ML040860141

FEMA - Final Exercise Report, Hatch Nuclear Plant

ML040860141
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	10/15/2003
From:	Burris K Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Reyes L NRC/RGN-II
Schneck D 415-3079 NRR/NUEPPO
References
Download: ML040860141 (67)

Text

Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IV 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 October 15, 2003 Mr. Luis A. Reyes Regional Administrator - RII Nuclear Regulatory Commission 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Mr. Reyes:

Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for the August 20, 2003, partial participation plume phase pathway exercise of the offsite radiological emergency response plans site-specific to the Hatch Nuclear Plant. This report addresses the evaluation of the plans and preparedness for the State of Georgia and the Counties of Appling, JeffDavis, Tattnall, and Toombs Counties that are within the 10-mile EPZ. Copies of this report will be forwarded to the State of Georgia, FEMA and NRC Headquarters by my staff.

The Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) and Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs Counties activated their emergency response plans to coordinate their response to the evacuation caused by the anticipated landfall of Hurricane Floyd. Their response showed the effectiveness and dedication of their emergency response organizations and the efficiency of their response plans. FEMA, after review of submitted documentation, granted credit for exercise objectives regarding actions to protect the spccial needs population; protective actions for schools; congregate care; shift change; and off hours and unannounced exercises.

All objectives of the exercise were demonstrated. No Deficiencies were identified. Two Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) were identified, one at the Emergency News Center concerning confusing information, the other concerning emergency worker decontamination in Jeff Davis County; both were immediately corrected. There are no outstanding issues resulting from this exercise.

Based on the results of the August 20, 2003, exercise, and FEMA's review of the annual letters of certification for 1998 and 1999, the offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Georgia and the affected local jurisdictions site-specific to the Hatch Nuclear Plant can be implemented and are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken offsite to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site.

The Title 44 CFR, Part 350, approval of the for the State of Georgia offsite radiological emergency response plans and preparedness site-specific to the Hatch Nuclear Plant, granted on May 5, 1981 will remain in effect.

If you should have any questions, please contact Helen Wilgus at 770/220-5560.

Sincerely, W Kenneth 0. Burris, Jr.

Regional Director Enclosure cc: Ms. Vanessa E. Quinn, Chief Federal Emergency Management Agency Headquarters Radiological and Emergency Preparedness Branch - NP-TS-RP 500 C Street, SW, Room 202 Was gton, D. C. 20472 Vs. Debra A. Schneck, Chief Emergency Preparedness and Health Physics Section Operator Licensing, Human Performance, and Plant Support Branch Division of Inspection Program Management Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washinglon, D. C. 20555-0001

Final Exercise Report Hatch Nuclear Plant Licensee: Southern Nuclear Operating Company Exercise Date: August 20, 2003 Report Date: October 15, 2003 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION IV 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

1. EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

............................................. 1 II. INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................2 111. EXERCISE OVERVIEW ............................................. 4 A. Plume Pathway Emergency Planning Zone Description ....................................... 4 B. Exercise Participants ............................................. 4 C. Exercise Timeline ............................................. 5 IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS ............................................ 7 A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2 ................................... 7 B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated ......................  ;.7

1. STATE OF GEORGIA ................. 11 1.1 State Operations Center ....................................... I1 1.2 Forward Emergency Operations Center ....................................... 11 1.3 Dose Assessment ....................................... 12 1.4 Emergency Operations Facility ....................... ................ 12 1.5 Emergency News Center....................................... 13

2. RISK JURISDICTIONS ................ 14 2.1 APPLING COUNTY ....................................... 14 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center ....................................... 14 2.1.2 Traffic Control Points ....................................... 15 2.1.3 Protection Actions for Schools ....................................... 15 2.1.4 River Clearing ....................................... 16 2.2 JEFF DAVIS COUNTY ............. .......................... 16 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center ....................................... 16 2.2.2 Traffic Control Points ....................................... 17 2.2.3 Reception and Congregate Care ....................................... 17 2.2.4 Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and Equipment .......................... ............. 18 i

2.3 TATTNALL COUNTY .......................... 19 2.3.1 Emergency Operations Center .......................... 19 2.3.2 Traffic Control Points .......................... 19 2.4 TOOMBS COUNTYY .......................... 20 2.4.1 Emergency Operations Center ............ .............. 20 2.4.2 Traffic Control Points............. ............. 20 2.4.3 River Clearance .......................... 21 2.4.4 Protective Actions for Schools .............. ............ 21 2.4.5 Medical Serviccs Drill (MS-I) .......................... 22

3.

SUMMARY

OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION ... 23 3.1 Issued 2003 ...... 23 3.1.1 31-03-5.b. I -A-0 1 Emergency News Center ..................... 23 3.1.2 31-03 -6.a. I -A-02 Jeff Davis County - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and Equipment....................................................................... 24 List of Appendices APPENDIX I - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .26 APPENDIX 2 - EXERCISE EVALUATORS .28 APPENDIX 3 - EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT .30 APPENDIX 4 - EXERCISE SCENARIO .31 List of Tables Table I - Exercise Timeline. 6 Table 2 - Summary of Exercise Evaluation .10 ii

EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On August 20, 2003, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region IV, conducted a partial participation plume pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) exercise for the Hatch Nuclear Plant. The purpose of this exercise was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological incident at a nuclear power plant. The exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and local radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures.

The previous exercise at this site was conducted on March 14, 2001. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise for the Hatch Nuclear Plant was conducted on October 8 and 9. 1980.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the representatives of the State of Georgia and the Counties of Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs, who participated in this exercise. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

Appling County had activated its Emergency Operations Center and emergency response organization in response to an Alert on April 2, 2002 at Plant Hatch. Their response to the event and the demonstration during this exercise once again demonstrated the County's commitment to protecting the health and safety of the citizens of Appling County.

The State and local organizations demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and appropriately implemented them. No Deficiencies were identified during this exercise. However, there were two Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) identified. The first ARCA was identified during the second media briefing when conflicting information was announced concerning the initial protective action decision. This ARCA was corrected during the third media briefing when correct information was provided. The second ARCA, concerning the monitoring of emergency workers and equipment in Jeff Davis County, was identified during the out-of-sequence demonstration for this exercise and was also corrected on the spot. No outstanding issues remain.

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11. INTRODUCTION On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

FEMA Title 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

• Taking the lead in offsite emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of radiological emergency response plans (RERP) and procedures developed by State and local governments;

• Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by State and local governments;

• Responding to requests by the NRC pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993);

• Coordinating the activities of Federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

- Department of Agriculture.

- Department of Commerce,

- Department of Energy,

- Department of Health and Human Services,

- Department of the Interior,

- Department of Transportation,

- Environmental Protection Agency,

- Food and Drug Administration and

- Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region IV Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA. Formal submission of the RERPs for the Hatch Nuclear Plant to FEMA Region IV by the State of Georgia and involved local jurisdictions occurred on January 23, 1980. Formal approval of the RERP was granted by FEMA on May 5, 1981, under Title 44 CFR 350.

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A partial participation plume pathway exercise was conducted on August 20, 2003, by FEMA Region IV to assess the capabilities of Statc and local emcrgcncy prcparcdncss organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during the plume phase of a radiological emergency involving the I-latch Nuclear Plant. The purpose of this report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with final determinations being made by the Chief Evaluator and Co-RAC Chairperson, and approved by the Regional Director.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

• NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;

• FEMA- "Areas of Evaluation Methodology" April 25, 2002.

Section III of this report, entitled "Exercise Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the exercise. This section contains a description of the plume pathway EPZ, a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities which were evaluated, and a tabular presentation of the time of actual occurrence of key exercise events and activities.

Section IV entitled "Exercise Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the demonstration of applicable exercise criteria at each jurisdiction or fimctional entity evaluated in a jurisdiction-based, issues-only format. This section also contains: (I) descriptions of all Deficiencies and ARCAs assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and the State and local governments' response and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous exercises and the status of the ORO's efforts to resolve them.

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111. EXERCISE OVERVIEW Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to the August 20, 2003, exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities in the area surrounding the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

A. Plume Pathway Emergency Planning Zone Description The Hatch Nuclear Power Plant is located on the Altamaha River approximately ten miles north of Baxley, Georgia. The plume exposure pathway EPZ includes portions of Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs Counties.

The land use within the 10-mile EPZ is primarily agricultural with a relatively low population density. The population of the 10-mile EPZ is estimated to be 8,394. Although there are no major parks, recreational areas, or transportation facilities in the EPZ, the Altamaha River is a principal waterway that is suitable for navigation and recreation. There are 16 evacuation zones in the EPZ.

B. Exercise Participants The following agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in the Hatch Nuclear Power Plant exercise on August 20, 2003.

STATE OF GEORGIA Department of Natural Resources Bureau of Radiation Control Georgia Emergency Management Agency PARTICIPATING JURISDICTIONS Appling County Jeff Davis County Tattnall County Toombs County PRIVATE AND VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS Meadows Regional Medical Center Meadows Regional Medical Center Emergency Medical Services Southeastern Chapter of the American Red Cross 4

C. Exercise Timeline Table 1, on the following page, presents the time at which key events and activities occurred during the Hatch Nuclear Plant exercise on August 20, 2003.

Included are actual times notifications were made to the participating jurisdictions/functional entities.

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I I I r I r r r r r r r r [ [ r r r I Table 1. Exercise Timeline DATE AND SITE: Au ust 20, 2003 - Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Time Time That Notification Was Received or Action Was Taken Classification utnity Level or Event Declared _

SOC FEOC DOSE ENC l APPLING JEFF DAVIS TATTNALL TOOMBS COUNTY COUNTY COUNTY COUNTY Unusual Event 0856 0856 0912 0906 0900 0900 0910 Alert 0902 0920 0914 0916 0914 0914 0914 0913 Site Area Emergency 1005 1005 1005 1005 1013 1009 1018 1015 1012 General Emergency 1117 1117 1117 1117 1119 1119 1146 1128 1130 Simulated Rd.Release 1110 1110 1110 1210 1142 1129 1146 1110 1128 Started Simulated Rod. Release End Ex End End Ex End Ex End Ex End Ex End Ex End Ex Terminated Ex Facility Declared Operational 0925 0950 0920 0937 1053 1013 Declaration of State of Emergency 9/A 0942 N/A 1047 N/A N/A Exercise Terminated 1223 1223 1223 1230 1226 1222 Early Precautionary Actions:

School relocation/evacuation 0930 N/A N/A 1035 Animals on stored feed and water 1045 Ist Protective Action Decision 1045 1045 1042 1045 1045 Evacuate Zones: A, C-5, F-10 and G-10 Shelter Zones: None Ist PNS: 1055 1055 1055 1057 1056 lI Supplementary Message 1023 1045 N/A N/A 2nd Protective Action Decision 1140 1135 1140 1140 1140 Evacuate Zones: Add Zone D-5 Shelter Zones: None 2d PNS: 1150 1150 1145 1150 N/A 2nd Supplementary Message N/A 1203 N/A N/A N/A 3rd Protective Action Decision 1210 1210 1212 1208 1205 Evacuate Zones: Add Zone B-5, E-5 and H-10 Shelter Zones: None 3rd PNS: 1220 1210 N/A NIA N/A 3rd Supplementary Message 1223 1220 1220 N/A KI Administration Decision: Do not ingest 1220 _2_° N/A 1221 N/A N/A County had no involvement or concurrence during this nction

IV. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities, which participated in the August 20, 2003, exercise to test the offsite emergency response capabilities of State and local governments in the 10-mile EPZ surrounding the 1latch Nuclear Plant.

Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated on the basis of its demonstration of criteria delineated in exercise criteria contained in Evaluation Area Methodology, dated April 25, 2002. Detailed information on the exercise criteria and the extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found in Appendix 3 of this report.

A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation - Table 2 The matrix in Table 2, presents the status of all exercise criteria scheduled for demonstration during this exercise by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise criteria are listed by number. The demonstration status of those criteria is indicated by the use of the following letters:

- M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs from prior exercises)

D - Deficiency assessed A - ARCA(s) assessed or unresolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s)

N - Not Demonstrated (Reason explained in Subsection B)

C - Credit for actual events B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated Tlhis subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity, in an issues only format. Presented below is a definition of the terms used in this subsection relative to criterion demonstration status.

• Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criteria under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.

Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criterion under which one or more Deficiencies was assessed during this exercise. Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.

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Area Requiring Corrective Actions - Listing of the demonstrated exercise criterion under which onc or more ARCAs were asscsscd during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that remain unresolved. Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

• Not Demonstrated - Listing of the exercise criterion which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.

v Prior ARCAs - Resolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises which were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

• Prior ARCAs - Unresolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during prior exercises which were not resolved in this exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues which are discussed in this report.

• A Deficiency is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."

• An ARCA is defined in FEMA-REP-14 as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety."

FEMA has developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues (Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Region. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis.

The identifying number for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

• Plant Site Identifier - A two-digit number corresponding to the Utility Billable Plant Site Codes.

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• Exercise Year - The last two digits of the year the exercise was conducted.

• Criterion Number - A number, alpha, number combination corresponding to the criterion number in the Evaluation Area Methology.

• Issue Classification Identifier - (D = Deficiency, A = ARCA).

Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.

• Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

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I I I I I I rI r r r r l Ir I I I Table 2. Summary of Exercise Evaluation DATE AND SITE: August 20, 2003 - Hatch Nuclear Plant SOC FEOC DOSE EOF ENC Appliing JeffDavis Tatnall Toombs ELEMENT/Sub-Element

1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Mobilization M- M M M M M M M M I.a.I M M M M M M M M I .b.i. Facilities Direction and Control M M M M M M M I.c. I.

M M M M M M M M M I.d.I. Communications Equipment

& Supplies to Support Operations M M M M M M M M M I.e. .Equipment I

2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING M M M M M M 2.a.l. Emergency Worker Exposure Control 2.b.1. Rad Assessment & PARs Based on Available Info M M M M M M M 2.b.2. Rad Assessment and PADs for the General Public M M M M 2.c.1. Protective Action Decisions for Special Populations 2.d.1. Rad Assessment & Decision MakingforIngestion Exposure 2.e.1. Rad Assessment & Decision Making for Relocation, Re-entry &

Return ______

3. PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION

___ M M M M 3.a.1. Implementation of Emergency Worker Control M M M M 3.b.l. Implementation ofKI Decisions

. M M M M 3.c. 1. Implementation of PADs for Special Populations M M 3.c.2. Implementation of PADs for Schools 3.d.1. Implementation of Traffic and Access Control M M MM

= M M M M 3.d.2. Impediments to Evacuation and Traffic and Access Control

). Implementation of Ingestion Decisions Using Adequate Info 3.e. ..

01 3.e.2. Implementation of IP Decisions Shoving Strategies and Instructional Materials 31.1. Implementation of Relocation. Re-entry and Return Decisions _ __.

4. FIELD MEASUREMENT and ANALYSIS .

4. 1. PlumePhaseFieldMeasurement &_AnalysisEquipment ._.

4.a.2. Plume Phase Field Measurement & Analysis Management _

4,a.3. Plume Phase Field Measurements & Analysis Procedures _ __ _

4 b.1. Post Plume Field Measurement & Analysis .___._.

4.b.2. laboratory Operations

5. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION & PUBLIC INFO _ __

Si. 1. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification M .

S.a.2. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification IS-Minute (Fast Breaker)

M M M M 5.a3. Activation of Prompt Alert and Notification Backup Alert and Notification _______ _ __ __ ___ _

(A)M M M M M 5.b. 1. Emergency Info and Instructions for the Public and the Media

6. SUPPORT OPERATIONS/FACILITIES 6.a.I. Monitoring and Decon of Evacuees and EWs and Registration of M Evacuees 6.b. . Monitoring and Decon of Emergency Worker Equipmentl_ _ _ _ __

(A-EW) M M_

M 6.c. 1. Temporary Care of Evacuees . M 6.d. 1. Transport and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals __

LEGEND: LGN:M=Met D = Deficiency A = ARCA (A)M = ARCA identified - corrected during exercise

l. STATE OF GEORGIA 1.1 State Operations Center The State Operations Center (SOC) was well equipped and able to perform the function of direction and control until the Forward Emergency Operations Center was operational.

Communication links were established and maintained with the plant, counties and FEOC.

a. MET: Criteria l.a.l, l.b.1, I.c.1, l.d.1 and l.e.l.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE C. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.2 Forward Emergency Operations Center The Forward Emergency Operations Center (FEOC) is co-located with the Emergency News Center (ENC). The facility was staffed with a highly competent and professional staff. The Governor's Authorized Representative (GAR) oversaw all activities and the Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA) Director of Operations effectively managed the emergency response. All protective action decisions (PAD) were effectively coordinated within the FEOC and with the risk counties. The PADs were disseminated to the public in a timely manner.

a. MET: Criteria L.a. 1, L.b. l, 1.c. 1, L.d. 1, .c. 1, 2.a 1, 2.b.2 and 5.a. l.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE I1I

1.3 Dose Assessment Staff from the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR) performed dose assessment. They successfully demonstrated the ability to make timely analysis of the radiological consequences of an accident at the Hatch Nuclear Plant and to make timely recommendations to GEMA for the protection of the public. The Radiation Emergency Coordinator (REC) from DNR worked well with a professional staff and was especially effective in briefing the GARP FEOC Chief, and the GEMA staff.

a. NIET: Criteria 1.a.l, I.c.l, 1.d.l, I.e.l, 2.a.l and 2.b.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 1.4 Emergency Operations Facility The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for the Hatch Nuclear Plant, located on-site, is an excellent facility from which all participating organizations can effectively manage emergency operations. Communications and coordination between and among the State officials at the EOF and with representatives of the utility operator were exemplary.

State officials were well trained, knowledgeable, followed applicable procedures, and overall; they performed their respective responsibilities in an efficient and professional manner.

a. MET: Criteria L.a. . I..b, 1.d. 1, I.e. I and 2.b. I

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 12

1.5 Emergency News Center Public Affairs personnel from GEMA, DNR, Toombs County, and the Southern Nuclear Operating Company jointly staffed the Emergency News Center (ENC). Appling, Jeff Davis, and Tattnall Counties also have assigned public affairs personnel, but they participated from their own Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The ENC is an outstanding new facility and is equipped with modem computer and communications technology. All ENC staff demonstrated outstanding professionalism and teamwork skills. Three media briefings were conducted and GEMA prepared and distributed six news releases. The ENC rumor control staff responded to 127 telephone calls in less than four hours. While the media briefings were conducted during a period of rapidly changing plant conditions, accurate and timely information was disseminated with the exception of the first PAD. During the second media briefing, GEMA and utility spokespersons provided incomplete and confusing information concerning this PAD.

This is described below. Complete and correct information concerning protective actions was provided during the subsequent press briefing.

a. MET: Criteria l.a.1, 1.b.1, 1.d.1 and l.e.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

CRITERION: 31-03-5.b. 1-A-01 CONDITION: The Emergency News Center (ENC) staff provided incomplete and confusing information to the media and public concerning the first protective action decision. Specifically, a protective action decision was made by the State and affected counties at 1045 to evacuate Zones A, C-5, F-1O, and G-1 0.

However, in the second media briefing that began at 1046, the utility's Public Information Director (PID) initially indicated that he just received information that Zones A and C-5 were being evacuated. A few minutes later, at 1052, the GEMA Public Information Officer (PIO) stated that he thought it was only the schools in Zones A and C-5 that were being evacuated and not the general public.

Later in the same briefing, at 1111, the Toombs County PIO did indicate that the public from Zone A was indeed being evacuated. The GEMA PIO then stated, at approximately I 115, that Zones F- 10 and G- 10 were also affected, but he did not know if they were being evacuated. There was no further mention of Zone C-5 during the second media briefing that ended at 1119.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The protective action decision was made just as the second media briefing was beginning. An adequate system was not in place to provide accurate updated information to the spokespersons while the briefing was ongoing. They were receiving information, but it was fragmented and it was not clear to the spokespersons whether the information concerned recommendations 13

that were still being considered or if the final protective action decision had been made.

REFERENCE:

NUREG-0654, E.5., 7., G.3.a., G.4.a.,b.,c.

EFFECT: The incomplete and conflicting information provided during the second media briefing could have caused confusion for the media and ultimately the public as to what actions they were being instructed to take.

RECOMMENDATION: Improve the system or method for providing accurate and timely information to the spokespersons during media briefings. It is imperative that any information they are provided during the briefing is accurate and clear especially if it concerns protective action recommendations and decisions.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The GEMA PIO provided accurate and complete information for the second protective action decision to evacuate Zones A, C-5, D-5, F-b and G-10. He provided this information at the beginning of the third media briefing that started at 1150. This corrected the Area Requiring Corrective Action.

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE

2. RISK JURISDICTIONS 2.1 APPLING COUNTY 2.1.1 Emergency Operations Center The EOC is spacious and organized to facilitate a full complement of staff and emergency support functions (ESF). Leadership in the EOC was apparent and the staff worked well as a team. The Mayor and Chairman of the County Commissioners were active players during the exercise. The Emergency Management Agency (EMA)

Director gave definitive guidance to the staff and required frequent feedback from all participants. The EMA Director was very proactive in carrying out his duties.

Communication systems worked well throughout the exercise.

a. MET: Criteria 1.a. I, l.b. 1, 1.c.l, I.d. 1, L.e. 1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c. 1, 3.a 1, 3.b. l, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 5.a.3 and 5.b.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE 14

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.1.2 Traffic Control Points Traffic control point (TCP) activities were demonstrated through interview with a sheriff's deputy. The deputy demonstrated a thorough understanding of radiological exposure control was equipped with the appropriate dosimetry and had a good working knowledge of all aspects of TCP responsibilities. The deputy's duties include mitigating highway impediments, availability of traffic cones, signs and barricades, knowledge of the locations of the decontamination site and reception center.

a. MET: Criteria 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE L PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.1.3 Protection Actions for Schools Appling County has one public elementary school located within the 10-mile EPZ. A detention facility for juveniles is also located in the 10-mile EPZ. This State operated facility manages the evacuation of its students with Appling County providing assistance if requested. During the exercise, the elementary school was evacuated at Alert. The school office staff was able to quickly communicate with the rest of the staff regarding the evacuation and buses for removing children and staff from the school. The staff member was very knowledgeable concerning the steps needed to evacuate the school's students and staff in the event of an emergency.

a. MET: Criterion 3.c.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE 15

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.1.4 River Clearing Two law enforcement officers from Georgia DNR assisted in identifying the location of warning signs at two public boat landings (PBL). The officers demonstrated their knowledge and ability to implement river warning procedures and individual radiological protection procedures. Both PBLs had warning signs with a listing of radio and television stations, which broadcast emergency messages. The signs also stated that boaters may be warned in person by DNR agents. Both officers demonstrated, through interview, the use of dosimetry and an understanding of radiological exposure control.

The DNR agents were very professional and were well prepared to implement the river clearing activities.

a. MET: Criteria 3.a.I and 5.a.3.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE L PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2 JEFF DAVIS COUNTY 2.2.1 Emergency Operations Center The effective execution of notification procedures allowed for the rapid activation of the EOC. Active participation by the Chairman of the County Commission, County Administrator and Mayor of Hazelhurst, and City and County department chiefs set the tone for a highly professional EOC operation. The senior management team was briefed on a recurring basis; involved functional representatives in the process, and facilitated interagency coordination in preparation for PADs. All participants displayed a positive attitude as they carried out their functions and sought improvements to their procedures.

a. MET: Criteria I.a.1, l.b.1, I.c., l.d. 1, L.e.1, 2.a.l, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a., 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 5.a.3 and 5.b.I.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE 16

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2.2 Traffic Control Points An officer from the County Sheriffs Department successfully demonstrated knowledge of TCP procedures and individual radiological protection during an interview at the EOC.

The officer was conversant in the use of dosimetry, requirements for recording and reporting readings, and applicable turn-back values. The Jeff Davis Public. Works Department was available through 911 to provide assistance in removal of impediments and to fill barrier requirements.

a. MET: Criteria L.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b. 1, 3.d.I and 3.d.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE C. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE E. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2.3 Reception and Congregate Care The reception and congregate care center was well managed. The staff included American Red Cross (ARC) volunteers, County Department of Health and staff of the Jeff Davis Junior and High Schools. The staffs, both paid and volunteer, were equipped with the appropriate dosimetry and instructions for use and recording. Everyone was knowledgeable of the roles and responsibilities required by the task at hand and performed those tasks in a professional manner. The reception and sheltering facility was well laid out with appropriate equipment available and was set up to prevent cross contamination.

a. MET: Criteria 1.b.1, L.e.1, 3.aI, 6.a.1 and 6.c.1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE C. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE 17

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.2.4 Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Workers and Equipment Emergency worker vehicle monitoring and decontamination was well demonstrated. -

Emergency workers doing the monitoring had the appropriate dosimetry, turnout gear, equipment, knowledge and training to do the job well. The lay out of the monitoring and decontamination area was well thought out and provided for good cross contamination control. The emergency worker monitoring aspect required additional coaching and re-demonstration.

a. MET: Criteria L.e. I, 3.a.1 and 6.b. 1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

d. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION:

CRITERION: 31-03-6.a.1-A-02 CONDITION: The driver and passenger of a known contaminated emergency vehicle were allowed to exit the vehicle, which was now outside the hot zone, without first having any personal monitoring.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Unfamiliarity with emergency worker vehicle occupant monitoring procedures.

REFERENCE:

(cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.):

NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a)

EFFECT: If an emergency worker disembarked his/her contaminated vehicle without their feet being monitored there would be no way to prevent possible contamination of the location(s) where the emergency workers walked.

Contamination in the walking area where all personnel would disembark their vehicles would then cause all emergency workers exiting vehicles to become contaminated.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide initial and refresher training on a more frequent basis to ensure that the individuals doing the monitoring are knowledgeable of cross contamination controls and occupant monitoring techniques.

18

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The process was halted, what was being done incorrectly was explained and why it was incorrect. After coaching, the emergency workers re-demonstrated the process and were able to complete the demonstration in a proficient and professional manner.

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.3 TATTNALL COUNTY 2.3.1 Emergency Operations Center The County Emergency Management Director and Chief of Operations coordinated operations in this the EOC. They involved a competent and supportive staff in the decision making process. The staff consistently coordinated with the State and other EPZ counties in the formulation and implementation of PADs and the PIO interacted with the ENC. The State and plant representatives provided vital support to the EOC operation.

The WebEOC, periodic briefings, and consistent posting of status boards kept the staff informed of developments. Alert and mobilization of the staff was accomplished smoothly. The EOC was fully staffed at 1053. County Sheriffs Department reservists provided security. This is a spacious and well-equipped facility that supported this well run emergency response operation.

a. MET: Criteria l.a.l, 1.b.1, 1.c.1, L.d.1, L.e.1, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 5.a.3 and 5.b.I.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQIJIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.3.2 Traffic Control Points Three deputies from the County Sheriff's Department professionally demonstrated TCPs at their individual locations. The Deputies were aware of KI procedures, their turn-back values and who to call/what to do if they reached or exceeded the turn-back values. They were also knowledgeable of road impediment removal, reception and congregate care locations and where to find equipment if needed.

19

a. MIET: Criteria l.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.4 TOOMBS COUNTY 2.4.1 Emergency Operations Center The EOC staff continues to provide efficient emergency management services. The Operations Officer provided consistent direction and control, insuring the safety of evacuees and residents alike. Information was promptly posted for the staff to see.

Accurate and timely information was provided to citizens despite equipment limitations for the PIO. Both city and county governments were represented in the EOC, which is reflective of Toombs County's overarching commitment to the emergency management program. Early precautionary actions included school evacuation, river clearance and assistance to the special needs population. PADS were appropriate and promptly implemented.

a. MET: Criteria l.a.l, l.b.l, 1.c.1, L.d.l, L.e.l, 2.a.1, 2.b.2, 2.c.1, 3.a.J, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 5.a.3 and 5.b.l.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.4.2 Traffic Control Points The EOC demonstrated implementation of TCPs by interview. The deputy for Toombs County talked through the selection and dispatch of TCPs in the county. The discussion also included use of equipment necessary to facilitate access control (barriers, cones, etc).

Commnunications between the TCP and the EOC were managed through the use of a 20

sheriffs department radio in the EOC. TCP locations were identified by the deputy and were utilized by staff for potential crew deployment. The TCP emergency workers were issued dosimetry and KI as required. The radiological office provided detailed instructions to teams prior to deployment.

a. MET: Criteria 1.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1 and 3.d.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.4.3 River Clearance Toombs County demonstrated implementation of alert and notification of boaters and fisherman along the Altamaha River. A DNR ranger was dispatched to the EOC where he picked up a dosimetry kit and got a radiological briefing prior to being dispatched to the river. The ranger periodically checked his dosimeter, recorded the reading and radioed into the FEOC. The ranger informed all boaters and fishermen he encountered there was a drill in progress and the river had been closed to traffic. The ranger was professional and answered all questions concerning the purpose and use of his radiological protective gear.

S. MET: Criteria 3.a.I and 5.a.3.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE C. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.4.4 Protective Actions for Schools The County Board of Education demonstrated the ability to implement protective actions for schools. At the Site Area Emergency, Toombs County Elementary School, located inside the 10-mile EPZ, was ordered to evacuate to Toombs County Middle School.

21

Transportation was arranged for the students, the Middle School was notified of the arrival of the extra students and was told to prepare their facility. Within 30 minutes the students had arrived and were sheltered at Toombs County Middle School.

a. MIET: Criterion 3.c.2.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

r. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 2.4.5 Medical Services Drill (MS-1)

The Meadows Regional Medical Center emergency room (ER) staff and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) crew participated in this exercise to demonstrate the ability to treat a contaminated, injured individual. The medical center was prepared to receive, monitor, decontarilnate and treat the patient. The transfer of the patient was expeditious and all appropriate information was relayed to the ER staff. The doctor established priorities for the treatment and decontamination of the patient. Monitoring and decontamination procedures were appropriate, samples were taken and the ER staff finctioned well as team. Exit procedures were appropriately demonstrated. Another health physicist, who remained outside, surveyed the EMS personnel and knew where to send them if they or the ambulance were contanminated. All individuals, EMS and medical center knew their roles and responsibilities, and performed them in an efficient and professional manner.

a. MET: Criteria 1.e. 1, 3.a. I and 6.d. 1.

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: NONE

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs - RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs - UNRESOLVED: NONE 22

3.

SUMMARY

OF AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION 3.1 Issued 2003 3.1.1 31-03-5.b.1-A-01 CONDITION: The Emergency News Emergency News Center (ENC) staff provided incomplete Center and confusing information to the media and public concerning the first protective action decision. Specifically, a protective action decision was made by the State and affected counties at 1045 to evacuate Zones A, C-5, F-I 0, and G- 10. However, in the second media briefing that began at 1046, the utility's Public Information Director (PID) initially indicated that he just received information that Zones A and C-5 were being evacuated. A few minutes later, at 1052, the GEMA Public Information Officer (PIO) stated that he thought it was only the schools in Zones A and C-5 that were being evacuated and not the general public. Later in the same briefing, at 1111, the Toombs County PIO did indicate that the public from Zone A was indeed being evacuated. The GEMA PIO then stated, at approximately 1115, that Zones F-l0 and G-10 were also affected, but he did not know if they were being evacuated. There was no further mention of Zone C-5 during the second media briefing that ended at 1119.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: The protective action decision was made just as the second media briefing was beginning. An adequate system was not in place to provide accurate updated information to the spokespersons while the briefing was ongoing. They were receiving information, but it was fragmented and it was not clear to the spokespersons whether the information concerned recommendations that were still being considered or if the final protective action decision had been made.

REFERENCE:

NUREG-0654, E.5., 7.,

G.3.a., G.4.a.,b.,c.

23

EFFECT: The incomplete and conflicting information provided during the second media briefing could have caused confusion for the media and ultimately the public as to _

what actions they were being instructed to take.

RECOMMENDATION: Improve the system or method for providing accurate and timely information to the spokespersons _

during media briefings. It is imperative that any information they are provided during the briefing is accurate and clear especially if it concerns protective action recommendations and decisions.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The GEMA PIO provided accurate and complete information for the second protective action decision to evacuate Zones A, C-5, D-5, F-l0 and G-

10. He provided this information at the beginning of the third media briefing that started at 150. This corrected the Area Requiring Corrective Action.

3.1.2 31-03 -6.a.1-A-02 CONDITION: The driver and passenger Jeff Davis County of a known contaminated emergency Monitoring and vehicle were allowed to exit the vehicle, Decontamination of which was now outside the hot zone, Emergency Workers and without first having any personal Equipment monitoring.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Unfamiliarity with emergency worker vehicle occupant monitoring procedures.

REFERENCE:

(cite the specific NUREG-0654 element, regulation, etc.): NUREG-0654, J.IO.h; J.12; K.5.a)

EFFECT: If an emergency worker disembarked his/her contaminated vehicle without their feet being monitored there would be no way to prevent possible 24

contamination of the location(s) where the emergency workers walked. Contamination in the walking area where all personnel would disembark their vehicles would then cause all emergency workers exiting vehicles to become contaminated.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide initial and refresher training on a more frequent basis to ensure that the individuals doing the monitoring are knowledgeable of cross contamination controls and occupant monitoring techniques.

CORRECTIVE ACTION DEMONSTRATED: The process was halted, what was being done incorrectly was explained and why it was incorrect. After coaching, the emergency workers re-demonstrated the process and were able to complete the demonstration in a proficient and professional manner.

25

APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS The following is a list of the acronyms and abbreviations, which may have been used in this report.

ARC American Red Cross ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action CFR Code of Federal Regulations DHHS Department of Health and Human Services DNR Department of Natural Resources DOC Department of Commerce DOE Department of Energy DOI Department of the Interior DOT Department of Transportation DRD Direct Reading Dosimeter EAS Emergency Alert System ECL Emergency Classification Level EEM Exercise Evaluation Methodology EMA Emergency Management Agency EMS Emergency Medical Services ENC Emergency News Center EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ER Emergency Room ESF Emergency Support Functions FAA Federal Aviation Agency FCC Federal Communications Commission FDA Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FEOC Forward Emergency Operations Center FR Federal Register GAR Governor's Authorized Representative GE General Emergency GEMA Georgia Emergency Management Agency GM Guidance Memorandum KI Potassium Iodide 26

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-l, Rev. 1, "CriteriaforPreparationand Evaluationof Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980 NWS National Weather Service OEM Office of Emergency Management ORO Offsite Response Organization PAD Protective Action Decision PAG Protective Action Guide PAO Public Affairs Official PAR Protective Action Recommendation PBL Public Boat Landings PID Public Information Director P1O Public Information Officer PNS Public Notification System RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service REC Radiation Emergency Coordinator REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan SAE Site Area Emergency SOC State Operations Center TCP Traffic Control Point TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter USCG U.S. Coast Guard USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 27

APPENDIX 2 EXERCISE EVALUATORS Following is a list of personnel who evaluated the Hatch Nuclear Plant exercise on August 20, 2003. The organizations represented are indicated by the following abbreviations:

DOT - Department of Transportation FDA - Food and Drug Administration FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency ICF - ICF Consulting, Inc.

NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION STATE OF GEORGIA State Operations Center Don Cornell FEMA Bernie Gunnels DOT Forward Emergency Operations Center Larry Robertson FEMA James Purvis FEMA-HIQ Emergency News Center Norman Valentine FEMA-R7 Dose Assessment Bernie Hannah ICF Emergency Operations Facility Robert Trojanowski NRC APPLING COUNTY Emergency Operations Ccntcr Eddie Hickman FEMA Tom Trout FDA Traffic Control Points Tom Trout FDA Protective Actions For Schools Tom Trout FDA River Clearing Tom Trout FDA JEFF DAVIS COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Bill Larrabee ICF Mark Pittman FEMA Reception and Congregate Care Helen Wilgus FEMA 28

EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Emergency Worker Decontamination Helen Wilgus FEMA Traffic Control Points Mark Pittman FEMA TATTNALL COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Robert Perdue FEMA Wanda Gaudet FEMA-RI Traffic Control Points Wanda Gaudet FEMA-RI TOOMBS COUNTY Emergency Operations Center Obhie Robinson FEMA Kevin Keyes FEMA-R6 Traffic Control Points Kevin Keyes FEMA-R6 Protective Actions for Schools Kevin Keyes FEMA-R6 River Clearing Kevin Keyes FEMA-R6 Medical Service Drill (MS-1) Helen Wilgus FEMA 29

APPENDIX3 EXERCISE CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT This appendix lists the exercise criteria scheduled for demonstration at the Hatch Nuclear Plant exercise on August 20, 2003, and the extent-of-play agreement approved by FEMA Region IV.

A. Exercise Criteria

- Following are the specific REP criteria scheduled for demonstration during this exercise.

(Final Report Only) 30

PLANT EDWIN I. HATCH FEMA EVALUATED EXERCISE August 20,2003 Extent of Play Agreement

Other than the exceptions described in this Extent of Play Agreement, exercise activities demonstrated for evaluation will be based on the Georgia Radiological Emergency Base Plan, the respective site-specific plan (Annex A), local county plans and appropriate Standard Operating Procedures.

It is requested that any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play be corrected immediately, at all player locations, if it isn't disruptive to exercise play and if it is mutually agreeable to both the controller and evaluator.

1. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT l.a - Mobilization:

Criterion l.a.l: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, AA;D.3, 4; E.1, 2; H.4)

Extent of Play Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an emergency situation from the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive to begin emergency operations. Activation of facilities should be completed in accordance with the plan andlor procedures..Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence.

Further, pre-positioning of staff for out-of-sequence demonstrations is appropriate in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• State personnel will be pre-positioned. Response to the FEOC will be, as much as possible, scenario driven. Appling, Jeff Davis, Tattnall and Toombs Counties will use normal call in procedures to their respective EOCs as the scenario dictates.

02/28/03 2

L.b - Facilities:

Criterion I.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response.

(NUREG-0654, 11.3)

Extent of Play Facilities will only be specifically evaluated for this criterion if they are new or have substantial changes in structure or mission. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the availability of facilities that support the accomplishment of emergency operations: Some of the areas to be considered are: adequate space, furnishings- lighting, restrooms, ventilation, backup power and/or alternate facility (if required to support operations).

Facilities must be set up based on the ORO's plans and procedures and demonstrated as they would be used in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• This evaluation will establish the baseline for these facilities.

U.c - Direction and Control:

Criterion 1.c.1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654, A.L.d; A.2.a, b)

Extent of Play Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential functions of the response effort, for example: keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other appropriate OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.

All activities associated with direction and control must be performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• Direction and Control will occur through the State Operations Center (SOC) in Atlanta until the Forward Emergency Operations Center (FEOC) in Vidalia, Toombs County, Georgia is operational.

02/28/03 3

L.d - Communications Equipment:

Criterion L.d.l: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

(NUREG-0654, F.1, 2)

Extent of Play OROs will demonstrate that a primary and at least one backup system are fully functional at the beginning of an exercise. If a communications system or systems are not functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed.

Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units should be used as needed for the transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities and field teams should have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency operations. OROs should ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists. The specific communications capabilities of OROs should be commensurate with that specified in the response plan and/or procedures. Exercise scenarios could require the failure of a communications system and the use of an alternate system, as negotiated in the extent-of-play agreement.

All activities associated with the management of communications capabilities must be demonstrated based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or in the extent-of-play agreement.

• In agreement L.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operation:

Criterion L.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.7,10; J.10.a, b, e, J.11; K.3.a)

Extent of Play Equipment within the facility (facilities) should be sufficient and consistent with the role assigned to that facility in the ORO's plans and/or procedures in support of emergency operations. Use of maps and displays is encouraged.

All instruments, should be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. Instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's 02/28/03 4

recommendations. Unmodified CDV-700 series instruments and other instruments without a manufacturer's recommendation should be calibrated annually. Modified CDV-700 instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of the modification manufacturer. A label indicating such calibration should be on each instrument or calibrated frequency can be verified by other means. Additionally, instruments being used to measure activity should have a range of readings sticker affixed to the side of the instrument. The above considerations should be included in 4.a.1 for field team equipment; 4.c.1 for radiological laboratory equipment (does not apply to analytical equipment); recdpti6n center and emergency worker facilities equipment under 6.a. 1; and ambulance and medical facilities' equipment under 6.d.1.

Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers should be available for issuance to all categories of emergency workers that could be deployed from that facility. Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry should allow individual(s) to read'the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.

Dosimetry should be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced, if necessary. CDV-138s, due to their documented history of electrical leakage problems, should be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced if necessary.

This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the Annual Letter of Certification, and/or through a staff assistance visit.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by emergency workers, as indicated on rosters; institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities; arid, where stipulated by the plan and/or procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ.

Quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the Annual Letter of Certification submission, and/or verified during a Staff Assistance Visit. Available supplies of KI should be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from a certified private or State laboratory indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with U.S. Pharmacopoeia standards.

At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs, etc.) should be available or their availability described.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

02/28/03 5s

• Practice or simulated TLDs may be furnished to the emergency workers and KI will be simulated for State and County emergency workers. Traffic and access control vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs, etc. are available and their availability can be described by the County EMA Director or his designee. The State of Georgia does not use any Civil Defense dosimeters. All self reading dosimeters are commercially procured.

2. PROTECTIVE ACTION DECISION MAKING.

2.a - Emergency Worker Exposure Control:

Criterion 2.a.1: OROs'use a decision making process, considering relevant factors and appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of K!, is in place for emergency workers including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guides. (NUREG-0654, K4, J.IO.e, f)

Extent of Play OROs authorized to send emergency workers into the plume exposure pathway EPZ should demonstrate a capability to meet the criterion based on their emergency plans and procedures.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions concerning the authorization of exposure levels in excess of preauthorized levels and to the number of emergency workers receiving radiation dose above pre-authorized levels.

As appropriate, OROs should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the distribution and administration of KI as a protective measure, based on the ORO's plan and/or procedures or projected thyroid dose compared with the established Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for K! administration.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

In agreement 2.b- Radiological Assessment and Protective Action Recommendations and Decisions for the Plume Phase of the Emergency:

Criterion 2.b.1: Appropriate protective action recommendations are based on available information on plant conditions, field monitoring data, and licensee and ORO dose projections, as well as knowledge of onsite and offsite environmental conditions. (NUREG-0654,1.8, 10 and Supplement 3) 02/28/03 6

process for protective actions considers (that is, either accepts automatically or gives heavy weight to) protective action recommendations made by ORO personnel, the ECL at which these recommendations are received, preplanned strategies for protective actions for that ECL, and the location of students at the tirme (for example, whether the students are still at home, en route to the school, or at the school).

All decision-making activities associated with protective actions, including consideration of available resources, for special population groups must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they. would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• In agreement Radiological Assessment and decision-Making for the Ingestion Pathway (2.d)

• (Criterion 2.d.1) This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

Radiological assessment and Decision-Making Concerning Relocation, Re-entry and Return (2.e)

• (Criterion 2.e.1) This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

3. PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION 3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control:

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a, b)

Extent of Play OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, and instructions on the use of dosimetry to emergency workers. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits (that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of Total Effective Dose Equivalent) and maximum exposure limits (for those emergency workers involved in life saving activities) contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.

Each emergency worker should have the basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. Procedures to monitor and record 02/28/03 9,

dosimeter readings and to manage radiological exposure control should be demonstrated.

During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers should demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and tumback values are reached. The emergency worker should report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans and procedures. OROs should demonstrate the actions described in the plan and/or procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, to authorize the worker to incur additional exposures or to take other actions. If scenario events do not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators should interview at least two emergency workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in the event authorization is needed and at what exposure levels. Emergency workers may use any available resources (e.g., written procedures and/or coworkers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission and adequate control of exposure can be effected for all members of the team by one dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate areas, e.g., at reception centers, counting laboratories, emergency operations centers, and communications centers, may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the work'area. It should be noted that, even in these situations, each team member must still have their own permanent record dosimetry.

Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as farmers-for animal care, essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public who must re-enter an evacuated area following or during the plume passage, should be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• Emergency workers in low exposure areas may be furnished practice or simulated TLDs (as described in 1.e.1) and/or may place a direct reading dosimeters in a centralized area as an area monitor instead of individual monitoring. KI will be simulated, if necessary (as described in 1.e.1).

Implementation of KI Decision (3.b)

• (Criterion 3.b.IL) In Agreement 3.c - Implementation of Protective Actions for Special Populations:

02/28/03 10

Criterion 3.c.1: Protective action decisions are implemented for special populations other than schools within areas subject to protective actions. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g)

Extent of Play Applicable OROs should demonstrate the capability to alert and notify (for example, provide protective action recommendations and emergency information and instructions) special populations (hospitals, nursing homes, correctional facilities, mobility impaired individuals, transportation dependent, etc.). OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide for the needs of special populations in accordance with the ORO's plans and procedures.

Contact with special populations and reception facilities may be actual or simulated, as agreed to in the Extent of Play. Some contacts with transportation providers should be actual, as negotiated in the extent of play. All actual and simulated contacts should be logged. -

All implementing activities associated with protective actions for special populations must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

Evacuation/relocation requirements, if necessary, will be demonstrated by discussions at the county EOC. Any calls if necessary, will be simulated.

Criterion 3.c.2: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools. (NUREG-0654, J.10.c, d, g)

Extent of Play Public school systems/districts shall demonstrate the ability to implement protective action decisions for'students. The demonstration shall be made as follows: At least one school in each affected school system or district, as appropriate, needs to demonstrate the implementation of protective actions. The implementation of canceling the school day, dismissing early, or sheltering should be simulated by describing to evaluators the procedures that would be followed. If evacuation is the implemented protective action, all activities to coordinate and complete the evacuation of students to reception centers, congregate care centers, or host schools may actually be demonstrated or accomplished through an interview process. If accomplished through an interview process, appropriate school personnel including decision making officials (e.g., superintendentlprincipal, transportation director/bus dispatcher), and at least one bus driver (and the bus driver's escort, if applicable) should be available to demonstrate knowledge of their role(s) in the evacuation of school children. Communications capabilities between school officials and the buses, if required by the plan and/or procedures, should be verified.

02/28/03 I1I

Officials of the school system(s) should demonstrate the capability to develop and provide timely information to OROs for use in messages to parents, the general public, and the media on the status of protective actions for schools.

The provisions of this criterion also apply to any private schools, private kindergartens and day care centers that participate in REP exercises pursuant to the ORO's plans and procedures as negotiated in the extent-of-play agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. -

• Appropriate actions will occur as necessary, actual evacuation will not be demonstrated.

3.d - Implementation of Traffic and Access Control.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.10.g, j)

Extent of Play OROs should demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points,.consistent with protective action decisions (for example, evacuating, sheltering, and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff should demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities. This capability may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview, in accordance with the extent-of-play agreement.

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (rail, water, and air traffic), they should demonstrate the capability to contact the State or Federal agencies with authority to control access.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• This criterion will be evaluated by interview of law enforcement officers in the various county EOCs. Actual demonstrations will not be performed.

Criterion 3.d.2: Impediments to evacuation are identified and resolved.

(NUREG-0654, J.10.k) 02/28/03 12

Extent of Play OROs should demonstrate the capability, as required by the scenario, to identify and take appropriate actions concerning impediments to evacuation. Actual dispatch of resources to deal with impediments, such as wreckers, need not be demonstrated; however, all contacts, actual or simulated, should be logged.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• Should an impediment oc-.ur, the local,-EMA Director or his designee will discuss procedures. Actual demonstrations will not be performed.

Implementation of Ingestion Pathway Decisions (3.e)

(Criterion 3.e.1) This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

(Criterion 3.e.2) This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

Implementation of Relocation, Re-entry and Return Decisions (3.1)

(Criterion 3.f.1) This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

4. FIELD MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS 4.a - Plume Phase Field Measurements and Analysis:

Criterion 4.a.l: The field teams are equipped to perform field measurements of direct radiation exposure (cloud and ground shine) and to sample airborne radioiodine and particulates. (NUREG-0654, H.10; 1.7,8,9)

Extent of Plav Field teams should be equipped with all instrumentation and supplies necessary to accomplish their mission. This should include instruments capable of measuring gamma exposure rates and detecting the presence of beta radiation. These instruments should be capable of measuring a range of activity and exposure, including radiological protection/exposure control of team members and detection of activity on the air sample collection media, consistent with the intended use of the instrument and the ORO's plans and procedures. An appropriate radioactive check source should be used to verify proper 02/28/03 13

operational response for each low range radiation measurement instrument (less than I R/hr) and for high range instruments when available. If a source is not available for a high range instrument, a procedure should exist to operationally test the instrument before entering an area where only a high range instrument can make useful readings.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they

_ would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

Criterion 4.a.2: Field teams are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure. (NUREG-0654, H.12; 1.8, 11; J.10.a)

Extent of Play Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to brief teams on predicted plume location and direction, travel speed, and exposure control procedures before deployment.

Field measurements are needed to help characterize the release and' o support, the adequacy of implemented protective actions or to be a factor in modifying protective actions. Teams should be directed to take measurements in such locations, at such times to provide information sufficient to characterize the plume and impacts.

If the responsibility to obtain peak measurements in the plume has been accepted by licensee field monitoring teams, with concurrence from OROs, there is no requirement for these measurements to be repeated by State and local monitoring teams. If the licensee teams do not obtain peak measurements in the plume, it is the ORO's decision as to whether peak measurements are necessary to sufficiently characterize the plume. The sharing and coordination of plume measurement information among all field teams (licensee, Federal, and ORO) is essential. Coordination concerning transfer of samples, including a chain-of-custody form, to a radiological laboratory should be demonstrated.

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP), and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play-agreement.

02/28/03 14

• This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

Criterion 4.a.3: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654, 1. 9)*-

Extent of Play Field teams should demonstrate the capability to report measurements and field data pertaining to the measurement of airborne radioiodine and particulates and ambient radiation to the field team coordinator, dose assessment, or other appropriate authority. If samples have radioactivity significantly above background, the appropriate authority should consider the need for expedited laboratory analyses of these samples. OROs should share data in a timely mannerwith all appropriate OROs. All methodology, including contamination control, instrumentation, preparation of samples, and a chain-of-custody form for transfer to a laboratory, will be in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

Post Plume Phase Field Measurements and Sampling (4.b)

(Criterion 4.b.1)

• This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

Sub-Element 4.c-Laboratory Operations Criterion 4.c.1: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654, C.3; J.11)

Extent of Play The laboratory staff should demonstrate the capability to follow appropriate procedures for receiving samples, including logging of information, preventing contamination of the laboratory, preventing buildup of background radiation due to stored samples, preventing cross contamination of samples, preserving samples that may spoil ( for example, milk),

02/28/03 Is

and keeping track of sample identity. In addition, the laboratory staff should demonstrate the capability to prepare samples for conducting measurements.

The laboratory should be appropriatelycequipped to. provide analyses of media, as requested, on a timely basis, of sufficientquality and sensitivity to support assessments and decisions as anticipated by the ORO's plans and procedures. The laboratory (laboratories) instrument calibrations should be traceable to standards provided by the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Laboratory methods used to analyze typical radionuclides released in a reactor incident should be as described in the plans and procedures. New or revised methods may be used to analyze atypical radionuclide releases (for example, transuranics or as a result of a terrorist event) or if warranted by circumstances of the event. Analysis may require resources beyond those of the ORO.

The laboratory staff should be qualified in radioanalytical techniques and contamination control procedures.

OROs should use Federal resources as identified in the FRERP, and other resources (for example, compacts, utility, nuclear insurers, etc.), if available. Evaluation of this criterion will take into consideration the level of Federal and other resources participating in the exercise.

All activities must be based QJothe ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

5. EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION AND PUBLIC INFORMATION 5.a - Activation of the Prompt Alert and Notification System:

Criterion 5.a.1: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance. (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E.IV.D and NUREG-0654, E.5, 6, 7)

Extent of Play Responsible Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to sequentially provide an alert signal followed by an initial instructional message to populated areas (permanent resident and transient) throughout the 10-mile plume 02/28/03 16

pathway EPZ. Following the decision to activate the alert and notification system, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures, completion of system activation should be accomplished in a timely manner (will not be subjec: to specific time requirements) for primary alerting/notification. The initial message should include the -

elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with route alerting as the primary method of alerting and notifying the public should demonstrate the capability to accomplish the primary route alerting, following the decision to acti'vate the alert and notification system, in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements) in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures. At least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated. The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route should be demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notification activities along the. route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location. The initial message should include the elements required by current FEMA REP guidance.

For exercise purposes, timely is defined as "the responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the'appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay." If message dissemination is to be identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

Procedures to broadcast the message should be fully demonstrated as they would in an actual emergency up to the point of transmission. Broadcast of the message(s) or test messages is not required. The alert signal activation may be simulated. However, the procedures should be demonstrated up to the point of actual activation.

The capability of the primary notification system to broadcast an instructional mcssagc on a 24-hour basis should be verified during an interview with appropriate personnel from the primary notification system.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• In Agreement Criterion 5.a.2.

• This Evaluation Area will not be demonstrated.

Criterion 5.a.3: Activities associated with FENIA approved exception areas (where applicable) are completed within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized 02/28/03 17

offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. Backup alert and notification of the public is completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. (NUREG-0654, E. 6, Appendix 3.B.2.c)

Extent of Play Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) with FEMA-approved exception areas (identified in the approved Alert and Notification System Design Report) 5-10 miles from the nuclear power plant should demonstrate the capability to accomplish primary alerting and notification of the exception area(s) within 45 minutes following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The 45-minute clock will begin when the OROs make the decision to activate the alert and notification system for the first time for a specific emergency situation. The initial message should, at a minimum, include: a statement that an emergency exists at the plant and where to obtain additional information.

For exception area alerting, at least one route needs to be demonstrated and evaluated.

The selected route(s) should vary from exercise to exercise. However, the most difficult route should be demonstrated at least once every six years. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play.

Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location..

Backup alert and notification of the public should be completed within 45 minutes following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary alert and notification system. Backup route alerting only needs to be demonstrated and evaluated, in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures and the extent-of-play agreement, if the exercise scenario calls for failure of any portion of the primary system(s), or'if any portion of the primary system(s) actually fails to function. If demonstrated, only one route needs to be selected and demonstrated. All alert and notification activities along the route should be simulated (that is, the message that would actually be used is read for the evaluator, but not actually broadcast) as agreed upon in the extent-of-play. Actual testing of the mobile public address system will be conducted at some agreed-upon location.

All activities for this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, except as noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• This Evaluation Area , if necessary, will be demonstrated by a discussion between the evaluator and the local County EMA Director.

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5.b - Emergency Information and Instructions for the Public and the Media:

Criterion 5.b.1: OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, E. 5,7; G.3.a, G.4.c)

Extent of Play Subsequent emergency information and instructions should be provided to the public and the media in a timely manner (will not be subject to specific time requirements). For exercise purposes, timely is defined as "the responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay.' If message dissemination is to be identified as not having been accomplished in a timely manner, the evaluator(s) will document a specific -

delay or cause as to why a message was not considered timely.

The ORO should ensure that emergency information and instructions are consistent with protective action decisions made by appropriate officials;- The emergency information should contain all necessary and applicable instructions ( for example, evacuation instructions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, what to take when evacuating, information concerning pets, shelter-in-place instructions, information concerning protective actions for schools and special populations public inquiry telephone number, etc.) to assist the public in carrying out protective action decisions provided to them. The ORO should also be prepared to disclose and explain the Emergency Classification Level (ECL) of the incident. At a minimum, this information must be included in media briefings and/or media releases. OROs should demonstrate the capability to use language that is clear and understandable to the public within both the plume and ingestion pathway EPZs. This includes demonstration of the capability to use familiar landmarks and boundaries to describe protective action areas.

The emergency information should be all-inclusive by including previously identified protective action areas that are still valid, as well as new areas. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to ensure that emergency information that is no longer valid is rescinded and not repeated by broadcast media. In addition, the OROs should demonstrate the capability to ensure that current emergency information is repeated at pre-established intervals in accordance with the plan and/or procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to develop emergency information in a non-English language when required by the plan and/or procedures.

If ingestion pathway measures are exercised, OROs should demonstrate that a system exists for rapid dissemination of ingestion pathway information to pre-determined individuals and businesses in accordance with the ORO's plan and/or procedures.

OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide timely, accurate, concise, and 02/28/03 19

coordinated information to the news media for subsequent dissemination to the public.

This would include demonstration of the capability to conduct timely and pertinent media briefings and distribute media releases as the situation warrants. The OROs should demonstrate the capability to respond appropriately to inquiries from the news media. All information presented in media briefings and media releases should be consistent with protective action decisions and other emergency information provided to the public.

Copies of pertinent emergency information (for example, Emergency Alert System

[EAS] messages and media releases) and media information kits should be available for dissemination to the media.

OROs should demonstrate that an effective system is in place for dealing with calls to the public inquiry hotline. Hotline staff should demonstrate the capability to provide or obtain accurate information for callers or refer them to an appropriate iMformation source.

Information from the hotline staff, including information that corrects false 6r inaccurate information when trends are noted, should be included, as appropriate, in emergency information provided to the public, media briefings, and/or media releases.

All activities for this criterion must,be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• In agreement 6.0 SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES 6.a - Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees:

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h; J.12; K5.a)

Extent of Play Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees/emergency workers should be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in the extent-of-play agreement. This would include adequate space for evacuees' vehicles. Expected demonstration should include 1/3 of the monitoring teams/portal monitors required to monitor 20% of the population allocated to the facility within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Before using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.

Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees should demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20% emergency planning zone (EPZ) population planning base within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored per hour by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate monitoring 02/28/03 20

procedure. A minimum of six individuals per monitoring station should be monitored, using equipment and procedures specified in the plan and/or procedures, to allow demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators in order to determine whether the twelve-hour requirement can be met. Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the twelve-hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers.

Decontamination of evacuees/emergency workers may be simulated and conducted by interview. The availability of provisions for separately showering should be demonstrated or explained. The staff should demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination.

Provisions could include floor coverings, signs and appropriate means (for example, partitions, roped-off areas) to separate clean from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions should also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals, provide changes of clothing for individuals whose clothing is contaminated, and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any individual found to be contaminated, procedures should be discussed concerning the handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings. -

Monitoring personnel should explain the use of action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They should also explain the procedures for referring evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow up in accordance with the ORO's plans and procedures. Contamination of the individual will be determined by controller inject and not simulated with any low-level radiation source.

The capability to register individuals upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities should be demonstrated. The registration activities demonstrated should include the establishment of a registration record for each individual, consisting of the individual's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination, if any, or as otherwise designated in the plan. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• This criterion is to be demonstrated out of sequence at 3:30 pm on May 28, 2003. The Reception Center is located at Jeff Davis County High School, Broxton Road, South, Hazlehurst, GA. Paper coverings for the floor will be simulated. Appling, Tattnall and Toombs Counties will not demonstrate this criterion.

6.b - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment:

02/28/03 21

Criterion 6.b.1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b)

Extent of Play The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to monitor equipment, including vehicles, for contamination in accordance with the Offsite Response Organization's (ORO's) plans and procedures. Specific attention should be given to equipment, including vehicles, that was in contact with individuals found to be contaminated. The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of equipment, including vehicles, based on guidance levels and procedures stated in the plan and/or procedures.

The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping and contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire surface of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor areas such as radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles should be demonstrated. Interior surfaces of vehicles that were in contact with individuals found to be contaminated should also be checked.

Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be decontaminated, may be simulated and conducted by interview.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

This criterion is to be demonstrated out of sequence as described in 6.a.1. Appling, Tattnall and Toombs Counties will not demonstrate this: criterion.

6.c - Temporary Care of Evacuees:

Criterion 6.c.1: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines. (Found in MASS CARE-Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031).

Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J.10.h, J.12)

Extent of Play Under this criterion, demonstration of congregate care centers may be conducted out of sequence with the exercise scenario. The evaluator should conduct a walk-through of the 02/28/03 22

center to determine, through observation and inquiries, that the services and accommodations are consistent with ARC 3031. In this simulation, it is not necessary to set up operations as they would be in an actual emergency. Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those services to simulated evacuees. Given the substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this objective, exercise demonstration expectations should be clearly specified in extent-of-play agreements. -

Congregate care staff should also demonstrate the capability to ensure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination, have been decontaminated as appropriate, and have been registered before entering the facility. This capability may be determined through an interview process.

If operations at the center are demonstrated, material that would be difficult or expensive to transport (e.g., cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) need not be physically available at the facility (facilities). However, availability of such items should be verified by providing the evaluator a list of sources with locations and estimates of quantities.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and !

procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• This item is to be demonstrated out of sequence as described in 6.a.1. The facility was demonstrated by interview and walk-through of the shelter (Jeff Davis County Junior High School, Pine Forrest Avenue, Hazlehurst, GA) with the Shelter Manager or his designee.

Appling, Tattnall and Toombs Counties will not demonstrate this criterion.

6.d - Transportation and Treatment of Contaminated Injured Individuals:

Criterion 6.d.1: The facility/ORO has the appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide transport, monitoring, decontamination, and medical services to contaminated injured individuals. (NUREG-0654, F.2; H.10; K.5.a, b; L.1, 4)

Extent of Play Monitoring, decontamination, and contamination control efforts will not delay urgent medical care for the victim.

Offsite Response Organizations (OROs) should demonstrate the capability to transport contaminated injured individuals to medical facilities. An ambulance should be used for the response to the victim. However, to avoid taking an ambulance out of service for an extended time, any vehicle (e.g., car, truck, or van) may be utilized to transport the victim to the medical facility. Normal communications between the ambulance/dispatcher and the receiving medical facility should be demonstrated. If a substitute vehicle is used for transport to the medical facility, this communication must occur before releasing the ambulance from the drill. This communication would include reporting radiation 02/28/03 23

monitoring results; if available. Additionally, the ambulance crew should demonstrate, by interview, knowledge of where the ambulance and crew would be monitored and decontaminated, if required, or whom to contact for such information.

Monitoring of the victim may be performed before'transport, done enroute, or deferred to the medical facility. Before using a monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation. All monitoring activities should be completed as they would be in an actual emergency.

Appropriate contamination control measures should be demonstratedtbefore and during transport and at the receiving medical facility. ,

The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to activate and set up a radiological emergency area for treatment. Equipment and supplies should be available for the treatment of contaminated injured individuals. i The medical facility should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on-the need for decontamination of the individual, to follow appropriate decontamination procedures, and to maintain records of all survey measurements and samples taken. All procedures for the collection and analysis of samples and the decontamination of the individual should be demonstrated or described to the evaluator.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent-of-play agreement.

• Meadows Memorial Hospital MS-I Exercise is to be demonstrated out of sequence on May 28, 2003.

02/28/03 24

APPENDIX 4 EXERCISE SCENARIO This appendix contains a summary of the simulated sequence of events, Exercise Scenario, which was used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by OROs in the Hatch Nuclear Plant exercise on August 20, 2003.

This exercise scenario was submitted by the State of Georgia, and approved by FEMA Region IV.

(Final Report Only) 31

3.1 NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness 2003 Exercise 04 3.1 NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

Initial conditions establish Unit 2 operating at 100% power, late in core life. Power history has been full power operation for the last 280 days. Unit 1 is in a refueling outage with the core unloaded.

Meteorological conditions have light winds out of the East Northeast at 4-6 MPH gusting up to 10 MPH. A 20 percent chance of precipitation in the form of afternoon thundershowers is forecast. Plant radiological and radiochemistry conditions are normal.

Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1B was taken out of service at 1800 (EDT) on 8/18/2003 for maintenance/repair placing Unit 2 in a 14 day Limited Condition of Operation (LCO). Work is in progress on EDG 1B and it is scheduled to be back in service by 1300 EDT today.

This scenario begins with a small primary system leak into the drywell from a weld on the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) shutdown cooling suction line between 2E1 1-F009 and 2E1 1-F067. The Operating Crew observes a gradual increase in the leak and performs calculations on the drywell sump levels to determine the leak rate. The results of the calculations indicate a leak > 50 gpm. The Superintendent of Shift (SOS) will assume Emergency Director (ED) duties and declare an ALERT IAW procedure 73EP-EIP-001 -0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions, Section 20.0, Loss of Coolant, as a result of the reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage being greater than the emergency action level (EAL).

The Operating Crew performs initial emergency response actions including offsite notifications and the public address announcement to initiate actions of site emergency responders. Emergency responders report to the emergency facility and initiate activation procedures. The Operating Crew responds to the loss of coolant accident (LOCA) per Abnormal and Emergency Operating Procedures (AOPs & EOPs) and continues to assess and monitor plant conditions.

The Operating Crew will begin venting the drywell through the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) IAW procedure 34AB-T23-002-2S, Small Pipe Break Inside Primary Containment, to control containment pressure. As drywell pressure and temperature increase, operators enter the EOP on Primary Containment Control. During venting, the 188 Drywell purge line valve 2T48-F319 fails in the open position.

A controlled reactor shutdown will commence in accordance with procedure 34GO-OPS-014-2S, Fast Reactor Shutdown. The ED/SOS in consultation with plant management may choose to manually SCRAM the reactor at any point during the fast shutdown. If a decision is made to SCRAM, the weld on RHR suction line will significantly degrade resulting in a significant increase in the RCS leak rate to approximately 1500 GPM on the SCRAM. The emergency response organization (ERO) will initiate emergency facility activation procedures and begin assisting the Operating Crew in mitigation of the events.

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Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness 2003 Exercise 04 3.1 NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

The Operations Support Center (OSC) and Technical Support Center (TSC) are activated and the Emergency Operatioils Facility (EOF) is brought to a standby status. The SOS transfers Emergency Director (ED) duties to a plant management ED in the TSC. State and Local notifications using.the Emergency Notification Network (ENN), and Federal (NRC) notifications using the Emergency Notification System (ENS) along with dose assessment activities are transferredto the TSC from the Control Room. The SNC Corporate Emergency Response Organization activates the Corporate Emergency Operating Center (CEOC)-and the GPO Corporate Emergency Response Organization activates the Emergency News Center (ENC). State and Local agencies initiate emergency Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and notifications in response to the plants declaration.

The Control Room (simulator) receives multiple indications (fire alarms) of a fire in the 4160V 2E switchgear room. Dispatch of the Hatch Nuclear Fire Service (HNFS) (Fire Brigade) is required. Following the fire alarms, the plant experiences a half-SCRAM and loss of all equipment supplied by the 2E 4160V bus. The 2A EDG will start, attempt to tie to the 2E 41 60V bus and run unloaded and trip due to high ternperature if not secured by the Operating Crew, '

HNFS members arrive atithe scene and begin fire fighting activities. Portable CO2 extinguishers in the area are ineffective. The- CO2 hose reel located in the 4160 V 2E

,switchgear room vestibule is inoperable. HNFS members must resort to the application of water to extinguish the blaze.

These activities result in a grounding of the supply cables from the Unit 2 start-up transformers 2C and 2D. There are no protective devices between the start-up transformers and the switchgear, grounding of both of these cables cause the disconnects (i.e., 520, 530,470, and 480) between the two 230 kV buses and the two'start-up transformers to trip open. This results in a loss of offsite power to all three 41 60V emergency buses (E, F, & G). At this time a Site Area Emergency (SAE) could be declared in accordance with 73EP-EIP-001 -0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions, section 8.0, Fire in Plant, based on the ED's conservative judgment that the fire has compromised safe shutdown functions.

This loss of the 41 60V emergency buses initiates a reactor scram, if not previously manually initiated. On the scram, the weld on RHR suction line will significantly degrade resulting in a significant increase in the RCS leak rate to approximately 1500 GPM.

Reactor water level begins to drop dramatically. Attempts to inject with HPCI are unproductive as 2E41 -F001 (the steam supply valve) is stuck in the closed position due to a problem in the control circuitry. RCIC starts and then auto isolates due to shorted high DP sensor auxiliary contact (E51 -N656A) which energizes K303A and sends a close signal to RCIC steam supply valve 2E51-F008. As the RWL level approaches the Top of Active Fuel (TAF) the Operating Crew emergency depressurize the reactor to allow use of low pressure injection systems.

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Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness 2003 Exercise 04 3.1 NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

The 1 B EDG is tagged out for maintenance.. The.2C EDG will start and tie to the 4160V G Bus. During the transfer the supply breaker from 600V Bus 2D trips due to a problem with' the breakers trip adjustments. The opening of this breaker de-energizes buses 2R24-S012, S012A and S012B. Motor operated valves for sEveral reactivity control systems and Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) are affected, including RHR, Corespray, Stand-by Liquid Control (SBLC), &.Control Rod Drive (CRD).:-

Additionally, pump power is lost for SBLC pump 2B and SBGT filter train 2B. The 2A RHR pump and 2A Core Spray pump are de-energized as a result of the fire in the 4160V E bus.

RHR pumps 2C and 2D are unavailable due to the inability of the 1 B EDG to'energize the 41 60V F bus.

Core Spray (CS) pump 2B is supplied with power from the 2G 4160V bus but fails to auto start due to a problem with the pump motor. RHR Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) pump 2B. auto starts with power supplied from the 2G 41 60V emergency bus. 'However, this train of LPCI is only partially effective due to a blockage in the suction strainer.

RHRSW pumps 2B and 2D are powered from the 41 60V G bus. However, the crosstie valve from RHR to RHRSW (2E1 -F073) is unavailable due to the-loss of 2R24-S012.

Emergency Response Facilities continue assisting the Control Room with assessment of equipment failures, development'of mitigation strategies, and assessment of plant conditions. The damage assessment teams will be dispatched to determine the extent of damage to the 4160V E bus, SUT 2C, SUT 2D and to investigate problems with 2R24-S012 and other plant equipment. Repair and corrective action teams are sent to restore the EDG 1B and restoration plans and priorities are developed as assessment activities report information to the facilities.

With limited feed to the reactor vessel and the ongoing RHR suction' LOCA, the reactor vessel depressurizes and drains down to the drywell. As it becomes evident that the coolant leak exceeds the capacity of the available 2B LPCI pump, a Site Area Emergency (SAE) will be declared inmaccordance with 73EP-EIP-001 -0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions, section 20.0, Loss of Coolant, based on RCS leakage eXceeding the capacity of all available ECCS capacities. .

The EOF activates and the ED transfers to the EOF from the TSC along with Offsite (ENN) notifications and dose assessment activities. Field Monitoring Teams will be assembled and prepared for dispatch. Mandatory site evacuation and protected area accountability are performed. State and Local Emergency Operating Centers (EOGs) are staffed and initiate activation procedures.

3.1-3 04

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness 2003 Exercise 04 3.1 NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

As the fuel becomes uncovered, fuel cladding failure begins and gas gap activity is released to the coolant and containment. As the released activity is transported outside the sacrificial shield in RCS piping and released to the primary containment atmosphere through the RHR LOCA, drywell post accident radiation monitors trend upward. Torus post-LOCA monitors reflect the increase in radiation levels as the released activity is transported to the Torus through the downcomers. Area Radiation Monitors (ARMs) alarm in the reactor building. Radiation levels in the reactor building areas begin to impact repair team activities.

Successful repair of the 1B EDG will allow the recovery of the 2F 41 60V emergency bus.

This will allow the starting of the 2C and 2D RHR pumps. Succesfule repair of the supply breaker from 600V Bus 2D will allow recovery of the 2R24-S012, S012A and S012B buses.

This will allow remote operation of the crosstie valve from RHR to RHRSW (2E1 1-F073).

A short in the control circuit for the 18' Drywell purge line isolation valve, 2T48-F320, opens the valve and allows contaminated Drywell atmosphere to be drawn into the operating train of Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS). Inventory contained in the drywell will flow to the main stack via the SBGTS and Off Gas system. An elevated filtered release of radioactivity to the environment begins through the Plant Stack.

A GENERAL emergency will be declared based on multiple failure criteria based on indications of Fuel Cladding failure, a Primary System breach, and a Primary Containment breach. Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) are issued to State and local authorities.

The Main Stack normal range monitors ramps up and the Kaman emergency range monitor initiates as SBGTS pumps the activity to the environment. The Dose Assessment Staff evaluates the release and coordinates activities to issue protective action recommendations (PARs) to State and Local authorities based on the radiological conditions.

LPCI 2C and 2D and/or RHRSW pumps 2B and 2D provide feed, flooding-up and covering the exposed fuel. The release of radioactive material to the environment will continue as SBGT continues to draw from the Drywell atmosphere.

The Field Monitoring Teams continue to track and monitor the radioactive plume.

Protective action recommendations are upgraded as needed based on the evaluation of the radiological release. The emergency response organization continues to assess plant conditions, restore needed systems and attempts to isolate the release path until the exercise is terminated.

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3.2 TIMELINE

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Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness 2003 Exercise 04 3.2 TIMELINE Time Event(s) 0730 Initial Conditions:

Unit 2 operating at 100% power, late in core life. Power history has been full power operation for the last 280 days. Unit I is in a refueling outage with the core unloaded.

Meteorological conditions have light winds out of the East Northeast at 4-6 MPH gusting up to 10 MPH. A 20 percent chance of precipitation in the form of afternoon thundershowers is forecast.

Plant Radiological and Radiochemistry conditions are normal.

Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 1B was taken out of service at 1800 (EDT) on 8/18/2003 for maintenance/repair placing Unit 2 in a 14 day Limited Condition of Operation (LCO). Work is in progress on EDG 1B and it is scheduled to be back in service by 1300 EDT today.

0800 A small leak develops from a weld on the RHR suction line between valves 2E1 1-F009 and 2E1 1-F067.

0815 Operators will begin venting the drywell through the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGTS) IAW procedure 34AB-T23-002-2S, Small Pipe Break Inside Primary Containment, to control containment pressure.

0825 Leakage increases to >60 GPM.

The Operating Crew should calculate the leakage rate from the Drywell Floor Drain and Equipment Drain Sumps As drywell pressure and temperature increase, operators enter the EOP on Primary Containment Control. During venting, the 18" Drywell purge line valve 2T48-F319 fails in the open position.

_ 0845 An ALERT should be declared IAW procedure 73EP-EIP-001-OS, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions, Section 20.0, Loss of Coolant.

ERO members are notified of the event via the plant public address system.

09:15 Control Room Fire Alarms are received in the in the 4160V 2E switchgear room.

3.2-1 04

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness 2003 Exercise 04 3.2 TIMELINE Time Event(s) 0915 'The Operations Support Center'(OSC) and Technical Support Center (TSC) are staffed and activated. The Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is staffed and placed in standby.

0920 A half SCRAM occurs and all equipment supplied by the 2E 41 60V bus fails..

ThedControl Roomrdispatches of the Fire Brigade.

0930 The RHR 90ction line leak increases to > 1'500 GPM.

Reactor water level begins to drop dramatically. The reactor scrams.

0935 Fire brigade arrives and makes their initial attack-on the fire.

0945 A loss of offsite power to all three 4160V emergency buses (4160V E, F, and G) occur6. The 2A EDG starts,' runs'un'loaded'and then trips on high temperature. The 2C EDG starts and ties to the 41 60V G Bus.

0950 The 6boV Bus 2D supply breaker for '2R24-S012 trips de-energizing 2R24-S012, S012A and SO12B. '

HPCI Vialve'2E41 -F001 sticks in: the closed position. RCIC starts but then auto isolafts.

A Site Area Emergency (SAE) could be declared in accordance with 73EP-ElP-OO1 -OS, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions, section 8.0, Fire in Plant based on the ED's conservative judgment that the fire has compromised safe shutdown functions.

0955 Fire Brigade reports Fire is out but the use of water wa "required due to a failure of the CO2 System.

As reactor water level reaches -155 (TAF), the reactor is emergency depressurize to use low pressure injection system.

1000 Damage assessment teams dispatched to determine the extent of damage to the 41 60V E bus, SUT 2C, SUT 2D and to investigate problems with 2R24-S012, S012A & SO12B.

Repair teams should be sent to restore the EDG 1B to service.

3.2-2 04

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness 2003 Exercise 04 3.2 TIMELINE Time Event(s) 1000 Core Spray (CS) pump 2B fails to auto start due to la problem with the pump motor windings. ,

Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) pump 2B auto starts but is ineffective due to a blockage in the suction strainer.  ;

1015 A Site Area Emergency (SAE) should be declared in accordance with 73EP-EIP-001 -OS, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions, section 20.0, Loss of Coolant based on coolant leak exceeds the capacity of the available ECCS.

The EOF is activated. .

1030 Drywell & Torus post-LOCA monitors and Drywell Wide Range Radiation Monitors (DWWRM) trend upward.

Area Radiation Monitors (ARMs) alarm in the reactor building.

1030 + Successful repair of the 1B EDG will allow the recovery of the 2F 41 60V emergency bus. This will -allow the starting of the 2Cansd 2D RHR pumps.

LPCI 2C and 2D provide feed, flooding-up and covering the exposed fuel.

Repair of the supply breaker from 600V Bus 2D will allow recovery of the 2R24-S012, S012A and S012B buses. This will allow operation of the crosstie valve from RHR to RHRSW (2E1 1-F073).

1100 The 18" Drywell purge line valve 2T48-F320 opens allowing the Drywell atmosphere to be drawn into the operating train of SBGTS Inventory contained in the drywell will flow to the main stack via the Standby Gas Treatment System (SBGT). A filtered release of radioacqtivity to the environment begins through SBGT and the Plant Stack.

1115 A GENERAL emergency will be declared based on multiple failure criteria.

Stack monitors begin to ramp up.

Dose Assessment Staff dispatches field teams to locate, track, and evaluate the release.

1230 + The exercise is terminated.

3.2-3 04