05000483/FIN-2009002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | |
| Description | The inspectors identified a self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, after operator response to an electrical fault on the condensate Pump C motor resulted in an unplanned and unnecessary reactor trip, feedwater isolation, and auxiliary feedwater actuation. On December 11, 2008, Callaway Plant experienced an automatic turbine trip/reactor trip during a power reduction initiated by the operators response to a loss of condensate Pump C. The control room supervisor directed a power reduction without immediately referencing Procedure OTO-AE-00001 guidance and without specifying any magnitude or rate limitations on the power reduction. The balance of plant reactor operator, not aware of the procedural limitations, initiated the power reduction using the turbine controls load limiter potentiometer. This method of turbine load control eliminated all automatic ratelimiting functions. The steam generator levels increased rapidly with sluggish main feedwater regulating valves slowing anticipatory response. The steam generator P-14 high-high level turbine trip/reactor trip occurred about 5 minutes after condensate Pump C had tripped. This finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of procedural quality and it affected the objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since it did not affect the Technical Specification limit for reactor coolant system leakage or mitigation systems safety function, did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and mitigation equipment or functions not being available, and did not increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flooding. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the licensee failed to effectively establish clear expectations and standards regarding procedurally directed actions versus actions viewed as necessary to stabilize a plant transient H.4(b) |
| Site: | Callaway  |
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| Report | IR 05000483/2009002 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2009 (2009Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Dumbacher P Elkmann V Gaddy J Groom |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2009002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Callaway) @ 2009Q1
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
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