05000331/FIN-2009004-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Perform an Immediate Operability Determination for the B Standby Diesel Generator |
Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by the inspectors for a failure of the Shift Manager to perform an Immediate Operability Determination (IOD) of the B Standby Diesel Generator (SBDG) after being notified by engineers of a concern with the seismic adequacy of the B SBDG normal air start system. The Shift Managers failure to follow procedure EN-AA-203-1001, Operability Determinations/Functionality Assessments, and Administrative Control Procedure (ACP) 110.1, Conduct of Operations, was considered a performance deficiency. The licensee entered this issue into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as item CAP 070061, and isolated the B SBDG normal air start system from the emergency air start system. A detailed seismic analysis was performed on the B SBDG normal air start system to fully evaluate operability of the system during the design basis earthquake. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to adequately implement the operability procedures could result in safety-related components being incorrectly declared operable rather than inoperable or operable but non-conforming (a more significant safety concern). The inspectors evaluated this finding using the SDP and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for longer than its Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time. The inspectors also determined that this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision-Making, because the licensee failed to make a safety-significant or risk-significant decision using a systematic process, especially when faced with uncertain or unexpected plant conditions, and thereby demonstrate that nuclear safety is an overriding priority. Specifically, the licensee did not make and document an IOD for the B SBDG once an adverse condition affecting a SBDG support system was identified. H.1(a) |
Site: | Duane Arnold ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000331/2009004 Section 1R15 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2009 (2009Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
Inspectors (proximate) | K Riemer R Orlikowski R Baker L Haeg T Go R Russell B Cushman C Scott M Audrain |
CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Duane Arnold - IR 05000331/2009004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Duane Arnold) @ 2009Q3
Self-Identified List (Duane Arnold)
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