over the short and long terms.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 47 CHEMISTRY DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCES 50 of 105 PROCEDURE NO.: AND PARAMETERS 0-COP-05.04 0-COP-OS.04 ST. LUCIE PLANT APPENDIX D NUCLEAR CHEMISTRY PARAMETERS (Page 20 of 72) PRIMARY SYSTEM CHEMISTRY ACTION LEVELS (continued)
. Action Level 2 Objective:
The Action Level 2 value of a parameter represents the threshold value, beyond which plant data or engineering judgment indicates significant damage could be done to the system in the short term, thereby warranting a prompt correction of the abnormal condition. Actions to be taken if a parameter exceeds the Action Level 2 Value: a) Efforts shall be made to bring the parameter to below the Action Level 2 value within 24 hours. b) If the parameter has not been restored to below the Action Level 2 ( value within 24 hours, an orderly unit shutdown shall be initiated and the plant shall be brought to a cold shutdown condition as quickly as permitted by other plant constraints. If chemistry is improved to below the Action Level 2 value prior to plant shutdown, full power operation may be resumed. c) Following a unit shutdown caused by exceeding the time limit on an Action Level 2 value, a technical review* of the incident shall be performed and appropriate corrective measures taken before the unit is restarted.
- It is required that each plant perform a formal technical review for prolonged abnormal water chemistry conditions. The review shall address an evaluation of the condition, informing appropriate levels of management of the existence of the condition and its implications, and the possible corrective measures over the short and long terms.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: '.' 47 CHEMISTRY DEPARTMENT SURVEILLANCES 51 of 105'. PROCEDURE NO.: AND PARAMETERS O-COP-05.04 0-COP-05.04 ST. LUCIE PLANT APPENDIX D 0 NUCLEAR CHEMISTRY PARAMETERS (Page 21 of 72) PRIMARY SYSTEM CHEMISTRY ACTION LEVELS (continued) Action Level 3 Objective: The Action Level 3 value of a parameter is the threshold value, beyond which plant data or engineering judgment indicates that it is inadvisable to continue to operate the plant. Actions to be taken if a parameter exceeds the Action Level 3 Value: a) An orderly unit shutdown shall be initiated immediately, with reduction of coolant temperature to <250°F as rapidly as other plant constraints permit. *
- If chemistry is improved to within the requirements of Action Level
( 3 prior to plant shutdown, power operation may be resumed, subject to the requirements of other Action Levels. b) Following a unit shutdown caused by entering an Action Level 3 condition, a technical review** of the incident shall be performed and appropriate corrective measures taken before the unit is restarted.
** It is required that each plant perform a formal technical review for prolonged abnormal water chemistry conditions. The review shall address an evaluation of the condition, informing appropriate levels of management of the existence of the condition and its implications, and the possible corrective measures over the short and long terms.
(
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 3 Group # KIA # G2.1.4 Importance Rating 3.3 Conduct of operations: Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as medical requirements 'no solo' operation, maintenance of active license status 10CFR55 etc. Proposed Question: R068 RO 68 You are an Active Licensed Reactor Operator and have just completed your Biennial physical exam. The Medical Review Officer (MRO) has informed you; you have high blood pressure and must start medication to control this condition. Which ONE of the following states your ability to stand watch in a Tech Spec position? You can: A. NOT stand watch, however as soon as you start taking blood pressure medication, you will be considered active and can stand shift. Your license will now have a restriction to take the required medication. B. NOT stand watch until your medication is started and the Medical review officer re-examines you and determines your blood pressure is acceptable. Your license will now have a restriction to take the required medication. C. stand watch until proven the blood pressure medication is not effective in controlling the condition. Your License will NOT have a restriction as long as the medication is controlling the condition. D. stand watch until the NRC reviews your condition to determine if the medication can control the condition. Your License will NOT have a restriction as long as the medication is controlling the condition. 135
Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: License is not active until blood pressure is proven to be controlled B. Correct C. Incorrect: License will have a restriction to take blood pressure medication to meet conditions D. Incorrect: Medical Review officer makes determination as to medication Technical Reference(s): NAP-40S License Maintenance NAP-40B (Attach if not previously provided) and Activation Program ADM-1S.09 Tracking of ADM-1B.09 Licensed Operators and License Candidates ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: 0904724-02 _0-=-9-=-0'----4'-.'-7-=2'----4---=0-=2________
--------------------------- (As available)
Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 -
----~-
55.43 Comments: ( 136
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 2 TRACKING OF LICENSED OPERATORS AND 8 of 34 PROCEDURE NO.: LICENSE CANDIDATES ADM-1B.09 ADM-18.09 ST. LUCIE PLANT
-~
3.11 The Reactor Operator Candidate or the Senior Reactor Operator Cand Candidate I Applicant (Upgrade or Instant) is responsible for: .
- 1. Completing his I her questionnaire form (Appendix A) completely and accurately and obtaining the requested documentation as stated on the form for verification.
- 2. Reviewing his I her license application and medical certification to ensure all questions are answered completely and accurately.
- 3. Upon licensing of the applicant by the NRC, he I she shall be responsible for complying with the conditions as stated on the license by the NRC (e.g., blood pressure reports, wearing of eyeglasses, operating the controls while another is present, etc.).
- 4. Notifying his I her supervisor and Department Manager in writing if there is a change in medical status that may affect the applicant becoming licensed as outlined in ANS 3.4.
12 3.12 The PSL Licensing Department is responsible for: ( 1. Notifying the NRC within 30 days of felony conviction, restriction change, license termination and 30 days prior to license expiration for renewals.
- 2. Initiate or coordinate the preparation of the notification to the NRC in accordance with QI-2-PRlPSL-5.
QI-2-PR/PSL-5.
- 3. Reviewing the license package in accordance with QI-2-PR/PSL-5.
- 4. Distributing the license package in accordance with QI-2-PR/PSL5 QI-2-PR/PSL5..
.0 4.0 DEFINITIONS .1 4.1 Applicant
- An individual applying for an operator or senior operator license.
4.2 Commission
- Nuclear Regulatory Commission or its duly authorized representatives.
4.33 Designated Medical Examiner
- A physician appointed by a facility to examine licensees and applicants.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 2 TRACKING OF LICENSED OPERATORS AND 7 of 34:'" PROCEDURE NO.: LICENSE CANDIDATES ADM-18.09 ST. LUCIE PLANT 3.8 The Physician is responsible for:
- 1. Determining whether the applicant meets the requirements of 10 10 CFR 55.33 (a) (1) and ANS 3.4 by gathering the data needed to complete NRC Form 396.
3.9 Site Medical is responsible for: ::0 N
- 1. Immediately notifying the individual's Department Manager, Licensing, and Training of changing medical condition to ensure adequate time to meet NRC reporting requirements.
- 2. Initiate a Condition Report to identify a change in medical status of a Licensed Operator to track NRC notification requirements.
- 3. Supply back up documentation for any restrictions or changes in medical status.
- 4. Update LMS as physicals are completed. ....
- 0 N
3.10 Licensed operators are responsible for the following: ((~
- 1. Reviewing his / her license application and medical certification to ensure all questions are answered completely and accurately.
- 2. Complying with the conditions as stated on the license by the NRC (e.g., blood pressure reports, wearing of eyeglasses, operating the controls while another is present, etc.).
- 3. Notifying his / her supervisor and Department Manager immediately of a felony conviction with copies to the AOM, Licensing Manager and Training Manager.
- 4. Notifying his / her supervisor and Department Manager in writing if there is a change in medical status that may affect the license as outlined in ANS 3.4 (AOM, Licensing Manager and with copies to the appropriate supervisors (ADM, Training Manager) as soon as possible to allow time for paperwork to be processed in accordance with a 10 CFR 50.74 requirement that the NRC be notified of the change in medical restriction within 30 days. (Some examples would be heart failure or if the licensee did not wear corrective lenses six months ago, but now is required to wear corrective lenses, or if the licensee wears corrective lenses and had surgery to correct the eyesight).
PROCEDURE RE NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: NAP-408 LICENSE MAINTENANCE AND 6 of 26 SION NO.: REVISION ACTIVATION PROGRAM 9 3.4 Shift Manager (SM)
- 1. Ensures that individuals enrolled in a formal license training program are under the direction and in the presence of a licensed operator or senior operator when manipulating facility controls.
- 2. activation/reactivation of their licenses Ensures licensees under instruction for the activationlreactivation are under the direction and in the presence of a licensed operator or senior operator as appropriate.
- 3. Ensures licensees complete all required time on shift, plant tours, and required documentation in support of activation, reactivation, and maintaining of individual licenses. This includes adequate documentation on Attachment A, License Watch-Standing Record, of time spent outside the control room WatCh-Standing room..
.5 3.5 Operations Training Supervisor
- 1. Ensures that each active licensee meets the training requirements for actively performing the function of a licensed or senior licensed operator, including medical, SCBA, emergency preparedness, and other training requirements.
(
- 2. Promptly notifies the AOM of any license training discrepancies.
- 3. Ensures that training and qualification documentation is properly vaulted.
3.6 Licensee
- 1. Ensures that license activation, reactivation, and the maintenance of an active license fully complies with the requirements delineated in this procedure.
- 2. Verifies compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 55 by his/her Signature signature on the applicable activation records contained in this procedure.
- 3. Notifies the Shift Manager immediately of any of the following:
A. Conviction of a felony B. Changes in medical conditions (physical or mental) that could adversely affect his or her ability to safely and competently perform licensed duties.
- 4. Submits completed records to the Shift Manager for review and signature.
- 5. Forwards completed records to the Operations Continuing Training Supervisor in a timely manner.
PROCEDURE NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: NAP-408 LICENSE MAINTENANCE AND 7 of 26 REVISION NO.: ACTIVATION PROGRAM 9 4.0 INSTRUCTIONS NOTE
- A complete shift (8 or 12 hours) is from "watch relief to watch relief,"
4.1.1.8, applies to section 4.1.1. B, and includes shift turnover time in accordance with NUREG-1262. The shift turnover duration shall conform to the current shift rotation schedule.
- Unit Supervisor duties may require some presence outside of the Control Room; however approximately 6/9 hours for each 8/12 hour shift, respectively, should be spent in the Control Room. The duties and responsibilities of the Shift Manager will require additional time outside the Control Room above that delineated for the Unit Supervisor. In all cases, time spent outside of the Control Room shall be documented on Attachment A.
- To activate/reactivate or maintain a senior operator license in an active status the licensee shall actively perform the functions of a Unit Supervisor or Shift Manager.
- A shift crew position in excess of those required by Technical Specification shall have a description of how the position is meaningfully
( and fully engaged in the functions and duties of the analogous minimum licensed position(s) required by Technical Specification. This description should be documented in a site specific procedure. 4.1 Maintenance of Active License Status
- 1. The licensee shall:
A. Actively perform the functions of an operator or senior operator, as appropriate, in a shift crew position required by Technical Specifications (TS) or shift crew position in excess of those SpeCifications required by Technical Specifications. (i.e., Reactor Operator, Unit Supervisor, or Shift Manager). B. Complete a minimum of 56 hours per calendar quarter in the position described in (A) above. pOSition
- 1. To complete the 56-hour minimum requirement, either seven 8-hour or five 12-hour shifts are acceptable.
- 2. The complete 8-hour or 12-hour shifts shall include participation in shift turnovers.
- 3. Watches shall not be truncated when the operator satisfies the minimum quarterly requirement (56 hours).
- 4. Hours shall be in the same/current calendar quarter.
C. Ensure the watch-standing position is logged in the Control Room Shift Log.
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # Tier# 3 Group # KIA # G2.35 Importance Rating 3.6 Equipment control: Ability to determine Technical Specification Mode of Operation Proposed Question: RO 69 Unit 1 is in a refueling outage. Which ONE of the following states when Mode 5 is entered? Mode 5 is entered when: A. the FIRST stud and nut on the Head is fully tensioned. B. the LAST stud and nut on the Head is fully tensioned. C. the Reactor Vessel head is first placed on the Reactor Vessel flange. D. ALL the studs and nuts have completed the FIRST pass of tensioning. ( 137
Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: Mode 6, fuel bundle required to be lowering into the core. Mode 5 requires ALL studs and nuts FULLY tensioned. B. Correct C. Incorrect D. Incorrect Technical Reference(s): Operations Department Policy (Attach if not previously provided) OPS-503 Technical Specification Guidance T.S. Table 1.2 Operational Modes Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: 0902713-01 (As available) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) ( New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge - X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 10CFRPart55Content: 55.41 7,10 55.43 2 Comments: 138
ST. LUCIE PLANT OPS-503 ( OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT POLICY Rev. 35 Date 05/04/09 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION GUIDANCE Page 3 of 34
- 2. Core Alterations A. The following evolutions are conside red to be Core Alterations dur ing refueling:
- 1. Fuel shuffle
- 2. CEA Shuffle
- 3. Any other evolution altering core components with the UGS NOT in place.
B. The following evolutions are NOT considered to be Core Alterations:
- 1. Latching / unlatching CEAs
- 2. Withdrawing 4-fingered CEAs into the UGS (Unit 2)
- 3. Raising / lowering of the Instrument Plate
( 4. Lifting / lowering the Reactor Vessel Head
- 5. Lifting / Lowering the Upper Guide Structure
- 3. Modes 6 Entry / Exit A. Mode 6 is considered entered from Mode 5 when the first stud and nut on 0n the Reactor Vessel Head is less than fully tensioned.
~,' Mode 6 is exited into the defueled condition when the last fuel bundle has been transferred to the S pent Fuel Pool.
Spent C; Mode 6 is considered entered from a defueled condition when the Refueling Machine is positioned over the core and begins to lower a fuel assembly into a defueled Reactor Vessel. D. Mode 5 is considered entered from Mode 6 when the LAST stud and nut on the Reactor Vess Vesselel Head has been ten tensioned sioned on the last pass of tensioning all Reactor Vessel Head studs and nuts.
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TABLE 1.2 ( OPERATIONAL MODES REACTIVITY % RATED AVERAGE COOLANT MODE CONDITION, ~ff Keff THERMAL POWER* TEMPERATURE
- 1. POWER OPERATION ~ 0.99
.::: >5% ~ 325°F
- 2. STARTUP ~
.::: 0.99 :;:5%
.:::5% ~ 325°F
- 3. HOT STANDBY < 0.99 0 ~ 325°F
- 4. HOT SHUTDOWN < 0.99 0 325°F> Tavg
> 200°F
- 5. COLD SHUTDOWN < 0.99 0 :;:
.::: 200°F
- 6. REFUELlNG** ~ 0.95
.::: 0 ~ 140°F
- Excluding decay heat.
( ** Fuel in the reactor vessel with the vessel head closure bolts less than fully tensioned or with the head removed. ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1 1-9 ~, 69 Amendment No. 28,
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier Tier# # 3 Group # KIA # G2.2.39 Importance Rating 3.9 Knowledge of less than or equal to one hour Technical Specification action Statements for systems. Proposed Question: RO 70 Unit 1 has been in a refueling outage for 12 days. The core is being unloaded with the following in service:
- 1A Wide Range Neutron Monitor
- 1B Wide Range Neutron Monitor
- 1A SOC Loop is in service with 3300 gpm flow rate.
- 1B SOC Loop is available but NOT operating.
Which ONE of the following would require suspending core alterations in accordance with Technical Specifications? A. 'A' Train manual initiation CIAS surveillance failed. ( B. NO audible indication in the Control Room from the 1B Wide Range Nuclear Instrumentation. C. NO visual indication in the Control Room from the 1A Wide Range Nuclear Instrumentation. O. The 1B SOC loop is removed from service due to a leaking CCW cooler line. ( 139
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: CIAS only required when moving 'recently irradiated' <<72 hour shutdown fuel) fuel. B. Incorrect: Unit 1 DOES NOT REQUIRE audible indication in the control room. Only Unit 2 has this requirement. C. Correct: each Wide Range requires VISUAL indication in the control room D. Incorrect: spec only applicable when <23 feet of water over top of fuel assemblies. >23 feet only requires ONE operable SDC loop. Fuel movement requires >23 feet of water over fuel assemblies. Technical Reference(s): T.S.3.9.2 (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: ( Learning Objective: 0902713-06 (As available) Question Source: Bank # Bank# Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 7, 10 55.43 -- 2 --- Comments: ( 140
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REFUELING OPERATIONS INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.2 As a minimum, two wide range logarithmic neutron flux monitors sshall 0 perati ng, ~~l'1r~j~l§l,t~~fi;l;tjElIj'Ol!i'$~i ha II be operating, each with continuous visual< ,i~,~:HGatlolr~jmitln~,:c~Cffl-indication;in the co~-
.;,t;f:;~.1i~~a~~lrfi!!ll"~~~~,Q~~t~i.$:~,,~.~~J;g{i;~I~**ii.~.~M~9ti' trol room and one with audible indication in the"'~~~t~~~'~~f1\tt"§;,containment.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 6. ACTION: With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or operations that would cause introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the boron concentration of Technical Specification 3.9.1. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.2 Each wide range logarithmic neutron flux monitor shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:
- a. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 7 days.
( b. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 8 hours prior to the start of CORE ALTERATIONS, and
- c. A CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours during CORE AL TERATIONS.
ALTERATIONS. ST. LtJC:tE- UNIT 1 3/4 9-2 Amendment No. 179
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"'l REFUELING OPERATIONS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.9 The containment isolation system shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: During movement of recently irradiatedfuel assemblies within containment. ACTION: With the containment isolation system inoperable, either suspend all operations involving movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies within containment or close each of the penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere. SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.9 The containment isolation system shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 72 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during movement of recently irradiated fuel assemblies by verifying that containment isolation occurs on manual initiation and on a high radiation signal from two of the containment radiation monitoring instrumentation channels. ( ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1 3/4 9-9 Amendment No. 4G, +W, ~, 400, -Mg, 4-M, 202
REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.2 As a minimum, two startup range neutron flux monitors shall be OPERABLE and operating, each with continuous visual indication in the control room and one with audible indication in the containment,. containment and
.. control
.. room.
APPLICABILITY: MODE 6. ACTION:
- a. With one of the above required monitors inoperable or not operating, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or operations that would cause introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the boron concentration of Technical Specification 3.9.1.
- b. With both of the above required monitors inoperable or not operating, determine the boron concentration of the Reactor Coolant System at least once per 12 hours.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.2 Each startup range neutron flux monitor shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:
- a. A CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours,
- b. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 8 hours prior to the initial start of CORE ALTERATIONS, and
- c. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 7 days days..
- hsr 5T. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 9-2 3/49-2 Amendment No. 122
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# 3 Group # KIA # G2.3.13 Importance Rating 3.4 Radiation Control: Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties Proposed Question: RO 71 Unit 1 is at 100% power preparing for Unit shutdown for a refueling outage. The 1A Charging pump is running and the RCO is preparing to start the 1B Charging pump lAW 1-NOP-02.02
'Charging and Letdown'.
Which ONE of the following is the correct order to start the 1B Charging Pump? A. 1) Start the 1B Charging pump.
- 2) Contact the SNPO to ensure the 1 B Charging pump is operating properly.
- 3) Notify Health Physics the 1B B Charging pump is running.
B. 1) Contact the SNPO to ensure the 1B Charging pump is ready to operate.
- 2) Notify Health Physics of the pending start of the 1 B B Charging pump.
- 3) Approximately 15 minutes later, start the 1B Charging pump.
( C. 1) Notify Health Physics of the pending start of the 1 B B Charging pump.
- 2) Start the 1B B Charging pump.
- 3) Contact the SNPO to ensure the 1B Charging pump is operating properly.
D. 1) Contact the SNPO to ensure the 1B Charging pump is ready to operate.
- 2) Approximately 15 minutes later, start the 1B B Charging pump.
- 3) Notify Health Physics the 1B B Charging pump is running.
141
Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: If starting the Charging pump in an off normal or emergency situation this sequence is acceptable. B. Correct C. Incorrect: Normal starting of Charging pump requires SNPO notified prior to start D. Incorrect: Health Physics required to be notified prior to start Technical Reference(s): 1-NOP-02.02 Charging and (Attach if not previously provided) Letdown ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: --'-07_0_2-'-CS-'-O_1----'-O0-'_1--1_ _0_7_0_2--=-80-=-1_---' ____ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge
-X- -
Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 --- 12 55.43 --- 4 Comments: 142
ON NO.: REVISION PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 39 CHARGING AND LETDOWN 23 of 85 IPR()CEDUF~E PROCEDURE NO.: 1-NOP-02.02 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 6.5
.5 Normal Plant Operation (continued)
- 4. If
!f Charging Pump (s) are to be started, Then PERFORM the following:
A. ENSURE that each Charging pump that is desired to be started is ready to operate by local inspection by the SNPO. CAUTION Placing a second or third charging pump in service will increase letdown flow which may cause the general area dose rates in the vicinity of the letdown line in the 19.5' Pipe Penetration room or 19.5' Letdown Cubicle room to exceed 1000 mr/hr (Locked High Radiation Area limit) due to reduced tra ort time of short lived radioactive isotopes. transport *conT.nnt:>co B. NOTIFY NOTI FY Health Physics of the pending charging pump alignment. C. ALLOW approximately 15 minutes for Health Physics to verify no personnel are in close proximity to Letdown piping, and to perform radiological surveys. D. If in Modes 1 or 2, Then PLACE V2520, Ion Exchanger Bypass Valve,
!f in BYPASS to minimize the reactivity effects of changing letdown temperature.
NOTE It may be necessary to change the scale on the Victoreen Letdown Rad Monitor (Channel 41) when changing Charging Pump combinations. I E. START the Charging pump. F. ADJUST the bias on HIC-1110, HIC-111 0, Pzr Level Ltdn Cntl Vlv, to control the letdown flow to maintain the actual Pressurizer level to program RRS Pressurizer level for current plant conditions, if required. G. If FIA-2212, Chg Flow to Regen Hx, is in service, Then VERIFY proper
!f Charging Header Flow by observing FIA-2212 raise and stabilize for the number of Charging Pumps that are running.
H. If
!f FIA-2212 is NOT in service, Then VERIFY proper Charging Header flow by observing Letdown flow and expected changes in Pressurizer level for the number of Charging pumps that are running.
I. After an additional Charging pump is started and when the Charging Header flow has stabilized at the expected value, Then STOP the Charging Pump that was running previously, if desired, and VERIFY Charging flow is as expected.
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier # 3 Group # KIA # G2.3.4 Importance Rating 3.2 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. Proposed Question: RO 72 A St. Lucie non-licensed operator is being sent to perform a valve alignment in the RAB. The dose rate in the area of the job is 120 mr/hr. The operator's exposure record to date for the year is 890 mrem. What is the MAXIMUM time the Operator can stay in this area without exceeding his FPL annual limit? (assume NO extension allowed) A. 40 minutes B. 45 minutes C. 54 minutes ( D. 60 minutes ( 143
Proposed Answer: C Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: 970 mrem B. Incorrect 980 mrem C. Correct: 1000 mrem maximum annual limit without extension D. Incorrect: 1010 mrem Technical Reference(s): HP-2 FP&L Health Physics (Attach if not previously provided) Manual ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0_7_0_2_9_1-' 0702910-07 _0_7_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # 2034 Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge Comprehension or Analysis x 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 12
----'-..::=---
55.43 --- 4 Comments: 144
Nuclear Plant Support Services NPSS-HP-WP-OO 1I NUCLEAR DIVISION Rev. 15 IS Date: 08/27/08 Radiation Protection Manual Page 32 of 79 on NRC Form 4. An attempt should be made to obtain the records of lifetime cumulative occupational radiation dose for FPL employees. They can provide an up-to-date NRC Form 4 that they have signed. Documentation of the attempt to obtain an individual's dose records shall be maintained on file. For non-FPL employees the person may provide a written estimate of their current cumulative lifetime dose. [Note: Estimated lifetime dose can be obtained via PADS].
- 3. Prior to performing a Planned Special Exposure (PSE), a written record verifying the person's lifetime radiation exposure shall be obtained and maintained on file.
NOTE Guideline extensions normally apply to administrative guidelines established for the quantity Total Effective Dose Equivalent. It is unlikely that the lens dose equivalent or shallow dose equivalent limits for the skin or to any extremity would ever be exceeded, ( and would not be the dose limiting factor.
- 4. The approval process for allowing a worker to receive occupational dose, provided that all current year exposure has been documented, is as follows:
NOTE Sections a and b apply to site annual TEDE doses. (
- a. At the beginning of each calendar year, each worker is allowed to receive up to 1000 mrem TEDE without a dose extension.
- b. Greater than 1000 mrem/year TEDE site exposure requires review from the Health Physics Supervisor and approval from the Plant General Manager.
(1) Greater than 2500 mrem/year TEDE site exposure requires review from the Health Physics Supervisor
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# Tier # 3 Group # KIA # G2.4.18 Importance Rating 3.3 Emergency procedures/Plan: Knowledge of the specific bases for EOP's Proposed Question: RO 73 Unit 1 has tripped from 100% power. 1-EOP-99, "Loss of Offsite Power / Loss of Forced Circulation" has been implemented. The 1A EDG is NOT running and the 1B 1B EDG is running loaded on its respective bus. Which ONE ONt:: of the following MINIMUM conditions indicates when 1-EOP-09 can be exited? (assume all Safety Functions are being met in 1-EOP-09) A. The 1A EDG has been started and is loaded on its respective bus. A cool down to Shutdown Cooling conditions is desired. B. The 1A EDG has been started and is loaded on its respective bus. Maintaining Mode 3 conditions is desired. ( C. Both 1A3 4.16 KV AND 1B3 4.16 KV buses have been restored from the Unit 1 Startup Transformers. A cool down to Shutdown Cooling conditions is desired. D. The 1A3 4.16 KV OR 1B3 4.16 KV buses have been restored from a Unit 1 Startup Transformer. Maintaining Mode 3 conditions is desired. 145
Proposed Answer: 0 Explanation (Optional): A) Incorrect: Exit criteria must have at least ONE vital bus restored from its own startup transformer. B) S) Incorrect: Exit criteria must have at least ONE vital bus restored from its own startup transformer. C) IncorreCt: Incorrect: do not need BOTH vital buses restored from its own startup transformer D) Correct: Reference( s): Technical Reference(s): 1-EOP-09 Loss of Offsite Power (Attach if not previously provided) Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: 0702835-04 (As available) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge -x X- - Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 10
-----'-'~-
55.43 - Comments: 146
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 21 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER/LOSS OF FORCED 5 of2B of 26 PROCEDURE NO.: CIRCULATION 1-EOP-09 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 3.0 EXIT CONDITIONS 3.1 . ANY of the following conditions exist,
- 1. The diagnosis of a LOOP/LOFC is NOT confirmed.
- 2. ANY of the LOOP/LOFC Safety Function Status Checks acceptance criteria are NOT satisfied.
- 3. The LOOP/LOFC procedure has accomplished its purpose by satisfying ALL of the following:
A. ALL SFSC acceptance criteria are being satisfied. B. At least ONE Vital 4.16 KV bus has power restored from a Unit 1 Startup Transformer. C. The need for a plant cooldown has been evaluated or a cooldown is NOT required and maintaining Mode 3 conditions is desired. D. An appropriate approved procedure to implement exists. (
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier Tier# # 3 Group # KIA # G2.4.18 Importance Rating 3.3 Emergency procedures/Plan: Knowledge of the specific bases for EOP's Proposed Question: RO 73 Unit 1 has experienced a Loss of Offsite power (LOOP). 1-EOP-01 Standard Post Trip actions are complete. The Unit Supervisor has announced to the crew 1-EOP-09 LOOP is being entered. . Which ONE of the following states the procedure actions that are performed to pI: pr: tect the:
- 1) Main Condenser?
- 2) RCP seals?
A. 1) Close the MSIV's and ensure Steam Generat Blowown is isolated.
- 2) Depressurize the RCS to between 1800-18 0 psia.
B. 1) Close the MSIV's and ensure Steam G erator Blowown is isolated. ( 2) Open V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief St p Valve. C. 1) Manually opening the Condenser. Condenser acuum breakers.
- 2) Depressurize the RCS to betw en 1800-1850 psia.
D. 1) Manually opening the Con enser Vacuum breakers.
- 2) Open V2507, RCP Blee ff Relief Stop Valve.
( 145
Proposed Answer: A Explanation (Optional): A) Correct: B) Incorrect: part one correct, part two is performed only if CIAS has isolated the normal RCP bleedoff flowpath to the VCT. C) Incorrect: part one not correct. Opening the condenser vacuum breakers is not a step in 1-EOP-09 LOOP. It is plausible due to the fact when MSIV's are closed vacuum will be lost due to air being drawn into the condenser through the LP turbine steam seals which is undesired. During normal plant shutdown breaking of vacuum is by opening the vacuum breakers. D) Incorrect: both part one and part two incorrect Technical Reference(s): 1-EOP-09 Loss of Offsite Power (Attach if not previously provided) ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _0_7_0_2_8_3_5-_1_4 0702835-14_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank # Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 10 55.43 -- 1 -- - Comments: ( 146
The operators are directed to control the charging system (and when available, letdown) to maintain RCS inventory control. Pressurizer level should be maintained at the programmed level. If letdown is not available, pressurizer level may be allowed to vary over a range of 10 to 68 percent. Level should be maintained however, above 27% to permit pressurizer heater operation. Directions are given to restore emergency instrument air to operation, since a LOOP will cause normal instrument air to be lost. The operators are directed to isolate CCW to the RCPs and Controlled Bleedoff if CCW is lost to the RCPs for greater than or equal to 30 minutes to ensure RCP seal integrity. RCS pressure control is maintained by the use of pressurizer heaters and auxiliary spray between 1800 and 1850 psia and within the limits of 1[2]-EOP-99 Figure 1A to maintain RCP seal temperatures. The use of available pressurizer heaters is monitored to ensure diesel generator loading limits are not exceeded. The operators verify natural circulation flow in at least one loop by all the following: (
- Loop Delta T (T H - Tc) less than normal full power Delta T (50°F),
- T-hot constant or decreasing,
- T-cold constant or decreasing,
- RCS subcooling is greater than or equal to the minimum subcooling based on representative core exit thermocouple (rep CET) as determined using 1[2]-EOP-99 Figure 1A,
- No abnormal differences (greater than 20°F) between T H and rep CET temperature.
The operators are directed to periodically check EDG day tank fuel oil levels. In addition, if the other unit has experienced a station blackout, they are directed to supply that unit with AC power per EOP-99. While the operators are ensuring that all safety functions are being satisfied, the restoration of the non-vital buses should be pursued. When offsite power becomes ( available, electrical AC power is restored to the electrical distribution system. When a 0711835 Rev 7, Page 13 of 54 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
ATT 1-2
- 11. Given a Loss of Offsite Power event and EOP-09 (Loss of Offsite Power) the student should be able to:
A. Describe two methods for ensuring at least one steam generator is available to remove heat. B. Determine if sufficient AFW flow is available to satisfy the RCS Heat Removal Safety Function.
- 12. Describe the beneficial information gained as a result of the St. Lucie Natural Circulation Cooldown events to include:
A. Why the formation of a steam bubble in the reactor vessel upper head is more likely during a natural circulation cooldown than a forced circulation cooldown. B. Why the cooldown rate directly effects the tendency for reactor vessel upper head steam formation during a natural circulation cooldown. C. How the pressurizer level can be utilized to identify reactor vessel upper head steam formation during a natural circulation cooldown.
- 13. Given plant conditions, utilize all graphs, charts, and calculation aids associated with the implementation of EOPs.
( 1
- 14. Describe the basis for operator actions included in all steps, notes, and cautions in the EOPs.
- 15. Given plant conditions, determine which safety functions are not being met and the order in which they should be addressed.
0702835, Rev. 08, Page 27 of 27 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
11..f1~ih/ c~ REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 21 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER/LOSS OF FORCED 90f26 PROCEDURE NO.: CIRCULATION 1-EOP-09 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 8. Depressurize the RCS A. COMMENCE depressurizing the RCS to between 1800 and 1850 psia. B. MAINTAIN pressurizer level between 10 and 68%. o 9. Protect Main Condenser A. If a LOOP has occurred, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following to protect the Secondary Plant:
- 1. ENSURE MSIVs are
( CLOSED.
- 2. ENSURE SGBD is ISOLATED.
B. STABILIZE the Secondary Plant. REFER TO Appendix X, Secondary Plant Post Trip Actions, Section 2. o 10. Stabilize RCS Temperature 10.1lf RCS T COLD is greater than 535°F, Then VERIFY MSSVs are ENSURE RCS TCOLD is less than controlling RCS temperature. 535°F and controlled by operation of ANY of the following: 10.2 Locally operate ADVs. REFER TO Appendix U, Local
- SBCS Operation of Unit 1 ADVs .
- ADVs 10.3lf ADVs are unavailable, Then use alternate steaming paths.
REFER TO Table 12, Alternate S/G Heat Removal Paths.
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 21 LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER/LOSS OF FORCED ( PROCEDURE NO.: CIRCULATION 8 of 26 1-EOP-09 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 7. Ensure RCP Seal Cooling A. VERIFY CCW to the RCPs. A.1 li an SIAS has isolated CCW If to the RCPs, Then RESTORE CCW. REFER TO Appendix J, Restoration of CCW and CBO to the RCPs. A.2 li ccw is lost for greater than If 30 minutes, Then PERFORM BOTH of the following: A. ENSURE CCW to the RCPs will remain isolated by PLACING the FOUR ( Containment CCW To/From RC Pump valves to CLOSE. B. ENSURE RCP controlled bleedoff will remain isolated by PLACING the TWO RCP Bleedoff valves to CLOSE. B. liIf BOTH of the following conditions exist,
- RCPs have CCW flow
- CIAS has isolated the normal RCP bleedoff flowpath to the VCT Then ESTABLISH the alternate RCP bleedoff flowpath to the Quench Tank by OPENING V2507, RCP Bleedoff Relief Stop Vlv.
(
( Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier Tier# # 3 Group # KIA # G2.4.3 Importance Rating 3.7 Emergency Procedures/Plan: Ability to identify post accident instrumentation Proposed Question: RO 74 Unit 1 Unit Supervisor is directing implementation of 1-EOP-15 'Functional Recovery'. Direction to the RO is to perform Safety Function status checks. Which ONE of the following states the instrumentation that is to be selected FIRST to assess the status of Safety Functions? A. ERDADS instrumentation B. DCS instrumentation C. Instrumentation ALSO designated as Remote Shutdown instrumentation. D. Instrumentation identified by White Bezel around the face of the instrument. ( 147
Proposed Answer: D ( Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: ERDADS can be used but NOTE states to use Reg. Guide 1.97 instruments for confirmation of Safety Functions B. Incorrect: DCS is not used for status of safety functions, although some parameters are available that can be used to confirm other indications that are the primary indications. C. Incorrect: Remote shutdown instrumentation is Technical Specification instruments, it is not Reg. Guide designated. D. Correct Technical Reference(s): 1-EOP-15 Functional Recovery (Attach if not previously provided) 0711834 Accident Instrumentation Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: 0702834-04_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ (As available) _0_7_0_2_8_3_4-_0_4 Question Source: Bank # ( Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge - X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 - 6 55.43 Comments: ( 148
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 27A FUNCTIONAL RECOVERY PROCEDURE NO.: 6 of 200 of. 205 1-EOP-15 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 " . 4.0 OPERATOR INITIAL ACTIONS INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS CAUTION A harsh containment condition exists if containment temperature is greater than 200°F. Figure 1A should be used for determination of saturation margin when indicated containment temperature is less than or equal to 200°F. Figure 1B should be used when indicated containment temperature is greater than 200°F. Figure 1A should also be used if containment temperature had exceeded 200°F during event progression but was lowered to 200°F or less by containment cooling systems.
~ NOTE
~~
(I Instruments should be channel checked when one or more confirmatory
~ indications are available. Reg Guide 1.97 1 .97 designated instruments should be used for diagnosis of events and confirmation of safety functions.
i~~~ _ (
- Steps designated with an
- may be performed non-sequentially or are to 1,-=(1=s=t=lep=s=d=es=i=g=na=t=e=d=w=i=th=a=n===*
be performed continuously.=m=a=Y=b=e=pe=rf=o=r=m=e=d=n=o=n=-=se=q=u=e=n=ti=a=IIY=o=f=a=re=t=0==lJ o 1. Classify Event EVALUATE EPIP Classification criteria for present plant conditions and Emergency Plan Actions. REFER TO EPIP-01, Classification of Emergencies. D 2. Implement Placekeeping OPEN the Place keeper Placekeeper and NOTE the time of EOP entry.
0711834, Rev. 06 Page 14 of 81 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY IDENTIFICATION OF ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Instrument indications, in the control room, that are specifically intended for use during accident conditions, are identified by a "White Bezel," around the face of the instruments. The "White Bezel," is the FPL method, developed by EBASCO, of identifying such indicators, developed within the specifications of Reg. Guide 1.97, to meet all requirements for essential instrumentation needed for safe shutdown and monitoring of the plant to assure health and safety of the public. "White Bezel" indicators include all Type A, B, or C, and, Category 1 or 2 instrument indicators, which Reg. Guide 1.97 requires. Reg. Guide 1.97 states that these indicators should be easily recognizable by Control Room personnel. All Reg. Guide 1.97 designated instruments, such as Types "0" and "E," are not required to be "White Bezel" indicators. (( Because the Control Room is not considered a harsh environment, the "White Bezel" indicators are not required to be, and are not, Environmentally Qualified (EQ'd). The corresponding transmitters in the plant, are required to be EQ'd The following reference document addresses the designation of "White Bezel" Control Room instruments, listing the Instrument, Tag No., Type, Cat, and Remarks (both Unit 1 & 2). FPL Inter-Office Correspondence JPN-PSLP-93-049, July 14, 1993, to S. A. Valdes-TECIPSL, TEG/PSL, from J. Scarola JPNIJB, JPN/JB, entitled: St. Lucie Plant Units 1 & 2 Reg. Guide 1.97, Bezel Color Coding File: PSL 100-16 PC/Ms 2002-192M & 203-192 This reference document is included in the text under, "Reference Attachments."
0711834, Rev. 06 Page 23 of 81 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY Confirmatory indications could be from any Category designation, although the priority would be Category 1, 2, or 3. In general, during accident conditions, Type A, B, or C, -- Category 1 or 2 instrument would be used over a Category, i.e., a "White Bezel" instrument would be used over a "Non-White Bezel" instrument, for the same variable (parameter). An acceptable, general sequence, for instrument choice, in Emergency / Accident Event monitoring, is to use:
"White Bezel" Instruments FIRST, if available, as appropriate, then, Other Reg. Guide 1.97, Safety Related Instruments, if available, as appropriate, then, Other Reg. Guide 1.97 instruments, if available, as appropriate, then, Other instruments, if available, as appropriate, and I or ERDADS Displays for confirmation, as appropriate, if available.
( Bottom Line: For Confirmation of Suitable Instrument Use:
- 1. Does the instrument have a "White Bezel":
- a. If YES, and the instrument is appropriate for the parameter to be monitored, OK,
- b. If NO, then, (go to 2.)
- 2. Is the instrument listed in the PassPort Report, "(To Be Specified Later)," as a "Reg.
Guide 1.97 designated instrument:
- a. If YES, and the instrument is appropriate for the parameter to be monitored, OK,
- b. If NO, then, attempt another choice, if possible, or consult with the SM I US, or Technical Support Center (TSC).
(
0711834, Rev. 06 Page 33 of 81 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM Remote Shutdown Instrumentation, which is NOT part of the Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, is addressed in this text, in response to specific Operator requests to distinguish between the two systems. Remote Shutdown Instrumentation is established as a minimum required set of instrumentation necessary for the specific accident of Control Room Inaccessibility, in which no other accident event is assumed to occur. Remote Shutdown instrumentation is used only when the Control Room has become uninhabitable, while the plant is at power, and must be taken to a stable, shutdown condition, outside of the Control Room. The various EOP-response events are assumed to NOT have occurred. ( , Reg. Guide 1.97 does not apply to Remote Shutdown Instrumentation. Remote Shutdown Instrumentation has separate, specific Technical Specification requirements, and separate, specific surveillance requirements. Remote Shutdown Instrumentation is addressed in the Self-Study Text, 1M #0704403, "Hot Shutdown Control Panels."
ATT 1-2 TERMINAL OBJECTIVE Given a set of unit conditions, evaluate the status of the plant instrumentation, on a written examination without references, unless stated. ENABLING OBJECTIVES
- 1. Describe the following qualifications as they apply to plant instrumentation:
A. Safety-Related. B. Class 1E. C. Environmentally Qualified.
- 2. Describe how to identify environmentally qualified (EQ) instrumentation in the control room.
- 3. Describe the operating philosophy for selecting the instrumentation to use for emergency conditions, including the use of channel checks.
1
, i,'
(., Given a set of plant conditions, a Control Room instrument or indicator, and bezel indications determine, if the instrument or indicator is:: ( A. Energized. B. Operable. C. Qualified for the current plant status. 0702834, Rev. 06 Page 32 of 33 FOR TRAINING USE ONLY
Examination Outline Cross-reference: Level RO SRO Tier# Tier # 3 Group # KIA # G2.4.6 Importance Rating 3.7 Emergency Procedures/Plan: Knowledge symptom based EOP mitigation strategies. Proposed Question: RO 75 Unit 1 has completed 1-EOP-01 'Standard Post Trip Actions' The Unit supervisor has completed the diagnostic flow chart and has implemented an optimal EOP. Shortly after entering this optimal EOP he gives direction to cooldown the RCS to T HOT less than 510°F. Which ONE of the following optimal EOP's has the crew entered? A. 1-EOP-03 'Loss of Coolant Accident' B. 1-EOP-04 'Steam Generator Tube Rupture' C. 1-EOP-05 'Excess Steam Demand' D. 1-EOP-06 'Total Loss of Feedwater' ( ( 149
Proposed Answer: B Explanation (Optional): A. Incorrect: Direction to cooldown is given in EOP-03 but the temperature milestone is SDC entry conditions which is less than 325°F or a cooldown to regain subcooling. SOC B. Correct: Cooldown the RCS to T HOT less than 510°F is the major mitigation strategy to isolate the ruptured Steam Generator. C. Incorrect: Direction to cooldown is not given early in EOP-05. Major mitigation strategy early is to stabilize RCS temperature when the faulted Steam Generator has blown dry. D. Incorrect: EOP-06 direction is to stabilize and control T COLD to less than 535°F to conserve feedwater. Technical Reference(s): 1-EOP-04 Steam Generator (Attach if not previously provided) Tube Rupture. ( Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: Learning Objective: _P_S_L_O_P_S_0-=--7_0,--2-,-8_2-,-5-~0_7____ _P_S_L_O_P_S_0_7_0_28_2_5_-0_7 _ _ _ _ (As available) Question Source: Bank# Modified Bank # (Note changes or attach parent) New x Question History: Last NRC Exam Question Cognitive Level: Memory or Fundamental Knowledge X Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: 55.41 -- 10-- - 55.43 - 5 Comments: ( 150
REVISION NO.: PROCEDURE TITLE: PAGE: 23 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 10 of 46 PROCEDURE NO.: 1-EOP-04 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 4.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS (continued) INSTRUCTIONS CONTINGENCY ACTIONS o 9. Verify RCP Operating Limits 9.1 STOP RCPs that do NOT satisfy operating limits. 1f 11 RCPs are RUNNING, Then VERIFY RCP operating limits are satisfied. REFER TO Table 13, RCP Operating Limits. CAUTION Operation of the 1C AFW Pump should be avoided to minimize direct releases to the environment. If motor driven AFW pumps are NOT S/G should be used. available, steam from the least affected SIG
~ 10.
D ~O. RCS Cooldown to less than 510°F 10.1 COOLDOWN the RCS to T HOT less than 510°F using ADVs from Cooldown the RCS to T HOT less than BOTH S/Gs. 510°F using SBCS. 10.21f Instrument Air is NOT available, 10.211 Then OPERATE ADVs locally. REFER TO Appendix U, Local Operation of Unit 1 Atmospheric Dump Valves. 10.3 COOLDOWN using 1C 1C AFW Pump and alternate steaming flow paths on the unisolated S/G. REFER TO Table 12, Alternate S/G SIG Heat Removal Paths.}}