05000331/FIN-2010002-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Evaluations for Crane and Special Lifting Devices |
Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified by the inspectors for deficiencies in the design documents for the reactor building crane and the special lifting devices. Specifically, the crane bridge girder rails supporting the trolley were not evaluated for the design basis seismic loads. In the reactor vessel head special lifting device calculation, the licensee did not evaluate the hook pins and the calculated safety factors did not meet the design criteria. In the dryer/separator special lifting device calculation, the licensee used incorrect stress allowable values. The licensee documented the condition in their Corrective Action Programs (CAPs) as CAPs 072917, 072568, 072885 and 072880, and initiated actions for calculation revisions and/or modifications. The inspectors determined that not evaluating bridge girder rails for seismic loads in accordance with NUREG-0554, not evaluating the hook pins and accepting safety factors not meeting the design criteria and American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard N14.6 on the reactor vessel head special lifting device, and the inadequate calculation of safety factors on the dryer/separator special lifting device in accordance with ANSI N14.6 was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset the plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. For the item associated with the crane rail, the Region III Senior Risk Analyst (SRA) performed an SDP Phase 3 risk-assessment for estimating the frequency of occurrence of an Operating Basic Earthquake (OBE) or higher seismic event during use of reactor building crane and concluded that the issue was of very low risk significance (Green). For the item associated with the special lifting devices, the inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and based on a No answer to all the questions in the Initiating Events column of Table 4a, as the licensee demonstrated adequate safety factors on all components through subsequent evaluations, determined the finding to be of very low safety-significance (Green). The inspectors did not identify any cross-cutting aspects associated with this finding because, based on the age of the performance deficiencies, it was not reflective of the current licensee performance |
Site: | Duane Arnold ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000331/2010002 Section 1R20 |
Date counted | Mar 31, 2010 (2010Q1) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
Inspectors (proximate) | K Riemer R Orlikowski M Mitchell R Baker V Meghani R Russell R Murray P Smagacz |
INPO aspect | |
Finding closed by | |
IR 05000331/2010002 (14 May 2010) | |
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Finding - Duane Arnold - IR 05000331/2010002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Duane Arnold) @ 2010Q1
Self-Identified List (Duane Arnold)
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