IR 05000456/2010503
| ML110600903 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Braidwood  |
| Issue date: | 02/28/2011 |
| From: | Hironori Peterson Division of Reactor Safety III, Operations Branch III |
| To: | Pacilio M Exelon Generation Co |
| References | |
| EA-10-220 IR-10-503 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML110600903 (16) | |
Text
February 28, 2011
SUBJECT:
BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 FOLLOW-UP INSPECTION OF EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL AND EMERGENCY PLAN CHANGE INSPECTION REPORT 05000456/2010503(DRS); 05000457/2010503(DRS)
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
On February 10, 2011, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an in-office inspection of your Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2. The purpose of the inspection was to review the facts and circumstances concerning Unresolved Item 05000456/2009005-07; 05000457/2009005-07, Changes to Emergency Action Level HU6 Potentially Decrease the Effectiveness of the Plans without Prior NRC Approval. The enclosed report documents the inspection results, which were discussed by telephone on February 10, 2011, with Mr. D. Enright and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
The report documents one NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. Based on the results of the inspection and following consultation with the NRC Office of Enforcement staff, we categorized the violation at Severity Level IV. The violation was evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRC=s Web site at (http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html).
The violation is cited in the enclosed Notice of Violation (NOV) and the circumstances surrounding it are described in detail in the subject inspection report. The violation is being cited in the Notice and a response is required because no corrective action had been taken to restore compliance since the issue was entered in your corrective action program in December 2009. You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In particular, the NRC is interested in any human performance issues associated with performance of 10 CFR 50.54(q) reviews of Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level changes for all Exelon facilities.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response, will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Hironori Peterson, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety
Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457 License Nos. NPF-72; NPF-77
Enclosures:
1. Notice of Violation 2. Inspection Report 05000456/2010503(DRS);
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
REGION III==
Docket Nos:
50-456; 50-457 License Nos:
05000456/2010503(DRS); 05000457/2010503(DRS)
Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC Facility:
Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:
Braceville, Illinois Dates:
June 16, 2010 through February 10, 2011 Inspectors:
Robert Jickling, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector Approved by:
Hironori Peterson, Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety
Enclosure 2
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Inspection Report (IR) 05000456/2010503(DRS), 05000457/2010503(DRS); 06/16/2010 -
02/10/2011; Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2; results of U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Inspection and Follow-up of Unresolved Item (URI)05000456/2009005-07; 05000457/2009005-07.
This report covers an approximate 6-month period of follow-up inspection and review of the licensees emergency action level and plan changes. One Green finding was identified by the inspector. The finding involved a Severity Level IV Cited Violation (NOV) of NRC regulations.
The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process. Findings for which the Significance Determination Process does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.
A.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
NRC-Identified
and Self-Revealed Findings
- Severity Level IV/Green The violation affected the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function because it involved implementing a change that decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan without NRC Commission approval. Therefore, this issue was evaluated using Traditional Enforcement. The NRC determined that a Severity Level IV violation was appropriate due to the reduction of the capability to perform a risk significant planning standard function in a timely manner. The violation is cited because no corrective action had been taken to restore compliance since the issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program in December 2009.
. A Green finding involving a Severity Level IV, Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) was identified by the inspector for the licensees change to the emergency plan which decreased the effectiveness of the plan without NRC approval.
Specifically, the licensee modified the Emergency Action Level (EAL) Basis in EAL HU6,
Revision 21, to delay the 15-minute classification time by the dispatching of personnel, reporting the notification of a fire from the field, and extinguishing the fire. As a result, this change indefinitely extends the start of the 15-minute emergency classification clock beyond a credible notification that a fire is occurring or indication of a valid fire detection system alarm. This change decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan by reducing the capability to perform a risk significant planning function in a timely manner.
The performance deficiency was more than minor and of very low safety-significance using Manual Chapter (MC) 0612 and MC 0609, Appendix B, because it is associated with the emergency preparedness cornerstone attribute of procedure quality for EAL and emergency plan changes, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, the performance deficiency was a finding. Using MC 0609, Appendix B, the inspector determined that the finding had a very low safety significance. The inspectors also determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, decision-making because the licensee did not recognize that the change made to the EAL basis document decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan.
(H.1.(b)) (Section 1EP4)
B.
No violations of significance were identified.
Licensee-Identified Violations
1.
REACTOR SAFETY
REPORT DETAILS
Cornerstones: Emergency Preparedness 1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes
.1
a.
Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes This inspection was a follow-up review of Unresolved Item (URI)05000456/2009005-07; URI 05000457/2009005-07. The issue was identified in December 2009 during a routine review of changes implemented to the Braidwood Station Emergency Plan Annex Emergency Action Level (EAL) and EAL Basis. The inspector reviewed applicable licensee documents and had discussions with licensee personnel.
Inspection Scope
b. Findings
Introduction A Green finding involving a Severity Level IV, Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) was identified by the inspector for the licensees change to the emergency plan which decreased the effectiveness of the plan without U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approval.
Description:
The Radiological Emergency Plan Annex for Braidwood Station, Revision 20, EAL HU6 provided the basis for declaring an Unusual Event due to a fire in the protected area not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection. The EAL HU6 Basis, Revision 20, stated in part: The 15-minute period begins with a credible notification that a fire is occurring or indication of a valid fire detection system alarm. A verified alarm is assumed to be an indication of a fire unless personnel dispatched to the scene disprove the alarm within the 15-minute period. The report, however, shall not be required to verify the alarm.
On March 28, 2008, Braidwood Station staff implemented Revision 21 of the EAL HU6 Basis which added the following text: The 15-minute period to extinguish the fire begins with a credible notification that a fire is occurring or indication of a valid fire detection system alarm. If the alarm cannot be verified by redundant Control Room or nearby fire panel indications, notification from the field that a fire exists starts the 15-minute classification and fire extinguishment clocks. The 15-minute period to extinguish the fire does not start until either the fire alarm is verified to be valid by utilization of additional Control Room or nearby fire panel instrumentation, or upon notification of a fire from the field.
Revision 21 of the EAL HU6 Basis allowed delay of the 15-minute classification time by the dispatching of personnel, reporting the notification of a fire from the field, and extinguishing the fire. As a result, this change indefinitely extended the start of the 15-minute emergency classification clock beyond a credible notification that a fire is occurring or indication of a valid fire detection system alarm. This was determined to be a decrease in effectiveness of the licensees emergency plan because the change reduced the capability to perform a risk significant planning standard function in a timely manner. This change was not submitted to the NRC for prior approval.
Analysis The inspector determined that the change made by the licensee to the EAL HU6 Basis decreased the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan and the change was implemented without prior NRC approval. The issue was determined to be a licensee performance deficiency that impacted the regulatory process and, in accordance with Manual Chapter (MC) 0612 Power Reactor Inspection Reports, was evaluated using the NRCs traditional enforcement policy as well as the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP).
Using the NRCs Enforcement Policy, this violation met Example c.2 in Section 6.6: A licensees ability to meet or implement any regulatory requirement related to assessment or notification is degraded such that the effectiveness of the emergency plan decreases.
Although the regulatory requirement could be implemented during the response to an actual emergency, the implementation would be degraded (e.g., not fully effective, inappropriately delayed). Specifically, the change made to the EAL Basis directly affected the Risk Significant Planning Standard Classification, which affected assessment of event conditions. Therefore, this violation met the example for Severity Level III. However, the NRC has classified this violation as a Severity Level IV, after determining that its actual and potential safety significance was very low based on the following considerations:
- (1) the issue involved only one Unusual Event EAL, and not any of the other higher event classifications; and
- (2) the issue could delay classification but would not prevent classification.
Using MC 0612 Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, the performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor and, therefore, a finding, because it is associated with the emergency preparedness cornerstone attribute of procedure quality for EAL and emergency plan changes, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, the licensee made a change to its EAL Basis, which was a decrease in effectiveness, because the change indefinitely extended the start of the 15-minute emergency classification clock beyond a credible notification that a fire is occurring or indication of a valid fire detection system alarm. Also, this change was made without prior NRC approval.
The inspector determined the finding could be evaluated using the Significance Determination Process (SDP) in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC)0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process. The finding is a failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.54(q) involving the risk significant planning standard 50.47(b)(4), which, in this case, is not considered degraded. This EAL Classification finding is Green because it involved one Unusual Event classifications (EAL HU6).
This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, decision-making, because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions when making decisions and did not demonstrate that nuclear safety was an overriding priority.
Specifically, the licensee changed its EAL Basis to indefinitely extend the start of the 15-minute emergency classification clock beyond a credible notification that a fire is occurring or indication of a valid fire detection system alarm for one EAL HU6. This change was screened through the licensees 50.54(q) process and was not identified as a decrease in effectiveness. However, after evaluation by the inspector, this change was determined to be a decrease in effectiveness of the emergency plan which was not approved by the NRC before the change was implemented.
Enforcement Title 10 of the CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, AA licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear power reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the standards in '50.47(b) and the requirements in Appendix E of this part.
The nuclear power reactor licensee may make changes to these plans without Commission approval only if the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the standards of '50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to this part.
Title 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) states, in part, A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.@
Contrary to the above, as of March 28, 2008, the licensee made a change to the emergency classification process which decreased the effectiveness of their emergency plan and caused the emergency plan to no longer meet the standards of 50.47(b) and Appendix E to this part without Commission approval. Specifically, the licensee modified the EAL Basis in EAL HU6, Revision 21, to delay the 15-minute classification time by the dispatching of personnel, reporting the notification of a fire from the field, and extinguishing the fire. As a result, this change indefinitely extended the start of the 15-minute emergency classification clock beyond a credible notification that a fire is occurring or indication of a valid fire detection system alarm. This change decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan by reducing the capability to perform a risk significant planning function in a timely manner.
This violation impacted the regulatory process, was of very low safety significance and was also entered into the licensees corrective action program as IR 01008718 dated December 22, 2009. The violation is being cited in the Notice and a response is required because no corrective action had been taken to restore compliance since the issue was entered in your corrective action program in December 2009. This violation is determined to be a Severity Level IV Cited Violation, consistent with Section 2.3.3 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NOV 05000456/2010503-01; NOV 05000457/2010503-01).
This issue has also been dispositioned as a Finding of very low safety significance (Green) (FIN 05000456/2010503-01, FIN 05000457/2010503-01).
The URI 05000456/2009005-07; URI 05000457/2009503-07, Changes to EAL HU6 Potentially Decreased the Effectiveness of the Plans without Prior NRC Approval is closed.
4OA6
.1 Management Meetings
On February 10, 2011, the inspectors discussed the inspection results by telephone with Mr. D. Enright, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issue presented. The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered proprietary.
Exit Meetings ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
- D. Enright, Site Vice President
Licensee
- K. Aleshire, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Manager
- S. Butler, Emergency Preparedness Manager
- V. Cwietniewicz, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Manager
- A. Daniels, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Manager
- D. Drawbaugh, Byron Emergency Preparedness Manager
- R. Gaston, Regulatory Assurance Manager
- J. Gerrity, Regulatory Assurance
- K. Kemper, Corporate Emergency Preparedness Director
- H. Peterson, Chief, Operations Branch, Division Reactor Safety
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
- E. Duncan, Chief, Branch 3, Division of Reactor Projects
- J. Beavers, Emergency Preparedness Inspector
LIST OF ITEMS
OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED
Opened
- 05000457/2010503-01 VIO (Traditional Enforcement) Changes to EAL Basis Decreases the Effectiveness of the Plan without Prior NRC Approval (1EP4.1)
- 05000457/2010503-01 FIN Changes Made to EAL Basis that Decreased the Effectiveness (1EP4.1)
Closed
URI Changes to EAL HU6 Potentially Decreased the Effectiveness of the Plans without Prior NRC Approval (1EP4.1)
Discussed
None