05000335/LER-2009-003

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LER-2009-003, Radioactive Ni-63 Source Not Located During Semi-Annual Source Inventory
St.Tlucie
Event date:
Report date:
3352009003R00 - NRC Website

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) 2009 - 003

Description of the Event

While performing a semi-annual radioactive source inventory, RP was unable to locate a 15 mCi Ni-63 sealed source generally licensed in accordance with 10 CFR 31. The source assembly was originally removed from the explosive detector located in the Nuclear Training Center by instrumentation and control(I&C) Security on December 7, 2007 and moved to the Environmental Lab radioactive material (RAM) storage cabinet to await shipping for repairs. On April 28, 2008 the source was returned to the Nuclear Training Center for re- installation and left at the explosive monitor to await missing hardware for installation. On February 18, 2009, during the performance of the semi-annual inspection, the RP Technical Analyst was unable to locate the source.

A team composed of RP, I&C, Training, and janitorial staff conducted a room- by-room search of the Nuclear Training Center; nearby Security and Access Buildings, source lockers and disposal containers, however, the source was not located.

Cause of the Event

The evaluation determined the cause of this event to be a lack of a proper source control and process for Generally Licensed Devices.

Analysis of the Event

10 CFR 20.2201, requires that within 30 days after the occurrence of any lost, stolen, or missing licensed material becomes known to the licensee, all licensed material in a quantity greater than 10 times the quantity specified in Appendix C to Part 20, a written report is required. A written report is required to be sent to the NRC within 30 days after performing a call (March 20, 2009). Extensive effort to locate the missing source determined the source to be lost and reportable in accordance 10 CFR 20.2201, "Reports of theft or loss of licensed material.

  • Analysis of Safety Significance The Smiths Detection IONSCAN explosive monitors used at St. Lucie are part of the security plan and maintained by qualified I&C personnel. They are positioned at the North and East Security Buildings outside the Protected Area. The source was housed in a multiple layer casing which provides adequate shielding for the beta radiation. The radioisotope Ni-63 is a beta emitter with a maximum energy of 66 keV and an average energy of 17 keV.

The foil-like radioactive material is contained in a sealed housing requiring a specialized tool for removal. Contact with the source poses no external or internal dose hazard to the health and safety of the public. The probability for personal contact and/or ingestion of the source is considered low. The FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) 2009 - 003 loss of a missing radioactive source meeting Appendix C criteria requires notification to the NRC and is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201.

Corrective Actions

The corrective actions and supporting actions were entered into the'site corrective action program. Any changes to the proposed actions will be managed under the corrective action program.

Actions Taken 1.Secured the radioactive sources located inside the inservice Smiths IONSCAN units with an RP controlled locking device.

2.Revised HP-43, "Control Inventory and Leak Testing of Radioactive Sources," to provide improved guidance for control of sources.

3.Revised 0-IMP-72.12,"Preventive Maintenance of IONSCAN Walk through Explosive Detectors," 0-IMP-72.14 "Preventative Maintenance of IONSCAN Table Top Explosive Detector," and 0-IMP-72.16, "Periodic Maintenance of IONSCAN Hand Held Explosive Detector" to include precautions in the handling the Ni-63 source.

4.Distributed a training bulletin to plant personnel regarding proper source control.

Similar Events An extent of condition was performed to identify additional radioactive sources stored outside the protected area; one additional radioactive non­ technical specification source (HP-00-13, 0.002 uCi Am-241) was located, removed, and returned to the RP Source Custodian.

A review of the corrective action program for a three year period identified no lost sources. This is not considered a repeat event.