05000324/FIN-2012007-03
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Perform Adequate Training for Reactor Vessel Reassembly |
| Description | NRC inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings for failure to properly implement plant procedure TRN-NGGC-1000, Conduct of Training for training and qualifications of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) reassembly team prior to RPV reassembly during the Unit 2 maintenance outage in November 2011. This resulted in inadequate worker knowledge of the tools and procedures associated with RPV reassembly, which contributed to the RPV head studs being inadequately tensioned and excessive leakage from the Unit 2 RPV during reactor startup and pressurization on November 15 and November 16, 2011. The unit was shut down and depressurized on November 16, 2011, and the issue entered into the licensees CAP as NCR 500035. The licensees failure to comply with procedure TRN-NGGC-1000, Conduct of Training, to ensure that the maintenance team performing the RPV reassembly after the November 2011 Unit 2 maintenance outage received adequate training was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of human performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown or power operations. Specifically, the failure to adequately implement procedure TRN-NGGC-1000 contributed to the failure to adequately tension the RPV head studs during the Unit 2 November, 2011 maintenance outage, which resulted in excessive leakage from the Unit 2 RPV during reactor startup and pressurization. Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP), Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet was used to screen the significance of the finding. The finding required a Phase 2 SDP analysis because it resulted in unidentified RCS leakage exceeding technical specification limits. Evaluation of the finding using the NRC pre-solved SDP table was not appropriate because the table does not contain a suitable target for RPV vessel integrity. Therefore, a Phase 3 SDP analysis was required. The regional Senior Reactor Analyst determined that adequate training of the RPV assembly team would have had the potential to mitigate the failure to adequately torque the RPV head studs, which was analyzed to be a Green finding (see NCV 05000324/2012007-01 above). Since the impact of the mitigation would be less than the impact of the underlying finding, this finding is also Green. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of training in the Resources component of the Human Performance area because the licensee failed to provide sufficiently trained personnel to reassemble the RPV. |
| Site: | Brunswick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000324/2012007 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Musser |
| CCA | H.9, Training |
| INPO aspect | CL.4 |
| ' | |
Finding - Brunswick - IR 05000324/2012007 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Brunswick) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Brunswick)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||