NRC Inspection Manual 0609/Appendix A
text
Issue Date: 06/19/12 1 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
APPENDIX A
THE SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION PROCESS (SDP) FOR
FINDINGS AT-POWER
1.0 APPLICABILITY
The SDP described in this Appendix is designed to provide the staff and management with a
simplified framework and associated guidance for use in screening at-power findings, directing
the user to other applicable SDP appendices, and performing a detailed risk evaluation. This
SDP is applicable to at-power findings within the Initiating Events, Mitigation Systems, and
Barrier Integrity cornerstones.
2.0 ENTRY CONDITIONS
The SDP described in this appendix is implemented by direction from Inspection Manual
Chapter (IMC) 0609, Attachment 4, “Initial Characterization of Findings.”
3.0 BACKGROUND
Over the years, maintaining the pre-solved tables and risk-informed notebooks from IMC 0609,
App A proved to be a challenging task. As plants implemented equipment modifications and
associated revisions to the plant risk model, the accuracy of the pre-solved tables and riskinformed notebooks began to degrade. Instead of separately maintaining and updating the
plant specific pre-solved tables and risk-informed notebooks, the agency decided to transition to
a software-based system called SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on
Integrated Reliability Evaluations). Using SAPHIRE a user can perform analyses on a regularly
maintained site-specific Standardized Plant Assessment Risk (SPAR) model. Updating sitespecific SPAR models provides an efficient and effective infrastructure that facilitates risk model
fidelity. For legacy, reference, and knowledge transfer purposes, the pre-solved tables, riskinformed notebooks, and associated ROP guidance documents will be archived.
In the transition from the pre-solved tables and risk-informed notebooks to SAPHIRE and the
site-specific SPAR models it is important to note process differences. The pre-solved tables
and risk-informed notebooks, by process, provided a second layer of screening and an
estimation of the risk impact of the finding. In lieu of the pre-solved tables and risk-informed
notebooks, the SDP Workspace, a module within each SPAR model, was developed. The SDP
Workspace performs a delta CDF calculation similar in many respects to the risk estimate
performed by use of the risk-informed notebooks. However, use of SDP workspace is no longer
intended to provide a prescriptive additional layer of screening beyond that which is outlined in
section 5.0 “Screening” of this appendix. Rather, the SDP workspace is one of many tools the
inspection staff and SRAs can utilize to support a detailed risk evaluation (see section 6.0
“Detailed Risk Evaluation” for more details).
Issue Date: 06/19/12 2 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
4.0 SCREENING AND DETAILED RISK EVALUATION OVERVIEW
This appendix is divided into two functional parts. The first part is a screening tool that uses a
series of logic questions to determine whether or not the finding can be characterized as having
low safety significance (i.e., Green) and preclude a more detailed risk evaluation. The second
part provides guidance in determining the risk significance of a finding that did not screen to
Green in part one.
5.0 SCREENING
The screening questions are categorized by cornerstone, as such there is one set of screening
questions for Initiating Events, one for Mitigating Systems, and one for Barrier Integrity (Exhibits
1, 2, and 3 respectively). If more than one cornerstone is affected, the screening questions in
all the affected cornerstones apply. In addition, under each cornerstone the screening
questions are categorized into sub-sections, so a finding and associated degraded condition
might be applicable to more than one subsection. Typically the inspection staff completes the
screening process with support from the regional SRAs, as needed. The screening questions
cover a wide range of instances and scenarios, but are not intended to be all inclusive.
Therefore, if the inspection staff and/or SRA do not agree with the screening results, other risk
tools (e.g., the SDP workspace) and guidance provided in section 6.0 “Detailed Risk Evaluation”
can be used to confirm or challenge the screening results. The screening process also directs
the user to other applicable SDP appendices as needed (similar to Table 3 of IMC 0609,
Attachment 4).
The screening logic questions are designed to systematically determine whether a degraded
condition(s) resulting from a finding is of low safety significance (i.e., Green) or not. If all the
logic questions under the applicable cornerstone(s) do not apply, then the finding is screened as
Green and the risk evaluation is complete (assuming that the inspectors do not have any
technical reservations with the screening results). Basically, the logic questions under a specific
cornerstone are linked by a logical AND in that all the logic questions are required to be not
applicable to the degraded condition(s) in order to screen as Green. Conversely, if any one of
the logic questions under a specific cornerstone is applicable to the degraded condition(s), the
finding cannot be screened as Green and further risk evaluation is warranted. In this case, the
logic questions are linked by a logical OR in that only one of the logic questions is required to be
applicable to the degraded condition to preclude screening the finding to Green.
Initiating Events (Exhibit 1)
The Initiating Events screening questions are categorized into five sub-sections titled Loss of
Coolant Accident (LOCA) Initiators, Transient Initiators, Support System Initiators, Steam
Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR), and External Event Initiators. Below is additional guidance to
support answering the screening questions for each sub-section:
LOCA Initiators – Considers small, medium, and large LOCA initiating events.
Issue Date: 06/19/12 3 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
Transient Initiators – A transient initiator is an event that results in a reactor trip or
scram. Some examples of transients are loss of main feedwater, loss of condenser
heat sink, and loss of offsite power events.
Support System Initiators – A support system initiator involves a degraded condition of
a support system that either causes an initiating event or increases the likelihood of an
initiating event AND causes a degraded condition with an increase in the likelihood of a
failure of one or more mitigating SSCs.
SGTR – No additional guidance
External Event Initiators – In the initiating events cornerstone the external events of
interest are limited to fire and internal flooding. Other external events, in the context of
the initiating events cornerstone, are not applicable because the licensee does not have
control over these events (e.g., tornado, hurricane). However, the licensee does have
control over the systems used to mitigate an external event and that is covered in the
Mitigating Systems section (Exhibit 2).
Mitigating Systems (Exhibit 2)
The Mitigating Systems screening questions are categorized into four sub-sections titled
Mitigating Systems, Structures, Components (SSCs) and Functionality (except Reactivity
Control Systems), External Event Mitigation Systems (Seismic/Fire/Flood/Severe Weather
Protection Degraded), Reactivity Control Systems, and Fire Brigade. Below is additional
guidance to support answering the screening questions for each sub-section:
Mitigating SSCs and Functionality (except Reactivity Control Systems) –
For the purposes of this subsection, the SSCs (and their associated functions) of
concern are those that provide a risk significant or risk relevant mitigating function in
response to an initiating event. Normally those SSCs that are in the risk model provide
a risk significant or risk relevant function; however that is not always the case (e.g.,
some SSCs are not modeled explicitly). There are several ways to determine whether
an SSC provides a risk significant or risk relevant mitigating function and below are
some sources of information to support this determination:
1) Plant Risk Information eBook (PRIB) (Table 6) – Table lists systems/functions that
are included in the SPAR model. It also provides specific success criteria given a
particular initiating event. See PRIB definition in section 6.0 “Detailed Risk
Evaluation”.
2) PRIB (Table 7) – Table lists the components included in the SPAR model with their
associated risk importance measures.
3) SDP Workspace – The SDP workspace contains risk significant and risk relevant
SSCs derived from the specific SPAR model.
4) UFSAR – Although the systems/function described in the UFSAR might be different
than the systems/function modeled in the SPAR, the licensed design bases for
systems/functions can provide useful information in determining safety significance.
Issue Date: 06/19/12 4 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
5) Licensee Risk Insights – If provided, risk insights from the licensee risk model (e.g.,
importance measures, dominant sequences, delta CDF calculations, etc) and
risk/safety significant SSCs from their maintenance rule program can be a good
source of risk information.
External Event Mitigation Systems (Seismic/Fire/Flood/Severe Weather Protection
Degraded) – No additional guidance
Reactivity Control Systems –
Reactor Protection System (RPS) – The main focus of the screening question
is to screen findings that result in a minor functional degradation of RPS
(e.g., one automatic trip from one instrument) but there are several redundant
trips that provide the same function (e.g., three other automatic functional
trips). If there is a significant functional degradation to RPS, a detailed risk
evaluation is warranted. The determination of what a “significant” or “minor”
functional degradation of RPS should be based on reasonable technical
judgment of the inspectors, SRA, and management.
Fire Brigade – No additional guidance
Barrier Integrity (Exhibit 3)
The Barrier Integrity screening questions are categorized into four sub-sections titled RCS
Boundary, Reactor Containment, Control Room/Auxiliary/Reactor Building or Spent Fuel Pool
Building, and Spent Fuel Pool. Below is additional guidance to support answering the screening
questions for each sub-section:
RCS Boundary – Pressurized thermal shock issues are addressed under the barrier
integrity cornerstone. All other RCS boundary issues (i.e., leakage) are evaluated
under the initiating events cornerstone.
Reactor Containment – No additional guidance
Control Room/Auxiliary/Reactor Building or Spent Fuel Pool Building – No additional
guidance
Spent Fuel Pool – No additional guidance
6.0 DETAILED RISK EVALUATION
The inspection staff and regional SRAs should coordinate efforts, using their specific skills,
training, and qualifications, to arrive at an appropriate risk evaluation given the specific
circumstances associated with the risk impact of the degraded condition(s) that resulted from
the finding. Typically inspectors develop the finding and the associated functional impact on the
equipment and gather plant information to support the detailed risk evaluation. Then the
inspectors and SRA collaborate to develop appropriate input assumptions while the SRA
Issue Date: 06/19/12 5 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
normally performs the detailed risk evaluation for greater than green findings using the SPAR
model, the RASP handbooks, and other risk information as necessary. When the internal
events detailed risk evaluation results are greater than or equal to 1.0E-7, the finding should be
evaluated for external event risk contribution. Any internal events results that are less than
1.0E-7 can be evaluated for external event risk contribution at the discretion of the regional
SRA. If an inspector uses the SDP Workspace to perform a detailed risk evaluation, a regional
SRA should review the results to determine if any additional analyses need to be performed.
If more than one cornerstone is affected by the finding and associated degraded condition(s),
the risk evaluation of the finding should take into account all of the associated degraded
condition(s) from all of the affected cornerstones. However, for the purposes of the power
reactor assessment program, the cornerstone which captures the majority fraction of the overall
risk evaluation should be identified as the affected cornerstone. The risk tools and guidance
available to the staff to perform the detailed risk evaluation are discussed below:
1) SDP Workspace – The SDP Workspace provides the user with a delta CDF (and
delta LERF) calculation with a comprehensive report of results. This tool only
accounts for risk associated with internal events (i.e., does not account for external
event risk contributions) and cannot be adjusted to change the model (e.g.,
recovery actions, common cause failure).
2) Event Condition Assessment – A workspace that is used by the SRA that allows the
analyst more flexibility in adjusting basic events.
3) General Analysis – A workspace that is used by the SRA that allows more flexibility
in adjusting both basic events and model logic.
4) Specific SPAR Model Changes – The SRA can alter the SPAR model logic and
create a set of changed basic events to reflect the degraded condition(s) and/or
event. This approach provides the most flexibility in performing a delta CDF
calculation.
5) Plant Risk Information eBook (PRIB) – The PRIB is a summary document
associated with the site-specific SPAR model that provides a variety of risk insights.
Changes to SAPHIRE and SPAR Models:
NOTE: The risk tools (e.g., SDP workspace) and guidance to support the SDP are
designed to have users engaged in the process and avoid a “blackbox” approach in
determining the risk significance of deficient licensee performance. Users need to be
aware of the limitations and specific capabilities of each risk tool and associated
guidance to preclude misapplication.
Issue Date: 06/19/12 6 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
Identified Errors or Discrepancies – Identified errors or discrepancies with SAPHIRE or the
site-specific SPAR model should be discussed and vetted by the inspection staff and SRA
and then reported to INL via the SAPHIRE webpage at https://saphire.inl.gov/. On the
SAPHIRE webpage there is one module to request changes to SAPHIRE (i.e., software) and
a separate module to request changes to the SPAR models (which includes changes to the
PRIB).
Timely SDP Evaluations – To support the SDP timeliness goal, a SRA may make changes to
the SPAR model of record, as appropriate, based on information from the inspectors and/or
the licensee, to accurately reflect the risk significance of the finding. These changes must be
documented in the associated inspection report and/or SERP package. The SRA should
subsequently review the model changes made to determine if those model changes should
be incorporated into the plant SPAR model of record.
Guidance:
1) RASP Handbooks – Volume 1 (Internal Events), 2 (External Events), and Volume 4
(Shutdown) - These handbooks provide standardized risk guidance and best
practices to support determinations across a variety of NRC programs (SDP,
Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP), and Management Directive (MD) 8.3 “Event
Evaluation”)
2) NUREGs – There are many NUREGs that can provide useful information when
performing a detailed risk evaluation (e.g., initiating event and failure data, common
cause failure modeling techniques).
END
Exhibit 1 - Initiating Events Screening Questions
Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions
Exhibit 3 - Barrier Integrity Screening Questions
Exhibit 4 - External Events Screening Questions
Issue Date: 06/19/12 Ex1 - 1 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
Exhibit 1 - Initiating Events Screening Questions
A. LOCA Initiators
1. After a reasonable assessment of degradation, could the finding result in exceeding the
RCS leak rate for a small LOCA?
□ a. If YES ➛Stop. Go to Detailed Risk Evaluation section.
□ b. If NO, continue.
2. After a reasonable assessment of degradation, could the finding have likely affected other
systems used to mitigate a LOCA resulting in a total loss of their function (e.g., Interfacing
System LOCA)?
□ a. If YES ➛Stop. Go to Detailed Risk Evaluation section.
□ b. If NO, screen as Green.
B. Transient Initiators
Did the finding cause a reactor trip AND the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to
transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition (e.g. loss of
condenser, loss of feedwater)? Other events include high energy line-breaks, internal
flooding, and fire.
□ a. If YES ➛Stop. Go to Detailed Risk Evaluation section.
□ b. If NO, screen as Green.
C. Support System Initiators
Did the finding involve the complete or partial loss of a support system that contributes to the
likelihood of, or cause, an initiating event AND affected mitigation equipment? Examples of
support system initiators are loss of offsite power (LOOP), Loss of a DC Bus, Loss of an AC
Bus, Loss of Component Cooling Water (LCCW), Loss of Service Water (LOSW), and Loss
of Instrument Air (LOIA).
□ a. If YES ➛Stop. Go to Detailed Risk Evaluation section.
□ b. If NO, screen as Green.
D. Steam Generator Tube Rupture
Issue Date: 06/19/12 Ex1 - 2 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
1. Does the finding involve a degraded steam generator tube condition where one tube cannot
sustain 3 times the differential pressure across a tube during normal full power, steady state
operation (3ΔPNO)?
□ a. If YES ➛Stop. Go to IMC 0609, Appendix J.
□ b. If NO, continue.
2. Does one or more SGs violate “accident leakage” performance criterion (i.e., involve
degradation that would exceed the accident leakage performance criterion under design
basis accident conditions).
□ a. If YES ➛Stop. Go to Detailed Risk Evaluation section and refer to IMC 0609,
Appendix JProperty "Inspection Manual Chapter" (as page type) with input value "NRC Inspection Manual 0609,</br></br>Appendix J" contains invalid characters or is incomplete and therefore can cause unexpected results during a query or annotation process. as applicable.
□ b. If NO, screen as Green.
E. External Event Initiators
Does the finding impact the frequency of a fire or internal flooding initiating event?
□ a. If YES ➛ Stop. Go to Detailed Risk Evaluation section.
□ b. If NO, screen as Green.
Issue Date: 06/19/12 Ex2 - 1 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
Exhibit 2 – Mitigating Systems Screening Questions
A. Mitigating SSCs and Functionality (except Reactivity Control Systems – see section C
below)
1. If the finding is a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating SSC, does
the SSC maintain its operability or functionality?
□ If YES ➛Screen as Green.
□ b. If NO, continue.
2. Does the finding represent a loss of system and/or function?
□ a. If YES ➛Stop. Go to Detailed Risk Evaluation section.
□ b. If NO, continue.
3. Does the finding represent an actual loss of function of at least a single Train for > its Tech
Spec Allowed Outage Time OR two separate safety systems out-of-service for > its Tech
Spec Allowed Outage Time?
□ a. If YES ➛Stop. Go to Detailed Risk Evaluation section.
□ b. If NO, continue.
4. Does the finding represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-Tech Spec Trains
of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensee’s
maintenance rule program for >24 hrs?
□ a. If YES ➛Stop. Go to Detailed Risk Evaluation section.
□ b. If NO, screen as Green.
B.
Does the finding involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically
designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event (e.g., seismic
snubbers, flooding barriers, tornado doors)?
External Event Mitigation Systems (Seismic/Fire/Flood/Severe Weather Protection
Degraded)
□ a. If YES ➛Go to Exhibit 4
□ b. If NO ➛screen as Green
Issue Date: 06/19/12 Ex2 - 2 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
C. Reactivity Control Systems
1. Did the finding affect a single reactor protection system (RPS) trip signal to initiate a reactor
scram AND the function of other redundant trips or diverse methods of reactor shutdown
(e.g., other automatic RPS trips, alternate rod insertion, or manual reactor trip capacity)?
□ a. If YES ➛Stop. Go to Detailed Risk Evaluation section.
□ b. If NO, continue.
2. Did the finding involve control manipulations that unintentionally added positive reactivity
(e.g., inadvertent boron dilution, cold water injection, inadvertent control rod movement,
recirculation pump speed control)?
□ a. If YES, ➛Stop. Go to IMC 0609, Appendix M
□ b. If NO, continue
3. Did the finding result in a mismanagement of reactivity by operator(s) (e.g., reactor power
exceeding the licensed power limit, inability to anticipate and control changes in reactivity
during crew operations)?
□ a. If YES, ➛Stop. Go to IMC 0609, Appendix M
□ b. If NO, screen as Green
D. Fire Brigade
1. Does the finding involve Fire Brigade training and qualification requirements, or brigade
staffing?
□ a. If YES ➛check if one or more of the following apply:
□ The fire brigade demonstrated the ability to meet the required times for fire
extinguishment for the fire drill scenarios, and the finding did not significantly affect
the ability of the fire brigades to respond to a fire.
□ The overall time duration (exposure time) that the Fire Brigade was understaffed
was short (< 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />).
□ b. If at least one of the above is checked ➛screen as Green.
□ c. If NO, continue
2. Does the finding involve the response time of the fire brigade to a fire?
Issue Date: 06/19/12 Ex2 - 3 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
□ a. If YES ➛check if one or more of the following apply:
□ The fire brigade’s response time was mitigated by other defense-in-depth elements,
such as area combustible loading limits were not exceeded, installed fire detection
systems were functional, and alternate means of safe shutdown were not impacted.
□ The finding involved risk-significant fire areas that had automatic suppression
systems.
□ The licensee had adequate Fire Protection compensatory actions in place.
□ b. If at least one of the above is checked ➛screen as Green.
□ If NO, continue
3. Does the finding involve fire extinguishers, fire hoses, or fire hose stations?
□ a. If YES ➛check if one or more of the following apply:
□ There was no degraded fire barrier and the fire scenario did not require the use of
water to extinguish the fire.
□ The missing fire extinguisher or fire hose was missing for a short time and other
extinguishers or hose stations were in the vicinity.
□ b. If at least one of the above is checked ➛screen as Green.
□ c. If none of the boxes under D.1.a, D.2.a, or D.3.a are checked ➛Stop. Go to IMC 0609, Appendix M.
Issue Date: 06/19/12 Ex3 - 1 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
Exhibit 3 – Barrier Integrity Screening Questions
A. RCS Boundary (e.g., pressurized thermal shock issues)
□ Stop. Go to Detailed Risk Evaluation section.
B. Reactor Containment:
1. Does the finding represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor
containment (valves, airlocks, etc), containment isolation system (logic and instrumentation),
and heat removal components?
□ a. If YES ➛ Stop. Go to IMC 0609, Appendix H.
□ b. If NO, continue.
2. Does the finding involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor
containment?
□ a. If YES ➛ Stop. Go to IMC 0609, Appendix H.
□ b. If NO, screen as Green.
C. Control Room, Auxiliary, Reactor, or Spent Fuel Pool Building:
1. Does the finding only represent a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for
the control room, or auxiliary building, or spent fuel pool, or SBGT system (BWR)?
□ a. If YES ➛ Stop. screen as Green.
□ b. If NO, continue.
2. Does the finding represent a degradation of the barrier function of the control room against
smoke or a toxic atmosphere?
□ a. If YES ➛ Stop. Go to Detailed Risk Evaluation section.
□ b. If NO, screen as Green
D. Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)
1. Does the finding adversely affect decay heat removal capabilities from the spent fuel pool
causing the pool temperature to exceed the maximum analyzed temperature limit specified
Issue Date: 06/19/12 Ex3 - 2 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
in the site-specific licensing basis?
□ a. If YES ➛ Stop. Go to IMC 0609, Appendix M.
□ b. If NO, continue.
2. Does the finding result from fuel handling errors, dropped fuel assembly, dropped storage
cask, or crane operations over the SFP that caused mechanical damage to fuel clad AND a
detectible release of radionuclides?
□ a. If YES ➛ Stop. Go to IMC 0609, Appendix M (refer to IMC 0609, Appendix C as
applicable).
□ b. If NO, continue.
3. Does the finding result in a loss of spent fuel pool water inventory decreasing below the
minimum analyzed level limit specified in the site-specific licensing basis?
□ a. If YES ➛ Stop. Go to IMC 0609, Appendix M.
□ b. If NO, continue.
4. Does the finding affect the SFP neutron absorber, fuel bundle misplacement (i.e., fuel
loading pattern error) or soluble Boron concentration (PWRs only)?
□ a. If YES ➛ Stop. Go to IMC 0609, Appendix M.
□ b. If NO, screen as Green.
Issue Date: 06/19/12 Att 1-1 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
Exhibit 4 – External Events Screening Questions
1. If the equipment or safety function is assumed to be completely failed or unavailable, are ANY of the following three statements
TRUE? The loss of this equipment or function by itself during the external initiating event it was intended to mitigate:
would cause a plant trip or an initiating event
would degrade two or more trains of a multi-train system or function;
would degrade one or more trains of a system that supports a risk significant system or function.
□ a. If YES ➛STOP. Go to Detailed Risk Evaluation section.
□ b. If NO, Continue.
2. Does the finding involve the total loss of any safety function, identified by the licensee through a PRA, IPEEE, or similar analysis,
that contributes to external event initiated core damage accident sequences (i.e., initiated by a seismic, flooding, or severe
weather event)?
□ a. If YES ➛Stop. Go to Detailed Risk Evaluation section.
□ b. If NO, screen as Green
Attachment 1 – Revision History for IMC 0609 Appendix A
Commitment
Tracking
Number
Accession
Number
Issue Date
Change Notice
Description of Change Training Required and
Completion Date
Comment and
Feedback
Resolution
Accession
Number
Issue Date: 06/19/12 Att 1-2 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
Commitment
Tracking
Number
Accession
Number
Issue Date
Change Notice
Description of Change Training Required and
Completion Date
Comment and
Feedback
Resolution
Accession
Number
04/21/00
CN 00-007
Initial issue
12/28/00
CN 00-029
Revised to incorporate changes based on
inspector feedback. Enhancements generated
by IIPB and SPSB risk analysts based on initial
implementation experience to date have also
been added. A significant change is the credit
given for operator actions in step 2.3 of the
document. Clarification changes have also been
made to the phase 1 screening worksheets.
Phase 2 worksheets are in the process of being
updated to include plant and site specific
information. This document is an integral part of
the Significant Determination Process for
reactor inspection findings for At-Power
operations and will be used by resident and
region-based inspectors as well as by SRAs.
02/05/01
CN 01-003
Revised to correct formatting problems with
charts and tables, and to make minor editorial
changes.
03/18/02
CN 02-009
Revised: 1) to correct identified problems with
the appendix, 2) to incorporate the rules for
using the site specific risk-informed inspection
notebook, 3) to simplify the process of
accounting for external initiators in
characterizing the risk significant inspection
Issue Date: 06/19/12 Att 1-3 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
Commitment
Tracking
Number
Accession
Number
Issue Date
Change Notice
Description of Change Training Required and
Completion Date
Comment and
Feedback
Resolution
Accession
Number
findings, and 4) to provide guidance on
evaluating concurrent inspection findings.
09/10/04
CN 04-023
Multiple editorial changes to enhance user
friendliness of the document. For example, reformat action steps, provided additional
examples, added the reference to Appendix J
for steam generator issues.
N/A
12/01/04
CN 04-027
Corrected two errors on page 4 of the
worksheet, under MS cornerstone for screening
issues and under BI cornerstone guidance for
question 3 for screening to Green.
N/A
11/22/05
CN 05-030
Enhanced guidance to help meet timeliness
requirements for finalizing the SDP for
inspection findings.
N/A
03/23/07
CN 07-011
Incorporate references to the site-specific
inspection notebooks and associated PreSolved Tables; In Attachment 2, update the site
specific risk-informed inspection notebooks
usage rules; Attachment 3, provide user
guidance for screening of external events risk
contributions.
1. Training has been provided
counterpart meetings, and
the SRAs have provided
training to the region based
and resident inspectors
(10/2006)
2. Formalized training will be
introduced through the P-111
course (FY 2008)
ML063060377 Removed the Phase 1 Initial Screening and N/A ML073460588
Issue Date: 06/19/12 Att 1-4 0609 Appendix A
Effective Date: 07/01/12
Commitment
Tracking
Number
Accession
Number
Issue Date
Change Notice
Description of Change Training Required and
Completion Date
Comment and
Feedback
Resolution
Accession
Number
01/10/08
CN 08-002
Characterization of Findings process to create
the new IMC 0609, Attachment 4. Added
clarification statement to Step 2.1.2 and Usage
Rule 1.1 that the maximum exposure time used
in SDP is limited to one year.
06/19/12
CN 12-010
Updated the guidance to reflect the transition
from the pre-solved tables and risk-informed
notebooks to SAPHIRE and the site-specific
SPAR models. Moved the Initiating Events,
Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
screening questions from IMC 0609, Attachment
4 to this appendix. Incorporated feedback from
ROPFFs 0609.04-1458 and 0609A-1575. This
is a complete reissue.
Senior Reactor Analysts and
headquarters staff provided
detailed instructor-led training
to resident inspectors, region
based inspectors, and other
regional staff.
June 2012
Closed FBF:
0609.04-1458
0609A-1575