05000454/FIN-2010004-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Perform Adequate Evaluation for Crane Upgrade |
Description | A finding of very low safety significance and an associated Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control was identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to perform adequate evaluations to upgrade the single failure proof crane. Specifically, the inspectors identified six examples where the licensee failed to perform adequate evaluations in accordance with American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) requirements. The licensee documented the conditions in Issue Report (IR) 1099897, and IR 1100062 and initiated actions for calculation revisions and field modifications. The Fuel Handling Building (FHB) crane was designed to Seismic Category I requirements and the licensee used compliance with ASME NOG-1-2004, Rules for Construction of Overhead and Gantry Cranes (Top Running Bridge, Multiple Girder), 2004, as the design basis for their crane upgrade to a single failure proof crane. The inspectors determined that the failure to perform adequate evaluations was contrary to ASME NOG-1-2004 requirements and was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor as it was associated with the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and attribute of design control because a fuel handling building crane heavy load drop can damage the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Cooling System or spent fuel cladding. The inspectors evaluated the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and based on a No answer to all of the questions in the Barrier Integrity column of Table 4a, determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources (H.2(c)) because the licensee did not provide adequate oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that design documentation was accurate to support nuclear safety. |
Site: | Byron |
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Report | IR 05000454/2010004 Section 4OA5 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | R Jickling R Ng C Thompson B Bartlett J Robbins J Cassidy E Duncan M Learn |
CCA | H.7, Documentation |
INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Byron - IR 05000454/2010004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Byron) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (Byron)
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