Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 45171 | 29 June 2009 11:02:00 | The following report was received via facsimile: Licensee contacted Ohio Department of Health at approx. 3:45 PM on 6/26/09 to report an incident which occurred earlier that day involving the inability to retrieve a radiography source at a job site near Dayton, Ohio. The incident involved a QSA Global Model 880D camera with a 85 Ci Ir-192 source. At approximately 11:30 AM and after several unsuccessful attempts to retrieve the source, the radiography crew secured the area around the source and contacted a trained source recovery individual at their Cincinnati office for assistance. This person arrived at the job site at approx. 12:20 PM and assessed the situation. The recovery person determined that a flange had fallen on the guide tube during the previous shot, which crushed the guide tube and prevented source retrieval. The shot involved a 90-degree bend on a six-inch pipe and the flange was a scrap piece of material found on site that the crew had used to hold the guide tube in place during the shot. It was further determined that the set-up used by the crew for the shot was not very stable, which contributed to the falling of the flange onto the tube. The recovery person was able to retract the source into the camera at approximately 12:45 PM. The licensee determined that there was no exposure to the public or radiography crew as a result of this incident. The radiography crew was reminded to ensure the stability of future shot setups before exposing the source. The guide tube was replaced and work continued. Ohio report number: OH090006 |
| ENS 45172 | 29 June 2009 12:53:00 | A notification to the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (Chattanooga Field Office) was made at 1134 (EDT), 29 June 2009, pursuant to a failed pressure test on an underground section of diesel generator fuel oil transfer piping. This section of piping is not required for operability of the emergency diesel generators. The section of piping has been isolated. Efforts are in progress to determine if fuel oil was released to the environment. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
During work to remediate the above concern, an offsite notification was required as described below: A notification to Hamilton County Air Pollution Control Bureau was made on July 23, 2009 at 1505 in accordance with the Site's Annual Asbestos Removal Notification . Work was being performed on buried piping when the pipe wrapping was determined to contain asbestos. Work was stopped and the work area controlled by site work documents. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Vias). |
| ENS 45174 | 30 June 2009 10:33:00 | On February 18, 2008, an administrative error medical event occurred at our Leksell Gamma Knife facility which resulted in the total dose delivered differing from the written directive by more than 20%, but which agreed with the therapy that was intended and planned by the radiation oncologist authorized user (AU) and the neurosurgeon. This was discovered during the 2008 annual quality management review that was completed on June 24, 2009. On February 18, 2008, a stereotactic radiosurgery treatment plan was developed by the neurosurgeon, AU and authorized medical physicist (AMP) that satisfied the therapy intentions of the AU and neurosurgeon. Two of the three metastatic lesions that were discussed in advance at the neurosurgery tumor board meeting on February 13, 2008 by the neurosurgeon and AU were treated, the third being geometrically out of range of the gamma knife system. Specifically, the lesion locations selected at the tumor board meeting were right cerebellum, right occipital lobe and left temporal/parietal. The left temporal/parietal was out of range. The correct intended dose of 20 Gy to 50% isodose was planned and delivered on February 18. The AU and AMP specified both lesions on the Gamma Knife planning QA form which was signed by the AU, Neurosurgeon and AMP. The AU signed the plan and initialed every page including screenshots of the isodoses superimposed on the MRI images for both lesions. The plan included all of the information required in 10 CFR 35.40 (b)(3). Finally, the time out form was completed by the AU, neurosurgeon and AMP. The administrative error medical event is the result of the AU not writing a directive for treatment of the right occipital lesion. (The event occurred due to) lack of attention to administrative tasks. (The individual who received the administration had) no detrimental effect. Treatment was delivered as planned according to doctor's orders. The gamma knife quality management review will be done on the day of treatment prior to delivery by a second physicist using the form/checklist attached. This process is already in effect. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| ENS 45175 | 30 June 2009 12:24:00 | Based on discussion between field personnel (authorized nuclear gauge user) and (the licensee), the rubber-tire wheels of a piece of construction equipment ran over (a Troxler) gauge. (The licensee) personnel, with assistance from the contractor, immediately cordoned off the area so that the appropriate steps could be taken to access the situation. Based on the pictures that were sent to (the licensee) and conversations with the field personnel, (the licensee) does not believe that the gauge was damaged severely enough to cause a radiation leak from the gauge. The source rod was inside the inner protective housing (i.e. shield) when it was damaged. It appears that only the outer plastic casing was cracked and the index rod was snapped. The inner protective housing (i.e. shield) protecting the CS-137 source and the Americium 241 source protective cover appear to still be intact. The source rod was not bent. The sliding block at the bottom of the gauge is fully closed. Since the index rod locks the source rod in place, (the licensee) instructed field personnel how to temporarily restrain the index rod and therefore keep the source rod inside the protective shield. After properly securing the source rod, (the licensee) had field personnel place the damaged gauge inside the yellow DOT transport box. The transport box / gauge was then properly secured inside a large steel container (dedicated to (the licensee)) at the construction site. Only (licensee) personnel have access to the steel container. (The licensee) sent down a radiation meter to field personnel via FedEx overnight. The radiation meter only showed that the radiation level immediately next to the gauge was 4 mrem. The measured radiation level several feet away from the gauge was about 0.12 mrem. No radiation was measured outside of the steel container. (The licensee has) scheduled for the gauge to be picked up on Thursday by (licensee's) repair service firm. The repair service will perform their own leak test in the field prior to transporting the gauge back to their shop. Gauge Make/Model: Troxler 3440 Gauge Serial Number: 28929 Langan Gauge No.: #22 Nuclide (Serial No.): AM-241:BE (47-25121), CS-137 (750-3218) Typical Troxler gauges of this series contain a 8 mCi Cs-137 source and a 40 mCi Am/Be source. |
| ENS 45179 | 1 July 2009 13:12:00 | The public address system (criticality accident alarm) was impaired for a portion of the Building 310 warehouse and a subcontractor trailer. The cause of the impairment was determined to be the result of a contractor drilling into a public address system speaker wire while installing fire protection components in the Building 310 warehouse. This created an electrical short which rendered the speakers inoperable for a portion of the Building 310 warehouse and a subcontractor trailer. The speaker wire was obscured from view by a structural beam. The system was repaired, tested, and placed back into service by 1721 hours (EDT) on 6/30/2009. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 45229 | 27 July 2009 09:52:00 | On Monday, July 27, 2009, at 0752, Seabrook Station is temporarily relocating its Technical Support Center (TSC) from the permanent location on the 75 foot level of the Control Building (CB) to an alternate location in the Online/Outage Control Center (OCC). This relocation is necessary to allow for installation of new equipment and upgrading of existing equipment in the TSC. The site Emergency Response Organization (ERO) has been notified of the modifications and has been instructed on the planned compensatory measure to be implemented during the temporary relocation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the relocation activities. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to loss of the emergency response facility. Seabrook Station will provide updates as necessary and will advise the NRC of the restoration of the permanent TSC. The State of New Hampshire has been notified.
On Thursday. July 30. 2009. Seabrook Station completed modifications of its Technical Support Center (TSC) and has restored the TSC permanent location on the 75 foot level of the Control Building (CB) to service. The permanent TSC was declared operable at 1456 on Thursday July 30, 2009. The site Emergency Response Organization (ERO) has been notified that the modifications to the permanent TSC have been completed, that compensatory measures are no longer necessary and that TSC personnel are to report to the permanent TSC in the case of a plant emergency. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified that the permanent TSC has been restored to service. The State of New Hampshire and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts have been notified. Notified R1DO (A. Dimitriadis). |
| ENS 45235 | 29 July 2009 12:40:00 | The licensee submitted test specimens to a certified laboratory for analysis. After 5 business days, the results of the test were not reported back to the licensee. The individuals affected are being retested. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. |
| ENS 45237 | 30 July 2009 15:15:00 | The licensee reported that a patient was undergoing brachytherapy treatment of the heart. During the procedure, it was determined that the source was not in the proper position. The sources were retracted and the procedure reattempted. During the reattempt, it was determined that the sources were not going into the proper position. However, the licensee was not able to retract the sources into the Novoste device. The physician removed the catheter and device as an assembly and placed in a safe box. The licensee does not know the failure mode with any degree of certainty and is sending the device to the manufacturer for evaluation. The cardiologist believes it may have been a kink in the catheter. The patient was notified of the event, and the licensee discussed the issue with NRC Region 3(G. Warren). The device is a Novoste Beta-Cath, Device number: 86865, and source number: ZB551. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
The licensee is retracting the event because the source never entered the patient's body and the exposure to the patient was negligible. Notified the R3DO(Kunowski) and FSME (Villamar). |
| ENS 45291 | 25 August 2009 10:57:00 | The following report was received from the State of Louisiana via facsimile: On July 9, 2009, a facility reported a mislabeled unit dose from GE Healthcare nuclear pharmacy. Three 20 mCi unit doses of Tc-99m MDP (bone scans) were ordered by Ochsner (a medical facility). Two patients were injected. After viewing the images, it was determined that the unit doses were mislabeled. An investigation of GE Healthcare was performed. A preliminary cause was determined to be a mix up of MDP cold vial with DTPA (renal scans) as they closely resemble each other with the same vial configuration and same color label. Contributing factors leading to the incident were Tc-99m/Mo-99 shortage, late arrival of generators, increased number of kits to prepare as a result of the shortage, and pharmacist working alone. Corrective actions involved reviewing procedures and discontinuing manual changes of inventory dispensed on prescription labels. Louisiana incident number: LA090017 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| ENS 45300 | 26 August 2009 09:20:00 | The TSC Air Handling Unit will be taken OOS to repair one of the two compressors. In order to perform this corrective maintenance, the TSC HVAC will be removed from service for (approximately) 1 hour to disconnect the compressor to be repaired and in doing so will render the TSC HVAC inoperable which renders the TSC as non-functional. The TSC HVAC will be restarted to return the TSC to an operable and functional status. The work to repair or replace the compressor is planned to be completed within (1-3 days). After the work is completed, the system will be taken out of service again to reconnect the compressor ((approximately) 1 hr) and return the TSC HVAC to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Maintenance was completed and the TSC was restored to operable status. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO(Widmann). |
| ENS 45303 | 27 August 2009 10:58:00 | The following information was received from the State of Ohio via e-mail: The Ohio Bureau of Radiation Protection was informed on 8/25/09 of the discovery of an abandoned radioactive source at the Meridian Automotive Systems, Inc. plant in Jackson, Ohio. Investigation on 8/26/09 revealed that the source is a 500 mCi Am-241/Be source in a generally licensed RMD Compuglass Analyzer. The EPA was notified and will pick up the source for disposal. The source is secure at the site. Ohio reference number: Ohio 2009-025 |
| ENS 45317 | 1 September 2009 09:10:00 | On July 31, 2009, (Crystal River Unit 3) personnel performed a video probe inspection of a spare safety-related Limitorque SB-3/SMB-3 actuator motor magnesium rotor and end rings. Visual indications were observed in the outboard end of the motor which were cause for rejection based on specified acceptance criteria. The specific indication was a cracked weld with dislodged metal in the outboard end of the motor. In 2007, the spare safety-related Limitorque SB-3/SMB-3 actuator motor (Motor Serial Number 7497004-001T1AL: Limitorque Part No. R-403-F04-0821) was purchased as safety-related Quality level 1 (QL-1) from AREVA under Purchase Order No. 337566. Limitorque purchased the motor from the Baldor Electric Company, doing business as the Reliance Electric Company, as commercial grade and dedicated the motor to safety related. The above evaluation was completed on August 28, 2009. The FPC director/responsible officer was notified of the above determination on August 31, 2009. The vendor (Limitorque) and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector have been notified of FPC's intent to report this issue under 10CFR21.21. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 45322 | 2 September 2009 10:43:00 | The following report was received via email from the State of Texas: A mobile slurry unit (authorized under TX license G02259) in which a 200mCi, Cs-137, Thermo Fischer Scientific Model 5190 density gauge was mounted, caught fire. This occurred at an oil field temporary job site south of Fort Worth, TX. It was relayed that the fire had melted the lead at the top of the shield exposing the source as evidenced by elevated readings with a survey meter. It is believed that the source remains in the holder and has not been breached. Further, the gauge housing is still intact and (the) plan (already instituted) is to have the manufacturer remove the gauge for disposal at their facility. The device and source serial number are B7274 and CN-3171 respectively. There was no exposure to anybody in excess of agency limits due to the manner in which the units were parked. Texas report # I-8662 |
| ENS 45324 | 3 September 2009 09:04:00 | This event is being reported via a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. In this case, the telephone report is not considered an LER. This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). During a maintenance activity to replace an Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) relay, one of the two High Pressure Injection (HPI) valves (MU-V-16C) in the 'B' train partially opened. The HPI system consists of the 'A' and 'B' trains, with each train containing two HPI valves. The cause of the partial opening of the HPI valve was inadvertent contact with adjacent energized circuits during the replacement of the ESAS relay. This resulted in a momentary short circuit, which bypassed the normal actuation logic, causing the HPI valve to open approximately 0.17 inches before blowing the control power fuse that stopped the valve movement. The event resulted in the inadvertent transfer of approximately 1000 gallons of water from the Make-up Tank into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), before the valve could be restored to the closed position. No other valves or components actuated as a result of the inadvertent short circuit. RCS volume and pressure were stabilized and returned to normal. The 'B' HPI train had been declared inoperable and the unit entered a 72 hour LCO at 1:03 AM on 7/10/2009 due to configuration requirements needed for the planned ESAS relay replacement. The inadvertent partial 'B' train HPI did not impact the 'A' HPI train, and the unit remained at full power during this event. Following troubleshooting and replacement of the control power fuse, MU-V-16C was tested and restored to OPERABLE at 4:59 AM on 7/11/2009. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45325 | 3 September 2009 11:25:00 | The following report was received via fax from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: In 2009, the Agency (Radiation Control Program of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts) billed the general licensee for the 2008 annual fee. The licensee was unresponsive and attempts to contact the licensee failed. On 9/1/09, the Agency discovered a published article in 'Business Week' that reported that the licensee, ACT Electronics, filed for bankruptcy in August 2008. Agency records indicate the licensee received these devices (static eliminators) in March 2007 and October 2007. The Agency contacted the manufacturer of the static eliminator devices, NRD Inc., and confirmed that the devices were not returned to the manufacturer. The Agency has declared the static eliminator devices as 'missing'. Manufacturer: NRD, Inc. Model #: P-2021 Serial Number: A2FL283, A2FW008, and AF2W009. Sources: (3) Polonium 210, 10 mCi each. MA Report No.: 09-8637
On 9/22/09, an Agency inspector visited the site of ACT Electronics, 2 Cabot Road, Hudson, MA. The building was empty and only a cleaning crew was present. The supervisor did not have any information on ACT Electronics. A 'for lease' sign was observed on the property and a real estate company's name, 'New Boston' and contact information was read. The inspector called the real estate company and was informed that the items in the building were auctioned off in April 2009, and that no one had any knowledge of radioactive material in any of the items. The inspector was given the name of the auction company, Branford Group of Philadelphia, PA, and a contact person name. The inspector sent an e-mail to the Branford Group requesting information on ACT Electronics. The Agency received no response and (has had) no further contact with any person associated with ACT Electronics. The Agency considers this event to be closed. Notified R1DO (Burritt) and FSME DEO (McIntosh). Notified ILTAB (English) via E-mail. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| ENS 45333 | 8 September 2009 23:56:00 | On September 8, 2009, during performance of quarterly Core Spray (CS) system flow rate testing, a pinhole leak was identified in the 1B Core Spray Minimum Flow Line. The pinhole leak is located just downstream of the 1B CS minimum flow valve (1-1402-38B) and cannot be isolated from primary containment. At 1935, hours it was determined that structural integrity of the piping could not be assured. Technical Specification 3.6.1.1, Required Action B.1, was entered and a plant shutdown was initiated at 2010 hours. In addition, the 1B Core Spray system was declared inoperable. All other ECCS systems remain operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event is being reported under 50.72(b)(2)(i) due to the initiation of a shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications. The licensee estimates reactor shutdown will be achieved at 0130 CDT. |
| ENS 45350 | 14 September 2009 17:40:00 | On September 14, 2009, Progress Energy Environmental Services determined that approximately 200 deceased or stressed Ladyfish (Elops saurus) were observed near the banks of the Crystal River Energy Complex (CREC) discharge canal. Only Ladyfish were found stressed or deceased. Three of the stressed fish were sampled and examined by the CREC Mariculture Center to evaluate potential causes of these fish mortalities. Of the three fish examined, the only item of note was that the stomach and intestinal tracks were empty. It is likely that the runoff from recent heavy precipitation, coupled with summertime warm water temperatures and rapid salinity changes, resulted in a localized area of low dissolved oxygen and physiologic stress that affected this population of Ladyfish. There were no unusual conditions or factors associated with CREC operations that would have contributed to this event. Notification to the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission will be made. This is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event for which notification to other government agencies will be made. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45353 | 16 September 2009 15:59:00 | A voluntary notification to the National Response Center was made on Sept. 16, 2009 at 1220. The purpose of the notification was to inform the National Response Center of an oil sheen on a concrete pad at the inlet of the diffuser pond. The diffuser pond is classified as waters of the U.S. There was no observable oil sheen on the pond. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45354 | 16 September 2009 17:10:00 | On September 16, 2009, at approximately 1036 hours, as a result of a regularly scheduled test of the Indian Point Energy Center (IPEC) Alert Notification System (ANS) 18 of 172 sirens did not pass the test. The sirens were not tested and declared as functional within one hour and in accordance with the reporting guidelines the event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a major loss of offsite response capability (i.e., a loss of 10% or more of the total number of sirens for more than one hour). Preliminary investigations and troubleshooting determined 14 sirens failed to indicate via the ANS computer system successful siren activation due to an incorrect software data adjustment for these 14 sirens. ANS technicians corrected the software error for these 14 sirens and are continuing to investigate the cause of the failure of the remaining 4 sirens to activate. To validate that the software error for the 14 sirens was corrected, a functional test of 1 of the 14 sirens was conducted. The test indicated the siren was functional but investigation and troubleshooting is continuing to validate this. Reverse 911 has been and remains available to alert the public should there be an actual event requiring the ANS. The condition was recorded in the IPEC corrective action program. The event remains under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Two sirens were repaired making a total of 156 sirens operable. No further reporting is forthcoming. Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Don Jackson) was notified. |
| ENS 45372 | 21 September 2009 12:54:00 | Earlier this morning, a contract worker fell from a ladder inside the Unit One Containment. The distance fallen is estimated to be eight and one half feet. First Responders arrived at the individual and after examining him secured him to a backboard, after which he was carried from (the) containment. Health Physics Technicians were not able to survey the individual's back since he was strapped to the back board. The ambulance containing the individual exited the PA (Protected Area) at 0551 and a Health Physics Technician accompanied the individual to the hospital. Upon arrival at the hospital and examination by a physician, the Health Physics Technician was allowed to fully check the individual and determined that there was no contamination present. This report is being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) since it could not be positively determined that the injured individual was not contaminated when he was transported off site. The individual has been released from the hospital. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45373 | 21 September 2009 14:07:00 | On Sept 21, 2009, (the licensee discovered) a stuck shutter on an ammonia tank (top) in the catalyst area. The gauge is an Ohmart Model SH-F2, Serial 64692, containing 800 millicuries of Cesium-137. The gauge was originally installed in 2006. The stuck shutter was discovered during a routine 6 month shutter check on Sept 18, 2009. The technician tried to electrically close the shutter, but was unable to do so. (The licensee has) scheduled a service provider for repair within the week. The source is safely mounted on the side of a tank, (and the licensee) expects no exposure to occur. The Ohmart manufacturer was contacted.
An Ohmart service representative responded to the site to repair the gauge. It was determined that a fuse had blown in the gauge actuating circuit and that the shutter was not mechanically stuck. The gauge has been repaired and returned to service. R1DO (DeFrancisco) and FSME EO (McIntosh) have been notified. |
| ENS 45374 | 21 September 2009 16:05:00 | At 1227 EDT, a reactor startup was commenced on Unit 2. Mode 2 was entered at 1325 EDT. At 1333, a Reactor Control Operator noted that Primary Safety Valve V1202 had indications that it was leaking past its seat. Plant procedures required reducing RCS (Reactor Coolant System) pressure in 100 psi increments until the safety reseated. This event required the plant pressure to be reduced to 200 psi below Normal Operating Pressure. Prior to commencing the depressurization, a manual reactor trip was ordered by the Unit Supervisor as discussed in the pre-evolution brief. The unit was in Mode 2 approaching criticality at the time of the trip. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3, Hot Standby. The reactor trip was uncomplicated. All equipment operated as expected. Main feedwater remained available during the entire event. Auxiliary Feedwater and Atmospheric Dump Valves remained in service during the entire event. Unit 1 was unaffected by the event and remained at full power. The grid remained stable throughout the event. All control rods fully inserted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45375 | 21 September 2009 19:02:00 | On September 21, 2009, at 14:46 EDT, Unit 1 received valid actuations of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and the Primary Containment Isolation System. Unit 1 was non-critical, operating in Mode 3, when a RPS actuation occurred. Operators were placing the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system in service for reactor pressure control, when a resulting water level shrink caused level in the Reactor Pressure Vessel to drop to Low Level 1 causing the actuation of RPS and the Primary Containment Isolation system. The HPCI system was secured, and level stabilized in the normal band. Primary Containment Isolation system Group 2 (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems), and Group 8 (i.e., RHR Shutdown Cooling) isolation signals were received. RHR was not in shutdown cooling at the time of the isolation signal. Actuations of the Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) were completed and the affected equipment responded as designed, with the following exceptions: Two Group 2 valves (1-G16-F003 and 1-G16-F019) and two Group 6 valves (1-CAC-V6 and l-CAC-V9) did not automatically isolate and were manually isolated from the control panel. Investigation is under way to determine why these valves did not automatically close. Unit 1 was non-critical, in Mode 3, with all rods inserted at the time of the event. The four primary containment isolation valves that did not automatically close did not create an unisolated primary containment penetration. The Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), along with Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), were operable and available. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45376 | 22 September 2009 13:46:00 | The normal power supply to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) was lost due to thunderstorms in the area. Support personnel were dispatched to assess the EOF. The facility has a diesel generator that should supply power to the facility. However, electricians discovered the generator degraded and non-functional. By 0511, 9/22/2009, electricians determined that they were unsuccessful at immediately restoring the generator. It is estimated that the EOF was degraded for approximately 5 1/2 hours. Following restoration of normal power, Computer Support personnel discovered that the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) at the EOF was not functioning. SPDS is a computer based system designed to monitor and display a concise set of parameters from which the safety status of the plant can be readily and reliably determined. The normal power supply was eventually returned (to service) by Entergy Arkansas Transmission and the EOF was restored at 0420 and SPDS terminals were subsequently restored at 0815, 9/22/2009. Due to the time that the EOF was degraded, this is considered a major loss of assessment, communications, and response capability. The licensee informed the Arkansas Department of Health. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45377 | 22 September 2009 15:11:00 | Based on the results of a past operability evaluation completed on 1329 (CDT), 9/22/2009, it appears that an unanalyzed condition existed intermittently for short periods of time in which a door that serves as a High Energy Line Break (HELB) barrier may have been unlatched. With the door not latched, an engineering evaluation concluded that a critical crack (HELB) in the Main Feedwater pipe traversing the south penetration room would force the door (DR-19) open, creating a harsh environment in the adjoining Emergency Feedwater (EFW) pump room. Because the EFW pump room is not evaluated for harsh conditions, it must be conservatively assumed that both pumps may fail to operate following this HELB event. Therefore, this condition is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. The licensee informed the Arkansas Department of Health. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45378 | 22 September 2009 18:32:00 | On September 21, 2009, a patient undergoing mammosite brachytherapy did not receive the proper dose administration due to the Ir-192 (9.6 Ci) source failing to retract. The administering physician retrieved the source from the patient and placed it back in the device. A dose estimate is in progress, however, the licensee does not expect the dosage to exceed 50 percent of the prescribed dose. The afterloader was cleaned recently and the licensee does not expect any debris from the device. The State will report any results of the dose assessment. Texas Incident Number: #8673 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
The following report was received via e-mail: On September 22, 2009, the Agency (Texas Department of Health) was notified of an incident that occurred on September 21, 2009 involving a patient undergoing mammosite brachytherapy. The patient did not receive the proper dose due to the Iridium (Ir)-192 (9.6 Curies) source failing to retract back into the High Dose Rate after-loader unit. The administering physician retrieved the source from the patient and placed it in a shielded container. An investigation by the Agency was performed on September 29, 2009 and it determined that this was not a reportable event because the fractionated dose delivered differed from the prescribed dose, for a single fraction, by less than 50 percent or the total dose for the prescribed treatment differed from that prescribed by less than 20 percent. Because this does not meet the criteria for a reportable medical event, the State of Texas would like to retract this report. Notified the R4DO (Pick), and FSME (Thaggard). |
| ENS 45379 | 23 September 2009 19:05:00 | The following information was provided from the State of California via email: J.L. Shepherd & Associates (JLS&A) performed a source exchange on a Model 44, serial number 7079, category 1 panoramic irradiator of their own manufacture. The source is identified as JLS&A Type 7810 capsule, manufactured by General Electric Company, Nuclear Center. The serial number is GEC-05-04. CA Sealed Source & Device registry: CA0598S122S At the time of source exchange, the Co-60 source was estimated to have (approximately) 250 Ci of activity. Wipe tests were taken at the location of the resourcing and showed no indication of leaks. The source holder rod was discolored and had evidence of corrosion. Source assembly was shipped to JL Shepherd's facility in San Fernando, CA. On September 22, 2009, the source was removed from the transport container in their hot cell with remote manipulators. The source was wiped and determined to have 0.0688 microCi of removable contamination. The source was decontaminated to between 0.001 - 0.0025 microCi level on smears, and placed into a stainless steel pipe and sealed with caps. This will remain in storage at their facility until disposed of in a proper manner. California reference number: 092209 |
| ENS 45426 | 12 October 2009 05:33:00 | This notification is being provided in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i), plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications. At 0300 (CDT) on 10/12/09, LaSalle Unit 2 commenced a plant shutdown. At 2333 (CDT) on 10/11/09, LaSalle Unit 2 exceeded the 2 gpm increase in unidentified leakage within the previous 24 hour period of Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.4.5.d. per required action B.1, unidentified leakage increase was required to be restored to within limits within 4 hours. At 0333 (CDT) on 10/12/09, TS 3.4.5 required action 8.1 was declared not met, and TS 3.4.5 condition C was entered which requires the unit to be in mode 3 within 12 hours and mode 4 within 36 hours. TS LCO 3.4.5, RCS operational leakage requires the plant to be in mode 3 by 10/12/09 at 1533 (CDT) and mode 4 by 10/13/09 at 1533 (CDT). The unidentified leakage is currently at 2.3 gpm. Although not physically verified, the source of the leakage is suspected to be from the 2B21-F016, Inboard Main Steam Line drain valve packing. Other primary containment parameters - Drywell Air Temperature, Drywell and Suppression Chamber Pressure, Suppression Pool Average Temperature - remain within TS limits. The licensee expects to enter mode 3 by 1200 CDT on 10/12/09 and mode 4 by 0000 on 10/13/09. The licensee suspects the leakage to be from the Inboard Main Steam Line Drain Valve packing due to an earlier maintenance requiring cycling of that valve. All safety-related systems required for plant shutdown and cooldown are operable. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45429 | 13 October 2009 08:20:00 | At 0744 (EDT) on Tuesday, October 13, 2009, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems were removed from service for scheduled maintenance. Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room if necessary. TSC ventilation system maintenance is scheduled to be completed at 1500 (EDT) on Tuesday, October 13, 2009. This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility. The licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
The CNP TSC ventilation system was returned to functional status following scheduled maintenance at 1333 (EDT) on Tuesday, October 13, 2009. This follow-up notification is being made to provide closure from the initial notification under 10CFR50.72.(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility. The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector of the return to service of the TSC Ventilation System. Notified R3DO (Eric Duncan) |
| ENS 45430 | 13 October 2009 08:33:00 | A Troxler Model 3440 (S/N 18635) containing two sources, i.e., 8 millicuries Cs-137 and 40 millicuries Am-241/Be, was stolen from the Indiana Department of Transportation field office in Elkhart, Indiana. The field office was broken into during the weekend and Troxler gauge was found missing from a locked closet. The licensee will conduct an investigation and inform their local law enforcement. The licensee notified the NRC Region 3 Office (Jim Lynch). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf Although IAEA categorization of this event is typically based on device type, the staff has been made aware of the actual activity of the source, and after calculation determines that it is a Category 3 event. Note: the value assigned by device type "Less than Cat 3" is different than the calculated value "Category 3 |
| ENS 45431 | 14 October 2009 09:12:00 | The following event was received from the state via e-mail: A radiation alarm was tripped at PSC Metals from a load of scrap metal coming from Polk Metal and Iron located in Zanesville, Ohio. The load of scrap metal was returned to Polk Metal and Iron. The BRP (Bureau of Radiation Protection) was informed on October 12 and dispatched an inspector to Polk Metal and Iron on October 13. Based on the information on the device (Texas Nuclear model # 5190 SN B5283 containing 200 mCi of Cs-137) the BRP contacted the manufacturer and learned that the device was initially distributed to Producers Service Corporation, also located in Zanesville. The Producers Service Corporation was contacted and sent a representative to meet the BRP inspector at the Polk site to retrieve the gauge. The inspector surveyed the gauge and found that the shutter was stuck open with an in-beam dose rate of 200 mR/hr at six inches. The shutter mechanism was freed and verified closed by the inspector. The device was transported less than a mile to the Producers Service Corp facility and is now secured in a vacant office in a secured building. The inspector wipe tested the device and found it to be free of contamination. Producers Service Corporation is in the process of contacting the device manufacturer to make disposal arrangements. The device was a generally licensed device distributed on September 9, 1986. The inspector determined that the device was inadvertently sent to the scrap yard and that Producers Service Corporation was not attempting to illegally dispose of the device. Device Name: Fixed Gauge Manufacturer: Texas Nuclear Model Number: 5190 Serial Number: B5283 Ohio Report No. OH09-031 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf Although IAEA categorization of this event is typically based on device type, the staff has been made aware of the actual activity of the source, and after calculation determines that it is a Less than Cat 3 event. Note: the value assigned by device type "Category 3" is different than the calculated value "Less than Cat 3 |
| ENS 45447 | 20 October 2009 11:05:00 | During an inspection on October 19, 2009, a process nuclear gauge was found to have a stuck open shutter. The gauge is a Kay Ray Model 7062P, serial number 5757, containing 100 milliCurie Cs-137 source. It was mounted 20 feet above the floor and no exposure to personnel occurred. At this time it appears that Radiation Technology, Inc. of Austin, TX will provide repair service at a date yet to be determined. In the meantime, the crusher is in service and the gauge is in use with no plans to work on associated equipment. As the gauge is located about 20 feet above the floor with no immediate access, it is not likely to present a hazard. A notification of hazard will be placed in the operations log to prevent any unintentional access until the gauge can be repaired. |
| ENS 45478 | 6 November 2009 13:26:00 | The following information was obtained from the State of Texas via email: On November 6, 2009, the (State of Texas) was notified that the shutter on a Ronan Engineering level gauge containing 2,000 millicuries of Cesium (Cs) - 137 failed to operate properly. The gauge is installed on the top of a vessel that is 16 feet high. The vessel had been taken out of service and the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) went to the location to perform a shutter operation check. He found that the shutter could not be fully closed. Dose rates in the area were normal. Lead shielding was placed in front of the gauge as shielding. The RSO believes that as many as four people may have entered the vessel while the shutter was not fully closed. The licensee intends to repair the gauge during their next scheduled outage. The RSO was not certain on what day the event occurred, but believed it was about two weeks ago. The licensee stated that he was not aware of the reporting criteria until he received a letter sent out by (the State of Texas) regarding the reporting requirements for this type of event. The licensee is continuing their investigation. Additional information will be provided as it is received. Texas Incident # I-8685. |
| ENS 45479 | 6 November 2009 14:31:00 | On November 6, 2009, the State of Texas reported that a Troxler moisture density gauge was lost and recovered by the Troxler Electronic Laboratories, Inc. The event occurred approximately one to two years ago. The density gauge was recovered two days after it was lost. The State of Texas will provide updates as more information is available. The gauge contained an 8 mCi Cs-137 and a 40 mCi Am/Be-241 source. Texas Incident # I-8686
On November 4, 2009, while conducting a routine inspection, an agency inspector found an event that involved a Troxler moisture/density gauge model # 4640 containing one 8 millicurie Cesium (Cs) - 137 source, which was lost during shipment and returned to the licensee the next day, intact and with no damage. The gauge did not contain an Americium source. The case did not have any scuff marks on it. Neither the licensee or the shipper had notified the agency of the event. They believed that it was not reportable since there was no chance that someone could have received an exposure from it and it was lost for only one day. The licensee also believed that the shipper would be required to make any required notifications. The licensee was informed that they would have been required to notify the agency of an event (and it) would have been reportable. The licensee stated that they believed the gauge had fallen off of their truck. The truck used had a faulty latch mechanism on the door. The driver received additional instruction on securing the door. Notified FSME (Lewis) and R4DO (Hagar). |
| ENS 45482 | 6 November 2009 23:22:00 | On November 6, 2009, at 1930 CST the reactor was manually scrammed following a manual trip of the Main Turbine due to an un-isolable leak on the Turbine High Pressure Fluid System (TGF). The RO (Reactor Operator) scrammed the reactor when (reactor vessel water) level lowered below 12 inches on the Narrow Range Instruments. All Control Rods fully inserted and a Group 2 Isolation occurred when level reached 3 inches on the Narrow Range Instruments. Reactor level lowered to approximately 22 inches on the Wide Range Instruments and was recovered in a slow and deliberate manner in order to minimize the effect on the cool down rate because of low levels of decay heat in the fuel. The Reactor Feed System was used to initially recover level. At 2043, the plant was in Mode 3 with the inboard MSIVs manually closed and level and pressure being controlled by RCIC. The MSIVs were closed to minimize the cool down rate and RCIC was started manually for level and pressure control. The Main Condenser remained available throughout the evolution and condenser vacuum is currently being maintained by the Mechanical Vacuum Pumps. The Group 2 Isolation was verified with no discrepancies and was reset at approximately 2010. All equipment operated as expected and there were no difficulties encountered during the evolution. The TGF System has been secured and is in the process of being tagged out for repair. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45484 | 7 November 2009 12:57:00 | At 0725 hours, a manual scram was inserted due to a Main Turbine Digital Electro-Hydraulic (DEH) control system leak and anticipated turbine trip on loss of DEH tank level. Initial investigation identified a DEH leak at the area of the Quad-Voter hydraulic trip subsystem on the high pressure turbine. All rods fully inserted, main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) remained open, no safety/relief valves (SRVs) opened, and all other safety systems operated as designed. Reactor water level was restored and maintained with the Reactor Feedwater and Condensate systems during the post-scram transient within normal operating bands. Reactor pressure was controlled using main steam drain lines. A normal cooldown to the condenser is in progress. Offsite power is available. All three emergency diesel generators are operable and available. The plant was operating at 52% for planned maintenance. All safety systems remain available. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45496 | 13 November 2009 10:30:00 | Technicians were performing radiography at the Kuparuk Oil Field in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska when the source in an Industrial Nuclear Corporation (INC) IR-100 radiography camera, serial number 6643 was unable to be fully retracted. This was caused by a frozen lock on the device which occurred due to weather conditions of blowing snow and freezing rain. A certified technician serviced the lock. The lock was returned to fully functional condition and the source was returned to the safe and secure position. The device has a 101 Ci Ir-192 source. No personnel over exposures occurred. |
| ENS 45498 | 15 November 2009 08:57:00 | At 0826 EST, Millstone Unit 2 declared a NOUE, due to a loss of power to the control room main board annunciators. Power was lost to the non-vital power supply, VR-11&21, during heater drain pump post maintenance testing, which caused the loss of power to the main control board annunciators. Charging and letdown systems are secured. Additional watchstanders were stationed during the annunciator outage. Power was restored to the main control board, and the licensee is in the process of terminating the NOUE. The NRC remained in Normal Mode. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The State of Connecticut has been notified.
Millstone Unit 2 terminated the NOUE at 0859 EST after power was restored to the main control board annunciator. Notified R1DO (Cahill), R1RA (Roberts), IRD MOC (Grant), NRR ET (Boger), NRR EO (Bahadur). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The State of Connecticut has been notified as well as DHS and FEMA. |
| ENS 45499 | 16 November 2009 02:24:00 | At 2242 (EST) on 11/15/09, the reactor was manually scrammed from 100% power due to a large oil leak on the main generator seal oil system. Condenser vacuum was broken immediately following the reactor trip, and the main turbine stopped rotating at 2324 (EST). Following the reactor trip, the 'B' steam generator Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) failed to fully close on demand, but was closed due to field actions at 2303 (EST). The reactor remained stable at NOP/NOT following the reactor trip. Offsite power remained available throughout the event. This condition is being reported as actuation of the reactor protection system in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). All control rods fully inserted and decay heat is being removed through the S/G relief valves to the atmospheric dumps. No known primary to secondary leakage exists. The plant remains stable in Mode 3. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45521 | 26 November 2009 14:52:00 | At 1328 (EST) on 11/26/09, the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Station Control Room received a call from an individual stating that he was a member of a group of Cuban nationals that had landed in the Turkey Point cooling canals. The individual reported that 33 Cuban nationals total (29 adults and 4 children) were in the cooling canal system. The Turkey Point Nuclear control room notified Turkey Point Nuclear Security, who located and assumed control over the Cuban nationals without incident. Turkey Point Nuclear Security notified local law enforcement agency (Miami-Dade Police), requesting assistance. At 1425 (EST), Miami-Dade Police arrived on site. United States Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) were notified by Miami-Dade Police. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), for an event requiring notification to a government agency. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45524 | 27 November 2009 15:36:00 | Technicians were performing radiography when the source in an Industrial Nuclear Corporation (INC) IR-100 radiography camera was unable to be fully retracted. This was caused by a frozen lock on the device which occurred due to freezing weather conditions. A certified technician serviced the lock. The lock was returned to a fully functional condition, and the source was returned to the safe and secure position. No personnel over exposure occurred. The licensee could not provide the serial number of the camera at the time of the report due to the remote location where the radiography was taking place. Similar events: EN #45384, 45469, 45496 |
| ENS 45527 | 29 November 2009 13:01:00 | At 1850 CST, on 11/28/09 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the C-333 Unit 6 Cell 5 UF6 Release Detection (PGLD) System was inoperable due to loss of power to the Area Control Room (ACR) alarm for this system. The purpose of the PGLD System is to detect a UF6 release and alert operators in the ACR by sounding an alarm. At the time this was discovered, G-333 Unit 6 Cell 5 was operating above atmospheric pressure. TSR 2.4.4.1 requires that at least the minimum number of detector heads in the cell are operable during steady state operations above atmospheric pressure. With the Unit 6 Cell 5 PGLD system inoperable, none of the required heads were operable. This PGLD System was declared inoperable, TSR LCO 2.4.4.1.B.1 was entered and a continuous smoke watch was put in place within one hour. Troubleshooting was initiated, a ground was discovered on the alarm circuit, the ground was isolated, and the system was tested and declared operable at 2305 (CST). This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10CFR76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. |
| ENS 45531 | 1 December 2009 12:23:00 | A non-licensed contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45532 | 1 December 2009 14:45:00 | The following report was received via e-mail: On Monday, February 4, 2008, a technician was attempting to load a gauge on a truck when he dropped the gauge on the tailgate whereupon the index probe broke off and the Cs-137 probe became extended and failed to retract to the shielded position. The gauge was then loaded into the cab of the truck and was delivered to the local site office less than ten minutes from the work site. A service company was notified and within an hour, the source rod was safely retracted into the shielded position. The gauge sources were satisfactory leak tested. No overexposures occurred in this event. The licensee required all gauge users to attend refresher training on nuclear gauge safety and procedures. The licensee was cited for a related violation. During a record review, it was discovered that this event was reported to the NRC using the Nuclear Materials Event Database (080192) instead of to the Headquarters Operations Officer. Texas Incident #: I-8494 |
| ENS 45534 | 1 December 2009 21:53:00 | The following transmission was made as a voluntary notification at 1800 EST: On 12/01/09 at 1410 (EST), due to a Unit 2 cooling tower make-up supply line failure, a valve vault was flooded and overflowed at several thousands of gallons per minute flow. The local fire company was contacted to provide equipment assistance in pumping out the vault. The river water overflowing the vault entered nearby storm drains and a nearby building housing non-safety related equipment. There are no injuries or an emergency of any kind. The water entering the storm sewer does not constitute a reportable spill. Unit 2 reactor power was reduced to 80% to minimize cooling tower impact. The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency was notified at 1800 EST. Various other local and state agencies have been advised of the event. Subsequently, notifications were made to the following agencies: Salem Township Supervisor Chairman State Senator Baker State Rep. Boback Columbia County Commissioner Soberick Federal Affairs to notify US Rep. Kanjorski's staff. Although the impact of this make-up supply line failure to the environment is insignificant (Radiological levels are less than lower limit of detection), its occurrence coupled with subsequent notifications to aforementioned agencies is likely to cause heightened public or government concern. Thus, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station is making a four hour ENS notification pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). A press release is not planned at this time. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45535 | 2 December 2009 17:09:00 | Notification to State agency due to sample exceeding limits. On 12/2/09, Wolf Creek received lab results for Wastewater Treatment Basin samples. The sample taken on 11/14/09 exceeded the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) daily limit of 15 parts per million (ppm) for oil and grease. The result was 18.3 ppm. Exceeding this limit required notification to the State. The Kansas Department of Health and Environment, Bureau of Water was notified on 12/2/2009 that our NPDES limit was exceeded. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45536 | 2 December 2009 17:25:00 | During reconstitution of the post fire safe shutdown analysis, it was noted that conditions exist whereby the requirements of the Hope Creek fire protection program (BTP CMEB 9.5-1) for the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains may not be met. A postulated fire in one of the reactor building fire zones (RB1 or RB2) may affect the ability to operate a required chilled water circulating pump due to the logic interrelationships between the cooling fans and their associated chilled water pump. Specifically, a fire in one area may affect cooling fans from each division and the fan failures could either trip or prevent the redundant chilled water pump from operating. This has the effect of removing the fire barrier between redundant safe shutdown trains. As such, this event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Fire watches have been implemented in accordance with our approved fire protection program as an interim compensatory measure. All required safe shutdown systems remain operable. No systems or safety-related equipment actuations occurred or were required or expected as a result of this condition. All systems and safety-related equipment affected by this condition remain operable and functional. Nothing has been noted as unusual or not understood. The only system affected is the chill water system. There were no actuations or initiating signals, nor effects of the event on the plant. No personnel have been injured. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. |
| ENS 45543 | 7 December 2009 15:33:00 | On November 30, 2009, the US Army Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM) discovered that a licensed nuclear scanning device was missing. (The device location is REDACTED). The device is an Ohmart VM00055 that is a part of a mobile vehicle and cargo system made by Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC). The source is a 1.6 Ci, CS-137 source with a source number: 3231CG.
A request made by Headquarters Department of Army Radiation Safety Officer was processed. Notified R1DO (Schmidt), R3DO (Phillips), FSME (Burgess).
The licensee called to clarify that on November 30, 2009, Fort Drum discovered the device was missing and then an investigation ensued. On December 7, 2009, Fort Drum successfully notified the US Army CECOM Life Cycle Management Command that a licensed nuclear scanning device was missing. The device is postulated to be located on a maritime security vessel. Notified R1DO (Schmidt), R3DO (Phillips), FSME (Einberg) THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 45544 | 7 December 2009 16:42:00 | Technicians were performing radiography when the source in an Industrial Nuclear Corporation (INC) IR-100 radiography camera was unable to be fully retracted. This was caused by a frozen lock on the device which occurred due to freezing weather conditions. A certified technician serviced the lock. The lock was returned to a fully functional condition, and the source was returned to the safe and secure position. No personnel over exposure occurred. The licensee could not provide the source number of the Ir-192 source at the time of the report. The camera number is 4812. Similar events: EN #45384, 45469, 45524 |
| ENS 45546 | 7 December 2009 19:48:00 | The following notification was received via email: On December 7, 2009, CPN Instrotek, California License CA1100-07, reported that a MC-3 gauge was stolen from a delivery truck while it was being transported to CPM Instrotek. The gauge is Serial Number M36046710. The gauge contains 10mCi of CS 137 and 50mCi of Am/Be. This theft was reported by CPN Instrotek on Monday, December 07, 2009 1118 AM by email. The report was made by (the) Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for CPN Instrotek. (The RSO) reported that CPN Instrotek had received a call on the morning of December 7, 2009 from the transport company that was transporting the gauge from the airport to CPN Instrotek (both in Concord California). The transport company stated that the gauge was stolen from one of their trucks between the evening of December 4th and the morning of December 7, 2009. The truck was locked. The transport company had picked up the gauge at the airport and it was being delivered to CPN Instrotek in Concord. The gauge was being returned to CPN Instrotek for disposal. The loss was reported to local law enforcement. California Event Number: N/A THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |