05000324/FIN-2012005-06
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Finding | |
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| Title | Fire Related Unanalyzed Condition that could Impact Equipment Credited in Safe Shutdown Analysis |
| Description | Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 50.48(b)(1) requires, in part, that all nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979, must satisfy the applicable requirements of Appendix R,Section III.G. Appendix R,Section III.G.3 states, in part, that alternative or dedicated shutdown capability be provided where the protection of systems whose function is required for hot shutdown does not satisfy the requirement of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Contrary to the above, from original plant startup to October 13, 2011, the licensee failed to provide an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability when the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 were not met. Specifically, the licensees alternative/dedicated post-fire SSD strategy for five FAs failed to ensure alternative shutdown capability because the licensee had not considered the possibility of certain fire-induced spurious actuations of critical components that would potentially result in the loss of equipment required for safe shutdown. Because the licensee committed to adopt NFPA 805 and change their fire protection licensing bases to comply with 10 CFR 50.48(c), and this commitment was documented prior to December 31, 2005, the NRC is exercising enforcement and reactor oversight process discretion for this issue in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 9.1, Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48) and Inspection Manual Chapter 0305. This issue was identified and addressed during the licensees transition to NFPA 805, it was entered into the licensees CAP as NCR 493784, immediate corrective action and compensatory measures were taken, it was not likely to have been previously identified by routine licensee efforts, it was not willful, and it was not associated with a finding of high safety significance. |
| Site: | Brunswick  |
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| Report | IR 05000324/2012005 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
| Type: | Violation: Severity level Enforcement Discretion |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Nielsen D Lanyi J Laughlin J Montgomery M Bates M Catts M Schwieg P Niebaum R Baldwin R Musser R Rodriguez |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Brunswick - IR 05000324/2012005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Brunswick) @ 2012Q4
Self-Identified List (Brunswick)
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