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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 46776 | 22 April 2011 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21 | Potential Defect in Submersible Valve Position Sensors | This letter is issued to provide notification of a potential defect in QualTech NP Top Potted Generation 3 Quick Disconnect Connector Pin Side assemblies installed on Topworx C7 and SV7 switches. All assemblies supplied prior to April 20, 2011 are potentially affected. These assemblies were supplied to Topworx (as) submergence qualified in accordance with our Test Report EGS-TR-23009-14. It was discovered during supplemental qualification testing that previously supplied assemblies may not properly seal against moisture intrusion if utilized in a submergence application. The recommended corrective action for existing assemblies is to pressure test and, if required, repair them. Corrective actions already implemented will be effective in preventing recurrence of this condition. Additionally, all future assemblies will be required to pass pressure testing prior to acceptance. It has been confirmed that all assemblies previously supplied are for use in Chinese Nuclear Power Plants and therefore, no US plants are affected." Most of the assemblies are still in this country and the remainder are in Switzerland awaiting shipment. All assemblies will be recalled and pressure tested.
The purpose of this letter is to provide additional information concerning the status of all affected assemblies. As stated in the previous notifications all serial numbers affected by this defect have been identified and to date only 30 production units remain to be returned for testing/repair. We are still experiencing 100% success when repair is needed. It was previously reported that 'all affected assemblies were for use in Chinese Nuclear Power Plants and therefore no US Plants are affected'. This is no longer a correct statement. Our customer, Topworx, notified us on August 9 that one of their customers, Flowserve, had supplied valve packages containing 16 of these assemblies to Pilgrim Station in Plymouth, MA. It has been reported to us that these assemblies were never installed and are in the process of being returned for testing/repair. These 16 assemblies are included in the 30 production units remaining to be tested/repaired. It has been identified that 4 of the remaining assemblies are still in China and the other 10 were supplied to Flowserve. Additional information concerning these assemblies will be provided as it becomes available. A final letter will be issued once corrective actions for these 30 assemblies are complete. Notified R1DO(Powell), Part 21 GRP via e-mail
On April 22, 2011 QualTech NP, Huntsville issued an initial notification letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and our Customer Topworx concerning a potential defect in QualTech NP Top Potted Generation 3 Quick Disconnect Connector Pin Side assemblies installed on Topworx C7 and SV7 Switches. A total of three notification/status letters associated with this subject have been previously issued. As of this date all affected production units have been returned and tested/repaired. We have experienced 100% success when repair was needed. This letter provides the final status and closeout of the above referenced 10CFR21 notification. Notified R1DO (Holoday) and Part 21 group via email. | ||
| ENS 47498 | 5 December 2011 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21 | Part 21 Involving Defective Spring Clips Used as Seismic Restraints on Two Scientific Modules | The following information was received via fax: The purpose of this letter is to notify you of a defect in spring clips that form part of the seismic restraint for Scientech CON2000-701 and RTD2100-7403 modules. Details of the defect are provided below and in the attached Technical Bulletin Volume 38, CON2000 and RTD2100 Spring Clips, dated December 2011. The written report shall include, but need not be limited to, the following information, to the extent known: (i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission. Michael Weinstein Director of Quality Operations Scientech, a business of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation 44 Shelter Rock Road Danbury, CT 06810 Scott Robuck General Manager Scientech, a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation 200 S. Woodruff Avenue Idaho Falls, ID 83401 (ii) Identification of the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect. PID controller, manufactured by Scientech, Model CON2000-701, Part No. NUS-A056PA RTD converter, manufactured by Scientech, Model RTD2100-7403, Part No. NUS-A121PA (iii) Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect. Scientech, a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow control Corporation 200 S. Woodruff Avenue Idaho Falls, ID 83401 (iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply. The CON2000-701 is replacement for the obsolete Bailey Meter Company 701 PID controller. It is a panel mounted module that is retained in the panel during seismic events by a spring clip on the top of the modules (part number NUS-P089DB-13) that engages a detent in the panel. The module can be pulled out about one inch out of the rack before the spring clip prevents further movement; full removal requires pressure on the spring clip to disengage the detent. The module was seismically tested as documented in Qualification Report NUS-A056QA Rev 2. During the CON2000 test, a minor anomaly occurred and was accepted by Scientech as not affecting the qualification results. Recently a client questioned Scientech's acceptance of the anomaly and requested a retest. Scientech agreed to retest the module; the RRS used is attached. During the retest, the spring clip failed to adequately restrain the module. The balance of the replacements for the Bailey 7000 series - the NUSI 2000 series - are cabinet mounted modules. When they are reconfigured for shelf or panel mounting they become part of the NUSI 2100 series, and the seismically qualified units use the same spring clip. The RTD2100-7403 is the only safety related panel mounted module sold as of December 2011 with the deficient spring clip. Investigation revealed that the original clip was made of 0.025" thick spring steel. After the seismic qualification test was performed, Revision 4 to NUS-F089DB-13 altered the characteristics of the retaining clip, reducing the force required to disengage the detent. The metal was changed to SS301 stainless steel and the thickness reduced to 0.015" thick. Scientech's design change process required an evaluation of the impact of the change; the evaluation was complet4ed, but did not address the impact on seismic qualification adequately. These controllers could be mounted in the in the main control room control panels. The failure of the seismic clip could result in the controllers coming out of the panels, impacting other safety related equipment or personnel, and failing to properly control their actuated devices during a seismic event. (v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained. Submitted for evaluation 11/30/11; evaluation completed 12/2/11. (vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part. PLANT CON2000-701 RTD2100-7403 Clinton 4 0 Davis Besse 8 0 Monticello 2 0 Perry 4 0 Susquehanna 20 7 TOTALS 38 7 (vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action. 1. All five plants were notified and provided with a technical bulletin addressing the problem and the proposed solution. 2. Scientech is expedition procurement of the correct spring clips and will supply them to all affected plants. They can be readily changed out on site. 3. Scientech had previously strengthened its design review process to specifically remind reviewers to evaluate the impact on and need for additional qualifications testing. 4. Scientech will review this event with all engineering staff and emphasize the need for correct reviews. (viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees. See attached Technical Bulletin. (provided separately) (ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred. Not applicable. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Robert Queenan, Operations Manager, Scientech/NUS Instruments, at (208) 524-9311. | ||
| ENS 47643 | 6 February 2012 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21, Notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect and its evaluation | Part 21 - Defective Plug Insulators | The following report was received via fax: This letter is issued to provide initial notification of a potential defect in Plug Insulators (P/N: GB-1A-1) supplied as part of GRAYBOOT 'A' (GB-1A) Connector Kits. There are two affected lots of Plug Insulators (Lot #: BA59961 and BA67711). The potential defect is an out of tolerance dimension that will possibly affect the sealing ability of the Plug Insulator to wire interface. The affected Customers and their associated Purchase Orders are listed below. All Customers will be notified today. Ralph a. Hiller; PO: NUC7505, Item 1, 15 Kits (P/N: GB-1A (16-18), Lot BA59961) supplied 19JAN2012. Bruce Power, PO: 00168187, Item 1, 20 Kits (P/N: GB-1A (12-14), Lot BA59961) supplied 13DEC2011. Dominion - Surry, PO: 45886290, Item 1, 22 Kits (P/N: GB-S-1A, Lot BA59961) supplied 19DEC2011. Dominion - Surry, PO: 45897749, Item 2, 30 Kits (P/N: GB-S-1A, Lot BA67711) supplied 01FEB2012. Ringhals AB, PO: 621728-053, Item 10, 30 Kits (P/N: GB-1A (16-18), Lot BA59961) supplied 19DEC2011. Ringhals, PO: 620625-066, Item 10, 300 parts (P/N: GB-1A-1, Lots BA59961/BA67711) supplied 30JAN2012. Ringhals, PO: 620996-066, Item 50, 1 Kit (P/N: GB-1A (16-18), Lot BA59961) supplied 29NOV2011. OKG, PO: 4113847, Item 4, 86 parts (P/N: GB-1A-1, Lot BA59961) supplied 30NOV2011. It is requested that all affected parts be returned for replacement to QualTech NP; 330 West Park Loop; Huntsville, AL 35806. Customers can contact Cindy Tidwell at (256) 895-7250 ext. 229 for freight collect shipping instructions. Additional details, corrective actions and root causes will be provided once complete. If you require additional information or would like to discuss this further please do not hesitate in contacting: Tony Gill Quality Assurance Supervisor QualTech NP, Huntsville A business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company Office 256-722-8500 ext. 1 Cell 256-426-4558 tgill@curtisswright.com
This letter provides for the formal closeout of notification 10CFR21-2012-01. The initial notification was made on February 06, 2012. All corrective actions and corrective actions to prevent recurrence have been completed and all affected parts listed on the initial notification have been returned by our customers and replacement items supplied. All affected parts in inventory at our facility were removed and discarded. The initial corrective action was to retrieve all affected parts both in our inventory and those provided to our customers as safety-related. As stated above, all affected parts have been returned and/or retrieved from inventory and discarded. There were four primary root causes identified that allowed the defective items to be manufactured and accepted. The causes are listed below: 1. Mold sections/mold inserts for the two different size plug insulators (regular and oversized) are used in the same mold assembly. Not all required mold parts were removed when changing from the manufacture of oversized to regular boots causing the defective parts to be manufactured. 2. Vendor did not verify the affected dimension prior to shipment of the parts to QualTech. 3. The inspection drawing in the QualTech dedication guidelines was not clear as to the required dimension to be verified. 4. The QualTech Inspector incorrectly interpreted the inspection drawing and verified the wrong dimension thus accepting the defective parts. The corrective actions to prevent recurrence have been completed and include the following: 1. An additional mold was purchased from our supplier to prevent mixing of inserts. Now there are no mold parts utilized in the manufacture of different sized plug insulators (regular vs. oversized). This issue was one of the primary causes of the defect. 2. Notification was made to our supplier and corrective actions implemented at their facility. 3. The QualTech inspection drawing in the affected dedication guidelines was revised to better define the required dimension. 4. The error was discussed with the QualTech Inspector to ensure understanding of the critical dimension. Based on the above information and corrective actions this part 21 file is considered closed. If you would like to discuss this information further please contact the undersigned at 256-722-8500 ext. 131 (office), 256-426-4558 (cell), or tgill@curtisswright.com. Tony Gill Quality Assurance Manager QualTech NP, Huntsville Operations a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Company Notified R2DO (Haig) and the Part 21 Group via email. | ||
| ENS 48996 | 3 May 2013 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Interim Part 21 Report of Potential Defect in a Relief Valve Bellows | The following was excerpted from a fax: (ii) Identification of the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which may fail to comply or contains a potential defect. Target Rock P/N: 303480-1, Bellows, Manufactured by Target Rock. (iii) Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect. Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation 1966E Broadhollow Road East Farmingdale, NY 11735 (iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply. During as-found steam testing on March 5, 2013 of a Pilgrim Main Steam Safety Relief Valve (MS-SRV) (TR Model 09J-001, valve assembly S/N 5, pilot assembly S/N 23, bellows PIN 303480-1 S/N 607) a loud pop was heard and as-found testing was secured. Subsequently, the pilot assembly was removed from the valve assembly and subjected to a leak test and would not hold pressure. The pilot assembly was disassembled and a visual inspection of the P/N 303480-1 bellows convolutions revealed a through wall failure in one of the convolutions. It is noted the steam testing was performed at an offsite test facility and the valve did not fail installed in the plant. The bellows acts as a pressure sensor responsible for initiating the opening of the MS-SRV at set pressure. Failure of the bellows does not directly impact the integrity of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary, which is maintained by the bonnet assembly that surrounds it, but does impair the ability of the MS-SRV to provide over-pressure protection of the RCS. This technology has an extensive history of reliability in nuclear power systems and has been used in Commercial Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) since the 1970s. This is the first reported incident regarding a thru wall bellows failure. Target Rock initiated a comprehensive root cause evaluation pursuing several areas of investigation. In parallel, Entergy is conducting an independent investigation and we are cooperating with them. A complete review of our paperwork confirms all manufacturing procedures and processes were performed in accordance with all specified requirements. This includes: - Raw material analysis - Dimensional inspections - Cleaning - Heat Treatment - Manufacturing processes - Testing - Review of design stresses Preliminary metallurgical analysis of the failed bellows indicates cracks forming in an inter-granular manner as would be expected from Inter Granular Stress Corrosion Cracks (IGSCC) originating at pit like location on the interior pressurized surface. The source of this cracking is the focus of on going investigations. Target Rock has also visually inspected two other bellows of the same part number, one manufactured from the same material lot and another manufactured from an earlier material lot. Both of these bellows were installed in valves steam tested at Target Rock. One of these valves bellows was also full flow tested at Wyle Labs. Neither of these additional bellows contained pit-like locations and may indicate this potential failure mechanism is an isolated incident. However, to date, neither Target Rock nor Pilgrim can draw final conclusions with the information collected and analyzed. The mode of failure has not been determined; however, in order to address the potential for a common mode failure, Target Rock is continuing metallurgical testing of the failed bellows and the two other bellows with the same part number. Based on these results, it is likely we will need to evaluate bellows that have been installed in other NPP as they become available. (v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained. The as-found steam test and identification of the potential defect occurred on March 5, 2013. (vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part. The following plants are running with bellows P/N 303480-1 installed: Limerick 1 & 2, Pilgrim, and J.A. Fitzpatrick. (vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action. The root cause of the potential defect is not yet known as of the date of this report. Therefore, no specific corrective actions have been initiated. Target Rock Corrective Action Request CAR 13-013 will document the corrective actions when they are determined. This determination will be based on further mechanical and material evaluations. TR anticipates completing these evaluations within 45 days; however, in the event the evaluations are not completed, TR will forward another interim report within 45 days. (viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees. Target Rock will recommend that the end user perform a detailed visual inspection of the interior convolutions of installed bellows P/N 303480-1 at the next opportunity to determine if any areas of pitting or cracking exist on the interior walls of the bellows. This is a difficult inspection to perform due to the following: internal geometry of the convolutions, a trained inspector is required and specific inspection technology is needed to yield reliable results.
The following are excerpts from an email sent by Target Rock, a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation: Our (Target Rock) investigation indicates the bellows failed due to in-situ hydrogen embrittlement and this hydrogen embrittlement may have been promoted by inadequate cleaning of the bellows. The inadequate cleaning may have induced formation of surface pits during heat treatment providing for localized concentration of hydrogen. Based on these results, we (Target Rock) are notifying end users with the P/N 303480-1 bellows in service (listed below) to perform field inspections at the next available opportunity. Note, the ASME Code requires these valves to be as-found tested at a maximum 5-year interval. A procedure to inspect the bellows will be forwarded to the applicable plants in parallel with this notification. In addition to this inspection Target Rock recommends, as a preventive measure, the P/N 303480-1 bellows be replaced with a P/N 300083-1 or -3 bellows, as applicable, to negate the effects of hydrogen embrittlement. Finite element analysis of the P/N 300083-1 or -3 bellows shows significantly lower stresses at plant operating conditions. The lower stress levels provide an incremental increase in safety margin so that hydrogen embrittlement need not be considered a significant degradation mechanism. Target Rock is implementing corrective actions to improve in-process cleaning and inspection, with emphasis on cleaning prior to heat treatment, to address this root cause. The corrective actions will be completed within 60 days of this letter. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Steven Pauly, Vice President Energy Products at (631) 293-3800, ext. 4640. Limerick 1 & 2 has 28, Pilgrim has 4, and FitzPatrick has 3 of these items. Notified NRR Part 21 Group (email), R1DO (Rogge) and R3DO (Daley) via email. | Reactor Coolant System Safety Relief Valve Main Steam | |
| ENS 50900 | 17 March 2015 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Interim Part 21 Report - Potential Test Induced Defect in a 0867F Main Steam Safety Relief Valves | The following report was received from Curtiss - Wright via email: This letter provides interim notification of a potential test induced defect in a 0867F Series Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MS-SRVs) manufactured and supplied by Target Rock (TR). The information required for this notification is provided below: (i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission. William Brunet Director of Quality Assurance James White General Manager Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation 1966E Broadhollow Road East Farmingdale, NY 11735 (ii) Identification of the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which may fail to comply or contains a potential defect. Target Rock 0867F Series of Main Steam-Safety Relief Valves Manufactured by Target Rock. This is a 3-stage piloted valve consisting of a main valve (the 'Main') with an actuator mounted to it (the 'Topworks'). The 0867F is the latest generation of the 67F line of MS-SRVs, including the original 3-Stage and 2-Stage designs, and this product line has over 40 years of plant operational experience. Only the 0867F is under investigation. This is due to the differences between the 0867F design and the other designs. (iii) Identification of the firm supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect. Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation 1966E Broadhollow Road East Farmingdale, NY 11735 (iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply. As we understand it, the Pilgrim Station recently manually opened the Target Rock Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MS-SRVs) as part of cooling down the reactor following a loss of offsite power. One of the four installed MS-SRVs may not have fully opened. As-found steam testing of the affected MS-SRV did not duplicate this failure; the valve opened on demand. However, the valve did not re-close as expected. Internal inspections found damaged parts in the main stage subassembly that could potentially affect the ability of the MS-SRV to operate as designed. We are investigating potential root causes for this damage. However, we are still unable to determine if a specific defect exists. GE SIL-196, Supplement 17 determined Main Spring relaxation was caused by 'extreme dynamics encountered during limited flow testing . Valve dynamics under full flow conditions (i.e. discharge not gagged) are much less severe than those under limited flow conditions.' These extreme dynamics, under limited flow test conditions, are the focus of our investigation. Specific areas of investigation include; a) Testing of materials to verify they are consistent with our material specifications, b) evaluation of differences between the 0867F and earlier designs, and c) evaluation of the differences between different limited flow test loop configurations and test procedures (v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained. The Pilgrim event occurred on January 27, 2015. As-found testing occurred on February 2, 2015. (vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for, manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part. While we have yet to determine if a specific defect exists, the following plants were supplied 0867F MS-SRVs: - Pilgrim (Model 09J-001) Quantity Shipped = 8 - Fitzpatrick (Model 09H-001) Quantity Shipped = 4, Quantity on order= 8 - Hatch 1 and 2 (Model 09G-001) Quantity Shipped= 24, Quantity on order= 12 The following plants will be supplied 0867F MS-SRVs: - Hope Creek (Models 14J-001, 14J-002) Quantity on order = 7 (vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action. The root cause of the potential test induced defect has not yet been confirmed as of the date of this report. Therefore, no specific corrective actions have been initiated. Target Rock Problem Report 080 will document the corrective actions when they are determined and complete the 10 CFR Part 21 evaluation of the potential test induced defect. This determination will be based on further mechanical and material evaluations. TR anticipates completing these evaluations within 45 days; however, in the event the evaluations are not completed, TR will forward another interim report within 45 days. (viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees. We are working with all three (4) sites to identify appropriate precautions. (ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred. Not applicable. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Michael Cinque, Director of Program Management at (631 ) 293-3800.
Curtiss-Wright provided an update to state that their root cause analysis is still in progress and they anticipate completion within 60 days. Notified NRR Part 21 Group (via email), R1DO (Gray), and R2DO (Ehrhardt).
Curtiss-Wright provided an update to state their root cause analysis findings and corrective actions. Corrective actions are estimated to be completed within 12 months. The following plants were supplied 0867F MS-SRVs: Pilgrim (Model 09J-001) Quantity Shipped = 8 FitzPatrick (Model 09H-001) Quantity Shipped = 4, Quantity on order= 8 Hatch 1 and 2 (Model 09G-001) Quantity Shipped = 24, Quantity on order= 12 The following plants will be supplied 0867F MS-SRVs: Hope Creek (Models 14J-001, 14J-002) Quantity on order = 7 Valves Currently Installed Target Rock recommends valves currently installed be inspected to ensure the main piston shoulder has contact with the main disc stem shoulder. These inspections should be scheduled based on plant-specific indications of the potential for fretting. These inspections can be performed by removing the base assembly from the main body and physically measuring for shoulder-to-shoulder contact. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Michael Cinque, Director of Program Management at (631 ) 293-3800. Notified NRR Part 21 Group (via email), R1DO (Dimitriadis), and R2DO (Suggs).
Target Rock, a business unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation (TR), previously submitted NID# 15428 (Ref. 1) regarding 0867F Series of Main Steam Safety Relief Valves (MSSRV). The purpose of this letter is to provide a final update on the status of the actions identified in NID# 15428 (Ref. 1 ). TR has developed a design change that we have verified, though analysis and qualification testing, ensures testing on the available limited flow test facilities will not impart damage to our product. Qualification included both limited and full flow testing. Target Rock confirms this design change has no effect on either National Board certification or the performance required by the applicable Specification to support the plant safety analysis.TR will offer this design change as our recommended long term solution to all utilities who currently have installed or plan to install the 0867F Series Main Steam Safety Relief Valve model in their respective plants. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me (Alex DiMeo) at (631) 293-3800. Notified R1DO (Gray), R2DO (Walker) and Part 21 Group. | Safety Relief Valve Main Steam | 05000293/LER-2015-002 |
| ENS 54485 | 21 January 2020 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Report - Target Rock 1" and 2" Fail Closed Solenoid Operated Valve Assemblies Unauthorized Modification During Assembly | The following was received via email: Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply. Condition 1 (Modified Fixed Core) The purpose of the fixed core is to provide the proper amount of magnetic pull force between itself and the plunger when the solenoid coil is energized. The fixed core is installed within the bonnet assembly and "fixed" in place by a "dimpling" process which captures a machined groove on the fixed core. During Assembly & Testing of a TR Solenoid Operated Valve, a fixed core unexpectedly came out of the bonnet assembly. Further inspections of the fixed core revealed unauthorized modification to the part beyond its design basis to force installation into the bonnet assembly. In the event a modified fixed core was to dislodge from its location within the bonnet, the specific valve assembly would fail to operate to the open position when the solenoid is energized and would remain in its fail safe closed position. Condition 2 (Main Disc Lift Misadjustment): The objective of the disc lift adjustment is to ensure the main disc is in contact with the bonnet base, which provides an "up stop" position while maintaining a minimum clearance between the plunger and the fixed core. Excessive clearance between the plunger and the fixed core reduces the available magnetic force. Conversely, improper adjustment, allowing contact between the plunger and the fixed core, may cause impact damage to the assembly during full pressure/temperature actuation and reduces the maximum flow (Cv) through the valve assembly. It was noted that a disc lift adjustment was not adjusted properly and would reduce the maximum flow. The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained. Condition 1 (Modified Fixed Core): During the investigation of the suspect technician, TR identified conditions, which required independent inquiry and subsequently confirmed intentional modification of the fixed core. On December 5, 2019, TR Engineering confirmed the condition. Condition 2 (Main Disc Lift Misadjustment): On November 22, 2019, TR Engineering performed a worst case Cv calculation to determine the amount of restricted flow that would result in the event a 1" y-body valve assembly was short stroked. This would reduce the flow of a 1" y-body valve assembly from a rated Cv of 15 to approximately a Cv of 14. The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action. Condition 1 (Modified Fixed Core): The discrepant bonnet assembly/fixed core was documented on a NCR (Non Conformance Report) and scrapped. A new bonnet assembly was issued to the valve kit. The valve assembly was reassembled, retested and successfully passed all required production testing. This was an unauthorized modification performed by a single individual (suspect technician). Four additional A& T technicians involved in the bonnet dimpling process were interviewed. All four technicians stated they have never intentionally modified components nor have they ever seen anyone intentionally modifying components in any form. TR investigation considers this to be isolated to the suspect technician. The suspect technician no longer works for the company. Condition 2 (Main Disc Lift Misadjustment): The initial valve assembly was readjusted in accordance with the applicable technical manual and solenoid valve adjustment procedure. The valve assembly was re-tested per the applicable production test procedure and successfully passed all required testing. Upon further investigation of valves assembled by the suspect technician, an additional 3 of 10 valve assemblies were verified to have misadjusted main disc lift. The misadjusted valves were readjusted, tested and successfully passed all production testing prior to shipment. All technicians working on solenoid valve assemblies were given an individual technician qualification exam to determine their understanding of this adjustment in accordance with the existing work instructions. Each technician was tested individually, with Engineering present as a witness. All technicians demonstrated a clear understanding and followed the necessary instructions/procedures to properly adjust the disc lift. TR determined the suspect technician did not follow the official work instructions for the disc lift adjustment in an effort to save time during this process. TR investigation concludes this defect is isolated to the suspect technician. The suspect technician no longer works for the company. This was the same technician involved in Condition 1. Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees. Condition 1 (Modified Fixed Core): TR performs production testing on all valve assemblies prior to shipment. TR considers this testing adequate screening to identify this condition at the factory. Satisfactory testing provides reasonable assurance the stated condition does not exist in shipped product. However, TR recommends un-installed bonnet assemblies and complete valve assemblies be returned to TR for re-inspection. This condition potentially affects valve models and bonnet assemblies detailed in Attachment 1 manufactured between 1/1/2018 and 10/31/2019. Any installed valves containing these parts should be reviewed and evaluated for history of operational testing anomalies. Many of these installed valves are subject to regular plant testing, such as 1 OCFR50 Appendix J. Satisfactory performance in this testing will provide reasonable assurance of an acceptable valve condition. Condition 2 (Main Disc Lift Misadjustment): All un-installed Valve Assemblies should be checked to determine if a misadjustment of the main disc lift exists. Although the process to check for a misadjusted valve is not difficult, it requires partial valve disassembly. The instructions for proper adjustment are located in the valve specific Technical Manual. Any 1" Y-body solenoid valve assemblies that have been installed should be reviewed and evaluated by each end user regarding the acceptability of having a lower flow (Cv) rating of 14 in lieu of 15 for the specific system in which they are installed. Any opportunity to disassemble the valve assembly for inspection and readjustment is recommended. This condition potentially affects valve models detailed in Attachment 1 manufactured between 7/1/2015 and 10/31/2019. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Michael Cinque, General Manager at (631) 293-3800 Very Truly Yours, Michael Cinque General Manager Target Rock, Business Unit of Curtiss-Wright Flow Control Corporation Affected sites are Arkansas Nuclear One, Beaver Valley, Brunswick, Calvert Cliffs, Farley, Fitzpatrick, Hope Creek, Millstone, Nine Mile Point, Oconee, Palo Verde, Sequoyah, Shearon Harris, St. Lucie, South Texas Project, Vogtle, Watts Bar | ||
| ENS 54674 | 20 April 2020 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Failure to Comply or Defect | Part 21 Report - Defect in Thermocouple Low Level Amplifier Modules | The following is a summary of information received from Curtiss-Wright, Nuclear Division: Three RTL modules (thermocouple low level amplifiers) have been delivered to clients that may have included faulty resistors that could have remained undetected during functional testing and will eventually malfunction with time in service. MAY/MCY resistors are precision, low temperature coefficient, metal foil technology resistors used in circuits where stability with time and temperature is required. The RTL module uses this style of resistor to achieve its accuracy and variable temperature effects specifications. The symptoms exhibited by faulty resistors were open circuit or changes in value in response to physical or thermal stress. Faulty resistors were sent to the manufacturer for failure analysis. Cracks were discovered in the bond wires that connected the resistor leads to the resistor chip inside the resistor package. The failure rate of resistors manufactured in 2017 and 2018 was significantly greater than resistors manufactured in earlier years. A search of the build records during that time interval resulted in three units. These three modules contain 10 kilo-ohm resistors with date codes from 2017. There are two 10 kilo-ohm resistors in an RTL module, R8 and R17, on the main circuit board assembly. Configured for an RTD input, only R8 is active. R8 sets the 1 milli-ampere excitation current for the RTD element. R17 is used in a voltage offset circuit that is only used in thermocouple and low level amplifier configurations. If the module has been in service for any significant amount of time with no problems, 12 weeks or more, then it is probable that R8, the only suspect resistor in the default configuration, is not affected by this phenomenon. However, if the module has not seen significant service, then the module should be considered suspect. Additionally, if the module has been or could in the future be reconfigured to a low level amplifier or thermocouple application, then the same situation exists with R17, which is not used in the default configuration. Affected Plant - Part Number (Serial Numbers): Beaver Valley - NUS-A135PA-1/3 (s/n: 1800083) Indian Point 3 - NUS-A138PA-3/13/W (s/n: 1800334) Ginna - NUS-A138PA-1/4 (s/n: 1800666) Contact Scientech-I&C-Repair@curtisswright.com to return these modules for further testing and rework, if necessary. Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact: Shanen Onken Scientech Business Segment Manager Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division sonken@curtisswright.com Tel 208-497-3410, Cell 208-821-4054 | ||
| ENS 55960 | 24 April 2022 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 Report - Potential Defect in Quick Disconnect Connector Cable Assemblies | The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile: On April 24, 2022, a potential defect was discovered in a configuration of the 1 « inch Quick Disconnect Connector (P/N: 913602-111) cable assemblies supplied to Duke ((McGuire Nuclear Station)) under procurement document 30129014. During post installation testing by Duke, it was found that one of the cable wires was shorted to ground. This damage could cause the cable assembly to not perform its intended safety function. Upon further investigation, Duke found 9 other cable assemblies to have similar damage. Duke returned the identified cable assemblies to Curtiss Wright who is investigating the issue. Although some testing and verification activities have been completed, additional testing and research is necessary and in progress. The current testing and research is projected to take 30 days and a follow-up letter with results and status will be provided by July 24, 2022. Currently, McGuire Nuclear Station is the only affected facility. For additional information, please contact Jim Tumlinson, Director of Operations (256-425-8037), Christopher Covan, Quality Assurance Manager (256-624-7301), or Tim Franchuk of Quality (513-201-2176).
The following is an update received via facsimile: After further research on this condition, we have determined there was a defect that was provided to this utility. The nature of the defect is a bushing supplied with these cable assemblies. This bushing was found to have burr edges near the interface of the connector. This burr, when moved up and down the wires during the installation process, has the potential to cause damage. This damage could compromise the integrating of the dielectric characteristic of the supplied connector which could lead to the component not to perform its intended safety function. Based on history, where we have never had an issue of this defect being detected either by Curtiss-Wright or Duke Energy, Curtiss-Wright is confident that this is a recent issue and efforts/research are being done to bound this issue to determine the extent of condition. Due to the nature of the damage, we also have a high degree of confidence that the defect would be evident and caught during the pre/post installation testing/inspection of this device which would further prevent them from being installed in the plants. All configuration that utilize this defective component were supplied to Duke Energy and installed in the McGuire, Oconee and Catawba operating plants. As of this time, we have identified 11 cables which have this defect and we are working closely with Duke to determine the full extent of condition. These 11 cables have been returned to Curtiss-Wright. Further evaluation will require a projected addition 30 days to continue our evaluation with the help of the utility. Another follow up letter will be issued to the NRC on August 26, 2022. Notified R3DO (Peterson), R2DO (Miller), and Part 21 Group (by email).
The following is an update received via facsimile: In pursuance of compliance to Federal Regulation 10CFR21, this letter is issued to provide closure for notification issued June 24, 2022 of the potential defect in a configuration of the 1 1/2 Inch Quick Disconnect Connector (P/N: 913602-111) cable assemblies supplied to Duke Energy under procurement documents 30129014, 03121479, 03114993 and 03124438 for of a total of 19 connectors at the McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Power Stations. We have a high degree of confidence that this is limited to these supply of cables. Of the 19 connectors, 11 have been returned to Curtiss-Wright and have been confirmed to have the suspected defect. Curtiss-Wright will be working with Duke Energy to have these connector assemblies replaced. Due to the nature of the defect and installation routines of the plant, for items installed at Duke Energy we have reasonable assurance that these connectors do not pose an immediate safety risk but could cause damaged during routine maintenance associated with the connectors and should be replace at earliest convenience. To prevent this from reoccurring, Curtiss-Wright will implement an inspection activity to verify the absence of burrs and/or sharp edges of all fittings that could potentially cause damage which could prevent the items from performing its intended safety function. For additional information, please contact Jim Tumlinson, Director of Operations (256-425-8037), Christopher Covan, Quality Assurance Manager (256-624-7301), or Tim Franchuk Director of Quality (513-201-2176). Notified R3DO (Pelke), R2DO (Miller), and Part 21 Group (by email).
The following is an update received via facsimile: In pursuance of compliance to Federal Regulation 10CFR21, this letter is issued to provide an amendment for notification issued on June 24, 2022 of the potential defect in a configuration of the 11/2 Inch Quick Disconnect Connector cable assemblies supplied to Duke Energy for a total of 460 of connectors only supplied to Oconee, McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Power Stations. This increase of scope is due to new evidence provided by Duke Energy, where this potential defect was found in other lots of material other than the ones previously bound to this condition. The nature of the defect is a sharp edge located inside of the supplied reducing bushing which could cause damage to the cables when being installed or removed. These cable assemblies and bushing need to be evaluated to determine if this potential defect has occurred or if there is a potential for damage to occur at the earliest convenience. To the best knowledge of the application, we believe that there is a very low risk of damage to the cable assemblies after installation but this needs to be evaluated at the plants. We have been working with Duke Energy and will continue to support them until this issue is resolved. To prevent this from reoccurring, Curtiss-Wright will implement inspection activities to verify the absence of burrs and/or sharp edges of all fittings that could potentially cause damage and prevent the items from performing its intended safety function. For additional information, please contact Jim Tumlinson, Director of Operation (256-425-8037) or Christopher Covan, Quality Assurance Manager (256-624-7301), or Tim Franchuk, Director of Quality (513-201-2176). Notified R3DO (Ruiz), R2DO (Miller), and Part 21 Group (by email). | ||
| ENS 56683 | 22 June 2023 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 Interim Report - Failure of Curtiss Wright Supplied Safety Related Relay | The following is a summary of the Part 21 report provided by Curtiss Wright: On June 20, 2023, Duke Energy sent a letter to Curtiss Wright (CW) to formally notify them that a Tyco (Agastat) relay had failed. Duke Energy had identified certain contacts that were found sticking in the open position. The relay was returned to CW for evaluation; however, CW could not duplicate the failure. As the relay is questionable for reliable service, CW is having the relay returned to Tyco for their evaluation. Once the evaluation is complete, the current report will be updated. CW anticipates an update to the notification with final results by October 15th. Affected plant: Catawba
The following information was provided by Curtiss Wright via email: The relay was subsequently returned to TYCO for their evaluation. TYCO tested the relay with and without the LL auxiliary switch option and could not duplicate the failure. In all tested conditions, the relay performed within manufacturer specifications, and with no contact binding. As the noted failure could not be reproduced by Curtiss-Wright or TYCO, there is no evidence of part malfunction and thus no further evaluation or notification applies. Notified RDO2 (Miller) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors | ||
| ENS 56821 | 30 August 2023 07:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 - Inconsistent Potentiometer Resistance Values | The following is a synopsis of information that was provided by Curtiss-Wright via fax: On August 30, 2023, Enertech (a division of Curtiss-Wright) determined a potential defect for potentiometer part number D2060S based on the inspection of a returned items from Korea Hydro and Electro Power in Korea. A number of returned potentiometers exhibited inconsistent resistance values at certain stroke positions. The potentiometers are used in modulating actuators. A shorter wiper was used in the manufacture of the potentiometers that introduced the possibility of intermittent separation between the wiper (sliding contact) and the coil at certain stroke positions, resulting in momentary signal interruptions. The evaluation at Enertech is also ongoing regarding the potential effects of wiper separation on the functionality of the modulating actuator and will not be completed within 60 days. The expected date of completion is December 20, 2023. South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (Operator: STP Nuclear Operating Company) purchased defective modulating actuators on four occasions. Questions should be directed to Loretta Anaya, Quality Assurance Manager, Enertech, at 714-982-1856. Known potentially affected plant(s): South Texas Project
Enertech has completed their evaluation of the deviation described in their interim report submitted on 27 October, 2023, and concluded that the deviation does not potentially create a substantial safety hazard. Notified R4DO (Dixon) and Part 21 Group (Email) |