ML033650383

Final Exercise Report for Hatch Nuclear Plant

ML033650383
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	10/15/2003
From:	Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML033650383 (67)

Text

1 Exercise Report.

Hatch Nuclear Plant Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company Exercise Dstc: August 20,2003 Report Date: October 15,2003 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION BV 3003 CIPamblee-Tuckcr Woad Atlanta, Georgia 30341

Page I. EXEC'I!TIVE SI.IMM.4HY ............................................................................................. 1 I1 . 1NTKOIPUJC:I'iON ........................................................................................................... 2 111. EXI-iRCISE OVERVIEW ................................................................................................ 4 A. Plume Pathway Eiiicrgcncy Planning Zone Description ........... ........................ 3 Excrcisc. Participants ............................................................................................

1%. 4

c. Exercise Timeline ...... ......................................................... 5 IV . EXERCISE EVALLJATIONAND RESULTS ................................................................ 7 A. Summary Results oEExercise F?valuation - Table 2 .............................................. 7 Status of Surisdictions Evaiuated ..........................................................................

B. 7 I. STATE OF GEORGIA ........................................................................... 11 1.1 State Operations Center .............................................................. 11 1.2 Forward Emergency Operations Ccnter ....................................... 11 1.3 Dose Assessment ........................................................................ 12 1.4 Enaergency Operations Facility ................................................... 12 1.5 Emergency News Center......................................................

2. RISK RiRISDICTIOFiS ......................................................................... 14 2.1 APPLING COUXFY .................................................................. 14

2. I .1 Emergency Operations Ccnter ......................................... 14 2.1.2 Traffic Controi Points...................................................... 15 2.1.3 Protection Actions f i r Schools ........................................ 15 2.1.4 River Clearing ................................................................. 16 2.2 JE FF DAWS coumY ............................................................. 16 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center ......................................... 16 2.2.2 TraEe Control Points...................................................... 17 2.2.3 Reception and Congregate V a e....................................... 17 2.2.4 haonitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and Equipment .................................................. 1g

2.4 'IAfTNALL COONTY .............................................................. 19 2.3.1 Emergency Operations Center ......................................... 19 2.3.2 Traffic Control Points...................................................... 19 2.4 'TOOMBStown .................................................................. 20 2.4.1 blmergency Operations Center ..................................... 20 2.4.2 Traffic Control Points ..................................................

2.4.3 River Clearance .......................

2.4.4 Prolecdive Actions for Schoois ......

2.4.5 Medical Serviccs Drill (MS-1)

3. SIJMMARY OF AREAS REQtJIRING CORRECI'IVE ACI'ION ......... 23 3.1 lssued 2003.......................... .................................................. 23 3.1 . I 31-03-5.b.l-A-01 Emcrgcricy News Center ............

3.1.2 3 1 6.a. 1-A-02 Jeff Davis County - Monitoring and [Becontarnination of Emergency Workers and Equipment ....................................................................... 24 kist 0 %AppsaPdiees APPENDIX 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS.. ...................................

APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS ................................................................ 28 APPENDIX 3 EXERCISE CKITERJA AND

~

EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT...........................................

APPEXDIX 4 - EXERCISE ~ C ' E N ~ ................

IO ............................................... 31 List of Tables Table 1 - Exercise T~mehne................................................................................................ 6 Table 2 ~

Summary of Exercise Evaiuatiun ....................................................................... 10 ii

On August 20, 2003. the Federal Emergency Managenient Agency (FEn/rA), Region I V .

conducted a partial participation plume pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) exercise for the Hatch Nuclear Plant. The ptirpctse o f this exercise was to assess the level of Statc and local preparedness in responding to a radiological incident at a nuclear power plant. The exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of Statc and local radiological emergency response plans (REKP) and procedures.

The previous exercise at this site was conducted on March 14, 2001. 'The qualifying emergency preparedness exerciss for the Hatch Nuclear Piant was conducted on October 8 and 9.1980.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts o f the representatives of the State of Gcorgin and the Counties ofhppling, JefTDavis, 'lattnall and Toonihs, who participated in this exercise. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job ofsome ofthe participants and an additional assigncd responsibility for others. Clthers have willingiy sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency serviccs to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

Appling County had activated its Emergency Operations Center and emergency response organization in response to an Alert on April 2,2002 at Plant tfatch. Their response to the event and the demonstration during this exercise once again demonstrated the County's commitment to protecting the health and safety of the citizens of Appling County.

n e State and local organizations demonstratcd knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and appropriately impiemcnted them. No Ikficiencies were identified during this exercise. Howeverl there were two Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARC.X) idcntified. The first A R C 4 ::'as idcntifid during the second media briefing when conflicting information was announced concerning the initial protective action decision. This A K A was corrected during the third media briefing when correct infornlation was provided. The second A K A , concerning the monitoring of emergency workers and equipment in Jeff Davis County, was identified during the out-of-sequence dcmonstration for this exercise and was also corrected on the spot. No outstanding issues remain.

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On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEh4.4 to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to Title 44 Code ofFederal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. 'I'hesc regulations are a key elemcnt in the Radiological Enrergency Prcparedness (REP) Program that was established foliowing the Three k4ile Island Nuclear Station accident in hlarch 1979.

FEMA Title 44 CFK 3 5 0 establishes the policies and procedures h r FERZA's initial and c.ontinued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness fix commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and locai government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEh4A's responsibilities En radiological emergency planning for fixed i w k s r Facilities include the following:

0 'laking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans (RFW)and procedures developed by StaFe and local governments; e Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemcnted on the basis ofobservation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments; e Responding to requests by the NRC pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding &tween the NRC and FEMA (Federal Rcyister, Vo!. 58, No. 136, September 14,1993);

B Coordinating the activities ofFedera! agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

- Department of Agriculture.

- Department of Commerce,

- Department of Energy,

- Department of IHcalth and Human Services,

- Department of the Interior,

- Department of Transportation,

- Environmental Protection Agency,

- Food and Drug Administration and

~ Nuclear Regutatory Commission.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region IV Regional Assistanse Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA. Formal submission of the RIXF's fur the Hatch Nuclear Plant to FEMA RegKin HV by the State of Georgia and involved local jurisdictions occmed on January 23, 1980. Formal approval ofthe RERP \vas granted by FEMA on May 5,1981, unde.r Title 44 CFR 350.

A partial participation plume pathway exercise was conducted on August 20, 2003. by FEIMA Kcgion IV to ~ S S C S Sthc capabiiitics of State and local emergency prcparcdncss organbations in iiriplernenting tbcir KERPs and procedures t(i protect the public health and safety during the p l u m phase o f a radiological cmcrgcncy involving the Ilatch Nuclear Plant. The purpose of this report is to present the exercise results and findings on the perlbmiance of the offsite tcspom urgmizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented are based on the evaluations ofthe Federal evaluator team, with final determinations k i n g mde by the Chief Evaluator and Co-RAC Chairperson, and approved by the Regional Director.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

i\'UREe;-0654iFH:haA-KEP-l, Rev. 1. "Criteria for Preparatiun and E.valuatiun of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980; 0 FEMA- "Areas of Eduation hklhodology" April 25.2002.

Section 111 of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents basic informtion and data relevant to the exercise. This section contains a description ofthe plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and fiinctional entities which were evaluated, and a tabular prcsentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

Section 1V entitled "E,xercise Evaluation arid I<esuits,"presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise criteria at each jtrisdiction or fiinctional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, Issues-only format. This section also contains: ( I )

descriptions of all Deficiencies and M C A s assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actiuns, and the State and local governments' response and (2) descriptions of unresolved M C A s assessed during previous exercises arid the status of the OKO'P elroris 10rewive them.

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Contained in this section are data and basic infornriition relevant to the AiIg,ust XI, 2003, exercise to test the ofkite emergency response capzbilitie-s in the area surrounding the Ilatch Nuclear Plant.

A. Plume Pathwry Emergency Pfanaiwg Zone Description The Hatch Nuclear Power Plant is located on the ,Mamaha Kivcr approxirnately ten miles north of Baxley, Georgia. The plume exposure pathway EP% includes portions of Appling, Jeff Davis, 'Tattnall and Toomhs Cortnties.

The land use within the IO-mile lip2 is primarily agricuitural with a relatively low population density. The population ofthe 10-mile EPZ is estimated tu be 8,394. Although there are 110 major parks, recreational areas, or transportation faci1itie.sin the EPZ, the hltamaha River is a principal waterway that is suitable for navigation and recreation. There are 16 evacuation zones in the EPZ.

B. Erercise Participants The following agencies, organimtions, and units of governnient participated in the Watch Nuslear POWFPlant exercise on August 20,2003.

STATE OP GEORGH.4 Depwitment of Natural Resources Bureau of Radiation Control Georgia Emergency Management Agency PARTHC%PATINGJURBSDHd3TPONS Appiing County Jeff Davis County TattnaH County

?'oornbs County PRWPaTE AND V0LUNTEE.R ORGANIZATIONS Meadows Regional Medical Center Meadows Regional Medical Center Emergency Medical Services Southeastern Chapter of the American Red Cross 4

C. Exercise Timeline Table I . on the following p g e , presents the time at which key events and activities occurred during the Hatch Nuclear Plant exercise on August 20,2003.

Inclucied are actual times notifications were ntade to the participating ent it izs.

jurisdiction~fifunctiona1 5

I SPOI j 1

Contained in this section are the results and findings ofthe evaluation ofall jurisdictions and fiinctional entities, which participatcd in the August 20, 2003, cxercise to test the ofkite emergency response capahilities of State and local governments in the 1O-mile EPZ surrounding the I latch Nuclear Plant.

kichjurisdiction and functionai entity u!as evaluated o n the basis of its derrionstration of criteria delineated in exercise criteria contained in Evaluation Area Methodology, dated April 25. 2002. Detailed inibrmarion on the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 ofthis report.

A. Summary Rasuks of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2 The matrix in Table 2, presents the status of ail exercise criteria scheduled Tor demonstration during this exercise by ill1 participating jurisdictions and hnctional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number. 'The demonstration status ofthose criteria is indicated hy the use ofthe following letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARGAS from prior exercises)

D Deficiency assessed A L iZRCA(s) assessed unresolved ARCA(s) From prior exercise(s)

N - Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B) c - credit for actual WeIltS B. Stilkus of Jawisdictions Evaluated I'his subsection provides inforniatiun on the evaluation nfeach participating jurisdiction and functional entity, in an issues only format. Presented below is a definition ofthe ternis used in this subsection relative to criterion demonstration status.

Met - Listing ofthe demonstratcd exercise criteria under which 110 Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARC& assessed during prior exercises remain unresoivtxi.

f Deficiency - Listing ofthe demonstrated exercise criterion under which one or more Deficiencies wm assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.

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Area Requiring Corrective Actions - Listing ofthe demonstrated cxcrcisc criterion under whkh onc or inorc ARCAs WCFC asscsscd during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that remain unresolved. Included is a description ofthe AKCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

Not Demo~~strabed - Listing ofthe exercise criterion which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the rcason they werc not demonstrated.

Prior ARCAS - Resolved - Desciiptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises hhich were resolved in this exercise and the carrectivc actions demonstrated.

P r i ~ ARCAs r - Ueresuhed - Descriptions of ARCASassessed during prior exercises which were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recornmended corrective actions to hc demonstrated brforc or during the next biennial exercise.

The filllowing are definitions of the two types of exercise issues which are discussed in this report.

6 A Defiiciewcy is defined i n FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed o r identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that ofkite emergency prepmedncss is not adequate to provide reasomabie assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event o f a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity o f a nuclear power plant."

e An ARCA is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...anobserved or identified inadequacy oforganizational pcrforminee in an exercise that is m'rt considered, by itsell; to adverseiy impact public health and safety."

FBMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAS). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifying number for Deficiencies and AKCAs inciudes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

Plant Site Identifies A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.

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e Exercise Year - The list two digits ofthe year the exercise was conducted.

e Criterion Number - A number, alpha, riunther combinifticin corresponding to thc criterion number in the Evaiuation Area Methologg..

• Issue Classification Identifier- (I1 = Deficiency. A ARCA).

-7 Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.

a Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to mch issue identified in the exercise.

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Table 2. Summary of Exercise Evaluation 1-1 ,hitate Op&?tXtiQnS CeRk?'

The State Operations Center (SOC') was well equipped and able to perfbrm the function of direction and control until the Forward 1:nmgency

. . Operations

. Center uas operational Communication links were established and nmintained with the piant, counties and FEOCI.

8. MET: Criteslai.a.l.I.b.l,l.c.1.I.cb.1andi.c.I.

b. DEPBCEENCY: NONE

e. AREAS REQUIRIXG CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DE,VONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NOkE e PRIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE s

13 Forwr4ardEmergency Operations Center The Forward Emergency Operations Center (FECdC) is co-iocated with the Emergency News Center (,ENC). The 1:scility was staffed with a highly competent md professional staff. The Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR) oversaw ail activities and the Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) Director of Operations effectively managed the emergency response. Ail protective action decisions (PAD) were effectively coordinated within the FEOC and with the risk counties. The PAUS were disseminated to thc public in a tunely maimer.

a. .VET': Criteria !.EL!, I.b.1, ~ . ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ! ~ ~ . ~ . ~ , ~ . ~ . ~ ~ ~ . ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

b. DEFICIENCY: NONIJ e= AREAS REQUHRHMG CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: KONE

e. PWHOW ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE

6. -

PRIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE 11

Staff from the Georgia Ikpartmrnt ofh'atural Resources JDNR) perfi~rnmeddose assessment, They succcssfully dcnionstratcd the ability to niakc timely analysis ofthe radiological consequences of an accident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant and to makc timely recommendations to GEMA for the protection of the public. The Radiation Emcrgcncy Coordinator (KEC) fiorn D5K worked well with a prufcssionai siaffand was especially eEeetivc in briefing the GAR. FEOC ChieE and the GEhlA staE

a. MET: Criteria I.a.1, 1.c.i. l . d . l +I.e.1, 2.a.l and 2.b.l

b. m F % c l E N Q ' Y :NOXE

e. PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE I. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.4 En~ergencyBPperafioras Facility The Emergency- Operations Facility (130F) for the 1Iatch Nuclear Plant, located on-site, is an excellent facility from which all participating organizations can effectively manage emergency operations. Communications and crmdination between and among thc State ofickils at the EOF and with representatives of the utility operator were exemplay.

State oiXcials were avell trained, knowledgeable. followed applicable procediires, and overall; they pcsfornied their respcctivc respomihilitics in an efficient and professional manner.

a. MET: Criteria I.a.1. l.b.1. 1 d  !% I.c.1 znd2.b.!

b. D@FICHENC:Y: NONE

e. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTWE ACTION: NONE d, XOT ~~~~~~~~~~E~~ NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE

~

f. PRIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE s

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1-5 Emergency News center Public Affairs personnel froin GEMA? DNI1, Tonnibs County, an3 the Southern Nuciear Operating Company jointly staffed the Emcrgcncy Ncws Centcr (,kNC). App!ing. Jeff Davis, and Tattnall Counties also have assigned public affairs personnel. but they participated fiom their own Emctgcncy Operations Center (EOC). The ENC is an outstanding new facility and is equipped with modern computer and communications technology. Ail EXC staff demomtrated outstanding professionalisnr arid teamwork skills. 'Three media briefings were conducted and GEMA prepared and distributed six news releases. ?'Is EXC runor control staffresponded to 127 telsphone calls in less than e media briefings were conducted during a period of rapidly four hours. W ~ i l the changing plant conditions, accurate and timcly information was disseminated with the exception of the first PAD. Iliaring the second media briefing, GEh4A and utility spokespersons provided incomplete and confusing information concerning this PAD.

This is de.scrihed below. Complete and correct inforination concerning protective actions was provided during the subsequent press briefing.

a. MEF: Criteria I.a.1, l . b ~ l I.d.1

, and 1.e.l.

b. DEFHC'IENCB': NONE CePNDBTION: The Emergency News Center (SNCj staff provided incomplete and confusing information to the media and public c.oncerning the first protective action decision. Speeifically, a protective action decision was made by the State and affected counties at I045 to cvacuate Zones A, C-5, F-10, md 63-10.

However, in the second media briefing that began at 1046, the utility's Public Information Director (PID) initially indicated that he just received information that Zones A and C-5 were heing evacnn?ed. 4 few minutes late;, si 052, ihc:

GEM4 Public Information Officer (PIO) stated that he thought it was only the schools in Zones A and C-5 that were being evacuated and not the generd pubiic.

Later in the same briefing, at 1 1 1 I, the Toombs County P I 0 did indicate that the public 6.om Zone A was indeed being evacuated. The GEMA PIC) then stated, at approximately I 1 15,that Zones F-10 and ki-10 were also affected, but he did not know ifthey were being evacuated. There was no further mention of Zone C-5 during the second media briefing that ended at 1 1 19.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The protective action decision was mide just as the second media briefmg was beginning. An adequate system was not in piacc to provide accurate updated information to the spokespersons while the briefing was ongoing. They were receiving information, but it was fragmented and it was not clear to the spokespersons whether the information concerned recommendations 13

that were still being considercd o r ifihe final protective action decision had beeti tnL3de,

REFERENCE:

fiCKEG-0554. E.5,, 4.: G.3.a.. 6.4.a.,b.,c.

%;.FFig,CT':The incomplete and conflicting information provided during the

~ d briefing could have causcd confusion for khc media and ultitnalcly

~ c o i media the public as to what actions they were k i n g instriicted to take.

~ ~ linprove the system o r~ method for providing accurate

~ ~ ~

and timely information to the spokespersons during incdia briefings. It is imperative that any information they are provided during the briefing is accurate and clear especially if it concerns prutcctive action reconmendations and decisions.

B'BRREC'FWE ACTION ~ ~ ~ The GEMA ~ PI0 provided

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ '

accurafc and complete information for the second protective action decision to evacuate Zones A. C-5,1>-5, F-10 and SI- IO. He provided this inlbrmation at the hcyiruiing of the third media briefing that started at 1 150. This corrected Ihc .kea Requiring Corrective Action.

d. MPT DE:MONSTNATEBP: NOSE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE F. PRIOR ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: KONE

%.B;B ~.~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~S Cepnter

'The EOC is spacious and organized to facilitate a full compiement of staff and

~ X I X X ~ ~ Asupport C ~ functions (ESF). Leadership in the 13OC was apparent and the staff worked well a s a team. The Mayor and Chairman of the County Commissioners were active players dwring the exercise. The Emergency Management Agency (EMA)

Director gave definitive guidance to the strrEand required Frequent feedback from all participants. The E M Director was very proactive in carrying out his duties.

Communication systems worked wleli throughout the exercise.

a. MET: ~iriteriai.a.l,9.h.l,i.c.%,l.d.1,i.e.l.2.a.1,2.b.2,2.c.l,3.a.1,3.b.l, 3.c.1, 3.e.2, 5.a.3 and 5.b.l.

b. DEFlCBENCY: NONE 14

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMDNSIXATED: NONE

e. @WBORARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE f~ FREOW ARCAS - UNRESOLVED: NONE Traffic control point (TCP) activities were dernonstrated through interview with a sheriffs deputy. The deputy demonstrated a thorough understanding of radiological exposure conti-ol was equipptd with thz appropriate dosinietry and had a good working knowlrdgc of all aspects of TCP responsibilities. l h e deputys duties include mitigating highway impediments, availability of trafilc cones, signs and barricades, knowledge of the locations ofthe decontamination site and reception center.

a. MET: Criteria I .e.i,3.a.I,3.b.l, 3.d.l and 3.d.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING C<)RRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. &OT DEMONSTRA7EE.D: NONE

e. PRWR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE Appiing County hiis one. public elementary S C ~ O F I located within the IO-niik CPZ. 4 detention facility for juveniles is also located in the 10-nuk EPZ. This State operated facility manages the evacuation of its students with Appling County providing assistance if requested. During the exercise, the elementary school was evacuated at Alert. The school oflice staff was able to quickly communicate with the rest of the staff regarding the evacuation a d buses for removing children and staff fiom the school. The staff member was very knowledgeable eonceming the steps needed to evacuate the schools students and staff in the event of an emergency.

a. MET: Criterion 3.c.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE e AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: KONE 15

e. PRIOR ARCAs RESOLVED: NONE

~

f, PRIOR ARC'& ~ UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.1.4 R i Y W Clearing Two law enforcement officers &om Georgia I)NK assisted in identifying the location of warning signs at two public boat landings (PBL). 'The ofijccrs demonstratcd thcir knowledge and ability tu implement river warning procedurcs and individual radiological protection procedures. Both PB1.s had warning signs with a listing ofradio and television stations, which broadcast emergency niessages, The signs ~ I S Q stated that boaters may bt: warned in p a w n by DNR agents. Both oficers dcmonstratcd. through interview, the 'use of dosimetry and an understanding of radiological exposure control, The DNR agents were very profcssional and wsre well prepared to implcrnent the river clearing activities.

a. MET: Criteria 3.a.l a d 5.a.3.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE C, AREAS REQUIRING CORREC'HVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT ~ E ~ O NONE

~ $ ~ ~ A ~ ~ ~ ~

e. PRYOR ARCAS -RESOLVED: NONE

f. -

PRIOR ARCAS UNRESC3LVED: NONE 22 JEFF DAVIS COUNTY 22.1 Emergeasy Operations Center The effective execution of notification nroce le Administrator-and h&or ofitazelhnrst, and City and Co& department chiefs set the tone for a highjy profcessional EQC operation. Thc senior management team was briefed on a recvmng basis; involved functional representatives in the ~ ~ Q C ~ and S S . fiicilitated interagency coordination in preparation for PADS. All participants displayed a positiw attitide as they carried out their hnctions and sought improvements to their procedures.

8. MET: ~riteriai.a.1,i.b.~,i.c.~,i.d.1,l.e.i,2.a1,2.b.2,Z.c.I,3.al,~.b.l, 3.~.9,5.a.3and5.h.I.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: KONE

~

f. PXHOK ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE

~

2 2 2 Fraffk Conti-d Papints Ari officer fforn the County Sheriffs Department sirccessfdiy demonstrated knowiedgc of TCP procedures and individual radiological protection during an interview at the EOC.

The officer was conversant in the use of dosimetry, requirements for recording and reporting readings, and applicable turn-back values. The Jeff Davis Public Works Ikpartmmt was available through 91 I to provide assistance in removal nfimpedimenis arid to fill harrier rcquircmcnts.

a. MET: Criteria I.e.l,3.a.i,3.b.l,3.d.l and3.d.2.

h. 5EF1671ENCY: NONE

6. AREAS KEQUIHBNG CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PREOR ARCAS - RESOLVKW: NONE E PRIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE 2 . 2 3 Reeep%ioaand Cowgregate Care The reception and congregate care center was we!] managed. The stafT include:

American Red Cross ( A R C ) volunteers, County Department of Health and stafTofthe Jeff Davis Junior arid High Schools. The stat&, both paid and volunteer, were equipped with the appropriate dosimetry and instructions for use and recording. Everyone ws knowIedgeable ofthe roles and responsibilities required by the task at hand and performed those tasks in a professional manner. The reccption and sheltcring hcility was well laid out with appropriate equipment available and was set up to prevent cross coritann6nlation.

a. MET: CritcriaI.b.i, l.e.1,3.a.1,6.a.Iand6.c.l.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

e. AREAS WEQUhHBHXG CORRECTIVE ACTION: XONE 17

2.2.4 Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and IE ag gai pme rat Hlnlergency workeT vehicle monitoring and decontamination was well demonstrated.

Iiniergency workers doing the monitoring had the appropriate dosimetry, turnout gear, equipment, knowlcdge and training to do the job well. The lay out ofthe nionitoring and decontamination area was well thought out and provided for good cross contamination control. The emergency worker monitoring aspect required additional coaching and re-demonstration.

a. MET: Criteria l.e.1, 3.a.l and 6.b.l CONDITION: The driver and passenger of a known contaminated emergency vehicle were allowed to exit the vehicle. which was now outside the hot zone, without first having any personal monitoring.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: I !nf?miliarity wit13 criiergency worker vehicle occupant monitoring procedures.

REFERENCE.: (cite the specific NUREG-6654 eiement, reguiatioq etc.):

NUREG-0654. J.1O.h; 5.12; K.5.a)

EFFECT: lf an emergency worker disembarked hidher contaminated vehicle without their feet being monitored there would kc no way to prevent possible contamination ofthe location(s) where the emergency workers walked.

ContmGnation in the walking area where all personnel would disembak their vehicles would then cause all emergency workers exiting vehicles to become contaminated.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Provide initial and refresher training on a more frequent h i s to ensure that the individuals doing the monitoring are knowledgeable of cross contaniination controls and occupant monitoring techniques.

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CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONS'I'RA'kED: The process \vas halted, what was being donc incorrectly was explained and why it was incorrect. M e r coaching, the emergency workers re-demonstrated the process and were able to coniplcte the dcnionsttrrttion in a proficient and professional nianner.

a. NOT HPE?&ONSTRATEI): XONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE

~

f. PRIOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE

~

23.8 En1ergenc:y Bperatians center The County Emergency Management Weetor and Chief of Operations coordinated operations in this the EOC. They kvolvcd a competent and supporiive st& in the decision making process. The staft'consistently coordinated with the State and other E?%

counties in the formulation and implementation of ?.ADSand the P I 0 interacted with the.

ENC. The State and plant representatives provided vital support to the ECK nperiition.

?'he U'eREOC, periodic briefings, and consistent posting of status boards kept the staff informed of developments. Alert and inobilization of the staff was accompiished smoothly. 'The EOC was f d l y staffed at 1053. County Sherifrs Deyartnient reservists provided security. This is a spacious and well-equipped faciEity that supported this well run emergency response operation.

a. ,MET: Criterial.a.l.I.b.1, ~ . c . l , ~ . ~ . l , ~ . e . l , 2 . a . l , ~ . b . 2 ~ ~ . ~ . ~ , ~ . a . ~ , 3 . b . l ~

R.c.1, 5.a.3and5.b.l.

b. DEPHCIENCY: NONE 2 - 3 2 Traffic Control Points Three deputies from the County Sheriff 's Department professionally demonstrated TCPs at their individual locations. The Deputies were aware o f U procedures, their turn-back values and who to caWwhat to do if they reached or exceeded the tun-back values. 'they were ako knowledgeable of road impediment removal, reception and congregate care locations and where to find equipment if needed.

19

8. .MET: Criteria 1.e.l- 3.a.1, 3.b.l. 3.d.L and 3.d.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs -RESOLVED: NONE 2.41.1 Emei-gewsy Operations Center 1he EOC staff continries to provide efficient enieigency management services. The Operations Officer provided consistent direction and control, insuring the safety u f evacuees and residents alike. Information was promptly posted for the staffto see.

Accurate and timely information was provided to citizens despite cquipnient limitations for the 1'10. Both city and county governments were represented in the EOC, which is reflecbivc of 'Toombs County's overarching comrnitnicnt PQ the emergency management program. Early precautionary actions included school evacuation, river clearance and assistance to the special needs population. PADS were appropriate md promptly implemented.

a. MET: Ciiter~aI.a.l,I.b.l,l.c.l,i.d.i,i.e.l,2.a.l,7.b.2.2.c,1,3,a.1.?,b,l, 3.c.l. 5.a.3 and 5,b.l.

The EO<: demonstrated implementation of 'I'CFs by interview. The deputy for T Q O ~ ~ S County talked through the selection and dispatch of TCPs in the county. The discussion also included use of equipment necessary to facilitate access control (barriers, cones, etc).

Communications between the ' T Oand the EOC were managed through the use ofa 20

shcrifl-s department radio in the EOC. TCI' locations were identified by the deputy :md werc utilized by staff for potential crew dcplcymcnt. Thc TCP emcrgency workers wcrc issued dosimetry ant1 KI as required. The radioiogical office provided detailed instructions to teams prior to depioynienc.

a. .MET: C'riteriaI.e.t.Z.a.I.3.b.i.3.d.l andZ.d.2.

b. DEFI6:HExCY: NONE

e. AREAS REQIJIRING CORRECTIVE ACT'IBBN: NOKE

d. NOT DEMOXSTKBTED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAS - RESOLVED: NONE Toombs County demonstrated implementation of alen and notification of ktaters and fishcrman along the Altamaha River. A DNK rmger was dispatched to the EOC where he picked up a dosimetry kit and got a radiological briefing prior to k i n g dispatched to the river. The ranger periodically checked his dosimeter, recorded the rcadiny and radioed into the FEOC. The ranger inhrmed all boaters and fishermen he encountered there was a drill in progress and the river had been closed to traffic. The ranger was professional and answered all questions concerning the purpose and use of his radiological protective gear.

a. MET: Criteria 3.a.l and 5.a.3.

la. DEFICIENCY: NONE

6. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. -

PRIOR ARCAS RESOLVED: NONE

f. -

PWEOR ARCAS UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.4.4 Protective Actions for sc:srools The CounCy Board of Education demonstrated the ability to implement protective actions for schois. At the Site Area Emergency, Toombs County Elementary School, located inside the IO-mile EPZ, was ordered to evacuate to Toombs County Middie School.

Ll

'I'ransportaiion was arranged for the students, the Middle School w ~ nolified s oi'the arrival ofthe cstra s?udcnts and was told io prepare theis facility. Within 30 minutes the students had arrived and were sheltered at Toomhs County Middlc Scliool.

8. MET: Criterion 3 x 2 .

b. DEFICIENCY: XONE 2.4.5 Medical services Drill (MS-1)

The Meadows Regional Medical Center rtncrgency rooni (ER) staff and Emergency Medical Services (FMS) crew participated in this cxcrcise to demonstrate the ability to mat a contaminated, in.juPed individual. The medical center was prepared to receive, monitor, decontaminate and treat the paticnt. The transfer ofthe patient was expcditious and a11 appropriate infomation was relayed to the EK staff. The doctor established priorities for the treatment and decontamin&n of the patient. Monitoring and decontamination procedures were appropriate, samples were taken and the ER staff functioned well as team. Exit procedures were apprqriatety demonstrated. Another health physicist, who remained outside, surveyed the EMS p s o n n e l arid knew where to send them if they or thc ambulance were contaminated. A11 individuals, EMS aid medical center knew their roles and responsibilities, and perfimned them in an efticicnt and professional manner.

a. MET: Criteria 1 t . 1 , 3.3.1 and 4 . d . l .

19. DEFBCBENIY: NONE 22

3.

~____.

.- ___~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -

CONDHTION: The Emergency News Center (ENC) staff provided inconipletc and confusing information to the inedia an(

public concerning the first protective acrioi decision. Specifically, a protective action decision was made by the State and affecte counties at LO45 to evacuate Zones A. C-5.

F-10, and G t O . However, in the second inedia briefing that began at 1046, the utilitys Public Information Director (PII))

initially indicated that he just received information that Zones A and C-5 were being evacuated. A few minutes later, at 1052, the GEMA Public Inforinstion Officer (PIQ) stated that he thought it was only the schools in Zones A and C-5 that were being evacuated m d not the general public. Later in the same briefing, at 1 1 11 the Toombs County PEO did indicate that the public h i n Zone A was indeed being wacuated. The CiEh4A P I 0 then stated, at approximately 11 15, that 73mes F-10 and G-10 were also affected, but he did not know if they were being e.vacuated. There was no farther mention of Zone C-5 during the second media briefing that ended at 1119.

POSSIBLE CAUSE,: The plutrciiw action decision was made just as the seconc media briefing was beginning. An adequat system was not in place to provide accuratt updated information to the spokespersons while the briefing was ongoing. They wen receiving information, but it was Fragmented and it was not clear to the spokespersons whether the information concerned recommendations that were still being considered or if the final protective action decision had been made.

REFERENCE:

NPJKEG-0654, E.5., 7.,

G.3.a., G.4.a.,b.,c.

WFECl: fhe incomplete and conllicting i h r m a t i ~ nprovided during the second nedia briefing could hake caused confusion br the media and ultimately the public as to ahat actions they were k i n g instructed to ake.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~: Improve the

ystern or method for providing accurate ind timely information to the spokespersons luring media briefings. It is imperative that my information they are provided during

he briefing is accurate and clear especially if it concerns protective action

ecomniendations and decisions.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The GEMA P I 0 provided accurate and cuniplete infrirmation for the second protective action decision to evacuate Zones A, C-5,D-S! F-10 and G-10, I-le provided $his information at the beginning ofthe third media briefing that started at 1 150, This corrected the Area Requiring Corrective Action.

CONDHTBON: The driver and passenger o f a known contaminated emergency vehicle were allowed to exit the vehicle.

which was xiow outside the hot zone, without Fwst having any personal nxnitciring, POSSIBLE CAUSE: IJnfaamiliarity with emergency worker vehicle occupant monitoring procedures.

~ E ~ E (cite ~ theEspecific

~ ~SURFG- ~ :

0654 element, regulation, etc.): N U W G 0654, J.1O.h; J.12; K.5.a)

EFFECT: If an emergency worker disembarked hislher contaminated vehicle without their feet k i n g monitored there would be . ~ .no

~ ~. .~

~ ~

way..to prevent possible

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ - . .- - -.-

24

~.~ ~

ontarnination of the locatioin(s) where the mergency workers walked. Contamination n the walking area where all personnel

• .auld disembark their vehic.les would then

awe all emergency workers exiting Qchiclesto beconie contaminated.

RECOM IblENDATION: Provide initial md refresher training on a more fiequent m i s to ensure that the individuals doing

he monitoring are knowledgeable of cross

ontarnination controls and occupant inonitorhg techniques.

CORRECTEVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: 'l'he process \vas halted, what was k i n g done incorrectly was xplained and why it was incorrect. After Eoaching, the emergency workers re-iKlllOrlStratKd the process and were able to somplete the demonstration in a proficient and professional manner.

25

APPENDIX 1 WCKQPNYMSAND ABBREVBATTONS The folloRing is a list ofthe acronyms and abbreviations, which may have been used in this report.

ARC American Red Cross ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action CFR Code of Federak Fkguiations D"1S Department of Health and Muman Services DNR Department of Natural Resources moc Department of Commerce DOE Dcpartmcnt of Energy DOi Department of the Interior DOT Department ctf'8'ranspoWdtion Dm Direct Reading Dosimeter EAS Emergency Alert System ECL Emergency Classification I.evel EEM Exercise Evaluation Methodology EMA Emergency Management Agency EMS Emergency Medical Services ENC Emergency News Centcr EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ER Emergency Room ESF Emergency Support Functions FAA Federal Aviation Agency FCC Federal Conununications Commission FDA Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FEW Furward Emergcncy Operations Center FW Federal Register GAR Governor's Authorixd Representative GE General Emergency GEMA Georgia Emergcncy Management Agency GM Guidance Memorandum KI Potassium Iodide 26

NOAA N RC NUREG-0654 NWS Office of' Emergency Management Offsite Response Organization Protective Action Decision Protective Action Guide Public '4ffairs Official Protective Action Reconimendation Public Boat Landings Public Information Dircctor Public Infornmtion Oficer Public Notification System llegional Assistance Committee Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Scrvice Radiation Emergency Coordinator Radiological Emergency Preparedness Radiological Emergency ilcsponse Plan Site Area Emergency State Opesations Centcn Traffic Control Point Thermoluminescent Dosimeter

APPENDIX 2 Following is a list of personnel who evaluated the Hatch NucCear Plant exercise on August 20, 2003. The organizations represcnted are indicated by the following abbreviations:

DOT - Department of Transportation FDA - Food and Drug Administration FEhIA - Federal Emergency Management Agency 1CF - lCF Consulting, Inc.

NIlC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission E_VALUATHON fxJ& EVALIJ

~. .ATOR .

STATE OF GEORGIA Stale Operatioris Center Don Comeli FEMA Bernie Gunnels BOT Forward Emergency Operations Center Larry Robertson FEMA James Purvis FEMA-IIQ Emergency News Center N o m Valentine FEMA-K7 Dose Assessment Bernie Hannah Emergency Operations Facility Robert Trojanowski NRC APPLING C:6PUNTY Emergency Operations Ccntcr Eddie I i i c k r ~ i i ~

Torn Tmut TraffEc Control Points Tam Trout FDA Protective Action5 For Schools Tom Trout FDA River Clearing Tom Trout FDA JEFF DAVIS COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Bill Earrabee ICF Mark Pittrnan FEMA Reception and Congregate Care Hekn Wilgus FEMA 28

BSVALI!ATION SITE EVAEWAl'OW E.mergency Worker Dczontamination IIclen Wilgus Traffic C ~ n t r dPoints Mark Pittman

'FATTNALL COllliVTY Emergency Operations Center Robert Perdue Wanda Gaudet

'Tr;+ffk Control Points Wanda Ciaudet TOOMBS COBJKTY Ohhie Robinson FEM.4 Kevin Keyes FBM A- R6

'l'ratiic Controi Points Kcvin Kcycs Protective Actims for Schools Kevin Keyes River Clearing Kevin Keyes FEMA-R6 A4edical Service I>rill (MS-I) Helen Wilgus FEMA 29

EXERCBSE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMEN'I' This appendix iists the exercise criteria sc.heduled for demonstration at the Hatch Nuclear Plant exercise on August 20. 2003- and the extent-of-play agreement approved by IFMA Region I\'.

A. Exercise Criteria Following are the specific REP criteria sc.hedulcd for denionstration during this cxercisc, (Final Report Only) 30

PLANT EDWIN I. HATCH FEMA EVALUATED EXERCISE August 20,2003 Extent of Play Agreement

Other than the exceptions desciibed i n this Extent of Play Agreement, exercise activities demonstrated for evaluation will be based on the Georgia Radiological Emergency Rase Plan, the respective site-specific plan (Annex A), local county plans and appropriate Standard Operating Procedures.

It is re.quested that any issue o r discrepancy arising during exercise play be corrected immediately, at all player locations, if it isnt disruptive to exercise play and if it is mutually agreeable to both the controller and evaluator.

1.a - Mobilization:

Criterion 1.a-I: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency persomiel and activate facilities in a timely nimner. (NcTKps6-0654, A 4 D . 3 , 4; E.l, 2; H.4)

Extent of Play Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an emergency situation from the licensee, verify the notification. and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manne.r. Re.sponsible QROs should demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive to begin emergency operations. Activation of facilities should be completed in accordance with the plan and/or procedures. Pre-positioning of emergency personnel i s appropriate, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal comnuting distance from the individuals duty location or residence.

Further, pre-positioning of staff for out-of-sequence demonstrations is sppropiiate in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement.

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• State personnel will be pre-positioned. Response to the FEOC will be, as much as possible, scenario driven. Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs Counties will use normal call in procedures to their respective EOCs as the scenario dictates.

02/28/03 2

E tO/8Z/ZO

recninmendations. Unmodified CDV-~700sei-ies instruments and other instruments without a manufacturer's recommendation shr)uld be calibrated annually. Modified

(:1)V-700 iiistrunieiits should be calibrated i n accordance with the recommen&tion of the modification manufacturer. A lahe! indicating such calibration should be on each instiutnent or calibrated fi-equency can be verified by other means. Additionally, instruments being used to nieasure activity should have a range of readings sticker affixed to the side of the instrument. The above considerations should be included in 4.a.l for field ream equipmen?; 4.c.l for radiological laboratory equipment (docs not apply to analytical equipment); reception center and emergency worker facilities' equipment under 6.a.i; and ambulance and medical facilities' equipment under 6.d. 1 .

Sufficient quantities of appropiiate direct-reading and pennanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers should be available for issiiarice to all categories of emergency workers that could be deployed from that facility. Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry should allow individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the OKO's plans and procedures.

Dosimetry should be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced, if necessary. CI>V-i38s, due fo their documented history of electrical leakage problems, should be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced if necessary.

This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitied in the Arinual Letter of Certification, and/or through a staff assistance visit.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by emergency workers, as indicated on rosters; institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities; and, where stipulated by the plan andor procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ.

Quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventoty submitted during the exercise, provided in the '4nnuaI Lxtter of Ccrtification submissiw, and/or verificd during a Staff Assistance Visi!. Available supplies of KI should be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the O K 0 may produce a letter from a certified private or State laboratory indicaling that the I U siipply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards.

Ai locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs, e?c.) should be available or their availability described.

All activities must he based on ihe ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

02128/03 5

0 Practice or simulated TLDs may be furnished to the emergency workers and Kl will he sirmil:itcd for State and County emergency workers. Traffic and access c.ontrol vehicles, harriers, traffic cones and signs, etc. are availahle and their availability can be described by the County EMA Director or his designee. The State of Georgia does not use any Civil Defense dosimeters. Ail self reading dosimeters are comrnercially procured.

2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING 2.a - Esriergency Worker Exposure Control:

Criterion 2.a.I: OROs use a decision making prwess, considering relevant facton: and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of KI, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, M.4, J.lO.e, Extent of Play OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ should demonstrate a capability to meet the criterion based on their emergency plans arid procedures.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess of areauthorized levels and to the number of emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels.

As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure, based on the OROs pian and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established Protective Action Guides (PA(%) for KI administration.

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otheiwise indicated i n the extent.-of-play agreement.

In agreement 2.b- Radiological Assessnient and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency:

Criterion 2.h.l: Appropriate protective action reconrmendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and O R 0 dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-8654,1.8,10 and Supplement 3) 02/28/03 6

Extent of Play 1)uring the initial stage of the emergency response, following notification of plant conditions that may warrant orfsite protective actions, the OK0 shojuiit deinonstrate the copnlility t n use appropriate means, described i n the plm a n d o r proccdures. to develop protccxivc action recommendations (PAR) for decision-makers based o n available information and recommendations from the licensee and field monitoi-ing data, if available When release and meieorological datu are provided b y the licensee, the O R 0 also considers these data. T h e O K 0 should deinonstrate a reliablc capability to independently validate dose prqjcctions. The types of calculations to be demonstrated depend on the data available and the need fnr assessments to support the PARS appropriate to the scenario. In all cases, calculation of pmjccted dose should be dernonstratcd. Projected doses should be related to quantities and units of the PAG to which they will he compared. PARS should be proniptly transmitted to decision-makers i n a prearranged format.

Diffrrences greater than a factor of 10 between projected doses by the licensee and the O R 0 should he discussed with the licensee with respect to the input data and assumptions used, the use of different models, or other possible reasons. Resolution of these differences should be incorporated into the PAR if timely and appropriate. The O R 0 should demonstrate the capability lo use any additional data to reEine projected doses and exposure rates and revise the associated PARs.

All activities must he based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

0 In agreement Irjterism Z.b.2: .A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (PAD) for the general public (including the rernmmeiadation for the use of KI, if O W 0 policy). (NITREG-0654, J.9?lo$ m)

Extent of Play Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should have the capability to make both initial and subsequent PADS. They should dernonstrate the capability to make initial PADS in a timely manner appropriate 10 the situation, based on notification from the licensee, assessment of plant status and releases, and PARs from the utility arid OK0 staff.

The d u x assessment personnel may provide additional PARs based on the suhwquent dose projectioiis, field monitoring data, or infomiatinn on plant conditions. The decision 7

makers should demonstrate the capability to change pmtcctive actions as appropriate hased on these projections.

If the O R 0 has detenined that KI will be. used as a protective measure for the ge.neral public under offsite plans, then the O R 0 should demonstrate the c;ipability to make de.cisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure for the general public to supplement sheltering and cvawation. This decision should be based nn the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the est&lished PAG for KI administration. The KI decision making process should involve close coordination with appropriate assessment and decision-making staff.

If more than one OR0 is involved in decision-making, OROs should communicate and coordinate FADSwith affected OROs. OROs should demonstrate the capability to communicate the contents of decisions to the affected jurisdictions.

All decision-making activities by OK0 personnel must be performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be i n an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-dplay agreement.

In agreement 2.c -Protective Action Decisions for Protection of Special Populations:

Criterion 2.c.I: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for special population groups. (NIJKEG-0654,9.9, J.lO.d, e)

F:xtent of Play Usually, it is appropriate to implement evacuation in areas where doses are projected to exceed the lower end of the range of FAGS, cxccpt for situations where there is a high-risk environment or where high-risk groups (e.g.. the immobile or infirm) are involved. In these cases, examples of factors that should be considered are: weather conditions, shelter availability, availability of transportation assets, risk of evacuation vs. risk from the avoided dose, and precautionary school evacuations. In situations where an institutionalized population cannot be evacuated, the administmtion of KI should be considered by the OROs.

Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify all public school systems/districts of emergency conditions that are expected to or may necessitate protective actions for students. Contacts with public school systemsldistricts must be actual.

In accordance with plans and/or procedures, OROs and/or officials of public school systems/districts should demonstrate the capability to make prompt decisions on protective actions for students. Officials should demonstrate that the decision making 02128103 S

process for protective actions considers (that is, eilhcr acccpts autornalically o r gives heavy weight to) protective action rccoinmendations niatle by O R 0 persnnnel, the ECI.

at which these reci~iiimend;lti~n~ ai-e received, preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, and the localinn of students at the time (for example, whether the stutients are still at home, en route to the school, or at the school).

All decision-making activities associatcd with protective actions, including considcration nf available resources, for special population groups must be based on the OROs plans and pocedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in t h e extent-of-play agreement.

8 In agreement Radiological Assessment and decision-&Pdkingfor the Ingestion Pathway (2.d) 9 (Criterion 2.d.l) This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated Radiological assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry and Rei~rrn(2.e) e (Criterion 2,e.B) This Evaluation Area w i l l not be demonstrated 3.a - ImpBernentation of Emergency Worker Expowre Controt:

Criterion 3.a.l: Fhe OR& issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each n k i o n rend their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate expowre rerord or chart. (NUREG-0654, MAa, b)

Extent of Play OKOs should demonstrate the capability to provide appropriate direct-reading and pernianent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, and instructions on the use of dosimetry to emergency workers. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined a5 dosimetry that allows individual(s) to mad Ilie administrative reporting limits (that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of Total EEfective Dose Equivalent) and maximum exposure h i t s (for those emergency workers involved in life saving activities) contained in the QROs plans and procedures.

Each emergency worker should have the hasic knowledge of radiation exposlire limits as specified in the OROs plan andior procedures. Procedures to monitor and record 02/%8/03

dosimeter readings and t o manage radiological exposure control should he demonstrated Ihinng a plume phase exercise, emergency workers shoiild demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits arid tuinback values are reached. The emergency worker should report accumulated exposures during the excrcise as indicated in the plans :ind procedures. OROs should demonstrate the actions described i n the plan and/or proce.dures by detemining whether to replace the worker, to authorize the worker to incur additional exposures or to take other actions. If scenario events do not require einergcncy workers t o seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators should interview at least two emergency workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in the event authorization is needed and at what exposure levels. Emergency workers may use nny available resources (e.g., written procedures and/or coworkers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct^ rrading dosimeter. there may be situations where team inembers will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission and adequate control of exposure can be effected for all rnembrrs of the team by one dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate areas, e.g., at reception centers, counting laboratories, eniergency operations centers, and communications centers, may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the work area. It should be noted that, even in these situations, each team member must still have their own permanent record dosimetry.

Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as fanners for animal care, essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public who must re-enter an evacuated area foilowing or during the plume passage, should be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate wpith completing their missions.

AI1 activities must be based on the OWO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be i n an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

0 Emergency workers in low exposure areas may be furnished practice or simulated 1'LL)s (as described in l d ) and/or may d a c e a direct reading dosimeters in a centralized area as an area monitor instead of individual monitoring. KI will be simulated, if necessary (as described in Le.1).

Implementation of KI Decision (3.b) o (Criterion 3.b.l.) In Agreement 3.c - lrnplementadion QF Protective Actions For Special Populations:

02/28/03 10

Criterion 3.c.l: Protective action decisions are impBernented for special populations other than schools within areiis subject to protective X ~ ~ Q I I S (NB;faEB;-O654,

. J.lO.c, d, g)

Extent OF Play Applicable OXOs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (for example, provide protective action recommendations and emergency information and instructions) special populations (hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility impaired individuals, transportation dependent, etc.). OKOs should demonstrate the capability to provide for the needs of special populations in accordance with the OROs plans and procedures.

Contact with special populations and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as agreed to in the Extent of Play. Some contacts with transportation providers should be actual, as negotiated in the extent of play. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged.

All implementing activitics associated with protective actions for special populations must be based on the ORQs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agre.ement.

• Evacuatioillrelocation requirements, if necessary, will be demonstrated by discussions at the county ECX. Any calls if necessary, will be simulated.

Criterion 3.c.2: OBOs/Sc:hool officials implement protective actions for schools. (N11REG-0654, J.10.6, d, g)

Public school systerns/districts shall demonstrate the ability to irnplernent proteclive action decisions for students. The demonstration shall be made as ~QIIOWS: 4 t least one school in each affected school system or district, as appropriate, needs to demonstrate the implernentation of protective actions. The implemcntation of canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering should be simulated by describing to evaluators the proccdures that would be followed. If evacuation is the impleinented protective action, all activities to coordinate and ctmplete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may actually he demonstrated or accomplished through an inteivicw process. If accomplished through an interview process, appropriate school personnel including decision making officials (e.g., supennlendent/principal, transportation directorbus dispatcher), and at least one bus driver (and the bus drivers escort, if applicable) should he available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(?.) in the evacuation of school children. Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by the plan and/or procedures, shoiuld he veiified.

Officials of the school system(s) should demonstrate the capability to develop arid provide timely informatiori t o OROs for use in messages to parents, the general puhlic, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

The provisions of this criterion also apply to any private schools, private kindergartens and day care centers that participate in REP exercises pursuant to the OROs plans and procedures as negotiated in the extent-of-play agreement.

All activities must be based o n the OROs plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicatcd i n t h e extent-of~-play agreement.

e Appropiiate actions will occur as necessary, actual evacuation will not be demonstrated 3.d - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control.

Criterion 3.d.l: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traEc and access control personnel. (MJFU3G-0654, J.lO.g, j)

Extent of Play OROs should de.inonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points, consistent with protective action decisions (for example, evacuating, shellwing, and relocation), in a timely manner. OKOs should demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and acc.ess control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff should demonstrate accurdte knowledse of their roles and responsibilities. This capability may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview, in accordance with the extent-of-play a.greement.

In instances where OWOs Lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (rail, water, and air traffic), they should demonstrate the capability to contact the State or Federal agencies with authority to control access.

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated i n the extent-of-play agreement.

@ This criterion will be evaluated by intewiew of law enforcement officers i n the various county EOCs. Actual deinonstretions will not be performed.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments do evacuation are identified and resolved.

(NUREG-0654, J.1O.k) 02/2 8/03 12

Extent of Play OKOs should ilemonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning inipediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to deal with impediments. such as wreckers, need not be demonstr;ited; however. all contacts, actual or simulated, should be logged.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated i n the extent-of-play agreement.

e Should an impediment occur, the local EhlA Director or his designee will discuss procediires. Actual denionstrations will not be perfonned.

Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions @.e)

(Criterion 3.e.l) This Evaluation Area will not be demonstIaled (Criterion 3.e.2) T h i s Evaluation Area will not he demonstrated.

Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry and Meturn Decisions (3.0 (Criterion 32.1) This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

4.a - PBunie Phase Field Measurements and Analysis:

Criterion 4.a.l: 'The field teams are eqiiipped t~ perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particutates. (NUREG-0654, H.10; 1.4,8,9)

Extent of Play Field teams should be equipped with all instrumentation and supplies necessary to accomplish their mission. This should include instruments capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting the presence of beta radiation. These instruments should he capable of measuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological protectionkxposure control of team members and detection of actirity on the air sample collection media, consistent with the intended use of the instrunienf arid the ORO's plans arid pi-ocedzires. A n appropriate radioactive check source should be uscd to verify proper 02/28/03 13

operdtional rcsponse for each low range radiation measurement instrument (less than I IUhr) antl for high range instruments when available. If a source is not available for a high rnnge instrument, a procedure should exist to operationally test the instrunlent before entering an arra where only it high range instrument can make useful readings.

All activities must be based on the ORBS plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above o r otherwise indicated in the extent-of.play agreement.

• This Evaluation Area will no1 be demonstrated.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterkze the release antl to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; 1.8, 11; J.10.a)

Extent of Play Responsible Qffsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to brief teams on predicted plume location and direction, travel speed, and exposure control procedures before deployment.

Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and to support the adequacy of implemented protective actions or to be a factor in modifying protective actions. Teams should be directed to take measurements in such locations, at such times to provide information sufficient to characterize the plume and impacts.

If the responsibiiity to obtain peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these measurements to be repeated by State and local monitoring teams. If the licensee teams do not obtain peak mcasuremcnts I n the plume, it is the OROs decision as to whether peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the piurne. The sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among ail field teams (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential. Coordination concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form, to a radiological laboratory should be demonstrated.

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in thc Federal Radiological Emergency Response Pian (FREKP), and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must he based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play-agrrement.

02/28/03 14

e T h i s Evaluation Arm will i w t br tlcnmnstratcd.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate Iocations, and radioiodine anal particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location tu determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been cdested on the sampling media. (NBJREQ;-OfiSJ, I. 9)

Extent of P h y Field teams should demonstmte the capability to report measurements and field data pertaining to the ineasuremeiit of ail-home radioiodine and particulatcs and ambient rxliation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment, or other appropriate authority. If samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the appropriate authority should consider the need for expedited laboratory analyses of these samples. OROs should share data i n a timely manner with all appropriate OROs. All methodology, including contamination control, instrunlentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody fonn for transfer to a laboratory, will he in accordance with the OROs plan and/or procedures.

C)ROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, etc.), ilavailable. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be must be hascd on the ORQs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-.of-play agreement.

This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

Post Phime Phase Field Measurements and Sanapling (4.b)

(Criterion 4.b.l) 0 This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated Sub-Element 4,c-Laboratory Operations Criterion 4.c.l: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions, {NUREG-0654, C.3; J.11)

Extent of Play The laboratory staff should demonstrate the capability to follow appropriate prr)cedures for receiving samples, including logging of infomalion, preventing contarnination of the laboratory, prcveniing buildup ot backgrr)und radiation dire to stored samples, pieventing cross contamination of samples, preserving samples that may spoil ( for exaniple, milk),

02/28/03 15

and kceping track of sample identity. In addition, the laboratory staff should demonstrate the capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements.

The laboratory should be appropriately equipped to provide analyses of media, as rcquested, o n a timely basis, of sufficient quality and sensitivity to support assessments and dcc.isions as anticipated by the OROs plans and procedures. The laboratory (laboratories) instrument calibrations should be traceable to standards provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Laboratory methods used to analyze fypical radinnuclides released i n a reactor incident should be as described in the plans and procedures. New or revised methods may be used to analyze atypical rddionuclide releases (for example, transuranics or as a result of a terrorist event) or if warranted by circumstmces of the event. Analysis may require resources beyond those of the ORO.

The laboratory staff should be qualified in radioanalytical techniques and contamination control procedures.

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the T;REKP, and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the e.xercise.

All activities must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

0 This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated

5. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION 5.a -Activation of the Prompt ABert and Notification System:

Criterion 5.a.l: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public.

are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency oficials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instnictional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10CFR Part 50, Appendix E.1V.D and NUREG-0654, E.5,6,7)

Extent of Play Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability tn sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (pemianent resident and transient) throughout the 10 mile plume 02/28/53 16

pathway EPL. Following the decision to activate thc alert and notification sIysrem, in

u x m h n c e with the OKOs plan aridor procetiures, comp1r

tion of systcrn a c t i v ~ t i o n sliould be accomplished i n a tiniely manner (will not hc sub.ject to specific time rcquii~cinirnts)for piimary alcrting/notification. The initial message should include the clernents required by current FEW\ REP guidance.

Offsite Response Organizations (ORCk) with mute alerting as the primary method of alerting and notifying the puhlic should demonstrate the capability to accomplish !he primary route alerting. following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in a tirtiely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements) i n accordance with the OKOs plan andor prrwxiurrs. At least one route needs to be demonstrated and cvnl~iatetl.The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However. the most difficult route should be denionstrated at least once every six years. All alcrt anti notificittiori activities along the mute should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually he used is read for the evaluator, hut not actually broadcast) as agrced upon in the extent--of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location. The initial message should include the elements required b y current FEMA REP guidance.

For exercise purposes, timely is defined as the responsible O R 0 person.nel/representatives demonstrate actions t o disseminate the appropriate infonnationlinstructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay. lf message dissemination is to be identified as not having been accomplished in a tiniely manner, rhe evaluator(s) will dacuinenl a specific delay or cause as to why a message was n o t considered timely.

Procedures to broadcast the message shouid be fully demonstrated as h e y would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) o r test niessages is not required. lhe alert signal activation may be simulated. Howevcr, the procedures should bc demonstrated up to the point of actual activation.

ihe capabi!ity of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional mcssagc on a 24-hour basis should be verified during an interview with appropriate pe~-sonnel from the primary notification system.

AI1 activities for this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and procediires and completed as they would he in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of play agreement.

e In Ageement Criterion 5.a-2.

0 This Evaluation Area will not bc demonstrated.

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FEMA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision hy authorized 02/28/03 11

offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the OM0 of a failure of the priniery alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E. 6 ,

Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Extent of Play Offsite Response Organizations (OR.Os)with FEMA-approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Kepott) S-10 nriles from the nuclear power plant should demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area(s) within 45 minutes following the initial derision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public o f an emergency situation. The 45-minute clock will begin when the OKOs make the decision to activate the ale^? and notification system for the first time for a specific emergency situation. Thc initial message should, at a minimum, include: a statement that ;in emergency exists at the plant and where to obtain additional information.

For exception area alerting, at least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated.

The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route should be demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play.

Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location.

Backup aleit and notification of the puhlic should be completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the O R 0 of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. Backup route alerting only needs to be demonstrated and evaluated, in accordance with the OROs plan andlor procedures and the extent-of-play agreement, if the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary sysiem(s), or if any portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to function. If demonstrated, only one route needs to be selected and demonstrated. All alert and notification activitics along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location.

All activities for this ciiterion must be based on the OROs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

0 This Evaluation Area , if necessary, will be demonstrated by a discussion between the evaluator and the local County EMA Director.

02/28/03 18

5.h - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Buhlic ;and the Media:

Criterion 5.b.l: OROs provide accurate emergeiicy in8i~rmntionanal instructions to the p~ahlicand the news media in a timely manner. (NBJWBSG-0654, E. 5,7; G . 3 4 G.4.c)

Extent of Play Sut)sequent emergency information and insfructions should he provided to the puhlic and the media in a timcly manner (will not be subject lo specific time requirements). For exercise purposes, timely is defined as the responsible O R 0 personnel/repr~senlative§ demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate infornialion/instructions with a sense of urgency and without iindue delay. If message dissemination is to be identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evalnatnr(s) will document a specific delay o r cause as io why a message was not considered timely.

The OR@ should ensure. that emergency infonnation and instructions are consistent with protective action decisions made by appropriate officials. The emergency information should contain all necessary and applicable instructions ( for example, evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, ~ l i i i to t take when evacuating, infonnation concerning pets, shelter-in-place instructions. information concerning protective actions for schools and special populations, puhlic inquiry telephone number, etc.) to assist the public in carrying out protective action decisions provided to them. The O R 0 should also be prepared to disclose and explain the Ernei-gency Classification Level (ECL) of the incident. At a minimum, this information mist he included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs should demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and iindcrstandable to the public within both the plurnc and ingestion pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use faniiliar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.

The emergency information should be all-inclusi7:e by including previously identified prokclive action areas that are stili valid, as well as new weas. The OKOs should demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs should demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency infomiation is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance. with the plan and/or procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English langtiage whzn required by the plan a d o r proccdures.

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs should demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissenlination of ingestion pathway infomiation t~ pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the OROs plan andlor procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and 10

coordinated information to the n e w media for suhsequent dissemination to the public.

This would include denionstration of the capability to conduct timely and peitincnt media briefings and distribute rnedia releases as the situation wnrrilnts. T h e OROs should demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately t o inquiries from the news media. All information presented in media briefings and media releases should be consistent with protective action decisions and other emergency information provided to the public.

Copies OF pertinent emergency infomation (for example, Emergency Alert System

[EASI messages and media releases) and media infomation kits should he available for dissemination to the media.

OKOs should demonstrate that an effective system is i n place for dealing with calls to the public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff should demonsti~atethe capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to an appropriate information source.

information from the hotline staff, including information that coirects false or inaccurate information when trends are noted, should he included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings, andor media releases.

Ali activities for this criterion must be based on the OKOs plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above o r otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play ageernent.

In agreement 6.0 SUPPORT OPEPPATPON/HiACILITIES 6.a - Monitoring and Decontamination of Fhacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees:

Criterion 6.a.l: The reception centeriemergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees a n d / ~ remergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.1O.h; 5.12; K.5.a)

Extent of Play Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacueeskmergency workers should be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated i n the extent-of-play agreement. This wouid include adequate space for evacuees vehicles. Expected dernonstration should include 1/3 of the monitoring teainslportal monitors required to monitor 20% of the population allocated to the facility within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the process of checking the instrutnent(s) for proper operation.

Staff responsible for the radioiogical monitoring of evacuees should demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed t o monitor the 20% emergency planning zone (EPZ) population planning base within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. T h i s monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can he monitored per hour by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate monitoring 02/28!@1 20

procedure. A minimum o f six individu;lls per inonitoing station shouki be monitored, using cqtiipinrnt and procedures specified in the plan ;ind/or procedures, to allow tienionstration of monitoring, decontamination, arid registration capabilities. The mrmitoring sequcnces for the first six simulated eviicuees per monitoring team will he tiincd by the evaluators in order to determine whether the iwelve h o u r requirement can be met. Monitoring nf emergency workers does ~ i ohave l to nicet the twelve-hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for 3 minimum of two crnergency workers.

Decnntan~iinatioiio f evacuecslemergency workers may be simulated arid conducted by intei-view. The availability of provisions for separately showering should be demonstrated or cxplajncd. l'he staff should demonstrate provisions for limiling the spread of contamination.

Provisions could include floor coverings, signs and appropriate means (for example, partitions, roped-off areas) to separate clean from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions should also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals, provide changes of clothing for individuals whose clothing is contaminated, and store contaniinated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contarnination of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any individual found to be contaminated, procedures should he discussed concerning the handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings.

Monitoring personne:l shr)uld explain the use of action levels for detexrninirrg the need for deconlaniii1;rtjon. They should also explain the procediit-es for refen-ing evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow up i n accordance with the ORU's plans and procedures. Contamination of the individual will be determined by controller inject and not simulated with any low-level radiation source.

T h e capability to register individuals upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities should be demonstrated. The registration activities demonstrated should include the establishment of a registration record for each individual, consisring of the individual's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination, if any. or as othenvise designated in the plan. Aiidio recorders, carncorders, or writteri records are all accepPable means for. registration, All activities associated with this criterion rniist be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless othenvise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

e This criterion is io be demonstrated out of sequence at 3:30 pm on May 28, 2003. The Reception Centcr is located at Jeff Davis County High School, Broxton Woad, South, Hazlehurst, GA. Paper coverings for the floor will be simulated. Appling, 'Pattnall and Toombs Counties will not demonstrate this criterion.

6.b - Monitoring and B~econhminationof Emergency Worker Equipment:

02/28/03

Criterion 6.b.l: The facility/QRO has atleqirate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of nionitoring and decontamination of ernergency worker equipment, including vehicles. (NIJREG-0654, K.5.b)

Extent of Play The monitoring staff shouid demonstrate the capability to monitor equipment, including vehicles, for contamination in accordance with the Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) plans and procedures. Specific attention should be given to equipment, including vehicles, that was in contact with individuals found to be contaminated. the rrionitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of equipment, including vehicles, based on guidance levels and procedures stated in the plan and/or procedures.

The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be set up as it would be i n an actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping and contarnination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures shouid be demonstrated for a minirnum of one vehicle. It is generally not rrecessary to monitor the entire surface of vehicles. IIowever, the capability to monitor areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles should be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that were i n contact with individuals found to he contaminated should also be checked.

Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be decontarrinated, may be simulated and conducted by interview.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the OROs plans and prcmxiures and completed as they would be i n an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

0 This criterion is to be demonstrated out of sequence as described in 6 . a . l . Appling, Tattnall and Toornbs Counties will not demonstrate this criterion.

6.c -Temporary Care of F,4 vacuees:

criterion 6.c.l: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Ked Cross planning guidelines. (Found in MASS CARE-Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031).

Managers denionstrate the procedures to assitre that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior tu entedng congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.lO.h, J.12)

Extent of Play Under this criterion, demonstration of congregate care centers may be conducted out of sequence with the exercise scenario. The evaluator should conduct a walk-through of the 01.128103 22

cciiter to detennine, through observation anti inquiries, that the services and acconimodaiions are consistent with A R C 3031. in this simulation, it is not necessary to set u p operations as they would he i n an actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those services to sirnulatcd evacuees. C;i ven the substantial differences between denionstration and siinulation of this objective, cuercise demonstration expectations should be clearly specified in extent-of-play agreenicnts.

Congregate care staff should also denionstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees have been monitored for contarnination, have been decontaminated as appropriate, and have been 1-egistered before entering the facility. This capability may be determined through mi interview process.

If operations a! the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive to transport (e.g,, cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically available at the facility (facilities). However, availability of such i t e m should be verificd by providing the eveluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantiiies.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans anti procedures and completed as they would he in an actual emergency, unless noted above o r otherwise indicated in the extcn't -of-play agreement.

e This item is to be demonstrated out of sequence as described in 6.a.l. The F;icility was demonstrated by interview and walk-through of' the shelter (Jeff Davis County Junior High School, Pine Forrest Avenue, Hazlehurst, GA) with the Shelter Manager or his designee.

Appling, Tattnall and Toombs Counties will not dcmonstrate this criterion.

6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Hndividt~als:

Criterion 6.d.B: The pdaci!itg/oWO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to pr~avidetransport, monitoring, decolat;nminalion, and medica8 services to contaminated injured indivitluais. (NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.3, R; %..1,4)

Extent of Play Monitoring, decontamination, arid contamination control efforts will not delay urgent medical care for the victim.

Offsite Response Organizations (OKOs) should demonstrate the capability to transport contaminated injured individiids to medical facilities. An ambulance should be used for the response to the victim. However, to avoid talung an ambulance out of service for an extended time, any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) may he utilized to transport the victim to the medical facility. Nomiai communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and the receiving medical facility should be demonstrated. If a suhstitute vehicle is used for transport to 'the medical facility. this communication must occur before releasing the ambulance from the drill. This communication wouitl include repoiling radiation 02/28/03 23

monitoring results; if available. Additionally. t h e anibulance ci-ew should demonstrate, by interview, knowledge of where the ambulance and crew wouid be monitored and decontaminated, i l required, or whom to contact for such information.

Monitoring of the victim may be performed before transport, done enroute, or deferred to the medical facility. Before using a monitoring instmment(s). the monitor(s) should demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. All monitoring activities should be completed as they would be in an actual emergency.

Appropriate contamination control measures should be dernonstrated before and during transport and at the receiving medical facility.

'The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to activate and set up a radiological emergency area for treatment. Equipment and supplies should be available for the treatment of contaminated injured individuals.

The medical facility should demonstrate the capahiiity to make decisions on the need for decontamination of the individual, to follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and to maintain records of ail survey measurements and samples taken. All procedures for the collection and analysis of samples and the decontainination of the individual should be demonstrated or described to the evaluator.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they wouid be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or othenvise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

0 Meadows Memorial Hospital MS-I Exercise is to be demonstrated out of sequence on May

28. 2003.

02/25/03 24

APPENDIX 4 EXERCISE SCENARIO This appendix contains a summary of the simulated sequence ofevents. Exercise Scenario, which was used as the basis for invoking crncrgency response actions by OROs iri the Hatch Nuclear PLant exercise on August 20, 2003.

This exercise scenario was submitted by the State ofGeorgia, and approved by FEMA Region I v.

(Final Report Ofliy) 31

3.1 NARRATlVE

SUMMARY

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness 2003 Exercise 04 3.t NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

Initial conditions establish Unit 2 operating at 100% power, late in core life. Power history has been full power operation for the last 280 days. Unit 1 is in a refueling outage with the core unloaded.

Meteorological conditions have light winds out of the East Northeast at 4-6 MPH gusting up to 10 MPH. A 20 percent chance of precipitation in the form of afternoon thundershowers is forecast. Plant radiologicai and radiochemistry conditions are normal.

Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1B was taken out of service at 1 8 0 (EDT) on 8/18/2003 for maintenancehepair placing Unit 2 in a 14 day Limited Condition of Operation (LCO). Work is in progress on ED6 1B and it is scheduled to be back in service by 1305 EDT today.

This scenario begins with a small primary system leak into the drywell from a weld on the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling suction line between 2E11-FOCI9 and 2Ell-FO67. The Operating Crew observes a gradual increase in the leak and performs calculations on the drywell sump levels to determine the leak rate. The resuits of the calculations indicate a leak > 50 gpm. The Superintendent of Shift (SOS) will assume Emergency Director (ED) duties and declare an ALERT IAW procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and lnitial Actions, Section 20.0, bass of Coolant, as a result of the reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage being greater than the emergency action level (EAL).

The Operating Crew performs initial emergency response actions including offsite notifications and the public address announcement to initiate actions of site emergency responders. Emergency responders report to the emergency facility and initiate activation procedures. The Operating Crew responds to the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) per Abnormal and Emergency Operating Procedures (AOPs & EOPs) and continues to assess and monitor plant conditions.

The Operating Crew will begin venting the drywell through the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) IAW procedure 34AB-T23-002-2S, Small R p e Break Inside Primary Confainrnent, to control containment pressure. As drywell pressure and temperature increase, operators enter the EOP on Primary Containment Control. During venting, the 18" Drywell purge line valve 2848-F319 fails in the open position.

A controlred reactor shutdown will commence in accordance with procedure 34GO-OPS-01423, Fast Reactor Shutdown. The ED/SOS in consultation with plant management may choose to manually SCRAM the reactor at any point during the fast shutdown. If a decision is made to SCRAM, the weld on RHR suction line will significantly degrade resulting in a significant increase in the RCS leak rate to approximately 1500 GPM on the SCRAM. The emergency response organization ( 3 0will ) initiate emergency facility activation procedures and begin assisting the Operating Crew in mitigation of the events.

3.1-1 04

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness 2003 Exercise 04 3.1 NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

The Operations Support Center (OSC) and Technical S ~ p p o t Center

? (TSC) are activated and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is brought to a standby status. The SQS transfers Emergency Director (ED) duties to a plant management ED in the TSC. State and Local notifications using the Emergency Notification Network (ENN), and Federal (NRC) notifications using the Emergency Notification System (ENS) along with dose assessment activities are transferred to the TSC from the Control Room. The SNC Corporate Emergency Response Organization activates the Corporate Emergency Operating Center (CEOC) and the GPC Corporate Emergency Response Organization activates the Emergency News Center (ENC). State and Local agencies initiate emergency Standard Operating Procedures (SOPS) and notifications in response to the plants declaration.

The Control Room (simulator) receives multiple indications (fire alarms) of a fire in the 41 S0V 2E switchgear room. Dispatch of the Hatch Nuclear Fire Service JHNFS)(Fire Brigade) is required. Following the fire alarms, the plant experiences a half-SCRAM and loss of all equipment supplied by the 2E 4 t 6 W bus. The 2A EDG will start, attempt to tie to the 2E 4160V bus and run unloaded and trip due to high temperature if not secured by t h e Operating Crew.

HMFS members arrive at the scene and begin fire fighting activities. Portable COz extinguishers in the area are ineffective. The C92 hose reel located in the 4460 V 2E switchgear room vestibule is inoperable, HNFS members must resort to the application of water to extinguish the biaze.

These activities result in a grounding of the supply cables from the Unit 2 start-up transformers 2C and 2D. There are no protective devices between the start-up transformers and the switchgear, grounding of both of these cables cause the disconnects (Le., 520, 530,470, and 480)between the two 230 kV buses and the two start-up transformers to trip open. This results in a loss of offsite power to all three 416OV emergency buses (E,F, & G). At this time a Site Area Emergency (SA) could be declared in accordance with 73EQ-I$-001-0, mergency Classification and lnifiai Actions, section 8,0, Fire in Plant, based on the ED'Sconservative judgment that the fire has compromised safe shutdown functions.

This loss of the 4160V emergency buses initiates a reactor scram, if not previously manually initjated. On the scram, the weld on RHR suction line will significantly degrade resulting in a significant increase in the RCS leak rate to approximately 1500 GPM.

Reactor water level begins to drop dramatically. Attempts to inject with HPCl are unproductive as 2E41-FO04 (the steam supply varve) is stuck in the closed position due to a problem in !he control circuitry. RClC starts and then auto isolates due to shorted high BP sensor auxiliary contact (E51-N656A) which energizes K303A and sends a close signal to RClC steam supply valve 251-F008, As the RWL level approaches the Top of Active Fuel (TAF) the Operating Crew emergency depressurize the reactor to allow use of low pressure injection systems.

3.1-2 04

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness 2003 Exercise 04 3.1 NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

The 1 B EDG is tagged out for maintenance. The 2C ED6 will start and tie to the 4160V 61 Bus. During the transfer the supply breaker from 600V Bus 219 trips due to a problem with the breakers trip adjustments. The opening of this breaker de-energizes buses 2824-S012, S012A and S012B. Motor operated valves for several reactivity control systems and Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) are affected, including RHR, Corespray, Stand-by Liquid Control (SBLC), ti Control Rod Drive (CRD).

Additionally, pump power is lost for SBLC pump 2 6 and SBGT filter train 2B. The 2A RHW pump and 2A Core Spray pump are de-energized as a result of the fire in the 4160V E bus.

WHR pumps 2C and 2 5 are unavailable due to the inability of the 1 B EDG to energize the 41 60V F bus.

Core Spray (CS) pump 2B is supplied with power from the 2G 4160V bus but fails to auto start due to a problem with the pump motor. RHR Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) pump 2B auto starts with power supplied from the 2G 4160V emergency bus. However, this train of LPCl is only partially effective due to a blockage in the suction strainer.

WHRSW pumps 2 6 and 2D are powered from the 41 60V G bus. However, the crosstie valve from RHR to RHRSW (2Ell-F073) is unavailable due to the loss of 2824-SO12.

Emergency Response Facilities continue assisting the Control Room with assessment of equipment failures, development of mitigation strategies, and assessment of piant conditions. The damage assessment teams will be dispatched Bo determine the extent of damage to the 4160V E bus, SUT 2C, SUT 2 8 and to investigate problems with 2R24-SO12 and other plant equipment. Repair and corrective action teams are sent to restore the EBG 1B and restoration plans and priorities are developed as assessment activities report information to the facilities.

With limited feed to the reactor vessel and the ongoing RHR suction LOCA, the reactor vessel depressurizes and drains down to the drywell. As it becomes evident that the coolant leak exceeds the capacity of the available 28 LPCl pump, a Site Area Emergency (SAE) will be declared in accordance with 73EP-EIP-004 -0, Emergency Classification and lnifial Actions, section 20.0, Loss of Coolant, based on RCS leakage exceeding the capacity of all available ECCS capacities.

The OF activates and the ED transfers to the OF from the TSC along with Offsite (E")

notifications and dose assessment activities. Field Monitoring Teams will be assembled and prepared for dispatch. Mandatory site evacuation and protected area accountability are performed. State and Local Emergency Operating Centers (EOCs) are staffed and initiate activation procedures.

3.1-3 04

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness 2003 Exercise 04 3.1 NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

As the fuel becomes uncovered, fuel cladding failure begins and gas gap activily is released to the coolant and containment. As the released activjty is transported outside the sacrificial shield in RCS piping and released to the primary containment atmosphere through the RHR LOCA, dryweli post accident radiation monitors trend upward. Torus post-b0CA monitors reflect the increase in radiaiion levels as the released activity is transported to the Torus through the downcomers. Area Radiation Monitors (ARMS) alarm in the reactor building. Radiation levels in the reactor building areas begin to impact repair team activities, Successful repair of the 1s EDG will allow the recovery of the 2F 41 6OV emergency bus.

This will allow the starting ob the 2C and 2B RHR pumps. Succesfule repair of the supply breaker from 600V Bus 2B will allow recovery of the 2R24-SO12, S012A and S012B buses This will a11ow remote operation of the crosstie valve from RHR to RHRSW (2Ell-FO33).

A short in the control circuit far the 18" Drywell purge line isolation valve, 2T48-F320, opens the valve and allows contaminated Drywell atmosphere to be drawn into the operating train of Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS). Inventory contained in the drywell will flow to the main stack via the SBGTS and Off Gas system. An elevated filtered release of radioactivity to the environment begins through the Plant Slack.

A GENERAL emergency will be declared based on multiple failure criteria based on indications of Fuel Cladding failure, a Primaty System breach, and a Primary Containment breach. Protective Action Recommendations (PARS)are issued to State and local authorities.

The Main Stack norma! range monitors ramps up and the Kaman emergency range monitor initiates as SBGTS pumps the activity to the mvironment. The Dose Assessment Staff evaluates the release and coordinates activities to issue protective action recommendations (PARS) to State and Local authorities based on the radiological conditions.

LPCI 2C and 2 8 and/or RWRSW pumps 2% and 2D provide feed, flooding-up and covering the exposed fuel. The release of radioactive material to the environment will continue as SBGB continues to draw from the Drywell atmosphere.

The Field Monitoring Teams continue to track and monitor the radioactive glume.

Protective action recommendations are upgraded as needed based on the evaluation of the radiological release. The emergency response organization continues to assess plant conditions, restore needed systems and attempts to isolate the release path until the exercise is terminated.

3.1-4 0'4

3 2 TIMELINE Edwin 1. Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness 2003 Exercise 04 3.2 TlMELiNE Time Event(§)

0730 Initial Conditions:

Unit 2 operating at 10046 power, late in core life. Power history has been full power operation for the last 280 days. Unit 1 is in a refueling outage with the core unloaded.

Meteorological conditions have light winds out of the East Northeast at 4-6 MPH gusting up to 10 MPH. A 20 percent chance of precipitation in the form of afternoon thundershowers is forecast.

Plant Radiological and Radiochemistry conditions are normal.

Emergency Diesel Generator (EBG) 1B was taken out of service at 1800 (EDT) on 8/1 %EO03for maintenanceirepair placing Unit 2 in a 14 day Limited Condition of Operation (LCO). Work is in progress on EDG 15 and it is scheduled to he hack In service by 1300 EDT today.

0800 A small leak develops from a weld on the RHR suction line between valves 2E11 -FOO9 and 2E11 -F067.

0815 Operators will begin venting the drywell through the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) IAW procedure 34AB-T23-002-2S, Small Pipe Break h i d e Primary Containment, to control containment pressure.

0825 Leakage increases to >60 GPM.

The Operating Crew should calculate the leakage rate from the Drywell Floor Drain and Equipment Drain Sumps As drywe18 pressure and temperature increase. operators enter the EOP on Primary Containment Control. During venting, the 1% Drywell purge line valve 2T4%-F319fails in the open position.

z 0845 An ALERT should be declared IAW procedure 73EP'-EIP-001-OS, Emergency Classification and lnifial Actions, Section 20.0, Loss of Coolant.

ERQ members are notified of the event via the plant public address system.

09:15 Control Room Fire Alarms are received in the in the 4160V 2E switchgear room.

3.2-1 04

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness 2003 Exercise 04 3.2 TIMELINE Time Even%(s) 0915 The Operations Support Center (OSC) and Technical Support Center (TSC) are staffed and activated. The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is staffed and placed in standby.

0920 A half SCRAM occurs and all equipment supplied by the 2E 41 60V bus fails..

The Control Room dispatches of the Fire Brigade 0930 The RHW suction line leak increases to > 1590 GPM.

Reactor water level begins to drop dramatically. The reactor scrams.

0935 Fire brigade arrives and makes their initial attack on the fire.

0945 W loss of offsite power to all three 41 6OV enaergency buses (416OV E, F, and G) occurs. The 2A EBG starts, runs unloaded and then trips on high temperature. The 2 6 EDG starts and ties 10 the 4160V G Bus.

0950 The 60OV Bus 2D supply breaker for 2R24-SO12 trips de-energizing 2R24-5012, S012A and S012B.

HPCl valve 2E41-FOOl sticks in the closed position. RClC starts but then auto isolates.

A Site Area Emergency (SA) could be declared in accordance with 73EQ-EIP-091-OS, Emergency Ciassification and Initial Actions, section 8.0, Fire in Plant based on the EDS conservative judgment that the fire has compromised safe shutdown functions.

0955 Fire Brigade reports Fire is out but the use of water was required due to a failure of the C 0 2 System.

As reactor water level reaches -155 (TAF), the reactor is emergency depressurize to use low pressure injection system.

1008 Damage assessment teams dispatched to determine the extent of damage to the 4160V E bus, SUT 2C, SUT 2D and to investigate problems with 2R24-SO?%.S012A L t SQ125.

Repair teams should be sent to restore the ED6 1B to service 3.2-2 84

Edwin I. Watch Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness 2003 Exercise 04 3.2 TIMELINE Time Event(s) 1000 Core Spray (6s)pump 26 fails to auto start due to a problem with the pump motor windings.

bow Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) pump 2B auto starts but is ineffective due to a blockage in the suction strainer.

s 1015 A Site Area Emergency (SAE:) should be declared in accordance with 73EP-EIP-001-OS, Emergency Classification and lnitial Actions, section 20.0. Loss of Coolant based on coolant leak exceeds the capacity of the available ECCS.

The EOF is activated.

4 030 Drywell 8. Torus post-LBCA monitors and Drywell Wide Range Radiation Monitors (DWWRM) trend upward.

Area Radiation Monitors (ARMS) alarm in the reactor building 1030 + Successful repair of the 7 3 EDG will allow the recovery of the 2F 4160V emergency bus. This will allow the starting of the 2C and 2D RHR pumps.

LPCI 2C and 2 0 provide feed, fiooding-up and covering the exposed fuel.

Repair of the supply breaker from 600V Bus 2D will allow recovery of the 2R24-SO12, SQ12A and S012B buses. This will albw operation of the crosstie valve from WHR to RHRSW (2E7 l-FO73).

1100 The 18" D w e l l purge line valve 2T48-F320 opens allowing the Drywell atmosphere to be drawn into the operating train of SBGTS Inventory contained in the drywell will flow to the main stack via the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGP).A filtered release of radioactivity to the environment begins through SBGT and the Plant Stack.

1115 A GENERAL emergency will be declared based on multiple failure criteria.

Stack monitors begin to ramp up.

Dose Assessment Staff dispatches field teams to locate, track, and evaluate the release.

1230 + The exercise is terminated.

3.2-3 04