05000321/FIN-2010004-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | |
| Description | A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the failure to adequately correct a condition adverse to quality affecting the Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) system. Consequently, a Unit 1 reactor scram occurred from 8% rated thermal power on May 10, 2009 during a reactor startup. The cause of the scram was attributed to IRM signal spikes on the A and H IRM instruments when the reactor mode switch was taken to run. Following the reactor scram, the licensee performed repair activities to correct degraded cables and connections to improve the grounding of the IRM system. Additionally, the licensee installed ferrite beads on each cable entering and exiting the IRM preamplifier on all eight IRM channels. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 2009104764. The failure to correct a condition adverse to quality is a performance deficiency. The licensee had several prior opportunities to fully investigate and correct the causes associated with IRM instrumentation spiking. Additionally, RER-2003-216 documents a decision not to make system improvements. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events (IE) Cornerstone and adversely affected the IE cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. Specifically, the electrical noise sensed on the IRM A and H instruments resulted in Unit 1 reactor scram on May 10, 2009. The significance of this finding was screened using the Phase 1 of the SDP in accordance with NRC IMC 0609 Attachment 4, Table 4a. This finding screened as Green, because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The inspectors concluded that the finding had an associated crosscutting aspect in the Human Performance area under the Decision Making component because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions when putting RER-2003-216 on hold based on accepting the risk of not making incremental improvements in the IRM grounding system. (H.1(b)) (Section 4OA3.1 |
| Site: | Hatch  |
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| Report | IR 05000321/2010004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Shaeffer G Johnson M Cain E Morris P Niebaum K Schaaf D Hardage |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Hatch - IR 05000321/2010004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hatch) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (Hatch)
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