ML20154P897
| ML20154P897 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 09/27/1988 |
| From: | Gardner R, Neisler J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154P871 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-341-88-24, GL-83-28, GL-85-14, GL-85-22, IEB-81-03, NUDOCS 8810030218 | |
| Download: ML20154P897 (7) | |
See also: IR 05000341/1988024
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C069tISSION
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Report No. 50-341/88024(DRS)
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Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-43 :
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Licensee: The Detroit Edison Company .
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2000 Second Avenue
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Facility Name: Fenni 2
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Inspection At: Fer:ni Site Monroe, Michigan
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Inspection Conducted: August 15 through September 9, 1988 j
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Inspector: J. H. Neisler 1
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Ronald N. Gardner, Chief 9[27fff
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Plant Systems Section Date
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Inspection Suninary
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Inspection on August 15 through September 9, 1988 (Report No. 50-341/88024(DRS)) f
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Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection of licensee's implementation of !
j Generic Letter 83-28 in the areas of ecuipment classification, vendor i
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t interface, post maintenance testing anc reactor protection system reliability.
IE Bulletins and open item followup. (25564)(25595)(92700)
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l SIMS 75 (B-77, B-78 B-79. B-80, R-86, B-87, B-88, B-92, B-93) MPA-C-02, ;
j Rssults: Of the four areas inspected, no violations or deviations were !
i identTTied in three areas. One violation was identified in the remaining area l
1 (inadequate procedures to control vendor technical information). Within the i
j scope of this report a weakness was observed regarding the inadequate control i
- of vendor equipment technical information. No significant strengths were i
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DETAILS -
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1. Persons Contacted
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Principle Licensee Employees [
, *S. G. Catola, Vice President, Naclear Engineering ,
i *W. S. Orser, Vice President, Nuclear Operations i
- *D. R. Gipson, Plant Manager ;
- P. Anthony, Compliance Engineer
- T. Riley, Supervisor, Compliance ,
- R. Nathews, General Supervisor, Instrument and Controls ,
- C. Gelletly, Director, Nuclear Engineering
- R. Stafford, Director, Nuclear Quality Assurance
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- L. Goodman, Director, Nuclear Licensing
i *T. Musseman, Supervisor, Nuclear Training
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G. Shukla, Licensing :
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J. Pendergast, Licensing j
j A. Elibe, NPRDS ,
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G. Booker, Production Information Center
- D. Delk, Supervision, QA Programs [
- R. Bailey, Supervisor, Production QA 1
i J. Kepus, Environmental Programs Coordinator
, B. Wickham, Supervisor, Maintenance Programs .
! B. Catanese, Maintenance Support Supervisor i
1 R. Ballis, Engineering Supervisor !&C
R. O'Sullivan, Surveillance Coordinator
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! * Denotes those persons attending the exit interview. l
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l 2. TI 2515/64RI (SIMS 75) (Closed) :
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a. Equipment Classification !
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f The inspector selected four components in the reactor protection l
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Reactor Protection System Core Spray System (E2Q !
! Mode Switch Core Spray Pump C001A ,
! Scram Auxiliary Contactor Core Spray Pump Motor ,
- Pilot Valve Solenoid Core Sara / Pump Circuit !
l Manual Scram Switch Breater
! Flow Transmitter N006A
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Pressure Transnitter N007A
Notor Operated Valve F036A
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Motor Operated Valve F005A
Check Valve F003A
Ficw Element FE-N001A
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For the selected components, the inspector performed the following
reviews:
(1) The inspector reviewed the licensee's safety-related component
list. At Fermi, the Q-List was replaced by the Fermi Central
Component Data Base (CECO), a computerized listing that is used
to identify safety-related components. The inspector selected
several components from system drawings and verified that these
components were properly identified in the data and that they
were correctly classified as safety-related or non-safety-related
components.
(2) Todeterminethelevelofplantmanarjementoversight,the
inspector reviewed procedures contro ling the classification of
structures, systems and components; preventive and corrective
maintenance; modifications; procurement, storage and issue;
inspection and testing of safety-related items; quality
assurance procedures, audits and surveillances; and corporate
level procedures and d:rectives for activities impacting
safety-related structures, systems and components.
(3) The inspector reviewed surveillance procedures, calibration
procedures, maintenance procedures and instructions functional
test procedures and storage procedures to verify that the
licensee has issued adequate procedures and instructions for
the perfomance of safety-related activities.
(4) The inspector reviewed the licensee's program and implementing
procedures for the training and indoctrination of technicians,
craft workers, staff engineers, planners and supervisors whose
duties include safety-related activities. Training records
indicated that the above personnel were being trained according
to applicable procedures.
(5) The inspector reviewed 12 audit reports and 19 surveillance
reports dccumenting Quality Assurance audits and surveillances
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involving safety-related activities. The quality assurance
organization maintains a schedule of planned audits and
surveillances of safety-related activities at the plant and at
offsite vendor and supplier organizations.
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(6) The corrective action program for safety-related activities is
described in the licensee's Quality Assurance Manual and
implementing procedures. The inspector's review of corrective
action for audit and surveillance findings listed in the audits
and surveillances in (5) above revealed that corrective action
for those findings was timely and adequate.
(7) Review and evaluation of infonnation concerning malfunctioning
equipment is controlled by the licensee's procedure
i P0M 12.000.059, "Operating Experience Assessment," by Deviation
i Events Reports and Nonconfonnance and Corrective action
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procedures. Included in the reviews and evaluation is the
detemination of the suitability of the equipment to perform j
its design function. ;
(8) The inspector reviewed modification packages involving the
reactor 3rotection system and the core spray system. The
design c1anges, work requests, drawings, inspection documents
and procurement packages were correctly identified as to their
safety classification.
b. Vendor Interface
The inspector reviewed procadures controlling the licensee's vendor
equipment technical information program. The procedures reviewed were
FMD 2.5.10. Revision 0, "Document Control," and NE 2.5.10, Revision 3
"Vendor Manuals". These procedures have no requirement to collect,
review, and control existing vendor technical infomation pertaining
to plant safety-related structures, systems, and cuoponents that are
in possession of individuals, shops, or departments onsite. The
inspector observed vendor information in each building visited
but there was no indication that the infortnation had been reviewed
to determine its applicability to plant components. During
discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector was infomed that
individuals and shops were in possession of uncontrolled and
unreviewed vendor manuals.
One of the manuals the inspector selected for review was the vendor
manual for the core spray pump discharge check valve, a safety-related
code valve that was included in the licensee's inservice inspection
program. The inspector was informed by personnel in the plant
Information Center (PIC) that the manual was in use and had not been
reviewed and approved. The licensee issued DER 88-1532 after the
inspector had identified the unreviewed and unapproved vendor manual.
Based on the above examples, the inspector determined that Fermi 2
procedures controlling the vendor equipment technical infomation
program are not adequate to assure that current, approved
technical information is used in the performance of safety-related
activities. This is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion VI (50-341/88024-01).
c. Post Maintenance Testing
The inspector selected components from the reactor ]rotection system
dnd the core spray system for review to ascertain w1 ether the licensee
was implementing i post maintenance test program.
For the selected corrponents, the inspector determined that:
(1) Written post maintenance test proceduros and checklists have
been developed by the plant staff. The inspector reviewed
procedures, tests, and conpleted work requests to verify that
post maintenance testing was being accomplished on the selected
components in accordance with the licensee's cennitments.
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(2) Criteria and responsibilities for maintenance approvals and for
designating activities as safety-related or non-safety-related
have been established in work request and modification
procedures. Criteria for post maintenance testing and
inspections are delineated in work request procedures, quality
inspection procedures and maintenance support planning
procedures.
(3) Methods for performing functional testing following maintenance
activities have been developed and are delineated in published
plant operations and maintenance surveillance procedures.
(4) The inspector reviewed 26 compiled maintenance work requests
and their supporting documentation. The work requests were
appropriately classified, properly approved, and the persons who
perfonned the activity and inspections or verifications were
I identified on the work requests and supporting documentation,
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l No violations or deviations were identified.
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d. Reactor Trip Systems Reliability
At Fermi II, on-line functional testing of the scram pilot
! solenoid valves is performed with the prottetion rystem instrument
j channel functional tests at the frequency required by the plant
l Technical Specifications. The inspector reviewed test procedures
and test results for the following functional tests:
Reactor Vessel Dome Pressure - High
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low
Reactor Vessel High Steam Line Pressure - High
Average Power Range Monitor High Flux Trip
Backup Manual Scram Functional Test
Intermediate Range Monitor Trip
MSIV Closure Functional Test
Main Steam Line High Radiation
Drywell Pressure - High
Scram Discharge Volume High Level
Turbine Control Valve /Turbinc Stop Valve
The procedures appeared to be adequate and the test data dates
indicated that the testing was being accomplished as required by
Technical Specifications.
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3. Tl 2515/95 (MPA-C-02) (Closed) )
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The inspector verified by review of as-built drawings 61721-2095-30, l
Revision X, 61721-2101-02, Revision n. 61721-2101-01, Revision L and i
0!?21-2095-37, Revision G that the licensee has installed reactor l
recirculation puup trips that are actuated by either low reactor water
level or high reactor vessel pressure.
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4. Genericletter85-22(Closed)
Potential for loss of post-loca recirculation capability due to
insulation debris blockage. The inspector reviewed the licensee's
evaluation of potential blockage of suction strainers in the drywell and
torus. The bulk of the insulation is metallic reflective insulation and
the remainder is totally stainless steel encapsulated fibrous material.
Suction strainers are installed at a 45-degree angle in the torus above
the bottom of the pool or halfway between the minimum water level and the
pool bottom. The licensee concluded that the material used and the location
of the strainers at Fennt would not result in significant blockage. This
item is closed.
5. Generic Letter 85-14 (Closed)
Connercial storage at power reactor sites of low level radioactive waste
not generated by the utility. Fermi does not store low level waste not
generated by the utility onsite. Discussions with l'censee personnel
revealed that the site does not plan to store waste generated by others
at the Fermi site. This item is closed.
6. Licensee Event Report 86-044-01 (Closed)
potentially degraded torus relief line isolation capability during
postulated accident event. An environmentally induced failure of a limit
switch for a drywell vacuum breaker valve can be postulated to occur
under harsh environtrental conditions. This can result in degradation of
the division 11 power supply circuit and cause the torus vacuum breaker
isolation valve to fail open. The licensee has modified the drywell
vacuum breaker valve limit switch circuit on the "close" side to
limit the maximum current to ground. This change will prevent shorts to
ground from being cleared by the pcwer supply fuse and removing power
frcm position indication for the vacuum breaker valves or the pilot vulve
solenoid on the air operated torus vacuum breaker valve. This item is
closed.
7. Inspection and Enforcenwnt Bulletin 81-03 (Closed)
Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components by
Corbicula sp. (Asistic Clans) and Mytilus sp. (Mussels). The
inspector reviewed the licensee's program for detecting the presence
of corbicula and sampling results for the years 1987, 1906 and 1985.
The presence of corbicula was not detected in any of the sarrples during
the three sarnple years reviewed. This item is closed.
8. Open Its 85003-01 (Closed)
Clarification of differences between Technical Specificatior and ASME
Section XI requirements for declaring valves inoperable. The licensee
has revised applicable procedures to remove the ASME requirerrent frorn the
surveillance procedures. Surveillance Procedure 24.207.10 was repeated
using the proper checklists and indepetident position verification
performed >y a person other than the person perfonning the surveillance.
This item is closed.
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9. Exit Interview
The inspector met with licensee representatives listed in Paragraph 1 and
sumarized the scope and findings of the insprtion. The inspector also
discussed the likely informational content of che inspection report with
regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the
inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents or
processes as proprietary.
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