05000313/FIN-2013011-09
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Finding | |
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| Title | Effectiveness of Material Handling Program |
| Description | The team evaluated the effectiveness of contingency measures to reduce the potential for a load drop. The team determined through interviews that the project management organization considered the temporary overhead crane to be a temporary hoisting assembly. Section 5.2, Load Handling Equipment Requirements, of Procedure EN-MA-119, Item [7], Temporary Hoisting Assemblies, specified the following measures to establish hoist integrity: Licensee engineering support personnel shall approve the design of vendorsupplied temporary overhead cranes. The temporary overhead crane shall be designed for 125 percent of the projected hook load and shall be load tested in all configurations for which it will be used. Load bearing welds shall be inspected before and after the load test. However, Item [7] also included a note specifying that specially designed lifting devices may be designed and tested to other approved standards. Through interviews with licensee staff, the team determined that the focus of the evaluations the licensee performed was to ensure the temporary overhead crane did not overload the existing plant structures. The licensee also identified that the temporary crane had not been load tested. Although the note in procedure EN-MA-119 allowed the use of alternate standards in lieu of load testing, the licensee could not provide the team with an alternate approved standard for the design and testing of the temporary overhead crane assembly. The team reviewed Calculation 27619-C1, Heavy Lift Gantry Calculation ANO Stator Replacement Project, Revision 0, which evaluated the structure of the temporary overhead crane. This calculation was completed by a contractor performing the stator replacement for the licensee. The calculation identified the American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Steel Construction Manual, 14th Edition, and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) standard NQA-1, Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Facility Applications, as references. The AISC Steel Construction Manual provided standard methods of evaluating acceptable loadings for beams and columns constructed from standard steel shapes. The ASME NQA-1 standard provided guidance for implementing an acceptable quality assurance program at nuclear power plants during siting, design, construction, operation, and decommissioning. Subpart 2.15, Quality Assurance Requirements for Hoisting, Rigging, and Transporting of Items for Nuclear Power Plants, provided standards for the design, manufacture, acceptance, testing, and use of hoisting, rigging, and transporting equipment to maintain the quality of designated nuclear power plant items that require special handling. The inspection team reviewed the conformance of the design and testing of the temporary overhead crane to criteria contained in Subpart 2.15 of standard NQA-1. The standard recognized that control over the handling of an item is dependent on the importance of the item to safe, reliable operation of the plant and the complexity of the operation. Subpart 2.15 of NQA-1 established the following three categories of items to establish criteria for handling of these items: Category A items need specially selected handling equipment and detailed handling procedures because of large size and weight. Category B items may be handled with conventional equipment but need detailed handling procedures because of the items susceptibility to damage Category C items may be handled with conventional equipment using sound rigging practices (i.e., the item is neither large in size and weight nor susceptible to damage). The team determined that the stator corresponded to a Category A item because it was large in size and weight and comparable in these parameters to examples of Category A items provided in the standard. For Category A items, the standard provided specific design, acceptance, and testing criteria applicable to special design handling equipment, including items such as special crane support runways, columns, and frames, which were the subject of Calculation 27619-C1. The team reviewed implementation of the design, acceptance criteria, and testing specified in Subpart 2.15 of NQA-1 in the design of the temporary overhead crane. The team identified discrepancies between the design criteria specified in Section 400 of Subpart 2.15 of standard NQA-1 and the design evaluation completed in Calculation 27619-C1, including an assumption of transverse frame loading that was less than two percent of the handled load and the absence of evaluations considering the design of column end fittings. Also, as noted above, the temporary overhead crane structure was not subjected to a load test as specified in Section 601 of Subpart 2.15 of standard NQA-1. The team noted that recognition of adequate capability by a qualified engineer was identified in Section 503.2(e) of Subpart 2.15 as an acceptable alternative to these design and test acceptance criteria for equipment used to handle only Category C items. The team did not have access to the contractor staff that completed the calculation to discuss the application of the standard. The team determined that the design and test process applied to the crane did not conform to applicable procedures and standards. However, the root cause of the stator temporary overhead crane failure had not been established at the time of this team inspection (URI 05000313/2013011-10 in Section 8.0 of this report) and alternate acceptable standards with different acceptance criteria may be identified. Therefore, the team concluded that additional inspection was needed to assess the effectiveness of the material handling program implementation in mitigating risk associated with the stator movement activities: Unresolved Item URI 05000313/2013011-09, Effectiveness of Material Handling Program. |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
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| Report | IR 05000313/2013011 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93800 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Sanchez D Allen D Loveless G Miller J Watkins S Jonesb Latta G Werner J Melfi L Willoughby N Okonkw |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2013011 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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