Letter Sequence Request |
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EPID:L-2016-LRC-0001, Response to Request for Supplemental Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron Absorbing Materials in the Spent Fuel Pools for Indian Point Energy Center, Unit 3 and Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station (Open) CAC:MF9412, (Open) |
Results
Other: ML17297A847, ML17303B158, ML17307A330, ML18030B178, ML18030B238, ML18030B361, ML18031A995, ML18249A049, ML18249A061, ML18249A075, ML18249A080, ML18249A091, ML18249A162, ML18249A178, ML18249A180, ML18249A231, ML18249A242, ML18249A334, ML18249A365, ML18249A380, ML18249A383, ML18249A386, ML18249A392, ML18249A407, ML18253A099, ML18253A130, ML18269A351
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MONTHYEARRS-17-053, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-012017-04-27027 April 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01 Project stage: Response to RAI ML17297A8472017-10-27027 October 2017 Request for Supplemental Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC No. MF9430; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML17285B1962017-10-27027 October 2017 Request for Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools. Project stage: RAI ML17304A0102017-11-0101 November 2017 Unit Nos.1 and 2 - Request for Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC Nos. MF9444 and MF9445; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: RAI ML17303B1582017-11-0707 November 2017 FENOC-Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Perry Nuclear Power Plant Unit 1 - Generic Letter 2016-01, Request for Supplemental Information Project stage: Other ML17307A3302017-11-20020 November 2017 Request for Supplemental Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools(Cac Nos. MF9920, MF9452, MF9437, MF9919, and MF9432; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18025A7992018-01-25025 January 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01 Project stage: Response to RAI NL-18-0085, Response to NRC RAIs Regarding Generic Letter 2016-012018-02-0505 February 2018 Response to NRC RAIs Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01 Project stage: Request ML18030B2382018-04-13013 April 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools Project stage: Other L-16-001, Units. 3 and 4, Response to Request for Supplemental Information Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools.2018-05-24024 May 2018 Units. 3 and 4, Response to Request for Supplemental Information Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools. Project stage: Request PLA-7704, Response to Generic Letter 2016-01, Request for Supplemental Information2018-05-24024 May 2018 Response to Generic Letter 2016-01, Request for Supplemental Information Project stage: Request AEP-NRC-2018-01, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-012018-05-25025 May 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01 Project stage: Response to RAI L-18-121, Response to Request for Supplemental Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01 Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools.2018-05-25025 May 2018 Response to Request for Supplemental Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01 Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools. Project stage: Request RS-18-067, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-012018-05-29029 May 2018 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01 Project stage: Response to RAI ET 18-0016, Response to Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools Request for Supplemental Information2018-05-29029 May 2018 Response to Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools Request for Supplemental Information Project stage: Request RA-18-0011, Response to Request for Supplemental Information Regarding Duke Energy'S Response to GL 2016-01 Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools2018-05-30030 May 2018 Response to Request for Supplemental Information Regarding Duke Energy'S Response to GL 2016-01 Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools Project stage: Request CNRO-2018-00021, Response to Request for Supplemental Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron Absorbing Materials in the Spent Fuel Pools for Indian Point Energy Center, Unit 3 and Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station2018-05-30030 May 2018 Response to Request for Supplemental Information Regarding Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron Absorbing Materials in the Spent Fuel Pools for Indian Point Energy Center, Unit 3 and Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station Project stage: Request CNL-18-061, Response to NRC Request for Supplemental Information Related to Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools2018-05-31031 May 2018 Response to NRC Request for Supplemental Information Related to Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools Project stage: Supplement ULNRC-06440, Response to Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools - Request for Supplemental Information2018-05-31031 May 2018 Response to Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools - Request for Supplemental Information Project stage: Request ML18031A9952018-08-27027 August 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC No. MF9423; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18030B1782018-08-27027 August 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC No. MF9441; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18030B3612018-08-30030 August 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC No. MF9427; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A2312018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC No. MF9448; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A0802018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC Nos. MF9431 and MF9430; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A4072018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC MF9920, MF9452, MF9451, MF9425, MF9406-MF9408; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A0492018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC Nos. MF9449 and MF9450; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A0612018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC Nos. MF9428 and MF9429; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A0752018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC Nos. MF9410 and MF9411; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A0912018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC Nos. MF9421 and MF9422; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A1622018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC No. MF9424; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A1782018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC No. MF9438; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A1802018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC Nos. MF9456 and MF9457; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A2422018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC Nos. MF9415 and MF9416; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A3342018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC Nos. MF9435 and MF9436; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A3652018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC No. MF9437; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A3802018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC Nos. MF9412 and MF9413; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A3832018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC Nos. MF9418 and MF9419; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A3862018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC Nos. MF9433 and MF9434; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18249A3922018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC MF9444, MF9445, MF9443, MF9440, MF9409; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18253A0992018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC No. MF9414; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18253A1302018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools (CAC Nos. MF9920 and MF9432; EPID L-2016-LRC-0001) Project stage: Other ML18269A3512018-09-26026 September 2018 Closeout of Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools Project stage: Other 2018-04-13
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Category:Letter type:L
MONTHYEARL-2024-132, 2024 Population Update Analysis2024-08-13013 August 2024 2024 Population Update Analysis L-2024-122, Core Operating Limits Report2024-08-12012 August 2024 Core Operating Limits Report L-2024-106, Fifth and Sixth 10-Year Inservice Testing Interval Relief Request No. VR-022024-08-12012 August 2024 Fifth and Sixth 10-Year Inservice Testing Interval Relief Request No. VR-02 L-2024-129, Relief Request (RR) 14. Limited Coverage Exams Due to Impractical Inservice Inspection Requirements - Fourth Ten-Year Inservice Inspection Program Interval2024-08-0707 August 2024 Relief Request (RR) 14. Limited Coverage Exams Due to Impractical Inservice Inspection Requirements - Fourth Ten-Year Inservice Inspection Program Interval L-2024-121, Subsequent License Renewal Commitment 30 Revision2024-07-30030 July 2024 Subsequent License Renewal Commitment 30 Revision L-2024-123, Submittal of In-Service Inspection Program Owners Activity Report (OAR-1)2024-07-29029 July 2024 Submittal of In-Service Inspection Program Owners Activity Report (OAR-1) L-2024-089, Notification of Deviation from Pressurized Water Owners Group (PWROG) Report WCAP- 17 451-P. Revision 1. Reactor Internals Guide Tube Wear - Westinghouse Domestic Fleet Operational Projections2024-07-25025 July 2024 Notification of Deviation from Pressurized Water Owners Group (PWROG) Report WCAP- 17 451-P. Revision 1. Reactor Internals Guide Tube Wear - Westinghouse Domestic Fleet Operational Projections L-2024-125, Notice of Intent to Provide Supplemental Information to License Amendment Request to Adopt Common Emergency Plan with Site-Specific Annexes2024-07-24024 July 2024 Notice of Intent to Provide Supplemental Information to License Amendment Request to Adopt Common Emergency Plan with Site-Specific Annexes L-2024-114, Quality Assurance Topical Report (FPL-1 Revision 31 Annual Submittal2024-07-10010 July 2024 Quality Assurance Topical Report (FPL-1 Revision 31 Annual Submittal L-2024-110, Environmental Protection Plan Report, Unusual or Important Environmental Event - Manatee in Intake2024-07-10010 July 2024 Environmental Protection Plan Report, Unusual or Important Environmental Event - Manatee in Intake L-2024-109, Schedule for Subsequent License Renewal Environmental Review2024-07-0303 July 2024 Schedule for Subsequent License Renewal Environmental Review L-2024-104, Response to Request for Additional Information, St. Luce Relief Request (RR) 7, Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1 Extension of Inspection Interval for Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds from 102024-06-26026 June 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information, St. Luce Relief Request (RR) 7, Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1 Extension of Inspection Interval for Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds from 10 L-2024-097, Technical Specification Special Report2024-06-20020 June 2024 Technical Specification Special Report L-2024-102, Official Service List Update2024-06-19019 June 2024 Official Service List Update L-2024-100, Withdrawal of License Amendment Request 274, Reactor Protection System, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, and Nuclear Instrumentation System Replacement Project2024-06-19019 June 2024 Withdrawal of License Amendment Request 274, Reactor Protection System, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, and Nuclear Instrumentation System Replacement Project L-2024-090, Revised Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reports2024-06-0404 June 2024 Revised Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reports L-2024-076, Reply to Notice of Violation; NOV 05000250, 05000251/2024010-052024-05-29029 May 2024 Reply to Notice of Violation; NOV 05000250, 05000251/2024010-05 L-2024-082, 2023 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report2024-05-15015 May 2024 2023 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report L-2024-075, Notification of Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ITS) Implementation2024-05-13013 May 2024 Notification of Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ITS) Implementation L-2024-060, 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Evaluation and 10 CFR 50.71(e)(2) Technical Specification Bases Summaries Report2024-05-0909 May 2024 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2) Evaluation and 10 CFR 50.71(e)(2) Technical Specification Bases Summaries Report L-2024-073, Cycle 34 Core Operating Limits Report2024-05-0101 May 2024 Cycle 34 Core Operating Limits Report L-2024-072, Cycle 33 Core Operating Limits Report2024-05-0101 May 2024 Cycle 33 Core Operating Limits Report L-2024-048, Divider Plate Assemblies Bounding Analysis Evaluation for Subsequent License Renewal Commitment Revision2024-04-30030 April 2024 Divider Plate Assemblies Bounding Analysis Evaluation for Subsequent License Renewal Commitment Revision L-2024-053, License Amendment Request L-2024-053, Updated Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis2024-04-30030 April 2024 License Amendment Request L-2024-053, Updated Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis L-2024-071, Cycle 27 Core Operating Limits Report2024-04-29029 April 2024 Cycle 27 Core Operating Limits Report L-2024-070, Cycle 32 Core Operating Limits Report2024-04-29029 April 2024 Cycle 32 Core Operating Limits Report L-2024-069, Radiological Emergency Plan Revision 762024-04-22022 April 2024 Radiological Emergency Plan Revision 76 L-2024-066, Sixth 10-Year Inservice Testing Interval Relief Request No. PR-022024-04-17017 April 2024 Sixth 10-Year Inservice Testing Interval Relief Request No. PR-02 L-2024-064, Florida Power & Light Company - 10 CFR 50.46 - Emergency Core Cooling System SBLOCA 30-Day Report2024-04-17017 April 2024 Florida Power & Light Company - 10 CFR 50.46 - Emergency Core Cooling System SBLOCA 30-Day Report L-2024-056, Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for Calendar Year 20232024-04-17017 April 2024 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report for Calendar Year 2023 L-2024-010, Point Units 3 and 4, Seabrook, Duane Arnold, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2, Nuclear Property Insurance - 10 CFR 50.54(w)(3)2024-01-25025 January 2024 Point Units 3 and 4, Seabrook, Duane Arnold, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2, Nuclear Property Insurance - 10 CFR 50.54(w)(3) L-2024-004, Relief Request (RR) 7, Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) Extension of Inspection Interval for Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds from 10 to 20 Years2024-01-18018 January 2024 Relief Request (RR) 7, Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) Extension of Inspection Interval for Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds from 10 to 20 Years L-2024-007, Inservice Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report (OAR-1)2024-01-18018 January 2024 Inservice Inspection Program Owner'S Activity Report (OAR-1) L-2024-002, Withdrawal of Proposed Alternative to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) 2C Pump2024-01-0808 January 2024 Withdrawal of Proposed Alternative to American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Operation and Maintenance (OM) Code for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) 2C Pump L-2023-173, Quality Assurance Topical Report (FPL-1) Revision 30 Update2023-12-15015 December 2023 Quality Assurance Topical Report (FPL-1) Revision 30 Update L-2023-179, Unusual or Important Environmental Event - Turtle Mortality2023-12-14014 December 2023 Unusual or Important Environmental Event - Turtle Mortality L-2023-168, License Amendment Request Supplement to Revision 2 for the Technical Specifications Conversion to NUREG-1432 Revision 52023-12-12012 December 2023 License Amendment Request Supplement to Revision 2 for the Technical Specifications Conversion to NUREG-1432 Revision 5 L-2023-166, Turkey Points Units 3 and 4, Correction to the 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report2023-12-0606 December 2023 Turkey Points Units 3 and 4, Correction to the 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report L-2023-172, Supplement to Exemption Request Regarding Enhanced Weapons. Firearms Background Checks. and Security Event Notifications Final Rule2023-11-29029 November 2023 Supplement to Exemption Request Regarding Enhanced Weapons. Firearms Background Checks. and Security Event Notifications Final Rule L-2023-155, Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information, Revised NextEra Common Emergency Plan, and Revised Site-Specific Emergency Plan Annexes Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-06542023-11-28028 November 2023 Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information, Revised NextEra Common Emergency Plan, and Revised Site-Specific Emergency Plan Annexes Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-0654, L-2023-162, Response to 50.69 2nd Round of Rals2023-11-21021 November 2023 Response to 50.69 2nd Round of Rals L-2023-146, Part 73 Exemption Request Regarding Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Final Rule2023-11-16016 November 2023 Part 73 Exemption Request Regarding Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Final Rule L-2023-078, License Amendment Request 278, Incorporate Advanced Fuel Products, Extend Surveillance Intervals and 10 CFR 50.46 Exemption Request to Facilitate Transition to 24-Month Fuel Cycles2023-11-15015 November 2023 License Amendment Request 278, Incorporate Advanced Fuel Products, Extend Surveillance Intervals and 10 CFR 50.46 Exemption Request to Facilitate Transition to 24-Month Fuel Cycles L-2023-077, License Amendment Request 277 Updated Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis2023-10-11011 October 2023 License Amendment Request 277 Updated Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis L-2023-131, Subsequent License Renewal Application - Second Annual Update2023-09-28028 September 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application - Second Annual Update L-2023-136, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2023-09-26026 September 2023 Supplement to License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors L-2023-122, Corrections to the 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report2023-09-20020 September 2023 Corrections to the 2022 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report L-2023-127, Correction to the 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report2023-09-18018 September 2023 Correction to the 2022 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report L-2023-113, Correction to the 2020 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report2023-09-14014 September 2023 Correction to the 2020 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report L-2023-118, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2023-09-11011 September 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors 2024-08-07
[Table view] Category:Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARL-2024-104, Response to Request for Additional Information, St. Luce Relief Request (RR) 7, Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1 Extension of Inspection Interval for Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds from 102024-06-26026 June 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information, St. Luce Relief Request (RR) 7, Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1 Extension of Inspection Interval for Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds from 10 ML24127A0632024-05-0606 May 2024 Supplemental Information to License Amendment Request to Adopt Common Emergency Plan with Site-Specific Annexes L-2023-155, Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information, Revised NextEra Common Emergency Plan, and Revised Site-Specific Emergency Plan Annexes Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-06542023-11-28028 November 2023 Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information, Revised NextEra Common Emergency Plan, and Revised Site-Specific Emergency Plan Annexes Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-0654, L-2023-162, Response to 50.69 2nd Round of Rals2023-11-21021 November 2023 Response to 50.69 2nd Round of Rals L-2023-118, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2023-09-11011 September 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors L-2023-110, Response to Requests for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request No. 276, Revise Fire Protection Program in Support of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Replacement Project2023-08-25025 August 2023 Response to Requests for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request No. 276, Revise Fire Protection Program in Support of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Replacement Project L-2023-098, and Point Beach Units 1 and 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-0654, Revision 22023-08-0707 August 2023 and Point Beach Units 1 and 2 - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Common Emergency Plan Consistent with NUREG-0654, Revision 2 L-2023-094, Response to Requests for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request No. 276, Revise Fire Protection Program in Support of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Replacement Project2023-07-27027 July 2023 Response to Requests for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request No. 276, Revise Fire Protection Program in Support of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Replacement Project L-2023-069, Response to Requests for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request No. 276, Revise Fire Protection Program in Support of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Replacement Project2023-05-31031 May 2023 Response to Requests for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request No. 276, Revise Fire Protection Program in Support of Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Replacement Project ML23151A4362023-05-24024 May 2023 License Amendment Request Revision 3 for the Technical Specifications Conversion to NUREG - 1431 Revision 5 ML23151A4372023-05-24024 May 2023 Attachment 3: Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 3 and 4, Improved Technical Specifications Conversion License Amendment Request NRC Request for Additional Information and FPL Responses Database L-2023-059, Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Set 4 Supplemental Response2023-04-21021 April 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Set 4 Supplemental Response ML23095A0082023-04-0404 April 2023 Attachment 2 - Improved Technical Specifications Conversion License Amendment Request NRC Request for Additional Information and FPL Responses Database L-2023-026, Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Requests for Additional Information Set 42023-03-27027 March 2023 Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Requests for Additional Information Set 4 L-2023-040, Response to Requests for Additional Information (Rals) and Requests for Confirmation of Information (Rc Ls) Following Regulatory Audit of Subsequent License Renewal Application2023-03-0303 March 2023 Response to Requests for Additional Information (Rals) and Requests for Confirmation of Information (Rc Ls) Following Regulatory Audit of Subsequent License Renewal Application ML23013A2032023-01-13013 January 2023 RAI Set 4 Draft Response L-2022-181, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for the Technical Specifications Conversion to NUREG-1431, Revision 52022-12-0101 December 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for the Technical Specifications Conversion to NUREG-1431, Revision 5 L-2022-165, Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Request for Additional Information (RAI) 4.3.1-1a(second Round) - Class 1 Fatigue Response2022-10-26026 October 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Request for Additional Information (RAI) 4.3.1-1a(second Round) - Class 1 Fatigue Response L-2022-166, Response to Request for Supplemental Information Regarding License Amendment Request 274, Reactor Protection System, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, and Nuclear Instrumentation System Replacement2022-10-0505 October 2022 Response to Request for Supplemental Information Regarding License Amendment Request 274, Reactor Protection System, Engineered Safety Features Actuation System, and Nuclear Instrumentation System Replacement L-2022-156, Correction to Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Set 1a Response2022-09-19019 September 2022 Correction to Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Set 1a Response L-2022-143, Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Requests for Additional Information Set 1A Response2022-09-0808 September 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Requests for Additional Information Set 1A Response L-2022-136, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Turkey Point Unit 3 Cycle 32 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2022-08-12012 August 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Turkey Point Unit 3 Cycle 32 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report L-2022-115, Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Set 3 Response and Submittal of Superseded Response for One Set 2 RAI and One Supplement 1 Attachment2022-08-0909 August 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Set 3 Response and Submittal of Superseded Response for One Set 2 RAI and One Supplement 1 Attachment L-2022-108, Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Set 2 Response2022-07-11011 July 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application - Aging Management Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Set 2 Response L-2022-075, Subsequent License Renewal Application-Aging Management Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Set 1A Response and Request for Confirmation of Information (RCI) Set 1 Response2022-06-13013 June 2022 Subsequent License Renewal Application-Aging Management Requests for Additional Information (RAI) Set 1A Response and Request for Confirmation of Information (RCI) Set 1 Response L-2022-051, Fifth Ten-Year Inservice Inspection Interval Relief Request No. 10 Part-II, Supplement Information and Response to Request for Additional Information2022-03-29029 March 2022 Fifth Ten-Year Inservice Inspection Interval Relief Request No. 10 Part-II, Supplement Information and Response to Request for Additional Information L-2022-000, License Amendment Request for the Technical Specifications Conversion to NUREG- 1432 Revision 5 - Request for Supplemental Information (Rsi) Response2022-01-19019 January 2022 License Amendment Request for the Technical Specifications Conversion to NUREG- 1432 Revision 5 - Request for Supplemental Information (Rsi) Response L-2021-213, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 273, Update Listing of Approved LOCA Methodologies to Adopt Full Spectrum LOCA Methodology2021-11-19019 November 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 273, Update Listing of Approved LOCA Methodologies to Adopt Full Spectrum LOCA Methodology L-2021-207, Response to Request for Additional Information for ISI Relief Request No. 102021-10-25025 October 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information for ISI Relief Request No. 10 L-2021-197, Response to Request for Additional Information for ISI Relief Request No. 102021-10-15015 October 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information for ISI Relief Request No. 10 ML21258A3792021-09-14014 September 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information, Relief Requests 8 and 9 Proposed Alternative in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1), Extension of Inspection Interval for Turkey Point Unit 3 and Unit 4 Reactor. L-2021-105, Response to Request for Additional Information for St. Lucie License Amendment Request to Allow Risk Informed Completion Times (RICT) for the 120-Volt AC Instrument Bus Requirements2021-05-12012 May 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information for St. Lucie License Amendment Request to Allow Risk Informed Completion Times (RICT) for the 120-Volt AC Instrument Bus Requirements L-2021-065, Response to Request for Additional Information. Relief Request Number RR 15, Extension of St. Lucie Unit 2 RPV Welds from 10 to 20 Years2021-04-0101 April 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information. Relief Request Number RR 15, Extension of St. Lucie Unit 2 RPV Welds from 10 to 20 Years L-2020-165, Supplement to Updated Final Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-022020-12-0404 December 2020 Supplement to Updated Final Response to NRC Generic Letter 2004-02 L-2020-094, Supplemental Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Modify the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Flywheel Inspection Program Requirements2020-06-26026 June 2020 Supplemental Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Modify the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Flywheel Inspection Program Requirements L-2020-111, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2020-06-24024 June 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report L-2020-081, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 264, Adopt Emergency Action Level Scheme Described in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactor2020-06-0808 June 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 264, Adopt Emergency Action Level Scheme Described in NEI 99-01, Revision 6, Development of Emergency Action Levels for Non-Passive Reactor L-2020-083, Supplemental Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 270, Modify Containment Atmosphere Radioactivity Monitoring, Containment Ventilation Isolation and RCS Leakage Detection System Re2020-05-21021 May 2020 Supplemental Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 270, Modify Containment Atmosphere Radioactivity Monitoring, Containment Ventilation Isolation and RCS Leakage Detection System Re L-2020-061, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Modify the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Flywheel Inspection Program Requirements2020-04-30030 April 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Modify the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Flywheel Inspection Program Requirements L-2020-071, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 270, Modify Containment Atmosphere Radioactivity Monitoring, Containment Ventilation Isolation and RCS Leakage Detection System Requirements2020-04-16016 April 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 270, Modify Containment Atmosphere Radioactivity Monitoring, Containment Ventilation Isolation and RCS Leakage Detection System Requirements L-2020-064, Exigent License Amendment Request 272, One-Time Extension of TS 6.8.4 Steam Generator Inspection Program - Response to Request for Additional Information2020-04-0909 April 2020 Exigent License Amendment Request 272, One-Time Extension of TS 6.8.4 Steam Generator Inspection Program - Response to Request for Additional Information ML20098F3412020-04-0707 April 2020 Exigent License Amendment Request 272, One-Time Extension of TS 6.8.4 Steam Generator Inspection Program - Response to Request for Additional Information ML20015A0282020-01-14014 January 2020 NMFS to NRC, Concurrence with Interim Response to Requests for Additional Information for St. Lucie Endangered Species Act Section 7 Consultation L-2019-164, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Relocate the MOV Thermal Overload Protection Bypass Devices Requirements to Licensee Control2019-09-11011 September 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Relocate the MOV Thermal Overload Protection Bypass Devices Requirements to Licensee Control L-2019-166, Refueling Outage SL2-24 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report RAI Response2019-08-21021 August 2019 Refueling Outage SL2-24 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report RAI Response L-2019-153, Exigent Technical Specification Amendment Request Supplemental RAI Reply One-Time Allowed Outage Time Extension for Inoperable EDG2019-07-25025 July 2019 Exigent Technical Specification Amendment Request Supplemental RAI Reply One-Time Allowed Outage Time Extension for Inoperable EDG L-2019-149, Exigent Technical Specification Amendment Request RAI Reply One-Time Allowed Outage Time Extension for Inoperable EDG2019-07-24024 July 2019 Exigent Technical Specification Amendment Request RAI Reply One-Time Allowed Outage Time Extension for Inoperable EDG L-2019-135, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 266, Clarify Requirements When One Unit Is Outside the Applicability of Certain Technical Specifications2019-07-22022 July 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 266, Clarify Requirements When One Unit Is Outside the Applicability of Certain Technical Specifications L-2019-118, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Allow Performance of Selected Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Surveillance Requirements (Srs) During Power Operation2019-06-28028 June 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Allow Performance of Selected Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Surveillance Requirements (Srs) During Power Operation ML19158A5032019-06-0707 June 2019 NRC to NMFS, NRC Responses to NMFS Requests for Additional Information for Turkey Point ESA Section 7 Consultation 2024-06-26
[Table view] |
Text
May 24, 2018 L-2018-108 10 CFR 50.68 10 CFR 50.54(f)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Re: St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Turkey Point Units. 3 and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
Subject:
Response to Request for Supplemental Information Generic Letter 2016-01, "Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools"
References:
- 1. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "NRC Generic Letter 2016-01: Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools," April 7, 2016. (ML16097A169)
- 2. Letter from L. Nicholson (NextEra Energy) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Response to Generic Letter 2016-01, "Monitoring of Neutron Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools,"
Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)," L-2016-188, November 3, 2016. (ML16312A050)
- 3. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools - Request for Supplemental Information,"
December 18, 2017. (ML173048153)
- 4. EPRI Report 3002013119, "Evaluation of the Impact of Neutron Absorber Material Blistering and Pitting on Spent Fuel Pool Reactivity," May 2018.
- 5. EPRI Report 3002013122, "Roadmap for the lndustrywide Learning Aging Management Program (i-LAMP)," May 2018.
- 6. EPRI Report 1021052, "Overview of BORAL Performance Based Upon Surveillance Coupon Measurements," December 2010.
On April 7, 2016, the NRC issued Generic Letter 2016-01, "Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools" (Reference 1). Florida Power & Light/NextEra Energy provided the required response on November 3, 2016 (Reference 2). The response provided the information requested for each of the units in the NextEra Energy nuclear fleet.
On December 18, 2017, the NRC staff issued a request for supplemental information to a selected
, group of plants (Reference 3). This letter documents responses to the NRC request for supplemental information for St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2 and Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4. The responses are based on a template that was developed by the industry, compiled by NEI. The responses rely on three EPRI reports (References 4 - 6), and are provided in the enclosure to this letter. - }vl ':J 8' Florida Power & Light Company /\ f f /c--
700 Universe Boulevard, Juno Beach, FL 33408 Iv
- L-2018-108 Page 2 of 2 In reference to this request, CAC Nos. MF9421, MF9422, MF9412, MF9413, and the EPID numbers are as listed below for each site:
Plant Incoming CAC EPID Letter No(s).
St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 ML16312A050 MF9421 L-2016-LRC-0001 MF9422 Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 ML16312A050 MF9412 L-2016-LRC-0001 MF9413 This letter contains no new or revised regulatory commitments.
Should there be any questions, please contact Steve Catron at (561) 304-6206.
~!~~~
Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Compliance Director Enclosures (2)
ENCLOSURE 1 St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 NRC Generic Letter 2016-01 Responses to Request for Supplemental Information
L-2018-108 Page 1 of 3 Enclosure 1 Responses to NRC Request for Supplemental Information The NRC request for supplemental information consists of two questions, but only the first one is applicable to St. Lucie.
St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 Generic-Boral-RAl-1 Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.68, "Criticality accident requirements," and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 62, "Prevention of criticality in fuel storage and handling," provide the requirements for licensees with regard to maintaining subcriticality in the spent fuel pool (SFP). For licensees that utilize neutron absorbing materials (NAM) in the SFP, the boron-10 (1°8) areal density (AD) of the NAM must be known so that the assumption for the 10 8 minimum AD in the SFP nuclear criticality safety (NCS) analysis of record (AOR) is supported. In order for the NRC staff to verify the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 and GDC 62 are met, the staff needs to ensure that licensees are taking appropriate action to confirm that the 10 8 AD of their NAM can reasonably be expected to remain above the minimum assumed in the SFP NCS AOR. In addition, the condition of the NAM must be considered in the SFP NCS AOR. In order to verify whether or not the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 and GDC 62 will continue to be met, the staff needs to verify that the potential reactivity changes due to degradation or physical changes to the NAM are accounted for in the SFP NCS AOR. This includes any changes that would affect the neutron spectrum for the SFP in addition to any loss of neutron attenuation capability.
Industry operating experience, as described in Information Notice (IN) 2009-26, "Degradation of Neutron Absorbing Materials in the Spent Fuel Pool," dated October 28, 2009 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML092440545), and IN 1983-29, "Fuel Binding Caused by Fuel Rack Deformation," dated May 6, 1983 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14043A291), has demonstrated that certain manufacturing processes and plant conditions (dose, chemistry, length of time installed, and installation configuration) have resulted in material deformation as a result of blisters or bulging associated with Baral.
St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, does not have a site-specific monitoring program, and consequently, is relying on general industry operating experience as a surrogate for the condition of the Baral installed in the SFP.
- a. Please describe whether industry operating experience bounds the condition of the Baral at St.
Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, thereby ensuring that any degradation or deformation that may affect the Baral at St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, is identified.
L-2018-108 Page 2 of 3 Enclosure 1 Responses to NRC Request for Supplemental Information
RESPONSE
Through its Nuclear Safety Culture, procedures, and processes, St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, systematically and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external operating experience (OE) in a timely manner. Issues emerging from the use of Baral in the spent fuel racks are monitored through the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, OE Program and Corrective Action Program.
As indicated in the original Generic Letter response for St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, the site will continue to monitor industry OE related to Baral, which includes ongoing participation in the EPRI Neutron Absorber Users Group (NAUG) and its related programs (e.g., industrywide learning aging management). Industry-wide, to date there have been no indications of a loss of Baral material of a nature that diminished the neutron-absorbing capability of the Baral (EPRI Report 1021052). St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, follows the EPRI Water Chemistry Control Program and there have been no indications of a loss of Baral neutron-absorbing capabilities at a plant following the guidelines. In addition, to date there are no plant-specific operating conditions or rack attributes that would merit concern that the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, spent fuel racks or SFP environment are not bounded by the industry-wide OE. Finally, EPRI Report 3002013119 documents that observed or foreseen degradation or deformation of the Baral has an insignificant impact on SFP criticality. The industry OE aligns with the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, licensing basis.
The NAUG, through EPRI, is currently developing an industrywide program/database to aid in monitoring indications of potential Baral degradation and deformation. Over 70,000 water chemistry data points have been collected to date, from over 30 SFPs, for this program.
Surveillance data from 50 coupons across 25 SFPs has also been collected to date. The program, supported by EPRI NAUG and industry participants, is described in EPRI document 3002013122 and includes insights and feedback received from numerous communications with the NRG. Relevant issues emerging from this industry effort will be monitored through the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, OE Program and Corrective Action Program.
The St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2 criticality analyses only credit Baral in the cask pit racks.
As noted in the original response to Generic Letter 2016-01 (NextEra Energy Letter L-2016-188, ML16312A050), these racks were installed in 2004 for Unit 1 and 2006 for Unit 2. The original response also notes that these racks are primarily used during refueling outages; in between outages, the racks are left nearly empty in the spent fuel pool. Just prior to outages, fresh fuel is loaded into these racks. Therefore, in terms of implementation date and dose, these racks have considerable margin to the rest of the industry.
- b. In addition, discuss the criticality impact due to relevant material deformation identified in general industry operating experience, and whether it can be accommodated by the NCS AOR for St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, without exceeding NRG subcriticality requirements.
L-2018-108 Page 3 of 3 Enclosure 1 Responses to NRC Request for Supplemental Information
RESPONSE
To date, the industry OE has revealed no instances of an impact on SFP criticality due to observed Baral deformation (e.g. blistering) or degradation (e.g. pitting). The NAUG, through EPRI, has recently completed a study (EPRI Report 3002013119) which analyzes the criticality impact of blisters and pits on Baral. Simulations were performed for varying enrichment, burnup, areal density values, at unborated conditions (0 ppm), which is conservative for PWRs such as St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2. The study results demonstrate that pitting and blistering, on a scale much larger than any that has been observed in the industry OE, has an insignificant impact on SFP criticality. Therefore, the SFP criticality safety analysis of record remains applicable.
Furthermore, the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2 criticality analysis for the Baral cask pit racks have margin to the regulatory limit. For Unit 1, the rack can be fully loaded with fuel of the maximum allowed enrichment, and that results in a rack kett of 0.9190. Unit 2 allows two different configurations; the 2 out of 4 configuration has a rack kett of 0.8126, whereas the 3 out of 4 configuration has a rack kett of 0.9900. All rack kett noted are for the unborated cases, after including all biases and uncertainties.
ENCLOSURE 2 Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 NRC Generic Letter 2016-01 Responses to Request for Supplemental Information
I---------
1 L-2018-108 Page 1 of 3 Enclosure 2 Responses to NRC Request for Supplemental Information The NRC request for supplemental information consists of two questions, but only the first one is applicable to Turkey Point.
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Generic-Boral-RAl-1 Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.68, "Criticality accident requirements," and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 62, "Prevention of criticality in fuel storage and handling," provide the requirements for licensees with regard to maintaining subcriticality in the spent fuel pool (SFP). For licensees that utilize neutron absorbing materials (NAM) in the SFP, the boron-10 (1°8) areal density (AD) of the NAM must be known so that the assumption for the 10 8 minimum AD in the SFP nuclear criticality safety (NCS) analysis of record (AOR) is supported. In order for the NRC staff to verify the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 and GDC 62 are met, the staff needs to ensure that licensees are taking appropriate action to confirm that the 10 8 AD of their NAM can reasonably be expected to remain above the minimum assumed in the SFP NCS AOR. In addition, the condition of the NAM must be considered in the SFP NCS AOR. In order to verify whether or not the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 and GDC 62 will continue to be met, the staff needs to verify that the potential reactivity changes due to degradation or physical changes to the NAM are accounted for in the SFP NCS AOR. This includes any changes that would affect the neutron spectrum for the SFP in addition to any loss of neutron attenuation capability.
Industry operating experience, as described in Information Notice (IN) 2009-26, "Degradation of Neutron Absorbing Materials in the Spent Fuel Pool," dated October 28, 2009 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML092440545), and IN 1983-29, "Fuel Binding Caused by Fuel Rack Deformation," dated May 6, 1983 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14043A291), has demonstrated that certain manufacturing processes and plant conditions (dose, chemistry, length _of time installed, and installation configuration) have resulted in material deformation as a result of blisters or bulging associated with Bora!.
Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, does not have a site-specific monitoring program, and consequently, is relying on general industry operating experience as a surrogate for the condition of the Bora! installed in the SFP.
- a. Please describe whether industry operating experience bounds the condition of the Bora! at Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, thereby ensuring that any degradation or deformation that may affect the Boral at Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, is identified.
L-2018-108 Page 2 of 3
RESPONSE
Through its Nuclear Safety Culture, procedures, and processes, Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, systematically and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external operating experience (OE) in a timely manner.
Issues emerging from the use of Boral in the spent fuel racks are monitored through the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, OE Program and Corrective Action Program.
As indicated in the original Generic Letter response for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, the site will continue to monitor industry OE related to Boral, which includes ongoing participation in the EPRI Neutron Absorber Users Group (NAUG) and its related programs (e.g., industrywide learning aging management). Industry-wide, to date there have been no indications of a loss of Boral material of a nature that diminished the neutron-absorbing capability of the Boral (EPRI Report 1021052). Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, follows the EPRI Water Chemistry Control Program and there have been no indications of a loss of Boral neutron-absorbing capabilities at a plant 1
following the guidelines. In addition, to date there are no plant-specific operating conditions or rack attributes that would merit concern that the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, spent fuel racks or SFP environment are not bounded by the industry-wide OE.
Finally, EPRI Report 3002013119 documents that observed or foreseen degradation or deformation of the Boral has an insignificant impact on SFP criticality. The industry OE aligns with the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, licensing basis.
The NAUG, through EPRI, is currently developing an industrywide program/database to aid in monitoring indications of potential Boral degradation and deformation. Over 70,000 water chemistry data points have been collected to date, from over 30 SFPs, for this program.
Surveillance data from 50 coupons across 25 SFPs has also been collected to date. The program, supported by EPRI NAUG and industry participants, is described in EPRI document 3002013122 and includes insights and feedback received from numerous communications with the NRC. Relevant issues emerging from this industry effort will be monitored through the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, OE Program and Corrective Action Program.
The Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4 criticality analyses only credit Boral in the cask pit racks. As noted in the original response to Generic Letter 2016-01 (NextEra Energy Letter L-2016-188, ML16312A050), these racks were both installed in 2004. The original response also notes that these racks are primarily used during refueling outages; in between outages, the racks are left nearly empty in the spent fuel pool. Just prior to outages, fresh fuel is loaded into these racks. Therefore, in terms of implementation date and dose, these racks have considerable margin to the rest of the industry.
- b. In addition, discuss the criticality impact due to relevant material deformation identified in general industry operating experience, and whether it can be accommodated by the NCS AOR for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, without exceeding NRC subcriticality requirements.
RESPONSE
To date, the industry OE has revealed no instances of an impact on SFP criticality due to observed Baral deformation (e.g. blistering) or degradation (e.g. pitting). The NAUG, through EPRI, has recently completed a study (EPRI Report 3002013119) which analyzes the criticality impact of blisters and pits on Baral. Simulations were performed for varying enrichment, burnup, areal density values, at unborated conditions (0 ppm), which is conservative for PWRs such as Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4. The study results demonstrate that pitting and blistering, on a scale much larger than any that has been observed in the industry OE, has an insignificant impact on SFP criticality. Therefore, the SFP criticality safety analysis of record remains applicable.
Furthermore, the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4 criticality analysis for the Baral cask pit racks have margin to the regulatory limit. For both units, the rack can be fully loaded with fuel of the maximum allowed enrichment, and that results in an unborated rack keff of 0.9735, after including all biases and uncertainties.
Text
May 24, 2018 L-2018-108 10 CFR 50.68 10 CFR 50.54(f)
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Re: St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Turkey Point Units. 3 and 4 Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251
Subject:
Response to Request for Supplemental Information Generic Letter 2016-01, "Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools"
References:
- 1. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "NRC Generic Letter 2016-01: Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools," April 7, 2016. (ML16097A169)
- 2. Letter from L. Nicholson (NextEra Energy) to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Response to Generic Letter 2016-01, "Monitoring of Neutron Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools,"
Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f)," L-2016-188, November 3, 2016. (ML16312A050)
- 3. Letter from U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, "Generic Letter 2016-01, Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools - Request for Supplemental Information,"
December 18, 2017. (ML173048153)
- 4. EPRI Report 3002013119, "Evaluation of the Impact of Neutron Absorber Material Blistering and Pitting on Spent Fuel Pool Reactivity," May 2018.
- 5. EPRI Report 3002013122, "Roadmap for the lndustrywide Learning Aging Management Program (i-LAMP)," May 2018.
- 6. EPRI Report 1021052, "Overview of BORAL Performance Based Upon Surveillance Coupon Measurements," December 2010.
On April 7, 2016, the NRC issued Generic Letter 2016-01, "Monitoring of Neutron-Absorbing Materials in Spent Fuel Pools" (Reference 1). Florida Power & Light/NextEra Energy provided the required response on November 3, 2016 (Reference 2). The response provided the information requested for each of the units in the NextEra Energy nuclear fleet.
On December 18, 2017, the NRC staff issued a request for supplemental information to a selected
, group of plants (Reference 3). This letter documents responses to the NRC request for supplemental information for St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2 and Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4. The responses are based on a template that was developed by the industry, compiled by NEI. The responses rely on three EPRI reports (References 4 - 6), and are provided in the enclosure to this letter. - }vl ':J 8' Florida Power & Light Company /\ f f /c--
700 Universe Boulevard, Juno Beach, FL 33408 Iv
- L-2018-108 Page 2 of 2 In reference to this request, CAC Nos. MF9421, MF9422, MF9412, MF9413, and the EPID numbers are as listed below for each site:
Plant Incoming CAC EPID Letter No(s).
St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 ML16312A050 MF9421 L-2016-LRC-0001 MF9422 Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 ML16312A050 MF9412 L-2016-LRC-0001 MF9413 This letter contains no new or revised regulatory commitments.
Should there be any questions, please contact Steve Catron at (561) 304-6206.
~!~~~
Nuclear Licensing and Regulatory Compliance Director Enclosures (2)
ENCLOSURE 1 St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 NRC Generic Letter 2016-01 Responses to Request for Supplemental Information
L-2018-108 Page 1 of 3 Enclosure 1 Responses to NRC Request for Supplemental Information The NRC request for supplemental information consists of two questions, but only the first one is applicable to St. Lucie.
St. Lucie Units 1 and 2 Generic-Boral-RAl-1 Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.68, "Criticality accident requirements," and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 62, "Prevention of criticality in fuel storage and handling," provide the requirements for licensees with regard to maintaining subcriticality in the spent fuel pool (SFP). For licensees that utilize neutron absorbing materials (NAM) in the SFP, the boron-10 (1°8) areal density (AD) of the NAM must be known so that the assumption for the 10 8 minimum AD in the SFP nuclear criticality safety (NCS) analysis of record (AOR) is supported. In order for the NRC staff to verify the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 and GDC 62 are met, the staff needs to ensure that licensees are taking appropriate action to confirm that the 10 8 AD of their NAM can reasonably be expected to remain above the minimum assumed in the SFP NCS AOR. In addition, the condition of the NAM must be considered in the SFP NCS AOR. In order to verify whether or not the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 and GDC 62 will continue to be met, the staff needs to verify that the potential reactivity changes due to degradation or physical changes to the NAM are accounted for in the SFP NCS AOR. This includes any changes that would affect the neutron spectrum for the SFP in addition to any loss of neutron attenuation capability.
Industry operating experience, as described in Information Notice (IN) 2009-26, "Degradation of Neutron Absorbing Materials in the Spent Fuel Pool," dated October 28, 2009 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML092440545), and IN 1983-29, "Fuel Binding Caused by Fuel Rack Deformation," dated May 6, 1983 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14043A291), has demonstrated that certain manufacturing processes and plant conditions (dose, chemistry, length of time installed, and installation configuration) have resulted in material deformation as a result of blisters or bulging associated with Baral.
St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, does not have a site-specific monitoring program, and consequently, is relying on general industry operating experience as a surrogate for the condition of the Baral installed in the SFP.
- a. Please describe whether industry operating experience bounds the condition of the Baral at St.
Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, thereby ensuring that any degradation or deformation that may affect the Baral at St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, is identified.
L-2018-108 Page 2 of 3 Enclosure 1 Responses to NRC Request for Supplemental Information
RESPONSE
Through its Nuclear Safety Culture, procedures, and processes, St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, systematically and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external operating experience (OE) in a timely manner. Issues emerging from the use of Baral in the spent fuel racks are monitored through the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, OE Program and Corrective Action Program.
As indicated in the original Generic Letter response for St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, the site will continue to monitor industry OE related to Baral, which includes ongoing participation in the EPRI Neutron Absorber Users Group (NAUG) and its related programs (e.g., industrywide learning aging management). Industry-wide, to date there have been no indications of a loss of Baral material of a nature that diminished the neutron-absorbing capability of the Baral (EPRI Report 1021052). St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, follows the EPRI Water Chemistry Control Program and there have been no indications of a loss of Baral neutron-absorbing capabilities at a plant following the guidelines. In addition, to date there are no plant-specific operating conditions or rack attributes that would merit concern that the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, spent fuel racks or SFP environment are not bounded by the industry-wide OE. Finally, EPRI Report 3002013119 documents that observed or foreseen degradation or deformation of the Baral has an insignificant impact on SFP criticality. The industry OE aligns with the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, licensing basis.
The NAUG, through EPRI, is currently developing an industrywide program/database to aid in monitoring indications of potential Baral degradation and deformation. Over 70,000 water chemistry data points have been collected to date, from over 30 SFPs, for this program.
Surveillance data from 50 coupons across 25 SFPs has also been collected to date. The program, supported by EPRI NAUG and industry participants, is described in EPRI document 3002013122 and includes insights and feedback received from numerous communications with the NRG. Relevant issues emerging from this industry effort will be monitored through the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, OE Program and Corrective Action Program.
The St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2 criticality analyses only credit Baral in the cask pit racks.
As noted in the original response to Generic Letter 2016-01 (NextEra Energy Letter L-2016-188, ML16312A050), these racks were installed in 2004 for Unit 1 and 2006 for Unit 2. The original response also notes that these racks are primarily used during refueling outages; in between outages, the racks are left nearly empty in the spent fuel pool. Just prior to outages, fresh fuel is loaded into these racks. Therefore, in terms of implementation date and dose, these racks have considerable margin to the rest of the industry.
- b. In addition, discuss the criticality impact due to relevant material deformation identified in general industry operating experience, and whether it can be accommodated by the NCS AOR for St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2, without exceeding NRG subcriticality requirements.
L-2018-108 Page 3 of 3 Enclosure 1 Responses to NRC Request for Supplemental Information
RESPONSE
To date, the industry OE has revealed no instances of an impact on SFP criticality due to observed Baral deformation (e.g. blistering) or degradation (e.g. pitting). The NAUG, through EPRI, has recently completed a study (EPRI Report 3002013119) which analyzes the criticality impact of blisters and pits on Baral. Simulations were performed for varying enrichment, burnup, areal density values, at unborated conditions (0 ppm), which is conservative for PWRs such as St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2. The study results demonstrate that pitting and blistering, on a scale much larger than any that has been observed in the industry OE, has an insignificant impact on SFP criticality. Therefore, the SFP criticality safety analysis of record remains applicable.
Furthermore, the St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2 criticality analysis for the Baral cask pit racks have margin to the regulatory limit. For Unit 1, the rack can be fully loaded with fuel of the maximum allowed enrichment, and that results in a rack kett of 0.9190. Unit 2 allows two different configurations; the 2 out of 4 configuration has a rack kett of 0.8126, whereas the 3 out of 4 configuration has a rack kett of 0.9900. All rack kett noted are for the unborated cases, after including all biases and uncertainties.
ENCLOSURE 2 Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 NRC Generic Letter 2016-01 Responses to Request for Supplemental Information
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1 L-2018-108 Page 1 of 3 Enclosure 2 Responses to NRC Request for Supplemental Information The NRC request for supplemental information consists of two questions, but only the first one is applicable to Turkey Point.
Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Generic-Boral-RAl-1 Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.68, "Criticality accident requirements," and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 62, "Prevention of criticality in fuel storage and handling," provide the requirements for licensees with regard to maintaining subcriticality in the spent fuel pool (SFP). For licensees that utilize neutron absorbing materials (NAM) in the SFP, the boron-10 (1°8) areal density (AD) of the NAM must be known so that the assumption for the 10 8 minimum AD in the SFP nuclear criticality safety (NCS) analysis of record (AOR) is supported. In order for the NRC staff to verify the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 and GDC 62 are met, the staff needs to ensure that licensees are taking appropriate action to confirm that the 10 8 AD of their NAM can reasonably be expected to remain above the minimum assumed in the SFP NCS AOR. In addition, the condition of the NAM must be considered in the SFP NCS AOR. In order to verify whether or not the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 and GDC 62 will continue to be met, the staff needs to verify that the potential reactivity changes due to degradation or physical changes to the NAM are accounted for in the SFP NCS AOR. This includes any changes that would affect the neutron spectrum for the SFP in addition to any loss of neutron attenuation capability.
Industry operating experience, as described in Information Notice (IN) 2009-26, "Degradation of Neutron Absorbing Materials in the Spent Fuel Pool," dated October 28, 2009 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML092440545), and IN 1983-29, "Fuel Binding Caused by Fuel Rack Deformation," dated May 6, 1983 (ADAMS Accession No. ML14043A291), has demonstrated that certain manufacturing processes and plant conditions (dose, chemistry, length _of time installed, and installation configuration) have resulted in material deformation as a result of blisters or bulging associated with Bora!.
Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, does not have a site-specific monitoring program, and consequently, is relying on general industry operating experience as a surrogate for the condition of the Bora! installed in the SFP.
- a. Please describe whether industry operating experience bounds the condition of the Bora! at Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, thereby ensuring that any degradation or deformation that may affect the Boral at Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, is identified.
L-2018-108 Page 2 of 3
RESPONSE
Through its Nuclear Safety Culture, procedures, and processes, Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, systematically and effectively collects, evaluates, and implements relevant internal and external operating experience (OE) in a timely manner.
Issues emerging from the use of Boral in the spent fuel racks are monitored through the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, OE Program and Corrective Action Program.
As indicated in the original Generic Letter response for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, the site will continue to monitor industry OE related to Boral, which includes ongoing participation in the EPRI Neutron Absorber Users Group (NAUG) and its related programs (e.g., industrywide learning aging management). Industry-wide, to date there have been no indications of a loss of Boral material of a nature that diminished the neutron-absorbing capability of the Boral (EPRI Report 1021052). Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, follows the EPRI Water Chemistry Control Program and there have been no indications of a loss of Boral neutron-absorbing capabilities at a plant 1
following the guidelines. In addition, to date there are no plant-specific operating conditions or rack attributes that would merit concern that the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, spent fuel racks or SFP environment are not bounded by the industry-wide OE.
Finally, EPRI Report 3002013119 documents that observed or foreseen degradation or deformation of the Boral has an insignificant impact on SFP criticality. The industry OE aligns with the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, licensing basis.
The NAUG, through EPRI, is currently developing an industrywide program/database to aid in monitoring indications of potential Boral degradation and deformation. Over 70,000 water chemistry data points have been collected to date, from over 30 SFPs, for this program.
Surveillance data from 50 coupons across 25 SFPs has also been collected to date. The program, supported by EPRI NAUG and industry participants, is described in EPRI document 3002013122 and includes insights and feedback received from numerous communications with the NRC. Relevant issues emerging from this industry effort will be monitored through the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, OE Program and Corrective Action Program.
The Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4 criticality analyses only credit Boral in the cask pit racks. As noted in the original response to Generic Letter 2016-01 (NextEra Energy Letter L-2016-188, ML16312A050), these racks were both installed in 2004. The original response also notes that these racks are primarily used during refueling outages; in between outages, the racks are left nearly empty in the spent fuel pool. Just prior to outages, fresh fuel is loaded into these racks. Therefore, in terms of implementation date and dose, these racks have considerable margin to the rest of the industry.
- b. In addition, discuss the criticality impact due to relevant material deformation identified in general industry operating experience, and whether it can be accommodated by the NCS AOR for Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4, without exceeding NRC subcriticality requirements.
RESPONSE
To date, the industry OE has revealed no instances of an impact on SFP criticality due to observed Baral deformation (e.g. blistering) or degradation (e.g. pitting). The NAUG, through EPRI, has recently completed a study (EPRI Report 3002013119) which analyzes the criticality impact of blisters and pits on Baral. Simulations were performed for varying enrichment, burnup, areal density values, at unborated conditions (0 ppm), which is conservative for PWRs such as Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4. The study results demonstrate that pitting and blistering, on a scale much larger than any that has been observed in the industry OE, has an insignificant impact on SFP criticality. Therefore, the SFP criticality safety analysis of record remains applicable.
Furthermore, the Turkey Point Nuclear Generating, Units 3 and 4 criticality analysis for the Baral cask pit racks have margin to the regulatory limit. For both units, the rack can be fully loaded with fuel of the maximum allowed enrichment, and that results in an unborated rack keff of 0.9735, after including all biases and uncertainties.