IR 05000219/2011503

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IR 05000219/2011503; on 07/01/2011 - 08/15/2011; Oyster Creek Generating Station; Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Inspection
ML112550521
Person / Time
Site: Oyster Creek
Issue date: 09/12/2011
From: Trapp J M
Plant Support Branch 1
To: Pacilio M J
Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
References
EA-11-128 IR-11-503
Download: ML112550521 (13)


Text

September L2, 20LLEA-11-128Mr. Michael J. PacilioSenior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLCPresident and Chief Nuclear Officer, Exelon Nuclear4300 Winfield Rd.Warrenville, lL 60555

SUBJECT: OYSTER CREEK GENERATING STATION, FOLLOW-UP INSPECTION OFEMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL AND EMERGENCY PLAN CHANGEINSPECTION REPORT 0500021 91201 1 503

Dear Mr. Pacilio:

On August 15,2011, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an in-officeinspection of your Oyster Creek Generating Station. The purpose of the inspection was toreview the facts and circumstances concerning changes made to Emergency Action Level HU6,which potentially decreased the effectiveness of the Oyster Creek Emergency Plan without priorNRC approval. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed bytelephone on August 15,2011, with Mr. V. Cwietniewicz and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license'The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewedpersonnel.This inspection was a follow-up to an issue identified during the December 2009 annualinspection of emergency plan and emergency action level changes at Exelon's BraidwoodStation, Inspection Report 05000456/2010503; 05000457/2010503. The NRC identified achange was made to an emergency action level basis which introduced a decrease ineffectiveness to Braidwood's emergency plan. The NRC issued a Severity Level lV TraditionalEnforcement violation with a Green finding to Braidwood. Extent of condition inspections wereconducted at the other nine Exelon sites where similar violations and findings were identified.Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC identified one issue that was evaluated underthe risk significance determination process as having very low significance (Green). The NRChas also determined that the issue involved a violation of NRC requirements. The violation wasevaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, and has been categorized atSeverity Level lV. However, because of its very low safety significance, and because the issuewas entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the issue as a Non-CitedViofation (NCV) in accordance with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The currentEnforcement Policy is included on the NRC's Web site at http://www.nrc.qov/aboutn rclreq u latory/e nforcemenUe nforce-po l. htm l. lf you contest the subject or severity of a Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a responsewithin 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, tothe U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,Region 1,475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, PA 19406; the Director, Office of Enforcement,U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident lnspectorOffice at the Oyster Creek Generating Station. In addition, if you disagree with thecharacterization of any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days ofthe date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the RegionalAdministrator, Region l, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Oyster Creek GeneratingStation. The information that you provide will be considered in accordance with lnspectionManual Chapter 0305.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component ofNRC's document system, Agencytide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS),accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.qov/readinq-rm/adams.html (the PublicElectronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,t*l"".pP-James M. Trapp, ChiefPlant Support Branch 1Division of Reactor SafetyDocket Nos. 50-219License Nos. DPR-16

Enclosure:

lnspection Report No. 050002 191201 1503M

Attachment:

Supplemental Informationcc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

lR 05000219/201 1503i 0710112011 - 0811512011; Oyster Creek Generating Station; EmergencyAction Level and Emergency Plan Changes Inspection.This report covers an approximate 2-month period of follow-up inspection and review of thelicensee's emergency action level and plan changes. One Severity Level lV Violation andassociated Green finding was identified by the inspector. The Severity Level lV Violation wasconsidered a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of NRC regulations. The significance of most findingsis indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (lMC)0609, "significance Determination Process." Findings for which the Significance DeterminationProcess does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC managementreview. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear powerreactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, datedDecember 2006.A. NRc-ldentified and Self-Revealed FindinqsEmergency Preparedness. Severitv Level lV/Green: The inspector identified a finding of very low safetysignificance involving a Severity Level lV NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for failing to obtainprior approval for an emergency plan change which decreased the effectiveness of theplan. Specifically, the licensee modified the Emergency Action Level (EAL) Basis in EALHU6, which indefinitely extended the start of the 1S-minute emergency classificationclock beyond a credible notification that a fire is occurring or indication of a valid firedetection system alarm. This change decreased the effectiveness of the emergencyplan by reducing the capability to perform a risk significant planning function in a timelymanner.The violation affected the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function because itinvolved implementing a change that decreased the effectiveness of the emergency planwithout NRC approval. Therefore, this issue was evaluated using TraditionalEnforcement. The NRC determined that a Severity Level lV violation was appropriatedue to the reduction of the capability to perform a risk significant planning standardfunction in a timely manner. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective actionprogram and revised the EAL basis to restore compliance.The finding was more than minor using IMC 0612, because it is associated with theemergency preparedness cornerstone attribute of procedure quality for EAL andemergency plan changes, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuringthat the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the healthand safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, theperformance deficiency was a finding. Using IMC 0609, Appendix B, the inspectordetermined that the finding had a very low safety significance because the finding is afailure to comply with 10 CFR 50.54(q) involving the risk significant planning standard50.47(bX4), which, in this case, met the example of a Green finding because it involvedone Unusual Event classification (EAL HUO).Enclosure

Due to the age of this issue, it was not determined to be reflective of current licenseeperformance and therefore a cross-cutting aspect was not assigned to this finding.(Section 1EP4)Licensee-ldentified ViolationsNo violations of significance were identified.iiiEnclosure

REPORT DETAILS

1. REACTOR SAFEWCornerstone: Emergency Preparedness1EP4 Emerqencv Action Level and Emersencv Plan Chanqes (71114.04).1 Emerqencv Action Level and Emergencv Plan Chanqesa. lnspection ScopeThis inspection was a follow-up review of an issue identified in December 2009 during aNRC Region lll routine review of changes implemented to Exelon's Braidwood StationEmergency Plan Annex Emergency Action Level (EAL) and EAL Basis. The Region IEmergency Preparedness inspector reviewed the issue for applicability to the OysterCreek Generating Station Emergency Plan. The Region I inspector reviewed applicablelicensee documents and had discussions with licensee personnel. This inspection did notrepresent an inspection sample.b. Findinqslntroduction:A Green finding involving a Severity Level lV, Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of10 CFR 50.5a(q) was identified by the inspector for the licensee's change to theemergency plan which decreased the effectiveness of the plan without U. S. NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC) approval.Description:In EP-OC-1010, Radiological Emergency Plan for Oyster Creek Nuclear GeneratingStation, Revision 10, EAL HUG provided for declaring an Unusual Event (UE) due to afire in the protected area not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection. The EAL HUoBasis stated, in part, "The 15-minute period begins with a credible notification that a fireis occurring or indication of a valid fire detection system alarm. A verified alarm isassumed to be an indication of a fire unless personnel dispatched to the scene disprovethe alarm within the 15-minute period. The report, however, shall not be required toverify the alarm."On November 12, 2007, Oyster Creek Generating Station staff implemented EP-AA-1010, Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Oyster Creek Generating Station,Revision 0, with the EAL HUO Basis containing the following text: "The 1S-minute periodto extinguish the fire begins with a credible notification that a fire is occurring orindication of a valid fire detection system alarm. lf the alarm cannot be verified byredundant Control Room or nearby fire panel indications, notification from the field that afire exists starts the 15-minute classification and fire extinguishment clocks. TheEnclosure 215-minute period to extinguish the fire does not start until either the fire alarm is verifiedto be valid by utilization of additional Control Room or nearby fire panel instrumentation,or upon notification of a fire from the field."The new Revision 0 of the EAL HUO Basis allowed delay of the 1S-minute classificationtime by the dispatching of personnel, reporting the notification of a fire from the field, andextinguishing the fire. As a result, this change indefinitely extended the start of the15-minute emergency classification clock beyond a credible notification that a fire isoccurring or indication of a valid fire detection system alarm. This was determined to bea decrease in effectiveness of the licensee's emergency plan because the changereduced the capability to perform a risk significant planning standard function in a timelymanner. This change was not submitted to the NRC for prior approval'On April 8,2011, Exelon implemented Revision 3 of EP-AA-1010, which restored theEAL HUO Basis language to the EP-OC-101 , Revision 10, guidance, thereby removingthe decrease in effectiveness.Analvsis:The inspector determined that the change made by the licensee to the EAL HUO Basisdecreased the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan and the change was implementedwithout prior NRC approval. The issue was determined to be a licensee performancedeficiency that impacted the regulatory process and, in accordance with InspectionManual Chapter (lMC) 0612 "Power Reactor lnspection Reports," was evaluated usingthe NRC's traditional enforcement policy as well as the Reactor Oversight Process(RoP).Using the NRC's Enforcement Policy, this violation met Example c.2in Section 6.6: "Alicensee's ability to meet or implement any regulatory requirement related to assessmentor notification is degraded such that the effectiveness of the emergency plan decreases.Although the regulatory requirement could be implemented during the response to anactual emergency, the implementation would be degraded (e.9., not fully effective,inappropriately delayed)." Specifically, the change made to the EAL Basis directlyaffected the Risk Significant Planning Standard "Classification," which affectedassessment of event conditions. Therefore, this violation met the example for SeverityLevel lll. However, the NRC has classified this violation as a Severity Level lV, afterdetermining that its actual and potential safety significance was very low based on thefollowing considerations: (1) the issue involved only one Unusual Event EAL, and notany of the other higher event classifications; and (2) the issue could delay classificationbut would not prevent classification.Using IMC 0612 "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "lssue Screening,"the performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and, therefore, afinding, because it is associated with the emergency preparedness cornerstone attributeof procedure quality for EAL and emergency plan changes, and it adversely affected thecornerstone objective of ensuring that the licensee is capable of implementing adequatemeasures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiologicalemergency. Specifically, the licensee made a change to its EAL Basis, which was aEnclosure 3decrease in effectiveness, because the change indefinitely extended the start of the1S-minute emergency classification clock beyond a credible notification that a fire isoccurring or indication of a valid fire detection system alarm. Also, this change wasmade without prior NRC approval.The inspector determined the finding could be evaluated using the SignificanceDetermination Process (SDP) in accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance DeterminationProcess," Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process."The finding is a failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.54(q) involving the risk significantplanning standard 50.47(bX4), which, in this case, met the example of a Green findingbecause it involved one Unusual Event classification (EAL HUO).Due to the age of this issue, greater than three years, it was not determined to bereflective of current licensee performance and therefore a cross-cutting aspect was notassigned to this finding. This change was screened through the licensee's 50.54(q)process and was not identified as a decrease in effectiveness.Enforcement:10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, that a holder of a nuclear power reactor operatinglicense shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in50.47(b) and the requirements in appendix E of this part. The nuclear power reactorlicensee may make changes to these plans without Commission approval only if thechanges do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed,continue to meet the standards of 50.47(b) and the requirements of appendix E to thispart.10 CFR 50.47(b) provides specific standards that offsite emergency response plans fornuclear power reactors must meet. One such standard, 10 CFR 50.47(bX4), is that astandard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which includefacility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, andState and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facilitylicensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.Contrary to the above, on November 12,2007, the licensee made a change to itsemergency plan without Commission approval, and that change decreased theeffectiveness of the plan and caused the plan to no longer meet the standards of50.47(b) and appendix E to this part. Specifically, the licensee modified the EAL basis inEAL HU6, Revision 0, to delay the 1S-minute classification time by waiting for thedispatch of personnel and the notification of a fire from the field. This change indefinitelyextended the start of the 15-minute emergency classification clock beyond a crediblenotification that a fire is occurring or indication of a valid fire detection system alarm.This change decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan by reducing thecapability to perform a risk significant planning function in a timely manner.Enclosure 4046.14This violation impacted the regulatory process, was of very low safety significance andwas also entered into the licensee's corrective action program as lR 01184333, datedMarch 7 , 2011. Because of its very low safety significance and because the issue wasentered into the licensee's corrective action program the violation is being treated as aSeverity Level lV Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRCEnforcement Policy (NCV 0500021912011503-01, Changes Made to EAL HU6 WhichDecreased the Effectiveness of the Plans Without Prior NRC Approval).The underlying finding aspect of a violation is evaluated separately from the traditionalenforcement violation and, therefore, the underlying finding is being assigned a separatetracking number (FlN 0500021912011503-02, Changes Made to EAL HU6 WhichDecreased the Effectiveness of the Plans Without Prior NRC Approval).Manaqement MeetinqsExit MeetinosOn August 15,2011, the inspector discussed the inspection results by telephone withMr. V. Cwietniewicz and other members of the licensee staff. The licenseeacknowledged the issue presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potentialreport input discussed was considered proprietary.ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

LicenseeCwietniewicz, Corporate Emergency Preparedness ManagerJesse, Corporate Regulatory Assurance Manager

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSEDOpened0500021912011503-01 Ncv0500021 9/2011503-02FIN(Traditional Enforcement) Changes to EAL BasisDecreased the Effectiveness of the Plan without PriorNRC Approval (1EP4.1)Changes to EAL Basis Decreased the Effectiveness of thePlan without Prior NRC Approval (1EP4.1)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this listdoes not imply that the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather thatselected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspectioneffort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document orany part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.1EP4 Emerqencv Action Level and Emerqencv Plan ChanoesEP-AA-1010; Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Oyster Creek Generating Station;Revisions 0 and 3lR

01184333; EP Notice of Violation for EAL Change-lmplement EAL Basis Change forHU6; March7,2011Attachment
A-2

LIST OF ACRONYMS

USEDAD [[AMS Agencyruide Document Access Management SystemCFR Code of Federal RegulationsDRP Division of Reactor ProjectsDRS Division of Reactor SafetyEAL Emergency Action LevelFIN FindingIMC Inspection Manual ChapterlP Inspection ProcedurelR lssue ReportNEI Nuclear Energy InstituteNCV Non-Cited ViolationNRC]]
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PARS Publicly Available Records SystemROP Reactor Oversight ProcessSDP Significance Determination ProcessUE Unusual EventURI Unresolved ltem