IR 05000263/2010007
Download: ML103140760
Text
November 10, 2010
Mr. Timothy Site Vice President Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Northern States Power Company, Minnesota 2807 West County Road 75 Monticello, MN 55362-9637
SUBJECT: MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000263/2010007
Dear Mr. O'Connor:
On October 1, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution (PI&R) inspection at your Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 1, 2010, with you and other members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. The inspection concluded that your staff was effective at identifying problems and incorporating them into the corrective action program (CAP). In general, issues were appropriately prioritized, evaluated, and corrected; audits and self-assessments were thorough and probing, and operating experience was appropriately screened and disseminated. Your staff was aware of the importance of having a strong safety-conscious work environment and expressed a willingness to raise safety issues. The inspectors also observed that actions taken to address a declining trend in Human Performance appeared to be effective. However, your staff was not fully effective in addressing an adverse trend in contractor oversight and in work control and planning, which had begun earlier this year. Although both issues were captured in the CAP program, the underlying causes were not fully understood. This resulted in corrective actions being more reactive, instead of proactive, when responding to related issues. The inspectors were concerned that this adverse trend, if not resolved, would negatively impact the significant number of work activities planned for next year. No violations or findings were identified during this inspection. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,/RA/
Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000263/2010007
w/Attachment:
Supplemental Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServe
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III Docket No. 50-263 License No. DPR-22 Report No: 05000263/2010007 Licensee: Northern States Power Company, Minnesota Facility: Monticello Nuclear Generating Station Location: Monticello, MN Dates: September 13 - October 1, 2010 Inspectors: N. Shah, Project Engineer - Team Lead D. Sand, Acting Resident Inspector - Monticello C. Scott, Reactor Engineer G. O'Dwyer, Reactor Engineer M. Phalen, Plant Support Specialist Approved by: Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
........................................................................................................... 1
REPORT DETAILS
OTHER ACTIVITIES
...................................................................................................... 3
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
.................................................. 3 4OA6 Management Meetings ........................................................................................ 8
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
..................................................................................................... 1
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED ......................................................... 1
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
......................................................................................... 2
LIST OF ACRONYMS
- US [[]]
ED .................................................................................................. 15
Enclosure
- OF [[]]
- FINDIN [[]]
- GS [[]]
- IR [[05000263/2010007; 09/13/2010 - 10/01/2010; Monticello Nuclear Generating Station; Biennial Baseline Inspection of the Identification and Resolution of Problems. This team inspection was performed by four regional inspectors and the resident inspector. No violations or findings were identified. Identification and Resolution of Problems Overall, the Corrective Action Program (]]
CAP) was good. Issues were effectively identified, evaluated and corrected. Nuclear Oversight (NOS) audits and department self-assessments
were generally critical and identified issues that were captured in the (CAP). Operating Experience (OE) was well communicated and appropriately evaluated. A strong safety culture was evident, based on interviews with licensee staff and a review of the types of issues captured in the
- OE was a potential precursor of the event. The licensee took proactive efforts to address a declining trend in the Security Department Safety-Conscious Work Environment (
SCWE). The inspectors received positive feedback
during interviews with Security officers, and noted an increasing trend in the number of issues identified by the Security force. The licensee's actions to address the previous cross-cutting issues in Human Performance and a potential cross-cutting issue in Issue Evaluation appeared good. The corrective actions
appeared appropriate and the inspectors noted improving performance over the last six months in these areas. However, the inspectors noted that the licensee had recurring problems with managing the
- CAP backlog and with ensuring that items identified during management observations were captured in the
- CAP. The inspectors also identified some examples where licensee staff had changed due dates for subtasks without referencing the source
CAP implementing procedures did not provide good guidance regarding how to evaluate "critical" and "non-critical" component failures. Specifically, some component failures, which could reasonably be considered "critical," (i.e., had significant consequences) could be classified as "non-critical" using the current guidance. The inspectors observed that there were continuing issues related to work planning and execution and with contractor control. Although both problems were captured in the CAP,
the underlying causes were not yet fully understood, resulting in most of the corrective actions
being reactive rather than proactive. For example, it was unclear whether the underlying
causes that affected site human performance were the same issues that were affecting the contractor performance. In addition, as previously stated, some issues identified through management observations associated with these topics may not be captured in the CAP.
Although the station continued to evaluate the issue, it remained an area of concern given the significant outage work planned for the next year.
Enclosure
- A. [[]]
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings No findings were identified. B. Licensee-Identified Violations No violations of significance were identified.
Enclosure
- REPORT [[]]
- OTHER [[]]
- PI&R ) (71152B) The activities documented in sections .1 through .4 constituted one biennial sample of
- IP ) 71152. .1 Assessment of the Corrective Action Program (CAP) Effectiveness a. Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensee's
- NRC [[]]
PI&R inspection in November 2008. The issues selected were appropriately varied across the NRC cornerstones, and were identified through
routine daily plant activities, licensee audits and self-assessments, industry operating
experience reports, and
- NRC inspection activities. The inspectors also reviewed a selection of apparent, common and root cause evaluations for more significant
- CAP items. The inspectors performed a more extensive review of the licensee's efforts to address ongoing issues with human performance and issue evaluation. This review consisted primarily of a five year search of related issues identified in the
- CAP and discussions with appropriate licensee staff to assess the licensee's corrective actions. During the reviews, the inspectors evaluated whether the licensee staff's actions were in compliance with the facility's
CAP and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B requirements.
Specifically, whether licensee personnel were identifying plant issues at the proper
threshold, entering the plant issues into the station's CAP in a timely manner, and
assigning the appropriate prioritization for resolution of the issues. The inspectors also evaluated the timeliness and effectiveness of corrective actions for selected issue reports, completed investigations, and
- NRC findings. All documents reviewed during this inspection were listed in the Attachment to this report. b. Assessment (1) Effectiveness of Problem Identification The licensee's implementation of the
- CAP was generally good. Workers were encouraged to identify issues and were familiar with the various avenues available (NRC,
CAP items generated
annually, which were reasonably distributed across the various departments. A shared
computerized database was used for creating individual reports and for subsequent
management of the processes of issue evaluation and response. This included
determining the issue's significance, addressing such matters as regulatory compliance
and reporting, and assigning any actions deemed necessary or appropriate.
Enclosure In reviewing licensee management observations conducted between June and October
2010, the inspectors found several examples of items that were apparently not captured in the
- CAP. Most of the examples were concerned with industrial safety or work planning issues that should have been captured in the
CAP. In one example, a worker
observing an industrial safety concern stated that because the worker had not met a
management expectation, vice a procedural requirement, the issue wasn't going to be
documented in the
CAP item 1251890. The licensee was also good at identifying and resolving trends. The inspectors noted a large number of trends identified through the "binning" of issues or via the quarterly department roll-up meeting (DRUM) reports. During the November 2008, PI&R review, the inspectors identified that the licensee's trending program was somewhat limited in that it did not always identify trends with
issues affecting the same functional area, but having dissimilar aspects. Subsequently,
the licensee initiated an effort to assign cross-cutting criteria (analogous to NRC criteria)
to apparent and root cause evaluations, which were then trended. Although the
inspectors considered this a positive effort, it was too early to determine its overall effectiveness. Findings No findings were identified. (2) Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues Overall, CAP issues were being properly screened. The majorities of issues were of low level and were either closed to trend or at a level appropriate for a condition evaluation.
Licensee staff appropriately challenged
- CAP items during screening meetings and were cognizant of potential trends. Most issues were closed to a work request or to another
CAP item. The inspectors noted that both the parent and daughter documents had the
necessary verbiage to document the interrelationship. Although fewer in number, the
inspectors did not have any concerns with those issues assigned an apparent cause
evaluation (ACE) or root cause evaluation. There were no items in the operations, engineering, or maintenance backlogs that were risk significant, individually or collectively. There were no classifications or immediate operability determinations with which the inspectors disagreed. Root and apparent cause evaluations were generally of good quality and were well documented. During the
ACEs did not
consider whether the failure to consider industry OE was a precursor to events.
Additionally, licensee management did not always address issues with ACE quality that
were identified during the evaluation grading process. The inspectors noted that subsequent
FP-E-SE-02, "Component Classification," was used by licensee staff to distinguish between a "critical" and "non-critical" component failure. The procedure
was written specifically to address equipment reliability, but was referenced in the CAP
for use during cause evaluations. Although the stated guidance was adequate for
Enclosure equipment reliability considerations, it was not appropriate for
- CAP evaluations. For example, this procedure specifically defines any component failure that results in a significant radiological release as a "non-critical" component failure. From a
CAP perspective, any component failure resulting in significant radiological consequences would be "critical." The inspectors were concerned that this procedure may result in
some component failures being treated as less significant under the
CAP item 1250116 to review this issue. Since 2006, the licensee has experienced numerous issues in human performance. Initially, these issues were primarily of low significance (i.e., did not result in an NRC finding). However, the issues continued through 2008, with the significance of the
findings increasing, until an adverse trend in human performance had become evident. The licensee's early efforts to address this trend were largely ineffective, as the licensee originally believed that the human performance issues were limited to specific behaviors or work groups, instead of a more widespread concern involving fundamental human
behaviors. Subsequently, the licensee identified that the issues were principally due to a
lack of resources and an inappropriate tolerance for risk among workers. Several
corrective actions were initiated, including additional training to site workers on
configuration control and risk management. The inspectors noted that performance had
improved among site workers in the past six months. However, the licensee was still dealing with an adverse trend in contractor human performance, primarily related to oversight and work planning and execution. Although this issue was captured in the CAP (items 1249158 and 1247197), the
underlying causes are not yet fully understood, and many of the corrective actions, to date, have been more reactive than proactive. For example, it is unclear whether the
underlying causes that affected site human performance were also affecting the contractor performance. To date, the majority of the issues have been of low significance (i.e., not resulting in an
- NRC finding); however, the overall trend was similar to the previous issue with site human performance. Findings Introduction: The inspectors identified an Unresolved Item (
- URI ) regarding the High Energy Line Break (HELB) Analyses. Description: As part of the review of the
DDGV) local leak rate testing (LLRT) performance documented in CAP 1202466,
the inspectors noted that the ACE had determined that the valves' performance
degradation did not prevent the valves from performing their safety function. The
- ACE only addressed the valves' safety function of providing containment isolation. The inspectors questioned if the safety function of the high pressure coolant injection (
HPCI), reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) and reactor water cleanup (RWCU) steam supply
valves to close after detection of a
- HE [[]]
LB should have been considered. The licensee
responded that the ACE did not need to consider the effect of the valves' increased
leakage on the
- HELB analyses because any leakage would not impact the alternate shutdown path. The inspectors reviewed the assumptions and acceptance criteria of the
- RW [[]]
CU line breaks and identified potential
inconsistencies between the calculations' assumptions with Technical Specifications'
and
- UFS [[]]
AR allowed values for valve closure times, incorporation of delay actuations,
and isolation initiation signals. The licensee entered the NRC concerns with these
Enclosure potential inconsistencies into the
CAP 01252363 on October 1, 2010. The licensee stated that the calculations were appropriate and provided the inspectors
with some original licensing documents for the
- HELB [[analyses and determination of the original and current licensing bases. (3) Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors concluded that corrective actions for identified deficiencies were generally timely and adequately implemented, commensurate with their safety significance. Those corrective actions addressing selected]]
- NRC [[documented violations were also generally effective and timely. The inspectors verified that work orders were in place (and scheduled) for selected, open actions that were two years old or greater. During interviews, the inspectors noted that some individuals did not refer back to the parent]]
CAP when changing due dates for associated subtasks (such as work requests).
The inspectors identified several examples where the revised due dates for subtasks were inconsistent with the parent CAP. Although none of the identified examples were highly significant, the inspectors were concerned that the practice may result in other
changes having a greater operational impact. The licensee initiated CAP item 1250089 to evaluate this issue. The station has a recurring problem with managing the backlog. A recent licensee initiative to redefine the items tracked in the backlog has reduced the numbers, but didn't
necessarily address the issue. The licensee currently tracks only Corrective Actions, Corrective Actions to Prevent Recurrence, and operability issues. Other items, that used to be part of the backlog, were instead tracked as CAP action items. However, the
inspectors noted that there was no formal effort to determine whether the CAP action
items were being addressed in a timely fashion (i.e., no performance indicator similar to
the formal backlog indicator). Since these action items were corrective actions (albeit of lower significance), the inspectors were concerned that some may not get implemented. Complicating the issue was an apparent mixed message from station management,
who expressed the view that the backlog numbers weren't important so long as items were being properly managed. Since this issue was already captured in the
- CAP , the inspectors' observations were included as part of the ongoing licensee evaluation. Findings No findings were identified. .2 Assessment of the Use of Operating Experience (
OE information, completed evaluations of OE
issues and events, and selected assessments of the OE composite performance
indicators. The inspectors' review was to determine whether the licensee was effectively
Enclosure integrating OE experience into the performance of daily activities, whether evaluations of issues were proper and conducted by qualified personnel, whether the licensee's
program was sufficient to prevent future occurrences of previous industry events, and whether the licensee effectively used the information in developing departmental assessments and facility audits. The inspectors also assessed if corrective actions, as a result of
- OE experience, were identified and effectively and timely implemented. Documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment to this report. b. Assessment In general,
- OE was discussed as part of the daily station planning meetings, at shift turnover meetings, and at maintenance pre-briefings. Also, the inspectors determined that
OE was
appropriately reviewed during causal evaluations. During interviews, several licensee personnel commented favorably on the use of
OE evaluation for a relay failure that resulted in the inoperability of a safety-related train at Harris (Action Request (AR) 1233871) was
somewhat limited in scope. The evaluation identified that similar relays were used at Monticello, but in non-safety related equipment; therefore, no actions were required. However, there was no documented evaluation whether a failure of these relays in the
affected equipment could have had any significant operational impact. The licensee documented this issue as
- CAP item 1252873. Findings No findings were identified. .3 Assessment of Self-Assessments and Audits a. Inspection Scope The inspectors assessed the licensee staff's ability to identify and enter issues into the
CAP program, prioritize and evaluate issues, and implement effective corrective actions, through efforts from departmental assessments and audits. b. Assessment The inspectors concluded that self-assessments and audits were typically accurate, thorough, and effective at identifying issues and enhancement opportunities at an
appropriate threshold level. The audits and self-assessments were completed by
personnel knowledgeable in the subject area, and the quality of the NOS audits was
thorough and critical. The self-assessments were acceptable but were not at the same
level of quality as the
CAP items had been
initiated for issues identified through the
- NOS audits and self-assessments. The inspectors observed selected meetings of the Performance Assessment Review Board and reviewed board meeting minutes over the past six months. The Board provided oversight for the
CAP including the self-assessment program. The inspectors identified no issues with the Board's performance during the inspection.
Enclosure Findings No findings were identified. .4 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment (SCWE) a. Inspection Scope The inspectors assessed the licensee's
- ECP [[coordinators, interviews with personnel from various departments, and reviews of issue reports. The inspectors also reviewed the results of licensee safety culture surveys. b. Assessment The inspectors determined that the plant staff were aware of the importance of having a strong]]
SCWE and expressed a willingness to raise safety issues. No one interviewed had experienced retaliation for safety issues raised, or knew of anyone who had failed to
raise issues. All persons interviewed had an adequate knowledge of the
- ECP process. These results were similar to the findings of the licensee's safety culture surveys. Based on these interviews, the inspectors concluded that there was no evidence of an unacceptable
SCWE trend within the Security force. This trend had been identified through
self-assessments and audits conducted in 2009. The number of issues self-identified by
the security staff had increased since the corrective actions were implemented.
Additionally, during interviews with the inspectors, Security staff commented favorably
on the licensee initiatives to improve the
CAP and ECP to identify concerns. However, many staff were unaware of the
other avenues the licensee had to raise concerns (collectively known as the
- PEA [[]]
CH process). For example, most staff were unaware of the Differing Professional Opinions
(DPO) program for addressing engineering issues. Additionally, some newer staff confused safety culture with industrial safety. Similar issues were identified during the
CAP item 1252870. Findings No findings were identified. 4OA6 Management Meetings .1 Exit Meeting Summary On October 1, 2010, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. O'Connor and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues
presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.
- ATTACH [[]]
- MENT [[:]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- SUPPLE [[]]
- MENTAL [[]]
- INFORM [[]]
- ATION [[]]
- KEY [[]]
- POINTS [[]]
- OF [[]]
CONTACT Licensee H. Butterworth, Fleet Operations Standards Director P. Byers, Security Manager
J. Early, Emergency Preparedness Manager
N. Haskell, Engineering Director
M. Holmes, Radiation Protection/Chemistry Manager
K. Jepson, Business Support Manager J. Mestad, Employ Concerns Program Manager D. Neve, Regulatory Affairs Manager
J. Ohotto, Design Engineering Manager
T. O'Connor, Site Vice-President
S. Porter, System Engineering Manager S. Radebaugh, Acting Plant Manager S. Sharpe, Operations Manager
- T. Toglery, Nuclear Oversight Manager J. Windchill, Fleet Performance Assessment Manager Nuclear Regulatory Commission K. Riemer, Chief, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ITEMS [[]]
- CLOSED [[]]
- AND [[]]
HELB Analysis Potentially Non-Conservative
Attachment
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
- NTS [[]]
- REVIEW [[]]
- ED The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the
- NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply
- NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
- PLANT [[]]
- SE -02 Component Classification Revision 4 EWI-05.02.01 Maintenance Rule Program Document Revision 16
- B. 5.12 System Basis Document: Area Radiation Monitor Revision 3 B.7.1 System Basis Document: Liquid Radwaste Revision 2
- ACTION [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
- ARM [[]]
- AR [[]]
AR 1158526 Adverse Trend In Work Package Quality 12/10/2008
Attachment
- CORREC [[]]
- TIVE [[]]
- ACTION [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
NTS Number Description or Title Date or Revision AR 01167235
AR 01167240
AR 01167237
AR 01143116 AR 01232720
AR 01190071 AR 01189968
AR 01151933
- WM [[]]
- JP&P [[]]
- 2008 DR [[]]
UM
Adverse Trend in FME issues
Ops
- CSE [[]]
ID's AFI in Objective 3 Adverse Trend: work plan changes made w/o review & approval
Potential trend
- DP [[]]
- 2008 DR [[]]
- OS [[]]
HA reportable injuries Recirc riser relay did not respond to de-energize
position during IST
LOR Annual Operating Exam Issues
Proposed NRC Violation - Reactor Level Control
- 9/11 Scram
- HP [[]]
CI failed to trip when Rx level rose to 48" Rx Low Low Water Level signal received during
CRD pump start
Voltage of cell 116 in #17 battery is at 2.07 Volts
Not all Tech Specs were entered 2009 Ops
SBGT Flow Not Within Band
Assessment
- AFI [[]]
ID'd for licensed operator
medicals
B
- SB [[]]
GT failed to operate as expected
Adverse Trend - Procedure performed without
GE Part 21 (SC05-03) Potential to exceed low
pressure limit
Main Steam Line plugs interfere with separator
removal
- SP [[]]
DS Disp 710 showing incorrect configuration of circuit breaker
NRC Commitments in procedures not meeting
requirements
Station challenged by projects interface/alignment issues Unplanned rise in Offgas Radiation and Stack
- WG [[]]
RM's
Loss of motor cooling to Div
- II [[]]
- LP [[]]
CI Select Interlock Channel Functional
Test Failure Adverse Trend; Inadequate maintenance of QA reports
Adverse Trend; Badge control by site personnel
Door-18, Condenser room flood door found closed1/29/2009
1/29/2009
3/18/2009
10/13/2008 6/09/2009
1/29/2009
9/07/2010
11/26/2008 8/5/2008 5/13/2010
11/7/2008
3/26/2009
9/21/2008 9/21/2008
1/12/2010
2/17/2009 7/20/2009 7/20/2009
7/10/2009
6/28/2009
4/9/2009 3/30/2005
3/20/2007
9/24/2008
10/8/2008
10/2/2008 10/31/2007
5/6/2008
6/25/2010
5/19/2009
9/9/2009
8/20/2009
Attachment
- CORREC [[]]
- TIVE [[]]
- ACTION [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
EOC-23 core
alterations
Reactor Scram Number 121 occurred on Sept
11th, 2008 Ops Trng
AFI's in Objective 1-4 Performance gaps to industry standards not recognized 4/20/2009 11/13/2008
9/12/2008
9/18/2008 1/30/2010
- AR [[]]
- PI&R [[]]
- FSA [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 1222439 MNGP [[]]
DRUM 12/22/2008
Attachment
- CORREC [[]]
- TIVE [[]]
- ACTION [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
- RWCU [[]]
Inadequate Documentation of Design Inputs 12/10/2009 02/22/2010
Attachment
- CORREC [[]]
- TIVE [[]]
- ACTION [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
NTS Number Description or Title Date or Revision AR 01222023
AR 01214814
AR 01228141
AR 01195119
AR 01088210
AR 01209649-01
AR 1088210-01
AR 01155275
P-109C,
- 13 RHR [[]]
SW Pump D/P in Alert Range
Adverse Trend in Bearing Failures on
- CBDI [[]]
FOF Mod Did Not Assess Impact to T-44
Tank SRV Lift Test Surveillance Interval Potentially Missed
Thin Pipe Identified During
- RHR [[]]
Appendix J Programmatic Deficiencies Post-Modification Testing Issues
Adverse Trend in Engineering Department
- CD [[]]
BI- Calculation Quality- Adverse Trend
- EPU -Wiring Discrepancy Discovered in Field Adverse Trend in Feedwater Heater Level Transmitter Replacement
- 1AR [[]]
XFMR Lockout Caused By 1N^ Ground
Fault
Declining Trend-Engineering Work Process-Work Control Mgmt Adverse Trend Control of Engineering MTE
Part of Head Vent Line Not Insulated
D10 125VDC Div 1 Battery Charger Unavailability
Exceeds MR Goal
D10 Exhibits Erratic Voltage Output During Surveillance Clearance and Tagging Issues
Degraded
SLAE Room
Missing Instillation On The Head Vent Valve
Manifold Equalizing Valve Failure Causes 'B' Main Steam Line Flow Isolation Instrument to Become Inoperable
Work Performed Without Adequate Tag-Out
Protection
Failure to Promptly Identify Failed
AC-4 (B4305) and V-AC-5 (B3305)
Adverse Trend for Engineering Non-Mod
EC Backlog
Failures of V-AC-4 Declining Trend for Engineering- Process Failure Mode-RR1
Increasing Trend for System Health Assessment
KPI 04/06/2010 03/31/2010 11/02/2009
05/14/2010
03/31/2009 04/23/2009
11/13/2009 09/25/2009
11/11/2009 03/04/2009 10/25/2009 04/14/2010
2/19/2009
05/29/2009 09/21/2010 09/29/2010
05/09/2008 02/04/2010
01/05/2007 04/20/2007 05/12/2009
08/03/2009
08/21/2009 05/22/2009 01/22/2009
09/19/2007 01/01/2009
10/14/2008
Attachment
- AND [[]]
- COMMON [[]]
- CAUSE [[]]
- AR [[]]
- AR [[]]
- FSA [[]]
- AR [[]]
- AR [[]]
- AR [[]]
- AR [[]]
- AR [[]]
- AR [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 01237478 PI&R [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 01237558 PI&R [[]]
FSA; Trend in security trng team used for shift needs 6/16/2010
Attachment
- CORREC [[]]
- TIVE [[]]
- ACTION [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
- PI&R [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 01237702 PI&R [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 01237779 PI&R [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 01237802 PI&R [[]]
- AR [[]]
- PI&R [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 01237838 PI&R [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 01237839 PI&R [[]]
- PI&R [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 01237905 PI&R [[]]
- PI&R [[]]
- 2010 PI&R [[]]
- FSA [[:]]
- AR [[]]
- 01238082 PI&R [[]]
- FSA [[]]
- INPO [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 01238284 PI&R [[]]
- FSA [[]]
- PI&R [[]]
- FSA [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 01243250 PI&R [[]]
- PI&R [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 01243430 PI&R [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 01243485 PI&R [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 01243644 PI&R [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 01243728 PI&R [[]]
- RF [[]]
- AR [[]]
MS 13 for work order planning above control band 11/15/2008
Attachment
- CORREC [[]]
- TIVE [[]]
- ACTION [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
- FSA [[]]
- AR [[]]
- AR [[]]
- AR [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 01243568 PI&R [[]]
- RFP [[]]
AR 01136879 Oil Flush on 11 Service Water Motor Ineffective 5/6/2008
Attachment
- CORREC [[]]
- TIVE [[]]
- ACTION [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
NTS Number Description or Title Date or Revision AR 01137901 The Site Lacks a Single Tracking Mechanism for
Failed
- AR [[]]
- AR [[]]
- RHRSW [[]]
- AR [[]]
- SBGT [[]]
- AR [[]]
- AR [[]]
CT Pump Operation Safety Enhancement Opportunity 07/13/2008
Attachment
- CORREC [[]]
- TIVE [[]]
- ACTION [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
- PI&R [[]]
- PI&R [[]]
- MET [[]]
LAR Required for Use of Tormis Code Methodology 02/28/2007 01197771
011977701
Revise
RHR-0552-01 as interim action for RCE1181868
Revise 0060 As Interim Corrective Action for
RCE1181868 09/15/2009 09/15/2009
09/15/2009 09/15/2009
Attachment
- CORREC [[]]
- TIVE [[]]
- ACTION [[]]
- DOCUME [[]]
NTS Number Description or Title Date or Revision 01197768
01197774
252368
250089
2149351
01159968 Revise 0060 As Interim Corrective Action for RCE1181868
Revise
RHR-0558-02 As Interim Action for
PI&R-Question on Classification of
- NRC [[]]
RCE Actions
Several
ARP-01
IPB Mod Design Issues with Service Water Valves 10/10/2010
09/16/2010 10/04/2010 11/20/2008
- OPERAT [[]]
- ING [[]]
- EXPERI [[]]
NRC IN 2009-03: Solid State Protection System Card Failure Results in Spurious Safety Injection
Actuation and Reactor Trip 6/11/2009 01137557 Station
OE 31105 Water Detected in a Cable Pit Beneath a MCC which Contained Safety-Related Cables
(Cook Plant) 5/7/2010 01245020 Station
- 01193202 MNGP [[]]
- PINGP [[]]
- INPO [[]]
- OE for Week 07/18/2008 09/23/2008 01142952 Westinghouse Detached P-Grid Dimples 01/09/2009 01149492 Station
EO for Week of 10/31/2008 09/30/2009
Attachment
- AND [[]]
- MNGP [[]]
- 1205004 EPU Outage Readiness Assessment 6/10/2010 2010-02-014 Corrective Action Program 5/14/2010 2010-01-029 Corrective Action Program 3/12/2010
- SAR [[]]
- DURING [[]]
- NRC [[]]
- AR [[]]
- 1250127 NRC [[]]
- NRC [[]]
- PI&R [[:]]
- AR [[]]
- 1249923 NRC [[]]
- PI&R [[:]]
- AR [[]]
- 1252870 NRC [[]]
- PI&R [[:]]
AR 1252873 OE Not Well Evaluated Beyond the Event 10/5/2010
Attachment
- MISCEL [[]]
- LANEOU S Number Description or Title Date or Revision 3784 A(1) Action/Performance Improvement Plant Revision 0
- NSPM [[]]
- CAP Screening Package 9/16/2010 Performance Assessment Review Board Package 9/14/2010 Alignment Teamwork and Oversight Meeting 9/15/2010
- INTR [[]]
- 0060 RC [[]]
IC High Steam Flow Sensor Test 2/18/2010
Attachment
- LIST [[]]
- OF [[]]
- ACRONY [[]]
- MS [[]]
- USED [[]]
AR Action Request CAP Corrective Action Program
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
CAQ Condition Adverse to Quality
DRUM Department roll-up meeting ECP Employee Concerns Program
- HE [[]]
IMC Inspection Manual Chapter IN Information Notices
IP Inspection Procedure
- MP [[]]
FF Maintenance Preventable Functional Failure
NCV Non-Cited Violation
NOS Nuclear Oversight
PARS Publicly Available Records System PM Preventive Maintenance
- RC [[]]
RHRSW Residual Heat Removal Service Water RPS Radiation Protection Specialist
- SC [[]]
- SC [[]]
- US [[]]
AR Updated Safety Analysis Report
WO Work Order
T. O'Connor -2-
No violations or findings were identified during this inspection. In accordance with
- NRC 's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Sincerely,
/RA/
Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-263
License No. DPR-22 Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000263/2010007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServe