05000327/FIN-2007006-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Procedure For Reduced Inventory/Mid-Loop Operation |
Description | The team identified a violation of TS 6.8.1, related to the failure to establish an adequate procedure for reactor coolant system reduced inventory/mid-loop operations. Specifically, procedure 0-GO-13, Reactor Coolant System Drain and Fill Operations, Rev. 57, was not adequate in that it did not establish adequate actions to maintain continuous RCS level indication during all possible plant conditions while in the reduced inventory/mid-loop configuration, specifically loss of off site power (LOSP). Additionally, the procedure did not establish contingency actions to recover power to the Mansell level indication systems or provide guidance for alignment of an alternate RCS level indication mechanism within the 30 minutes for which power was available from Description: Procedure 0-GO-13, Reactor Coolant System Drain and Fill Operations, Rev. 57, implements the licensees commitment to GL 88-17, Loss of Decay Heat Removal (non power operations) and related FSAR section 5.6 requirements state that at least two independent continuous RCS level monitoring indications will be maintained during mid-loop operations. Per this procedure, two channels of the Mansell System provide the two continuous independent level monitoring systems required for reduced inventory/mid-loop operations. The instruments are powered from 120 VAC wall receptacles in the main control room which are powered by the auxiliary building lighting boards (LC-132 and LC-232, powered from Units 1 and 2 respectively). On a loss of off-site power the lighting boards would be de-energized and are not re-energized when the EDGs restore on-site vital power. Each Mansell unit has an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) battery to maintain the system for approximately 30 minutes. This was verified by on-site testing performed during the inspection. No procedure contingency plan exists for maintaining/restoring Mansell indication once the UPS is depleted. Analysis: The failure to establish an adequate procedure for reactor coolant system reduced inventory/mid-loop operations is a performance deficiency associated with the initiating events cornerstone. This finding is more than minor because it impacts the Cornerstones objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown and is associated with the cornerstone attribute of procedure quality. This finding was reviewed for cross-cutting aspects and none were identified |
Site: | Sequoyah |
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Report | IR 05000327/2007006 Section 1R21 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2007 (2007Q3) |
Type: | NCV: |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Rivera -Ortiz R Taylor R Moore W Fowler S Kobylarz M Lewis T Tinke |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Sequoyah - IR 05000327/2007006 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Sequoyah) @ 2007Q3
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