ML17244A180

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Application for Amend to License DPR-18,changing Tech Specs to Reflect Overpressure Protection Sys Requirements.Safety Evaluation & Justification for Continued Operation Encl
ML17244A180
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 10/11/1978
From: WHITE L D
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17244A179 List:
References
TASK-05-03, TASK-5-3, TASK-RR NUDOCS 7810190069
Download: ML17244A180 (17)


Text

UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICANUCIEARREGULATORY COMMISSION IntheMatterofRochester GasandElectricCorporation (R.E.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.,UnitNo.l))))DocketNo.50-244))APPLICATION FORAMENDMENT TOOPERATING LICENSEPursuanttoSection50.90oftheregulations oftheU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission (the"Commission"

),Rochester GasandElectricCorporation

("RG&E"),

holderofProvisional Operating LicenseNo.DPR-18,herebyrequeststhattheTechnical Specifica-tionssetforthinAppendixAtothatlicensebeamendedtoincludereactoroverpressure protection systemrequirements.

Theproposedtechnical specification changeisset.forthinAttachment AtothisApplication.

Asafetyevaluation issetforthinAttachment, B.Thisevaluation alsodemonstrates thattheproposedchangedoesnotinvolveasignificant changeinthetypesorasignificant increaseintheamountsofeffluents oranychangeintheauthorized powerlevelofthefacility.

Justifi-cationforclassification oftheamendment pursuantto10C.F.R.Section170.22isincludedasAttachment, C.Acheckfortheappropriate feeaccompanies thisApplication.

lS(o]qoo6q WHEREFORE, Applicant respectfully requeststhat.AppendixAtoProvisional Operating LicenseNo.DPR-l8beamendedintheformattachedheretoasAttachment A.Rochester GasandElectricCorporation ByL.D.Whxe,Jr.VicePresident, ElectricandSteamProduction Subscribed andsworntobeforemeonthis///FLBayofOctober,1978.GARYL.REISSNOTARYPUBLIC,StatoofN.Y.MonroeCo.MyCommtssioo ExpiresMarchpp,19,./yg Attachment AFigure3.10-2isnotmet,theplantshallbetakentothehotshutdowncondition andtheoneloopshutdownmarginshallbemet.d.Atleastonereactorcoolantpumpshallbeinoperation foraplannedtransition fromoneReactorOperating Modetoanotherinvolving anincreaseintheboronconcentration ofthereactorcoolant.e.AreactorcoolantpumpshallnotbestartedwithoneormoreoftheRCScoldlegtemperatures

<330'Funless1)thepressurizer watervolume7slessthan324cubicfeet(38%level)or2)thesecondary watertemperature ofeachsteamgenerator islessthan50'FaboveeachoftheRCScoldlegtemperatures.

3.1.1.2SteamGenerator a.Onesteamgenerator shallbecapableofperforming itsheattransferfunctionwhenevertheaveragecoolanttemperature isabove350'F.b.Thetemperature difference acrossthetubesheetshallnotexceed100'F.3.1.1.3SafetValvesa~Atleastonepressurizer codesafetyvalveshallbeoperablewheneverthereactorheadisonthevessel.b.Bothpressurizer codesafetyvalvesshallbeoperablewheneverthereactoriscritical.

Basis:Whentheboronconcentration ofthereactorcoolantsystemistobereducedtheprocessmustbeuniformtopreventsuddenreactivity changesinthereactor.Mixingofthereactorcoolantwillbesufficient 3+12Proposed

Eachofthepressurizer codesafetyvalvesisdesignedtorelieve288,000lbs.perhr.ofsaturated steamatthevalvesetpoint.Below350'Fand350psiginthereactorcoolantsystem,theresidualheatremovalsystemcanremovedecayheatandtherebycontrolsystemtemperature andpressure.

Ifnoresidualheat.wereremovedbyanyofthemeansavailable theamountofsteamwhichcouldbegenerated atsafetyvalvereliefpressurewouldbelessthanhalfthevalves'apacity.

Onevalvetherefore providesadequatedefenseagainstoverpressurization.

Prohibiting reactorcoolantpumpstartswithoutalargevoidinthepressurizer orwithoutalimitedRCStemperature differential willpreventRCSoverpressurization duetoexpansion ofcoolerRCSwaterasitentersawarmersteamgenerator.

A38%levelinthepressurizer willaccommodate theswellresulting fromareactorcoolantpumpstartwithaRCStemperature of140'Fandsteamgenerator secondary sidetemperature of340'F,orthemaximumtemperature whichusuallyexistspriortocoolingthereactorwiththeRHRsystem.Thespecification permitsanorderlyreduction inpowerifareactorcoolant(gamp islostduringoperation between130MWTand50%ofratedpower.Above50%power,anautomatic reactortripwilloccurifeitherpumpislost.Thepower-to-flow ratiowillbemaintained equaltoorlessthanonewhichensuresthattheminimumDNBratioincreases atlowerflowsincethemaximumenthalpyrisedoesnotincrease.

Temperature requirements forthesteamgenerator'correspond withmeasuredNDTfortheshellandallowable thermalstressesinthetubesheet.References (1)FSARSection14.1.6(2)FSARSection7.2.3Proposed c~Oneboricacidtankmaybeoutofserviceprovidedaminimumof2,000gallonsofa12%to13%byweightboricacidsolutionatatemperature ofatleast145'Fiscontained intheoperabletankandprovidedthatthetankisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin24hours.d.Onechannelofheattracingmaybeoutofserviceprovideditisrestoredtooperablestatuswithin24hours.3.2.4Basis:Wheneverthereactorcoolantsystemis>200'FandisbeingcooledbytheRHRsystemandtheoverpressure protection systemisnotoperable, atleastonechargingpumpshallbedemonstrated inoperable at,leastonceper12hoursbyverifying thatthecontrolswitchisinthepull-stop position.

Thechemicalandvolumecontrolsystemprovidescontrolofthereactorcoolantsystemboroninventory.

Thisisnormallyaccomplished byusingeitheroneofthethreechargingpumpsinserieswithoneofthetwoboricacidpumps.Analternate methodofborationwillbetousethechargingpumpsdirectlyfromtherefueling waterstoragetank.Athirdmethodwillbetodepressurize andusethesafetyinjection pumps.Therearetwosourcesofboratedwateravailable forinjection throughthreedifferent paths.(1)Theboricacidtransferpumpscandelivertheboricacidtankcontents(12%concentration ofboricacid)tothechargingpumps.(2)Thechargingpumpscantakesuctionfromtherefueling waterstoragetank.(2,000ppmboronsolution)

(3)Thesafetyinjection pumpscantaketheirsuctionsfromeithertheboricacidtanksortherefueling waterstoragetank.Thequantityofboricacidinstoragefromeithertheboricacidtanksortherefueling waterstoragetankissufficient toborate.thereactorcoolant.inordertoreachcoldshutdownatanytimeduringcorelife.Approximately 1800gallonsofthe12%to13%solutiqy)of boricacidare.requiredtomeetcoldshutdowncondi-tions.'hus, aminimumof2000gallonsintheboricacidtanksisspecified.

Anupperconcentration limitof13%boricacidinthetankisspecified tomaintainsolutionsolubility atthespeci-fiedlowtemperature limitof145'F.Twochannelsofheattracingareinstalled onlinesnormallycontaining concentrated boricacidsolutiontomaintainthespecified lowtemperature limit,.3~23Proposed Placingachargingpumpinpull-stop wheneverthereactorcoolantsystemtemperature is>200'FandisbeingcooledbyRHRwithout,theoverpressure protection systemoperablewillpreventinadvertayP) overpressurization oftheRHRsystemshouldletdownbeterminated.

References:

(1)FSAR,Section9.2(2)FSAR,Page9.2-37(3)L.D.White,Jr.lettertoA.Schwencer, NRC,datedFebruary24,19773.2-4Proposed (ii)Thetworeactorcoolantdraintankpumpsshallbetestedandtheiroperability demon-stratedpriortoinitiating repairsoftheinoperable residualheatremovalpump.d.Oneresidualheatexchanger maybeoutofserviceforaperiodofnomorethan24hours.e.Anyvalverequiredforthefunctioning ofthesafetyinjection orresidualheatremovalsystemsmaybeinoperable providedrepairsarecompleted within12hours.Priortoinitiating repairs,allvalvesinthesystemsthatprovidetheduplicate functionshallbetestedtodemonstrate operability.

3.3.1.3f.Powermayberestoredtoanyvalvereferenced in3.3.1.1gforthepurposesofvalvetestingproviding nomorethanonesuchvalvehaspowerrestoredandprovidedtestingiscompleted andpowerremovedwithin12hours.Exceptduringdieselgenerator loadandsafeguard sequencetestingorwhenthevesselheadisremovedorthesteamgenerator manwayisopenamaximumofonesafetyinjection pumpshallbeoperablewheneverthetemperature ofoneormoreoftheRCScoldlegsis<330'F.3.3.1.3.1 3.3.23.3.2.1Wheneveramaximumofonesafetyinjection pumpmaybeoperableby3.3.1.3atleasttwoofthesafetyinjection pumpsshallbedemonstrated inoperable atleastoncepertwelvehoursbyverifying thatthecontrolswitchesareinthepull-stop position.

Containment CoolinandIodineRemovalThereactorshallnotbemadecriticalexceptforlowtemperature physicstests,unlessthefollowing condi-tionsaremet:a~b.c~Thesprayadditivetankcontainsnotlessthan4500gallonsofsolutionwithasodiumhydroxide concentration ofnotlessthan30%byweight.Atleasttwocontainment spraypumpsare'perable.

Atleastthreefancoolerunitsareoperable.

3.3-4Proposed

'untilrepairswereeffected.

Thefacilityhasfourservicewaterpumps.Onlyoneisneededduringtheinjection phase,andtwoarerequiredduringtherecirculation phaseofapostulated loss-of-coolant accident.

(8)Thelimitsfortheaccumulator pressureandvolumeassurethere-quiredamountofwaterinjection duringanaccident, andarebasedonvaluesusedfortheaccidentanalyses.

Theindicated levelof50%corresponds to1108cubicfeetofwaterintheaccumulator andtheindicated levelof82%corresponds to1134cubicfeet.Thelimitation foramaximumofonesafetyinjection pumptobeoperableandthesurveillance requirement toverifythattwosafetyinjection pumpsareinoperable below330'Fprovidesassurance thatamassadditionpressuretransient canberelievedbytheoperation ofasinglePORV.3~312Proposed 3.15OveressureProtection Sstem~lb1Applieswheneverthetemperature ofoneormoreoftheRCScoldlegsis<330'F.Ob'ctiveTopreventoverpressurization ofthereactorcoolantsystem.Secification 3.15.1Atleastoneofthefollowing overpressure protection systemsshallbeoperable:

a.Twopressurizer poweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)withaliftsettingof<435psig,orb.Areactorcoolantsystemventof>1.1squareinches.3.15.1.1WithonePORVinoperable, eitherrestoretheinoperable PORVtooperablestatuswithin7daysordepressurize andventtheRCSthrougha1.1squareinchvent(s)withinthenext8hours;maintaintheRCSinaventedcondition untilbothPORVshavebeenrestoredtooperablestatus.3.15.1.23.15.1.3WithbothPORVsinoperable, depressurize andventtheRCSthrougha1.1squareinchvent(s)within8hours;maintaintheRCSinaventedcondition untilbothPORVshavebeenrestoredtooperablestatus.Useoftheoverpressure protection systemtomitigateaRCSpressuretransient shallbereportedinaccordance with6.9.3.BasisTheoperability oftwopressurizer PORVsoranRCSventopeningofgreaterthan1.1squareinchesensuresthattheRCSwillbeprotected frompressuretransients whichcouldexceedthelimitsofAppendixGto10CFRPart50whenoneormoreoftheRCScoldlegsare<330'F.EitherPORVhasadequaterelieving capability toprotecttheRCSfromoverpressurization whenthetransient, islimitedtoeither(1)thestartofanidleRCPwiththesecondary watertemperature ofthesteamgenerator

<50'FabovetheRCScoldlegtemperature or(2)thestartof~1~afetyinjection pumpanditsinjection intoawatersolidRCS.

References:

(1)L.D.White,Jr.lettertoA.Schwencer, NRC,datedJuly29,19773.15-1Proposed OveressureProtection SstemAlicabilit

Appliestothereactorcoolantsystemoverpressure protection system.Ob'ective:

Toverifythattheoverpressure protection systemwillfunctionproperlyifneeded.Secification EachPORVshallbedemonstrated operableby:a~Performance ofachannelfunctional testonthePORVactuation channel,butexcluding valveopera-tion,within31dayspriortoenteringacondition inwhichthePORVisrequiredoperableandatleastonceper31daysthereafter whenthePORVisrequiredoperable.

b.Performance ofachannelcalibration onthePORVactuation channelat,leastonceper18months.c.Verifying thePORVisolation valveisopenatleastonceper72hourswhentheoverpressure protection systemisrequiredtobeoperable.

TheRCSvent(s)shallbeverifiedtobeopenatleastonceper12hourswhenthevent(s)isbeingusedforoverpressure protection exceptwhenthevent,pathwayisprovidedwithavalvewhichislocked,sealed,orotherwise securedintheopenposition.

Thenverifythesevalvesopenatleastonceper31days.Proposed (2)Annually:

Atabulation onanannualbasisofthenumberofstation,utilityandotherper-sonnel(including contractors) receiving ex-posuresgreaterthan200mrem/yrandtheirassociated manremexposureaccording toworkandjobfunctions, e.g.,reactoroperations andsurveillance, inservice inspection, routinemaintenance, specialmaintenance (describe maintenance),

wasteprocessing, andrefueling.

Thedoseassignment tovariousdutyfunctions maybeestimates basedonpocketdosimeter, TU),orfilmbadgemeasure-ments.Smallexposures totalling lessthan20%oftheindividual totaldoseneednotbeaccounted for.Intheaggregate, atleast80%ofthetotalwholebodydosereceivedfromexternalsourcesshallbeassignedtospecificmajorworkfunctions.

(NOTE:Thistabulation supplements there-quirements ofSection20.407of10CFRPart20.)ReactorOverpressure Protection SystemOperation IntheeventeitherthePORVsortheRCSvent(s)areusedtomitigateaRCSpressuretransient, aSpecialReportshallbepreparedandsubmitted totheCommission within30days.Thereportshalldescribethecircumstances initiating thetransient, theeffectofthePORVsorvent(s)onthetransient andanyothercorrective actionnecessary topreventrecurrence.

6.9-10Proposed Attachment BAreactorcoolantsystemoverpressure protection systemhasbeeninstalled atR.E.Ginnatomitigatepressuretransients thatmightotherwise exceedthoselimitswhicharebaseduponAppendixGto10CFRPart50.Thesystemisdesignedtomitigatetransients whichmayresultfrompersonnel error,equipment malfunction orprocedural deficiencies.

Adescription ofthissystemwasprovidedinlettersfromMr.L.D.White,Jr.,Rochester GasandElectricCorporation, toMr.A.Schwencer, U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission, datedFebruary24,1977,March31,1977,andJuly29,1977.Theoverpressure protection systemwillpreventawatersolidreactorcoolantsystemfromexceeding apressureof535psigforasafetyinjection pumpdischarging tothereactorcoolantsystem,areactorcoolantpumpstartwitha50'Ftemperature differential betweentheprimaryandsecondary systemorlessseveremassinputorheatinputtransients.

Thespecification prohibiting reactorcoolantpumpstartsunlessthefilledpressurizer volumeislessthan324ft(38%level)orunlessthetemperature differential betweentheprimaryandsecondary systemsislessthan50'Fwillproperlylimitheatinput,transients.

Apressurizer levelof38%willaccommodate theswellresulting fromareactorcoolantpumpstartwithareactortemperature of140'Fandsteamgenerator temperature of340'Fwithouttheneedforoperation oftheoverpressure protec-tionsystem.Relieffromthepressurizer poweroperatedreliefvalves(PORVs)would,however,increasethemarginbetweenthepeaktransient pressureandthelimitofTechnical Specification 3.1.2.Withnogasorsteambubbleinthepressurizer theover-pressureprotection systemwillbyitselfpregytthepressurefromexceeding Technical Specification 3.1.2.Thespecification tolimitthenumberofchargingpumpswhichmaybeoperablewhenthereactorcoolantsystemtemperature isgreaterthan200'Fandtheoverpressure protection systemisinoperable willpreventapotential overpressurization oftheresidualheatremovalsystem(RHR)shouldletdownbeisolated.

AnalysishasshownthattheRHRsystemcanrelievetheinputfromthreechargingpumpswhenthereactorcoolantsystemtemperature islessthan200'Fandcanrelievetheinputoftwocyygingpumpsattemperatures greaterthanorequalto200'F.Thecombinedcapacityof3chargingpumpsislessthanthat,ofonesafetyinjection pumpandwillnotproducetransient pressures greaterthanthosewhichcanbemitigated bytheoverpressure protection systemwhenthatsystemisoperable.

Proposedspecification 3.3.1.3willprohibitmorethanonesafetyinjection pumpfrombeingoperablewhenoneormoreoftheRCScoldlegtemperatures islessthanorequalto330'Fexceptduringdieselgenerator loadandsafeguard sequencetestingorwhenthevesselheadisremovedorthesteamgenerator manwayisopen.Theshutoffheadofthesafetyinjection pumpsislessthan1500psig,apressurewellbelowtheallowable pressurefor RCStemperatures of330'Fandabove.Allsafetyinjection pumpsmaybeoperablefortemperatures above330'F;onepumpmaybeoperablebelow330'F,whenthepotential foroverpressure transients exists,becauseof~)emitigating effectoftheoverpressure protection system.Whenthereactorheadisremovedorwhenasteamgenerator manwayisopenapotential foroverpressurization doesnotexistandthereisnorestriction onsafetyinjection pumpoperation.

Duringdieselgenerator loadandsafeguard sequencetestingextraprecautions aretakentopreventsafetyinjection pumpdischarge tothereactorcoolantsystem.Thepumpdischarge valvesareclosed,thevalvebreakersareopenedandtheDCcontrolfusesareremoved.Theseprecautions reducethepotential foroverpressurization toanacceptable levelduringthetestperiod.Surveillance ofthepumpcontrolsoncepertwelvehourswhenonlyonepumpmaybeoperableisappropriate topreventinadvertent pumpstarts.Proposedspecification 3.15requiresthatanoverpressure protection systembeoperablewhenoneormoreoftheRCScoldlegtemperatures islessthanorequalto330'F.Fortemperatures greaterthan330'Ftheallowable RCSpressureisgreaterthanthenormalreliefpressureofthetwopressurizer poweroperatedreliefvalvessothatnootheroverpressure protection isrequired.

Below330'FeachofthePORVs,usingalowpressuresetpointof435psig,willmitigatepressuretransients inawater-solid RCSresulting fromthedischarge ofasinglesafetyinjection pumporthestartingofareactorcoolantpumpwitha50'Ftemyy~ature differential betweenthereactorandsteamgenerators.

A1.1squareinchventistheorificeareaequivalent tothatofasinglePORV.BecauseeachofthePORVswillprovideoverpressure protec-tion,7daysisanacceptable timeduringwhichoneofthePORVsmaybeinoperable.

Aftersevendays,orintheeventthatbothPORVsareinoperable, 8hoursisanacceptable periodoftimetoestablish aRCSventandisarelatively shortperiodoftimetobewithoutadditional overpressure protection.

Proposedspecification 4.16requiresappropriate actiontoassurethattheoverpressure protection systemfunctions properly.

Achannelfunctional testwillbeperformed priortothetimethatthesystemisrequiredtobeoperableandatleastonceevery31daysthereafter whenit,isoperable.

Achannelcalibra-tionwillbeperformed atleastonceevery18months.Thesetestsandcalibrations aresimilarinnatureandfrequency tothosewhichareperformed onplantprotection systemseventhoughthissystemdoesnotperformwhat,isconsidered tobeasafetyfunction.

Verification thatthePORVisolation valveisopenatleastonceevery72hourswhentheoverpressure protection systemisrequiredtobeoperablewillprovideappropriate assurance thattheoverpressure protection functionhasnotbeeninadvertently defeated.

(1)LetterfromL.D.White,Jr.,Rochester Gas6ElectricCorporation, toA.Schwencer, NuclearRegulatory Commission, July29,1977.(2)LetterfromL.D.White,Jr.,Rochester Gas&ElectricCorporation, toA.Schwencer, NuclearRegulatory Commission, February24,1977 Attachment CTheproposedAmendment.

totheProvisional Operating Licensehasbeenevaluated anddetermined tofallwithinthedefinition ofClassIIIof10C.F.R.Section170.22therebyreguiring afeeof94,000.Theproposedamendment dealswithasinglesafetyissue,over-pressureprotection ofthereactorvessel.Theissuehasbeenclearlyidentified byanNRCposition.

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