ML20044B102

LER 90-013-00:on 900619,discovered That Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor C Inoperable for Greater than Time Allowed by Tech Specs 3.3.1.a & 3.3.1.b.Caused by Personnel Error. Personnel counseled.W/900713 Ltr

ML20044B102
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	07/13/1990
From:	Hegrat H, Lyster M CENTERIOR ENERGY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-013, PY-CEI-NRR-1198, NUDOCS 9007170312
Download: ML20044B102 (4)

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, July 13, 1990 PY-CEI/NRR-1198 L U.S.-Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk L- Washington, D.C.. 20555 Perry Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-440  ;

LER 90-013 I

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 90-013 for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.

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Michael D.-L ster Vice President, Nuclear - Perry i

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Enclosure:

LER 90-013 l cc: NRR Project Manager l NRC Resident Inspector-l t ,1 -i L 'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission l

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Personnel Error During Surveillance Results in an Inoperable Main Steam Line i Radiation Monitor in Excess of Technical Sr.eelfication Allowances 4vtNT DAT4168 Ltn ,synetR f6) RIPO.t? OATI 171 OTMtR f ACitfTit8 INVOLVED 108 MONTM DAV YEAR vl&R " $, "$n"

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, j l l AesT a Act u. , > <= . . . -, a, . . ... . , nei On June 19, 1990 at 1035, it was realized that the "C" Main Steam Line' Radiation.

Monitor [IL) '(MSL RM) had been inoperable for greater than the time allowed by Technical Specification 3.3.1.a and 3.3.2.b without taking the required actions.

The root cause of this event is personnel error, inattention to detail. Both the 4'

Tc.nnician who performed the surveillance and the Control Room Unit Supervisor who reviewed the results failed to recognize that one of the tested values was <

outside of its allowable value. After replacing the faulty MSL RM drawer, the mode of failure could not be recreated while performing additional bench testing.

. AfLer further review, it has been determined that a prob'able cause of the drawer failure was due to oxidation of the drawer test switch contacts.

At the time of the event discovery, the faulty MSL RM drawer was replaced and a complete retest and calibration of the new circuitry was performed. Both the operator and technician involved were counseled on the importance of surveillance >

reviews and attention to detail. All Instrument and Control Technicians will be trained on the lessons learned from this event. All Licensed Operators will be trained on the lessone learned from this event through routine requalification training.

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On June 19, 1990 at 1035, it was realized that the "C" Main Steam Line Radiation l Monitor [IL) (MSL RM) had been inoperable for greater than the time allowed by l Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.1.a and 3.3.2.b without taking the required  ;

- actions. At the time of the event, the plant was in Operational Condition ! l (Power Operation) with reactor power at 100 percent of rated thermal power. The '

Reactor Pressure Vessel [RPV) was at oaturated conditions.at approximately 1038  ;

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fl On June 18, 1990 at 2101, Surveillance Instruction (SVI-D17-T0040-C) "MSL RM

? Channel C Functional For ID17-K6100" was released for work by the control room.

The applicable steps of the procedure were physically completed and then reviewed by the technicians. Upon completing the cover sheet of the surveillance at 2145, the technicians marked that three of the test readings had as found values outside of their leave as is zones (LAIZ) but within their allowable values. The Control Room. Unit Supervisor then reviewed the results of the testing and concurred with the technician by signing the cover sheet. A work reouest was then submitted to correct the calibration of the drawer. On June 19, the system engineer reviewed the work package and identified that an additional parameter had been outside of both its LAIZ and allowable value. The engineer immediately brought this to the attention of the control room at 1035. The "C" MSL RM was then. declared inoperable and the trip system for this chanoc1 was placed in the

. tripped condition in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.3.1.a and 3.3.2.b. Troubleshooting activities determined that a problem

" existed within the MSL RM instrumentation drawer. This drawer was replaced and a system retest was conducted. At 0546 on June 20, 1990, the "C" MSL RM was declared operable and the manually inserted trip condition was removed.

The mode of failure for the faulty MSL RM drawer could not be recreated while

-performing additional bench testing. After further review, it has been

- determined that a probable cause of the drawer failure was due to oxidation of

% the drawer function switch. Since this function switch does not affect the

$ component operability during normal operation, no negative affects are expected 6 to be experienced in the other.three MSL RM drawers.

The root cause of the failure to comply with Technical Specifications is personnel error, irattention to detail. Plant Administrative procedure (PAP-1105) " Surveillance Test Control" requires that upon discovering a surveillance value outside the allowable value the person performing the test shall inform the Control Room Unit Supervisor and document the problem through a condition report. This procedural guidance is given so that action can be taken to satisfy any Technical Specification action requirements. During the performance of SVI-D17-T00400, the technician performed all the required steps in accordance with plant procedures; however, he failed to recognize the individual 2 parameter as being outside of allowable value. Additionally, during the review

'A of the surveillance after completion, both the technician and the Control Room Unit Supervisor, who reviews all completed surveillances, failed to recognize that one of the parameters was outside of its allowable value. As a result, the required Technical Specification actions were not taken.

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-The MSL RM' system monitors the radiation level exterior to the MSL. The

( detectors are geometrically located so that each detector is capable of .

I detecting significant increases in radiation levels from any of the MSL's. The i detectors are physically located in separate pipe wells which extend into the- ,

j; steam tunnel just downstream of the main steam line isolation valves. In the event of a gross release of fission products from the core, t.his monitoring

- system provides channel trip signals to the Reactor Protection System [JE] (RPS)- I

{j; and the Nuclear Steam Shutoff System [JM) (NSSS) to initiate a reactor scram and containment isolation. The MSL RM system consists of four redundant'  !

instrumentation channels serving two RPS and NSSS trip systems. Since the RPS l and NSSS trip logics are both one out of two taken twice and with only one MSL RM ,

inoperable, any high level of rs.diation would have been detected and all ,

required protective actions would have been taken. Therefore, this event is not considered safety significant. No previous similar events have been identified.

.At the time of the event discovery, the faulty MSL RM drawer was replaced and a complete retest and calibration of the-new circuitry was performed, Both,the o operator and technician involved were counseled on the importance +k surveillance reviews and attention to detail. All Instrument and Control Technicians will be ,

trained on the lessons learned from this event. All Licensed Operators will be trained on the lessons learned form this event through routine requalification i training.

Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as [XX].

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