05000498/FIN-2010004-02
From kanterella
Revision as of 16:53, 8 October 2017 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Perform Adequate Operability Review of High Temperatures in Isolation Valve Cubicle Room |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to follow Procedure 0PGP03-ZO-9900, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments, Revision 1. On August 4, 2010, the Unit 2 isolation valve cubicle room temperature exceeded 104F for longer than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, reached a peak recorded temperature of 109F. Per Technical Requirements Manual Specification 3.7.13, when the temperature of the isolation valve cubicle exceeds 104F for longer than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> then an evaluation must be performed to determine continued operability of the affected equipment. The inspectors determined that the previous prompt operability determinations concluded that the maximum recorded temperature had been 108F and that the time allowed at this temperature was roughly 150 hours0.00174 days <br />0.0417 hours <br />2.480159e-4 weeks <br />5.7075e-5 months <br />. The inspectors review of the control room logs determined that both of these conditions were exceeded, 109F and over 250 hours0.00289 days <br />0.0694 hours <br />4.133598e-4 weeks <br />9.5125e-5 months <br />, therefore, a new prompt operability determination needed to be performed to ensure continued operability of the equipment, not only from an environmental qualification standpoint, but also from a high energy line break accident scenario. The licensees corrective actions included performing a new prompt operability determination to ensure continued operability of the affected equipment. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could have led to a more significant safety concern because systems that may be inoperable may not be recognized and it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors performed the significance determination using the NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Attachment 0609.04, dated January 10, 2008, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone while the plant was at power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, it did not result in the loss of a system safety function, it did not represent the loss of a single train for greater than technical specification allowed outage time, it did not represent a loss of one or more non-technical specification risk significant equipment for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. In addition, this finding had human performance crosscutting aspects associated with decision-making in that the licensee did not make safety-significant decisions using a systematic process, specifically, not implementing roles and authorities as designed and obtaining interdisciplinary input and reviews H.1(a)(Section 1R15) |
| Site: | South Texas  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000498/2010004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Dixon B Tharakan W Walker T Buchanan |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - South Texas - IR 05000498/2010004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (South Texas) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (South Texas)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||