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Insp Rept 50-341/88-24 on 880815-0909.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Implementation of Generic Ltr 83-28 in Areas of Equipment Classification,Vendor interface,post-maint Testing & Reactor Protection Sys Reliability
	ML20154P897
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	09/27/1988
From:	Gardner R, Neisler J; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20154P871	List: ML20154P868; ML20154P883; ML20154P897;
References
	50-341-88-24, GL-83-28, GL-85-14, GL-85-22, IEB-81-03, NUDOCS 8810030218
	Download: ML20154P897 (7)
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY C069tISSION

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Report No. 50-341/88024(DRS)

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Docket No. 50-341 License No. NPF-43 :

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Licensee: The Detroit Edison Company .

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2000 Second Avenue

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Facility Name: Fenni 2

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Inspection At: Fer:ni Site Monroe, Michigan

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Inspection Conducted: August 15 through September 9, 1988 j

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Inspector: J. H. Neisler 1

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Ronald N. Gardner, Chief 9[27fff

j Approved By:

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Plant Systems Section Date

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Inspection Suninary

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Inspection on August 15 through September 9, 1988 (Report No. 50-341/88024(DRS)) f

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Areas Inspected: Routine announced inspection of licensee's implementation of !

j Generic Letter 83-28 in the areas of ecuipment classification, vendor i

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t interface, post maintenance testing anc reactor protection system reliability.

IE Bulletins and open item followup. (25564)(25595)(92700)

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l SIMS 75 (B-77, B-78 B-79. B-80, R-86, B-87, B-88, B-92, B-93) MPA-C-02, ;

j Rssults: Of the four areas inspected, no violations or deviations were !

i identTTied in three areas. One violation was identified in the remaining area l

1 (inadequate procedures to control vendor technical information). Within the i

j scope of this report a weakness was observed regarding the inadequate control i

of vendor equipment technical information. No significant strengths were i

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DETAILS -

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1. Persons Contacted

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Principle Licensee Employees [

, *S. G. Catola, Vice President, Naclear Engineering ,

i *W. S. Orser, Vice President, Nuclear Operations i

*D. R. Gipson, Plant Manager ;

P. Anthony, Compliance Engineer

T. Riley, Supervisor, Compliance ,

R. Nathews, General Supervisor, Instrument and Controls ,

C. Gelletly, Director, Nuclear Engineering

R. Stafford, Director, Nuclear Quality Assurance

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L. Goodman, Director, Nuclear Licensing

i *T. Musseman, Supervisor, Nuclear Training

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G. Shukla, Licensing :

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J. Pendergast, Licensing j

j A. Elibe, NPRDS ,

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G. Booker, Production Information Center

D. Delk, Supervision, QA Programs [

R. Bailey, Supervisor, Production QA 1

i J. Kepus, Environmental Programs Coordinator

, B. Wickham, Supervisor, Maintenance Programs .

! B. Catanese, Maintenance Support Supervisor i

1 R. Ballis, Engineering Supervisor !&C

R. O'Sullivan, Surveillance Coordinator

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! * Denotes those persons attending the exit interview. l

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l 2. TI 2515/64RI (SIMS 75) (Closed) :

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a. Equipment Classification !

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f The inspector selected four components in the reactor protection l

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Reactor Protection System Core Spray System (E2Q !

! Mode Switch Core Spray Pump C001A ,

! Scram Auxiliary Contactor Core Spray Pump Motor ,

Pilot Valve Solenoid Core Sara / Pump Circuit !

l Manual Scram Switch Breater

! Flow Transmitter N006A

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Pressure Transnitter N007A

Notor Operated Valve F036A

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Motor Operated Valve F005A

Check Valve F003A

Ficw Element FE-N001A

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For the selected components, the inspector performed the following

reviews:

(1) The inspector reviewed the licensee's safety-related component

list. At Fermi, the Q-List was replaced by the Fermi Central

Component Data Base (CECO), a computerized listing that is used

to identify safety-related components. The inspector selected

several components from system drawings and verified that these

components were properly identified in the data and that they

were correctly classified as safety-related or non-safety-related

components.

(2) Todeterminethelevelofplantmanarjementoversight,the

inspector reviewed procedures contro ling the classification of

structures, systems and components; preventive and corrective

maintenance; modifications; procurement, storage and issue;

inspection and testing of safety-related items; quality

assurance procedures, audits and surveillances; and corporate

level procedures and d:rectives for activities impacting

safety-related structures, systems and components.

(3) The inspector reviewed surveillance procedures, calibration

procedures, maintenance procedures and instructions functional

test procedures and storage procedures to verify that the

licensee has issued adequate procedures and instructions for

the perfomance of safety-related activities.

(4) The inspector reviewed the licensee's program and implementing

procedures for the training and indoctrination of technicians,

craft workers, staff engineers, planners and supervisors whose

duties include safety-related activities. Training records

indicated that the above personnel were being trained according

to applicable procedures.

(5) The inspector reviewed 12 audit reports and 19 surveillance

reports dccumenting Quality Assurance audits and surveillances

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involving safety-related activities. The quality assurance

organization maintains a schedule of planned audits and

surveillances of safety-related activities at the plant and at

offsite vendor and supplier organizations.

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(6) The corrective action program for safety-related activities is

described in the licensee's Quality Assurance Manual and

implementing procedures. The inspector's review of corrective

action for audit and surveillance findings listed in the audits

and surveillances in (5) above revealed that corrective action

for those findings was timely and adequate.

(7) Review and evaluation of infonnation concerning malfunctioning

equipment is controlled by the licensee's procedure

i P0M 12.000.059, "Operating Experience Assessment," by Deviation

i Events Reports and Nonconfonnance and Corrective action

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procedures. Included in the reviews and evaluation is the

detemination of the suitability of the equipment to perform j

its design function. ;

(8) The inspector reviewed modification packages involving the

reactor 3rotection system and the core spray system. The

design c1anges, work requests, drawings, inspection documents

and procurement packages were correctly identified as to their

safety classification.

b. Vendor Interface

The inspector reviewed procadures controlling the licensee's vendor

equipment technical information program. The procedures reviewed were

FMD 2.5.10. Revision 0, "Document Control," and NE 2.5.10, Revision 3

"Vendor Manuals". These procedures have no requirement to collect,

review, and control existing vendor technical infomation pertaining

to plant safety-related structures, systems, and cuoponents that are

in possession of individuals, shops, or departments onsite. The

inspector observed vendor information in each building visited

but there was no indication that the infortnation had been reviewed

to determine its applicability to plant components. During

discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector was infomed that

individuals and shops were in possession of uncontrolled and

unreviewed vendor manuals.

One of the manuals the inspector selected for review was the vendor

manual for the core spray pump discharge check valve, a safety-related

code valve that was included in the licensee's inservice inspection

program. The inspector was informed by personnel in the plant

Information Center (PIC) that the manual was in use and had not been

reviewed and approved. The licensee issued DER 88-1532 after the

inspector had identified the unreviewed and unapproved vendor manual.

Based on the above examples, the inspector determined that Fermi 2

procedures controlling the vendor equipment technical infomation

program are not adequate to assure that current, approved

technical information is used in the performance of safety-related

activities. This is a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,

Criterion VI (50-341/88024-01).

c. Post Maintenance Testing

The inspector selected components from the reactor ]rotection system

dnd the core spray system for review to ascertain w1 ether the licensee

was implementing i post maintenance test program.

For the selected corrponents, the inspector determined that:

(1) Written post maintenance test proceduros and checklists have

been developed by the plant staff. The inspector reviewed

procedures, tests, and conpleted work requests to verify that

post maintenance testing was being accomplished on the selected

components in accordance with the licensee's cennitments.

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(2) Criteria and responsibilities for maintenance approvals and for

designating activities as safety-related or non-safety-related

have been established in work request and modification

procedures. Criteria for post maintenance testing and

inspections are delineated in work request procedures, quality

inspection procedures and maintenance support planning

procedures.

(3) Methods for performing functional testing following maintenance

activities have been developed and are delineated in published

plant operations and maintenance surveillance procedures.

(4) The inspector reviewed 26 compiled maintenance work requests

and their supporting documentation. The work requests were

appropriately classified, properly approved, and the persons who

perfonned the activity and inspections or verifications were

I identified on the work requests and supporting documentation,

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l No violations or deviations were identified.

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d. Reactor Trip Systems Reliability

At Fermi II, on-line functional testing of the scram pilot

! solenoid valves is performed with the prottetion rystem instrument

j channel functional tests at the frequency required by the plant

l Technical Specifications. The inspector reviewed test procedures

and test results for the following functional tests:

Reactor Vessel Dome Pressure - High

Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low

Reactor Vessel High Steam Line Pressure - High

Average Power Range Monitor High Flux Trip

Backup Manual Scram Functional Test

Intermediate Range Monitor Trip

Manual Scram

MSIV Closure Functional Test

Main Steam Line High Radiation

Drywell Pressure - High

Scram Discharge Volume High Level

Turbine Control Valve /Turbinc Stop Valve

The procedures appeared to be adequate and the test data dates

indicated that the testing was being accomplished as required by

Technical Specifications.

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3. Tl 2515/95 (MPA-C-02) (Closed) )

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The inspector verified by review of as-built drawings 61721-2095-30, l

Revision X, 61721-2101-02, Revision n. 61721-2101-01, Revision L and i

0!?21-2095-37, Revision G that the licensee has installed reactor l

recirculation puup trips that are actuated by either low reactor water

level or high reactor vessel pressure.

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4. Genericletter85-22(Closed)

Potential for loss of post-loca recirculation capability due to

insulation debris blockage. The inspector reviewed the licensee's

evaluation of potential blockage of suction strainers in the drywell and

torus. The bulk of the insulation is metallic reflective insulation and

the remainder is totally stainless steel encapsulated fibrous material.

Suction strainers are installed at a 45-degree angle in the torus above

the bottom of the pool or halfway between the minimum water level and the

pool bottom. The licensee concluded that the material used and the location

of the strainers at Fennt would not result in significant blockage. This

item is closed.

5. Generic Letter 85-14 (Closed)

Connercial storage at power reactor sites of low level radioactive waste

not generated by the utility. Fermi does not store low level waste not

generated by the utility onsite. Discussions with l'censee personnel

revealed that the site does not plan to store waste generated by others

at the Fermi site. This item is closed.

6. Licensee Event Report 86-044-01 (Closed)

potentially degraded torus relief line isolation capability during

postulated accident event. An environmentally induced failure of a limit

switch for a drywell vacuum breaker valve can be postulated to occur

under harsh environtrental conditions. This can result in degradation of

the division 11 power supply circuit and cause the torus vacuum breaker

isolation valve to fail open. The licensee has modified the drywell

vacuum breaker valve limit switch circuit on the "close" side to

limit the maximum current to ground. This change will prevent shorts to

ground from being cleared by the pcwer supply fuse and removing power

frcm position indication for the vacuum breaker valves or the pilot vulve

solenoid on the air operated torus vacuum breaker valve. This item is

closed.

7. Inspection and Enforcenwnt Bulletin 81-03 (Closed)

Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components by

Corbicula sp. (Asistic Clans) and Mytilus sp. (Mussels). The

inspector reviewed the licensee's program for detecting the presence

of corbicula and sampling results for the years 1987, 1906 and 1985.

The presence of corbicula was not detected in any of the sarrples during

the three sarnple years reviewed. This item is closed.

8. Open Its 85003-01 (Closed)

Clarification of differences between Technical Specificatior and ASME

Section XI requirements for declaring valves inoperable. The licensee

has revised applicable procedures to remove the ASME requirerrent frorn the

surveillance procedures. Surveillance Procedure 24.207.10 was repeated

using the proper checklists and indepetident position verification

performed >y a person other than the person perfonning the surveillance.

This item is closed.

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9. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives listed in Paragraph 1 and

sumarized the scope and findings of the insprtion. The inspector also

discussed the likely informational content of che inspection report with

regard to documents or processes reviewed by the inspector during the

inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents or

processes as proprietary.

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ML20154P897

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