05000440/FIN-2010003-05
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure To Effectively Use The Intended Radiological Engineering Controls During Cavity Drain-Down In Preparation For Its Decontamination |
Description | A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1 was self-revealed during reactor cavity drain down. On March 14, 2009, an airborne radioactivity condition (about 3.3 DAC (derived air concentration)) was generated on the refuel floor when the cavity water level was lowered to support decontamination activities. The inspectors concluded that the licensee failed to effectively implement intended radiological engineering controls in accordance with the ALARA Plan, which caused the event. Due to a communication problem, cavity drain-down commenced before the decontamination crew already positioned on the refuel floor was ready to support the activity. Moreover, the drain-down proceeded at a rate faster than expected by the work crew. The work plan called for the cavity walls to be misted with water as the drain-down took place. Five workers had small (low dose) unplanned intakes. Corrective actions focused on the communications problem and better controlling the rate of drain-down through a procedural modification. The inspectors did not identify any examples in IMC 0612, Appendix E, similar to the performance issue. However, the inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it impacted the program and process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Specifically, the failure to effectively implement intended engineering controls during cavity drain-down caused several unplanned worker intakes and placed workers at increased radiological risk. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not an ALARA planning issue, there was no overexposure nor substantial potential for an overexposure, and the licensees ability to assess dose was not compromised. The cause of the problem involved the cross-cutting component of work control in the human performance cross-cutting area (H.3.(b)), in that the licensee did not appropriately coordinate work activities by incorporating actions to address the need for work groups to communicate and coordinate with each other during activities in which interdepartmental coordination was necessary to assure human performance. |
Site: | Perry |
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Report | IR 05000440/2010003 Section 2RS3 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2010 (2010Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Or Safety |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71124.03 |
Inspectors (proximate) | R Winter F Ramirez M Marshfield T Bilik W Slawinski M Phalen R Baker J Bozga N Feliz T Hartman V Myers |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Perry - IR 05000440/2010003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Perry) @ 2010Q2
Self-Identified List (Perry)
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